The Elite Status of Think Tank Directors : Corporate Liberals Versus the New Right

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1984 The elite status of think tank directors : corporate liberals versus the New Right. Beata Panagopoulos University of Massachusetts Amherst

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THE ELITE STATUS OF THINK TANK DIRECTORS:

CORPORATE LIBERALS VERSUS THE NEW RIGHT

A Thesis Presented

Beata D. Panagopoulos

Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

September 1984

Department of Political Science A MASTERS THESIS

The Elite Status of Think Tank Directors!

Corporate Liberals Versus the New Right"

PREPARED BY

Beata Panagopoulos

Approved by:

Jean B. Elshtain, Member

June 20 , 1984

i i .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

II. METHODS i q

III. RESULTS.. is

IV. • DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 70

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 82

. . APPENDIX. . . . .84 LIST OF TABLES

1. Percentage of Think Tank Directors Who Fall Within Distinct Age Categories 19 2 . Percentage Distribution of Think Tank Directors, According to Geographic Residence . 22 3. Percentage of Think Tank Directors Attending Elite Prep Schools 27 4. Percentage of Think Tank Directors Attending Elite Universities 31 5. Level of Academic Education Achieved. 34 6. Percentage of Think Tank Directors with Exclusive Club Membership 37 7. Percentage of Think Tank Directors Also on Another of the Five Think Tank Boards .40 8. Percentage of Directorships of Elite Universities

and Foundations . .45 9. Percentage of Memberships in Major Cultural of Charitable Organizations ...... 49 10. Number of Fortune 500 Directorships Held ...... 53 11. Number of Corporate Directorships, Excluding Fortune 500 Companies ...... 55 12. Percentage of Think Tank Directors Who Are Members of Elite Business or Policy-making Associations ...... 58 13. Percentage of Think Tank Directors Who Are Members of Either the Trilateral Commission of the NAM ..60 14. Percentage of Think Tank Directors Who Have Held Top Governmental or University Positions. .63 15. Percentage of Think Tank Directors Who Have Been Appointed to an Elite Governmental Committee...... 65 16. Big Linkers ...... 74

iv ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure

1 . The Policy Process _ 6

Map

1. Census Regions and Geographic Divisions of the United States ...... 88

v CHAPTER I

Introduction

Although it came as a shock to many, the rise of the Right to power in the 1980 election has a substantial history behind it. The story is one of complex configurations which have developed since the mid-sixties across the political spectrum: disarray on the Left, a vacuum in the Center, and coalition-building on the Right. This political scenario is taking place in connection with a profound restructuring of the economy, from one based on labor-intensive manufacturing to one based on services. Since most of the new jobs created are low-wage and unskilled, the characteristic pyramid structure of income and wealth distribution in the U.S. is changing to an hour-glass shape. The middle-class is being squeezed out as the relatively few jobs that are skilled are reserved for a professional-managerial elite. During a period of transition like this, political opportunities are opened - for example, the state could move toward a social welfare state like that of Sweden where public spending and taxation support expanded public services and collective consumption.

But mobilization for such an economic alternative would require minimally, as Mike Davis points outs, "a high degree of conscious trade-union solidarity, the creation of a broad labour/black/poor- people's alliance..., and the international transformation of the

Democratic Party. In the absence of such preconditions, the Right

1. Mike Davis, "The Political Economy of Late-Imperial (Jan. /Feb. 1984), 20. America," New Left Review , No. 143

1 0

has been able to muster support from the middle class that has suffered economically during this last decade racked with recession.

In their campaign social issues such as the right to abortion and school prayer, and economic issues around taxation have been combined with an appeal to the fear of communism to gain substantial backing from people who want decisive action taken on the problems which are confronting them. But, although the New Right claims to have grown from the grassroots and directs its attack at the Eastern Establishment, it is not clear who exactly the leaders of the New Right represent.

The mere wealth which backs their campaigns throws into question whether the New Right is a distinct class fraction or whether it is actually an outgrowth of the political shift to the right of the established elite. This study attempts to address this issue by examining the socio-economic backgrounds, current positions and activities, and elite connections of New Right and Corporate Liberal

think tank directors. By examining the differences between the two

groups I hope to provide better and more systematic evidence about

this issue than is now available.

Although there is little literature which deals specifically

with the social and economic base of capitalist support for the New

Right, there has been a continuing debate over the nature of the

divisions within the capitalist class. A popular theory which empha-

sizes the distinction between the ultra-conservatives and the corporate-

liberals is that of the "Cowboys and the Yankees." This theory was

Guardian 1968) and developed by Carl Ogelsby (Yankees vs Cowboys", , 3

Kirkpatrick Sale ( Power Shift , 1975) to explain the rise to influence of a new group within the capitalist class that has a different economic base than the established corporate-elite. These "Cowboys" are based in the South, Southwest and Southern California, and are directors of rising enterprises such as independent oil, aerospace,

"new technology," and real estate. The Yankees represent the old established wealth that is institutionalized in giant corporations such as auto, steel, oil and chemicals. Based on different economic interests, the one internationalist, the other isolationist, the two groups are locked in a power struggle. The argument was used to explain conflicts within the capitalist class of involvement in the

Vietnam War, Watergate, the Kennedy assassination and other issues.

A variation on the above theme, which avoids some of its reduc- tionist pitfalls is Michael Klare's theory of the "Traders and the

Prussians." Klare maintains that the division within the ruling class "cannot be differentiated on the basis of regional loyalties -

Traders and Prussians are found in botht he Northeast and Southwest. Nor can their differences be reduced to an "internationalist" vs. "isolationist" contest - both factions are committed to the maintenance of a world order predicated on the pre-eminence of American capital. But they differ sharply on their estimates of the threats to this ord^r and on the strategies to be employed in pro- tecting it.

The Traders are mostly directors of the corporate-banking sector,

although they do include many "Cowboy" types; they are mainly con-

cerned with maintaining a strong and unified capitalist bloc. Where-

2. Michael Klare, "The Traders and the Prussians," Seven Days (Mar. 28, 1977) 32. 4

as the Prussians, who are an alliance of military officers, arms producers, intelligence operatives, Cold War intellectuals and some domestic capitalists, perceive the Soviet threat as paramount and put U.S. national interests above intra-capitalist unity. Klare points out, though, that this is not a precise and fixed framework.

In contrast to these two theories which stress division and realignment within the ruling class, Ferguson and Rogers point to what they call a "dealignment, the continued disintegration of those political coalitions and economic structures that have given American party politics some stability and definition during the past generation." In "The Reagan Victory" Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers detail the history of the economic crisis of the 1970's, which made it impossible for Carter to sustain a New Deal coalition of labor and

Dusiness. As the international economic crisis deepened, multinational corporate and banking leaders were compelled to support a more militar- ist foreign policy and tighter fiscal controls on the welfare state at home, leading to the substantial support of the internationalist liberal free-traders for the Reagan candidacy. This shift in support was embraced by the Reagan camp, which is evident from the number of high-level appointments of Eastern Establishment figures in the current administration. Such support was critical to Reagan's victory and it demonstrates that the Establishment still remains in control but has found it necessary to move to the right.

3. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, "The Reagan Victory: Corpor- ate Coalitions in the 1980 Campaign," in The Hidden Election : Politics and Economics in the 1980 Presidential Campaign ,T. Ferguson and J. Rogers,

ed . , 53. 5

The implications of these conflicting theories are just as

diverse . If the New Right does constitute a distinct class segment which was able to rise to power politically by a show of force in a

period of both economic and social crisis, then one might expect their defeat as those same problems which they addressed so decisively per-

sist and deepen. But if the New Right is not a distinct element, but

actually only the shock troops for long dominant groups which have

shifted their political orientation, this might indicate a fundamental

change in the structure of the political terrain.

If one looks at Thomas Dye's chart on the policy making process

(see Figure 1), it is clear why I am focusing on major research insti-

tutes which represent the ideologies of the New Right, the corporate-

conservatives and the Corporate-Liberals respectively. It is in these

research institutes that the issues and problems which have been

studies previously by foundations and universities are refined and

transformed into governmental policies. The think tanks which I chose

to study are certainly not the only important ones from each category,

but I chose to limit my sample to five in order to keep the number of

directors under analysis manageable. The Council on Foreign Relations

and the Brookings Institute were chosen for the Corporate-Liberal

sector, following Domhoff who describes them as "ruling-class" insti-

tutions and organizations of the "power elite. The Heritage Founda-

tion and the Institute for Contemporary Studies were chosen from among

182 and The 4. G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles , p. Powers That Be, p. 62. 6

MAKING

OPINION

MAKING

OKISION

From: Who's Running America Figure by Thomas R. Dye 7

a myriad of New Right research institutes due to their substantial influence on the current Reagan Administration. For example, in response to the Heritage report card on the early presidency called The First Year Reagan , wrote Edwin Feulner, Chair of Heritage: "I am looking forward to working with you and the members of this team in 5 pursuit of our common goals for a better America." The Institute for Contemporary Studies has had ties with Reagan since its inception and has contributed such people as Caspar Weinberger and Edwin Meese to his administration. Through its numerous and timely publications,

I.C.S. is able to promote its conservative analysis and recommendations, and influence the government's policies. I have chosen two Corporate-

Liberal and two New Right think tanks for purposes of comparison; the fifth think tank, whose directors are under scrutiny in this study, is the American Enterprise Institute. It is perhaps the most interesting of them all for its transitional position - during the last two decades it has changed from being an ultraconservative institution on the fringes to becoming a center for respectable conversative research backed by more moderate, high-level executives. A number of

Reagan appointees have also come from the ranks of the A.E.I.

In the following section I would like to briefly describe the history of the five think tanks under discussion. What becomes clear from such an overview is that these institutions are not static entities, but are constantly changing as the needs of the capitalist system do. These are institutes of planning and social engineering,

5. Reagan quoted in Dorn Bonafede, "Issue-Oriented Heritage Foundation Hitches its Wagon to Reagan's Star", National Journal (Mar. 20, 1982) 502. 8

each trying to develop policies which will stabilize the political economy and get it under control. They have different ideological

positions which lead to conflict, but in their development, many of

their goals converge and means may become ultimately secondary, if a

consensus is necessary. As will become evident from this study

these groupings are integrated and revolve around a common axis.

The Institute for Contemporary Studies was founded in 1972

in San Francisco by a group of men who were close associates of

Governor Reagan in the California state administration. It sees

itself as offering another point of view, juxtaposing itself against

the Corporate-Liberal think tanks that have dominated the policy-

making process in Washington since WWII. They are unabashedly right-

wing and allied with Reagan and they actively propagate their ideas

by addressing current public debates immediately. They commission

studies and have them published within six months. With this barrage

of publications, they are able to get high publicity for their views.

This is a tactic that was very successful for the New Right, especially

during the 1980 campaign. Although it has had, up at least until 1980,

a small budget of about $1 million, its staff is also heavily inter-

locked with the A.E.I., the Hoover Institution, and the Center for

Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown. With these types

of connections, I.C.S. publications (including the Journal of Contempo-

with the present rary Studies ) undoubtedly carry respect and influence

administration.

The Heritage Foundation was founded in Washington D.C. in 1973 .

by Colorado brewer, Joseph Coors, Paul Weyrich who was at that time press secretary to former Colorado Senator Gordon Allott, and Richard Mellon Scaife, great grandson of Judge Thomas Mellon, whose personal fortune is estimated at $150 million. Beginning with Coor's $200,000 and Scaife's $900,000, the foundation now has a budget of $7 million,

(Scaife has given almost $4 million to Heritage and $1.7 million to

I.C.S.). For years Heritage had been promoting conservative propaganda, but it wasn't until the Reagan victory that the foundation was cata- pulted into the news. They had just published a massive 20 volume,

3000 page report called Mandate for Leadership which had been intended to give the new President policy guidelines to follow. It quickly became the "3ible for conservative policy-making." Of the 250 scholars and analysts who worked on the Heritage report, "several dozen were selected for high-level executive branch positions," according to

Heritage officials. ^ Like I.C.S., Heritage subscribes to the New

Right strategy of actively pushing its ideas in the White House, Con- gress, and the national news media. As Sydney Blumenthal describes it:

Heritage... is self-consciously a para-party organization. Ideas are its instruments for power. It wants not only to manufacture beliefs, but also dominate government.^

It published prolifically and quickly, and uses its papers to influence crucial committee hearings. They have also set up a network of conserva-

b. Karen Rothymer, "Citizen Scaife," Columbia Journalism

Review , July/August 1981, 44,47.

7. Bonafede, op . cit , p. 506. 8. Sydney Blumenthal, "The Ideology Makers," The Boston Globe Magazine (August 8, 1982) 42. .

tives across the country. The "resource bank" consists of about 450 research groups and 1,100 scholars and public policy experts, who are available to appear as expert witnesses at congressional and administrative agency hearings. Heritage’s activist role in con-

junction with the American Enterprise Institute is summed up by

Burton Yale Pines, Heritage’s vice-president for research like this:

A.E.I. is more philosophical and takes a broader approach to issues.

This allows us to complement each other. In some ways, we're the

9 infantry and A.E.I. is the artillery with the big guns."

The American Enterprise Institute has certainly acquired "big

guns, but it hasn’t alv/ays had so much clout. It was founded in

1943 by Lewis H. Brown of the Johns-Manville Corporation, who wanted

to restore free-market economics in the wake of the New Deal. In

the fifties, William Baroody, Sr. became president and changed the

name to its current form. He was determined to create of the

organization a center for conservative intellectual activity. Slowly,

conservatism created its stronghold within the Republican Party and

by the end of the Goldwater campaign, for which Baroody managed the

policy development and speechwriting, its base had expanded. But it

wasn't until the end of the Ford Administration, when many prominent

Ford officials became visiting fellows of the Institute, that A.E.I.

finally attained the prestige and the corporate connections that would

put it in a position to rival Brookings. Now more than 600 major

corporations give to A,E.I. and its annual budget is more than $12

million. From an association whose publications had been considered

9. Pines quoted in Bonafede, op . cit , p. 505. 11

poor academically and simply a mouthpiece for corporations, A.E.I. has become a research institute that rapidly turns out highly respected, influential papers on major hot policy issues from deregulation of industry to defense and foreign policy. Although generally, A.E.I. 's staff share a belief in laissez-faire economics and limited government intervention in the social sphere, their scholarly research is considered responsibly conservative. By paying alot of attention to the marketing of their ideas through the news media, television programs, radio, four magazines, conferences for the press and policy-makers, and seminars for corporate executives, A.E.I.'s voice is being heard.

And with 23 of A.E.I.'s staff appointed to administrative positions, such as Jeanne Kirkpatrick, U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.; James C.

Miller, 3rd at the Office of Management and Budget; Michael Novak, special U.S. representative to the United Nations Human Rights conference in Geneva; Roger Fontaine of the National Security Council and Lawrence Korb, one of six key undersecretaries in the Defense

Department, the influence of A.E.I. on the Reagan administration cannot be overestimated.

It is said that A.E.I. *s success is due to their timeliness — the right ideas at the right time. It is the right time because we are in a critical stage of capitalist development. David Gordon,

Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich argue that what is occurring is a fundamental restructuring of some basic institutions as a new

"social structure of accumulation" is being formed. This theory is built on the theory that the capitalist economy experiences 12

"long-waves," that is, cycles of approximately 25-30 years of rapid growth followed by a period of slow growth. The economic cycle develops within an inter-related structure of social, political and economic institutions, and when this structure develops critical problems, it must change in order to survive. We are now in the midst of such a crisis which began in the early seventies with the onset of "stagflation."

The Brookings Institute is one of the leading institutions of the corporate-banking sector. Founded in 1916 as the Institute of

Government Research, it later merged with the Institute of Government

Research and the Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and

Government. It has always been a source of expertise and advice for the federal government. In its early days, it worked closely with the National Civic Federation. The N.C.F. was a powerful coalition of business leaders, formed at the turn of the century.

It tried to mediate between the struggle of capital and labor. By pushing a program of reforms the N.C.F. was able to play an important role in containing the strength of the growing labor movement. And it was in respect to the N.C.F. that James Weinstein developed the

Corporate-Liberal theory which maintains that these early corporate managers are responsible for the assumptions and ideology that have guided modern corporate leaders till the present day. In 1927, Brook- ings received large donations from Robert Brookings and from the

Carnegie, Rockefeller, and George Eastman foundations. Its board of trustees was made up of the biggest businessmen and corporate 13

lawyers of the time. Founded on principles of the Progressive Era (regulation of big business, municipal reform, and economy and effi- ciency in government), 3rookings became the dominant policy-planning group of the sixties. It played a major role in the formulation of Keynesian domestic policies of the Kennedy—Johnson era. With the Republican victories in 1968 and 1972, it became the center for opposition budgetary proposals. And then, with the Carter Administra- tion, it resumed its crucial advisory role.

The last research institute whose board I am examining is the

Council on Foreign Relations. Established in 1921, it brought together elite members of the corporate-banking sector to discuss world problems and international relations. It is now made up of 1,500 bankers, lawyers, and corporate executives, plus journalists and subject- area specialists. "It is entirely accurate to say that no major figure in the shaping of American foreign policy over the last half of the century has not been a C.F.R. member."^ The C.F.R.'s most important sources of income are from leading corporations and foundations. It is a prime example of how the policy formation process is interlocked. For instance, the major foundations which have contributed to the C.F.R. have been the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Cor- poration, and the Ford Foundation. The directors of the foundations are men from Bechtel Construction, Chase Manhattan, Cummins Engine,

Corning Glass, Kimberly-Clark, Monsanto Chemical and many others.

10. Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Murray J. Edelman, American

Politics: Policies, Power, and Change , 4th edition, p. 241. 14

furthermore, most foundation directors are also members of the

C.F.R. As opposed to the New Right's marketing of ideas, the C.F.R.'s discussions are not publicized and it is only from time to time that a book is published which contains C.F.R. recommendations. It is more often the case that C.F.R. conclusions are simply made into governmental policy. A few of the major decisions credited to the

C.F.R. are: (1) every major part of the post-WUII peace settlement;

(2) the Marshall Plan; (3) the containment policy regarding the

USSR; and (4) the subnuclear force strategies that led to the Vietnam

11. Ibid. s

CHAPTER II

Methods

Given that the focus of this study is on the corporate funding of the New Right think tanks, it would have been the easiest to examine the think tanks full and complete data on funding. However, they are not required legally to supply such information and most are unwilling to do so. Thus, I had to take an indirect route to assessing their resources, and that was to study the connections that the directors of the boards have to business. In this way one should be able to ascertain the extent of the support for Mew Right politics within the capitalist class. This also affords the opportunity to look at the socio-economic backgrounds of these trustees and compare the New

Right with the corporate elite to see what their relationship is.

The number of directors from these five think tanks comes to a total of 109, four of whom were not listed in the available biographical sources. These four directors are from the New Right think tanks:

Joseph R. Keys, chair of Joseph R. Keys Enterprises, Cannon Beach,

Oregon; J.F. (Fritz) Rench, President of Racine Industrial Plant Inc.,

Racine, Wisconsin; and Frank J. Walton, former Heritage president, are all trustees of the Heritage Foundation; Francis A. O'Connell, Jr., consultant, is a director of the Institute for Contemporary Studies.

The sources used to compile the biographical information on the direct-

ors were the standard references such as the most recent Marquis Who '

Who publications; corporate affiliations were found in Standard and

15 , ,

Poor ' s Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives and Dun and Bradstreet's Reference 3ook of Corporate Management . 1982-83 .

In order to gather information on the four missing directors, I checked both the last ten years of the Washington Post and New York

Times indexes and wrote to Heritage and I.C.S. for biographies, but received no results. Time and expense limited my research and I had to continue my study on the basis of the 105 directors.

From the available data I want to test the notion that the material base of the New Right is different than that of the established elite. If the Cowboy-Yankee theory is correct, then compared to directors of Corporate—Liberal think tanks, directors of New Right think tanks should:

1. be more concentrated geographically in the South and

Southwest

2. have more directorships of "rising" industries or

entrepreneurial enterprises,

3. have less elite college educations,

4. have less memberships in exclusive gentlemen's clubs,

5. have less directorships in the corporate-banking

sector

6. have less memberships in ' para-statal policy-formation '

organizations, and

7. have held fewer top-level governmental or advisory posts

in the Federal government.

In order to examine the above points data was systematically 17 collected on the following aspects of each director: age, geographic region of residency, listing in the Social Register , attendance of an elite prepatory school, attendance of an elite college, level of education achieved, membership in an exclusive club, directorships of Fortune 500 companies, elite governmental or university positions, directorships of other research institutes, directorships of elite universities or foundations, membership in charitable or cultural organizations, membership in elite business associations, appointment to elite government committees, party affiliation, and membership in either the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) or the Trilateral

Commission. In the tables which describe the results I have combined the two New Right think tanks and the two Corporate Liberal ones to form two groups. This is necessary due to the small sample I am testing. Within each category there aren't usually very marked differences, so by combining the think tanks along political and ideological lines, the data is easier to understand and interpret. AEI is handled separately because it behaves differently in many ways; it is no longer reputed to be an ultra-conservative organization and I have found that its directors differ markedly from the New Right's. In the following section I describe the results of the study. CHAPTER III

Results

Age

The category of age was chosen for analysis to verify the hypothesis that the New Right leaders tend to be younger than those of the Establishment. This hypothesis is based on two assumptions:

1) the New Right represents the "new wealth" of the post-WWII growth industries, and 2) the New Right is a radical movement with populist overtones. Both of these characteristics may be associated with the energy of a younger generation. To test this hypothesis age categories were divided in the following manner: directors who are under

55 years of age are young, those between 56-67 are middle-aged, and thos 68 and over are older. The tabulated results confirms what was expected. (See Table 1(b)) Directors of New Right think tanks were somewhat more likely than directors of Corporate Liberal think tanks to be under 55 years old, but the differences were not very pronounced

(32.3% vs. 26%). Only about one-sixth (17.4%) of AEI directors are under 55. Although these results do support the above hypothesis, they are not statistically significant (p>.05).

Region

A basic tenet of the Cowboy-Yankee theory is that there has

been a shift in power from the Northeast to the Southern Rim. In

18 1ii H 1 H Vi1

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order to see whether there is a relationship between the particular think tanks and the geographical residence of their directors, a crosstabulation of these two variables was made. The geographic categories

of the U.S. Bureau of Census were used with two exceptions. (See Map

2) First, the South and the West were combined to form the Southwest.

In this manner all of the states which make up the Southern Rim are included in the Southwest .* Second, Washington D.C. is considered

here a category unto itself because of its uniqueness: directors residing in Washington D.C. often do so in relation to government service and do not make it a permanent domicile. 16.2% of the directors live

there. (See Table 2 (c))

A relationship between the think tanks and the geographic residence of their directors is indicated by the results of the crosstabulation. (See Table 2 (b)) 61,3% of the New Right directors reside in the Southwest compared to 17.6% of the Corporate Liberal directors who do. Only a quarter of AEI's directors are from the Southwest, whereas one-third live in the Northeast and one-third in the North- central region. The relationship between the Corporate Liberals and the

^Kirkpatrick Sale defines the categories "Southern Rim" and the "Northeast" as used in the Cowboy-Yankee theory in the following way: the Southern Rim consists of those states which lie to the south of the 37th parallel - North and South Caroline, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico and Arizona; the Northeast "encompasses the entire quadrant east of the Mississippi and north of the Mason-Dixon line" - Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New 9 Jersey Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Illinois. “ Merging the census categories of South and West together is valuable in this study because it does include the geographic region vital to the Cowboy-Yankee analysis and virtually none of the directors in this > 1 H 1\ V

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CO OJ CO c r-H 3 01 03 CO u -H u 3 - c TC H-i •H 01 Z 4-1 "C > C o. CO •H •H E CO 0) CO "O 3 H 3 0) C rH 00 Z Ci •H O co o 4—1 m 0) 3 U on CN m 4-1 o 00 o 0 3= cn O o 4-1 0) C *H 3 geographic 01 TO z Z •H 44 43 3 01 E CO >, E 3 C 03 Z O Z U u 4—1 o 3 4-4 3 to O o CJ 4J 0) 00 CD -o 03 z 01 4-1 c c 4-1 3 E O h •H according o o o CD Z 3 U 03 o o o TO E ^4 C 4-1 H O O 0) o > u a. 4_) O •H • -a 01 4H H i— o 0) 01 4J 3 CO 44 directors cn m u 44 •H • c 0 o 01 CO Q in TO 01 O CN H 3 44 o 3 01 3 3 z CO tank •H 44 >4 0) cn pH 40 /— H 3 • e —— "3 -o O i— Z 40 n- O 1) 3 00 4-1 rH vO CN o CO CO 01 3 3 44 think O V z CO CO a. CD 44 CJ w 1-4 3 01 o CO of 4-1 3 00 t— 3 CO 03 CO CO 01 CO C CO O 01 z 4-4 H •H •H 44 -a C O 4-1 U 01 0) m 00 p- 4J •H o /—1s 44 ® « O • U 3 00 4-4 CO ND m CD OC 01 0) distribution grouping* j= cn (— S-i •H 4J u 4-1 •rH 00 CO • ® 44 c •a CJ cn o c CO z z cn CO o •H 3 o 3 •H CO o CO 4-J • 4-1 o c O.CJ 4—1 • 01 0) • political CO o u a 03 C II X CD 40 oo CN *H 4H 0) s • * a Percentage 43 Z r— o o i-> CN r-H 4-1 0) o 44 U CN cn > 3 3 00 O 4-1 CD CO 44 3 by z O i—l 01 •H H— z Z 44 CD 44 CO CD U CO •H CO (b) Z 3 3 3 44 OJ E CO 4-1 r— 2 oc z 3 CJ CO CO c 00 CO i-H C •H • 3 CN •H •H Ci CO 4H 3 O 3 a OS O S-I rH •H •rH c 3 Q. CD CO 3 01 00 TO Table H C O 3 1— H Z 4-1 00 z 01 3 43 CO U 0) W O ’H o •H H U CO H 4-1 OC z < CJ -4 H co 1 J s

0 t— 0 3 0 -o u u •H •rH - c > ji; AJ 0) H a. 0 -3 -a 0 0 •H c H 3 0 •H un 00 JO 0) O o AJ l-l L-I 0 3 O 00 O u CO •H u o JO 0 AJ 0 a J3 c JO a: E u 3 •H AJ 0 Z SH E o Sr lr 0) AJ o oc 3 LH 3 o O o AJ 0 o AJ 00 oc 0 0 •3 c AJ JO 0 •H C AJ 3 "O 0 •H 1-1 U 0 JO o l-i -o E u 0 •H O u a. O > U CO O •H • c r—H "O 0 LH CO E rH lr rH 1-1 3 0 O 0 0 o rH AJ AJ 3 0 4-1 O O 4J u U AJ St AJ •H 0 0 0 u "3 0 o •H lr 3 AJ -a o 3 0 3 jj . CN 3 JO c CJ « •H AJ 2h • CO JO Sr 4-1 Q —1 -o -a OO 0 3 O 0 0 0 c 3 AJ •H JO 0 JO 0 4—1 u AJ AJ lr 3 CO 0 O 0 <4-1 0 -t 3 CO 0 o 2 0 JO CN 0 0 c AJ on 0 JO •a o 3 H AJ 0 *H o Sr AJ 4J CO O /—s 0 3 00 rH 0 _Q 0 Sr •H AJ AJ S-i 0 • • AJ u 0 0 CO rH 3 •H •H 0 0 O -o l-i 3 •H e 4J 0 AJ CJ 0 c 3 CL • OC 0 r— 0 0 a 0 a © a U 4-1 r-> X — c J0 i—H

Northeast might be further strengthened by the number of Northeastern- erS hidden in the substantial figure (25.5%) of those Corporate-Liberal

directors residing in Washington D.C. That 25.5% of the Corporate Liberals reside in Washington D.C. compared to 9.7% of the New Right also indicates that the Corporate Liberals have stronger government or para-statal connections. These results are statistically significant at the .001 level.

Social Register

G.W. Domhoff, a leading scholar in elite research, has demonstra- ted the usefulness of the Social Register in ascertaining social class bacKground. rie considers it the "best guide to the membership of the 13 national upper class." Unfortunately in this case, only 23% of the think tank directors are listed in the Social Register , which is too small a sample from which to draw any conclusions. In addition, the relevance of the Social Register listings is doubtful when one is study- ing the divisions within the capitalist class, which may have developed regionally along "sunrise-sunset" industry lines. Domhoff uses the

Social Register as a tool in demonstrating the existence of a socially study reside in the Pacific Northwest or Mountain States. However, the North Central region and the Northeast are not merged as Sale has done because valuable distinctions would be lost in the statistics. There might be differences in history, culture and economics between the two regions which should be taken into account. 12. Kirkpatrick Sale, Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern

Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment , pp. 11-12.

13. G.W. Domhoff, Who Rules America? , p. 13. 26

cohesive national upper class. He acknowledges that the Register

has certain drawbacks, two of which are important to this study: U the Register is published for only twelve cities and has little

or no value for the South and Southwest, and 2) the Social Register for Washington automatically lists the President, Vice-president,

Cabinet, Senate, Supreme Court and some ambassadors. Thus, to be

listed in Washington is not an indication, in itself, of upper class

status. Since many of the directors of the Mew Right think tanks come from the Sunbelt region, and many Corporate Liberal directors serve

in high positions of the federal government, the Social Register is

problematic in an analysis of a Cowboy-Yankee split.

Prep schools

G.W. Domhoff also uses elite preparatory school attendance as a valuable indicator of upper class status. An elite prep school education provides essential upper class training, inculcating the values, traditions, and manners of the upper class. It is here also that children make social connections with their peers which will form a basis of a social network to be important in their lives later on. Information on secondary education is not often published in the standard biographical sources, so I was only able to obtain data on

26.6% of the directors. The results of the crosstabulation, based on such a small sample supports somewhat the Cowboy-Yankee theory (See

Table 3 (b)). Roughly the same percentage of the New Right directors

(42.9%) as Corporate Liberals (35.3%) attended elite prep schools. i i 1 ) H H1 v \

^7 -3 CO . CU c 3 44 o 3 1 44 think •H 0 3 a. CJ CJ 3 o E CU C O c - CO u X X X X "C 3 3 CO 33 3 3 X 3 3 44 X 3 ^ - "3 CO O 3 X individual •H CO o 3 EX > 43 X X —1 X CJ O 3 CO X 0 a, "O CO 3 C a) X X •H x CO X X 0 44 -tf Nf O' 00 00 u X GO X 3 CN 3 X by <4-1 00 X o X CO X X M4 CU 3 CU <44 X 3 •• 3 43 o X XS U 4— X CO >1 .. • schools, E •H 44 N 3 43 X 3 Z 3 CO c 3 •H •a CU 3 • 44 GO 3 3 3 O * CO O X "3 X 4-1 CO X 3 X elite 3 •3J — 0 < 3 0) 0) O Cu w O u CO o E x 3 X >1 3 0) X o X E X a. CO O 3 X CO O -O O c 3 a. Cu E x 3 attending 3 3 O U w 3 X CO < r“H n X Q. rH o o o f— a. 0 CJ o 3 rH x 0 /\ X X •H X X a. u X X u CO iX X GO 3 »• Q-, CU >, directors 3 CJ 0) 44 3 X CJ 3 X think CO CU c o X X (J X 4-1 o CN m •H z CO 3 O <44 CO • • • -o 3 3 3 CU o > o o m CN r- 44 p— CU -x O V-4 E-i • CO 4— 44 X 00 X • • • 3 ii o ON O 3 o o o X n *H 4 00 O 3 • • • • V - Percentage *H X rH 3 3 X 3 X o m m in CN 44 0) o X 3 2d 43 o CN O' in > X X 3 GO tank 3 f-H <44 CU X X O — 0- O X 3 0 i— 3 X 3 X iX X 3 c CU X E 0 X > CU 33 CO E 3 4 •rH

TO QJ 3 c 1 r— 3 c 3 c •H o 0 CJ o a. H CJ c E CJ 3 O 3 - 3 rH u 3 H 3 3 TO •H 3 4-J 3 3 CO TO 3 3 -a 3 rH SX X H-/ •h co o xc w political > -O o c •H -C 3 r 3 4J -a co o O a- CO c a; O •H 'H 3 r" -X JO i— > 3 CO JO < 3 •H 0- • rH T3 3 •> - • QJ TO 3 H H prep JO 3 3 3 • 3 4-4 3 O > OS oo 4-4 4-J O c 4—1 3 TO - co o 4J j-j 3 3 JO 4-4 < 4J elite c 3 TO 3 o - 3 o QJ H CU O CO o ' r Oh E 3 o o o 3 JO 3 0) E o o o -3 4-J Q. , directors QJ 4-4 3 3 • 3 3 c 3 JO 3 • 0 a, O' CO CO O. 4-J 3 ,~3 •H • e u 3 « 3 QJ CN O m •H 3 IH s: 2 Cu 4-1 3 u QJ 4-1 3 JO CJ 3 4J think CO aj 3 o 4H 4-J '— CJ 3 4J O H 2 3 3 O 4-1 CO • • TO C 3 3 O- o > o in O' 3 H O 3 of •H CN CN -X O- 4-1 4J 3 T0 QJ X a CN •H o 3 3 a. CJ co O' rH • H -J 3 oh 4-1 CN 3 o H • m H C* 4-4 oo H • • • c II O o 3 U H rH 00 o 3 Percentage •H o CO JO rH c ' 3 JO 3 grouping rH • e o 4-J QJ o •H u T. -Q m m > •H 4H 3 CO 3 m co 4-4 aj 4J Hi O - CU O rH 3 o H 3 3

—1 C JO r H 3 3 0) •H E O H > QJ u E o 4-4 •H O (b) X) c H n > TO 4J QJ E CO 3 3 3 3 00 jo 4-1 3 CJ 4J • JO 3 < 3 c oo CO t— C •H 3 4J 3 Hr H H 3 CO 4H TO • 3 -X a. OS O 3 rH H . 3 3 3 j= CO u QJ W O -H O •H H JO 3 -J TO E-1 4-1 00 2 < CJ rJ H CO * 29

But, there is a very clear pattern of strong attendance of public schools by the New Right and AEI (57.1% and 75% respectively) as opposed to the Corporate Liberals (35.3%). From these results the trend of the Corporate Liberal directors receiving a more elite second- are education than the New Right and the AEI is discernible. However, it is not statistically significant (p>.05).

Elite college/university attendance

The choice of college or university may be an indicator of social class, especially if analysed in conjunction with other variables.

From 1900-1940, Harvard, Princeton, Yale, and a few other Ivy League colleges were predominantly institutions for the rich. After World

War II, as scholarships for the less wealthy became available and other universities grew in respectability, this concentration of the rich at a few Eastern schools began to change. Most of the directors in this study attended college in the 1940's and the 1950's at the beginning of this transition, so data on where they attended college is noteworthy. In order to evaluate the college attended as an indicator

of social class background , the colleges and universities were divided into three categories: average, top, and elite. The elite colleges were narrowed down to the top three universities: Harvard, Princeton, and Yale. The list of top colleges consists of other Ivy League and well-respected colleges, and major state universities. The list of

"average" colleges and universities was compiled from all those colleges which did not fit the above two categories. The criteria for judgement 30 of the "top" colleges were based on reputation and data on endowments. The results show that 29 . 0 % of the New Right directors attended on elite university compared to 51% of the Corporate Liberals (See Table ^ (b)). This significant difference is further emphasized by the fact that 41.9% of the New Right directors attended average colleges, whereas only 15.7% of the Corporate Liberals did. These results are statistically significant at the .01 level.

Level of academic eduation achieved

The basic assumption of the Cowboy-Yankee theory in regard to higher education is that the Cowboys value higher degrees less than the

Yankees. Judging from the percentage of higher degrees earned by each group of think tank directors, such a conclusion may be inferred (See

Table 5 (b)). Whereas 22.6% of the New Right directors stopped with the Bachelor's degree, only 17.6% of the Corporate Liberal directors did; 22.6% of the New Right went on to earn doctorates compared to

31.4% of Corporate Liberals who did. There were more law degrees earned by the New Right (32.3% to 21.6%) and more Master's degrees earned by the Corporate Liberals (27.5% to 9.7%). A great difference between the two groups is not indicated, but there is a general trend for the Corporate Liberals to have gone further on in their education.

The AEI directors stand out as the least educated with about one- third of its directors only earning Bachelor's, about one-third earning

Master's and only 4.3% with doctorates. These results are significant at the .05 level. 1 li 1 1 1 1

-3 u •H -3 3 individual 3 o —3 i i a CO 0) by 3 cn -o CO •H _3 o CO oo CO in > CM CM CM CM o •H cn -o QJ C U •H 3 CO universities, C •H o 4h u C 3 E X 3 E r-H 3 O 2 3 elite

0) O0 CO 4-1 attending c 3 o u O o O o o CD o o o o o 0* rH r—H f— r-H r-H r-H C O E i— V directors 3 3 On r t— 4-4 ^ _ O o O 4-1 4-4 3 3 3 3 tank u •H 3 o CM o CO CM o 4H * 4-1 • • o • • 4-1 •H > •H in 00 cn O' in u 3 4-1 i— CO r-H r—t CO MO 3 or think •H W 3 •H cn •H CO <4-1 T3 o 3 O CO CO CO rH of > Ou • • • • • •H o o O' MO 3 00 cn 3 H CO CM cn CO CM 3 o 3 3 4-) o 4-1 • tank 3 3 Dt: a OC 3 3 II CO 3 00 O m CM 3 > 4-1 3 < o rH 3 3 3 3 (a) X 3 3 E 3 3 00 3 3 4 00 3 3 •H 3 •H 4H 4_) rH •H c •1— o 3 3 4-4 Table •H 3 CO u hH o X 00 X 3 o 3 W 3 Ou o •H 4-1 h— X < X o H CO Dt c1 4 4

-a 3 C CO O X3 CO

5h r—4 CO X 3 oj 3 x •> "3 3 cn •H 00 -H •H •H <4-1 X -a r-H on i-H uo •H c c CO CN m o CO •H E »—H X 3 0) <4-4 r-4 > O O •H C x 3 OJ X x u 3 E X X 3 X *H Z 3 rH 0)

00 c •H CD TO 00 C 3 CD 4-1 4-1 C 4-) 0) CO o o o o i-4 o o o CO a; r-H (—H r—j S x Q. r4 o X c o

i— u E I V < 3 3 a. X X 4-> •H o o to CJ 4=4 X XC c c 3 3 CO X o 4-1 3 O o CD o rH * 4-1 • 4 • X X X! >1 •H O' CO rH 3 •H C 0 4-4 rH CN (—1 in 3 C •H c •rH w X oc X -H CO •r4 •r4 4-> a i-4 TO cn 3 <4-1 0) o CO CO (4-4 o o > a. • • • XC O X *H o O' Nf CO c o oc CO c H CN CO CO 3 Hf CD 3 3 X o O0 X 4-1 \ o CO CO 3 CD XC • 4-4 ac 3 c

C -H 00 3 CO O' CN r- •r4 II CD 4-1 rH 3 • • • X r-H r— CJ -H r— i-4 CN m X 3 X r— o 3 m rH > X 3 cu a < o r-H X 3 r—N 3 3 X X c X 3 g 3 00 -C X 3 3

Brigham Young University Southern Methodist University Carthage College Texas A & M University Davidson College University of Iowa Holy Cross College University of Krakow Georgia Institute of Technology University of Minnesota Hope College University of Nebraska Kansas University University of Oklahoma Lafayette College University of Pittsburgh Middlebury College University of Texas Osgoode Hall Lav/ School University of Washington Pennsylvania State University Virginia Military Institute Polytechnical Institute of Mew York Washington and Jefferson Colleg Regis College Wayne State University Rider College San Deigo State University

The list of "top" colleges/universities attended consists of:

Bryn Mawr College Carleton College Cornell University Dartmouth College Fordham University Georgetown University Howard University Johns Hopkins University Northeastern University Occidental College Purdue University Stanford University University of California, Berkeley University of California, Los Angeles University of Chicago University of Michigan University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill University of Notre Dame University of Paris University of Pennsylvania University of Wisconsin Wellesley College Wesleyan College

The list of elite colleges attended consists of:

Harvard University Princeton University Yale University I H1 4

CO I

i—< ocrc 4-1 CO -HO) o 3 _c y-i cn c u co S-i •H •H C~Q r-H 20 CD > JO r= r-H 23 28 23 105 -3 •H 3 5 co e TD r-H dJ 3 C c o Ih 2 •H o u 3

individual

directors c E rH 3 CO (H 4-1 o o of CJ 4-1

— O CN CO i H 0) <0 e o OJ < cn in 00 r-H percentage CN S-4 z 2: »-H CO cn CN 00 - •H CO -C rH •a 4-1 0) Level think > o 4-4 CD 2 o rH

u 0) CD CJ (a) JO c CO E 3 OJ 00 3 CJ 5 00 c C *H CO •H 4h js 4J JS rH •H c •rH o CO C Table •H co u hH o OS 4-1 00 o CD w u tu o •H H 1— 2 < ca CJ E-i CO H 4 H|

CO 1 i“H 00 -1^ >4-1 CO •H CD o 3 -C CO "3 CJ CO u •H •rH a -3 ——4 CO fH m CL) > g= CO CN n J3 •rH O 3 5 CO t—H E -o rH CD 3 c C O C 2 •rH o u 3

directors

0) 00 CO 4-) C QJ tank u Ul o O o CD o o o o- p-H r-H think c E l“H 3 CO rH 4-1 of o O o 4-1

r- 00 in CD • • * percentage < QJ < CO O' NT u s: S CO CN 00 CD a • o NO CO NT CD ® • • • by •H o' J= CN ,— E s: CU CN CO 0) -a CO r-s u CO O' NO m CO 5 • • • achieved, o CO CN r— r— • 4H rJ CO CN CN V o Cl- 's--/ 0) NO 00 nO a. • • • >, C CN Nf 1--. 4H E-* CQ CN CO rH 3 CO education CO CJ 1h •H o O 4-4 QJ in z O rH

QJ QJ a (b) JO c 4J QJ E CO 00 J3 4-1 3 o 5 c 00 cO rH C •H •rH •H C CO 4-4 as a, as O S-i rH •H c OS 3 a. qj CO C 1-4 4-1 Table •rH c o 3 l-i 33 00 -C CO Cl CD w O -H o •H E-i 4-1 ao z < O J H CO 36

Exclusive club membership

Much of Domhoff's work bears out the validity of using membership in elite social clubs as an indicator of upper class standing. Domhoff has shown the clubs to be a means of upper-class intracommuni- cation and social cohesiveness:

These clubs - familiar names include Links (New York), Pacific Union (San Francisco), and Somerset (Boston) - provide a convenient, relaxed, and private setting where businessmen establish and maintain formal ac-°

quaintance. . .Moreover , since affiliation with several clubs in different cities is common, members have an informal national network. ^

Of the total number of think tank directors in my study (105) only forty-one belong to an elite social club from the list compiled by Domhoff, and those forty-one belong to a total of seventeen clubs

(See footnote to Table 6). These figures in themselves indicate that the elite social club network is tight. One would expect the Corporate

Liberal directors to be more involved in the circuit than the New Right, this assumption is confimred by the results (See Table 6 (b)). Only

22.6% of the New Right directors are members of an elite club, whereas 37,3% of the Corporate Liberals are. This is a considerable difference worth noting, but the outstanding figure is that of the American

Enterprise Institute, with 65.2% of its directors belonging to an exclusive social club. These results are statistically significant at the. 01 level.

14. Michael Useem, "The Inner Group of the American Capitalist Class," Social Problems, v. 25 (1978), 232. t H H t 1 / - \1 H , \

x u

3 4-1 3 CO X individual 30 o r— CO CO •H 3 CJ 3 X x u o CO u u O 3 3 > >- CO U X •rH x. PA) by X X 2 CO ,x > CO • H >-< (St. 3 3 - u 2 x 3 i— -o u CO co CO 3 3 o UO CJ O 3 - 3 3 CN CN CN CN 3 H 3 O X CJ o 3 33 u >4 — Mass.) 0£ 1-3 3 - >H — Club 4-1 X o u a 3 3 >- (Pittsburgh, membership, O 4-1 -C u u 3 2 3 C E-< O 2 * CO 3 U E X w X U - -3 3 43 3 2 X • 3 O \ s 3 (Boston, E X Country 3 O 3 3 3 O 2 o NT X U O >» club 1 w 3 •H XC x U U 3 U *> Rock CJ X > CO • 0 3 3 •fH 3 X •H oo 00 X JC 03 X X X St. XCJ' Xc w 3 o o o o O o o o o 4-1 r-H with 4-t X C o o E X 30 4-4 3 CO CO E r—I X o O U o o Q 30 CJ X V CO directors Cu CJ

o 4-t u * c o CO a. 3 •H X CO co co u tank J3 o cn CN O' 3 3 u c • * • • CO CO o X U CO 3 u o r^ m CN o 4-1 30 3 (U >- CN CN 'O of X X 3 3 3 3 rH o 3 pH 3 CN u >, u X U • CJ 43 o X 3 3 X /— ,x Mich.) • / V >-i u 3 X X u X Beach, tank u X > X (J X CJ 00 2 X - > 3 1! X 3 3 2 3 - •H •rH 3 3 >> < X t— - Percentage CO O oo X T— 3 3 3 3 3 o 3 O • • • • . 43 u X X lx X X 3 O 00 >H (Palm think r— 2 o CN - O' > CJ X 3 3 O 3 u 00 r^- co m 4D 43 u X X 3 o 3 X u (Detroit, X o X u 3 >< O 'X 3 X w 3 CO CJ u X 3 u X X '— 3 2 a U o o U U 3 (a) X 3 3 2 E X co E 3 X 3 3 's— 3 3 u 00 3 O 3 o 3 00 3 >, o 6 00 3 3 X X X X 3 O 3 00 Everglades 3 •H X 1— CJ E X X X 3 3 X 4-1 X X X u U o 1— X X (J Detroit 3 X H o 3 3 u 3 X o 3 X 3 X 1-4 43 Table •H 3 CO 3 o X 00 X X o 3 3 3 U X X 3 CJ u w 3 X o X H X CO CQ CQ CJ CJ CJ E-* 4-1 M X < X CJ H co * 1 ^ H — — sr V \,-

X a £ 2 3 CO O X 3 3 CO TJ CJ rH 3 « 3 CO QJ o 3 3 > c >4 TO 43 >< u ca « 43 •H •H z CO /T“N H C/5 • >- - > CO •H X — 3 3 - 3 z 40 va ^— •H 3 rH C. 33 a 3 44 3 00 a a O a or 1 3 a CO •H 3 3 — CO pH m X J3 •H 00 CO CN CJ o a Z 3 40 CO in o 01 0~ “N C/5 •H Pa a 40 3 3 4-1 f— - a 4-1 O >" CO rH 2T 3 O 05 to 2 3 >- 44 CJ -C a 3 3 44 33 a 3 > E 3 E H o Z X •H ou c 3 43 3 44 ' * sa 3 CU a o 44 Z u sa 44 a E £ rH a S4 3 o o 3 CO 43 2 u 3 a 3 >< 3 O 3 z 3 O a: O X I H Z •H as a CJ a- rH vO u U 3 a CD 0 3 a. •H 00 O 0) 00 3 O o. 4-1 3 ai 3 H H t—4 3 n> 3 H> 3 •H 3 H *H O, > r-H 3 3 3 co oo 3 C •H O h X c z z CU 3 K CO C/5 X 3 O' *H 3 a < o o o 1 3 3 o o o W o 43 Q» rH r— rH 44 4-1 rH •H 3 4-1 O rH 3 E O 4-t 3 3 43 CO rH H rH E 3 • H o o o o so mh o cj 4-> 44 •H jj O V r-H a Q. E 3 CO 3 O a CJ H a 3 H 44 •* TO s|< 44 44 o 34 3 3 o o as •H X) CN X 3 2 CO « • 3 43 CO • CO U 3 CO •H 3 CO 3 CN m a •H a a CJ a) a >-< CN 43 X o 44 TO 3 3 3 44 H 40 H 3 r-N 4*: 43 o 3 CO E • a • v 3 0£ E 3 OC 3 3 44 Pa 4a • •H 3 3 a •H 2 E *H •H 44 43 -H E •H X rH C rH •H 4-j a a CO 3 3 3 3 t— 3 43 JO a O X CJ 3 4-4 O 3 44 o 3 3 CJ O H rH 3 X rH * ^— oc 3 3 o U >r o CO • r 3 44 o TO u X 3 r— « X X 00 rH 3 • 3 3 CO 3 rH X r4 3 3 44 r—1V — 3 3 > as > •H 1 1 3 z H a 3 HJ * CJ OO X s: 3 3 -H CO •H CO 3 z 3 — X 3 44 3 43 r-H 3 CO 3 >, o 43 Pa z 44 CO o 00 •H r4 3 O X CO MD 44 3 X 44 a 3 O 3 O 3 (X & w O rH 3 3 o 3 X U a X 3 3 >- O w 2 •H a -— a 3 44 •H X CJ 3 X 3 /H 3 O o V_r• 2 z CJ Q 43 43 3 CO 3 3 3 a Na Na CO r 44 3 E 3 44 a Z E -h 3 oc 43 44 3 U CO o 3 a 3 3 TO 43 3 00 3 rH 3 •H *H 44 3 oo a >4 o 44 3 •H •H a 3 44 r4 O •H 3 O a CO •H r4 3 as a 04 o a rH •H 3 E Z •H 44 3 3 o 00 rH 3 44 3 34 3 3 3 3 a 3 o rH -H 44 3 a a 43 •H 3 O u !H a 43 44 00 40 •H 42 o a h 3 •H 44 3 3 43 3 a 3 w O -H o •H E-1 TO O a 3 3 3 X 3 > Eh E-h al 0C Z < CJ X E-* X X X X CJ CJ o Q W 39

affiliations with other -research institutes

To demonstrate tne coherence within the political groupings a table was made which shows which directors are also directors on another of the five think tank boards in this study (See Table 7 (a)).

Although the table does not show any interlocking of boards between these particular New Right think tanks, it does support a coherence between the corporate elite: about one-third of Brookings directors are on the Council of Foreign Relations. Also interesting is that

26% of the AEI's directors are also members of the CFR. Since the

Council of Foreign Relations is so pivotal in these results, it is important to note that in this particular case I have included members of the Council and not only board directors. Members of the CFR number 1,400. I included members because the CFR is not a research institute in the same sense that the other four are and membership on the Council is a very significant indicator.

As mentioned above, one would expect more corporate-elite directors to be on the boards of other major research institutes.

Such is the tendency shown in the results of the run: more than two- thirds of the New Right directors are on no other research institute boards compared to only about one-third of the Corporate-Liberals.

19.4% of the New Right directors are on one or two other boards, whereas 49% of the Corporate Liberals are. About one-half of the

AEI's directors are on one or more other boards. These results, although supportive of the Cowboy-Yankee theory, are not statistically significant (See Table 7 (c)). i 1 1 I 1

co CO c- •33 o Vr j_i 3 o O 04 ja u •H as •a c o r-H CO as x # 1- 4-1 Ur o o vO 04 X CJ 04 CO c as o c •rH r" CO o 4-1 CO ij c c CO r-H as 04 •rH • > as U, o o

l-l as c .. •H c O CO T3 CO Si 4-1 CO o CD rH 4-1 CO JS CO CD o c 3 04 -C •rH TO Si 4J JO •rH TO •rH 4-1 > 0) TO oo •H CO c 0-1 -a CO JJ •H o c J3 3 "O •rH o r— CO 00 CO 3 3 04 04 CN r-H CN CN CN 4-1 OC 0-1 00 u CO o CO JS c 4-1 4-1 3 C Si 3 •rH 04 0) 04 J3 U JO U 4-> Si E Si 04 3 04 <41 Or Z Or o CD "O Si CO Si 04 CO CO CO JO u o •—/ CO E JO as 00 3 co x- 00 3 3 •H CO co •rH JO 4-1 04 JS 4-1 JS rH 4-4 *H t-H 3 JS rH o 3 JO •rH 3 oo Si 1— o OS 4-1 C <41 CO 0) JO CO CJ CJ u Ur O I—l o E-i E-i 4—1 M on < an CJ E-h * \ i 1i i —H

CO rH CO c 3 CO T3 4-1 •H -a > C 04 Mi •rH E CO C TO 3 CO H C x x X *H o 4-1 U 04 CM cm 0£ o O X CO o p-H co 00 co X U 4-1 CN r— CcJ CN CN o <11 U •H C »-H 00 01 X 04 CO XI ? O Ml E Mi c 3 C 0) 04 2 o a o M, 04 Cl,

Sm 04 X 00 CO - 4-1 CO C 0) 04 4-1 Ml 3 U 4-1 04 o o o o O •H Q, o o o o O 4-1 r*H r-H r*H »“H CO c c E rH •H 3 CO r-H 4-1 x o o U o 4-1 Ml CO X 1) o CO 0) /N u CO a. a v s u •rH 0) X X CO 4-1 4-1 M. ''fi o CN o CO c • • O Mi o + • « CO c 4-1 CO oo CO r- - u CM CO o r 4 T-— rM r— •rH O 4-1 04 cm u •H co m: •H CO c CL c "3 Mi CC rH *H o •H X x Mi 4-4 CO CO 4-4 C O r-H ,—4 O' m o sz 1 m O' O' CN U o Ml O 4 CN CO - 3 -H 3 CM 0) z -a 2 o X

M 04 s— 0) U X X c w CO E (0 04 ao 3 a r--. 00 c C H CO •rH CM 0! Mi 4-1 Mi X •rH rM C Mi •H O CO C X H C on Mi i— o S 4-1 00 CO X C0 O 0) W M, l-M o •H H H 4-1 zz < CQ CJ H C/0 (1 4 4 \

1— CO 3 "3 •H TO > c 0) •H E CO think •o 3 CO C r4 33 •4 o u CD 4f f-H , of OC CO I uo O -C CO CO CN uo o o 43 -—4 in •H 3 CD X CD 33 3 O e 4 3 c CD percentage z o a

directors 43 o of 4-4 • O O CO CO 33 • • • C II 4 o r4 r^- uo H - CD I " CO 33 r4 33 43 CD Number E > tank 3 44 o Z o i-H

4 0) (D (c) 33 c 43 E CO 0£ 33

Think tank directors were on the boards of these institutes major research

Adlai E. Stevenson Institute of International Affairs American Petroleum Institute Atlantic Institute for International Affairs Bildenberg Meetings Carnegie Institute Center for Advanced Studies, Stanford Center for Advanced Study inthe BehavioralSciences Center for Inter-American Relations Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Center for Strategic and International Studies Committee on Economic Development East-West Center, Honolulu Hoover Institute Institute for European Studies, London International Center for Economic Policy Studies, NYC International Institute for Strategic Studies International Management and Development Institute Lehrman Institute Midwest Research Institute, Kansas City National Bureau for Economic Research Overseas Development Council Rand Corporation Resources for the Future Southwest Research Institute , San Antonio Stanford Research Institute Trilateral Commission Twentieth Century Fund Urban Center, Columbia University Urban Institute Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars World Affairs Center 44

University and foundation boards

Data on whether the think tank directors are also directors of elite universities and foundations was analysed because of the hypothesis that universities and foundations seek trustees who not only have money but are , also part of an elite transcorporate network.^ Business leaders who have a broad perspective also realize the importance of being on such boards, since education and research are critical factors for the good of business as a whole. We assume that the Cor- porate Liberals tend to be more at the core of the transcorporate network than the New Right and have a broader outlook, which means that a higher percentage of them will be on the boards of the elite universities and foundations. This assumption is strongly supported by the statistics (See Table 8 (b)). 39.2% of the Corporate Liberals are on elite boards compared to only 6.5% of the New Right; about one- fourth of the AEI directors are on elite boards. These results are statistically significant at the .01 level.

Charitable and cultural organizations

According to Domhoff, members of the social upper class belong to many charitable and cultural institutions. It is a means for the newly rich to make inroads into upper class society because participation in such organizations often leads to private dinner invitations

15. Michael Useem, The Inner Circle , p. 173. o\ It i 1 • t 1 *

-o 3 3

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0) o 00 3 3 -a • — 4-1 c CO 3 c C c 4-1 O 3 X 3 o o X 3 o X c c 3 E JJ H s X 3 X 3 U CO 3 o 3 3 •* 3 00 U CO I—I X 4-1 3 X X 3 G -a O 0) o c O au >- 4-1 X rH -G 3 Q X -a pH 3 o 3 o 4-1 3 u X 3 3 c 3 TO E C 3 33 C O O X 3 ”ob CO X X 3 X H 4-1 X O r* 3 c -a CO i <— i O — r— LO E "3 X G 3 QJ O G 3 X to O' UO CO X X S-4 G X 3 w CM CO • CO X 3 X X x c — 3 X 3 3 oo X a. JS CO -a 3 X> 3 3 > O C 4J 3 X X X 3 X 3 x 3 4-1 a* 3 3 3 r— 0) 3 X X 3 X o X > 3 3 X X -M 3 3 3 X 01 X 4-1 3 3 3 v X 3 > X > Q, X X 3 3 o O X o 3 o U •H c *(— X 3 X J= 3 c X X X 3 CO 3 U 3 3 3 X o X * X X X 3 o JS O X TO X 3 X 3 4-1 C X •H 3 3 O X O 3 CJ 3 c O 0) 4-1 3 OC 3 o X 3 3 x X •H C X X X X •H ^ CO •H X o X 3 X T3 C a. a X 3 Ox X •H •H 4—1 to X 3 X X X X co 3 c c C O O 4-1 3 c X X 4-4 HH 3 U X 4J 3 X Q Ox > >-i TO > X X O 3 C 4-4 3 3 X Cu X O X ® • 3 r-H X c X O X 3 O CO o 3 X ^— 3 3 r-H •H > X 3 X C 3 pH X c 3 E 3 4-1 •* rH c o 3 00 3 U 3 o •H G a co 00 c C •H X CM E 3 •H (X f— 3 X 3 X X X •H O — CJ X c j*: X o 3 CO 3 • o 3 •H H- X X C C/3 1-1 X o OS X c X Ox X 3 X 3 CJ 3 CU X lx O •H E-1 a. 4=e- a 3 E-* H x X X < X CJ H CO 1 H H Hi —

CO 46 rH 1 CO 3 C£ 0) 3 "3 rr •H •H O. > g 3 H E o -a 3 -g o Sr 3 rH CU u 0.C ‘H o 3 3 * CJ e 3 j= r— 32 i—H 3 g CO r-H lO < -3 cO o -3 co uo O N o 4-1 "3 -H u O 3 r-H 0£ H 3 4_) •H f-t *H OC 3 3 •H 4-4 3 JO 3 3 3 •H 3 3 3 4-1 rH E 3 jo 3 3 3 3 4-1 3 "3 o 3 3 (U 3 3 00 3 Q. 2 O o as 3 3 3 00 O rH H > 33 JO s E 0) rH o o o 3 3 3 o 3 u 3 *— r-H r-H • 3 3 3 3 *H rH 3 4-1 3 H 4-1 4-1 O o CU o 2h JO •H 03 3 CO a. 4-1 o 4-1 3 -a a 3 > c •H 3 *H 3 3 JJ It 3 3 >4 a. £ E 3 3 rH O 3 4-1 3 C ~a c 32 o 4-1 4-1 s o £-4 •H Jj 3 CO •H CU 4-1 3 > 3 4-1 4-1 in r-H CN E 3 •H -H rH CO CO •H • • O TO J3 H JO cu "3 rH vO vO O' 3 3 4-i Q. CO •H c w CN CO 4H 3 rH 4-) 3 O 3 -H •H 3 O 3 4-4 - > 3 CO 34 3 -H rH > St — JJ 00 "3 3 3 0) > 3 CO 3 3 4-1 > 4-1 4-14-13 *H *H 3 3 3 3 CO 3 JO a. o 3 Sr 3 4-1 3 C H CU -> •H H 3 0) > 4-4 JO O 4-1 •H 3 O 4-J 3 3 H 3 3 JO 3 rH 3 CU /-V •H 3 3 4J It 3 4-1 r— 4-1 4-1 > 4-4 •H UO m 40 O •H 3 3 4-1 CU 4-4 O rH • • • 3 •H JO O JO r- o CU m ro 11 3 3 4-1 - CO 1 on -d CN a. 3 3 J2 3 CO 3 3 s ^ > O 0 4-14-4 a 4-1 O -H u •H 3 O rH CO J25 CO H -H JO 4-1 4-1 3 4-1 3 3 4-4 CO c n 3 3 3 Si—1 n i 1-1 3 3 T3 •H & O 3 o rH O 3 3 0 ° = 4-1 4-1 H 3 u CJ 4-4 3 4-1 St 3 3 *H 3 O ^ 3 3 1-1 3 3 3 •H 2h -H > *H CO •H OC O 4-1 r--t tH O -3 Q. TO •H •H 3 3 •H CO 4-1 “3 O rH 4-4 30 -3 3 3 4-1 O o CO 3 "3 3 4-1 -H It r-H l-l O

— 1 4-1 i—4 3 JO CU O 4-4 3 3 - 3 2 O iH • • 0) 34 h 3 3 3 o CO O Q 3 3 CJ r-H •H *H 30 32 3 3 rH 4-1 r 4-1 3 E 3 4-1 rH r—N -H CO 30 4-1 3 CJ 3 O •H • 3 00 3 co 3 rH 3 •H •H N S 3 St •H H 3 3 4-4 rH r-H -3 C 3 a- 3 3 3 3 • O 3 -H 32 •H 3 O 3 HH 3 32 4-1 CO _c 32- rH O 3 CO -3 3 3 3 w O -H O •H E-4 Cu<& JO 3 E-i 4-1 00 Z < CJ tJ E-i CO * 47

Foundations with assets greater than $100 million

Asssts (millions of dollars) Foundation

$3,146 Ford Foundation 840 Rockefeller Foundation 636 Mellon Foundation 366 Duke Endowment 336 Carnegie Corporation

The top privately endowed colleges and universities

Rank Endowment (in billions of dollars)

1 Harvard 1,013 2 Yale 358 3 Chicago 275 4 Stanford 223 5 Columbia 201 6 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 184 7 Cornell 163 8 Northwestern 135 9 Princeton 134 10 Johns Hopkins 112 11 Pennsylvania 95 12 Dartmouth 91

The list of non-elite foundations and universities on whose boards think tan directors serve is simply made up of those that do not fit on the above "elite" category:

Foundations

American Health Foundation Pacific Legal Foundation Jack Eckerd Foundation Purdue University Foundation William and Flora Hewlett Foundation Southeastern Legal Foundation George C. Marshall Foundation University of Iowa Foundation John M. Olin Foundation National Right to Work Foundation

Universities

Bennington College Polytechnical College of NY -Manchester NH Brown University St. Anselm College , , California Institute of Technology Southern Methodist University Eisenhower College Syracuse University Fordham University University of the Redlands Hillsdale College University of So. Calif. Ind. Colls. No. Cal. Washington University Medical College of Ohio Williams College 48 and inclusion m other upper class activities. Michael Useem also stresses the importance of membership in these associations for increasing the legitimacy of the corporate role in communities and the enhancement of the business climate in general. The director who is involved in elite community activities is most likely part of the transcorporate network. Determination of the list of major organizations was compiled from those that were noted in the biographical sources used for the gathering data on the directors. As expected, there is a pronounced difference between the number of New Right directors who are members and the Corporate Liberals: only 16.1% of the New Right are members of at least one such charitable or cultural organization, whereas 52.9% of the Corporate Liberals are.

39.1% of the AEI are members. These results are statistically significant at the .01 level (See Table 9 (b)).

Directorships of Fortune 500 companie

In order to compare the corporate affiliations of the think tank directors, directorships on the boards of Fortune 500 and

Fortune Service 500 companies was tabulated. Fortune magazine compiles an annual directory of the largest 500 industrial corporations.

To be listed a corporation must derive over fifty percent of its sales in manufacturing of mining. Fortune also compiles a directory of the largest 500 U.S. non-industrial corporations. This Fortune Service

500 ranks the largest diversified financial, diversified service, commercial banking, life insurance, retailing, transportation, and l £1 1 111 11 —4 1 Hf1

sz u •H xz by 3 c O "3 0 cn co 3 CO CO XZ 3 organizations, -a qj •H 0 > CO

-a c o r-H cn oo CO m c o CN r-H CN CN CN o •H u »“H c <4-1 CD o a

Cl c 0) E charitable .31 3 E 3 3 o Z o

ll 00 3CO cultural c 0) u c 0) o O o O o a, o O o o o m r-H t— r-H r 1 r— O major c E I— V 3 CO a, i— 3 - in O o CJ CJ 3 C 3 CO U Ci •i— Ci o 3 0 o CN t— i— 00 4-) 3 memberships tank'"' X> • • • • • u C E m 00 O' r- 0 oc S i3 I-— CO m Ci •H Z a•rH co think oo of Xi c r— CO CN Ci 3 o i) • .3 JC E o 00 O' O' CN c II 1) • • • • • •H

individual 1— 1 Percentage S m o CN CM 3 — CO CO M3 NT m 3 0 4-1 > o <3 0 zzz o r3

c. 0 0 CJ (a) Xz c CO E 3 xz 3 •r4 c j*: •H O 3 C 00 Table •H c cn C C— O cc 3 sz CO o 14 W Ci Pc 0 •H E-i 4-1 1— 30 < CQ CJ H CO 11

3 u •HX X•H o o. X CJ X>4 X•H 3 •> co C c o -o o cu •H CO CO 4-1 x ca 3 3 X N 3 •H -o 3 00 •H X x -a c o C 3 •H U X CO pH X 0) X CO C4 X o 1— X 3 pH X o a, ca 4-1 x c •H 3 E x X 3 ca E x X 3 O a Z 3 x o X ca 3 x 00 3 3 X X r— c 3 3 CJ O X X 3 o o o pH O a. o o o o •I”! pH pH pH ca c V e E x cu 3 3 c X X X O O CJ x u CO c a. 03 •H u X •H CO X UH x 3 pH pH O •H 3 X • c c X E X O' CN OC E 3 pH CO X 'H 1) s CO E

4-1 pH o 3 X o 0) X o o OO sl< 3 X e ca OO X 3 X c E O' O' rX 3 II c H 3 • • « X 0) a, s: CO o O' X X u 3 GO X T3 3 X O X > 3 X o X 3 CU 00 z o X X 3 / N 3 3 X X C '—/ X 3 E 3 OO X X 3 3 O' c 00 3 x C •H •H X X 3 X 0) XS X os: O X X X tX C 3 3 a. 3 3 a X X c o 3 X X X X OO CO X 3 X 3 w o x O X H H x oc Z < CJ -J H GO 51

The 1 St ° f IT' a '' 0r cul tural and charitable organizations of which think , i tank directors are members consists of the following:

Charitable and cultural organizations

American Council for the Arts American Red Cross Boston Museum of Fine Arts Boys Brotherhood Republic, N.Y.C. Boy Scouts of America Children’s Memorial Hospital Columbia Presbyterian Hospital Fresh Air Fund, N.Y.C. Grand Central Art Galleries Indianapolis Museum of Art Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts Louden Memorial Hospital Metropolitan Opera Association Museum of Contemporary Art Museum of Modern Art Museum of Science Museum of Science and Industry National Gallery of Art New York City Center of Music and Drama New York Hospital - Cornell Medical Center New York Public Library Philadelphia Museum of Art Pittsburgh Symphony San Francisco Symphony Seattle Art Museum Sloan Kettering Institute for Cancer Research Smithsonian Toledo Art Museum United Fund, Greater N.Y. United Negro College Fund United Way of America United Way of Tri-State United Way / Crusade of Mercy, Chicago 52 utility companies. In the tabulation, the number of directorships, from 0 to 4+, was specifically examined to determine the degree of involvement in the transcorporate network. The results show that more than half (58.1%) of the New Right directors are on no Fortune 500 board compared to a little over a quarter of the Corporate

Liberals and (27.5%) less than one-tenth (8.7%) of AEI's directors

(See Table 10 (b)). 25.8% of the New Right, 26.1% of AEI and 27.5% of the Corporate Liberals were on the boards of one or two Fortune

500 companies. And 6.5% of the New Right, 56.5% of AEI and 33.3% of the Corporate Liberals are on four or more Fortune 500 boards. These results are statistically significant at the .001 level. While support ing the Cowboy-Yankee theory, they point to the significnt corporate connection of the American. Enterprise Institute.

Directorships of non-Fortune 500 companies

41.9% of the New Right directors are on no corporate boards, compared to approximately the same number (41.2%) of Corporate Liberals

(See Table 11 (b)). 22.6% of the New Right are on one board and 35.5% are on two or more compared to 13.7% of the corporate elite on one board and 45.1% on two. These figures are in stark contrast to AEI's directors of whom only 13% are on no corporate boards and 73.9% are on two or more. The results are significant at the .05 level.

Memberships in elite business or policy-making associations

90.3% of the New Right directors do not belong to a major 1iI 41 4i 1

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percentage

0) CO CO 4-1 c cd by o c o s o o o o CD o o o o o a. held a

E i— 3 CO r—l 4-4 o o CJ X •a c 3 V o a. 4-4 directorships

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44 3 4-1 43 3 3 O 4 43 3 4-1 3 E 3 4-1 o 0C 43 4-1 3 3 3 rH 3 00 3 rH 3 •H •rH •rH 44 3 <4H

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0) 00 JO 3 o 4-4 4 c JO 0) 3 u 4 3 0) O Cl, 3 So i— TO JO 3 3 3 3 - TO 3 CO •H JO 3 > CO •H •H 3 QJ 3 TO 3 O r-H CO 00 CO m 4 CO 3 4 CN r-H CN CN CN o e ex •H 3 r-H 3 E OC ex o 4-1 H s u O 4-4 o 3 o 4 3 o 3 E O m JO 3 o E r—4 m cu 3 O c Z o 3 3 3 4-4 3 4 4-4 o 4 Px O 3 Cx 00 00 c 3 <4-4 H 4-4 O X) 3 3 3 CO r4 U TO 3 4 / \ 4 X 3 o o o o o in 3 0) CX o o o o o o O r-H r-H r— r-H (—H 0 JO 0> 3 /\ CO E i— cx 3 CL, 3 3 \ ^ JO •rH ,— 4-1 4-4 JO 3 O o CO 3 o 4-4 4-4 3 4 4-1 3 O o 3 4-1 o*: 3 4-> u 3 •rH o 0) •4 4H 3 4 JO CO •rH •4 4-1 a CO 3 3 TO •rH 4 OC 4 JO JO O •rH 3 cu o 3 O -O’ O' vO oo 4-4 CO 4-1 3 4 CN • 0 0 « 0 u O CO 3 O m cO CO CO 4 Z o OS 4H —3 3 o i 1 3 3 4 3 O 3 3 3 3 J3 3 CO E 3 3 r-H 3 00 3 3 4-4 r-H 00 3 3 •rH 3 3 •H 4H TO 0) y 4) JJ <— •H rH 3 JJ •H O 3 3 3 •H 3 cn 4 1— O PC 4-1 00 JO CO JO 3 u 3 w 4 Cx O •rH H 1 CO H E-i 4-4 M 00 < OQ o E— 1 1 11 H11 H H HH 1 1\ '

4-1 O .

CD 00 X G u X •H C X OJ 3 o X C CD o a, CO 1— X X G CD 3 CO - X G CO •H X CD > CO •H •H CO CD C X CD t— X 1— in X G c X CO CN X o C a. •H 3 r-H CO E OO a, O X X E u o X O o X c o o CD E o in X 3 o E r— m CD 3 o c 13 CD X CN • • • a o 03 o X CO X CD X X Jh C X X r^ - X X X 3 X CD CD o i— a G X CD O X CD CJ o — X C X CD E G G r-H OO X X 3 u X r—H c 00 G X C X G H •H X G X X CD JvJ cu PS O X i— X

T 1 c x; 3 CU CD G c (D X X c O •> X X X X 00 X G X G X CD W O X O •rH [— H E-i X OO 3 < CJ X H CO 57 elite business or policy-making associations compared to 49% of the

Corporate Liberals; 6.5% of the New Right are members of one or two, and 3.2% are members of three or more, compared to 35.3% of the Cor- porate Liberals who are members of one or two, and 15.7% who are members of three or more (See Table 12 (b)). Almost half of the AEI directors are association members: 21.7% are members of one or two associations and 26.1% are members of three or more. These results are significant at the .01 level.

A major premise of the Cowboy-Yankee theory is the split along domestic/international interests. In order to check this assumption the distribution or National Association of Manufacturers membership versus Trilateral Commission membership was examined. The NAM was selected for its ultra-conservative position on international policy issues and the Trilateral Commission for its committment to cooperation among the industrialized democracies. This assumption is supported by the results on Trilateral Commission membership (See Table 13 (b)).

3.2% of New Right directors are members compared to 31.4% of the Cor- porate Liberals. The tally of NAM membership proved not so fruitful since very few of the directors of any of the think tanks are members:

6.5% of the New Right are members compared to 2.0% of the Corporate

Liberals. These statistics are significant at the .01 level.

Elite university or government posts

The closer one's connections to the Establishment, the higher are one's chances of being appointed to an elite university of govern- 4 1 1 1 H 1 11 1 41 i

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mental position. "In the governmental sector, the operational

definition of the elite is those individuals who occupy formal positions of authority in the major civilian and military bureaucracies of the

” 16 national govememnt . In the academic world an elite position is

one of formal authority at an elite institution; in this case, the twelve universities which control over half of the resources available

to private higher education and which are consistently ranked among the

’best' universities make up the list of elite institutions. The

tendency for those closer to the Establi shment to be appointed to such

elite posts is confirmed in the results (See Table 14 (b)). 87% of

the AEI and 58,1% of the New Right directors have not been appointed

to any university or governmental position compared to only 37.3% of the Corporate Liberals. Only 4.3% of the AEI and 19.4% of the New

Right have been appointed to elite positions compared to 35.3% of

the Corporate Liberals. These results are significant at the .01 level.

Appointment to elite governmental committees

Appointments to elite governmental committees are an indication of involvement in the Establishment network. The New Right, judging

from how many New Right think tank directors have been appointed to committees (See Table 15 (b)), are apparently left out of the newtork.

Only 12,9% of the New Right directors and 21.7% of the AEI have been appointed to such committess, compared to 45.1% of the Corporate Liber- als. This is a considerable difference, significant at the .01 level.

11-12. 16. Thomas R.Dye, Who's Running America , pp. H 1 1 1 I i iI I 1

I >>

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" Th el te 8 °Vernmental commi ttees include special ?u M . commissions, "blue ribbon citizen committees and "task forces" appointed by the Presi-^ dent and executive departments. The list of committees to which the think tank directors were appointed consists of the followino* Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea (National Security Council) Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid (Department of State) Advisory Committee on Workmen’s Compensation Advisory Council on Japan-U.S. Economic Relations American Council on Germany Brandt Commission on International Development Issues Citizens’ Advisory Commission on Environmental Quality Committee on Adjudication of claims of the Administrative Conference of the U.S. Cost of Living Council Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Council Joint Council on Economic Education New York State Committee of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights National Commission on U.S. -China Relations National Council for U.S. -China Trade National Council on Crime and Delinquency President Reagan's Economic Policy Advisory Board President Reagan's Small Business Task Force President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force President's Commission on Government Employment Policy President’s Commission on Personnel Interchange President’s Labor-Management Advisory Commission President’s National Commission on Productivity President's Pay Advisory Committee President’s Price Commission Public Interest Advisory Committee U.N. Comm, on International Commodity Trade U.S. Treasury's Advisory Committee on Reform of the International Monetary System 68

Political party affiliation

Data on the party affiliation of the think tank directors was too scarce in order to draw any conclusions: information on

only 34 directors was available. 69

CHAPTER IV

Discussion and Implications

The results of this study support the theory that the New Right has a different material base than the established elite:

—Three times as many New Right directors than Corporate

Liberals (61.3% to 17.6%) are located geographically

in the South and Southwest. (AEI = 26%)

Almost one-third of New Right directors compared to

one-half of the Corporate Liberals received an elite

college education. (AEI = 13%)

—More Corporate Liberal directors belong to an exclu-

sive gentlemen's club than New Right directors: 37.3%

to 22.6%. (AEI = 65.2%)

—-42% of New Right directors are also directors of Fortune

500 companies compared to 72.6% of the Corporate Liberals.

6.5% of New Right directors compared to 33.3% of Corporate

Liberals are on four or more Fortune 500 boards. (AEI =

91.3% on Fortune 500 boards; 56.5% on four + )

—One-tenth of New Right directors compared to one-half of

the Corporate Liberals are members of elite business or

policy-making organizations. (AEI = 47.8%)

— 19.4% of New Right directors compared to 35.3% of the

Corporate Liberals have held top governmental or univer-

sity positions. (AEI = 13%) 70

12.9% of the New Right directors compared to 45.1% of the Corporate Liberals have been appointed to an elite govern-

mental committee. (AEI = 21.7%)

These results are all statistically significant. The one point which remains unanswered by my study concerns the hypothesis that New

Right directors should be on more boards of directors of "rising" industries or entrepreneurial enterprises. The results of the run on directorships of non-Fortune 500 companies are not statistically significant. But even so, the categories of Fortune 500 and non-

Fortune 500 companies do not capture the details of whether the companies are "rising" industries or not.

Throughout this study AEI directors have been treated separately due to their transitory position. From the results we can see that they do, in fact, behave differently than the other two groups:

—They are spread somewhat evenly geographically across

the country.

—They have the least elite college education.

—They have by far the most memberships in exclusive clubs.

—They have the most directors who are members of three

or more "para-statal" policy organizations.

—They are not distinguished by elite governmental or univer-

sity positions.

These results are interesting in light of recent studies done

by J. Allen Whitt (1981) and Michael Useem (1983). In Whitt’s study

of the directors of oil companies, he addresses the important distinction 71

between two types of corporate board directors: ’’inside" directors who are managers of the company on whose board they sit, and "outside" directors whose only connection to the firm is through their position on the board. Directors who sit on several corporate boards are more integrated into the corporate class than those who do not, which demonstrates what Whitt calls the "extensive integrative function of cor- 16 porate interlocks in the U.S. economy." He calls those directors who sit on four of more corporate boards "big linkers." Thirty-one of the think tank directors are "big linkers" (See Table 16). They share certain characteristics which place them in a pivotal role of power.

The "big linkers" constitute the core of Michae Useem's "inner circle." Because they are top officers of large firms and directors of several other large diverse corporations, they "constitute a distinct, semi-autonomous network, one that transcends company, regional, sectoral, and other politically divisive fault lines within 17 the corporate community." The characteristics of these multiple firm directors parallel those of Domhoff’s ruling class. They are:

1) descendants of business elite families, individually

wealthy or members of wealthy families,

2) mutually acquainted,

3) members of exclusive metropolitan social clubs, and

4) influential in affairs of local community organizations

16. J. Allen Whitt, "Is Oil Different" A Comparison of the Social Backgrounds and Organizational Affiliations of Oil and Non-oil 147. Directors," Social Problems , Vol. 29, no. 2 (Dec. 1981),

17. Useem, Inner Circle , p. 3 72

and in some colleges and universities.

Due to their ability to mobilize great resources in behalf of favored policies and institutions through their social contacts and their broader understanding of business interests, "big linkers" are likely to be an important source of political leadership capable of promoting 19 the more general interests of the entire capitalist class."

As mentioned above, the characteristics of the leaders in the

"inner circle" typify those of the Corporate Liberals. "Big linkers" are, in fact, likely to have a more liberal political outlook, i.e., they are likely to view Keynesian economics and social welfare policies more favorably than those corporate directors with more parochial interests. However, the breakdown of "big linkers" among the think tanks show that the American Enterprise Institute has proportionately the most directors who are members of the "inner circle" (See Table 10

(b)). 56.5% of AEI's directors are on four or more Fortune 500 boards, compared to 6.5% of the New Right and 33.3% of the Corporate

Liberals. If we look historically at the development of the AEI, following its growing acceptance as a moderate conservative research institute which can now rival Brookings in terms of influence and respectability, together with its growth in big corporate connections, it becomes clear that its potential role in determining governmental policies is great.

18. Michael Useem, "The Social Organization of the American Business Elite and Participation of Corporation Directors in the Review Governance of American Institutions," American Sociological , v. 44 (August 1979), 557.

19. Ibid . , p. 553. 73

In conclusion, the results of this study support a cleavage between the Yankees and the Cowboys. The New Right has significantly fewer connections to "inner group" institutions (corporate, social clubs, elite universities, political organizations and prior governmental appointments). Consequently, although the New Right has been able to attain power politically in the wake of the Reagan revolution, they are cut off in the long run from the policy-making process. But if Michael Useem is correct in positing that multiple firm directors may constitute "a special segment of the capitalist class, if 'class segment can be defined as a subset of class members sharing a social location with partially distinct interests," then my data point to a realignment of the corporate elite. That is, given the number of

big linkers in the AEI who are an integral part of the elite social club and business associatin network, yet lack the education characteristic of the Eastern Establishment, it is evident that they are also part of the "inner circle." Their inclusion has contributed to the rightward shift of the corporate elite.

20. Ibid., p. 556. 74

TABLE 16

BIG LINKERS

Institute for Contemporary Studies

DONALD RUMSFELD

—chief exec, officer and dir. G.D. Searle Co. —Bendix Corp., dir. —Eastern Airlines, Inc., dir. —Sears Roebuck & Co. (Chicago), dir.

Heritage Foundation

WILLIAM EDWARD SIMON

-—Citibank/Citicorps , dir. — I.N.A. Corp. dir. , —Xerox Corp., dir. — Dark & Kraft, Inc., dir.

American Enterprise Institute

WILLIAM 0. BEERS

—Chmn . Fin. Comm. & Dir. Dart & Kraft, Inc. —A.O. Smith Corp., dir. — Sears Roebuck & Co., dir.

—AmericanAirlines , dir. —U.S. Steel Corp., dir.

WILLARD CARLISLE BUTCHER

—Chmn. & chief exec, officer Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. —ASARCO, Inc., dir. —Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., dir. —Texaco, Inc., dir.

CHARLES T. FISHER III

—Pres. National Bank of Detroit —American Airlines, dir. —Detroit Edison, dir. —General Motors, dir. .

ROBERT S. HATFIELD

Chmn. & chief exec, officer The Continental Group 1971-81 —Citicorps/Citibank, dir. —General Motors Corp., dir. —Eastman Kodak Co., dir. —Johnson & Johnson, dir. —Nabisco Brands, Inc., dir.

HAROLD J. HAYNES

—Chmn. & chief exec, officer Standard Oil Co. of Cal. —Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., dir. —Citicorps, dir.

—Boeing Co . , dir —Hewlett-Packard Co., dir.

ROBERT HARVEY MALOTT

—Chmn. & chief exec, officer FMC Corp. —Continental 111. Corp., dir. —United Technologies Corp., dir. —Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), dir. —Bell & Howell Co., dir.

DAVID PACKARD

—Chmn. Hewlett-Packard Co. —Caterpillar Tractor Co., dir. —Standard Oil Co. of California, dir. —Boeing Co., dir.

JACK STEELE PARKER

—Pan American World Airways, dir. —The Continental Group, Inc., dir. —Southern Pacific Co., dir. —TRW, Inc., dir. -—dir., vice-chair of bd & chief exec, officer General Electric Co., 1968-1980

WILLARD F. ROCKWELL, JR.

—-Rockwell International Corp., dir. —El Paso Co., dir. —Lone Star Industries, dir. —Magic Chef, Inc., dir. .

HERMAN J. SCHMIDT

—Mobil Int'l. Oil Co. , pres. 1959-63. —H. J. Heinz Co. , dir. —N.L. Industries, Inc., dir. —MAPCO Inc., dir.

RICHARD RANDOLPH SHINN

Chmn . & chief exec, officer Metropolitan Life Ins —Chase Manhattan Bank, dir. —May Dept. Stores, dir. —Norton Simon, Inc., dir.

—Sperry Corp. dir . , Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, trustee

RICHARD D. WOOD

—Chmn., Pres., & chief exec, officer Eli Lilly & Co. Chemical New York Corp. & Chemical Bank, dir. —Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), dir.

—Dow Jones & Co . , Inc., dir.

WALTER B. WRISTON

—Chmn. Citicorps —Citibank, N.A., chmn. —General Electric Co., dir. —J.C. Penney Co., dir. —Chubb Corp., dir.

Brookings Institute

LOUIS WELLINGTON CABOT

—Chmn. Cabot Corp. —Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., dir. —R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co., dir. —Wang Laboratories Inc., dir. .

FRANK TAYLOR CARY

—Chmn. bd. I.B.M. —Merck & Co. , Inc. , dir. —J.P. Morgan & Co., dir. —Texaco, Inc., dir.

WILLIAM THADDEUS COLEMAN, JR.

. --I B.M. , dir . —Chase Manhattan Bank, dir. —PepsiCo., dir. —Am. Can Co., dir. —AMAX Inc., dir. —Pan Am World Airways, Inc., dir. —Philadelphia Electric Co., dir. INA — Corp. , dir —Penn Mutual Life Ins. Co., dir. —First Penn. Corp., dir.

JOHN D. DE BUTTS

—Chmn. & chief exec, officer Citicorps — Dark & Kraft, Inc., dir.

—U . S . Steel Corp., dir. —-General Motors Corp., dir. —Chmn. bd. A.T.T. (1972-79); dir. 1967-81

ROGER WILLIAM HEYNS

—-Norton Simon, Inc., dir. —-Times Mirror Co., dir. —Kaiser Steel, dir. —-Levi-Strauss & Co., dir.

CARLA ANDERSON HILLS

— I .B.M. Corp. , dir. —American Airlines, dir. —Signal Cos. Inc., dir.

—Standard Oil oT Calif . , dir.

—Corning Glass Works , dir. .

ROBERT STRANGE McNAMARA

—Pres. Ford Motor., 1960-61 —The Washington Post Co., dir. —Corning Glass Works, dir. Royal Dutch Petroleum, dir. —T.W. dir A. ,

ARJAY MILLER

—Ford Motor Co., dir. Trans World Airlines, dir. —Levi-Strauss & Co., dir. —The Washington Post Co., dir. —Utah International, Inc., dir. —Southern Pacific Co., dir. —Wells Fargo Co., dir.

DONALD S. PERKINS

—Chmn , exec. comm. & dir. Jewel Cos. —Time Inc., dir. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., dir. —Corning Glass Works, dir. —Cummins Engine Co., dir. —Freeport-McMoran Inc., , dir. —Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., dir. —G.D. Searle & Co., dir.

JAMES D. ROBINSON, III

—Chmn. & chief exec, officer American Express Co. —-Bristol-Myers Company, dir. —Coca-Cola Co., dir. —Trustee Co. of Ga.

HENRY BREWER SCHACHT

—Chmn. & chief exec, officer Cummins Engine Co. —American Telephone & Telegraph Co., dir. —Chase Manhattan Bank, dir.

—C.B.S. Inc. , dir. 79

Council on Foreign Relations

MICHAEL W. BLUMENTHAL

—Chinn. & chief exec, officer Burrough Corp. —Chemical New York Corp., dir. —Pillsbury Co., dir. —Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U.S., dir.

RICHARD LEE GELB

—Chmn . & chief exec, officer Bristol-Myeres Co. —Charter Corp., dir. —Tankers Trust New York Corp., dir. —Cluett Peabody & Co., dir. —New York Times Co., dir. —New York Life Insurance Co., dir.

PETER G. PETERSON

—Bell & Howell Co., chmn bd. 1968-71 —Black & Decker, dir. —American ExpressCo., dir. —Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., dir. —Federated Dept. Stores, dir. —General Foods Corp., dir. —R.C.A. Corp., Dir.

CYRUS B. VANCE

—I.B.M., dir. —U.S. Steel Corp., dir. —Mfrs. Hanover Trust., dir. —New York Times Co., dir.

MARTHA REDFIELD WALLACE

-—American Can Co., dir. —American Express Co., dir. —Bristol-Myers Co., dir. —Chemical New York Corp., dir.

MARINA von NEUMANN WHITMAN

—Vice-pres., chief econ. General Motors Corp. MARINA von NEUMANN WHITMAN (continued)

—Mfrs. Hanover Trust Co., dir. —Westinghouse Electric Co., dir. —Proctor & Gamble Co., dir. 81

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Blumenthal Sidney, , "The Ideology Makers," The Boston Globe Maoazinp ’ (August 8, 1982), 8-49.

Bonafede, Dom, "Issue-Oriented Heritage Foundation Hitches its Wagon to Reagan's Star," National Journal (March 20, 1982), 502-507.

Crawford, Alan, Thunder on the Right , New York, Pantheon, 1980.

Davis, Mike, "The New Right's Road to Power," New Left Review, ' no 128 (1981), 28-49.

, "The Political Economy of Late - Imperial America," New Left

Review , no. 143 (Jan. /Feb. 1984), 6-38.

Dolbeare Kenneth , M. and Murray J. Edelman, America n Politics: Policies,

Power, and Change , fourth edition, , Lexington Mass . , D.C. Heath and Company, 1981.

Domhoff, G. William, The Higher Circles , New York, Random House, 1970.

, The Powers That Be , New York, Random House, 1978.

—- — -, Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967.

, Who Rules America Mow? A View for the 80's , Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983.

Dye, Thomas R., Who ' s Running America? The Carter Years , second edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979.

Ferguson, Thomas and Joel Rogers, "The Reagan Victory: Corporate Coalitions in the 1980 Campaign," The Hidden Election: Politics

and Economics in the 1980 Presidential Campaign , ed. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers, New York, Pantheon Books, 1981, 3-64.

Gordon, David M., Richard Edwards and Michael Reich, Segmented Work,

Divided Workers : The Historical Transformation of Labor in the Press, 1982. United States , Cambridge, Cambridge University

Klare, Michael, "The Traders and the Prussians," Seven Days , (March 28, 1977) 32-33.

(July/Aug. Rothymer, Karen, "Citizen Scaife," Columbia Journalism Review , 1981) 41-50. , ,, :

Sale Kirkpatrick, Power ' Shift The_ Rise of_ the Southe rn Rim and Challenge to Its the Eastern Establishment, New York, 1976. Vinta^B^ks,

Silk, Leonard and Mark Silk, The American Establishment. New YnrV ’ ’ Basic Books, 1980.

Sklar Holly, ed., Trilateralism , Boston, South End Press, 1980.

Stone Peter H., "Conservative Brain Trust," New York Times Magazine. B ’ (May 10, 1981) 18-93.

Useem Michael, "Business and Politics in the United States and United Kingdom," Theory and Society , v. 12, no. 3 (May 1983) 281-308.

The Inner Circle: Large Corporat ions and the Rise of Business Political Activity in_ the U.S. and U.K. , New York , Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1984.

"The Inner Group of the American Capitalist Class," Social

Problems , v. 25, (1978) 225-239.

"The Social Organization of the American Business Elite and Participation of Corporation Directors in the Governance of American Institutions," American Sociological Review, v. 44 (August, 1979) 553-572.

Whitt J. Allen, "Is Oil Different? A Comparison of the Social Backgrounds and Organizational Affiliation of Oil and Non-oil Directors," Social Problems , v. 29, no. 2, (December 1981) 142-150.

Whitaker, Robert W., The New Right Papers , New York, St. Martin's Press, 1982. 83

Appendix. Boards of directors.

Institute for Contemporary Studies

Leif H. Olsen - Chairman of the Board A. Lawrence Chickering - Executive Director

Shirley R. Chilton Robert J. Derr Eli S. Jacobs Joseph J. Jacobs Vincent W. Jones William L. Knecht J. Clayburn LaForce Henry Lucas, Jr. Richard J. MacLaury Francis A. O'Connell, Jr. Laurence H. Silberman Judge J. P. Vukasin, Jr. Glenn Dumke Jan J. Erteszek Donald Rumsfeld Robert D. Stuart, Jr. H. Monroe Brov/ne Edwin Meese III Caspar W. Weinberger

Founded: 1971. Staff: 12. Organizations, corporations and individuals interested in developing and publishing public policy studies and distributing them to leaders in government, the media and universities. Undertakes the study of an issue if it has some bearing on the free-market system, is immediately relevant and has ongoing impact and importance. Maintains Public Affairs Fellowship Program. Publi- cations: (1) Journal of Contemporary Studies, quarterly; (2) The Letter, quarterly. Convention/Meeting: annual - always January, Pebble Beach, CA.

Encyclopedia of Associations .

Heritage Foundation

The Honorable Ben B. Blackburn The Honorable Frank Shakespeare Dr. David R. Brown Joseph Coor The Honorable Shelby Cullom Davis Midge Decter The Honorable Jack Eckerd Dr. Edwin J.Feulner Joseph R. Keys Dr. Robert H. Krieble Lewis E. Lehrman J.F. (Fritz) Rench The Honorable William E. Simon The Honorable Frank J. Walton

Founded: 1974. Public policy research institute dedicated to the principles of free competitive enterprise, limited government, individual liberty and a strong national defense. Publishes research in various formats for the benefit of decision-makers and the interested public. Programs include: analysis of current public policy subjects; monographs on major public policy subjects; seminars on major fundamental issues designed to inform and encourage interaction between policy-makers and the public; conferences on education and business issues. Heritage Resource bank provides communication among 1000 academics and several hundred other policy research groups. Departments: Foreign Policy Studies; Legislative Information; Research; Resource Bank; Special Projects; Studies; United Nations Assessment Program. Publications: (1) Background/Issue Bulletins, weekly; (2) National Security Record, monthly; (3) Policy Digest (business executives' newsletter), monthly; (4) Heritage Today (newsletter), 6/year; (5) Institution Analysis, quarterly; (6) Policy Review (public policy journal), quarterly; (7) Education Update, semi-annual; also publishes reserach papers, studies, books, and monographs

Encyclopedia of Associations 85

American Enterprise Institute

Richard B. Madden - Chairman William J. Baroody, Jr. - Chief Executive Officer W. Wallace Abbott William 0. Beers John Burditt Williard C. Butcher Edwin L. Cox Richard J. Farrell Charles T. Fisher, III Robert S. Hatfield H. J. Haynes Lewis E. Lehrman Robert H. Malott Paul A. Miller Paul F. Oreffice David Packerd J. S. Parker W. F. Rockwell, Jr. Herman J. Schmidt Mark Sheper, Jr. Richerd R. Shinn R. G. Wingerter Richard D. Wood Walter Wriston

Founded: 1943. Staff: 150. "Nonpartisan research and educational organization supported by grants from foundations and contributions from corporations and individuals." Aims are "to assist policy-makers, scholars, businessmen, the press and the public by providing objective analysis of national and international issues." Studies are commissioned in the areas of government regulation, economics, energy, health, foreign policy, defense, political and social processes, social security and retirement, tax policy, legal policy and legislative analyses. Foster- ing competition of ideas is a principal objective; the institute itself does not take positions on policy issues. Programs and studies are mon- itored by panels of distinguished scholars, a Council of Academic Ad- visors and a program priorities advisory committee. Sponsors Francis Boyer Lecture; bestows annual award. Maintains library of 8000 volumes. Publications: (1) Economist, monthly; (2) Foreign Policy and Defense Review, bimonthly; (3) Public Opinion, bimonthly; (4) Regulation, bimonthly; also publishes books, monographs and produces monthly series of television shows. Formerly: American Enterprise Association. Convention/Meeting: annual board of trustees meeting.

Encyclopedia of Associations 86

Brookings Institute

Robert V. Roosa - Chariman Andrew Heiskell — Vice Chairman Louis W. Cabot — Vice Chairman

Vincent M. Barnett, Jr. Barton M. Biggs Frank T. Cary A. W. Clausen William T. Coleman, Jr. Lloyd N. Cutler Bruce B. Dayton John D. deButts George M. Elsey Hanna H. Gray Huntington Harris Roger W. Heyns Carla A. Hills Lane Kirkland Bruce K. MacLaury Robert S. McNamara Arjay Miller Herbert P. Patterson Donald S. Perkins J. Woodward Redmond Charles W. Robinson James D. Robinson III Henry B. Schacht Warren M. Shapleigh Phyllis A. Wallace

Founded: 1927. Staff: 220. Not a membership organization. Independent organization devoted to non-partisan research, education and publication in the fields of economics, government and foreign policy. Maintains library of 5,000 volumes. Divisions: Advanced Study; Economic Studies; Foreign Policy Studies; Governmental Studies; Publications; Social Science Computation Center. Publications: (1) Brookings Bulletin, quarterly; (2) Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2/year; (3) An- nual Report; also publishes its research in books and reprints. Formed by merger of: Institute of Economics; Institute . for Government Re- search; Robert Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government.

Encyclopedia of Associations 87

Council on Foreion Relations

David Rockefeller - Chairman of the Board Winston Lord - President John Temple Swing — Vice President and Secretary

Graham T. Allison, Jr. Richard L. Gelb Theodore M. Hesburgh Lucien W. Pye William D. Ruckelshaus Martha Redfield Wallace George S. Franklin Edward K. Hamilton Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Lane Kirkland Peter G. Peterson George P. Shultz Stephen Stamas Franklin Hall Williams W. Michael Blumenthal Philip L. Geyelin James Hoge C. Peter McColough William D. Rogers Cyrus R. Vance Marina v.N. Whitman Walter B. Wriston

Founded: 1921. Members: 2031. Staff: 95. Local Groups: 37. Individuals with specialized knowledge of and interest in international affairs. "To study the international aspects of American political, economic and strategic problems." Research projects are carried out by professional staff advised by study groups of selected statesmen, business leaders and academic experts. Operates International Affairs Fellowship Program, awarding eight to 12 grants annualy for advanced international relations research by Americans between the ages of 27 and 35. Maintains extensive library. Publications: (1) Foreign Affairs, 5/year; (2) Annual Report; also publishes specialized studies on various aspects of U.S. foreign policy. Convention/Meeting: annual - always fall.

Encyclopedia of Associations 88

REGIONS AND DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1

NORTHED

CENTRAL

NORTH

PACIFIC

ALASKA

U.S- Department of Commerce BUREAU OF THE CENSUS

Map 1