VOLUME XVIII, NUMBER 2, SPRING 2018 A Journal of Political Thought and Statesmanship William Charles R. Voegeli: Kesler: Arthur M. inking Schlesinger, Jr. about Trump Anthony Esolen: Peter C. When Myers: Harry Race Became Talk Sally Angelo M. Joseph Codevilla: Postell: e Natural e Trouble Law of War with Congress & Peace Michael Burlingame: David P. Ulysses S. Goldman: Grant Sigmund Freud Paul A. Rahe: John James Fonte: Madison’s American Notes Sovereignty A Publication of the Claremont Institute PRICE: $6.95 IN CANADA: $8.95 mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm Essay by Mackubin Thomas Owens The Vietnam War Revisited hough north vietnam defeated Third, Burns and Novick do not do justice to But by far the biggest problem with the and absorbed South Vietnam 43 years the war’s purposes, which were serious despite PBS series is that it ignores much of the re- Tago, Americans remain divided over the flawed strategy to achieve them. Vietnam’s visionist scholarship that casts the Vietnam their role in that country, as responses to last geographic position and cultural strengths war in a different light. These interpretations year’s ten-part PBS documentary, The Vietnam made it, as historian David Halberstam wrote contend that the United States, far from be- War, made clear. A veteran proud of my service years ago, “one of only five or six nations in the ing destined to lose the war, had a number of in Vietnam, I watched the series—purportedly world that is truly vital to U.S. interests.” opportunities to win it. an even-handed examination of the war—and Fourth, The Vietnam War persists in de- According to the conventional assessment, saw one more rendition of the antiwar case, scribing the conflict as a civil war. But as surely embraced by Burns and Novick as if there made by those who didn’t even acknowledge as North Korea invaded South Korea, North were no alternative, the United States could the existence of counter-arguments. Vietnam invaded South Vietnam. The North never have won, given the nature of the war The series, produced by Ken Burns and Vietnamese and their American supporters and the determination of the Vietnamese Lynn Novick, has several problems. First, it have consistently dismissed American scholars, Communists. The key contentions are drea- isn’t really about the war. At the end of the such as the late Douglas Pike, who long ago rily familiar: Southeast Asia in general, and program, the producers tell us, “The Vietnam stated this fact. But in 1983, Vo Nguyen Giap South Vietnam in particular, were not vital War was a tragedy,” one they call “immeasur- and Vo Bam, North Vietnam’s chief strategists strategic U.S. interests. The “domino theory” able and irredeemable.” Still, “meaning can be during the war, admitted that the country’s was false—the fall of South Vietnam to the found in the individual stories.” Communist Party decided in 1959 to begin the Communists would not lead to the collapse Second, the documentary downplays the armed struggle against the Saigon government. of other non-Communist regimes in South- patriotism of those who fought. Contrary to The North Vietnamese subsequently built the east Asia. The South Vietnamese govern- Burns, Novick, and most interpretations, the “Ho Chi Minh” trails to move men and supplies ment, utterly corrupt, never commanded the U.S. military in Vietnam was not an army of to South Vietnam through Laos and Cambo- allegiance of South Vietnam’s people, which unwilling draftees, in which minorities were dia, violating those countries’ neutrality. These meant it was always destined to lose a civil seriously overrepresented. In fact, two thirds events, long before American combat units war to the indigenous Viet Cong. Finally, Ho of those who served—and 73% of those who came to Vietnam in 1965, confirm the U.S. Chi Minh was more of a nationalist than a died—were volunteers. justification for its action in Vietnam. Communist. Claremont Review of Books w Spring 2018 Page 37 mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm In short, the Vietnamese Communists were Triumph Forsaken demonstrates that one ing control of his country, a Catholic running too resolute, the South Vietnamese govern- of the main weaknesses of the orthodox view roughshod over a predominantly Buddhist ment too corrupt, and the Americans too clue- is its constricted historical horizon. For the populace. Moyar contends that, in fact, Diem less to fight the kind of war that would have most part, the historians whose views shape was an effective leader who put down the or- secured victory. Vietnam was destined to be the PBS series have assessed the war as if the ganized crime empires that had thrived before a quagmire, and America was destined to lose only important decisions were made in Wash- his rise to power. He was no democrat, but there. As one American veteran, a lieutenant ington and Saigon, neglecting those made in his legitimacy in the eyes of the Vietnamese who fought in Vietnam in 1965, told Burns Hanoi, Beijing, and Moscow. Moyar demon- people rose from his ability to wield power ef- and Novick, “We have learned a lesson…that fectively and provide security for the targets of we just can’t impose our will on others.” Communist insurgency. Indeed, under Diem’s But, of course, war’s only purpose is to im- Discussed in this essay: leadership, the insurgency had been largely pose one’s will on the enemy. A nation that stymied by 1960. directed by Ken does not intend to do so, in the expectation of The Vietnam War, Moyar cites Communist documents that Burns and Lynn Novick. Screenplay achieving a more secure, more just peace, has by Geoffrey C. Ward. Public acknowledge the North’s lack of success in no business resorting to war. Broadcasting Service the period leading up to November 1963, Over the past 20 years, however, observers when Diem was deposed and assassinated in have challenged the conventional assessment. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam a military coup. Diem’s government had been Some have traced our defeat to a flawed na- War, 1954–1965, by Mark Moyar. killing and capturing Communist cadres in tional strategy devised by civilian policymak- Cambridge University Press, 512 pages, unprecedented number, which had caused ers, especially by Robert McNamara, secre- $56 (cloth), $31.99 (paper) many survivors to defect. Moyar argues that tary of defense from 1961 to 1968. Others by far the greatest U.S. mistake was to acqui- have indicted U.S. military leadership, both A Better War: The Unexamined esce in the coup, a decision that “forfeited the in Washington and Saigon, for adopting a de- Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s tremendous gains of the preceding nine years fective operational strategy. Last Years in Vietnam, by Lewis Sorley. and plunged the country into an extended pe- The producers of the PBS series appear Harcourt, 507 pages, $17.95 (paper) riod of instability and weakness.” oblivious to the revisionist views of writers “I can scarcely believe that the Americans such as Mark Moyar, whose groundbreak- Westmoreland: The General Who could be so stupid,” Ho Chi Minh said of the ing work on the Vietnam war poses the most Lost Vietnam, by Lewis Sorley. coup, understanding its import immediately. important challenge to the assumption that Harcourt, 416 pages, The Hanoi Politburo recognized the opportu- America’s defeat in Vietnam was inevitable. $30 (cloth), $15.95 (paper) nity that the coup afforded the Communists. Lewis Sorley appears briefly in the series, but “Diem was one of the strongest individuals his assessments of Generals William West- First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. resisting the people and Communists,” it moreland and Creighton Abrams are not Marine Corps, by Victor H. said. “Everything that could be done in an at- deemed worthy of discussion. Krulak. Naval Institute Press, tempt to crush the revolution was carried out The most astute American observer of 272 pages, $21.95 (paper) by Diem. Diem was one of the most compe- Vietnamese Communism, Douglas Pike, tent lackeys of the U.S. imperialists.” And in- , by William doesn’t get a mention despite the fact that his A Soldier Reports deed, the coup encouraged the Communists Westmoreland. Doubleday, analysis of Communist strategy goes a long to push for a quick victory against the weak 446 pages, out-of-print way in explaining the dynamic of the war. As South Vietnamese government before the these scholars show, the United States was not Americans intervened. In Retrospect: The Tragedy and destined to lose in Vietnam. America’s defeat As conditions continued to deteriorate, Lessons of Vietnam, by Robert S. was the result of bad strategy and bad deci- McNamara. Crown Forum, 414 pages, John Kennedy’s successor, Lyndon Johnson, sions at all levels, from Washington to Saigon. $27.50 (cloth), $18.95 (paper) was forced to consider an American escalation of the war in order to save South Vietnam. He Lacking the Will PAV N: People’s Army of Vietnam, did not, as many have argued, use the August by Douglas Pike. Da Capo Press, 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident as an excuse to n triumph forsaken, one of the most 384 pages, out-of-print escalate U.S. involvement. That claim is belied important books written on the Vietnam by the fact that Johnson saw intervention only Iwar, Mark Moyar, now a senior advisor at After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam, as a last resort to avoid defeat in South Viet- the U.S. Agency for International Develop- by Ronald Spector. Free Press, nam and, he thought, the subsequent toppling ment, posed a stark challenge to the conven- 400 pages, $29.95 of the Southeast Asian dominoes.