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Home , 7th Division (Australia), Arthur Allen (general), Charles Spry, Chester Wilmot, Corps of Staff Cadets, Edmund Herring

‘The Making of a : Lost Years, Forgotten Battles’

Lieutenant General

1894-1941

by

Peter J Dean B.A. (Hons), Grad Dip Ed.

Major-General Frank H Berryman, 1942

A thesis submitted to the University of in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

Sydney, , 2007 COPYRIGHT STATEMENT

‘I hereby grant the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all proprietary rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation. I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstract International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only). I have either used no substantial portions of copyright material in my thesis or I have obtained permission to use copyright material; where permission has not been granted I have applied/will apply for a partial restriction of the digital copy of my thesis or dissertation.'

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Date ……………………………………………...... PLEASE TYPE THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES Thesis/Dissertation Sheet

Surname or Family name: Dean

First name: Peter Other name/s: John

Abbreviation for degree as given in the University calendar: PhD

School: History Faculty: Arts & Social Sciences

Title: ‘The Making of a General: Lost Years, Forgotten Battles’ General Frank Berryman 1894-1941

Abstract 350 words maximum: (PLEASE TYPE) This thesis examines the early military career and life of Frank Berryman from 1894 through to the end of his involvement in the campaigns. It begins with his family background and education on the outskirts of before tracing, in detail, his personal life and military career until the end of 1941. The specific focus of this investigation is not just his military education and his role in the and Syrian campaigns, but also the development of his personality and character. Personality and character provides a window of insight that not only helps to illuminate Berryman’s performance as an and his professional relationships but it also allows for a deeper understanding of this complex individual. This thesis argues that these, the ‘lost years’ and ‘forgotten battles’, are integral to developing an understanding of this exceptional officer. In Berryman we see an important staff officer and commander whose place in Australia’s military history has been largely overlooked.

One of the central themes of this work is that Berryman has been misunderstood and misrepresented within the existing historiography. He was one of the most important figures in the Australian during the Second World War and it was during the period covered in this thesis that he established his reputation as a commander and staff officer. Key to this investigation, therefore, is the themes of Berryman’s developing leadership and culture of command. This work seeks to reveal the nature and experience of a highly successful officer who is also, to a great extent, representative of a generation of permeant Staff officers who have largely been ignored within the genre of Australian military biography.

Ultimately this thesis concludes that Berryman was a central figure in the ’s success in Cyrenaica and . He demonstrated all of the qualities essential for a successful commander and senior officer and it was in these battles and his earlier military and life experiences that set the stage for his exceptional performance and contribution to the success of the Australian Army, not only in the Middle East but also later in the South West Pacific Campaigns.

Declaration relating to disposition of project thesis/dissertation

I hereby grant to the University of New South Wales or its agents the right to archive and to make available my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in the University libraries in all forms of media, now or here after known, subject to the provisions of the Copyright Act 1968. I retain all property rights, such as patent rights. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

I also authorise University Microfilms to use the 350 word abstract of my thesis in Dissertation Abstracts International (this is applicable to doctoral theses only).

…………………………………………… ……………………………………..…………… ……….……………………...… Signature Witness Date

The University recognises that there may be exceptional circumstances requiring restrictions on copying or conditions on use. Requests for restriction for a period of up to 2 years must be made in writing. Requests for a longer period of restriction may be considered in exceptional circumstances and require the approval of the Dean of Graduate Research.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY Date of completion of requirements for Award:

THIS SHEET IS TO BE GLUED TO THE INSIDE FRONT COVER OF THE THESIS ORIGINALITY STATEMENT

‘I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial proportions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project's design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.’

Signed

Date: 22 January 2007 For all of the soldiers of my family who have fought in Australia’s wars and in particular for:

NX 1662 Lance Patrick Goggin MM, b. 1894 – Died of Wounds, 7 January 1937.

&

NX 5026 Sargent John Carnel Goggin, b. 1890 – Killed in Action, Hangard Wood, 7 April 1918.

They knew first hand the deprivations and sacrifice of a soldier’s life. CONTENTS

Page Contents v Acknowledgements vii Maps x Figures xi Abbreviations xii Introduction 1

The Formative Years ______

Chapter One ‘The Foundations of a Military Career’ 24 From to Duntroon

Chapter Two ‘A Military Education’ 48 The Royal Military College Duntroon, 1913-1915

Chapter Three ‘A Gunners War’ 65 War & the Western Front, 1915-1918

Chapter Four ‘The Bitter-Sweet Years’ 102 The Staff Corps, Romance, and Camberley, 1919-1929

Chapter Five ‘Hard Work and Friends in High Places’ 132 Depression, Rearmament, and Resentment, 1929-1939

v The Architect of Victory ______

Chapter Six ‘Friends, Colleagues and Conflict’ 153

Colonel F.H. Berryman and the Preparations for War, September 1939 – December 1940

Chapter Seven ‘Planning for Victory’ 179 F.H. Berryman and the Battle for , December 1940 - January 1941

Chapter Eight ‘The Perfect Battle’ 217 , January 1941

A Fighting Leader ______

Chapter Nine ‘Commanding from the Front’ 239 Operation Exporter & the Battle for Merdjayoun, January 1941-June 1941

Chapter Ten ‘Artillery Commander’ 283 The Battle for Damour, July – December 1941

Conclusion ‘In Reflection 1894-1941’ 311

Appendices

Appendix A Berryman Family Tree 333

Appendix B 6th Australian Operational Order No.6 334 For the Capture of Bardia 1 January 1941.

Appendix C Career details and appointments: 341 Lieutenant-General F.H. Berryman 1913-1946

Bibliography 348

vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While ultimately a thesis is an individual journey there is inevitably going to be a vast community of supporters who have contributed to the project and helped it to reach it goals. Firstly I would like to acknowledge the support of the Berryman family, especially Sir Frank’s son Richard and daughter Ann. They have been most supportive of the project and have provided me with interviews, open access to the family’s papers and most importantly their trust in me to provide an accurately and fair assessment of their father’s life.

Any good historical work must be grounded in archival research. This thesis would not have been possible without the help of the staff at a number of Australian and overseas archives, libraries and institutions. I would like to especially thank; David Jolliffe and the staff at the whose efficiency, friendly disposition and knowledge were of immense value. This thanks must also extend to James Zobel of the Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives in Norfolk Va, Luke Savage – archivist at , Dr John Bourne (University of Birmingham), Associate Professor Andrew Moore (University of Western Sydney), the staff at the National Archives of Australia (both in and Sydney), and the staff at the National Library of Australia.

Particular thanks must also go to Professor (Australian National University), for his advice, support, encouragement and access to his personal research collection. A special note must be made of the support of Roger Lee and the Royal Australian Army History Unit. Their award of an Army Research Scholarship made an exceptionally valuable financial contribution to the project.

My thanks also extend to; Lorraine Shannon who provided excellent advice in the editing of my work and Professor Simon Adams (Executive Dean Arts & Sciences, University of Notre Dame) for support of the project. To the fine soldiers of Echo 2/17th Royal New South Wales Regiment with whom I have spent the last six years of my service with the Australian Army Reserve, I thank them for their support and understanding. In particular I would like to acknowledge Sheldon Klotz,

vii Tony Ventorino, Nathan Butson, Craig Batty, and Scott Cook. I would also like to thank Lieutenant-Colonel Mathew Jones who on a number of occasions went through maps and operational orders with me and gave me sound tactical and operational advice (that can only come from a professionally trained staff officer) on my thoughts and interpretations of the Battles of Bardia, Tobruk and Merdjayoun.

This dissertation would not have been completed if it was not for the help of my friends and colleagues at the University of New South Wales. Financial assistance was provided to me by both the School of History and in particularly the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences which helped to facilitate research on three continents. I would like to thank the academic and administrative staff in the School of History who provided an excellent support network during the completion of my thesis. In particular I would like to thank Dr Jean Gelman-Taylor and Dr Mina Roces for their guidance and advice as postgraduate co-ordinators and Dr Grace Karskens for her assistance and counsel. Jo Daniels, Lyn Stump, Inge Mayne and Sam Russell always had the right answer to even the most difficult or obvious of questions.

To the history post-graduate community at UNSW, I owe my continued sanity. Throughout my degree I shared space, problems, politics and all of the ups and the downs of postgraduate life with them. A special note goes to Sophie Lieberman and Craig Turnbull, Edmund McMahon, Sascha Davies and Mathew Fitzpatrick. My greatest supporters at UNSW however were my supervisors. My co-supervisor Associate Professor Raelene Francis always provided a sympathetic ear, guidance, support and direction in my PhD, work and life. However I would like to offer my greatest thanks to Associate Professor Bruce Scates, my supervisor. Bruce’s vast knowledge of Australian history was a most valuable resource for my work and Bruce gave his unbridled support to my thesis as well as my other endeavours at the university. His creative input, editing and enthusiasm for the project were instrumental in the completion of this thesis.

I would like to especially thank my fiends and family for their support, guidance and interest. To Craig Bolger and Paul Jenkins, my closets friends, who are always there when needed - I cannot thank you enough. A sympathetic ear was always provided by Bianca Roche and Gillian Hodgson, while Xavier and Sienna Bolger could always

viii manage to lift my spirits. My love and thanks goes out to the Lee family; Michael & Vivienne, Adam & Lisa, Sean & Annette and Jean, who endured many a drawn out discussion over Sunday dinner and who always make me feel so welcome in their family and home. To my sister Sharon whose love and support I can always rely on and whose home I am welcomed into as if it was my own. My most special thanks go to Liberty who has provided unconditional love and support during these past four years and to my parents John & Ann; I owe a life time of gratitude and love to them for the support, faith and belief that they have shown in me.

ix List of Maps

1 The Somme 1916 70

2 The Western Front 1917 84

3 The Western Front 1918 92

4 Berryman’s Plan for Phase I and II at Bardia, HQ 186

5 Detail of Phase II of Berryman’s plan as at 1 January 1941 201

6 Savige’s plan for 17th at Bardia 203

7 Bardia at dusk on 3 January 1941 207

8 The Attack of the AIF, 4 January 1941 210

9 The Situation at Tobruk at the end of the first day, 21 January 1941 228

10 Tobruk the Final Phase, 22 January 1941 230

11 ‘The Vichy French Counter Attack’ (detail), 14-16 June 1941 261

12 The situation at Merdjayoun, 16 June 1941 264

13 2/2nd Attack 17 June 1941 266

14 Situation on Berryman’s right flank, Merdjayoun 18-22 June 1941 273

15 Attack of 2/33rd Battalion and 2nd Battalion King’s Own Royal 274 Rifle Corps – 23 June 1941

16 Berryforce dispositions and the attack on Col’s Ridge, 25-29 June 1941 279

17 The Battle for Damour and the end of the Syrian Campaign, 292 4-13 July 1941

x List of Figures

1 Mr Mamoru Shigemitsu of signs the surrender document, 1945 3 1.0 The Berryman Family 33

2.0 Cadet F.H. Berryman and section, circa 1913 53

2.1 Royal Military College Duntroon, 3rd Class circa 1915 57

3.0 Lieutenant Frank H Berryman AIF, Circa 1915 66

3.1 Studio portrait of Frank Horton Berryman, DSO, Brigade 91 Major 7th Infantry Brigade, 1918

3.2 Staff of the 7th Australian Infantry 98 Brigade Headquarters, 1 January 1919

4.0 Studio portrait of Muriel Whipp, circa 1923/1924 113

4.1 Gates at Staff College Camberley, winter 1928 126

4.2 Frank and Muriel Berryman’s European Tour, 1928 130

5.0 Berryman at the service, 1931 134

6.0 Officers waiting at the embarkation of the second convoy AIF 159 Melbourne, April 1940

6.1 Senior Officers 6th Division AIF, Ikingi Maryut area 1941 162

9.0 HQ. Hill 1284, Syria 1941 249

9.1 ’s Allen, Berryman & Baxter-Cox celebrate the capture 255 of Merdjayoun, 11 June 1941

9.2 ‘The Mad Mile’ – Djezzine, 1941 257

9.3 ‘Merdjayoun’ by Harold Herbert. A reconstructed view of the action 268 at Merdjayoun, Syria 1941

10.0 Gunner A.M. Weaver, R.J. Triglone And 289 Gunner W.A. Mckenzie Manning A Flash Spotting Post Of the 2/1st Australian Survey Regiment, El Ain, Syria, 1941

xi ABBREVIATIONS

AA&QMG Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (divisional staff) ABC Australian Broadcasting Commission (now Corporation) ABDA American, British, Dutch Australian (Command) ADC Aide de Camp ADFA Academy AIF Australian Imperial Force AMF Australian Military Forces ANZAC Australian and Army Corps Arty Artillery Aust Australia AWM Australian War Memorial Bde Brigade Berry Berryman, Frank Horton BFP Berryman Family Papers BGS Staff (corps staff) BM Brigade Major (brigade staff) BMRA Brigade Major, Bn Battalion Brig Brigadier Bty Battery Capt Captain CB Companion of the CBE Companion of the Order of the CCRA Commander, Corps Royal Artillery CGS Chief of the General Staff CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff C-in-C Commander in Chief CMF Citizen Military Forces CO Commanding officer Comd Commander Coy Company CRA Commander, Royal Artillery (division) CRE Commander, Royal Engineers (division) DA&QMG Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General (corps staff) DAQMG Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General (divisional staff) DCGS Deputy Chief of the General Staff Div Division DSO Distinguished Service Order FHB Frank Horton Berryman Fwd Forward GHQ General Headquarters GOC General Officer Commanding GSO1 General Staff Officer Grade 1 (also G1, divisional staff) GS02 General Staff Officer Grade 2 GS03 General Staff Officer Grade 3 HQ Headquarters IO Intelligence officer

xii Inf Infantry KBE Knight Commander of the Order of the British Empire KCB Knight Commander of the Bath LHCMA Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College, London LHQ Land Headquarters Lt Col LO Liaison Officers L of C Lines of Communication Maj Major MC ME Middle East MG MGGS Major-General General Staff MMMA MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia MS Manuscript MT Motor Transport NCO Non-Commissioned Officer NGF Force NLA National Library of Australia OC Officer Commanding (company, battery) OO Operations Order OP Observation Post Pl Posn Position PRO Public Record Officer (Kew, London) Recce Reconnaissance Regt Regiment RSL Returned Servicemen’s League Sigs Signals SLNSW State Library, New South Wales SWPA South West Pacific Area RAA Royal Australian Artillery RMO Regimental Medical Officer RNF Royal Northumberland Fusiliers RTR Royal Regiment TAB Thomas Albert Blamey TEWT Tactical Exercise Without Troops Tps Troops VC Cross VPRO Victorian Public Records Office US United States WO Warrant Officer

xiii Introduction

Introduction

‘Misunderstood, Misrepresented and Largely Forgotten’

‘When writers discuss generals it is not fair to give details of personal leadership and risk taken in some cases and omit to mention them in other cases including my own. My record will stand on its merit…I’ve been too preoccupied with the duties of leadership to paint glowing pictures to [press correspondents]. I have not been portrayed correctly by the members of your profession. I do not necessarily desire publicity but my biography might be useful to provide a background in any serious articles by your friends. I know you will treat this subject as confidential and I think you know I have great confidence in your wisdom and discretion.’ Lieutenant General Frank H Berryman to Lieutenant Colonel A G Fenton (Assistant Director of Public Relations, AHQ), 21 November 1944.

The Pinnacle of Success The day was dark and overcast, a remnant of the typhoon that had delayed the impending proceedings for the previous two days. Fifty senior military officers lined up on the open quarter deck of the USS Missouri. Surrounding them, on every vantage point, were the officers and sailors of the Missouri as well as camera men and reporters. The senior officers came together in a ragged formation, in the words of one American officer they were ‘milling about… as though they were at a junior prom.’1 In the front stood the senior delegates from each of the Allied powers that were represented. They lined up from right to left in the order that they would sign the document of surrender. Behind them, in descending order of seniority, came the remaining delegates of each Allied power representing the various arms of service; Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines. In the centre of the quarter deck sat a table, covered with green baize set with one chair on either side, where the formalities would take place.2

Directly behind the , General Douglas MacArthur, and squeezed between Lieutenant General K.N. Derevyanko of the and Colonel L. Moore Cosgrave of Canada stood the Australian Commander in Chief, General Sir . Lieutenant General Frank H. Berryman, the Australian

1 Colonel I. Bennett [interview], ‘Contribution from the Public’, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives [Norfolk, Virginia, USA] , RG-15, Box 75, Fol “Vallery, David”. Bennett provides an insightful recount of events that morning. 2 J.P. Buckley, ‘The victory year 1945’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 113 July/ Aug 1995, p. 40. 1 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Army representative to the and Blamey’s most trusted subordinate stood immediately behind his commander in chief.3

Soon after the officers were assembled the eleven Japanese representatives, five civilians and six military officers, headed by Japanese Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu arrived. With a solemn expression and eyes bowed Shigemitsu reflected the fortunes of his nation’s experience of war. He sat down at the desk on the quarter deck of the Missouri, a symbol of American power anchored in the heart of Tokyo Bay, and slowly but deliberately he removed his top hat before signing two copies of the surrender document, one for the Allies bound in green and one in black for his own country. As he signed, Berryman ‘leaned forward from behind Blamey…and fixed Shigemitsu with a very deliberate stare. Shigemitsu caught [the] look’ and raised his eyes to Berryman from his chair before lowering them back to the document.4

For Berryman the Japanese surrender ceremony was to be the high point of his military career. Over the preceding six years he had risen from Colonel and GS01 6th Australian Division in the Middle East to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Chief of Staff New Guinea Force, Commander I and II Corps AIF, Chief of Staff Australian Military Forces and Commander of Advanced Land Headquarters during the Pacific campaigns. From 1943 he was, in effect, Blamey’s ‘right hand man’ and responsible for the operational planning of the Australian Army in the South West Pacific. It was in the war against Japan that Berryman had made his greatest contribution to the Australian Army.5

3 Ibid. The rest of the Australian delegation, Rear Moore, Air Vice Marshals Jones and Bostock lined up behind Berryman. 4 Colonel I. Bennett [interview], ‘Contribution from the Public’, Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives, RG-15, Box 75, Fol “Vallery, David”. 5 It has been noted that ‘Berryman is primarily remembered as the principal planner of successful operations against the Japanese in New Guinea during WW II. First as chief of staff New Guinea Force, and then in November 1944, when he was appointment to command II Corps, he supervised operations in the Finisterre, , and Markham Valleys.’ See R.S. Billett, ‘Berryman, Lieutenant-General Sir Frank (1894-1981)’, in Joan Beaumont (ed), Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, Vol VI The Australian Centenary History of Defence, (, Melbourne, 2001), p. 139. 2 Introduction

Figure 1: Berryman ‘leaned forward from behind Blamey…and fixed Shigemitsu with a very deliberate stare.’ Mr Mamoru Shigemitsu of Japan signs the surrender document, 1945. (AWM No. 019128)6

One of Berryman’s most significant achievements during this time was his corps command in New Guinea from November 1943 until April 1944. During this time the AIF captured Sattelberg and fought their way up the , linking up with the Americans at Saidor. In the period from September 1943 to April 1944, Australian forces had not only captured Finschhafen and other important points in the area but they had also soundly defeated [their] principle opponent, the 20th Japanese Division, and had mauled elements of two other divisions – The Finschhafen-Langemak Bay-Dreger Harbour area was transformed into a massive sea and air base from which subsequent amphibious operations against Hollandia and were launched. It was a considerable achievement.7

6 The Allied delegations are lined up behind their delegation leader waiting their turn to sign the surrender document. This photo, one of the many taken during the ceremony, captures the moment precisely. Berryman (second row directly behind MacArthur) can be seen staring at Shigemitsu over Blamey’s shoulder. For a discussion of photographs and digital collections see Joanna Sassoon, ‘Photographic meaning in of digital reproduction’, Lasie, vol. 29, No. 4, December, 1998, p. 5-15. 7 , An Atlas of Australia's wars, Vol VII The Australian Centenary History of Defence, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001), p. 252. 3 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Throughout his time as GOC 2nd Corps, Berryman followed the same ideals in personal leadership that he had shown in the Middle East in 1940-41 and had continued, where possible, as a staff officer and commander in the Pacific. He was steadfast, led by example and visited the forward troops as often as possible. During the assault and capture of Mount Tambu near Salamaua, and similarly on many other occasions, Berryman was in the front line sharing the privations of his men, motivating and making sure that every soldier knew that his contribution was appreciated. This type of leadership was not commonly displayed by a Lieutenant-General commanding a corps of two divisions.8 Berryman’s success as a corps commander did not go unnoticed or unappreciated. The Allied Commander in Chief South West Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur, described him as ‘quite brilliant’ and Blamey praised his ‘skilful planning, able supervision and vigorous leadership’.9

However Berryman's accomplishments as a commander, either in the Middle East or the Pacific, are not generally recognised nor remembered. More commonly Berryman is known and remembered for his roles and positions as a staff officer. During the Second World War he made his name within the army as an operations staff officer at the Battles of Bardia and Tobruk in the Middle East and followed this up with outstanding performances as the Chief of Staff to New Guinea Force and Deputy Chief of the General Staff. From the time of his arrival in in late 1942 Berryman served as Blamey’s principal operational staff officer for the remainder of the war and it is in this role that Berryman cemented his reputation.10 As David Horner notes in his authoritative study of General Blamey, The Commander in Chief, Berryman was ‘an outstanding staff officer, forceful, tough and decisive…’11 David Moore in the History of the Royal Military College of Australia argued that Berryman was ‘the finest staff officer in the army.’12

However Berryman’s rise to prominence had not been preordained. He had returned from Australia’s war in the Middle East at the end of 1941 as a Brigadier with

8 ‘Records of ’, Australian War Memorial (AWM) 67, 3-30 part 2. 9 As quoted in John Hetherington, Blamey: controversial soldier (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1973), p. 343. 10 David Horner, Blamey: The Commander in Chief, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998), p. 372. 11 Ibid. 12 David Moore, A History of the Royal Military College of Australia, 1911-2001, (RMC, Canberra, 2001), p. 401. 4 Introduction

a reputation as not only an outstanding staff officer, excellent commander and loyal subordinate, but also as a difficult and trying colleague. Some officers also believed that he held distinct anti-militia sentiments. Furthermore Berryman had nurtured a close professional relationship with Lieutenant General J.D. Lavarack in the Middle East and and this relationship, with Blamey’s closest rival and bitter enemy, did not endear him to the Commander in Chief. 13

It took several months and several campaigns to smooth over these differences. It was not until late 1942 and his appointment as Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCGS) that Berryman began to make his mark on both Blamey and the . In his role as DCGS Berryman was able, for the first time, to work closely with Blamey. The two men formed a very close working relationship, so close that one of Blamey’s biographers, John Hetherington, noted that ‘no two men could have worked together more effectively or with fewer disagreements.’14 However, Berryman was anything but a ‘yes’ man to the Commander in Chief. He frequently opposed Blamey on a number of operational and strategic issues and Blamey often changed his mind on the advice of Berryman and others such as Charles (‘Gaffer’) Lloyd. Blamey was endeared to Berryman's predilection for secrecy as well as his candid and loyal demeanour.

With the twin postings as DCGS and Chief of Staff of New Guinea Force, the principal Australian army formation in the South-West Pacific Area, Berryman became ‘one of the most important officers in the Australian army in its struggle against the Japanese.’15 Blamey and Berryman remained close for the rest of the war and Blamey came to rely heavily on Berryman for advice.16

Berryman's importance within the army high command was further enhanced by his particular talents in inter-Allied cooperation. One of the most beneficial skills that he possessed, which assisted both Blamey and the army, was that Berryman developed an intimate, personnel and professional relationship with Australia's most important allies,

13 Berryman’s relationship with Lavarack actually stretched as far back as the First World War. 14 John Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1973), p. 294. 15 Peter Dennis (et al), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1999), p. 96. 16 Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, p. 312. 5 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

the Americans. As the key planning and operations officer, Berryman worked closely with MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ). The relationship between Australian and American commanders was often difficult and strained, fuelled by competing political and military objectives and cultural misunderstandings.17 But as John Hetherington points out Berryman understood the Americans and they understood him; he had a knack of avoiding friction without sacrificing Australian dignity or interests. His achievements in keeping the peace were of no mean order in light of America's preponderant contribution to the overall forces under MacArthur's command. It was a time when a careless word or a thoughtless gesture could have upset the delicate balance of the Australian-American partnership.18

The other major reason that Blamey respected Berryman so much, and was so reliant on him for advice, was that he saw Berryman not as a rival, but as a trustworthy and very capable subordinate, one who at all times made paramount the interests of the army and gave loyalty to his commander-in-chief above his own ambition. As a consequence, Berryman's personality and achievements have been overshadowed by Blamey's.19

When and if Berryman is spoken of by historians and commentators it is generally in the context of the Pacific campaigns. He is, however, remembered fleetingly in the standard texts of the period, a less than memorable adjutant to the ‘big man’ Blamey. Berryman carried out his work in the Pacific, as with his whole career, with little fanfare or publicity, indeed several newspapers after the war asked the question - who is this officer? This question became critical to both journalists and the public alike when Berryman emerged in 1945 as one of the leading candidates to become the post-war Chief of the General staff.20 This lack of publicity, notoriety or

17Peter J. Dean ‘The forgotten man: Lieut.-General Sir Frank Berryman’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 37, October, 2002. See also ‘Berryman to Lt-Col Fenton’, 21 November 1944, AWM PR 84/370. 18 Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, p. 343. 19 In many respects Berryman is somewhat similar to John Currey’s observations of the First Fleet officer, David Collins. Currey argued that Collins ‘In the grand scheme of things… he [was so]… close to the centre of so many significant events [and] personalities, [that he is]...a truly historical figure.’ See John Currey, ‘History, Biography and the Past’, Tasmanian Historical Journal, Vol 7, No. 2, 2001, p. 42, 44. 20 See Newspaper clippings 1945-1946, ‘Berryman Family Scrap Book’, Berryman Family Papers, p. 9- 17 & Newspaper clippings regarding his possible appointment as Chief of the General Staff 1948, Papers of Lieutenant General Berryman, AWM PR84/370, item 16. See also ‘Records of Gavin Long’, AWM 67 2/99. Long (the official historian) wrote in his notes book in 1945 ‘What would he (Lieutenant General ) come back to? TAB (Blamey) would presumably have the nomination of his 6 Introduction

recognition of his role in the Pacific has largely carried over into the broader historiography of the war and has meant that although one of the most important senior officers in the Australian Army in the Second World War he is the most forgotten.21

Berryman’s presence on the deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay can easily be viewed as the pinnacle of his career. Undoubtedly the Pacific war is the most important period of Berryman’s career and there is a desperate need for a thorough historical investigation of his role in these campaigns. But an investigation of Berryman’s Pacific campaigns without contextualising his earlier career would make for an unbalanced analysis. To achieve an understanding of Berryman’s rise to prominence within the army any thorough historical investigation must first dissect his career and campaigns leading up to his promotion to Major-General and his move to the Pacific theatre of operations in 1942.

* * * Forging a Reputation Even more so than in the historiography of the Pacific War Berryman’s role as a staff officer and commander in the Middle East suffers from a considerable a degree of historical neglect. The nature and circumstances of Berryman’s role in the historiography of the Middle East campaigns is, however, different. While he is remembered as relatively important figure at Bardia, Tobruk and in the Syrian campaign he has suffered, like all of the officers and men involved, from the relative obscurity of these battles. Furthermore when Berryman has been included in historical discourse he has commonly been misrepresented during this period as tactically deficient, personally ‘difficult’ and particularly biased against senior Australian officers whose service had been based in the part time militia. This characterisation of Berryman is in critical need of a thorough investigation and reappraisal.

To remove this shroud of mystery that surrounds Berryman’s career, to begin to uncover his true character, his major contribution to the Australian military and the reasons for his rejection in much of the historiography we must delve into the years that

successor and would see to it that Lavarack was retired and Rowell shelved. Would Berryman become CGS? 21 Dean, ‘The forgotten man: Lieut.-General Sir Frank Berryman’, p. 5. 7 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

lead him towards his greatest accomplishments. This deliberate focus on the ‘development’ of Berryman as an officer calls for a close analysis of his early career and an even closer analysis of his performances on the battlefields of France during the First World War and in the Middle East during 1940-1941. Major-General Berryman did not arrive at New Guinea Force Headquarters as a blank canvas – his skills, attitudes, values and personal characteristics that had seen him rise to become a general had already been moulded during the preceding 47 years. To understand Berryman’s ‘apprenticeship’ we need to undertake a ‘blow by blow’ detailed and analytical approach to this period of his life.

Opinions of Berryman during the Pacific campaigns, both negative and positive, were largely formed by his colleagues and historians long before his arrival in New Guinea in December 1942.22 Berryman has suffered from more than his fair share of criticism from his peers and historians. These have mainly centred on his personal characteristics and his opinions of his fellow officers, especially those in the Militia. While often acknowledged as an outstanding staff officer Berryman is more often remembered as ‘Berry the Bastard’, a hard, uncompromising, reserved, sarcastic officer who loathed senior militia officers. These traits, it is argued, developed in the inter war period and the Middle East and Berryman carried them with him throughout the rest of his career. He is characterised as an officer who went out of his way to push the cause of the permanent Staff Corps at the expense of his part time comrades.

Character and Personality The ability to prove or disprove this characterisation of Berryman can only be undertaken through a study of his training as a military officer, his formative experiences as a career officer in the interwar period and his relationships with his fellow officers, militia and Staff Corps, during Australia’s campaigns in the Middle East

22 For some examples see Stuart Braga, Kokoda Commander: A Life of Major General Tubby Allen, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004); , Australian Brass: The career of Lieutenant General Sir , (Cambridge University Press, Victoria, 1992), David Horner, General Vasey’s War, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1992), Ivan Chapman, Mackay: Citizen Soldier, (Melway Publishing, Melbourne, 1975), ‘Papers of Lieutenant General S Savige’, AWM 3DRL 2529 & ‘Vasey Family Papers’ National Library of Australia, MS 3782.

8 Introduction

during 1940-1941. The same is true of other key features of Berryman’s controversial career. He arrived at New Guinea Force HQ with a reputation as one of the premier staff officers in the Australian Army and as a soldier who had displayed the capabilities for high command. This reputation, like his character, was built on his experiences during the First World War, at Staff College in the 1920s, as a Brigade Major and staff officer in Australia in the 1930s and through his active service in and Syria. It is only through an investigation of his military success and failures and his formative relationships with his peers and superiors during this time that an understanding of Berryman’s military outlook, career and his personality can be understood.

This phase of an officer’s career is particularly important to their formation as an effective senior military commander or staff officer. As General Montgomery Megis has observed One of the most important things a soldier does is to prepare himself for the time when the nation calls…[and] when the crucial test comes for a senior military leader, whether in peacetime or in war, it is too late then for preparation… A better understanding of the link between what historians term as character and instincts honed over years of service should highlight the qualities that will help senior leaders to prevail in “the hour of the day.”23

Yet these early ‘formative years’ have generally been overlooked in biographical studies on Australia’s senior military officers.

Of the major studies of Australia’s senior army officers few provide an in- depth analysis of their subjects early years or life outside of the military. This is despite the fact that these years are essential to developing an understanding of their personality and character. The importance of personality and character in investigating senior military figures has however been acknowledged in Australia. Author of several key texts in this field and Professor of Australian Defence History at the Australian National University, David Horner has argued that, at ‘the heart of the military problem is the personality of the commander.’24 Horner’s observations about the importance of ‘character’ and development have

23 Montgomery C. Megis, ‘Generalship: Qualities, instincts and character’, Parameters: US Army War College, Vol. 31, No. 2, 2001, p. 15. 24 David Horner (ed), The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984), p. 1. 9 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

been recognised by few of the authors in the field of Australian military biography.25

There are only three biographies of senior Australian army officers that adequately address this issue. The first of these studies is Geoffrey Serle’s excellent study of General Sir .26 Serle gives ‘due weight to his [Monash’s] early years’27 by dedicating over one third of his analysis to Monash’s life and events prior to the First World War.28 Secondly Ross McMullin’s mammoth 700 page study of Brigadier ‘Pompey’ Elliot is dedicated to providing an extraordinary amount of analysis to all facets of Elliot’s life. The third and final text that provides an adequate coverage of the ‘formative’ years of a senior officer is Horner’s recent study of General Sir .29 Horner devotes the first twelve chapters of his work to Wilton’s early life, career at Duntroon, the inter-war period, the Second World War, his staff work in the pre-  Vietnam period and his personal relationship with his wife Helen. Horner’s insightful analysis, which accounts for almost half of the work, allows the reader

25 One of the other major reasons that personality has not been addressed by historians in this genre has been the lack of personal papers for a number of Australian Army officers. As Christopher Wray and Jeffery Grey point out, their biographical subjects – James Whiteside McCay and Horace Robertson – burnt their papers before their deaths, make a personal study almost impossible. 26 Geoffrey Serle, John Monash: A Biography, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2002) (First Edition 1982). Searle’ work falls into the category of a traditional rather than a military biography, thus further removing his work from the orthodox approach to Australian military biography. For the majority of biographies of Australia’s generals very little space, normally no more than one chapter, is devoted to the study of their pre-military life or time spent ‘between the wars’. Often family life and even their wives rate few mentions from historians. For instance David Coombes, Morshead: Hero of Tobruk and , (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001) devotes little more than twelve pages to Morshead’s life, personality development and education prior to . Stuart Braga’s Kokoda Commander: A life of Major-General ‘Tubby’ Allen, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004) only devotes eleven pages to his pre war life and thirteen pages to his post war career. His ‘life’ is almost totally encompassed within his military career. Recognition is given to the fact that these office’s significance to Australian history stem from their military careers and that historian’s are often restricted in the scope of their work by publishers but these men’s personalities, careers, and lives extend well beyond this somewhat narrow focus and that the formative influences on the personalities of these men often came from outside their wartime experiences or even military culture. 27 Rickard, ‘Biography in Australia’, Canberra Historical Journal, 18, 1986, p. 16. 28 Ibid. 29 David Horner, Strategic Command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s Asian Wars, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005).  This is same time period that this PhD thesis covers for Berryman’s life. Horner’s approach is particularly adept given the nature of Wilton’s service (like Berryman) as a Staff Corps officer and his efforts to provide not only a wider context to Wilton’s life, but to also to provide insights into the service of this neglected (and at times maligned) group of officers. Berryman’s and Wilton’s careers provide interesting points of comparison, comprising as they do of two professional officers in the same mode of service, but from different generations. It can also be argued that Wilton was one of Berryman’s protégés. 10 Introduction

to develop a full appreciation of the key influences on Wilton’s career as well as his character, and personality.

‘Personality’ is one of the critical areas of consideration when analysing the development of senior military officers. But like Horner’s work on Wilton it is not the purpose or intent of this work to enter into a psycho-history approach to Berryman’s life. However due recognition must be given to personality and psychology literature. As the eminent British historian A.J.P. Taylor noted ‘biography…raises the terrible shadow of psychology’. Taylor however acknowledged that biographical studies cannot be entirely centred on a psychological approach, but rather that the ‘biographer must employ psychology in less extreme ways’ than pure psycho analysis.30 The military historian Richard Holmes has probably made the most astute observation regarding the interplay between psychology and military history. He noted in his work Firing Line that …despite the risks of venturing into a discipline in which I have no formal training, I have come to the conclusion that, in an attempt to explain some aspects of battlefield behaviour, I must at times leave the terra firma of military history for the quicksands of psychology.’31

Holmes’ approach is especially applicable to an evaluation of Berryman’s development and performance as a leader and commander. It is integral then that broad conclusions have to be drawn between the paradigms of military leadership and psychology through the interplay of personality.

Personality is one of the key features that affect ‘leadership and command’ which is an essential factor in the study of any military officer. While initial attempts to develop theories about military leadership and command have traditionally concentrated heavily on the personality traits of successful leaders, in the post Second World War era it was concluded that ‘personality traits, by themselves, explained very little about leadership.’32 However since the 1990s several psychology theorists such as Luke

30 A.J.P. Taylor, ‘The Historian as Biographer’, From Napoleon to the Second International: Essay on Nineteenth Century Europe, (Penguin, London, 1982), p. 26-28. 31 Richard Holmes, Firing Line, (Pimlico, London, 1985), p. 14. 32 See Luke McCormack and David Mellor, ‘The Role of Personality in Leadership: An Application of the Five-Factor Model in the Australian Military’, Military Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2002, p. 179-197. See also Bartone, Paul T. (et al) ‘Cognitive and Personality Predictors of Leader Performance in West Point Cadets’, Military Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2002, p. 321-322l; H. Canan Sumer (et al), ‘Using a 11 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

McCormack and David Mellor have challenged this view of understanding leadership and it has been concluded that ‘the abandonment of the trait approach to leadership and leadership effectiveness was premature…personality had been dropped prematurely and [it] should re-emerge.’33

Biographies of senior Australian officers have been largely written within the post Second World War paradigm of command and leadership studies and as a result they generally fail to give due weight to the development of personality. Instead they tend to focus on the pinnacle of an officer’s career thus confining the ‘journey’ to this summit, with its formative experiences and critical relationships, to a form of restrictive preamble. All too often this aspect of a life ends up as a series of fragmented stories hastily glossed over in an effort to frame the events of a ‘big battle’ or ‘formative engagement’.

By rejecting this ‘orthodox’ approach to the study of an Australian senior military officers and adopting a methodology similar to Serle, McMulllin and Horner this work seeks to recognising the importance of Holmes and Mellor observations on personality and provide a much broader basis to the study of Berryman’s development as a senior officer. Recognition of these complexities has led to this thesis being constructed around a detailed appraisal of Berryman’s life in the period before and between the two world wars as well as providing for a thorough analysis of his command potential and performance in the First World War and during the Middle East campaigns in the Second World War. This approach also allows this study to integrate ‘the private and public man’.34 What emerges is a more complete appraisal of Berryman’s early life and path to becoming one the Army’s most senior officers during the Pacific campaigns of the Second World War. Berryman, a ‘self made man’, and his accomplishments are enhanced rather than diminished when the most fragmented elements of his life are draw together and an appreciation is made of his formative experiences and relationships.35

Personality-Orientated Job Analysis to Identify Attributes to Be Assessed in Officer Selection’, Military Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 3, 2001, p. 129-146. 33 McCormack and Mellor, ‘The Role of Personality in Leadership: An Application of the Five-Factor Model in the Australian Military’, Military Psychology, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2002, p. 179-197 34 Ibid. 35 Interestingly two of these writers would not classify themselves as ‘military historians’. Serle’s analysis of Monash’s military strengths and weakness covers about one third of his work and while it demonstrates insight this aspect of Serle’s work is not where he is most comfortable. McMullin carries out and extensive review of Elliot’s performance in World War I and devotes more than half of his 700 12 Introduction

Regrettably the application of this form of historical methodology, within the confines of the limited space of a PhD thesis, means that a whole life is beyond the scope of this project. Rather this work is constructed around shining the light of historical discourse on Berryman’s critical formative experiences. It reconstructs Berryman’s journey to the summit of success and provides the essential ground work for any investigation of his later career.

To provide a framework for investigation this thesis is constructed to address three separate, but interrelated components of Berryman’s life. Firstly ‘The Formative Years’ where he is guided by the institution of the family, school and the Army. Secondly, ‘The Architect of victory’, an analysis of his role in the Cyrenaican campaign and lastly, ‘The Commander’, which addressed his leadership of both the artillery and ‘Berryforce’ during the Syrian campaign. This thesis in effect covers the first ‘act’ of what is, in reality, a life that needs a complete two act play to do it justice. But by completing this investigation the essential foundations have been laid for a definitive account of Berryman’s Pacific campaigns and his considerable accomplishments in the post war period.

* * * The Staff Corps While for some officers a narrow focus on the pinnacle of their military careers has left many historical questions unanswered for others it has meant being left unaccounted for altogether. The most glaring omission in the ranks of Australian military biography has been the early graduates of the Royal Military College Duntroon. Permanent officers of Berryman’s generation have been neglected by historians; in fact only one officer of his generation, Lieutenant General Horace Robertson, has been the subject of a biographical study of his life and career.36 This is despite the fact that a page study to his career on the frontline. These examples leave open the question as to why, with the exception of David Horner’s latest work, has it been the non ‘military historians’ who have delved into the broader aspects of their subject’s lives? 36 Jeffrey Grey, Australian Brass: The Career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, (Cambridge, Victoria, 1992). The only other major biographical study of senior Staff Corps officer during Second World War has been Brett Lodge’s, Lavarack: Rival General, (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998). Lavarack however was not a graduate of the Royal Military College Duntroon and was in effect a generation ahead of Berryman. The other significant study that has been made is David Horner’s, General Vasey’s War, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1992). Horner’s work on Vasey is not a 13 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

number of regular officers of Berryman’s generation held important posts in the Australian Army during the Second World War. These are officers whose military contributions were mainly in the area of logistics, organization and structure, operational planning and intelligence but a number, such as Berryman, also held significant command responsibilities. These officers generally lack the glamour and controversy of the better known commanders and their contributions, which often had direct bearing on operations, are usually overlooked.37

There are a number of reasons that these officers have been overlooked but perhaps the most compelling has been the way in which Australia’s military leaders have been remembered (or not) in Australia’s history. Australians have always had a tendency to play down the importance and achievements of their military leaders. The Australian tradition, established at , has been one of honouring the mateship, courage, and steadfastness of individual soldiers – citizens who have volunteered for war service in times of emergency. In earlier years winners such as Albert Jacka and were well-known and widely admired. Belatedly, historians and the public have come to accept that Australia’s military commanders have played a role in the nation’s military success. Thus Generals Sir John Monash and Sir have been recognised for their leadership in the First World War. In the Second World War, Field Marshall Sir Thomas Blamey, Lieutenant-General Sir Lesile Morshead, and Major-General George Vasey became household names, and the importance of their roles during the war were appreciated…It is much harder to place… [professional soldiers] among this pantheon…Earlier generations saw it as more noble to leave a civilian occupation and to join the army in time of war, than to devote a lifetime to study and training in preparation for war. The achievements of citizen soldiers were indeed admirable and worthy of recognition; but as warfare has become more complex…the need for professionals has become paramount. This should now be acknowledged with respect…38 traditional biography rather it is centred on Vasey’s extensive correspondence to his wife during the Second World War. Lieutenant General Sydney Rowell is the only officer of this generation to publish an autobiography, Full Circle, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1974). However Rowell spends only minimal time detailing his career at Duntroon, in World War One and during the inter war period. 37 The genre of military biography in Australia has been dominated by three very distinct military categories, Firstly the Victoria Cross winners, secondly, and a far more prolific field, focuses on the ‘commanders’ and the third and smallest of these categories are the ‘founding fathers’ of Australia’s army. See Chris Coulthard-Clarke, ‘Exploring the history of the Australian Army through biography.’ Journal of the Australian War Memorial, June, 2001, www.awm.gov.au/journal/j34/bioyear.htm & David Horner, ‘Australian military history in the 1980’s: Genres, Military Biography’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 19, November, 1991. 38 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 373. There is room here to argue that perhaps this tradition of ignoring the professional military caste in Australia is part of a much larger ‘British’ tradition that was transferred to Australia. This is based on the Britain have a history of deliberately keeping their regular army as small as possible. 14 Introduction

In fact there are a considerable number of these high ranking professional officers in the pre-war Australian Army, besides Frank Berryman, who have yet to receive the attention of any detailed historical investigation. For example Major- General Beavis, a regular officer and RMC graduate in the same class as Berryman, made a significant contribution to the Australian military.39 Major General Bridgeford is another prominent military officer to fall into this category40 and there are many other officers of this generation that can be added to such a list.41 Berryman, however, stands out amongst his peers. He is one of only two RMC graduates to have commanded a Corps during the Second World War (Lieutenant-General Sydney Rowell the other) and he emerges at the end of the war as the finest staff officer in the army.42 This investigating of Berryman and his early life and career up until the outbreak of the Pacific War is but one small step in the need to broaden the historiography of this much neglected cohort of officers.43

39 During the Second World War he was Director of Ordnance Middle East before returning to Australian as Master-General of Ordinance in 1942. His control and reforms of the ordnance branch played a central role in organising the Australian military during the Second World War and he exercised substantial influence in the professionalisation of the Army. Furthermore he played a prominent role in the establishment of the long range weapons facility at Woomera in the post war period. He was a member and sometimes chair of a number of Department of Defence Committees up to 1952. See Jan Bassett, ‘Beavis, Major-General Leslie Ellis’ in Joan Beaumont (ed), Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001), p. 138 40 A fellow RMC graduate with Beavis and Berryman during WWII he held the positions of; Commanding Officer (C.O.) of the 25th Infantry Brigade, Quarter-Master General 1st Australian Army, and C.O. 1944-45. In the post war period he was appointed to the re-established Military Board and later was Quarter-Master General, and Commander in Chief British Commonwealth Occupation Force Japan. After his military career he was an executive member of the Returned Serviceman’s League, and CEO of the Melbourne Olympic Games in 1954. See Jan Bassett, ‘Bridgeford, Lieutenant-General William’ in Joan Beaumont (ed), Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, p. 141. 41 For instance Major-General – Director of Artillery (1939-40), CRA 7th Div (1940-41), Master-General Ordnance (1941-42), CO 4th Div (1942-44), MGGS N.G. Force (1944), CO 7th Div (1945), DCGS & Adjutant-General (1946-48) Lieutenant-General – Director of Military Operation and Intelligence (1933-38), Chief of the General Staff (1940-42 & 1946-1950), CO 1st Australian Army (1944) and Commander in Chief Australian Military Forces (1945). Lt-General Sydney Rowell – GSO1 6th Division (1939-40) and 1st Aust Corps (1940-41), DCGS (1941- 42), CO 1st Aust Corps (1942) Vice-CGS (1946-50), CGS (1950-54), Chairman of Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (1957-68). 42 D. Moore, Duntroon: A History of the Royal Military College of Australia, 1911-1986, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2001), p. 401. 43 See C. Coulthard-Clarke, ‘Exploring the history of the Australian Army through biography’, p. 3, see www.awm.gov.au/journal/j34/bioyear.htm and David Horner, ‘Australian military history in the 1980’s: Genres, Military Biography’ for an overview of Australian military biography. The major Second World War biographies include: John Hetherington, Blamey, (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1954). W.B Russell, There Goes a Man: The Biography of Sir Stanley G. Savige, (Longmans, London, 1959). Frank Legge, Story, (Angus & Roberston, Sydney, 1965). Brett Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, (Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1998). David Coombes, Morshead: Hero of Tobruk and El Alamein, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001). David Horner, Blamey: The Commander in Chief, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998). Bill Edgar, Warrior of Kokoda: A Biography of Brigadier , (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 15 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Remembering the Middle East If Berryman’s career (amongst others) has been largely forgotten, so too have the campaigns of the Second World War on which this thesis concentrates. The two major campaigns that Berryman was involved in during 1940-41, First Cyrenaica and Syria, remain arguably the most ‘forgotten campaigns’ in the history of the Australian Army during the Second World War.44 They have slipped from memory, overshadowed in the Middle East by the fixation on the 9th Australian Division’s heroic resistance during the and its pivotal role at the Battle of El Alamein.45

In January 1941 the Australian victories at Bardia and Tobruk were hailed throughout the western world.46 These two victories, along with the earlier defeat of the Italians at Sidi Barrani by the British 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions during the Cyrenaican campaign, were the first by an Allied land army during the war. They were to remain the lone British victories in the Western Desert until El Alamein in November 1942. However the twin victories of Bardia and Tobruk have fallen victim to the larger battles and campaigns fought later in the war. Historians, both in Australia and overseas, have paid these battles little attention and they have faded from memory even more, in recent years. The lack of interest in this campaign is personified by John Bayes’ biography of the British commander of the First Cyrenaica campaign, Lieutenant General Richard ‘O’Connor, entitled The Forgotten Victor.47

Berryman, as the GS01 (Chief of Staff) 6th Australian Division, was one of the key officers in this campaign. It was his plan of attack, his organisation, and in the end his actions, that were critical to the successes of the Australians at Bardia and Tobruk. Not

1998), Steve Eather, Desert Sands and Jungle Lands: A biography of Major-General Ken Eather, (Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2003), Stuart Braga, Kokoda Commander: A Life of Major-General ‘Tubby’ Allen, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004), Gavin Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job: Lieutenant General Sir as a Military Commander, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2006). 44 It could be equally argued that the Australian involvement in the Greek Campaign of 1941 has been just as forgotten as Cyrenaica and Syria. Cyrenaica is a province of the Italian colony of Libya. 45 The status of Tobruk has been further enhanced by the recent publication of Peter Fitzsimons’, Tobruk, (HarperCollins, Pymble, 2006). Fitzsimons’ previous book Kokoda, was a best seller and reached a wide public audience even if contributing little to original scholarship. Undoubtedly Tobruk will prove to be the same. 46 Mark Johnston, Fighting the Enemy: Australian Soldiers and their Adversaries in World War II, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 9. Newspapers reported the story, not only in Commonwealth countries but in the United States and other non-belligerent countries. 47 John Baynes, The Forgotten Victor: General Sir Richard O’Connor, (MacMillan, London, 1989). In Australian military history little has been written about the First Cyrenaican campaign except the Official History and the regimental histories of the units that fought there. 16 Introduction

only has Berryman’s role been largely neglected, but the little study that has been made of these battles lack a detailed analysis of his impact on operations and often portray him in a negative light.48

While Bardia and Tobruk have been largely overlooked in the historiography the Syrian campaign ranks as its even poorer cousin. Despite the fact that Australian troops made up the majority of forces in this operation and that it was a hard and bitterly fought campaign, it received little publicity at the time, and even less publicity since. There are only two major works covering the Australian operations, part of one volume of the Official History, , Crete and Syria, and an Australian Training Command publication, Largely a Gamble.49

While Syria was not a strategic centre piece of the Allied war effort in the Mediterranean the battles fought during this campaign were very important in the context of Australian operations. They are in essence ‘forgotten battles’ and despite his significant role in ensuring the victorious nature of Australian operations in this campaign (as at Bardia and Tobruk) Berryman has emerged as the ‘forgotten man’ in these ‘forgotten battles’.

The purpose of this thesis is to cast light on Berryman’s life / career and in doing so place the campaigns in Libya and Syria at the forefront of this investigation to help redress the imbalance that currently stands in relation to the nature and importance of these two major Australian and Allied campaigns. Hitherto historians have been complicit in relegating Berryman to obscurity. His problematic relationship with the Australian official historian, Gavin Long, meant that he was marginalised in the major summary account of these campaigns.50 The Official History’s implied criticisms of Berryman (along with some more recent historiography) have painted him as a difficult and recalcitrant officer who devised complicated plans and disrupted militia field commanders. However this characterisation is unjust and based on largely biased accounts that rely heavily on Berryman’s major critics for their interpretation of events.

48 See Gavin Long, To , (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952) & Stuart Braga, Kokoda Commander: A Life of Major-General ‘Tubby Allen, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2004). 49 Despite the fact that the campaign is well covered in the regimental histories the audience for these works is limited. 50 For the Middle East campaigns see Gavin Long, To Benghazi, AWM, Canberra, 1952 & Long, Greece Crete and Syria, (AWM, Canberra, 1953). 17 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

The more contemporary works in this field also lack a detailed analysis of source material and documents covering the battles in which Berryman fought.

‘Commanding’ Judgement Finally there is the question of command experience. Berryman’s only major command during this period was the 7th Division’s artillery during the Syrian Campaign. The artillery has long been seen as the junior partner in Australia’s infantry dominated army. C.E.W Bean’s authoritative account of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) during the First World War is heavily dominated by the role of the infantry to the detriment of the other Corps in the Australian Army. As Eric Andrews has noted; his [Bean’s] stress on the front line soldier has swamped readers with a tidal wave of detail and hidden or ignored matters like logistics, weapons and their use – especially the vital subject of the artillery, which is probably the gravest weakness in his work.51

Arguably, this tradition carried over into the official histories of the Second World War.52 This investigation of Berryman also provides the chance to ‘recover’ some of the ground that the artillery has lost in the histories of these campaigns by highlighting the career of an officer who served in the artillery at the battery, brigade and divisional level across two world wars.

The Middle East campaigns of 1940-41 are seminal to any investigation of the development of Berryman’s career and his ascension to the rank of General. Ultimately

51 C.E.W Bean’s -Australia’s official historian of World War I. Eric Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, (Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1993), p. 2. Also Bean’s deference to the ‘ordinary’ hero made military history in Australia more ‘concerned with the writing from the point of view of the men in the field rather than the staff at G.H.Q.’ See S. Encel, ‘The Study of Militarism in Australia’, The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol 3, No.1, 1967, p. 3 & Jane Ross, The Myth of the , Southwood Press, Sydney, 1985, p. 13. 52 Ian Maclean, ‘The War History Project’, A Guide to the Records of Gavin Long, (Australian War Memorial, 1993). Maclean notes that the planning for the official history was started by Bean and that he suggested Long as the editor of the Official History. ‘Long and Bean were personal acquaintances [and]… Long had signalled his “tremendous admiration” for Bean’s Work.’ [See AWM 3DRL 6673, item 498.] Similar comments can also be found on the Australian War Memorials Website. Anne Marie Conde notes in her introduction to the Memorials online editions of Bean’s history ‘Gavin Long was appointed under Bean’s recommendation, and the two men were similar in background and temperament. Both were the sons of clergymen and, at different times, attended the same school, All Saints College in Bathurst. Both were journalists early in life and both were appointed official war correspondents, Bean in 1914 and Long in 1939. Both were eyewitnesses to the wars about which they later wrote. Long adopted many of Bean’s research and writing methods and he offered his authors the same firm but generous guidance that Bean’s colleagues enjoyed from him.’(http://www.awm.gov.au/histories/ww2/intro.asp). See also Garth Pratten, The old Man: Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War, (PhD Thesis, Deakin University, 30 September 2005), p. 11. I am indebted to Garth for lending me a copy of his thesis. 18 Introduction

it is his performance in these campaigns which must be used to judge his qualities as an officer and his suitability to high command. Two essential elements of this equation are the role of personality and character. Furthermore he must also be judged on the quality of the staff work, command and leadership that he demonstrated in the Middle East.

There are an innumerable number of studies covering the topic of military ‘command and leadership’ and it is not the intension of this work to enter into a detailed discussion of this subjective field.53 However, some recognisable ‘traits’ of successful senior military officers included in the components of both command and leadership are; ‘intellect, energy, selflessness, and humanity.’54 One of the other key essences of leadership is the ‘ability to motivate people [and] instil confidence in his superiors, peers and subordinates.55 Wavell, under whom Berryman served in the Middle East and in Java, described the essential qualities of a good commander as: …robustness, the ability to withstand the shocks of war, boldness – the ability to make decisions based on a careful calculation of risk, physical and moral courage, the ability to inspire confidence in subordinates, the ability to judge character, energy and drive and excellence in administration.56

Redressing the extent of Berryman’s role in these ‘forgotten’ Middle East battles and campaigns is just one, but very important, part of understanding the man and his contribution to the nation’s military history. Overall his performances also demand thorough investigation, and must be assessed against the widely recognised qualities for senior military command. But it is through his involvement in these campaigns that he

53 Command and leadership are terms that are often confused and often used interchangeably. Command is in essence the ‘authority vested in an individual for the direction, co-ordination and control of military forces’, (The Fundamental of Land Warfare, Australian Army, Georges Heights, 1993), as quoted in Pratten, ‘The “Old Man” Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War, p. 19) Leadership is the process by which subordinates are motivated to achieve what has been decided upon. (Pratten, ‘The “Old Man” Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War, p. 20) Leadership is one function of command, but as is has been noted for centuries; ‘There is no command without leadership’ (Sun Bin, The Lost Art of War, c. 350 BCE). In the case of this study of Berryman where his command and staff responsibilities did not go beyond that of a Brigadier it is generally regarded that ‘when dealing with middle-ranking commanders – above company level but below corps level…the line between leadership and command is often blurred.’ Mathew Hughes, ‘Book Review: G.D. Sheffield (ed) Leadership and Command: The Anglo American Experience since 1861, in Defence Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 173-174. 54 Megis, ‘Generalship: Qualities, instincts and character’, p. 15. Megis was the Commander of the US Army Europe and 7th Army in 2001. 55 R. C. Moor, ‘Junior leadership training and development in the Australian Army’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 130, May/ June 1998, p. 39. 56 Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell as quoted in David G. Blackwell, ‘Command and Leadership in the Australian Army’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 130, May/June 1998, p. 23. 19 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

first reveals his capabilities, and it is on the back of those outstanding performances that he goes on to attain the rank of General and exercises staff and command responsibilities at the highest levels of the Australian Army during the Second World War.57

* * * Focussing on Development This investigation focuses on Berryman’s life from 1894 to the end of 1941. It seeks to provide, as Ritchie argues, a past life with its ‘thoughts, hopes, acts, opportunities and constraints.’58 While it attempts to remain true to the subject it is written in the biographical tradition and thus as Daniel O’Connor has argued ‘it is…[a]creature whose habitat and activity is mostly circumscribed by the whims of its host.’ 59 Of course all biographers naturally tend to favour their subject, but despite the numerous pitfalls of biography60, this interpretation of Berryman’s life and early career attempts to provide not just ‘any’ view, but one that strives for a balanced and detailed analysis of his life and career up to the start of the Pacific War.61 In doing so its

57 It has been argued by some that there is a distinctive Australian form of leadership that has it origins in egalitarianism and the Anzac legend. This encompassed the ideas that Australian commanders must lead by example and could not revert to more authoritarian or ‘punishment’ command and leadership styles. It has been noted that Australian soldiers did not, at times, always work well under British Command during World War I & II given that it tended to be more ‘authoritarian’. However it has been noted that it is dangerous to over simplify the Australian experience as the supposed distinctly ‘Australian features’ are in fact common to many other nation’s in particular New Zealand and Canada who have similar military traditions to Australia. See R.G. Taylor, ‘Command the Australian Way’, Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, Vol. 17, November 1996, p. 33-39; Mark Johnstone, At the Front Line: Experiences of Australian Soldiers in World War II, (Cambridge Uiversity Press, Melbourne, 1996), p. 69-71; H. Bondy. ‘Personality Type and Military Culture in the Anglo-West’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 169, 2005, p. 4-14; S.J. Watts, ‘Better than Monash? Compare the Performance of Monash, Curries and Russell on the Western Front’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 140, January / February 2000, p. 55-58; Pratten, ‘The “Old Man” Australian Battalion Commanders in the Second World War’, p. 32-34. 58 John Ritchie, ‘Getting a Life: A Practical guide to the ‘impossible’ craft of biography’, Meanjin (Melbourne), Vol. 61, No. 1, 2002, p. 94-97. 59 Daniel O’Connor, ‘Biography as History and Abbot Salvado of New Norcia’, New Norcia Studies, Vol 8 September 2000, p. 51. 60 Stuart Macintyre, ‘Biography’, The Oxford Companion to Australian History, (Melbourne, Oxford University Press) p. 72. Macintyre highlights that despite La Naze’s view and the suspicion by some historians that biography exaggerates the role of human agency that ‘historians have largely dropped their suspicion of the genre.’ Macintyre also notes that biography is ‘the printed equivalent to that other index of celebrity [in Australia], the portrait entered for the .’ The lack of biographical investigation of Berryman therefore does much to explain how he has slipped from memory. 61 There is a great body of work in Australia on the nature of the problems of writing biography. Some of the most important works in this area include: Ian Donaldson (ed), Shaping lives : reflections on biography, Humanities Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1992. John Rickard, ‘Biography in Australia’, Canberra Historical Journal, 18, 1986. Yasmine Gooneratne ‘You can’t put lies in a book: Australian Biography as history’, Meridian, Vol 7, No. 1, May, 1988. Jill Roe, ‘The appeal of Biography’, Special Issue: Writing Lives, Australian Feminist Studies, No. 16, Summer, 1992. David 20 Introduction

objective is not ‘in [the] pursuit of heroes and inspiration’ but rather the quest for ‘historical enlightenment.’62 This thesis will help us to understand an officer who is exceptionally important in the history of the Australian military yet is frequently overlooked in major texts. Furthermore on the infrequent occasions that he is mentioned, Berryman has been often misrepresented and 'maligned'. This work will investigate the nature of Berryman’s reputation and contribute to a broadening and balancing of the historiography of Australia’s senior military officers.

This study will reveal Berryman as a very different type of officer to the one described in previously published historical accounts. Berryman emerges as a complex personality. On one hand he is a warm and engaging family man whose harder personality traits are smoothed by his relationships with strong women, especially his wife Muriel. On the other he is a hard nosed professional who away from this feminising influence could be cold, sarcastic and uncompromising while remaining loyal to those above and below him and staying, at all times, dedicated to the service of his country.

These two aspects of his personality did, at times, come together during his professional career. To many soldiers and officers, Berry (as he was nicknamed) ‘was a warm and engaging character, possessing a hard streak but one tempered by humour and a sense of the practical.’63 Berryman was, however, rather selective about the officers that he demonstrated his more amicable qualities to during his military career. This small and select club, nevertheless, embraced some of the army’s most successful and influential leaders including: Lieutenant Denzil Macarthur-Onslow and John Wilton [Later General and Chief of the General Staff]; Raymond Monaghan and Murray Moten; Major-Generals , and Douglas Wynter; Lieutenant Generals Robertson, Sydney Rowell, Leslie Morshead and ; and General Blamey.

Ellis, ‘Writing Biography: a Colloquium’, Meridian, Vo. 16, No. 2, October, 1997. John Currey, ‘History, biography and the past’, Tasmanian Historical Studies, vol. 7, no. 2, 2001. Rodney Cavalier, ‘The Task of Biography’, Voices, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter, 1994. Susan Tridgell, ‘I Know just how you feel: Knowledge Power and intrusion in biography’, Critical Review, No. 41, 2001. 62 John Rickard, ‘Biography in Australia’, p. 14. This project has also been carried out with the thoughts of Rickard and other historians clearly recognised, notably that ‘crucial to the success of any biography is the relationship of the biographer to the subject. There must be a degree of empathy… but empathy must not become identification.’ 63 Dennis (et al), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 96. 21 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Berryman also emerges from this work as an intellectual, something not generally praised in army at this time.64 Also he is a man of personal courage and great strength of character who did not suffer fools gladly. Importantly, in the context of the previous historiographical view of Berryman, he surfaces as an officer who judged his contemporaries and superiors harshly but fairly, his assessments being based on their professional capabilities, not their mode of service, militia or otherwise.

Significantly, Berryman is revealed as a man who wielded enormous influence and power. His role in achieving victory in New Guinea and the Pacific is profound and may well be debated by future historians. What this thesis will argue is that he was the uncontested architect of victory at the battles of Bardia and Tobruk. In Syria he reveals his propensity for command. His brigade command at Merdjayoun emerges as one of the most important platforms for victory and his leadership of the artillery is one of the major reasons for the Australian success in the Syrian campaign.

Berryman emerges out of the Middle East campaigns of 1940-1941 as an officer of the highest promise with a special aptitude for staff work and training, while his energy, tactical foresight, gift of predicting enemy intentions and his commitment to leading by example, showed that he had both a desire and the ability to assume command at the brigade, division or even corps level.65 It is in the Middle East that his training, attitudes and values instilled from Duntroon, the First World War; Staff College, Camberley; and his work at Australian Army Headquarters in the inter-war years, are put to the test. It is the Middle East where he emerges as one of the army’s most capable and efficient officers. An officer gifted not just with a grasp of the more mundane tasks of administrative detail, but one who demonstrated a grasp of the necessities of command and the ability to deal with the fluid and unpredictable nature of modern warfare.

64 See chapters 4 & 5. This idea of an ‘intellectual’ and / or Staff Corps officer received much scorn from some senior Militia officers in the interwar period, notably Major-General Gordon Bennett. See also Correlli Barnett, The Desert Generals, (London, Pan Books, 1962), p. 103-104. Barnett when discussing the British in The Second World War argued that ‘cleverness… [was] considerably less prized than modesty, good manners, courage, a sense of duty, chivalry and a certain affection of easy-going non- professionalism.’ 65Horner, Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese threat, 1941-1943, (ANU, Canberra, 1978), p. 58. Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, p. 295.

22 Introduction

France, Bardia, Tobruk, and Syria were ‘training grounds’ for Berryman’s later accomplishments at both high command and senior operational staff positions in the Australian Army throughout the Pacific campaigns during the Second World War. These formative years are the most critical focus point upon which to begin to unearth the life and career of this influential, yet largely unheralded military officer.

23 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

Chapter 1 ‘The Foundations of a Military Career’ From Geelong to Duntroon

Compulsory state education and later compulsory cadets and military training were part of a grand design to mould the private and family lives of the people according to the needs of the state. Graeme Davidson, ‘The Outcasts of Melbourne’, Essays in Social History, p. 24.

The most unlikely beginning for a military career When one visualises Frank Berryman, the image of an ‘Anzac’ does not readily come to mind. His background did not lend itself to the idealised image of the Australian digger. At 5ft 7 inches and only 10 stone 7lbs he was neither tall nor powerful.1 Hardly the icon C.E.W. Bean had in mind when he spoke of that fine specimen of man which made up the early Australian Imperial Force (AIF).2 He was very far from a ‘bushman’ given his upbringing in large country towns and the suburbs of Melbourne and this cemented the alienation of Berryman from the Anzac mythology. 3

Also, Berryman was both an officer and a professional soldier. His status stood in stark contrast to the amateur army and ‘diggers’ who made up the AIF. As Jane Ross argues, the ‘myth’ of the digger failed to integrate the experience of the officer corps and in particular it ‘ignores the functions of the highest commanders and staff officers. It is indeed the myth of the fighting private’.4 About the only thing that Frank Berryman

1 ‘Personnel File – Staff Cadet No. 83. Frank H. Berryman’, Royal Military College Duntroon, Archives. 2 See C.E.W. Bean, The Story of Anzac, (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1981). 3 Ibid, p. 47. When C.E.W. Bean wrote, ‘The Australian was half soldier before the war; … (and that he) differed very little from the Australian who rides the station boundaries every week-day and sits of a Sunday around the stockyard fence’ he certainly never had Frank Berryman in mind. This view, of course, forms one the foundations for the Anzac myth, a myth whose viability has been tested and appraised by historians ever since Bean wrote his much celebrated Official Histories. See Alistair Thomson, ‘A past you can live with: digger memories and the Anzac legend’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 20, April 1992. Denis Woodward, ‘The Anzac legend as folklore’, Australian Folklore, No. 15, Aug 2000, p. 215-224. Sherie Leeson, ‘The image and reality of the Anzac soldier’, Passim (La Trobe), No. 3, 2004, p. 12-15. David A. Kent, ‘Bean's “Anzac” and the making of the Anzac legend, in Anna Rutherford and James Wieland (eds) War: Australia's Creative Response, (Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 1997). David. A. Kent, ‘The Anzac Book and the Anzac legend: C. E. W. Bean as editor and image maker’, Historical Studies, Vol. 21, No. 84 April, 1985, p. 376-390. 4 Jane Ross, The Myth of the Digger, (Southwood Press, Sydney, 1985), p. 101. See also S. Encel ‘The Study of Militarism in Australia’, The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol. 3, No.1, 1967. For a discussion of the ‘officer type’ in the AIF see James Blair, ‘An Australian “officer type” a demographic study of the composition of officers in the 1st Battalion, First AIF’, Sabretache, Vol. 39, No. 1, March 1998, p. 21-27. 24 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

seemed to have in common with the Anzac mystique was his humble working class origins and his English heritage.5

If there was not much in Frank Berryman’s background and physique to lead us to believe that he was the idealised Australian digger there was even less to suggest that he would become an officer and a gentleman in Australia’s permanent military forces. Prior to 1913 the closest the family came to a military tradition was their name. ‘Berryman’ had developed from the word ‘bury,’ which in late old English and Middle English, meant fortified town. The name, however, was more generally used for someone living near a manor house or as a name denoting the occupation of someone employed in a manor house.6

Frank Berryman’s English heritage harked back to his grandfather, John Berryman, the second son of Samuel Berryman, an agricultural worker from Cornwall. In March 1851, Samuel married Elizabeth Ann Martin, the daughter of the local stone mason, at St James Church in Kilkhampton, North Cornwall. By then their plans to migrate to Australia were already far advanced. In the months leading up to the wedding both John and Elizabeth presented themselves to the Commission for the Selection of Immigrants. They fitted the requirements perfectly: young, about to be married, with testimonials of good character and possessing the four pounds necessary for the cost of the journey.7

5 See L.L. Robson, The First AIF: A study of its Recruitment, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1982), and ‘The Origin and Character of the First AIF’, Historical Studies, 15, 1973; A. Thomson, ‘A past you can live with: digger memories and the Anzac legend’, p. 5-6; M. Lake, ‘The Power of Anzac’, in M. McKernan and M. Browne (eds), Australia: Two centuries of war and peace, (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1988). See also C.E.W. Bean, The Official in the War of 1914- 1918, ‘The Story of Anzac’, Vol. I, 1981, p. 43-49. Berryman had much more in common with the idea of the 19th century British ‘Practical man’- a man of action, skill, and independence who, had lost favour in late Victorian England, but remained, according to Roy MacLeod, ‘alive and well in Australia.’ Berryman’s life stands as a testament to the great Australian notion of social improvement. His life epitomises the pragmatic Australian ideology in which accomplishments are won on merit and ability. See Roy MacLeod, ‘The “Practical Man”; Myth and Metaphor in Anglo-Australian Science,’ Australian Cultural History, No. 8, 1989, p. 24 6 Beverly Spratling & Margaret Storey, Woven in Time: A History of the Wild Family, (Clayton, Victoria, 1997), p. 155. 7 Dorothy Johnston, The Berryman Story: John and Elizabeth Berryman, (Melbourne, 1984), p. 4-6. This is a privately published family tree that only provides historical detail on Berryman’s grandparents. The material covering Frank Berryman’s immediate family does not go beyond a family tree. I am indebted to Richard Berryman for providing me with a copy. 25 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

After an arduous journey across the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans in the John Knox the vessel hove to in the port of Geelong in the winter of 1851 and it was here that John and Elizabeth made their home.8 In early 1852 their first child Samuel Martin was born and in March 1854, a girl, Fanny Jane. By 1855 they had settled in Clarke St, Chilwell and John had found himself a job as a carter.9

Geelong during this period was undergoing rapid changes. The Gold Rush and the expanding Australian frontier saw the city develop as a major regional port. The expanding population and the cities commercial importance led to the development of a regular coach service to Melbourne, and in December of 1854, the opening of the first telegraph office. In May 1860 the gas was turned on and the railway line opened with Melbourne.10

The railway line led to a rationalisation of the carting business in 1860 and John wisely decided to relocate the family to Ballarat. In Ballarat the last of the children were born and in December of 1871 John purchased his own plot of land. His small block of land at Mount Hollowback in the Bald Hills just outside of Ballarat was where he would be laid to rest just eight years later.11

William Lee Berryman (Frank’s father) was John and Elizabeth’s third son. He completed his limited education in Ballarat and found employment in his father’s carting business. Not long after, he joined the Victorian railways in the locomotive branch and moved back to Geelong.12 The railway was, by all accounts, a very reputable occupation for a man of working class origins.13 It gave respectable

8 The history of these voyages has been covered in detail, see Andrew Hassam, Sailing to Australia: shipboard diaries by nineteenth-century British emigrants, (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994). 9 ‘Berryman, John & Berryman, Elizabeth’, Index to Registers of Assisted British Immigrants 1839-1871, (Victorian Public Record Service [VPRS] 7310), Book 5, p. 150 & Book 5a, p. 143. For detailed studies of Australia’s immigration history see James Jupp, Arrivals and Departures, (Cheshire-Lansdowne, Melbourne, 1966), Thomas Jenkins, We Came to Australia, (Constable, London, 1969) & John Capper, The Emigrant's guide to Australia in the eighteen fifties, (Hawthorn Press, Melbourne, 1973). 10 David John Davies, Geelong, events in history, 1802-1972, (Highton, D.J. Davies, 1972), p. 9. 11 Johnston, The Berryman Story: John and Elizabeth Berryman, p. 20. See also Stephen H. Roberts, History of Australian land settlement 1788-1920, (Macmillan of Australia, Melbourne, 1968). 12 ‘Obituary to Mr W. L. Berryman’, The Reporter, Box Hill, September 21, 1928. 13 Stuart Braga, Kokoda Commander: A Life of Major General Tubby Allen, p. 6. Tubby Allen’s father was also a locomotive engine driver. 26 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

employment backed by a high degree of job security. It also provided William Lee with an opportunity to improve both his social and financial standing by securing a trade.

By 1884 William was registered as an engine cleaner and his work took him from Geelong down to Camperdown.14 During his time on the railways William met Annie Jane Horton, the daughter of Elizabeth Newton and Joseph Horton, a carpenter from East Collingwood.15 Little evidence has survived to provide us with an insight into the nature of their relationship, but we do know that on 14 December 1887 the couple were married at the bride’s family home by the Reverend Fred Lockwood.16

Within a year William Lee had moved his new family to Geelong and it was here that their first child, a girl, Emily Mabel was born on 28th November 1888. All the children, Ada Florence (1890), Ethel Annie (1892), Frank Horton (1894), William Alfred (1896) and Raymond George (1898) were born during the family’s time in Geelong. Their first three children were girls, the last three boys and the last five children were all born almost exactly two years apart. Indeed March and April became busy months for celebration in the Berryman household with all except the eldest, Emily having a birthday between February 1st and April 11th an average of one birthday every ten days.17

As the family grew William Lee’s work with the Victorian railways progressed steadily. He moved up to Locomotive Fireman in 1890 and by 1893 he was listed as an engine driver, his ‘apprenticeship’ completed.18 At the time their first son, Frank Horton, was born the family were living at Little Lywers Street in Geelong.19 They remained there until the railways took the Berryman family on a number of moves throughout Victoria. These relocations are easily traceable through the young Frank

14 ‘List of Railway Employees’, Victorian Government Gazette 1884, Victorian Public Record Office, p. 1461. 15 ‘Registry of birth – No. 13 - Annie Jane Horton’, 1864 Births in the District of Collingwood in the Colony of Victoria: Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages – Melbourne. 16 Johnston, The Berryman Story: John and Elizabeth Berryman, 1984, p. 46. 17 Ibid, see birth dates p. 46-54. See also Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages – Geelong 1888-1898. 18 See ‘List of Railway Employees’, Victorian Government Gazette 1890 & 1893, Victorian Public Record Office, p. 390 & 1241. 19 ‘Registry of birth – No 330 Frank Horton Berryman’, 1894 Births in the District of Geelong in the Colony of Victoria: Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages – Melbourne. 27 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

Berryman’s school records. The first move was to Camperdown (1900-1903), then back to Geelong (1903-1906), to Port Melbourne (1906-1907) and Carlton (1907).20

These relocations were no doubt deeply disruptive for the Berryman children. At young and impressionable ages they constantly changed schools, homes and social networks. Every time the family settled, and established a complex web of friendships, they were uprooted and the whole process was repeated. This was, however, apart of working class life in Australia during this period. As Graeme Davison has argued ‘mobility was the unspoken assumption behind everyday customs and beliefs’, one major part of this movement were the ‘sojourners’ people such as the Berryman’s who were ‘moved from posting to posting by their employers.21 It was not until 1908, when the railways sent William Lee to Box Hill, that the family were finally settled. For Frank Berryman these constant moves were a prelude to life in the Army, with its incessant postings both interstate and overseas.

Unfortunately little of substance remains to reconstruct the early years of Frank Berryman’s life. A quiet and reserved character, he spoke little to his friends and family about this time.22 This lack of evidence is compounded by the deaths of his mother and father in the 1920s well before the birth of Frank Berryman’s own children. The close links and bonds between grandchildren and grandparents that often allow family anecdotes to survive therefore had no opportunity to develop. This gap in the historical record is further compounded by the fact that none of William Lee’s children kept a detailed record of their early lives. Nor did they pass on specific instances of oral memory to the family.23

This lack of evidence highlights one of the most difficult prospects for any historian attempting to recreate an individual’s life. This particularly affects those who, (like Frank Berryman), rose to prominence from relatively humble beginnings and whose family did not have a tradition of maintaining family records. The absence of

20 ‘Personnel File: Staff Cadet No. 83, Frank Horton Berryman’, archives, Royal Military College Duntroon. 21 Graeme Davison, ‘People moving’, in Davison et al (eds), Australians 1888, (Fairfax, Syme & Weldon, Broadway, 1987), pp. 230-232. 22Richard Berryman & Anne Willis (nee Berryman) interview, 18 February 2004. Richard Berryman, interview, 22 January 2004. 23 Ian Johnston, correspondence, 12 February 2004. 28 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

evidence makes it almost impossible to form an authoritative insight into his early thoughts and aspirations, philosophies or beliefs. The best indications of these can be found in reflections of Frank Berryman’s broader social, cultural and family experiences.

Only a few ephemeral memories of the family’s early life have survived. Frank Berryman’s nieces and nephews recall their parents speaking of a close knit and happy family. They talk of Frank’s fondness for his sister Ada, who remained unmarried throughout her life, and his youngest sister Ethel.24 While this type of information is useful to verify aspects of the young Frank Berryman’s life, they have a sketchy anecdotal quality and make it difficult to ‘integrate the private and public man’.25

The one story that survived refers to petty jealousies aimed at a young Frank by his sisters who, it was said, believed that the eldest son did not often have to bear the full burden of chores, like milking the family cows.26 Fragmented families memories such as these do not, however, form a reliable basis for the reconstruction of past lives. Conversely, despite their somewhat problematic reliability, they can provide some insight into domestic arrangements. The difficulty with Frank Berryman’s early life is that very few of even these anecdotal memories have survived the depredation of time.

Despite this, there are a number of clear influences upon the life of the young Frank Berryman. He grew up in a clearly working class family. His father’s work in the railways would have enculturated the young Berryman into the views of the skilled 19th century and early 20th century Australian working class. Certainly Frank was old enough in 1903 to understand the actions of his father during the great railway strike of that year. Being only nine years old may have detracted from young Frank’s understanding. However, as the prestigious eldest son, it is likely that the details of the strike, and William’s views both on the industrial actions and the government’s response, would have been explained to such an enquiring young mind.

24 Ian Johnston, correspondence, February 2004. 25 Rickard, ‘Biography in Australia’, p. 16. 26 Author’s Correspondence with Ian Johnston (Frank Berryman’s nephew and son of Ethel Berryman) February 2004. [unofficial Berryman family curator] 29 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

The strike itself does not rank in the annals of great labour movement battles; it lasted only a week and involved roughly 1300 engine drivers, fireman and cleaners, but at the time it was described in the Victorian newspapers at the ‘most momentous strike in the history of Australia.’27 Although small in numbers the strike was significant as it was the first to be called by government employees in Victoria. As such it was seen in some quarters of the community as mutinous; a defiance of constitutional authority. On the striker’s part, the Federal Locomotive Engine Drivers Union claimed a raft of grievances that forced them to act. They cited a number of issues, one of the most pressing being the lack of reform in the service, which had stagnated since the restrictions imposed during the depression of the 1890s. These measures included a stoppage of increment payments and the continuation of a nine hour day. The later was a significant point of contention, given that the rest of the Victorian workforce had adopted the universal eight hour day.28

While the Union movement’s grievances were certainly legitimate they found themselves opposed by the very shrewd and ruthless Victorian Premier, W. H. Irvine. Irvine’s response to the strike would, in modern terms, be described as draconian. His ‘Strike Suppression Bill’ included a 100 pound fine or 12 months gaol for joining a railway strike. Irvine announced that all striking railway employees would be sacked, forfeiting their pension and compensation rights. Meanwhile special volunteers called on to fill the job vacancies would be given double pay and seniority. In the face of these measures the union wavered and despite the strike only starting on Saturday it was over by the following Friday.29

William Lee Berryman, like virtually all engine drivers,* was at the forefront of the action and when the strike finished in a resounding defeat for the union they also bore the brunt of the Irvine government’s punishments. William Lee was conditionally  reinstated along with other selected strikers, but he received a 14.2 per cent pay cut for

27 Argus, May 9, 1903. 28 Lorraine Benham & John Rickard, ‘Masters and Servants’, in J. Iremonger, J. Merritt, & G. Osborne (ed) ‘Strike Studies in 20th Century Australian Social History’, Labour History, 1973, p. 7. See also John Rickard, Class and Politics: New South Wales, Victoria and the early Commonwealth, 1890-1910, (Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1976). 29 Ibid, p. 13-16. * Only 13 of the 650 engine drivers did not participate in the strike on its first day.  This denotes that although a willing participant in the strike his reinstatement meant that he was in no way a strike leader or spokesperson for the men or the union during the strike. 30 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

his trouble. It was to take another 13 years before his pay was returned to pre-strike levels. This level was reached just before his retirement in July 1916 and in this he was lucky as many strikers retired on rates that never approached this mark.

While it is hard to draw concrete conclusions as to William Lee’s exact position on the strike, his union membership and willing participation in the industrial action speaks for itself. The government’s response was the type of action that ‘influence[d] … the political behaviour of a generation of workers’ and it is almost certain to have had such an impact on William Lee and his family.30 As Lorraine Benham and John Rickard argue the strike ‘intensified the us/them feeling (among) the burgeoning metropolitan electorate (and) … It did of course make the railwaymen’s vote solidly Labor.’31

The impact of the strike was felt for the next decade and also had a generational impact on the Berryman family. The strike was a sharp reminder to the Berryman family of the inherent insecurities that came with working class life in the early twentieth century. It is reasonable to assume that the aspirations of Frank Berryman and his siblings were intensified by the experience, and while William remained committed to the cause of Labor politics he may well have pushed his sons towards middle class occupations that were less reliant on the Labor Movement for pay and conditions. Frank Berryman’s persistent need to achieve financial security undoubtedly had its roots set deep in the Victorian Railway strike of 1903.32 Furthermore, despite Frank Berryman’s political orientation moving firmly to the right of Australian politics as he got older, he maintained a considerable degree of sympathy for Labour politics and an insight into the conditions of a working life.33

30 Rickard, Class and Politics, p. 195 31 Benham & Rickard, ‘Masters and Servants’, p. 24. Conversely William Berryman may have held the Union responsible for the failure of the strike and thus turned his back on the Labor Movement. This is hard to ascertain. The available evidence supports Benham and Rickard’s conclusions, yet it is reasonable to suspect that William Berryman pushed his sons towards middle class occupations that were less reliant on the Labor Movement for pay and conditions. 32 Letter Ian Johnston to Author February 2004, ‘William Lee Berryman stories’. 33 See correspondence ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Wills (nee) Berryman’, & Berryman Family Papers, circa 1920-1945. Throughout these letters Frank Berryman often made mention of politicians and politics and on a number of occasions he stated his sympathy for what the Labor party was trying to achieve, but he believed they were heavily influenced by Communist agitators and therefore he could not give them his support. Berryman’s Labor sympathy’s were not knowingly expressed to his children who were surprised to hear of their father and grandfather’s association with the Labor movement. 31 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

In 1908 the settlement of the family at Box Hill finally allowed the Berrymans to establish meaningful roots in a community. The Berrymans had maintained their connections with the Methodist faith that had been handed down from John and Elizabeth. William Lee and his family became strong members of their local church community.34

As for many families, Methodism was a defining influence on the Berrymans. The Methodist church had been established by Reverend John Wesley and the County of Cornwall, the very region from which John and Elizabeth Berryman hailed, was seen as its sentimental homeland. In Australia the Methodist church was most prominently established in the colonies of and Victoria, especially in the mining communities.35 As a result, John and Elizabeth’s strong convictions and faith were easily accommodated in Geelong, the major gateway port to the Victorian goldfields, and in Ballarat, one of the principal mining towns of Victoria.

The Methodist faith preached, beyond traditional Christian views, the ideas of reformation of the character and the transformation of society. Their conviction was that these principles were to be achieved through a liberal democratic system. This was complemented by a thirst for self-improvement and respectability. For strict Methodists this meant the adherence to ‘an austere moral code, keeping the Sabbath and eschewing dancing, gambling and drinking.’36 During their time at Box Hill, William Lee and his family were devoted members of the local Methodist community and in time William Lee was a trustee of the church.37

The church’s values of a strong moral and personal code helped influence the children’s upbringing, while William Lee’s support for the union and his involvement in community groups lent itself to the Methodist belief in broader social change. William Lee’s commitment to the local community indicates his more holistic approach to both his religious beliefs and general value system. He was not only a trustee of the Box Hill Methodist church, but also president of the bowling club, and ‘an enthusiastic member

34 Obituary, William Lee Berryman’, The Reporter, Box Hill, 21 September, 1928. 35 Graeme Davidson, ‘The Methodist Church,’ G. Davidson, J. Hirst & S. Macintyre (eds) The Oxford Companion to Australian History, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1998), p. 428. 36 Ibid. 37 The Reporter, 21 September 1928. 32 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

of the Masonic club’.38 His contributions to the community over the last 20 years of his life were reflected in the ‘large funeral cortege’ that accompanied the coffin to his final resting place at the Box Hill cemetery. This commitment to civic values was emulated by Frank and manifested itself throughout both his life and career.39

Figure 1.0 ‘The church’s values of a strong moral and personal code helped influence the children’s upbringing’ ‘The Berryman Family’ (Johnson, The Berryman Story, p. 48)40

During his formative years the major socialising forces in Frank’s life appear to have been grounded in the links between William Lee’s Methodism and his beliefs in working class ideology. Frank Berryman also inherited a number of more subtle characteristics from his father. The parallels between father and son extend to the rigid, if not exhaustive planning and organisational skills, his community focus and, in particular, Frank came to share his father’s passion for gardening. His mother,

38 Ibid. 39 In the post war period Frank Berryman was colloquially known in the Army and Sydney as ‘Frank the Florist’. This nickname was a result of his commitment to the beautification of army barracks in his Eastern Command as well as the civics and citizens programs he put in place for his soldiers. Berryman was also known for his involvement in charity organisations such as the War Widows Association, his work as the Director of the Silver Jubilee Federation Celebrations, as head of the Remembrance Drive project and a number of other charity and civic projects. 40 Top: Ethel, Ada and Frank Horton Berryman Front: William (Bill), William Lee, Anne Jane, Mabel and Raymond Berryman (sitting), date unknown.

33 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

meanwhile, was to be one of a number of ‘strong’ women in his life who provided the emotional and family foundation upon which Frank Berryman was to rely so heavily.

With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to see the development of so many of Frank Berryman’s personality traits as being derived from that most important of all socialisation agents, the family and its values and religion. Throughout his life and career it is easy to recognise the influence of family organization and administration. His desire for self improvement, respectability and the ideals of community improvement and charitable work all had an affect on his personality and career.

It was also during these early years that Berryman developed some of his less inspiring and less benevolent characteristics. Frank Berryman could be overly ambitious, critical of others, and he lacked both tact and patience with those whom he deemed to be less than above average in their work. These attributes were to lead to a number of personality clashes throughout his career and eventually earned him the nickname, ‘Berry the Bastard’.

All of these developmental characteristics had a lasting influence on Frank Berryman. Some, such as his reserved character and at times abrasive persona remained with him for the rest of his life. However, other areas such as his devotion to Methodism, while influential and important, came to play a lesser role in the coming years.41 But the most significant of the moves away from the family fold would undoubtedly be his shift in ideology from a committed working class culture, to a much more conservative middle class value system. The first area in which the young Berryman was exposed to these divergent views was his entry into high school.

‘The Coming Man’42 School shaped the young Berryman’s life and prospects almost as much as his family. Despite the disruptive nature of family reallocations during Berryman’s primary school

41 Richard Berryman, interview 22nd January, 2004. Richard expressed surprise at his father’s dedication to religion in his early years, describing him as a church-goer, but one who took little interest in Christianity. Richard believed that his regular attendance at church was more of an expression of contemporary social standards of the time. (referring to post -1945) 42 R. White, Inventing Australia; Images and Identity 1688-1980, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1981), p. 125. 34 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

years it was evident that he possessed a clear and inquiring mind and a superior intellect. Berryman blossomed academically during his time at state primary school and his abilities won him an academic scholarship to the new Melbourne Continuing School.

Melbourne High School* was the birthplace of selective schooling in Victoria. The school was created, as the Director of Education Frank Tate certified at the opening, so that ‘brains, not money, [could] be the passport to the higher realms of knowledge.’ Furthermore, the school was established as a coeducational facility to ensure that opportunities were open to all members of society, regardless of .43

Mr Joseph Hocking was appointed as the first principal and as such was responsible for the establishment of every aspect of the school. From the very beginning he sought to emulate the culture and outlook of a prestigious and select institution. Although Hocking had stated in 1908, that there was ‘no model for the school to follow’ it was very clear that Melbourne High was to be built upon an educational foundation that was pioneered by the great ‘public schools’ of Australia.44 Hocking sought to establish a state secondary school that could compete with the established public schools,* not only in terms of academic performance, but also in terms of character formation.45

Hocking’s efforts to develop the character and model the identities of his young students as well as his efforts to replicate the ‘public’ school system meant that he adopted a ‘whole school’ approach to education. Beyond the introduction of a basic curriculum and discipline system, Melbourne High very quickly developed ‘cadets, sports, a school magazine, school colours, badges, uniforms, a motto, prizes, a school

* Melbourne High School was known as Melbourne Continuing School until 1913, but hereafter referred to as Melbourne High. 43 In 1927 due to the dilapidated condition of the buildings the boys were moved to Forrest Hill, South Yarra and the girls to Albert Park. Mr. J Hocking was principal of the school till 1923. 44Gregory, Chapter 3, ‘Consolidation – “The Best School of All,”’ p. 1. [hereafter referred to as ‘Gregory, Chapter 3’ see also Ours (Melbourne High School Magazine), December 1908, p. 3. (These ‘great’ Australian public schools were of course modelled on their predecessors in England. The term ‘public school’ was reminiscent of the current ‘private’ schools in Australia). Martin Crotty, The Making of the Australian Male; Middle-class Masculinity 1870-1920, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 2001), p. 224-225. * ‘Public School’ as per the English Public Schools, e.g. Eton, Rugby etc. were represented in Victoria in the form of Geelong Grammar, Wesley College & Ballarat Grammar etc. 45 Crotty, The Making of the Australian Male; Middle-class Masculinity 1870-1920, p. 225. 35 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

song and a past student’s association.’46 Hocking was, as Martin Crotty has argued, developing ‘traditions, rituals and old boy networks that gave them the appearance of the public schools.’47 It was at Melbourne High that Frank Berryman made his first steps from boyhood to manhood and where he was instilled with the values of Australian nationalism and militarism.*

Hocking’s vision for Melbourne High School reflected a major ideological challenge that was facing the newly emerging State Secondary schooling system. At the turn of the century, while many educational reformers believed that State Secondary education was a means to meet the growing demand for skilled workers in the para- professional, clerical and public service sectors, schools such as Melbourne High, were modelled on a traditional academic curriculum epitomised by existing public schools. This meant that instead of producing semi-skilled workers the schools were, as Bob Bessant demonstrated, producing students ‘won over to join the ranks of the newly emerging groups who would come to be called the “middle class.”’48

The school, to Hocking, was to be a place not just of educational attainment but of preparation of the youth for society. In particular, the school was to instil in its young boys the dominant hegemonic masculinity. By the time Frank Berryman arrived at Melbourne High in 1909 the prevailing middle-class values for boys were centred on physical strength, patriotism, their worthiness to the nation and the Empire and what Crotty calls their ‘military usefulness’.49 Melbourne High School (MHS) had come ‘into being with a flood tide of Empire Values, and … the School was dominated, in its formative years, by military ideals.’50

46 Gregory, Chapter 3, p.1 47 Crotty, The Making of the Australian Male; Middle-class Masculinity 1870-1920, p. 224. * ‘Militarism’ is of course a contested term, but in the context of developing masculinity during this period I have deferred to Martin Crotty’s definition, ‘to denote an emphasis on, and an admiration for, the ability to fight for one’s country and the qualities of the idealised soldier, such as bravery and fortitude. They [including ‘militarist’] believe that fighting for one’s country is the peak of personal achievement and the epitome of manliness, but they do not necessarily imply a war-mongering spirit; Crotty, The Making of the Australian Male; Middle-class Masculinity 1870-1920, p. 9. 48 Ibid, p. 25. See also Bob Bessant, Schooling in the Colony and State of Victoria, (Centre for Comparative and International Studies in Education, School of Education, La Trobe University, 1983.) 49 Crotty, The Making of the Australian Male; Middle-class Masculinity 1870-1920, p. 11; Stephen Graton, ‘War and masculinity in twentieth century Australia’, Journal of Australian Studies, No. 56, March 1998, p. 86. 50Damien Powell, Honour in the Field; Melbourne High School and the Military in the Centenary of Federation, (Melbourne High School, Melbourne, 2001), p. 3. 36 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Hocking saw the cadets at MHS as forming a part of a ‘well-rounded education’ for the boys and the military training was seen as ‘serving a dual purpose, in shaping appropriate values of citizenship and of preparing young men for military service.’51 These ideas were, of course, not restricted to MHS. The Melbourne Punch remarked in 1907 that teachers were ‘bitten by the military idea’ and as a whole the ‘Victorian inspectors and teachers … embraced the cadet movement with enthusiasm.’52

In his book The Making of the Australian Male; Middle-class Masculinity 1870- 1920 Martin Crotty has argued that The nation, rather than God, became the dominant paradigm… [and] the most obvious way in which manliness could be defined in national terms was in the glorification of fighting for the nation against external enemies [thus] militarism became increasingly important aspect of the definition of the ideal Australian boy…[and] practical steps [such as school cadets] were taken to provide boys with military training.53

Hocking’s vision for Melbourne High was but one element that made up this dominate nationalistic movement of the time.

Of course these middle-class values with their emphasis on militarism and the significance of boys in terms of Empire and nationalism were social constructs. They were ideas and values and as such could be negotiated or rejected by the young Frank Berryman. Barring social, peer and institutional pressure Berryman could have chosen to reject these ideals. Through a combination of passive and active resistance, avoidance and non-compliance, all members of society can choose their level of acquiescence to social mores.54 Yet Frank Berryman chose not to reject the established social and national values as expressed through the middle class masculinity of Melbourne High. Instead he eagerly embraced it.

In many ways Berryman’s adoption of these middle class values was not surprising. The Berryman’s English heritage, along with their Methodist faith and upwardly mobile working class strata, favoured supporting Australian and British

51 Ibid, p. 4. 52 Powell, Honour in the Field; Melbourne High School and the Military in the Centenary of Federation, p. 4. & David Jones, ‘Cadets and Military Drill’, B. Bessant (ed) Mother State and her Little Ones, (Centre for Youth and Community Studies, Melbourne, 1987), p. 69. 53 Crotty, The Making of the Australian Male; Middle-class Masculinity 1870-1920, p. 24-25, 27. 54 Ibid, p. 7. 37 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

nationalism and the militarist values that Melbourne High School espoused. As Richard White has argued, ‘Australians [were] being urged well before the war (First World War) to be fit and ready for battle.’ Methodists for example sang hymns seeking protection from the ‘alien host’ God of battle, lend thy might Where e’er we fight Australia’s foe.’55

The fact that Frank and his brother William Berryman were involved in the School Cadets before the introduction of the Defence Act (when cadet training was made compulsory for boys aged twelve to eighteen), indicates that the family was nothing if not supportive of the values they believed military training would instil in their sons.56 William Lee’s Labour political views were also not far removed from the issue of nationalism and military training. It was Andrew Fisher, a coal miner and Labor Party prime minister, who saw the Bill for compulsory military service through parliament.57

The Cadet Corps was established at Melbourne High in 1906 under Captain John Sidney Kitson and Lieutenant Walter McNicoll* and from its inception the cadets at MHS was extremely popular. Despite the fact that the boys had to purchase their own uniforms and that enlistment was entirely voluntary only one boy chose not to participate.58 By the time Berryman had arrived at the school and joined the unit virtually the entire male student body, and a large number of the male staff, were a part of the MHS Cadet Unit.

55 ‘Methodist School Hymnal’, Australasian Supplement, (London, 1911), p. 8. As quoted in White, Inventing Australia, p. 126. The Methodists were known for their ‘hearty hymn singing’, Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 5. 56 See Australian Army Service Record, Frank H. Berryman. Frank listed 6 years of cadets on his AIF enlistment form in 1914 all prior to the orders in the Defence Act for compulsory training. See Samuel Duncan, ‘Compulsory military training (CMT) in Australia prior to the First World War’, Sabretache, Vol .46, No. 3, Septenmber 2005, p. 23-26. 57 See Glenn Withers, : Necessity and Justice. The case for an all volunteer army, (Angus & Robinson, Sydney, 1972), p. 2-4. ‘Conscription’ in Dennis (et al) (eds) The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, (Oxford, Melbourne, 1999), p. 174; ‘Fisher, Andrew (1862-1928)’ in Davidson (et al) Oxford Companion to Australian History, (Oxford, Melbourne, 1988), p. 254; Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organization 1901-2001, (Oxford, Melbourne, 2001), p. 44-46. * Later Brigadier-General McNicoll, 1st AIF 58 Hocking, The Story of Melbourne High School, 1905-1921, p. 10. It may well be that the students of the school chose to participate in cadets to escape the boredom of the classroom and the urbanised Melbourne life style. Escape and adventure may well have been just as powerful means of inspiration than nationalism and militarism. This type of outdoor adventurism could be seen in the Scouting movement. See Lord Baden-Powell, Rovering to success: a guide for young manhood, Scout Association of Australia, 1983 (First ed. Published by Scout Association (UK), London, 1922). 38 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Kitson and McNicoll were to mould the MHS Cadets into a highly efficient and award-winning unit. In 1910 the unit won the coveted Stanley Cup for rifle shooting and in 1912, just a year after Berryman left the school, the unit won best Cadet Unit in Victoria. The MHS corps followed this up by winning top Cadet Unit in Australasia and missed out on being the top shooting team in the Empire by one point. They were awarded the title of the Commonwealth’s elite cadet unit and two boys were chosen to represent the school at the 1913 Canadian Exhibition.59

The Cadets at Melbourne High School were not Frank Berryman’s first introduction to a rigorous military regime and aspects of military life. Nor was the high standard of MHS Cadets and its award-wining performances unfamiliar to him. During his time at Box Hill State School the principal, Peter McGregor, had established a ‘strong cadet corps’. McGregor took his role in the cadets seriously and organised manoeuvres at Albert Park and the Port Melbourne rifle range. Berryman’s cadet unit had won both the general and marching prizes. However, their performance was somewhat undermined when the boys marched off ‘beautifully out of step’ after collecting their prize.60

While there is little record of Berryman’s individual service in the Cadets, it is easy to reconstruct the military life and regime at MHS.61 The boys were taught basic military drill and field exercises, musketry (often undertaken on the miniature rifle range opened on the school’s grounds), physical toughness and discipline. Camps were a regular feature of the Cadet’s training and during these exercises the boys were introduced to drill at the company, battalion and at times brigade level. These camps

59 Gregory, ‘Chapter 3,’ p.15-17. Powell, Honour in the Field; Melbourne High School and the Military in the Centenary of Federation, p. 5. 60 A. B. McIntosh, ‘Box Hill State School’, Papers Read Before the Box Hill Historical Society, Volume III, p. 51. During the early 20th century the Cadet Corps played an important role in the Australian military and were, as David Jones has demonstrated, ‘at the forefront of military training’ in Victoria in the period leading up to World War I. See Jones, ‘Cadets and Military Drill’, p. 70. As early as 1905 the Minister for Defence James McCay believed that the ‘military training of youth was a key element of national defence, especially for Australia.’ See Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organization 1901-2001, p. 56. 61 Luke Savage (MHS Archivist) to author 31 May 2002. Frank Berryman’s student records for 1909 & 1910 are missing. 39 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

enabled the students to broaden their military experiences and understanding by contact with the militia and members of Australia’s permanent military forces.62

During the period 1906-1910 the supervisor of cadet training in Melbourne and Victoria was the then Lieutenant Thomas Blamey of the Australian Administrative and Instructional Corps. It is quite possible during one of these camps, or perhaps at a review of the cadets at the school, that the young Frank Berryman came into contact with the man who was to be such a dominate influence on his life and career during Second World War.63

The role of the Cadet Corps at MHS was ‘preparing young men for military service’. It also shaped the values of citizenship, promoting the nationalist and militaristic views of adolescent masculinity prescribed in the early twentieth century. The boys of MHS however were given the chance to prove themselves when former prime minister and one of the ‘founding fathers of federation’, Alfred Deakin delivered the Empire Day Address in 1911.64

Resonant with reference to nationalism and service Deakin’s address centred on the need for the ‘Empire to hang together … [and] depend upon ourselves, at the cost of war to prevent our Empire from tumbling.’ This of course was the ‘burden’ and ‘responsibility’ of the youth of Australia. In response,

the Head Prefect assured the Founding Father [Deakin] that ‘when the time came’, the boys would exercise their national ‘franchise with judgement.’ [He then invited] Deakin and other guests to ‘visit the boys drill yard on Friday’, so as to ‘see a body of soldiers so fierce and Warlike in appearance that a foreign foe, on seeing them, would instantly take cover.’ The Prefect’s words…[were] Met ‘with vociferous acclamation.65

62 Powell, Honour in the Field; Melbourne High School and the Military in the Centenary of Federation, p. 4 -5; Gregory, ‘Chapter 3,’ p. 17. 63 David Horner, Blamey; The Commander in Chief, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998), p. 9 -11. Blamey was supervisor of Cadets until April 1910 before being transferred to the A&I staff of the Victorian Militia. 64 Powell, Honour in the Field; Melbourne High School and the Military in the Centenary of Federation, p. 4. 65 Powell, Honour in the Field; Melbourne High School and the Military in the Centenary of Federation, p. 4. Quoting Hocking, The Story of Melbourne High School, 1905-1921, p. 24. 40 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

It was with the same enthusiasm that 540 ‘old boys’ of MHS along with 24 teachers presented themselves for service in the Great War. Well over 100 of these were killed and to this day their names are inscribed on the School’s honour boards. A further 58 carried back to Australia wounds that were serious enough to also be inscribed on the Roll of Honour. The allegiance to nationalism and militarism, that was so prevalent in the culture of both the school and the community during the years leading up to the First World War, was eventually paid for in full with the sacrifice of the young MHS boys.

Cadets were one major element of both the cultural and social life of the School. Athletics and sport were the other. The cult of militarism in Australia surrounding the education of boys did not mean an end to the link between athleticism and education. If anything, the end of athleticism as the dominant form of middle class masculinity was not a barrier to the emerging ideas of nationalism and military prowess, but an adjunct. Physical fitness was as much a part of military preparedness as was drill. It was often remarked that wars were won on the playing fields of Eton or in the case of Australia, Geelong Grammar or MHS.66

Achievement at sport has long been seen as a preparatory activity for training for war. From the very beginning of his time at MHS Frank Berryman appeared in the school magazine Ours, adorning the sporting pages. The School actively encouraged boys to participate in sport, as they did with cadets, and although the opportunities for inter-school and club competition were restricted for the girls, there were no such difficulties for the boys’ teams. 67 Berryman made his greatest impact in this arena through Australian Rules Football (ARF). Although ARF did not attract the same passions for imperial loyalty or Anglo-Australian rivalry, as cricket and Rugby Union, it did provide a chance for Berryman to test his masculine qualities of courage and

66 Crotty, The Making of the Australian Male; Middle-class Masculinity 1870-1920, p. 74 -94. See also Holmes, Firing Line, p. 54-55. Holmes argues that sport helps to develop physical health and strength and that team games provide training for essential qualities of the officer and leader. He argues that although it is tempting to ‘regard this type of emphasis on sport… as antiquated and excessive… fast moving team games do indeed call for quick decisions under pressure, and often involve physical contact calling for physical courage and determination.’ 67 Gregory, ‘Chapter 3,’ p. 11. See Ours, 1909-1911. For a discussion of the rise of organised sport in Australia see Richard Cashman, Paradise of Sport: the rise of organised sport in Australia, (Oxford University Press Melbourne, 1995). 41 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

fortitude within a team environment.68 It seems that team sports were encouraged at home and the prowess in ARF ran in the family. At the same time as Frank was making his mark at MHS his younger brother Billy was making a name for himself in the first XVIII at Box Hill State School.69

Frank proved a better player in 1910 and by July his performances on the field saw him playing for the School’s first division side. ARF also allowed Berryman to extend his community networks, particularly as most of the matches were accompanied by a social event.70 Inter-school sport at MHS was not restricted to just local teams, but also included matches against rural schools. In August 1910 a team of ‘20 lads’ from Ballarat Agricultural Team travelled to Melbourne and a match was played on 15 August at Fitzroy oval. The game was a very one-sided affair with MHS wining by 58 points and Berryman again rated a mention as one of the best players with his three goals.71

Berryman’s sporting success undoubtedly helped nurture his confidence, develop his inter-personal skills and his ability to work within a structured team environment. School sport also provided him with a broad social network within the school. These skills were complimentary to those which he received in the Cadets and helped to mould him into the typical ‘boy’ that Joseph Hocking and the State of Victoria were trying to achieve.

Of course Cadets and football were not the only social outlets for Berryman. Despite the depth of his involvement in the school and its culture he still maintained close links with his local community at Box Hill. In 1911, his first year at MHS, Mr Edmond W. Greenwood of Oxford St, Box Hill, concluded that Box Hill needed a club

68 Daryl Adair (et al), ‘Playing fields through to battle fields: the development of Australian sporting manhood in its imperial context, c.1850-1918’ Journal of Australian Studies, March 1998, No. 56, p. 51- 52, 65. 69 A. B. McIntosh, ‘Box Hill State School,’ Papers Read before the Box Hill Historical Society, Volume III, p. 54. 70 Gregory, ‘Chapter 3,’ p. 11. 71 Ours, September 1910, p.17. MHS also played some of the elite public schools of Victoria including the prestigious Scotch College. Of course as a newly founded State school they were restricted to taking on the second division teams of such schools. That decision, however, proved to be more of an embarrassment for Scotch when they went down to MHS in August 1910 by a massive 58 points. Again Berryman, who was proving to be one of the school’s best players, starred with four of the teams 13 goals. 42 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

for the young men of the town which was not aligned to any church or other organization. Greenwood’s association became know as the ‘Wattle Club’ and Berryman was listed as one of its foundation members. The Club’s main purpose was ‘mutual improvement’ and this involved sporting teams, lectures, debates and social evenings. The Club proved extraordinarily popular in the local community and had to expand into a purpose-built structure by the end of its first year. The early years in the club’s history were marked by ‘enthusiasm and a sense of achievement’ amongst the members.72

Berryman excelled in the classroom as well the sports field. The main focus of MHS was, of course, academic preparation for adulthood. He was also fortunate that the teaching environment at MHS appealed to his temperament. The more traditional style school curriculum allowed him to fully benefit from his preferences for mathematics and science.

Unfortunately Berryman’s full school record has not survived and his senior year results are limited. The records that do exist suggest a very solid performance. He achieved marks consistently above the class average and maintained his position in the top echelons of his year group. This achievement is all the more impressive given the selective nature of the school and the academic grading of classes. Furthermore Berryman rated two mentions in final year results which were regarded as quite ‘unusual’.73 In Term two the staff commented that Berryman was ‘V[ery] Good, an excellent student whose sense of responsibility has a good influence on his whole class.’74

In this conspicuously male environment the young Berryman also encountered strong and independent women. Dr Allan Gregory, the Melbourne High School historian regards this period of the School’s history as containing ‘some particularly outstanding women.’75 Berryman was lucky that two of these outstanding teachers were at the forefront of his education. Both Mary Hutton and Julia Flynn taught him one

72 F. N. Bamford, ‘The Wattle Club’, Papers Read before the Box Hill Historical Society, Volume III, p. 29-30, 41. 73Luke Savage, (Curator MHS archives), correspondence, 31 May, 2002. 74 Melbourne High School, Senior Class Lists, 1911. 75 Ibid. 43 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

of his favourite subjects, mathematics. Mary Hutton received no less than three awards recognising her dedication both to teaching and scholarship.76 Julia Flynn was one of the first students at teachers college to have completed a university degree. She was ‘an important influence on the school’ and later became one of three inspectors of secondary schools, senior inspector in 1924 and assistant chief inspector in 1928. This meant that she was the most senior woman ever in the Victorian Public Service and only her gender prevented further advancement. Both of these outstanding teachers formed a close professional relationship with Berryman during his time at MHS and provided testimonials on his graduation.77 Frank Berryman’s academic performance and general commitment to the school’s culture did not go unnoticed by the MHS community. In his final year at MHS Berryman’s dedication to his studies and his performances were recognised when he received the Rix Prize.78

Frank Berryman’s time at Melbourne High School had culminated in academic success and recognition of his contribution to the broader culture of the school. Berryman had immersed himself in school life and his sporting success, cadet experience and scholastic achievements meant that he left the school with a broad range of experiences. He emerged from MHS as a young adult with military training, a love of Empire and a strong sense of nationalism. His exposure to the culture of Melbourne High gave him a glimpse of life beyond a small working class suburb in outer Melbourne and gave him both confidence and ambition. School provided him with an excellent education and ‘life’ training that was backed up and supported by a stable and comforting family environment.

Frank Berryman’s education at Melbourne High proved exceptionally beneficial to him throughout his life. The school, through its accomplishments and its standing amongst the GPS schools in Victoria, was unique. It was and still remains an

76 She was a recipient of the Gladman Prize at teachers college, the Dwight Prize for education and the Cobden Prize for political economy and she was later to become headmistress of Melbourne Girl’s High. 77 Gregory, ‘Chapter 3’ p. 25; FHB, Engineer in Chief Inward Correspondence, Victorian Public Record Office, VPRS 425, unit 430, file No. RC12/387. 78 Ours, April 1911, p. 3. The Rix Prize, instituted in 1907, was named after Henry Finch Rix, a former Inspector with the Victorian Education Department. Rix had been an Inspector from 1885 until his death in 1906 and was an early advocate of a teachers' congress and played an important roll in the Victorian Royal Commission in Technical Education (1899-1900). 44 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

educational institution of ‘old school ties and no silver spoons.’79 During Frank Berryman’s time at MHS, the school proved itself as an avenue for social advancement and prominence. Of the 2221 Victorian men who made Australia’s Who’s Who in 1980 one in ten went to Melbourne High School, the third highest amongst the schools in the state.80 Melbourne High’s strength came with the production of men like Frank Berryman, who rose to prominence in ‘public service’.81 Melbourne High offered Berryman and his fellow student’s opportunities in life that they could never have achieved in an education system dominated by class and privilege. The meritocracy of MHS contrasted sharply with the established prestige of Scotch College, Melbourne, Geelong and the other prominent private Grammar schools and arguably it mirrored the meritocracy Berryman would encounter in the newly founded Australian army.

Searching for a public identity The end of secondary education can often be a time of great anxiety for many young adults.82 Gone are the well-established structures and routines of school life. School leavers, particularly those who possess solid academic results and strong references such as Frank Berryman, were faced with the prospect of a multitude of life options and career paths. Berryman’s results at Melbourne High and his Rix Prize stood him in good stead with any potential employer.

At the end of his final year at Melbourne High, having already passed the Junior Public Service Exam in eight subjects, Berryman elected to sit for the Senior Public Service Examination in ‘Algebra, Geometry, Trigonometry, Physics and Chemistry’.83 At the same time, with his preference for science and mathematics subjects, Berryman considered a job as a civil engineer. Accordingly, and presumably under some influence from his father, he applied for a position as an engineering student in the Victorian Railway Construction Branch.84

79 Janet McCalman, ‘Old School Ties and Silver Spoons: A statistical Footnote from Darkest Victoria.’ Australian Cultural History, No. 8, 1989, p. 81. 80 Berryman first appeared in Who’s Who in Australia as early as 1933. 81 Ibid, p. 79. 82 For a discussion of the issues facing young adults in the transition of school to work see; Gary Marks, ‘Issues in the school-to-work transition’, Journal of Sociology, Vol. 41, No. 4, December 2005, p. 363- 385. 83 ‘F. H. Berryman to Hon A. A. Billson, Minister of Railways, 18th November 1911’ Engineer in Chief Inward Correspondence, Victorian Public Record Office, VPRS 425, unit 430, file No. RC12/387. 84 Ibid. 45 THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MILITARY CAREER

Berryman applied to the Minister for Railways, the Honourable A. A. Billson in a very direct and uncompromising letter on 18 November 1912. He ensured that the Minister was aware of his excellent academic results and his Rix prize. He backed up his application with testimonials from the principal, Mr Hocking and two of his mathematics teachers, Miss Mary Hutton and Miss Julia Flynn.85

Within a few weeks Berryman had received a summons to the Railway offices in Spencer St, Melbourne for an interview on 14 December. Berryman’s application and interview were received favourably and on 18 December the Chief Engineer notified Berryman, that as there were no positions available in the engineering branch at that time, he was to be offered an appointment as a junior draughtsman starting on 3 January 1912 on 3/6 per day.

At the time Berryman entered the railways, the Royal Military College was being established in Canberra. By the end of school Berryman must have been aware that entry to RMC was a possibility. The first class at RMC had included Melbourne High School graduate and keen MHS Cadet Sergeant, William H Dawkins. At the end of 1912 Berryman had acquired six years in cadets and six months in the CMF. As a result the prospect of a military career was very inviting. David Jones has argued that the experience of participating in the cadets does not in itself oblige boys to take a military career. However the combination of a Cadet unit in addition to the prevailing military ethos at MHS and the early links that were established between RMC and MHS must have been a major factor in Berryman’s decision to apply.86

One may well speculate about the reasons Berryman chose to abandon a quiet life in the railways for the uncertainty of a military career. Military culture played a part as did perhaps boredom with the public service. Berryman may also have seen an opportunity to combine his interests in engineering and the military. RMC provided cadets with military engineering training in their final year of study and opportunities to be commissioned as an officer in the engineering branch. On 8 November 1912 Berryman

85 ‘F. H. Berryman to Hon A. A. Billson, Minister for Railways, 18 November, 1911’ Engineer in Chief Inward Correspondence, Victorian Public Record Office, VPRS 425/p, 430, RC 12/387. 86Jones as quoted in Powell, Honour in the Field; Melbourne High School and the Military in the Centenary of Federation, p. 16. 46 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

applied to the Victorian Railways for leave without pay from 11-28 November to prepare for and sit the Military’s entrance examination.87

On the 25th February 1913 he had tended his resignation to the railways, having accepted a position at the Royal Military College as a staff cadet. Frank Horton Berryman was ready to leave Melbourne and his family home at Box Hill to start a new life in the military.

87 ‘F. H. Berryman to Railway Office, Melbourne, 8th November, 1912’, VPRS 425/p 427 1912/16239. 47 AMILITARY EDUCATION

Chapter 2 ‘A Military Education ’ The Royal Military College Duntroon, 1913-1915

Bridges was determined that the college would be demanding, professionally rigorous, and open to talent...however Duntroon had a certain elitist basis…, discipline was severe and conditions bordering on the primitive, and life was made all the more demanding by the unofficial but tolerated practices of bullying and hazing. C.D. Coulthard Clarke, Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia, 1911-1986.1

The Royal Military College The weather was hot, the landscape dry and dusty. The converted sheep paddock seemed a far cry from the lush green hills and valleys that surrounded Geelong or the hustle and bustle of a busy Melbourne morning. To the young Frank Berryman the site of the parade ground and the line of marching men from the upper classes signified the start of a professional career that was to define him as a man for the rest of his life. Young, intelligent and idealistic he had already completed a demanding journey before his appearance on the outskirts of the nation’s fledgling capital. Frank Berryman’s arrival at The Royal Military College (RMC) Duntroon signified his introduction into the second institution that was to decisively mould his character.

No. 83 Staff Cadet Frank Berryman was the second member of the new class of cadets to arrive at the Royal Military College, Duntroon on Saturday 9 March 1913.2 The new cadets were greeted not by an elaborate institution, (that was not to develop until later years) but a collection of buildings indicative of the spartan living conditions at the new academy. As Staff Cadet Sydney Rowell later recalled ‘it is almost impossible to envisage just how isolated the college was in those days.’3 It was, as the Commander in Chief of the New Zealand forces Major-General Godley reflected, ‘a lonely and out-of-the-way spot’.4

1 Chris Coulthard-Clarke, ‘Royal Military College (RMC), Duntroon’, in Dennis (et al), The Oxford Companion to Australian military History, p. 521-522 & Chris Coulthard-Clarke, Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia, 1911-1986, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1986). 2 Routine Orders 9/10, Royal Military College, Duntroon, 1913, RMC Archives. 3 Sydney Rowell, Full Circle, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1974), p. 2. He was later Lt- General Sir Sydney Rowell. 4 Major-General Godley, C in C New Zealand Military Forces, 1912, as quoted in Chris Coulthard- Clarke, Duntroon, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 37. 48 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

For the new class at RMC the first week was particularly hectic. Besides the issuing of clothing, equipment, and rooms the cadets received their first introduction to the regimes that were to dominate their lives for the next two and a half years. This, of course, was not carried out in a manner that would allow for an easy adjustment from civilian life. Fellow classmate Leslie Ellis Beavis remarked that this first day gave them ‘an inkling of the severe discipline to come.’5

The tone of this discipline was set by the , Brigadier-General William Throsby Bridges. To the students he was uncompromising, ‘aloof and … very shy’.6 He ‘stalk[ed] through the college grounds with his arms folded and his head on his chest … appear[ing] not to notice the salutes …’ of his cadets.7 Bridges was a firm advocate of the stern discipline at RMC which was based on the United States Military Academy at West Point.8 Interestingly, later in his career, Berryman was to share a number of Bridge’s attributes. Berryman was also both stern and aloof in manner and most significantly, like Bridges he, ‘detested the kind of public image which, in later years, high ranking officers were supposed to enjoy if they were to be successful.’9

5 Diary of Staff Cadet L. E. Beavis, March, 1913, Beavis Papers, AWM PR 91/009, Series 3, Item 56. I would like to thank Major-General Beavis’s daughter Connie Barber for giving me permission to read and quote from her father’s diary and papers. 6 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 9; Dennis (et al) Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 120. See also Interview: Lt-General Sir Frank Horton Berryman, Royal Military College Duntroon, Oral History Records, 12 December 1974. Berryman was adamant that ‘Nobody got near the Commandant’s house when I was there. Bridges was (there).’ 7 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 9-10. See also Chris Coulthard-Clark, A Heritage of Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges K.C.B, C.M.G, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1979), p. 103. 8 At the invitation of Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, Field Marshal Viscount Kitchener of Great Britain visited Australia in 1909 to inspect the existing state of defence preparedness of the young Commonwealth, and advise on the best means of providing Australia with a land defence. Kitchener’s report, submitted in February 1910, the establishment of a College for the training of Permanent Officers. In 1910 Bridges was give the job of visiting and reporting on the military colleges in England, Canada and the United States. A public version of Kitchener’s report was published as 'Defence of Australia: Memorandum’ in Commonwealth Parliamentary Papers – General (Session 1910, Volume II, pp. 83– 104). For information on RMC Sandhurst see Christopher Pugsley & Angela Holdsworth, Sandhurst: A Tradition of Leadership, (Third Millennium Publishing, London, 2006), Hugh Thomas, The Story of Sandhurst, (Hutchinson, London, 1961), & Anthony Clayton, The British Officer: Leading the Army from 1660 to the Present, (Longman, London, 2005). 9 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 9. Bridges would go on to secure a lasting place in Australia’s military heritage, through his death while in command of the 1st Australian Division at Gallipoli. His stature in Australia’s military community was consolidated by the distinction of being the only Australian soldier killed in action during World War I to be returned to Australia. (An obvious exception being the interment of Australia’s ‘Unknown Soldier’ in the Australia War Memorial in 1993). Fittingly he is interned on the hill above Duntroon overlooking the college in which he played such a decisive role. 49 AMILITARY EDUCATION

The two other principal military instructors at the college were the Director of Military Art, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles William Gwynn and the Director of Drill Lieutenant-Colonel Ewen Sinclair-MacLagan. Gwynn, who was an officer of Irish decent, was ‘slight in build and had a mild stammer.’10 He was both charming and blunt and later instructed a number of the cadets, including Frank Berryman, during his time as commandant of the Staff College in Camberley during the 1920s Sinclair- MacLagan was the antithesis of Gwynn. He was a burly Scot who has been described as the ‘ideal type of regimental soldier.’11 He commanded the 3rd Brigade at Gallipoli, the first to go ashore, and finished the war as commander of the 4th Australian Division in 1917-1918.

For Berryman and the majority of his fellow staff cadets the transformation from civilian to soldier was not as distressing as it was for those students as yet unaccustomed to a military life. His extensive service in the cadets and his time in the militia had exposed him to military discipline and he was well prepared for the more rudimentary aspects of military life such as parades, marching, weapons handling and daily routine. On the first Tuesday after arrival the cadets were issued with their books and later they climbed Mount Pleasant for both exercise and for an orientation to the area. On Wednesday the cadets undertook their first ceremonial parade.12

On Wednesday 12 March 1913, just three days after the commencement of the course, came the official opening of ‘Canberra’. The Cadets marched to the site of the proceedings and joined a select band of dignitaries including the Prime Minister Andrew Fisher and the Minister for Home Affairs, King O’Malley. O’Malley had selected the site for the national capital and according to Staff Cadet Beavis he looked to all intents and purposes like a ‘wild man from .’ The cadets watched in silence as the Governor General and his wife, Lord and Lady Denam laid the foundation stone and officially named the city.13 Berryman thus stood as witness to one of the formative moments in the development of the new nation; participation in such events would become a hallmark of Berryman’s life. Berryman witnessed the dedication of Canberra

10 Coulthard-Clarke, A Heritage of Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges K.C.B, C.M.G, p. 42. 11 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 11. 12 Beavis Papers, item 56, Wednesday 12 March 1913. 13 Beavis Papers, item 56, Saturday 14 March 1913. 50 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

as a representative of the Royal Military College, one of the country’s few truly national institutions and like the Australian Federation it was still very much in its infancy. One of Duntroon’s roles was to help foster Australian nationalism. With the absence of a standing army the College stood not only as a physical representation of Federation, but also as the one of the few symbols of national defence.14 It was during these early years that both Duntroon and Federation were trying, as establishments, to forge their own traditions and sense of place within the Australian landscape.

From a purely military perspective the college’s main role was to produce permanent officers for the Australian Commonwealth Military Forces. These officers were to fill the staff and administrative positions that would support the mainstay of the Australian army, the citizen Militia. The graduates of RMC would fill the ranks of the Staff Corps, an arm of the military forces that would furnish officers to fill the vast permanent administrative structure that Lord Kitchener had recommended the Australian Army adopt to support compulsory military training.15 However, for the cadets in their first week of training at RMC the prospect of one of these administrative positions seem too distant to even contemplate.

The formal induction of the cadets culminated with an inspection by the Governor-General. Informally, their acceptance into Duntroon was marked by the arbitrary brutality that characterised a cadet’s life. At 8pm on the first Saturday evening Berryman and his classmates fell in on parade. They were marched down to the bathrooms where they were promptly locked in and told to undress. The dousing to follow was one of series of childish ‘pranks’ designed to humiliate new students. Staff Cadet Beavis described the entire incident in his diary:

[We were]… squirted with water and flicked with towels. Laid on[a] tarpaulin [and had] Buckets of water thrown over [us]. Tossed thrice then ascended [a] platform. Flown over. Painted with tar; head arm legs, everywhere. Then treacle and axle grease. [Our] hair cut then shaved with a meat axe. A members mug full of Condy’s fluid, H2S and conglomerated stink [was] then placed over head and [we were] christened a staff cadet. [Afterwards we were]Thrown into bath full of iced water, [our] Head forced under [and] Then chased with towels to [the]

14 The only other symbol of Australia’s national defence at this time was the . 15 Jeffery Grey, The Australian Army, (Oxford, Melbourne, 2001), p. 29. 51 AMILITARY EDUCATION

bathroom. Others had to sit on a block of ice – naked- and sing a comic song; climb greasy rope, climb ladders helped by a powerful jet of water, [and] go through rifle exercises with a toy gun – mind you covered in tar which burnt into the skin inflicting sever pain. Then with battered bruised bodies we jumped into a hot bath already filled with tar, scum and suffering humanity. There we scrubbed, rubbed and swore for an hour or so trying to get the tar off. [We] Had to use kerosene and all kinds of oil and soap to no end. Then the last post went and we had to go to bed filthy.16

‘Hazing’ or ‘bastardisation’ remained (and arguably still remains) a problem for the college. The details of this particular incident found their way into a Sydney paper and received ‘sensational treatment.’17 Despite the denials of Bridges ‘hazing’ continued to mar the reputation of RMC.

Less scandalous but just as demanding was the ‘torturous’ regime of college life. While the British General Sir Ian Hamilton ‘approve[d] entirely of the arrangements for the pay and equipment, which are a direct incentive to a modest, unostentatious style of living,’ Berryman thought the lifestyle imposed upon him by the commandant and his staff much more akin to a prison.18 Berryman was not the only trainee officer to make this analogy. Classmate wrote that RMC was more like a ‘penitentiary or a monastery’ than a military college and Duntroon soon became known amongst the cadets as the ‘clink.’19

The food was plain and unappetising. The barracks were cold and at times seemed uninhabitable. There were only two tubs for each block of ten cadets and the latrines were over a hundred yards away. During winter the cadets had to crack the ice off the shower so they could bathe and the ‘junior class were the first to use the latrines, to warm the seats up!’ And while Berryman thought this information was not the type that could be put ‘in the [history] books … it was fact’ none the less.20 The conditions at

16 Beavis Papers, Saturday 14 March 1913. 17 Coulthard-Clarke, Duntroon, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 37. 18 Berryman interview, RMC. 19 Coulthard-Clarke, Duntroon, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 37. 20 Berryman interview, RMC. 52 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

the college were so severe that there were a number of health problems plagued the cadets. In 1913 a diphtheria outbreak hospitalised many cadets in Berryman’s class.21

The spartan living conditions were supplemented by an oppressive array of regulations. Cadets were not allowed to marry; cigarettes, gambling, fireworks, alcohol, pets, raffles, as well as the display of women’s photographs were all forbidden.22 In fact the college was an institution that denied all manner of masculine pleasures and indulgences. Originally the entire staff was male, including the cooks and cleaners. However under pressure Bridges relented and allowed some of the women to do laundry, but only on the proviso that they be ‘darned old and darned ugly’.23

Figure 2.0 ‘Berryman thought the life style imposed upon him by the commandant and his staff much more akin to a prison’ Cadet F.H. Berryman and section, circa 1913. (Berryman Family Archives)24

21 David Moore, Duntroon, The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001, (RMC, Canberra, 2001), p. 32. 22 Moore, Duntroon, The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001, p. 37; Clarke, A Heritage of Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges K.C.B, C.M.G, p. 103. 23 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 3; Clarke, A Heritage of Spirit: A biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges K.C.B, C.M.G, p.103. 24 Frank Berryman is standing on the far fight of the photograph. Given the mix of cadet ranks it is most likely that the group are Berryman’s mixed class ‘section’ consisting of 1911, 1912 and 1913 students. The lack of cadet rank on Berryman’s sleeve indicates that this photograph was taken in his first year at the College. 53 AMILITARY EDUCATION

These measures were designed to harden the cadets to the rigours of a military life and like all military training facilities, to remove their sense of individuality. One of the essential elements in the effectiveness of any military unit is the formulation of team work. To achieve this aim the students were moulded into a cadet ‘corps’ based upon the collective ideas of a regular British military regiment. This imposing discipline regime was also the central factor in ensuring that the college remained ‘essentially democratic.’ Bridges was trying hard to establish a college where the cadets would be drawn from a wide range of social classes and, as such, regulations were put into place to guarantee that Duntroon remained, as much as possible, a classless institution.25 To achieve this Bridges realised that ‘all hints of privilege and favour had to be avoided’.26

As a result RMC was the only major military college in the world that did not charge fees or require a deposit on entry.27 Cadets were limited to five shillings a week pocket money and ‘expensive items of personal gear were prohibited.’28 Cadets had the status of private soldiers only and when on leave they travelled second class.29 Bridges also discouraged visits from parents as Canberra’s isolated position and the cost of travel would disadvantage those students whose families came from a more modest financial background. Furthermore, entry into the college was strictly confined to the results of the entrance examinations. Selection was therefore based entirely on merit as opposed to privilege or favour. Without this approach cadets such as Frank Berryman would never have been able to attend the Royal Military College.

To ensure the transparency of this process the exams were conducted by an independent authority. In the case of the 1913 class it was the . The rigorous nature of the examinations was guaranteed as prospective students had to compete not only for a place at the military college, but also qualify for a civil program. This secured every successful cadet a university degree. Competition amongst the 1913 cohort was made that much more difficult by an increase of 50 per cent in the number of

25 Clarke, A Heritage of Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges K.C.B, C.M.G, p. 103. 26 Ibid, p. 109. 27 Moore, Duntroon, The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001, p. 37. 28 Clarke, A Heritage of Spirit: A biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges K.C.B, C.M.G, p. 103. 29 Clarke, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 38. 54 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

applicants over the previous year and the decision of the government to offer only 29 places for the coming year.30

Education at Duntroon was exacting and competitive. When the results of the entrance examinations became known Frank Berryman with a score of 946.5 / 1100 was ranked first out of the 154 eligible candidates. His closest rival, A.E.C. Gepp was a full 99 marks behind.31 This result was exceptional. Berryman had performed above any of his fellow class mates and well in advance of any cadet who entered the college in the years leading up to the First World War.32 On entry, Berryman was the senior cadet of his class until the examinations at the end of the first year.33

Thirty-three cadets were selected for entry into the college.34 The last cadet on the examination list was the future Lieutenant-General , a full 327 marks behind Berryman. The bottom four scoring cadets, B.J. Andrew, R.H. Robinson, K.M. Mortimer and Bridgeford were only accepted after New Zealand failed to fulfil its quota of students. The test results also had one other unpredictable result: Victoria provided twice the number of cadets as NSW. In fact by 1913, 52 per cent of all Staff Cadets were from Victoria. In Berryman’s year there were only two South Australians, one Queenslander and no cadets at all from .35 The significant contributing factor to the dominance of students from Victoria was, as Chris Coulthard- Clarke argued, the presence of the Federal government in Melbourne and the ‘strength of the state’s school cadet movement.’36

While test results and regulations meant that all the cadets were, on the surface equal, the institution itself could be never described as classless. The military in

30 Clarke, A Heritage of Spirit: A Biography of Major-General Sir William Throsby Bridges K.C.B, C.M.G, p. 101. 31 Appendix I, ‘Names and marks of candidates who secured cadetships’, Exam Papers, RMC, (Sydney, William Gulliver, Government Printer, 1913). 32 See ‘Report on Exam Papers RMC 1911-1914’, AWM published record 355.00711 E96. Figures available for the first 4 classes of cadets’ ranks Berryman as the most ‘intelligent’ cadet (based on examination) to enter the college. Figures during World War I are not available. 33 Moore, Duntroon, The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001, p. 33. The difference of 29 to 33 was accounted for by an increased number of places made available as New Zealand was unable to fill its allocated quota of cadets. 34 L. E. Lee, Duntroon: The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-1946, (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952), p. 31. 35 Clarke, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 49; Appendix I, Exam Papers RMC. 36 Chris Coulthard-Clarke, ‘The Corps of Staff Cadets over seventy four years’, Defence Force Journal, No. 62, Jan/Feb 1987, p. 9. 55 AMILITARY EDUCATION

Australia during this period was an inherently conservative institution based on models, standards and hegemonic Australian middle class values.37 Furthermore while the theory of selection based on examination opened the system to ‘all’ social strata in Australian society, the vast majority of Australians did not have access to free universal high school education in 1912. As noted earlier Frank Berryman was only able to sit the examination as a result of his scholarship at Melbourne High. Most candidates who sat the examination were products of the exclusive and expensive ‘public school’ system.38

In 1919, when the commandant of RMC released the list of the occupations of the cadet’s fathers since the opening of the college, it was seen that the professional and commercial classes were ‘heavily over-represented’. One of the consequences of this was that ‘RMC did take on something of an elitist character’.39 Isolation compounded this elitism. The college was (contemporaries noted) a largely self contained community, relatively self-sufficient and not susceptible to outside influences.40

Being from the wrong social strata may have been alienating enough, but Berryman also found himself part of a religious minority. The college was dominated by the . Though the largest number of cadets entering RMC came from Wesley College, only one of its five students declared himself as a Methodist. The dominance of the Anglicans reflected the dominance of the British professional and commercial classes in the college. It drove some students such as George Vasey, a Methodist, to describe his religion upon entrance as Church of England.41

37 Ibid, p. 15. Clarke argues that candidates were ‘more likely to be conservative and traditionally minded.’ 38 L. J. Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer; An Autobiography, (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1972), p. 28. Wackett was a member of Berryman’s Class at RMC and remarked that ‘almost all [cadets] had come from leading public schools.’ 39 Ibid, p. 10. 40 Clark, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 39. The 1911 Australian census record 38.4% of the population as Anglicans. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Year Book 2006 (http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/46d1bc47ac9d0c7bca256c470025ff87/bfdda1ca506d6cfaca257 0de0014496e!OpenDocument) Clark also notes that ‘Throughout the life of the college Anglicans were hugely over-represented as a proportion of the cadet body.’ See Clark, ‘The Corps of Staff Cadets over Seventy-Four Years’. p. 11. 41 Ibid, p. 11-12; Clarke, ‘The Corps of Staff Cadets over seventy four years’, p. 12; David Horner, General Vasey’s War, (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1992), p. 23. 56 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

For Frank Berryman, like all the other cadets, the move to RMC meant a move away from his family and its influences for the next fours years. Like his shift to MHS Duntroon exposed him to a new culture that was distant from his working class origins. Unlike MHS there were no female students or even staff to distract the cadets and for Frank Berryman there was no working class family or Box Hill community to return to after class each evening. For all of the College’s meritocracy, Berryman became acutely conscious of the differences in amongst the cadets. All too aware of his ‘inferior’ background he turned to hard work, dedication and discipline. Although he had drifted away from his family, the heritage of a Methodist upbringing placed him in good stead for the spartan lifestyle and rigorous examinations that were a consistent part of life in Duntroon.

Figure 2.1 ‘Berryman had performed above any of his fellow class mates and well in advance of any cadet who entered the college in the years leading up to the First World War.’ Royal Military College Duntroon, 3rd Class circa 1915 (Berryman Family Archives)42

While Berryman’s background in the cadets stood him in good stead for the military training, his education at Melbourne High left him at some disadvantage. The

42 Frank Berryman is second row (from front), sitting, fourth in from the left. Clearly visible are his sergeant’s chevron which places the photography as sometime in early 1915 or late 1914. 57 AMILITARY EDUCATION

curriculum at RMC during the first two years of study concentrated heavily on civil as opposed to military subjects and it included areas in which Berryman had little or no experience. The RMC syllabus included both French and German.43 A large number of the cadets from exclusive private schools were well-versed in these subjects and progressed through the course at an accelerated pace. As fellow staff Cadet Lawrence Wackett recalled, ‘No allowance was made for the deficiency of cadets in any subject … this made it extremely difficult for beginners.’44 Wackett’s experience goes a long way to explaining why Frank Berryman was only ever described as ‘average’ in languages while at RMC.45

Despite these setbacks Berryman immersed himself in his academic work at RMC and by the end of the academic year he could proudly boast that he had maintained his position as the senior cadet in his class. Berryman was placed first in his academic results as well as first in the combined civil and military subjects.46 His close friend Staff Cadet Leslie Beavis was not far behind. Berryman’s academic performance was based on his continued excellence in science and mathematics and his solid performance in military subjects was built on his cadet experience.

Over the next two years Berryman achieved excellent marks in his military and civil subjects. At the end of his first year he was granted the RMC 4th Class prize for the highest aggregate score in civil subjects in the exams conducted by the University of . Berryman was presented with his award by the British Inspector of Overseas Forces, General Sir Ian Hamilton, during his tour of Australia in front of the entire cadet corps. But by the end of his second year Berryman had slipped down the list. His disappointing military results may have been a result of the design of RMC’s syllabus. In the first year a heavy emphasis was placed on infantry training, of which Berryman had considerable experience, but in the second year the cadets moved into cavalry training, a more socially elitist arm of the service which required a well

43 ‘Frank H. Berryman – academic results’, Melbourne High School Archives. Berryman concentrated on maths and the sciences at MHS. 44 Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer; An Autobiography, p. 28-29; Clarke, The Royal Military College 1911- 1986, p. 51. 45 ‘Personnel File – Staff Cadet No. 83. Frank H. Berryman’, Royal Military College Duntroon, Archives. 46 ‘Routine Orders’, Royal Military College, Duntroon, No. 1, 1914. Berryman had 7,367 points (max 9,500) and Beavis 7,179. 58 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

developed sense of horsemanship.47 By the time of graduation Berryman had slipped to 5th place in the order of merit. This placed him in the top 15 per cent of graduates. To all intents and purposes an excellent result, but one that must have been a little disappointing given his prominent position in the first two years. He had continued to perform well in his civil subjects, but his success in the military subjects was not as consistent.48

Berryman’s results may well have been different if the First World War had not interrupted the full four years of military training. Given his strong background in science and mathematics Berryman would have excelled in his third and fourth years at RMC, with its emphasis on the more technically demanding artillery and engineering training. Arguably Berryman would have reclaimed his position at the very head of this graduating class given his preference in these areas of the military art and his continued excellence in civil subjects.49

Of course Berryman’s time at RMC was not simply a matter of classroom studies. The Cadets undertook field exercises, site visits (including a tour of the munitions factory in Melbourne), as well as working as visiting instructors and temporary in militia camps like the ’s camp at Liverpool, Sydney in 1914.50 These activities were all designed to give the students a well balanced and rounded military education to prepare them for their future roles as staff officers in the Australian military. Probably the only real deficiency on their program of military study was the lack of emphasis on the technical aspects of war. As Staff Cadet Wackett noted, Not once … was the aeroplane taken into consideration as a possible factor in war … there was not a single bit of radio apparatus among instructional equipment [and] even motor transport was not considered. The horse reigned supreme.51

47 RMC Training syllabus see, Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer; An Autobiography, p. 29, 34. See also Clarke, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 51. It is more than likely that Berryman had little exposure to horse riding prior to RMC. 48 ‘Personnel File – Staff Cadet No. 83. Frank H. Berryman’, Royal Military College Duntroon, Archives. 49 This is based on Berryman’s excellent results at RMC and MHS in these subjects as well as his desire to enter engineering in the Victorian Railways. 50 ‘With the 8th Brigade in Liverpool’, Journal of the Royal Military College of Australia, Vol. II, No. 3 November 1914, p. 92-94. 51 Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer; An Autobiography, p. 30 & 32. 59 AMILITARY EDUCATION

Berryman’s achievements in his studies were also matched by his advancements in the cadet hierarchy.52 In an institution renowned for its stern discipline and punishments Berryman’s conduct sheet (blank save for entries of promotion) suggests a blameless record.53 However this does not mean that Berryman never tested the rules of the College; it was just that he never got caught. On at least one occasion Berryman, along with cadets, Beavis, Peasant, Thompson and Potter, were brought before ‘the office’ but managed to escape censure as a result of unclear evidence. The same quartet also managed to avoid punishment for ‘pinching grapes’ during a ride to Yarralumla.54

Berryman’s medical record on the other hand, was beyond reproach. At no time during his 2 ½ years did he report as sick, evidence, he thought, of a ‘strong constitution.’55 Other than maintaining his healthy constitution and working on his studies Berryman found some relief from the monotony of military life. Sunday was the only free day for the cadets and as such there was little opportunity to indulge in extra curricular activities. Recreation (such as it was) was hampered by the discipline of college life and the isolation of Canberra. However, Berryman and his friends were able to undertake rides in the local countryside and they also found that a pack march with all their kit out to Cotter on a Saturday afternoon provided an opportunity for relaxation and ‘a bit of a swim.’56

Duntroon’s isolation fostered the creation of a number of clubs and societies, virtually the cadet’s only social outlet. Amongst these were the Christian Union, the Duntroon Bible Study Group. This along with the regular Sunday church parades allowed Berryman to continue to practise the strict Methodist beliefs that he was brought up with. We know Berryman was an active member of the Christian Union, serving as it secretary/treasurer in 1914 and also writing articles in the College’s journal on the Union’s behalf.57 Berryman was no doubt encouraged by the fact that one of his

52 See ‘Routine Orders’, RMC, No. 1, 1914; No. 45, 1914 & No. 3 1915. (9 out of the 33 cadets were promoted L/CPL, 7 CPL and 7 SGT.) Berryman was always amongst the first batch of his class to receive promotion. 53 Moore, Duntroon; The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001, p. 29. For example Staff Cadet Dunlop was confined to barracks (CB) for two days for reading the Argus in class and Staff Cadet Christie got seven days CB for reading a novel during study hour. 54 Beavis Diary, 28 March 1915. 55 ‘F. H. Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, circa 1923, Berryman Family Papers (BFP). 56 ‘Berryman interview’, RMC Oral History Archive. 57 RMC Journal, No. 2 June 1914; Berryman, F.H. ‘The Christian Union’, RMC Journal, November 1914, p. 51. 60 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

immediate superior officers in the College, Captain H.D.K. MaCartney, was also a very active member of the Christian Union. ‘More British than the British’ MacCartney was also well known for his lack of humour and blunt manner. These were character traits also possessed by Berryman. When MaCartney was promoted to Major in 1914 the college choir sang a rendition of ‘Crown him with many crowns.’58 Its significance was probably lost on both these self possessed (and self obsessed) soldiers.

Sport was the other principal social activity for the cadets at the College and provided, (as the commandant put it) ‘a means of maintaining health, and as assistance to discipline’.59 Berryman, through his ‘solid and useful work’ and ‘roving’ enhanced his reputation in Australian Rules Football that he had earned at Melbourne High.60 He played Aussie Rules throughout his time at RMC and supplemented his good performances in this arena with commendable efforts in the College swimming and sports carnivals.61

As mid-1914 approached, Duntroon’s cadets were more concerned with the ‘sport’ amongst the leading powers of Europe as it was becoming clear that the British Empire was drifting into a war with Germany. On Sunday 2 August one of Berryman’s friends, Staff Cadet Beavis, recorded that the assembled students were amused with a ‘picture show, mainly films of European armies [and] …Whenever pictures were shown of British or Russian troops the cheering was deafening, but the German films were greeted with silence or hissing.’62

When war finally broke out the cadets at RMC greeted the news with euphoria. Cadet Marlin wrote in his diary that ‘England declares war! Staff Cadets greatly excited’.63 It had, as Chris Coulthard-Clarke noted, ‘electrified the college.’64 RMC fell into a flurry of activity with Cadet Beavis recording that ‘Never have I passed such an exciting week in all my life.’65 The declaration of war and decision to graduate the first class also led to a mass exodus of the staff starting with the Directors of Military Art

58 Clarke, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 46. 59 Ibid. 60 See RMC Journal, December 1913, November, 1914 & August 1915. 61 Clarke, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 42. 62 Beavis Diary, Sunday 2 August 1914. 63 Diary of R.F. Marlin, 2-5 August 1914, AWM PR00104 64 Clarke, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 55 65 Beavis Diary Saturday 8 August 1914. 61 AMILITARY EDUCATION

and Drill. A mere two weeks after the declaration of war the only remaining original officer was the adjutant.66 Berryman and his class remained at their studies amid speculation about their fate and, while their military studies took on even greater importance, most of the students had little time for their continuing civil courses. Despite the outbreak of war and the decision to graduate the first class almost immediately followed by the second year class in November 1914, Berryman and the rest of his 3rd Class, as well as the rest of the College, were sent home for their usual summer leave.67

The summer leave for Berryman’s class (the third of RMC) was in many ways fortuitous. It was to be the last time that they were to see their family and friends before their eventual departure for war. While speculation as to their fate grew, the new senior class and their fellow cadets reassembled on 31 January 1915 and recommenced their ‘normal routine.’68 By February Berryman and his class were lined up and informed by the commandant that they were to graduate on 30 June, nearly eighteen months early. As most of the cadets were only 20 years of age and entry into the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) required an age of 21, the whole class was obliged to secure the consent of their parents. At the call of one pace forward those wishing to volunteer their services, the entire class moved as one.69

The original intention was to graduate Berryman and his fellow cadets into either the light horse or infantry. This was a justifiable decision at the end of just two years study as they had already qualified for these two arms of military service. The class was asked to parade and declare their preference. It was then that the particularly strong-willed and outspoken Cadet, L.J. Wackett, broke the silence of Duntroon’s parade ground with a single note of defiance, ‘neither’. Wackett declared that he would volunteer but only for one of the army’s technical arms. The response made its way to the Commandant and eventually to Army H.Q. There it must have struck accord with H.Q. staff and the class was again paraded and asked who would like to join the technical services. Immediately, twelve of the cadets including Berryman, Beavis, Clowes, and Vasey stepped forward. As a result of Wackett’s persistence the Army

66 Moore, Duntroon, The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001, p. 46. 67 Lee, Duntroon; The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-1946, p. 41. 68 Ibid. 69 Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer; An Autobiography, p. 35. 62 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

decided to form a special class to graduate the twelve as artillery officers.70 Henceforth their instruction was to be entirely in this specialist arm and they were sent off to train on artillery tactics. This was to prove a fateful decision for Frank Berryman.

If it had not been for Wackett’s dogged persistence Berryman’s career may well have ended abruptly. In the First World War the infantry suffered enormous casualties and a posting to the artillery almost certainly saved Berryman from death or serious injury. The RMC infantry officers suffered a staggering 70 per cent casualty rate.71 It is not surprising therefore that a number of the Army’s Second World War senior officers came from the artillery class of RMC 1915 namely, Generals Berryman, Vasey, Clowes, Milford and Beavis.

The news of the landing at Anzac made its way to the college and was greeted with great enthusiasm by the cadets. Their spirit was saddened, but little dampened, by the announcement of the first death from the college, that of their former commandant General Bridges. His stature in Australian’s military community was consolidated with the distinction of being the only Australian soldier killed in action during the First World War to be returned to Australia.72 Fittingly he was interred on the hill above Duntroon overlooking the college in which he played such a decisive role.

Bridge’s death on the Gallipoli peninsula was just one of a tide of casualties that soon engulfed the 1st and 2nd classes from RMC. Most of the cadets who remained behind in Australia lost not only comrades but friends, and Frank Berryman was no exception. His greatest lost was Lieutenant William Dawkins, a fellow graduate of Melbourne High School and its Cadet corps. Despite the age gap the two men became firm friends at RMC sharing many evening ‘chats’ together and, at times, the same tent while on field exercises. On the news of Dawkin’s death Berryman felt compelled to write to his family, not just as a close friend, but also on behalf of both Melbourne High and RMC. Berryman’s words to the family provide a clear insight into the response of the cadet corps when faced by the loss of a comrade:

70 Wackett, Aircraft Pioneer; An Autobiography, p. 35-36; Moore, Duntroon; The Royal Military College of Australia 1911-2001, p. 49. Interestingly Wackett left the artillery during the war to pursue a career in the flying corps. 71 Clarke, The Royal Military College 1911-1986, p. 62-63 72 The unknown soldier was not brought ‘home’ until 1993. 63 AMILITARY EDUCATION

Dear Mrs Dawkins, On behalf of the old High School, cadets at Duntroon I wish to express to you our heart felt sympathy for the loss of William … One cheering thing is that he had his wish fulfilled. On saying goodbye to me some months ago he said, that he considered that the most glorious death was that on the field of battle & more over he wished, when his time came, it would be on the field of honour.73

Within a month of Berryman’s letter to the Dawkins the class that entered RMC in 1913, thirty one Australians and three New Zealanders, were graduated for active service abroad. For the majority of them their first test of arms came on the killing fields of the Western Front.

73F.H Berryman to Mrs Dawkins, Duntroon, 2 June, 1915, as quoted in J.A. Ingle, From Duntroon to the Dardanelles: a biography of Lieutenant William Dawkins: including his diaries and selected letters, (J. Ingle, Canberra, 1995), p. 175. 64 AGUNNERS WAR

Chapter 3 ‘A Gunners War’ War & the Western Front 1915-1918 The war of 1914-18 was an artillery war. Artillery was the battle winner, artillery was what caused the greatest loss of life, the most dreadful wounds and the deepest fear. John Terraine, White Heat, p. 95

‘To the last shilling and the last round’ On graduation Frank Berryman was granted a commission in the Permanent Military Forces and on 12 November 1915 a commission in the Australian Imperial Force (AIF). By now he had the benefit of a significant amount of military training. After six years instruction in the Cadet Corps, six months as a member of the Citizen Forces and two and a half years of formal military training at RMC, he was setting off for war. Despite his seemingly impressive military record Berryman was only 21 years and 7 months. But youth, determination and contemporary military training were to prove poor preparation for the mass carnage of France.

As a result of Berryman electing to specialise in the artillery he found himself posted as second in charge (2IC) of the 12th Battery, under Major William Allsop, of the recently formed 4th Field Artillery Brigade (4th FAB), AIF.1 Berryman’s elation at his commission would also have been shared by fellow Duntroon graduates, George Vasey and Edward Milford who were also posted to the 4th FAB.

Berryman had an immediate impact on his new comrades. Alex Crawford noted that while Lieutenant Vasey was ‘rather hesitant [in] manner and his orders did not have the air of authority’, and Lieutenant Milford was a ‘delightful, gentle natured chap, friendly [and] very likeable’, Berryman was ‘blunt as the back of an axe’, ‘fanatically keen’ and his commitment to the military was uncompromising.

1 ‘Major Frank Horton Berryman’, AWM 183 / 7 Australian War Records Section – biographical details; see also Berryman, F. H. ‘Application for a commission in the Field Artillery AIF’, June 1915, NAA WWI Personnel Service Record. See also War Diary, 4 FAB [Field Artillery Brigade] November 1915, AWM 8, Item 13/32/1. 65 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

‘We used to say of Berry that he would cut his grandmother’s throat if it was in the interests of the army.’2

The 4th FAB was formed on 23 September 1915 in Albert Park, Melbourne, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel W.H. Grimwade. Grimwade was a 46 year old Melbourne businessman and keen militia officer.3 His brigade consisted of three batteries, Nos. 10, 11, 12, with a mixed bag of personnel ranging from the Duntroon graduates to former militia personnel down to raw recruits.4 The three RMC graduates were posted to the unit as first lieutenants and detailed as brigade orderly officers.5 The 4th FAB along with the 5th and 6th and the 2nd Divisional Ammunition Column (2nd DAC) formed the artillery component

Figure 3.0 ‘blunt as the back of an axe’ Lieutenant Frank H Berryman AIF, Circa 1915 (Box Hill Historical Society) of the 2nd Infantry Division, AIF. The was sent to Gallipoli in August 1915 without its artillery units which were being formed in Australia and only began to arrive in Egypt in December, just as the Australian forces were withdrawing from .6

On 17 November 1915 the men of the 4th FAB were loaded on to the Wiltshire for service overseas. The Wiltshire’s voyage was uneventful. The men were kept busy with physical exercise and military lessons and, to relieve the boredom and monotony of the ship’s daily routine, they amused themselves with deck sports and gambling. To Berryman and his fellow officers the voyage was a frustrating time. For while the

2 David Horner, General Vasey’s War, pp. 11-12. 3 War Diary, 4th Field Artillery Brigade (4th FAB), AWM 4; Major-General H.W. Grimwade. Commanded 4th FAB 1915-16. He went on to command the artillery of the 3rd Division AIF 1916-1918. 4 David Horner, The Gunners: A History of the Royal Australian Artillery, (Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1995), p. 112. 5 War diary 4th Field Artillery Brigade, AIF, AWM 4. Appendix 1, ‘List of Officers of 4th F.A.Bde A.I.F.’, December 1915/January 1916. 6 Horner, The Gunners, p. 112. 66 AGUNNERS WAR

‘training of the officers and the signallers proceeded steadily … the training of the gunners was restricted.’7

To the gunners this frustration meant boredom. Gunner Day could not even find solace in his diary as the same ‘routine goes on everyday … [except] Sundays [when] we have Church parade and no drill, so there is not [even] much to write about.’8 Most of the time was spent caring for the two hundred horses on the ship. They were ‘exercised on coil matting laid along the deck [and the] horses from the lower deck were walked up an incline plane to the exercise deck and back again displaying amazing dexterity.’9

One of the tasks of the AIF in Egypt was the defence of the and as such the 4th FAB was deployed to Ferry Post in early March.10 Egypt was a fascinating and exotic destination for the Australians, especially to a number of the AIF who had never left their district or home town. But, the sight of the Australian camp of over four infantry divisions was almost as impressive and even ‘awe-inspiring’ to the new arrivals when the artillery’s horses stampeded through the camp.11

For soldiers and officers alike one of the most notable sights was the vast array of troops from right across the British and French Empires. British, Indians, French, French colonial troops and Gurkhas mixed freely with the colonials from Australia and New Zealand on the streets of .12 Egypt, however, offered so much more to these soldier ‘tourists’ than the mere spectacle of a military parade. Before them was the mystic orient full of mystery and sensuality, a haven for new experiences that included trips to the exotic pyramids and markets of Cairo. Yet despite all of the supposed glamour and mystery within a few weeks Egypt would, for the new arrivals, cease to be

7 F. H. Berryman, ‘Chapter 1: Introduction’, in Brook, D. (ed) Round Shot to Rapier: Artillery in South Australia 1940-1984, (Investigator Press, , 1986), p. 21. 8 Diary of Gunner K.S. Day, 4th FAB, 19 November 1915, AWM PR01054. 9 Ibid. 10 C.E.W. Bean, The AIF in France 1916, Volume 3, (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1934), pp. 23-31. 11 Berryman, ‘Introduction’, Round Shot to Rapier, p. 22. For a greater insight into the events of troopship life see, David Kent, From Trench and Troopship: The Experience of the Australian Imperial Force 1914-1918, (Hale, Victoria, 1999) and David Kent ‘Troopship Literature: “A Life on the Ocean Wave,” 1914-19’ Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 10, April 1987, p. 3-10. 12 Papers of Frank E Hobson, New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, 3rd January 1915, AWM PR 00081. 67 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

a place where ‘splendid things gleam in the dust’.13 Rather, as for the veterans of the AIF, Egypt became a place of ‘sun, sand and syphilis.’14

During this time enormous pressure was placed on the AIF as it went through a period of rapid expansion from one and one half divisions to five.* One of the results of this reorganisation was the creation of the Ammunition Column, Berryman’s first ever command.15 His appointment was recognition of his training and his dedication to the performance of his duty. The young Lieutenant was charged with keeping the Brigade’s guns supplied with ammunition, a posting that suited the young officer perfectly; a matter of logistics, routine and timing.

The Western Front Berryman’s command was, however, to prove ephemeral. Shortly after his arrival in France his promotion to temporary captain was affected by yet another reorganisation of the artillery. After less than two months in the position Berryman’s command was wiped away with the stroke of a pen. In an effort to save on personnel and horses the brigade ammunition columns were merged into divisional trains and Berryman found himself as just one of seventeen other officers on the establishment of the new 2nd Divisional Artillery Column (2nd DAC).16 The expansion of the Australian Army had created opportunities, but had just as rapidly taken them away. The fortunes of war, however, are fickle. A few weeks later Berryman was called into Lieutenant- Colonel Watts’s office and informed that he was to be the new adjutant for the 4th FAB.17

The field artillery brigades were the chief fire support available to the division’s commander. As such they were allocated in 1916 at four per division, each brigade equipped with three batteries of 18-pounder field guns and one battery of howitzers. The artillery brigade can easily be compared in structure and rank to the infantry battalion. Both were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonels. In an infantry battalion the

13 Richard White, ‘Sun, Sand, And Syphilis: Australian soldiers and the Orient Egypt 1914’, Australian Cultural History, No. 9, 1990, p. 50 -51. 14 Ibid. * The 3rd Division was formed back home in Australia under Major-General Monash. 15 Horner, The Gunners, p. 113 16 War Diary 2nd DAC, May 1916. The entry for 13 May includes a reorganisation table for the new officer complement. 17 War Diary 4th FAB, 15 July 1916. 68 AGUNNERS WAR

companies were commanded by , as were the batteries of an artillery brigade. At the headquarters level, for both formations, the principal staff officer was the adjutant, usually a captain.

The adjutant is one of the most important positions in the headquarters and as such it is normally a post given to a senior captain. With the rapid expansion of the field artillery and the importance of the adjutant’s role in both planning and administration it is easy to see why RMC graduates such as Frank Berryman, despite their young age and limited time at the front, were seen as the most able of young officers for this position. This was the first time that Berryman held a genuine staff job, even though at a low operational level. It was this capacity that became synonymous with Berryman’s career.

The Australians had arrived on the Western Front at a pivotal time, especially for the development of the artillery. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) had gone to war in 1914 with no artillery above divisional level. They also lacked experienced commanders and staff officers to deal with the required expansion caused by the nature and style of warfare on the Western Front.18 The British artillery of 1914 had demonstrated that it lacked the ability to support an infantry advance in a systematic way and it had also revealed that the BEF lacked the ability to communicate effectively between commanders, guns and observers. Compounding these problems was the fact that the guns were short of range and they lack a sufficient number of shells.19

These problems remained throughout 1915 and the lack of artillery in the British Corps as well as modern heavy artillery at the army level meant that the German Army held the advantage over the BEF on the Western Front throughout 1915.20 There was also a much broader problem with British Army doctrine in relation to their use of artillery during this phase of the war. By the end of 1915 the British had put their hope in the development of the artillery to overcome the problems of trench warfare on the Western Front and by 1916 British leaders had adopted the idea of a

18 Jonathan Bailey, ‘British Artillery in the Great War’ in Paddy Griffith (ed), British Fighting Methods in the Great War, (Frank Cass, London, 1996), p. 24. 19 Shelford Bidwell & Dominick Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904- 1945, (Allen & Unwin, London, 1985), pp. 67-69 20 Ibid, p. 68. 69 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

‘massive bombardment’ designed to ‘crush all resistance [so] that it would [only] be necessary for the infantry only to march forward and take possession’ of the enemy’s trenches.21 By the time of the arrival of the AIF in 1916 the British were preparing for an offensive on the Somme. This battle would come to personify the idea of ‘mass destruction’ artillery tactics and demonstrate the futility of such an approach.

The Australian divisions reached the Western Front just after the start of the . By then the role of the artillery in the British battle preparations had become paramount. The availability of the artillery set the scope of operations and battle plans were designed around the notion of the crushing artillery bombardment that would increase in volume and then advance like a giant wall of destruction before the advancing infantry.22

Berryman’s unit, the 4th FAB, arrived at 12 days after the start of the battle of the Somme on 1 July and continued its training until the 30 July when it moved into the line relieving the 2nd FAB in an area known as ‘Sausage Valley’ at Farm du Mouquet. Here the 2nd Australian Division was involved in large scale operations on the Western Front for the first time. This was particularly significant for the Division’s artillery as they had not seen service during the . Now they were entering a battlefront dominated by their branch of the service. One of Berryman’s own gunners, K.S. Day noted on their arrival that ‘hundred of guns … Canadian and British batteries as well as our own’ were crammed in on top of each other in preparation for continuing the drive into what was left of the town of Pozières.23

By 30 July the 2nd Division, under the pressure of the Reserve (later 5th) Army commander General Gough and the British Commander in Chief General Haig, had launched a disastrous assault on the German lines which cost 3,500 casualties. Despite the slaughter the 2nd Division’s GOC Major-General Legge was committed to continuing the assault with his division.

21 James Edmonds, Based on Official Documents 1914, Vol 1. (London: Macmillan, 1922), as quoted in Jonathan Bailey, ‘British Artillery in the Great War’, pp. 31-32. 22 Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918, (Frank Cass, London, 2005), p. 106. 23 ‘Diary of K. S. Day’, 4th FAB, 16th August 1916, AWM PR01054. 70 AGUNNERS WAR

The 4th FAB started a series of operations in support of not just the 2nd Division, but all of the divisions of the 1st Anzac Corps.24 As soon as the brigade arrived it undertook wire-cutting tasks and night bombardments for four successive nights and on 4 August at 9.15pm the assault of the 2nd Division started with an intense three minute bombardment. Sustained operations were maintained throughout the next two days in support of the attacking infantry soldiers. The 2nd Division lost 6,846 men in their attack on Poziéres.25

Map 1: The Somme 1916 (Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 101, Map 7b)

Behind the lines the 4th FAB suffered only one officer and five soldiers killed in action and one officer and thirty two men wounded for the period of September to November. These casualties paled in comparison to the sacrifices of their comrades in the infantry. The debacle of Poziéres astounded even those seemingly immune to the slaughter. The

24 At this time the 1st Anzac Corps consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 4th Australian Divisions. The artillery was normally controlled at the Corps level and thus the brigades could find themselves at any time supporting other divisions of the Corps or indeed neighbouring units. 25 War Diary 4th FAB, 1-9 August 1916; Horner, The Gunners, p. 131-132. 71 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

British Commander in Chief, General Sir Douglas Haig, concluded that the 2nd Division’s Commanding officer, Major-General Gordon Legge, ‘was not much good.’26

There was to be no respite for the Australian infantry or the artillery of the 4th FAB. The 4th Australian Division now took its turn in the ‘slaughter house’ and, supported by the artillery of the 2nd Division and two artillery brigades of the 1st Australian Division, it advanced towards Mouquet Farm.27 As the adjutant Berryman circulated throughout the brigade ensuring that the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Watts were carried out. The action was so intense that he noted: With prolonged periods of firing the springs in the buffers were weakened and it was not unusual for the guns to recoil metal to metal and for the gun crews to have to push the gun back home into its firing position. A stranger visiting Sausage Valley at this time might have seen up to 50 gunners pulling a rope attached to a coil of springs tied to a hold fast in an effort to stretch the spring coil back to its original position.28

These, however, were not the brigade’s only problems and Berryman noted how the mass manufacture of shells and lack of quality control led to a high number of premature rounds. This was systematic of the vast array of problems that still faced the British artillery in 1916. The supply of fuzes and ammunition was not satisfactory throughout the battle of the Somme and the whole of 1916. The artillery lack howitzers and the low quality of the guns meant that 25% of them were out of action during the battle as a result of design faults or poor servicing.29

During this stage of the war the poor quality of the shells were particularly dangerous for the 4th FAB. Due to the restricted space in Sausage Valley the batteries were lined up one behind the other and to counter the ammunition problem the batteries had to build sandbag parapets at the rear of the gun positions instead of at the front in order to protect themselves from their own fire as opposed to German counter-battery fire .30 But for the men in the artillery batteries the position did hold a number of non tactical advantages. One of Berryman’s gunners, K.S. Day, recalled that one of the few

26 For a more in depth discussion of this issue see Chris Coulthard-Clarke, No Australian Need Apply: The Troubled Career of Major-General Gordon Legge, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1988). 27 Horner, The Gunners, p. 132. 28 Berryman, ‘Introduction’, Round Shot to Rapier, p. 24. 29 Bidwell & Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, p. 96. 30 Ibid, p. 23 -24. 72 AGUNNERS WAR

compensations of this cramped position was its proximity to the batteries from Canada and Great Britain. This allowed him and his mates to expand their vocabulary due to the ‘great variety of swear words’ on offer.31

The 4th FAB rotated in and out of the front line with the 3rd FAB throughout August before both units were pulled out for a rest and replaced by British formations. The 4th FAB pulled back and was redirected first to Albert, then Ypres, and Amiens before finally settling at Flers for an extended rest on 1 November. The battle of the Somme had been a steep learning curved for Berryman, the 4th FAB and the artillery in general. Overall the battle had not been a success and it had demonstrated a number of the limitations that still plagued the artillery, despite the advances made over the period 1914-1915. Artillery tactics were still to rigid and the protective barraged that had been developed to prevent German counter attacks was ‘far from ideal.’ The destructive power of the British artillery in 1916 had been countered by the increase depth of German defences and the linear nature of the artillery barrage had revealed it as to simple and to rigid to meet the changing demands of the battlefield. This coupled with quality, quantity and supply problems as well as poor tactics meant little territorial progress was made.32

However 1916 was not all doom and gloom for the artillery. Berryman and the 4th FAB artillery had arrived on the Western Front during a period of developing tactical innovation in their arm of the service. One of the most important developments to come out of the battle of the Somme was the ‘creeping barrage’. This artillery barrage allowed attacking troops to move as close to a rolling wall of shells as possible in order to gain its protection, whereby they could be ready to rush the enemy trenches before they had time to bring up their machine guns from their dugouts.33 As Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham note, ‘the creeper barrage marked the beginning of the return to emphasising covering fire, designed to neutralise enemy fire until the infantry could close with him, rather than artillery preparation intended to destroy the enemy.’34 Unfortunately this was not immediately apparent to the British High Command.

31 ‘Diary of K. S. Day’, 4th FAB, 16 August 1916, AWM PR01054. 32 Jonathan Bailey, ‘British Artillery in the Great War’, p. 33. 33 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918, p. 107. 34 Bidwell & Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, p. 85 73 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Berryman had been immersed in all of these major developments during 1916. As a staff officer on an artillery brigade headquarters he had seen first hand these changes in tactics and helded plan the brigade’s role in providing creeping and protective barrages. This period also saw the increasing use of aerial observation, improved communications and the ground work had been laid for some significant changes in the year to come. On a more personal note it was during this period that Major J.D. Lavarack was posted to the 4th FAB as the OC the 104th howitzer battery.35 This was, in all likelihood, the first time that Lavarack and Berryman worked together, a precursor to their close working relationship during later years.

Escaping the Trenches Historians of the Western Front have noted the fragmented nature of soldiers fighting lives. Not all of Berryman’s time was spent on the frontline. This intense experience of service was also punctuated with periods of rest and behind the lines as soldiers and officers were given the opportunity to chance to escape the rigours of the seemingly never ending slaughter. After settling in for the winter around Fleurs, Berryman found time to take a few days leave to Naours with friend and RMC classmate Edward Milford. While both Berryman and Milford’s reasons for enlisting probably differed from the vast mass of volunteers for the AIF one thing they all had in common was the desire to see countries that they had ‘heard and read about for years.’36 Both of these young officers had experienced the ‘exotic orient’ in Egypt, but it was Europe and the ‘old countries’ that the men yearned to see. They were young, idealistic, inquisitive and beneficiaries of the fact that the rank of an officer, especially those with French language skills, allowed access to social situations which class, status and language denied ordinary soldiers.

The distances from Europe to Australia precluded home leave for the troops and as such the time spent away from the front was often more akin to a tourist experience.37 For most Australian troops service on the Western Front meant a few days leave in Paris which provided ‘a metropolitan oasis amidst a desert of death and

35 War Diary 4th FAB, 8/9 September 1916. 36 Richard White, ‘The Soldier as Tourist: The Australian Experience of the Great War’, War and Society, Vol. 5, No. 1, May 1987, p. 66. 37 Ibid. This of course only relates to those soldiers born in Australia. A large number of soldiersin the AIF had been born in Great Britain. 74 AGUNNERS WAR

destruction’ for the visiting colonial troops.38 However, long months spent in the trenches around the Somme Valley and Flanders and little movement of the front lines meant that, at times, the troops were able to become more than mere ‘tourists’ in these areas and establish relationships with many of the local inhabitants.

Too many soldiers the ‘fantasy of a romantic love in Paris’ like the idea of the ‘exotic’ and ‘sensual Orient’ in Cairo, was shattered in the ‘labyrinthine world of backstreet [French] brothels.’39 But for some the distance from family and friends and the lack of home leave could be offset by the allure of French charm and the urge to satisfy emotional needs. In a country ravished by war, with thousands of lost, displaced souls and grieving families the need to connect to someone who understood war and its devastating impact proved stronger than cultural barriers. Berryman’s ‘engagement’ to a young French war widow was perhaps one of these temporary relationships that helped both parties fulfil such basic human needs.40 Berryman’s supposed love affair with a French war widow provides us with an insight into a part of his character that defies the official record. It is but a glimpse of a life absent from military files and army personal records and reminds us that in a time dominated by the experience of the frontline that other forms of humanity could still coexist to mould and shape our character.

Brigade Staff After enjoying Christmas out of the line Berryman was informed of a new posting. It was policy in the AIF to ‘circulate’ the Duntroon graduates to introduce them to a range of duties. As Adjutant of the 4th FAB Berryman had shown that he was a very capable administrator and liaison officer. He performed his role as the unit’s chief staff officer with efficiency and zeal. A mere glance at the unit’s war diary (which as adjutant he was responsible for) records his characteristic hallmarks of precision, dedication and detail.41 A field artillery brigade, however, does not have a formal staff structure and in order to ensure that Berryman was exposed to this

38 James Curran, ‘Bonjoor Paree: The First AIF in Paris, 1916-1918’, Journal of Australian Studies, No. 60, 1999, p. 18. 39 James Curran, ‘Bonjoor Mardermwazell!; Diggers discover Gay Paree’, Wartime, No. 3, 1998, p. 37. 40 Interview, Ann Wills (nee Berryman), March 2004. 41 See War Diary 4th FAB January – August 1917. 75 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

experience he was posted to the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, 2nd Australian Infantry Division.

The infantry brigade was the smallest formation with a formalised staff structure. The principal staff officer was the Brigade Major (BM) who was assisted by a Staff Captain (SC). The third officer, Berryman’s role, was the orderly officer or staff trainee, the Brigade’s most junior staff position. Berryman’s principal role was to support these two officers and in particular the SC. The role of the BM was exceptionally important. As Roger Lee has noted ‘the ability of the brigade major was a key factor in the Brigade’s combat effectiveness’42

Each of the infantry divisions consisted of three brigades; the 2nd Australian Division included the 5th, 6th and 7th Infantry Brigades. The core of each Brigade was its four infantry battalions. The AIF’s brigades and battalions were raised on a regional basis, for example the 1st - 4th battalions were raised in New South Wales. However some, such as the 7th, were christened ‘outer states’ brigades as each of the battalions were made up of cohorts from Queensland (25th Battalion), Queensland and (26th Battalion), South Australia (27th Battalion), and Western Australia (28th Battalion). The other primary units of the included the Brigade Headquarters, the 7th Light Trench Mortar Battery and the 7th Machine Gun Company.43

By the time Berryman arrived at the 7th Brigade in January 1917 the brigade was under the command of Brigadier Evan Alexander Wisdom. Wisdom, a pre-war militia officer in Western Australia, had gone to Gallipoli as the Brigade Major of the 5th Infantry Brigade, AIF. After being awarded the Distinguished Service Order for his work at Anzac he went on to command the 18th Battalion in Egypt and the Western Front before his promotion to the 7th Brigade in November 1916. Bean described him in 1918 as a ‘level-headed, cautious, experienced leader [who] was [both] Saxon in appearance and temperament … [as well as being] ... one of the best leaders in the

42 Lee, ‘The Australian Staff: The Forgotten men of the First AIF’, p. 120-121 43 Albert, Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organization 1901-2001, (Oxford, Melbourne, 2001), p. 68; Mallet, AIF Order of Battle, www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/~rmallett/noframes.html, Australian Defence Force Academy, 21 January 2005. 76 AGUNNERS WAR

AIF.’44 It was from Wisdom that Berryman formed many of his ideas on staff work and the leadership of men in battle. The pair formed a relationship that was to last from one war to another.45

After the destruction of the battle of the Somme during 1916 Wisdom and his staff were working hard to rebuild the brigade. noted that the changes made during this time led to the brigade achieving a ‘standard of remarkable efficiency [and that the] … moral atmosphere, as well as the physical seemed to have further brightened.’46 During the New Year Berryman and the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade were involved in the capture of Malt Trench and numerous other actions as the German’s withdrew to their new defensive positions in the . Collectively these actions became know as the battle for the ‘Outpost Villages’ and the British and Australians battled to push the Germans back to their main defensive positions on the Hindenburg line.

One after the other these German outposts were taken and on 22 March 1917 the 7th Brigade prepared to move into the line to capture the town of Lagincourt.47 By now the ‘cutting edge’ of the 7th Brigade was, according to Bean, ‘probably keener than that of almost any other [brigade] in the AIF’.48 Furthermore the open spaces they now found themselves in after emerging from the Somme battlefield and the chance for open warfare ‘sharpened their spirits.’49 Berryman and the staff at 7th Brigade headquarters were kept exceptionally busy during this period ensuring the brigade was fulfilling its allotted task in this new environment which they had not previously experienced.

Always a dedicated and exceptionally hard working officer Berryman helped to support the brigade’s operations in a number of ways. His job as the orderly officer or

44 Bean, The AIF in France, 1916,Vol. III, p. 662; C. E. W. Bean The AIF in France, 1918, Vol.VI, p. 219-220. 45 Twenty four years later it was to Wisdom that Berryman composed a detailed and exacting letter explaining his first major triumph (at Bardia) during the Second World War. See ‘F. H. Berryman to Brig-Gen Wisdom, 14 February 1941’ Berryman Family Papers. See also ‘First Campaign – Libya – Bardia- (12 Dec 1940 to 6 Jan 1941): Letter from Brigadier-General F. H. Berryman to Brig-Gen E. A. Wisdom, describing Australian operations at Bardia and Tobruk’, AWM 54 521/2/9. 46 Bean, The AIF in France 1917, Vol. IV, p. 189. 47 Ibid, p. 114. 48 Ibid, p. 115. 49 Ibid, p. 189. 77 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

junior staff trainee meant he assisted in every facet of the plan. His priority was to assist the Staff Captain, the Brigade’s administrative and logistics officer. This was the unglamorous side of staff work. Organising manpower, rations, water, clothing, equipment, and all other essentials consumed by an infantry brigade at a prodigious rate during combat operations was an indispensable task in ensuring that the brigade remained ‘combat ready.’50

Berryman, by now an experienced artillery officer, would also have been put to use in the ‘G’ or operational planning section of the staff under the Brigade Major (BM). The BM was ‘a key factor in the Brigade’s combat effectiveness’ and his principal task was to ‘interpret the commands from higher headquarters and transform them into precise instructions and specific actions for each of the brigade’s combat elements.’ Furthermore the BM, under the direction of the brigade commander, was also responsible for the tactics that were used to secure the brigade’s objectives and co- ordination of the artillery support.51 This latter point was exceptionally important as artillery tactics became increasingly complicated as the war progressed. Liaison was also one of the BM’s responsibilities, either with neighbouring units or those directly supporting the brigade’s operations including the attached artillery formations.

Berryman was not exposed to lengthy periods in the more dangerous parts of the frontline during his service at brigade headquarters. But he was nevertheless never beyond the reach of that palpable danger of the Western front, enemy shellfire. The stereotype of the staff officer sitting in a comfortable French chateau miles behind the front line and well removed from danger was far from the truth for officers at the brigade level. Brigade headquarters was at times within 1500 meters of the front line, well within the range of German artillery and members of the staff often ventured forward to ‘move amongst their [the brigade’s] units in and out of the front line.’ Service at brigade headquarters while not carried out in the same tortuous conditions as life in the frontline trenches, was none the less quite rightly considered as ‘frontline service’ and treated as such by Charles Bean when the official history of the AIF was

50 Lee, ‘The Australian Staff: The Forgotten men of the First AIF’, p. 120-121; See also Peter Stanley, ‘Paul the Pimp re-considered: Australian “G” staffs on the Western Front and the “Kiggell anecdote”’, Australian War Memorial History Conference, 1987. 51 Lee, ‘The Australian Staff: The Forgotten men of the First AIF’, p. 120. 78 AGUNNERS WAR

written. 52 The commander of the 11th Australian Infantry Brigade, Brigadier-General , believed that it took ‘great physical strength and endurance to be an adjutant … a brigade major, [or] a staff captain. Looking back on it I think these appointments required ages of not under 24 and say up to 30.’53 Berryman, at the time of his posting to the 7th Brigade, was just 22.

The dangers of warfare were nowhere more apparent than at the end of the Lagincourt operation. At 12.37 pm, 26 March, the brigade’s headquarters dugout on the edge of Bapaume was rocked by the explosion of a massive German mine. Lieutenant Waraker, the brigade’s bombing officer, was blown clean out of the dugout and several of the wireless operators were buried alive. The mine was one of many that the Germans had planted in the cellars and dugouts of Bapaume during their withdrawal in the hope of destroying headquarters units such as the 7th Brigade. Brigadier-General Wisdom along with Frank Berryman and the other senior members of the headquarters staff had moved on to Vaulx-Vraucourt earlier that evening thus escaping death or grievous injury. Digging parties worked day and night to recover the missing men but were unable to save the signallers.54

Berryman remained with Brigadier-General Wisdom and the 7th Brigade until August 1917. During the remainder of his time with the brigade he took over as the Staff Captain (SC) for almost two months while other brigade officers were either on leave or attending courses in England. As well as working hard on the brigade’s role as the reserve unit to the action at 2nd Berryman was also sent to the headquarters of the 2nd Division to gain further experience in operational staff work with the Division’s ‘G’ branch.55 The 2nd Battle of Bullecourt, an attempt to seize a part of the formidable Hindenburg line, took place between 3-17 May 1917. The first battle was a disaster and its reprise a few weeks later was to prove almost as costly, although the mistake of dispensing with a protective barrage was not repeated. Furthermore the second battle of ‘Bullecourt had become the focus of practically the whole British front when operations elsewhere failed …This meant that the struggle for

52 Stanley, ‘Paul the Pimp re-considered: Australian “G” staffs on the Western Front and the “Kiggell anecdote”’, p. 11. 53 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 15. 54 Bean, The AIF in France, Vol. IV, pp. 206 & 206 (n). 55 See Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA, B2544. 79 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

a small, tactically useless piece of ground had assumed importance out of all proportion to the original rationale.’56 Berryman, at 2nd Division headquarters, had been on hand to witness this drama unfold. The battle had drained the resources of the 1st Anzac corps and it was withdrawn for a well deserved rest.

As the first half of the year drew to a close and the British and AIF operations began to move north to Flanders in Belgium, Berryman was finally given his chance to lead men in action. On 1 September 1917, Berryman was promoted to Major and sent to the artillery headquarters of the 2nd Division. Shortly afterwards he was informed that he was the new Officer Commanding 18th Battery, 6th (Army) Field Artillery Brigade. It was time for his first test of command in combat on the Western Front.

Commanding by example The 18th Battery, 6th FAB was the only AIF artillery unit raised in South Australia and was initially made up of soldiers from the 34th Militia Battery. The battery was part of the 2nd Division and left for overseas service with the rest of the division’s artillery in November 1915. The battery trained in Egypt for three months before proceeding overseas to France. There it was involved in the operations around Poziéres and Monquet Farm.57

During the time of Berryman’s attachment to the 7th Infantry Brigade the artillery had undergone yet another reorganisation which included the creation of a number of ‘independent’ Army Artillery Brigades. Berryman’s new command in the 6th ‘Army’ Field Artillery Brigade was among the units to be withdrawn from their parent divisions. This was in line with the establishment of a centralised command structure for the artillery at corps headquarters.58

56 Clark, The Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, pp. 127-128. 57 Papers of Gunner Percival Gilmore Farmer, 18th Battery, 6th FAB, AWM PR02081/3. 58 Horner, The Gunners, p. 137-139. The number of guns in a battery was reduced to six and the number of batteries in the AIF fell from 75 to 54. The guns themselves had also undergone modifications. The buffer springs were replaced by a hydropneumatic system that enabled the guns to fire for long periods. This meant that scenes reminiscent of the large numbers of men in Sausage Valley in 1916 attempting to straighten the buffer springs on the guns were no longer seen. The guns were also supplied with the new ‘Fuze 106’ which greatly enhanced their ability to cut barbed wire entanglements. See Berryman, Round Shot to Rapier, p. 24. 80 AGUNNERS WAR

The creation of Berryman’s new Brigade was one of the many changes that the British artillery was undergoing during 1917. The expansion of this branch of the army meant that, unlike 1915, the British artillery could now defeat the German artillery.59 Advances had been made not only in the strength of the artillery, but also in a number of other fields. Advances in survey and the use of aerial photography had lead to improved maps, while the location of enemy batteries through the use of instruments as well as the use of predicted fire had greatly enhanced the performance and capabilities of the artillery. The latter development was particularly significant as it meant that each battery no longer had to register onto targets thus increasing the probability of surprise.60

Advances in doctrine were to also prove significant. The use of the artillery in massed preparatory bombardments in order to ‘destroy’ the enemy’s defences, as during the battle of the Somme, had been replaced with a ‘bite and hold’ tactics. This new approach meant that the British would take a ‘bite’ out of the German line to a depth no greater than the range of the artillery in order to allow them to hold it against German counter attacks. This step by step approach meant that the British could capture a section of the German line, unleash a protective barrage, push the infantry forward to mop up resistance, consolidate the ground and move up the artillery for the next stage of the advance.61 The other major change for this style of operation was that the artillery was to no longer destroy the enemy but rather neutralise him for a short period of time. The infantry using its new weapons, in particular the Lewis light machine gun and rifle grenades, could then follow behind the creeping barrage to assault the enemy trenches.62

By 1917 the British army held the view that the ground was gained and defended by the artillery and that battles were won by the artillery and lost by a lack of it. The problem was that while these new tactics had been developed ‘commanders remained addicted to long bombardments with heavy shells whose affect was largely to

59Bailey, ‘British Artillery in the Great War’, p. 35. 60Bidwell & Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, p. 91. 61 MCMullin, Ponpey Elliott, p. 301. 62 Paddy Griffith, ‘The Tactical Problem: Infantry, Artillery and the Salient’, in Peter Liddle (ed), Passchendaele in Perspective: the Third Battle of Ypres, (Leo Copper, London, 1997), pp. 66-68. 81 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

create a landscape filled with craters obstructing movement’63 and inevitably indicating the general front for an attack.64

To Berryman these problems of tactical innovation and doctrine were much less immediate than the realities of day to day command. His battery was but one of the three (16th, 17th & 18th) 18 pounder ‘gun’ batteries that along with the 106th howitzer battery made up the 6th (Army) FAB. His command was a microcosm of the Australian artillery. Approximately 200 men made up the battery, including up to ten officers, twelve senior non-commissioned officers, ninety drivers and gunners as well as a number of support staff including artificers, signallers and quartermaster staff. At the heart of the battery were its six 18 pounder field guns, named after the weight of the shell that they fired.65 Each gun required a crew of six men and their principal roles were to cut wire in no man’s land, provide a creeping or specialised barrage, counter- battery fire and destroy enemy field fortifications.66

Despite the vast improvements in the British artillery by 1917 the 18 pounder gun, the workhorse of the artillery brigades attached to infantry divisions, was not well suited to the requirements of trench warfare. Its low flat trajectory made it difficult to cut wire and its short range, approximately six kilometres, meant that the guns had to be positioned close to the front line trenches.67 This also made it difficult to support the infantry as they would often advance beyond the range of the guns and remain vulnerable until the gun lines could be moved forward through the quagmire and desolation of the trench area. One of the advantages of the 18 pounder was its relatively high rate of fire. For short periods of time the guns could fire up to 20 rounds per minute, but in order to maintain accuracy and also to reserve the strength of the men, a rate of 8 rounds per minute was much more realistic.68

63 Bidwell & Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, p. 91 64 Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918, p. 109. 65 Papers of Gunner Percival Farmer; Horner, The Gunners, p. 57. 66 S. Gower, Guns of the Regiment, (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1981), p. 62. See also Bernard Fitzsimons (ed) The big guns: artillery, 1914-1918, (Phoebus, London, 1973). Martin Farndale, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery: Volume 1 The Western front, 1914-18, (Royal Artillery Institution, Woolwich, London, 1986). 67 Papers of Gunner Arthur Stratton, Royal New Zealand Artillery, 1990.2612, Kippenberger Military Archives, Waiouru. 68 Papers of Gunner Percival Gilmore Farmer. 82 AGUNNERS WAR

As Battery Commander, or ‘BC’ Berryman was responsible not just for his frontline guns. In action the battery was divided in half, the forward gun pits forming the sharp end of the battery’s capability. The principal danger was counter-battery fire from the enemy’s artillery, but premature explosions soon after firing or even worse in the muzzle were also ‘common place’ with all of the guns.’69

The second half of the battery was comprised of the forward wagon lines. Here Berryman’s headquarters was located amongst the supporting men and drivers, along with the horses, wagons, gun limbers and gun carriages. The forward wagons lines role was to supply the guns with ammunition, provide any transport as required and to maintain the battery’s equipment and horses.70 The wagon lines were also a hazardous place. They were sufficiently close to the front line to come under constant artillery fire from the heavy guns and the battery’s drivers, in particular, often suffered numerous casualties trying to keep the gun pits supplied with ammunition. In this area, ‘once quiet country roads & lanes [had] become main thoroughfares teeming with traffic’.71 As Gunner Arthur Stratton recalls it was an area in which ‘we [the artillery] lost too many drivers … in daylight in the full view of Fritz’s observers up in his balloon… [or] [taking] up shells in the dark of night … travelling over muddy shell holed ground.’72

Berryman’s responsibilities as BC did not end here. Besides the care and command of his unit in and out of the line one of his most important roles was liaison and coordination. This was conducted, not just with the battery’s senior headquarters, but with flanking units and most importantly with the infantry in the frontline trenches whom they were immediately supporting. The responsibility for the lives of 200 men and the efficient running of an artillery battery was a significant task for a young man of just 22 years of age.

A position of this nature at such a young age may seem perilous or daunting to some, but to Frank Berryman it was an opportunity. It was a chance to command troops and make his name as an effective leader of men. If there was anything lacking in Berryman’s character it certainly was not confidence in his own abilities. However,

69 Horner, The Gunners, p. 122. 70 Papers of Gunner B.A. Helmore, AWM, PR 86/026; Papers of Gunner Percival Gilmore Farmer. 71 Papers of Gunner B.A. Helmore. 72 Papers of Gunner Arthur Stratton. 83 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

faith in himself and his faith in his new command, as well as his soldier’s confidence in their new battery commander, was to be the first test of Berryman’s leadership.

On arrival at the 18th Battery Frank Berryman was faced with the same issues as every new commanding officer. Army units of any kind or size inevitably become close knit and establish their own informal systems and relationships. Every unit, as a result of their combat experience and the personalities which make up the unit’s complement, form their own distinct personality. A commander requires the ability to assess his new unit’s capabilities, its strength and weakness as well as impressing upon its personnel his authority and individual leadership style. Berryman was to prove himself as a commander who possessed ‘cleverness, push, ruthlessness, ambition’73 and courage coupled with professionalism, devotion to duty and the willingness to go forward to the frontline to see the conditions for himself and share the hardships of the frontline with his men.74

These factors would be exceptionally important in the next conflict as most Australian (and British) senior commanders in the Second World War had seen service, like Berryman, as junior officers on the Western Front and like Berryman were born in the period 1885-1898.75 British military historian Correlli Barnett argued in his critique of senior British officers in the Second World War that unfortunately ‘a sense of duty, chivalry and a certain affection of easy going non-professionalism’ were much more high prized than ‘cleverness, push, ruthlessness, self-interest and ambition’.76 Berryman possessed all of these characteristics except that he completely shunned any idea of ‘easy going non professionalism’. Later on, Berryman was to be described as ‘highly strung’ in relation to his professional conduct and he was, if anything, too

73Correlli Barnett as quoted in David French, ‘Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisional Commanders in the War against Germany, 1939-1945’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 111, No. 444, November, 1996, p. 1182. 74 One of the important elements at company or battery command is the ‘practice of “do as I do” leadership…They lead literally and direct face-to-face.’ H. Wass de Czege. ‘A Comprehensive view of leadership’, Military Review, Vol. 72, August 1992, p. 28. 75 General Sir Francis Hassett, ‘Military Leadership’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 148, May/June 2001, p. 53. Hassett saw service with the Australian Army throughout the Second World War, Korea and Malaya rising to Chief of the General Staff in 1975. He notes that Army courses on ‘military leadership deal with about 11 desirable leadership qualities: motivation, courage, decisiveness, responsibility, initiative, integrity, judgement, knowledge, loyalty, selflessness and [the] ability to communicate. But there is an infinite variety of interpretation and emphasis that can be placed on each of these qualities.’ 76 Correlli Barnett as quoted in David French, ‘Colonel Blimp and the British Army: British Divisional Commanders in the War against Germany, 1939-1945’, p. 1182. 84 AGUNNERS WAR

serious. But in many respects it can be argued that Berryman had almost all of the attributes of success coupled with those required for respect from his peers.

Unfortunately Berryman also possessed a hard streak and aspects of his persona would lead to a number of fellow officers to regard him as arrogant, hard to please, unfriendly and argumentative. Despite these negative indictments he dedicated himself to demonstrating personal courage and initiative combined with a thorough knowledge of the artillery and staff work. These are some of the most critical factors in the development of an effective commander and leader of men and they were hallmarks of his philosophy of command for rest of his time on the Western Front.

On taking charge of the 18th Battery Berryman found that he had only a few days to take a firm grip on his command and prepare it for action.77 He spent his time inspecting the Battery and ensuring that all possible measures were taken to ensure that they were ready for action. It was a testing time with the pressures of past events weighing heavily on the commander and men alike. This was made even more difficult by the fact that just prior to the arrival of Berryman to take over the Battery it had been on the verge of mutiny. This ‘incident’ had arisen over the transfer out of the Battery of a popular NCO and his replacement by a NCO ‘under some disciplinary action, the reason [being] best forgotten.’78 The incident had led to the Brigade Commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold Edward Cohen, calling the Battery out on parade. We can only imagine Berryman’s response to these extraordinary actions prior to his arrival. We can, however, safely assume that the 18th Battery’s ‘fanatically keen’ new commander, who was known for being ‘blunt as the back of an axe’ and willing ‘would cut his grandmother’s throat if it was in the interests of the army’, would certainly have not taken a sympathetic approach to the men’s position. Undoubtedly the consequences of the Battery’s actions, relevant to this episode, went far beyond Gunner John Dyer’s appraisal of ‘a slight misunderstanding’ between Berryman and his new command.79

The war nevertheless progressed unchecked by the internal disputes of the 18th battery. In a difficult operation on the night of 19 September 1917 the battery moved its

77 See Dyer, The Story of the 18th Battery, Field Artillery, p. 20. 78 Ibid. Dyer provides no additional information as to the Name of the NCO concerned or the discipline issue that caused such a controversy. 79 Ibid. 85 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

gun positions forward approximately 1000 yards in preparation for the start of the battle of Menin Road. What both Major Frank Berryman and the men of the 18th Battery were unaware of was that the next four weeks were to be ‘the most strenuous, drawn out, and dangerous the Battery had been in.’80

The battle of Menin Road was one phase in an overly ambitious plan (characteristic of the British plans on the Western Front during most of the war)81 that had originally called for a breakout out in Flanders and a sweep to the north to cut off large portions of the German Army.82 The campaign, like those before it, degenerated into a series of gruesome battles of attrition. The major changes in these battles, as opposed to those in 1916, were the systematic step by step advances made during the early phases of the campaign under clear skies. Central to the success of these advances was the strategy whereby the attacking troops never pushed beyond the range of the new rolling and box barrages provided by the supporting artillery. The campaign, however, became synonymous with later battles which saw the British High Command demand the continuation of offensive operations, despite the onset of winter rains which reduced the entire area to a quagmire.

At 5.40am on the morning of 20 September 1917 1,295 guns crashed out a barrage which was to use over three and a half million shells. The gunners were supporting the assault of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions as they attempted to drive up the Menin Road, the first time that two AIF divisions had attacked side by side.83 The 18th Battery was firing in direct support of the 1st Australian division as a part of ‘A Group’. ‘A Group’ was an example of yet another of the changes made to the artillery in 1917. To support the ’s assault three artillery brigades, the 3rd, 6th and 12th were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cohen. A second group, ‘B Group’ with the 7th and 8th Brigades were also in support. Both of these

80 Dyer, The Story of the 18th Battery, 6th Brigade Field Artillery, p. 21. Note: The War Diary of the 6th Field Artillery Brigade for the period covering Berryman’s posting as OC 18th Battery is very poor. As such one of the few reliable sources for this period of time is Dyer’s ‘official’ account of the Battery’s operations. 81 Bidwell & Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, p. 88. 82 For a detailed discussion of this operation see Philip Warner, Passchendaele: the story behind the tragic victory of 1917, (Sidgwick & Jackson, London, 1988) & Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, Passchendaele: the untold story, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996). 83 Chris Coulthard –Clarke, The Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, (Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001), p. 130. 86 AGUNNERS WAR

groups were under the immediate control of the Corps Artillery Commander (CRA) Brigadier-General Coxen. This group system meant there was at least one spare Lieutenant-Colonel in each group was available to supervise the wagon lines or, more importantly, to be deployed as a liaison officer with the infantry brigades that the guns were supporting. With liaison officers at the infantry brigade headquarters and Forward Observation Officers (FOOs) in the trenches, the Battle of Menin Road was the ‘first step in the modern practice by which artillery commanders place themselves at the headquarters of the unit being supported.’84

The initial assault by the 1st Anzac Corps proved to be an ‘outstanding success’ and the barrage was regarded as ‘the most complete artillery support to that time.’85 Yet, in spite of the appearance of a success, the artillery was facing its most severe test of the war to date. One of the major issues it faced was the precarious nature of the gun positions around Ypres. The British position in the line was in effect a salient; meaning that although the British had collected a far superior ratio of guns to the Germans they were in fact facing German counter-battery fire from three sides. The positioning of so many guns in such a small space restricted the ability of the artillery to ‘manoeuvre’ during the course of the battle. The unstable nature of the drainage system in Flanders, compounded by the flat terrain and the relative closeness of the water table to ground level, meant that the guns were not able to ‘dig themselves in’ as would ordinarily be the case. The final difficulty was that the Germans held the high ground and as a result most of the movement of the guns was carried out under observation of the Germans.86 With observers on the high ground around the salient the Germans not only had excellent observation but also the ability to converge their guns for concentrated fire.87

The Australian artillery first began to suffer under accurate counter-battery fire of massed German artillery during mid 1917 and now the Germans were taking full advantage of their superior positions. During the battle of Menin Road the 18th Battery started to feel the effects of the German’s advantages with the loss of several of the unit’s horses and with their guns exposed in the lower ground, it was during the next

84 Horner, The Gunners, p. 139, 157. 85Horner, The Gunners, p. 157. 86 Ibid. 87 Griffith, ‘The Tactical Problem: Infantry, Artillery and the Salient’, p. 69 87 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

stage of the advance, the battle for Polygon Wood, where the Germans extracted a grim toll in reprisal for the Battery’s recent successes.

By 26 September 1917 the stage was sent for the next assault. These limited offensives were designed ‘to proceed in succession … to follow one another, like blows of a sledge hammer at a few days interval, the pauses being only necessary to push forward the guns and ammunition.’88 The conduct of battle, however, did not rest solely in the hands of the British. The Germans were using their superior positions to launch counter-attacks to win back key terrain lost to the British in an effort to keep their opponent off balance.

Map 2: The Western Front 1917 (Grey, Military History of Australia, p. 104, Map 8)

88 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 364. 88 AGUNNERS WAR

By the morning of 25 September the 18th Battery had moved into position in preparation for the next stage of the assault. As dawn started to break, the Battery’s ammunition column was still in the process of pack-horsing the ammunition to the new gun positions when a tremendous storm of German heavy artillery fire came screaming down into the old gun lines. 77mm and 5.9 inch shells screamed across no man’s land and drove themselves deep into the ground around the drivers and horses of the 18th Battery’s reserve lines. They came in continuous barrages. The German 77s sent over 'whiz-bangs' which arrived with the noise of giant firecrackers and the 5.9s shells screamed and whined as they approached before ending their lives ‘with vicious, ill- tempered crashes.’89 Their shells drove over the Australians’ heads like express trains and crashed into the earth with a terrible dull thud. All this noise and confusion was punctuated by the sounds of screaming men and dying horses. As German artillery fire moved on in search of other targets the smoke cleared and revealed the carnage. Staff Sergeant Gaylard, Corporal Sandaver, Bombardier Potts and Gunners Keith and Webb lay wounded. Drivers Rupert Willshire and Patrick Lacy were dead.90

These were the first men to fall in battle under Berryman’s direct command and their loss was felt heavily by the battery. But in the immediate aftermath there was no time for grieving. The wounded were packed off to the casualty clearing stations and the dead removed for burial. Despite the casualties Berryman’s battery remained in action throughout the day.91

Well before first light the new gun line had been established near Clapham Junction in a position ‘half way between Yeomanry Post and Dormy House.’92 They spent the morning supporting the infantry in repulsing the German counter-attack and then later in preparation for the assault to start the following day. The day had been a hard one

89 Ibid, p. 327. 90 The Service Record of the 18th Battery Australian Field Artillery, 1915-1919, p. 2. 91 It is unknown what impact that the loss of these soldiers had on Berryman. Certainly by this stage of the war he was no stranger to death or casualties. While Berryman most likely took this incident in his stride, perceiving it as a necessary consequence of war, this was his first combat command and a Battery or Company command is ‘about the highest level of close direct contact with soldiers. It is a big job for a young man responsible at times for the lives of a large group of soldiers.’ Hassett, ‘Military Leadership’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 148, May/June 2001, p. 55-56. 92Statement by ‘8348 Bdr J Hatherell’, in ‘Carr, Lawrence William’, Red Cross Wounded and Missing Enquiry Bureau Files. 89 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

for Berryman’s battery. Not only had they lost two killed and six wounded and a number of the battery’s horses, they had been in constant action all day. The men were already showing the first signs of fatigue after Menin Road and they had been in continuous action ever since. Their work was made even harder by the introduction of new and improved German gas shells which meant that a great amount of their time was spent in respirators, which further diminished performance and increased the men’s state of exhaustion.93 The scenes being played out in the 18th Battery were repeated in the British and Australian artillery right along the gun lines at Ypres. The difficult conditions and the ‘heavy German shelling of the British supply lines [was] interfering badly with the delivery of ammunition, in spite of the heroic efforts by individuals who ran the gauntlet.’94

Preparation for the assault continued unabated. The 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions were replaced after Menin Road by the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions who provided fresh infantry forces.95 Berryman and his battery waited in silent anticipation in their position near Clapham Junction until 5.50am on 26 September 1917. At precisely the moment that: Polygon plateau became visible … the most perfect [barrage] that ever protected Australian troops [descended]. It seemed to break out, as almost every report emphasises, with a single crash … the shells raised a wall of dust and smoke which appeared to be solid … Roaring, deafening, it rolled ahead of the troops “like a Gippsland bushfire.”96

As the infantry advanced behind their rolling barrage the men on the guns were fully occupied ‘firing shrapnel shells … setting fuses & passing shells.’ Often the first indication of German counter-battery fire was when ‘lumps of dirt and chalk started to

93 Albert Palazzo, Seeking Victory on the Western Front: The British Army and Cemical Warfare in World War I ictory on the Western Front ( Univeristy of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 2000), pp. 123-124 94 Philip Warner, Passchendaele: The Story Behind the Tragic Victory of 1917, (Sidwick & Jackson, London, 1987), p. 98. 95 Not that the 4th Australian Division could be really described as ‘fresh’. This division had seen more fighting in 1917 that any other Australian division, with relatively little rest time. Its morale on the eve of the battle was at it ‘lowest ebb.’ See Ashley Elkins, ‘The Australians at Passchendaele’, in in Peter Liddle (ed), Passchendaele in Perspective: the Third Battle of Ypres, (Leo Copper, London, 1997), p 231. 96 Bean, The AIF in France 1917, Vol. IV, p. 813.

90 AGUNNERS WAR

shower the gun crew[s]’.97 As the Germans reacted to the assault, their heavy guns ‘searched and swept the area’ around the 18th Battery.98

The German fire crashed down around the battery with merciless precision and deadly ferocity. One of the first hit was an 18 pounder under the command of Corporal Lawrence Carr. While still in action the gun was struck by a German 5.9 inch shell on ‘the breech ring…knocking it off in 4 pieces.’ Cpl Carr, Bombardier Alexander Paterson and Gunners ‘Snowy’ Bodhole, and Alf Henson ‘were blown to pieces’ and the same shell wounded Berryman’s second in command Captain Thomas Leaper MC in the neck, ear and spine.99

Berryman, who believed in leading by example and exposing himself to the same dangers as his men to win their confidence, also came forward to the gun line for the start of the assault. He would, almost certainly, have wanted to keep a keen eye on his men after the casualties of the previous day and the stress accruing from continuous operations. But he too soon became a casualty of shrapnel from the German artillery fire on the battery’s exposed position and despite his efforts to fight on he was forced to seek medical treatment behind the lines. Slowly, and with methodical precision, the Germans put Berryman’s battery out of action. Their shells worked their way backward and forwards over the position while the crews worked feverishly trying to support their comrades in the infantry. One by one the guns were knocked out of action, casualties amongst the gun crews started to increase and there were soon no officers left to provide direction.100

Fortunately Berryman’s shrapnel wound was only minor and he was able to resume command late in the day. But, despite the numerous casualties, and the loss of their commander, the Battery continued in action, even though it was reduced to only one gun. Personnel were eventually brought forward from the wagon lines and repairs

97 G. Mann, Soldier Boy: The Letters of Gunner W.J. Duffell, 1915-1918, (Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, 1992), p. 53. 98 Dyer, The Story of the 18th Battery, 6th Brigade Field Artillery, p. 21. 99 See Statement by ‘8348 Bdr J. Hatherell’, in ‘Carr, Lawrence William’, Red Cross Wounded and Missing Enquiry Bureau Files., ‘9515 Gunner Alfred Henson’, Red Cross Wounded and Missing Enquiry Bureau Files, ‘Service Record of Captain Leaper, Thomas Duncan, AIF’, National Archives of Australia (NAA) B2455/1. 100 War Diary, 6th Field Artillery Brigade; Dyer, The Story of the 18th Battery, 6th Brigade Field Artillery, p. 22. 91 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

were made to the three salvageable guns. The battery, however, had suffered terribly and this was not just simply a matter of ‘bad luck’ on their part. Polygon Wood was the second successive advance in the same area of operations. The limited step by step operations carried out by General Plummer, while securing ground ‘did not allow for the capture of the German guns; the advances were too shallow to even overrun the close support enemy field artillery.’101 German artillery firepower was not diminished, the element of surprise had vanished and the problematic nature of positioning guns in a salient under observation of the enemy was taking its toll.

Although the British and Australian forces were once again successful at Polygon Wood the toll, however, was tremendous. The attacking divisions suffered over 15,000 casualties, a 50 per cent increase in terms of ground won in comparison to Menin Road only six days earlier.102 The casualties among the Australian gunners had nearly doubled at Polygon Wood. The 18th Battery suffered its fair share. Seven members of the battery were killed and 22 wounded in action. In the 23 days of operations undertaken by the 18th Battery before it was withdrawn from the front on 3 October it suffered 70 per cent of its total killed in action for the year and 40 per cent of its wounded for the year. By his choice of battlefield the British Commander in Chief, Douglas Haig, had placed his army at a distinct disadvantage. At the very moment when his artillery had developed the techniques and technology to be a decisive weapon on the battlefield he had chosen to attack in a salient that was overlook by German observation on all sides. In the end this meant that the 3rd battle of Ypres was to prove to be ‘the hardest fought battle in the whole history of the Royal Artillery.’103

The losses in Berryman’s command were serious for the battery and the little time available between operations was dedicated to the remembrance of their fallen comrades. On 27 September the Battery took time out to bury Lawrence Carr, Alexander Paterson, ‘Snowy’ Bodholt and Alf Henson together in a small grave behind the gun line where they had been killed. They were buried as they had died, side by side, and a single headstone united them in death as their mateship had in life. Frank Berryman held a small memorial service for the dead and the men fenced off the area

101 Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson, Passchendaele: The Untold story, p. 131. Ashley Elkins, ‘The Australians at Passchendaele’, p. 236. 102 Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson, Passchendaele: The Untold story, p. 131 103 Bidwell & Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, p. 85. 92 AGUNNERS WAR

to protect the site. The bodies were eventually moved and reunited with the other dead from the battery before they were interred together at Hooge Crater Cemetery. They remained, however, just as they were buried by their mates in 1917 all four in a row together, with the others from the battery in pairs.104

Berryman’s conduct during the operations at Ypres did not go unnoticed. At Polygon Wood the men had stood ‘firm under fire’ and this ended the ‘slight misunderstanding’ that had developed between battery and battery commander after the ‘mutiny’ incident. Steadfastness under fire was the greatest test of discipline and ‘the new battery commander acknowledged this.’105 Not only had the men of his battery recognised their new commander’s courage, determination and technical expertise, but the brigade commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Cohen, had as well. Berryman was Mentioned in Despatches (MID)* for Menin Road and Polygon Wood. In recommending him for a MID Cohen highlighted all the positive attributes Berryman had developed as a battery commander; the respect that the 18th Battery held for him, and the leadership style that was to characterise his career:

[Major Berryman] Commanded the Battery during the whole period under review and did particularly good and effective work during the operations … He showed great initiative … [kept]in touch with the infantry Companies in the front line and in observing and reporting on hostile movements rendering many useful reports … He … succeeded in registering his battery and using it in the operation notwithstanding the heavy hostile fire. The Battery suffered many casualties both in personnel and material but it fought with splendid determination and the men who had never previously been under the command of this Officer in action throughout the operations before HOOGE were kept in the most excellent fighting spirit by his determination, leadership and strong personality. He has shown himself to be an Officer of remarkable judgement and great technical ability.106

104 Carr, Lawrence William’, Red Cross Wounded and Missing Enquiry Bureau Files, ‘9515 Gunner Alfred Henson’, Red Cross Wounded and Missing Enquiry Bureau Files. See also ‘Debt of Honour Register’, Commonwealth War Graves Commission, http://www.cwgc.org/cwgcinternet/search.aspx (21 March 2005). Author’s visit to Hooge Crater Cemetery and Western Front battlefields, November 2003. Dyer, Story of the 18th Battery, 6th Brigade Field Artillery, p. 21-23. 105 Dyer, Story of the 18th Battery, 6th Brigade Field Artillery, p. 21-23. * MID was a public recognition for valiant conduct, devotion to duty or other distinguished service by formally mentioning them in dispatches. 106 ‘Honours and Awards (Recommendations: First World War)’, AWM28 2/36, file: 2/36 - 1st ANZAC Corps and Corps Troops - 24/9/1917 to 30/9/1917, p. 26 93 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

These battles were also quite an accomplishment for the AIF. In three step by step advances, Menin Road, Polygon Wood and the Ridge on 4 October, the Australians advance a total of 4200 yards. This ground was won at the cost of 17,000 Australian casualties, a rate that as Ashley Elkins notes was equal ‘to that of Pozières in 1916.’107 While costly these attacks were tangible victories and they stand in contrast to the two final, and unsuccessful, Australian attacks of the campaign. In torrential rain, deep mud and conditions that defy description the Australians attempted to capture Passchendaele Ridge on 9 and 12 October 1917. The failure of these attacks and the horrible conditions in which they were fought became one of the defining images of the battle, completely wiping out the memory of the successful Australian advances only a few weeks before.108

The end of the operations around Hooge was a period of ‘relative quiet’ for the 18th Battery. It moved in and out of the line yet no major operations were undertaken. However, a further seven members of the battery were killed in action and fourteen were wounded - the majority occurring during a German artillery barrage on 7 November 1917.109 An extended relief did not arrive until 22 November 1917, some five weeks after entering the frontline. As the year drew to a close the battery remained in camp. Berryman’s organisation and command along with the efforts of the men were rewarded at New Year with the prize for the best turned out battery in the brigade. The Army meanwhile took the opportunity of the relative quiet to send Berryman to a Battery Commander’s course in England, a full five months after he had taken command. This demonstrates the disjointed nature of the requirements of service versus the training required by the military.110 His battery commander’s course was a resounding success and he had marched out of the 13th Field Course on 2 February with a final examination mark of 86 per cent.111

Two days before Berryman’s withdraw from the front line in November 1917 the British had launched their only other offensive on the Western Front for the year. While set with only very limited objectives the battle of Cambrai was to provided a

107 Ashley Elkins, ‘The Australians at Passchendaele’, p. 237. 108 Ibid, p.244. 109 The service Record of the 18th Battery Australian Field Artillery, 1915-1919, p. 4. 110 ‘Australian War Records Section – Biographical Details, Major Frank H. Berryman’, AWM 183/7. 111 ‘Signal 188/1567– HQ Australian Corp Royal Artillery, 2 March 1918’, Papers of Lt-General Frank Horton Berryman, AWM PR84/370 item 10 1918 -1939. 94 AGUNNERS WAR

window to the future for the nature of operations in 1918. Cambrai was to demonstrate the power and effectiveness of the changes made to artillery tactics and doctrine during 1916-17. By November 1917 the artillery had started to perfect its new technique of predicted fire. This was aided by the development of calibration for its guns which meant that the flight path of shells from each artillery piece could be plotted much more accurately. The use of air-spotting and air photos from the plus the addition of flash spotting, surveyors and sound ranging meant that modern artillery tactics had finally arrived. With the removal of the preliminary bombardment surprise could be achieved and the guns were also being used by the high command to neutralise, rather than destroy, the enemy. The supply and quality of the guns had improved and the introduction of the new type 106 fuze, replacing the old delayed action fuze, meant that the infantry were not hampered by the cratering of the ground over which they would advance.112

At Cambrai the British had launched the first major tank offensive in history.113 Nineteen British divisions and three tank brigades of the 3rd Army attacked between 20 November and 5 December. Preceded by a short hurricane bombardment of the frontline followed by counter battery and supply interdiction fire by over 1000 guns, 400 with supporting infantry the assault began at 6.20am. By nightfall the British had penetrated up to five miles into the German lines and the church bells of Britain rang out in triumph.114 While only a small victory the lessons to be learnt from the battle were especially significant.

The key to the Cambrai operation was surprise, and this was now possible due to three factors. First, large numbers of Mark IV tanks were available to crush lanes through the wire and overcome the immediate defences rather than rely on a lengthy preliminary artillery bombardment, which told the enemy exactly where the attack was to go in, and also churned up the ground and impeded the advance. Secondly, the artillery was now able to do counter-battery and suppression work, and fire a standing and lifting barrage, without previous registration, thanks to the development of field survey and calibration techniques over the autumn of 1917. And thirdly, some higher commanders such as Byng [3rd Army

112Bidwell & Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904-1945, pp. 70-91. Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918, pp. 106-112. 113 Tim Travers, How the War Was Won : Command and Technology in the British Army, (Routledge, London, 1992), p. 11. 114 Spencer Tucker, The Great War, 1914-1918, (UCL Press, London, 1998), pp. 141-142 95 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Commander] had grasped the fact that surprise was now essential to success.115

While the lessons from Cambrai were being absorbed the strategic situation on the Western Front was changing and when Berryman returned to France on 19 February 1918 preparations were underway to meet the expected German counter-attack in spring.

With the conclusion of peace with Russia in 1917 the Germans now had a large numbers of divisions available for an offensive in the West. On 21 March 1918 the German Army launched the ‘Ludendorff Offensive,’ their last ditch attempt to win the war on the Western Front before the arrival of large numbers of Allied troops from the United States. Their initial attacks were stunningly successful wrestling large amounts of territory from the Allies. During this period the majority of the remained in reserve, recovering from the devastation of the Passchendaele offensive, and it was not until 9 April 1918 that the 18th Battery started to move south, back toward the Somme Valley. By 11 April the unit had arrived at Ribemont and there they relieved C Battery of the 157th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery.116

The German advances using their new ‘storm trooper’ tactics had proven to be devastatingly effective in March 1918. Yet despite these accomplishments the Germans were unable to develop a solution to the tactical problems of trench warfare on the Western Front. Berryman now entered a period of his service which he considered intensely interesting.117 It was during this period that the more complex all arms cooperation doctrine that had been developed in 1917 was put to use as in a defensive posture as the Australians were forced to fight desperate battles to blunt the German advance. During this period of operations tensions remained high as there was the constant threat of further German advances and, as a result, the battery was prepared every morning for an emergency departure. The 18th Battery remained in position at Ribemont for 19 days, firing over 6000 rounds. The most notable individual feature of this period being the crash of Baron Von Richtofen’s plane not far from the

115 Travers, How the War was Won, p. 20. 116 Ibid, p. 27. 117 ‘Australian War Records Section – Biographical details, Major Frank H. Berryman’, AWM 183/7. 96 AGUNNERS WAR

battery’s position that allowed most members of the unit to go and inspect the crash site.118

The beginning of May saw Berryman’s departure from the 18th Battery. Unfortunately there is little evidence, other than his MID citation, on which to make a full evaluation of his performance as a Battery Commander. The only notable exception are the remarks made by one of his officers, Edward Mattner in 1944. In 1944, Mattner, by then a Liberal Senator for South Australia, remarked in parliament that:

Let us encourage young Australians to follow in the traditions of some great men who have served this country so well. Names that readily come to my mind included those of Lt-General Rowell and Lt-General Berryman. It was my privilege to serve in our land forces and it is for that reason that I mention the names of two distinguished leaders … Lt-General Rowell and Lt-General Berryman are brilliant men who contributed substantially to the advancement of this country. Lt- General Berryman has probably seen more front line service than any other high ranking officer in Australia. It was my privilege to serve under him as a ranker … He came to us in 1917 in the darkest days in France and as I believe the youngest Major in the AIF [sic]. I pay tribute to his gallantry, courage and character. He is a great man and a great Australian … I could wish for nothing better than that my sons should receive the benefit of his guidance.119

Figure 3.1 ‘He came to us in 1917 in the darkest days in France and as I believe the youngest Major in the AIF [sic]. I pay tribute to his gallantry, courage and character.’ Studio portrait of Major Frank Horton Berryman, DSO, Brigade Major 7th Infantry Brigade, 1918. (AWM P02543.001)

118 Dyer, Story of the 18th Battery, 6th Brigade Field Artillery, p. 27-29. 119 Senator Edward Mattner, undated Hansard Proof, Berryman Family Papers. 97 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

The admiration with which the 18th Battery regarded Berryman after his service was recognised in the persistent invitations to ‘one of their most respected commanders’ to attend battery reunions, and, an invitation to write the ‘Introduction’ to the history of the South Australian Artillery.120

By May 1918 Berryman had been employed on active service as a Battery Orderly Officer, commander of a Brigade Ammunition Column, Adjutant to a Field Artillery Brigade, Assistant Staff Officer of an infantry Brigade headquarters and a Battery Commander. Consistent with his training at the Royal Military College and the Army’s preference to expose these officers to a wide range of experience, especially in staff positions, it is a matter of some interest that Berryman’s next posting was not to a staff position, notably as a Brigade Major. Instead he was posted to another command position, Battery Commander of the 14th Battery, 5th Field Artillery Brigade.121

It was here, in the final phases of the war with the 14th Battery, that Berryman’s abilities came to the fore. As Battery Commander, Berryman was required to keep abreast of technical advances and his deep professional interest in the artillery meant that he was widely regarded for his abilities in this area. Berryman was now also making greater use of his liaison and forward reconnaissance skills which he had learnt both as a staff officer with the infantry and as a battery commander with the 6th FAB. Increasingly Berryman spent less time on the gun line with his men and more time with the infantry commanders ensuring that his battery was providing the best possible support. His talents in this area were recognised by higher headquarters and he was often seconded to perform reconnaissances and liaison with the brigade commander and even the division artillery commander.122

This period of war on the Western Front was critical in terms of the changing nature of warfare. As Professor Brian Bond has argued ‘there had been a clear

120 See ‘Invitation to Lt-General Frank Horton Berryman to 18th Battery AIF, Reunion’ Berryman Family Papers & Berryman, F. H. ‘Chapter 1: Introduction’, in Brook, D (ed) Round Shot to Rapier: Artillery in South Australia 1940-1984, (Investigator Press, Adelaide, 1986). 121 The 5th FAB brigade under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel H.W. Riggall was one of the integral artillery brigades of the 2nd Australian Division 122 ‘Australian War Records Section – Biographical details, Major Frank H. Berryman’, AWM 183/7. ‘Honours and Awards (Recommendations: First World War)’ AWM28 1/118P2, File: 1/118P2 - 2nd Australian Division - 27/8/1918 to 5/9/1918, DSO Recommendation Major Frank H. Berryman, p. 95. 98 AGUNNERS WAR

transformation, if not indeed a revolution, in the style of conducting war between 1914 and 1918.’123 These changes, according to Bond, meant that at the end of the war British and Commonwealth forces were ‘practising the essential components of the modern all arms battle’ and that at the centre piece of this transformation was the ‘key tactical development… [of the] provision of accurate artillery protection for advancing infantry.’124 Gary Sheffield argues that ‘most scholars view artillery as the innovative arm which provided the basis for [this] revolution in military affairs… [and that the British army in 1918 used an] ‘embryonic version of the modern all arms battle.’125 Sheffield is so adamant in his conclusions that he goes so far as to argue that ‘1918 is the greatest victory in British military history.’126 The Advances in technology and tactics of 1916-1917 had come of age in 1918. These changes it tactical procedure and the development of an ‘embryonic version of the modern all arms battle’ are exceptionally important in the development of Berryman’s military skills. This view of the artillery as the ‘vital innovative arm’ and the basis for a ‘revolution’ in military affairs is exceptionally important.127 As an artillery officer serving on the gun line, as well as at brigade and divisional headquarters, Berryman was therefore at the forefront of these changes.

It was in Berryman’s next major operation, the attack at Hamel on 4 July 1918, that all of these innovations were to fuse together for the AIF.128 Hamel, although a small engagement, was critically important for the Australians, now united under the Command of Lieutenant-General Monash, to test their new offensive tactics. The artillery was to maintain complete surprise with little or no registration of targets and the infantry was to employ peaceful penetration tactics and although the 14th Battery provided only six of the 326 guns and howitzers used in the operation Berryman experienced first hand the new methods and techniques of combined arms

123 Brian Bond, The Unquiet Western Front, (Cambridge, Cambridge, 2002), p. 22. 124 Ibid, p. 21. 125 Gary Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities, (Headline, London, 2001), p. 98, 59-60. Field Marshall Foch, the Allied Commander in Chief notes that on the final advance ‘Never at any time in history has the British army achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive.’ Foch as quoted in Bond, Unquiet Western Front: Britain's Role in Literature and History, p 91. For a further appraisal of the historical arguments covering this revision of the First World War see also Ian Beckett, The Great War, 1914-1918, (Longman, Harrow, 2001). 126 Sheffield, Forgotten Victor: The First World War: Myths and Realities, p. 60. 127 Bond, Unquiet Western Front: Britain's Role in Literature and History, p. 98. 128 See John Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, Vol VII The Australian Centenary History of Defence , (Oxford, Melbourne, 2001), pp. 78-79. 99 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Map 3: The Western Front 1918 (Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 107, Map 9) operations.129 The artillery’s close liaison with infantry commanders, the use of tanks both as offensive weapons and in support tasks, and the coordination of ground forces with the were all significant additions to Berryman’s education as a military officer.130 But it was most likely the thoroughness of the preparation and the meticulous nature of the planning at all levels that impressed Berryman as a

129 Sheffiled notes that the power and marked superiority of the of the Brtisih artillery in 1918 meant that even a mediocre dividion like the 46th British Division could gain ground and breach the Hindenburg line. See Gary Sheffiled, ‘The Indispensible Factor: The Performance of British Troops in 1918’, in Dennin & Grey, 1918: Defining Victory, pp. 72-95 130 Historian Tim Travers noted that ‘Hamel at ground level is a story of very little or no enemy opposition, due to surprise, a powerful artillery barrage, excellent Australian infantry, [and] the impact of the tanks.’ Timothy Travers, How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army. (Routledge, London, 1992), p 114. 100 AGUNNERS WAR

formula for success. At Hamel, Monash, as Eric Andrews argues, ‘reveal[ed] his complete mastery of the set piece battle’.131

The next major operation for the 14th Battery and the Australian Corps was at Amiens on 8 August 1918, the ‘Black Day for the German Army.’132 The assault on 8 August 1918 by the Australian and Canadian corps spelt the end for the German Army on the Western Front. 8 August was a momentous day for the Australian Corps and its importance was reflected in the comments made by the 5th FAB’s adjutant in the war diary. He recorded that:

All our guns had been calibrated out of the line, and lines of fire were laid out by instruments. The infantry reported the covering curtain as perfect. It certainly prevented the enemy from offering any opposition and inflicting no casualties on our forces [artillery].

This is the first time the Australian Corps had attacked as a composite force, and we are all proud of the quiet strong courage of our dauntless infantry who went forward with a steady determination, overcoming all opposition and capturing all our objectives before noon.133

The role of the artillery units, like Berryman’s, had been crucial to the success of 8 August. It was the artillery that ensured that the infantry could survive on the battlefield of 1918. Effective counter battery fire using predicted bombardments to maintain surprise enured that the German artillery played only a limited role in the battle while the other scourge of the infantry, the machine gun, was dealt with by the creeping barrage. Meanwhile German infantry and machine guns that escaped this destructive barrage were dealt with by the infantry’s flexible tactics employing Lewis light machine guns, rifle grenades and mortars.134

During the period from the German offensive in March 1918 until the withdrawal of the Australian corps from the frontline in October the Australians captured 29,144 Germans, 338 guns, 116 towns and villages and engaged 39 enemy

131 Eric Andrews, ‘Hamel: Winning a battle’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 18, April 1991, p. 5 -13. 132 Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, p. 144. 133 War Diary 5th FAB, 8 August 1918. 134 Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson, ‘Winning the War’, in Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey, Defining Victory 1918, Chief of Army History Conference 1998, (Army History Unit, Canberra, 1999), p. 38. 101 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

divisions, six of which were, as a result, disbanded. This represented about 22 per cent of captures made by the British army, although the Australians formed only 9 per cent of its troops. This was accomplished at the cost of 21,000 Australian casualties.135

Berryman and the 14th Battery played their own part in the dramas of 1918. Together they confronted the enemy for three months of continuous fighting and were present in the first assaults at Amiens where 342 Mark V and 72 Medium tanks, more than 50 Mark V infantry-carrying tanks, and 120 supply tanks…operating with 9 divisions of the best BEF troops in France - the Australian and Canadian Corps.136 In a little over three hours the German frontline trenches were overrun and for ‘the first time in [the] Australian experience, most of the enemy’s field artillery had been overrun and captured.’137 The 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions, who had led the assault, dug in and the 4th and 5th Divisions continued the advance for a further three miles.

From then on the Australian advance became a series of relentless battles fought at Lihons (9-11 August), Etinehem (10-13 August), Proyart (10-12 August), Chuignes (23 August), Mont St Quentin (31 August -2 September) ‘the crowning achievement of the AIF’ and Hindenburg Outpost Line (18 September 1918)138 which proved that ‘the British had developed methods of overwhelming the most powerful defensive systems at a relatively modest cost.’139 The 14th Battery provided support to all of the battles in which the 2nd Australian division fought as well as supporting many other battles engaged in by other Australian divisions.140 Berryman’s last engagement with the Battery was the assault on the Hindenburg Outpost line on 18-19 September 1918.

The attack kicked off in ‘drizzling rain and dense fog’ and the advance by the 1st Division was entirely successful. One captured German officer remarked that his

135 Andrews, The Anzac Illusion, pp. 147-148. 136 Travers, How the War Was Won: Command and Technology in the British Army, p 118. Travers also notes that ‘While the Canadian Corps suffered 3,500 casualties, the Australian Corps suffered less at 3,000 casualties, and while the Canadian Corps captured 114 officers, 4,919 other ranks and 161 guns, the Australian Corps captured 183 officers, 7,742 other ranks and 173 guns’, p. 124. He concludes that the superior performance of the Australian Corps was a result of its experience in the use of tanks and in combined arms assaults as a result of the success at Hamel. 137 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 470. 138 Coulthard-Clarke, The Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 151-158. 139 Robin Prior & Trevor Wilson, ‘Winning the War’, p. 41. 140 Horner, The Gunners, p. 182. 102 AGUNNERS WAR

troops ‘would not face the Australians.’141 On the following day the weather was ‘fine’ and the Brigade remained active with harassing fire against the enemy. 19 September was the day that the dangerous nature of the war finally caught up with Major Frank Berryman.

In the early afternoon of 19 September Berryman was taken to the 2nd Australian Field Ambulance at Harquaix with gun shot wounds to the right eye caused by an artillery splinter. At this stage his Battery had been in support of the 1st Australian Division yet there is no record of his wounding in the 5th FAB’s war diary. With his processing by the 2nd Field ambulance, and the reports that both the 1st and 2nd Australian Infantry Brigades had received heavy shelling during the day, it is most likely that Berryman was wounded while carrying out the duties of a Group Liaison Officer with the infantry.142 The most probable explanation is that Berryman was wounded while accompanying the Commander of the 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade in his reconnaissance of the 1st Australian Infantry Brigade’s lines for the relief that was to occur the following day.143

Berryman’s wounds were serious enough to necessitate his evacuation from the front line and a few days convalescence in the hospital. Thankfully there was no permanent damage to his vision. His wound also meant an end to his career as a Battery Commander. The AIF used the opportunity to transfer Berryman to his long overdue posting as an Infantry Brigade Major.

Berryman’s command of the 14th Battery had proved to be even more successful than his time at the 18th Battery. He had benefited from his original command posting and he had matured as a commander. His detailed professional knowledge this technical branch of the service saw him widely regarded as an expert in the artillery and as his performance as group liaison officer with the infantry was excellent. His efficiency in these areas and his willingness to expose himself to hostile enemy fire earned him a Distinguished Service Order for the period of May to the

141 Bean, Anzac to Amiens, p. 485; Coulthard-Clarke, The Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 158. 142 War Diary 5th FAB, 19 September 1918, War Diary 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, 19 September 1918, War Diary 2nd Australian Field Ambulance, 19 September 1918. Berryman, F. H. Field Service Record, September 1918, NAA WWI Personnel Service Record. 143 War Diary 1st Australian Infantry Brigade, 19 September 1918, War Diary 2nd Australian Infantry Brigade, 19 September 1918. 103 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

beginning of September 1918. Significantly it was the ‘great praise from infantry Brigade Commanders’ for his ‘conscientious and untiring work’ as a ‘Group Liaison Officer’ as well as his proficiency as a battery commander that sealed the decoration. A reflection of the changes to the nature of artillery tactics and doctrine on the Western Front during 1918 and Berryman’s role in helping to implement them. Recognition for his services with the 14th Battery did not end there. The Brigade commander thought highly enough of his skill to recommend a Bar to Berryman’s DSO for the period covering the assault on Mont St Quentin and the Hindenburg Outpost Line, but Anzac Corps headquarters believed that he had received his fair due of recognition and down graded his award to a second MID.144

Berryman’s new posting took him back to familiar territory. On 25 September he reported for duty to the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Brigade where he found his old commanding officer Brigadier-General-General Wisdom still holding court. Berryman’s posting was, however, not to take effect immediately and instead he found himself as the assistant BM during an interim hand over period that was to last for just over a month.145 On arrival, Berryman found the Brigade at Herleville carrying out tactical exercises with tanks in preparation for their next operation.146

Berryman was immediately put to work helping to organise the Brigade’s operational orders for their attack on the Beaurevior Line, in what turned out to be the last major operation by the AIF in the war. This type work was exceptionally important to helping win the war in 1918 for without the improvement to the quality of staff work being produced the changes in tactics and doctrine that had occurred in 1917-1918 could not have been implemented. As the commander of the Australian Corps, General Monash, noted ‘it was upon [the Staff], after all, that the principal burden of the campaign rested.’147

This operation was to prove a difficult one for the 2nd Australian Division. One of the major reasons for this was that while the 7th Brigade, ‘had a good rest’ during the

144‘Honours and Awards (Recommendations: First World War)’, AWM28 1/118P2 File: 1/118P2 - 2nd Australian Division - 27/8/1918 to 5/9/1918, DSO Recommendation Major Frank H. Berryman, p. 95. 145 ‘Australian War Records Section – Biographical Details, Major F. H. Berryman’, AWM 183/7, Australian War Records Section – Biographical Details. 146 War Diary, 7th Australian Infantry Brigade, September 1918. 147 General Monash as quotes in Lee, ‘The Australian Staff: The Forgotten Men of the AIF’, p. 114. 104 AGUNNERS WAR

later part of September ‘and [the men] were looking remarkably fit’148 as a result of declining enlistments in the all volunteer AIF the 7th and ’s could only muster 2,500 men between them to carry out the attack.149

Figure 3.2 ‘Berryman’s new posting took him back to familiar territory… the headquarters of the 7th Infantry Brigade where he found his old commanding officer Brigadier-General-General Wisdom still holding court’ Staff of the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade Headquarters, Belgium, 1 January 1919.150 (AWM E04210)

Berryman’s chance to work on the staff of an infantry brigade during 1918 was restricted to the AIF’s final assault in France during the war. His status as assistant BM also leaves open to question the precise nature of the role that he had in the conduct of operations. The ambiguity surrounding his role in this final battle was compounded by the fact that after taking over as BM of the 7th Infantry Brigade there were no further active operations. However, during this later phase of the war Berryman had already participated in the majority of the actions of the AIF, either as a Battery Commander or as a liaison officer attached to the Staff of an infantry unit. His first hand knowledge of

148 Ibid, 28/29 September 1918. 149 Coulthard-Clark, The Encyclopedia of Australia’s Battles, p. 165. The low numbers in the AIF in 1918 were a result of the continuation of the of voluntary enlist policy and the collapse of recruiting for the AIF in 1918. 150Belgium: Wallonie, Hainaut Marchienne-au-Pon. An outdoors group portrait of members of the Staff of the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade Headquarters in front of the chateau that served as their headquarters. From left to right; back row: unidentified lieutenant (Lt); unidentified captain (Capt) MC with Bar, MM; unidentified Capt; unidentified Lt MC; unidentified 2nd Lt; unidentified Lt MC with Bar, MM. Front row: Major Frank Horton Berryman; unidentified Lt Colonel MC; unidentified Capt. 105 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

these operations was both in-depth and included a wide range of experiences and perspectives.

The announcement of the armistice on 11 November did not radically change Berryman’s work load. The emphasis in the Brigade, however, now turned to the Anzac Corps instructional program, the rapid demobilisation of the men and their repatriation to Australia. Liberal leave was granted to all ranks and training was reduced to a minimum. By 13 March 1919 the Brigade’s strength had fallen to the extent that it was amalgamated into one battalion and the 2nd Division into one brigade. After Berryman’s last order as a BM, on 14 March 1919, the 7th Australian Infantry Brigade ceased to exist. It had not turned out to be a glamorous end to the war for Frank Berryman, but nevertheless his role in the demobilisation of the Brigade and the overseeing of the men’s repatriation and retraining was an important one. He had, in the end, finished the war in a position that his training at Duntroon and his posting to the Australian Permanent Military Forces had prepared him for.

The war was a pivotal experience for Frank Berryman and his fellow Duntroon graduates. He gained valuable experience as a commander, staff officer and in the nature of modern military tactics and organisation. He was also extremely lucky to survive the destructive nature of war. Australian casualties during the First World War were exceedingly heavy. No more so than amongst junior and middle ranking officers. Duntroon graduates took disproportionately heavy causalities. Although they only made up 1.2 per cent of the officers in the AIF (with only 133 seeing active service) two thirds of RMC graduates became a casualty at some stage during the war and their death rate of 28 per cent stands higher than that for AIF officers generally (23 per cent) and the AIF as a whole (17.5 per cent).151 While it has become fashionable for historians such as Jay Winter and Brian Bond to re-assess the scale of British losses on the Western Front and argue forcibly that the ‘deaths directly related to combat of 722,785 British soldiers was not demographically significant’152 the same cannot be

151 Coulthard-Clark, Duntroon, p. 62. 152 Jay Winter, The Great War and the British People (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985), pp. 71- 99 as quoted in Bond, Unquiet Western Front : Britain's Role in Literature and History, p. 24. 106 AGUNNERS WAR

argued for the Australian experience. The Australian experience of war defies Bond’s argument that the notion of a ‘lost generation’ was exaggerated.153

There are also other ways beside casualties to ‘measure’ the contribution of Berryman and his fellow Duntroon graduates. While Dr Chris Clark accurately regards decorations and casualties as a ‘superficial yardstick of performance’ they do however reveal some interesting facts.154 Twenty six RMC officers received a MID, including seventeen, like Frank Berryman, who received it twice. Distinguished Service Orders were awarded to RMC graduates at three times the rate of other AIF officers however as it has been noted the higher percentage of awards was also accompanied by a higher casualty rate. It was, as Clark reminds us, ‘an impressive record of sacrifice and valour’, but one that was perchance a ‘demonstration of “courage noble indeed, if perhaps too reckless.”’155

Berryman’s survival during the war had a lot to do with that fateful day at RMC when he stepped forward and volunteered for the artillery over a posting to the infantry. The casualty ratios for the Australian artillery during the war can never be taken lightly. They were in fact considerable with 58 per cent of those gunners who embarked in Australia becoming casualties. By way of contrast the infantry, who always bore the brunt of the fighting, suffered almost 79 per cent casualties. Berryman’s preference for a ‘technical’ branch of service meant that the statistics certainly fell in his favour.156

Wartime conditions had taught Berryman much about the nature of men and modern warfare. His experiences revealed a dedicated and resolute officer who became well respected for his technical knowledge and his ability to carry out orders. His time in the frontline gave him great empathy for the common soldiers experience of war and

153 Bond, Unquiet Western Front: Britain's Role in Literature and History, p. 24. Of course the impact of these casualties on Australia went far beyond the immediacy of death or injury. The affect on the home front on parents, wives and children was devastating. This was particularly hard for countries, like Australia, who were situated far from the battlefields leaving relatives with little hope of visiting the graves of those lost on the fields of battle. This resulted in Australia of a unique and particular form of pilgrimage that has also been associated with the notion of the Anzac experience as a defining point in Australia’s history. See Bruce Scates, Return to Gallipoli: Walking the Battlefields of the Great War, (Cambridge, Melbourne, 2006). 154 Coulthard-Clark, Duntroon, p. 62. 155 Ibid, pp. 62-63. 156 Ibid, pp. 64-65. 107 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

it impressed upon him the need for a commander to set an example to the men and be willing to suffer the same privations in order to win their confidence.

Berryman had served on the Western Front during the period where ‘the key tactical development between 1916 and 1918 was the provision of accurate artillery protection for advancing infantry’157 and he had learnt the importance of carrying out thorough reconnaissances and the need to develop close liaison between all units, in particular when he was providing support to the infantry. Beyond his direct combat experience Berryman had trained as a staff officer and in this role he showed a high degree of competence and dedication to his duties. The experiences on Brigade and Divisional Staff taught him the importance of meticulous planning and attention to detail, as well as giving him a broad range of experiences in combined arms cooperation as it stood in 1916-1918.

These developments were crucial to Berryman’s understanding of the nature of warfare and his professional development. This period had proven that in modern warfare the importance of ‘meticulous planning, [where]each component was integrated with, and provided maximum support for, every other component. Here, more than anywhere else, was the great technical achievement of these climactic battles. It was not that the British had developed a war-winning weapon. What they had produced was a weapons system: the melding of the various elements in the military arm into a mutually supporting whole.’158 These were the key lesson for a young staff officer to take away from his experiences of war and they were to provide a platform of experience for the years to come.

Berryman was now a changed man personally. He had not seen his family in over three years and his experiences during the war had taken him a long way from life in semi-rural Victoria. While he retained his youthful looks, his boyish mannerisms and enthusiasm had been lost and he had matured well beyond his years. Like many of his

157Bond, The Unquiet Western Front , p. 21. 158 Trevor Wilson The Myriad Faces of War , (Polity, Cambridge, 1986), p. 586. 108 AGUNNERS WAR

fellow officers he had lost some of his earlier devotion to the Christian faith, but not his drive, ambition and sense of duty.159

Berryman emerged at the end of the war as an experienced combat and staff officer with the Distinguished Service Order and two Mentions in Dispatches. Although his accolades and experiences were not unique compared to his fellow RMC graduates they were nevertheless considerable. The challenge that lay ahead for Frank Berryman was to maintain his commitment to the Army despite the fact that the coming years of peace were to prove a graveyard for the careers of so many aspiring young officers.

159 The war had an impact on a number of soldiers and their relationship to religious worship. Berryman remained a Christian throughout his life, but his devotion to Methodism declined remarkably during and after the war. Another somewhat similar example can be seen in Thomas Blamey, also a Methodist who ‘lost his earlier Christian faith’. See Horner, Blamey the Commander in Chief, p. 62. 109 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

Chapter 4

‘The Bitter-Sweet Years’

The Staff Corps, Romance, and Camberley 1919-1929

The ‘war to end all wars’ had been fought and won, and military affairs could be safely accorded a minor place in the nations concerns. Jeffrey Grey, The Australian Army, p. 72.

New Directions When Major Frank Berryman strode down the gang plank of the SS Windhuk in August 1919 both the city and country that he returned to were very different. The First World War had been a defining moment in the history of Australia and like all the countries affected by the war there was no possibility of a return to the days before 1914. Gone forever was the blind faith that Australia had demonstrated in the British Empire before Gallipoli, and gone too was the enthusiasm that had greeted the start of the war. In 1919 the Australian people were sick of war. 60,000 war dead, two bitterly fought conscription plebiscites and an enormous public debt caused by the war led to calls for immediate reductions in the military and a refocusing of the nation towards the development of Australian society.1 The First World War was, after all, the ‘War to End all Wars’ and the bitter memories of the casualties and suffering lead to a genuine belief in disarmament and peace.2

From a military standpoint the end of the war bought about a change to Australia’s strategic situation. In the post war period Japan emerged as the only genuine threat to Australian security. David Day argues that it ‘had been acknowledged that the Pacific Ocean would probably provide the arena for the next world conflict’.3 Japanese

1Stuart Macintyre, The Oxford History of Australia: The Succeeding Age 1901-1942, Volume 4, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1999), pp. 182-197. Macintyre argues that the end of the war saw a widening of the gap in Australian society that had developed over the issue of conscription. Australian society after the war consumed itself with issues such as unemployment, sectarian divisions and industrial disputes. Military issues were dominated by the RSSILA (Returned Soldiers and Sailors League of Australia), soldier settlement and other related issues. See also John McQuilton, ‘A Shire at War: Yackandandah, 1914-1918’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 11, October, 1987, p. 11- 13. McQuilton argues that ‘During the 1920’s, the shire, like the nation in general, seemed intent on putting the war behind it.’ 2 Grey, Military History of Australia, p. 119; Grey, Australian Brass, p. 44. 3 David Day, The Politics of War, (Harper Collins, Sydney, 2003), p. 1. 110 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

power and expansionist policies had been on the rise since the nineteenth century and at the Paris Peace Conference her support of the allied powers during the war resulted in the acquisition of the German Pacific colonies in the Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands. This in effect cemented Japanese ‘domination of the central and western Pacific’.4

Australia’s strategic position in relation to Japan was radically altered by the redistribution of German colonies in the Pacific. Australia acquired the and its excellent harbour at from the Germans and this, along with Japanese acquisitions, effectively made the two countries uncomfortable neighbours. Japan emerged from the First World War as a major military power and any further expansion by her, into the southern or south-western pacific, would bring Japan into direct conflict with the United States and / or Great Britain.5

Australian security against Japanese power had been provided, before and during the First World War, by the Anglo-Japanese Naval Agreement (1902). In the post war period it was hoped that the and disarmament would guarantee not just Australian security in the Pacific but peace throughout the world. War, as Craig Wilcox reminds us, had ‘lost its glory in the mud of France and Belgium sometime between 1914 and 1918’. It was ‘now not something to be prepared for’.6

The Washington Naval Conference of 1921 had major repercussions for the defence of Australia. The world’s major naval powers all signed the agreement, which created a fixed ratio of capital ships between the powers and placed limitations on the building and tonnage of new warships.7 It was hoped that a repeat of the naval arms race which had been blamed as being one of the principal causes of the First World War could be avoided. The Washington Conference, however, also meant the lapse of the Anglo-Japanese Naval agreement, something that both Australia and New Zealand fought hard to retain.8

4 John McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence: A Study in Air and Sea Power, (University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1976), p. 7. 5 Ibid, p. 7-8. 6 Craig Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998), p. 83. 7 Capital Ships accounts for Battleship, Battle-Cruisers. 8 W. David McIntyre, ‘The Strategic Significance of 1917-1942: The Naval Base and the Commonwealth’ Journal of South East Asia History, No. 10, 1969. For a discussion of the Anglo- 111 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

However the Australian government, ever reliant on Great Britain and specifically the for protection, was not overly perturbed by this development and publicly welcomed the outcome of the Washington Naval Conference. With a country weary of war and a prevailing belief in the League of Nations and disarmament the government saw ‘few votes in defence’.9 To the government the Washington Conference seemed to also solve Australia’s strategic problems over Japan. With hindsight this was, however, a ‘misguided perception’ that was to have ‘catastrophic [results] for Australian defence’.10

The government’s complete faith in peace and disarmament was undermined the following year with the ‘Chanak’ crisis when it appeared that Britain was on the brink of war with Turkey. Australia instantly threw its support behind the ‘Mother Country’. Fortunately the crisis quickly passed, but it served to remind the Australian government of the potential for international conflict and that this had ‘in no way lessened as a result of the Great War’.11

After ‘Chanak’ there was a growing recognition that the Washington Conference provided little real security for Australia. So when , the Australian Prime Minister, went to the 1923 Imperial Conference he was resolved to confirm the proposal to provide a British base in the Pacific. The outcome of this Conference was the and Australia’s continued commitment to Imperial Defence.12 At the conference it was agreed that each part of the empire was responsible for its own local defence, but also that a naval base would be built at Singapore to service the British

Japanese agreement, the British government’s changing policy towards Japan and its misinformation to the Australian government during this time see, D. K. Dignan, ‘Australia and British Relations with Japan, 1914-1921’, Australian Outlook, Vol. 21, No. 2, August 1967, p. 135-149. 9 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 119. 10 David Horner, High Command: Australia’s struggle for an independent war strategy, 1939-1945, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1982), p. 2. 11 Grey, Military History of Australia, p. 122. 12 Horner, High Command, p. 2. Australian Defence policy had actually been based around Singapore since 1921. The 1923 Imperial conference merely formalized these previous arrangements. See David Day, ‘A Great and Impotent Friend: The Singapore Strategy’, in Martin Crotty & David Roberts (eds), The Great mistakes of Australian History, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2006, pp. 125-126 & I. Hamil, The Strategic Illusion: The Singapore Strategy and the Defence of Australia and New Zealand, 1919-1942. (SUP, Singapore, 1981), p. 3. Imperial Defence was the ‘joint defence of United Kingdom possessions and interests by a combination of United Kingdom, Dominion and Colonial Forces.’ Australian participation dated back to the Sudan conflict of 1885 and saw the commitment of Australian forces to the Boer War, Boxer Rebellion and World War I. See McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence, p. 1-2. 112 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

battle fleet thereby providing a deterrent to Japanese aggression in the Pacific.13 Australia was responsible for the protection of maritime trade in the Australian region and financial support was pledged for the construction of the Singapore Base. The Singapore Strategy was the foundation of Australian Defence policy throughout the inter-war period.14 At the time it was viewed by the British chiefs of staff as one of the ‘keystones on which the survival of the British would depend’.15 This policy was, however, to have serious repercussions not just for the Australian army and Frank Berryman’s career, but for the security of the entire nation.

The rejected soldiers At the end of the war the AIF were demobilised with the greatest possible speed and Australian society turned its attentions away from the military and towards civil society. From the war emerged a heavy distrust amongst the populace of all things military. Before the Great War the majority of the Australian population supported the Empire and encouraged participation in the cadets and the military. These same people who once sought to drill were now interested in listening to the radio, the cinema and cars. Those who might once have desired to be soldiers now looked towards the development of the nation.16

Soldiering, never a widely popular vocation in Australia, now lost much of its pre-war appeal. Prior to the Great War entry into the new Royal Military College in Canberra attracted a very high number of candidates but in 1921 applications were fewer than the number of places available.17 Cuts to military spending were popular with the electorate and after the end of compulsory military service a member of the militia was ‘likely to be regarded by his acquaintances as a peculiar fellow with an

13 Malcolm Murfett, ‘The Singapore Strategy’ in Carl Bridge & Bernard Attard, (eds), Between Empire and Nation: Australia's External Relations from Federation to the Second World War, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Kew 2000 [Informit online]. See also J. J. Dedman, ‘Defence Policy Decisions before Pearl Harbour’ Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 13, December 1967, p. 331. 14 Horner, High Command, p. 2. See also John Gooch, ‘The Politics of Strategy: Great Britain, Australia and the War against Japan 1939-1945’, War in History, No. 10, Vol. 4, 2003, pp. 425-426. 15 ‘Review of Imperial Defence by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence, 22 February 1937.’ As quoted in J. McCarthy, ‘Singapore and Australian Defence 1921-1942’, The Australian Outlook, No. 2, 1971, p. 165. 16 Craig Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 83. 17 Grey, The Australian Army: The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume 1, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001), p. 75. 113 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

eccentric taste for uniforms and the exercise of petty authority’.18 As Gavin Long, Australia’s Official Historian of the Second World War argues, ‘Peace-time military service conferred little prestige … [and] Soldiers and Soldiering were in particular bad odour’.19 In the post war period the real value of the military in Australian society was not in militarism and the professional military caste, but rather in the ‘enormous value of being a “returned serviceman”’.20

By 1922 the government had cancelled compulsory military training for rural areas and abandoned training camps for that year. As a result the strength of the militia fell to 37,000 or a reduction of 90,000 on the previous year.21 Army reductions were also a consequence of the false beliefs that arose about the abilities of the Australian soldier during the Great War. In parliament D.C. McGrath (Labor) argued that the war proved that Australians with no military experience were, after a month or two of training, ‘equal to if not superior to any other troops’.22 As Craig Wilcox argues this false belief became ‘more popular than ever before’ especially as the wider community still regarded the AIF as the ‘national army’.23

While the public placed faith in the natural soldiering abilities of the Australian male the government placed its faith in the protective power of the British navy. The Singapore Strategy meant that the role of the Army in national defence was reduced to local defence against raids rather than a full scale invasion of the country. As a result in 1924 the Council of Defence declared that army expenditure be dedicated to the training of the command and staff, the procurement of essential equipment and the training of the rank and file ‘in that order’.24 This combination of a lack of prestige in the wider community along with its relegation to a minor role in the defence of Australia proved devastating to the army in the inter-war period. The situation was only exacerbated by the false belief that the Australian male possessed natural soldiering abilities.

18 Gavin Long, To Benghazi: Australia in the War of 1939-1945, Volume 1, (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952), p. 10. 19 Ibid, p. 10-11. See also Michael McKernan, The Strength of a Nation: Six Years of Australians fighting for the nation and defending the Australian homefront in WWII, (Allen & Uwin, Crows Nest, 2006), p. 8- 9. 20 S. Encel ‘The Study of Militarism in Australia’, The Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, Vol. 3, No.1, 1967, p. 3. 21 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 121. 22 Gavin Long, To Benghazi, p. 3. 23 Wilcox, For Heaths and Homes, p. 85 24 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 121. 114 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

The belief in the dominance of sea power in the plans for the defence of Australia meant that the army’s share of the defence vote was considerable lower than that of the navy throughout the inter-war period. This was in spite of the fact that in the event of war the Australian navy would most probably be placed under British Admiralty control.25 The cuts to funding were felt almost immediately. The defence vote fell from £8,000,000 in 1921-1922 to £5,200,000 in 1923-1924.26

By 1929 the navy also claimed nearly half the money available, leaving the air force and the army to divide up the remainder between them.27 In the army ‘the sharp edge of the axe was most keenly felt by two relatively small groups’. The most heavily hit were the army’s warrant officers and the wartime graduates from the Royal Military College Duntroon. Men like Frank Berryman. 28

In 1921 the army had united all of its regular officers into one branch of service, the Staff Corps. This Corps, the senior division in the army and the army’s ‘elite corps’29 was only open to officers and its functions were to provide ‘the army with professional officers trained in staff duties and the organisation and administrative qualifications needed in modern armies’.30 However the reductions in the army’s defence vote meant that redundancies among the regular staff started almost immediately and the newly established Staff Corps became a skeleton of what the army’s high command thought necessary. In 1922 seventy eight of the three hundred officers who made up the Staff Corps were retrenched.31 This was only the start of reductions in pay, conditions of service and restrictions on promotion and employment that led military historian Jeffrey Grey to describe the inter-war period as a time when ‘some of the best soldiers Australia has produced simply marked time’.32 Others left the

25 Ibid, p. 132. 26 Horner, The Gunners, p. 191-192. David Day, ‘A Great and Impotent Friend: The Singapore Strategy’, p. 127. Day notes that by 1928-29 defence spending was 1.04% of national income. 27 , The Government and the People 1939-1945, Vol I, Australia in the War of 1939-1945, (AWM, Canberra, 1952) p. 32. 28 Long, To Benghazi, p. 5. The Army’s Warrant Officers were all transferred to a new branch of the service know as the Australian Army Instructional Corps. Officers were formed into the Staff Corps. 29 Warren Perry, ‘The Australian Staff Corps – its origins, duties, status and influence from October 1920 to the outbreak of the War of 1939-1945’, Sabretache, Vol XXXVI, October/December 1995, p. 32. 30 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 137. 31 Ibid, p. 121. Gavin Long claims that the number was only 72. See Long, To Benghazi, p. 4. 32 Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 138. 115 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

service altogether. Many opted for better pay and conditions in civilian life33 while others, like General Chauvel’s two sons, transferred to the British or Indian armies.34

Prospects for Frank Berryman’s post-war career looked bleak. As Gavin Long argues, ‘before and during the war of 1914-1918 each young officer saw a brilliant career ahead of him, if he survived. The reductions of 1922 dashed these hopes’.35 Berryman returned from the war as a major with considerable command and staff experience, but this rank was that of an officer in the AIF and throughout the war he remained a lieutenant in the permanent military forces. As such Berryman along with all his fellow RMC officers who served during the war reverted back to their pre-war rank and pay. Their only compensation was permission to wear the rank they attained in the AIF. Reductions in the defence vote and the size of the militia meant drastic reductions in the ability of staff officers to attain the professional development that was essential for their career prospects. The numbers of officers attached to or loaned to British or Indian army units was cut and the lack of a permanent military force meant that it was impossible to attain regimental experience in Australia.36

Promotion came to a virtual standstill. The number of senior officers was dictated by the defence vote each year and promotion levels were tied to retirements or resignations.37 Officers with the rank of major in the AIF such as Berryman now found themselves at the bottom of the seniority list with no prospect of promotion for at least ten years.38 This meant that they often filled positions that were well below their capabilities.

Pay and conditions of service were also less than satisfactory. Officers of Berryman’s RMC class who attained the AIF rank of major in 1917 were paid at the rate of a lieutenant in the peacetime army on their return from the war and only promoted to

33 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 98. 34 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 53. 35 Long, To Benghazi, p. 5. 36 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 98. The Defence Act prohibited the formation of regular army field units which made it impossible for regular officers to gain regimental experience. 37 Ibid. The Defence Act in Australia prevented the formation of regular army field units. 38 Long, To Benghazi, p. 5. 116 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

captain four years after their return.39 This remained the same for these officers until 1935, a total of sixteen years. In addition the pay scales for the Australian army were poor in comparison to their British counterparts and Australian civil society. In Australia a lieutenant received £250-375 per year while in the British Army a lieutenant received £375-429, a married officer £448-503. In the Indian Army a Lieutenant could expect £570-660.40 In 1938 Lt-Colonel Berryman received only £779 per annum while an equivalent civil servant received £912 and a British Army Lt-Colonel £1,204. There was also no superannuation scheme and low rates of pay helped to accentuate the ‘unattractiveness of the profession’.41

Having been brought up in a working class family with limited financial prospects and now finding his pay and conditions well below the standard of his civilian contemporaries it is therefore not surprising to find that the search for financial security was a persistent concern for Frank Berryman from the 1920s right through until the post Second World War period.42 Low pay and poor conditions not only limited entry into the profession but it also severely restricted the Staff Corps officers from taking their ‘proper place in social life outside the military’.43 Repercussions of the government’s treatment of army officers during this period were widespread and led to not just the ‘isolation’ of the corps from the militia and the broader community, but also to a deep resentment of the government and a mistrust of politicians and the media.44

By 1927 General Chauvel reported that the ‘disparity of opportunity and stagnation in promotion, with retention in subordinate positions, cannot lead to the maintenance of the active, virile and efficient staff that the service demands’.45 The other significant consequence of these difficulties was a decline in the morale and the professional capabilities of Staff Corps officers. Jeffrey Grey even argues that the severe conditions faced by Staff Corps officers during the inter-war period profoundly

39 Berryman was lieutenant in the Staff Corps from his return to Australia in 1919 until 1 March 1923 when he was made a captain and then brevet major in the same day. He was not confirmed (and thus paid) as a major until 1935. ‘Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record’, NAA, B2455. 40 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 76. 41 S. Encel, Equality and Authority: A Study of Class, Status and Power, (Cheshire, Melbourne, 1970), p. 451. 42 See ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, circa 1925-1945, Berryman Family Papers. Financial discussions were a consistent theme in Frank and Muriel’s correspondence. 43 Long, To Benghazi, p. 5. 44 Ibid, p. 11-12. 45 As quoted in Long, To Benghazi, p. 9. 117 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

affected officers on an individual level. Grey claims, in his biography of General Horace Robertson, Australian Brass, that these conditions contributed to the development of signs of ‘egotism, arrogance and vanity’ in Robertson. Grey also suggests that George Vasey, once an ‘outgoing and gregarious’ young officer, became ‘moody and introspective in the face of years of professional neglect’.46 These same issues drew a heavy cloud over Berryman during the 1920s and they were to affect both his professional and his personal life.

Finding a balance For the army and Staff Corps officers one of the only ways to avoid ‘stagnation’ was an overseas posting and during the 1920s Frank Berryman received two such postings, both at rather fortuitous times. With barely enough time to get his feet dry from the long voyage home Berryman secured a posting to attend a specialist course at the Royal Artillery College in Woolwich, London, from November 1920 until December 1922. The cost of travel and allowances etc was exceptionally high to the Army for such postings and the course with its qualification P.A.C. (Passed Artillery College) guaranteed that he would avoid the enforced redundancies taking place back in Australia. Berryman’s overseas posting clearly marked him out as an officer that AHQ saw as having a long term future in the service. 47

Berryman returned to Australia in 1923 and was posted to the 2nd District Base (New South Wales) at Victoria Barracks Sydney as the Inspecting Ordnance Officer (IOO), North East Area. The position of IOO was an important administrative role. Permanent officers with a background in either engineering or artillery were selected to carry out inspections for the Australian Army Ordnance Department (AAOD). Their main functions were technical inspections and proofing of machinery and ammunition. For the 2nd Military District this involved a much work at the AAOD’s headquarters and depot at Circular Quay and Darling Harbour and later at the two depots established at Leichhardt and Liverpool (Moorebank).48 The job, however, did not confine Berryman to Sydney. His duties involved travel to northern New South Wales, Queensland and as

46 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 53-54. 47 See Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455. 48 J. D. Tilbrook, To the Warrior his Arms: A History of the Ordnance Services in the Australian Army, (Royal Australian Ordnance Corps, Canberra, 1989), p. 98. 118 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

far a field as Thursday Island and the Torres Strait,49 areas that he became even more familiar with some twenty years later.

Brevet Major Berryman held the position of IOO from 1923 until his posting to Staff College in 1927. While this was an important appointment it was not one that he ‘relished’50 as he was capable of a much more advanced position. It was, unfortunately, common in the inter-war period for officers to be in such a difficult employment situation. In this instance Berryman found that after the first few months his position did virtually nothing to enhance his professional development or tap his considerable potential.

Berryman was not blind to the limitations of service in the inter-war army. Like many of his fellow officers he thought of leaving the army, but like Sydney Rowell and Horace Robertson, Berryman stayed through a combination of ‘devotion to duty and a lack of civilian skills or opportunities’.51 His posting in Sydney, however gave Berryman the time and space to pursue other interests in his life. The First World War caused a drastic reduction in his academic studies at RMC, but his Sydney posting allowed Berryman time to renew his interest in the sciences and gain a qualification that had a practical civilian application.52

On the basis of his excellent performance in his civil subjects at RMC and under the University of Sydney’s ‘War By-law Chapter XXXiiiA’53 Berryman applied for and received permission to enrol in a Bachelor of Science degree (Chemistry, Physics and Mathematics). His previous academic training earned him an exemption from the first year of study and in recognition of his full time military work the university also agreed to exempt him from such portions of the attendances and examinations … [where]

49 Half Track, ‘Frank the Florist’, Bulletin, 1961, p. 46. 50 Ibid, p. 47 51 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 53. 52 Berryman’s degree would have to be self funded. The Army made little provision for the funding of university courses for its officers and prior to 1931 the only courses they funded were in engineering and Japanese. After 1931 the Department of Defence funded limited places for Staff Corps officers in Science, Economics/Commerce, Law, Veterinary Science, Analytical Chemistry as well as a number of single subject courses. See ‘Attendance of Officers of the Australian Staff Corps at Universities for Degree or Diploma’, NAA B1535 929/16/10. 53 Calendar of the University of Sydney for the Year 1924, (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1924) p, 107. ‘Professional Board and the Faculty concerned, grant such status or degree as it deems proper to any student who has been engaged in active military or naval service during the late European War.’ Calendar of the University of Sydney for the Year 1924, (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1924) p, 107. 119 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

possible’.54 This opportunity allowed Berryman to receive some professional development that was sadly lacking in his military posting.55

Full time work as an IOO and part time study at the University of Sydney occupied most of Frank Berryman’s time. The 1920s were also a time when the young Berryman turned his thoughts to courtship and marriage. Unfortunately memory and folklore have not captured the romantic ‘love story’ of Frank Berryman and Muriel Whipp. Nor is it entirely clear when the couple first met. Amongst Muriel Whipp’s vast collection of correspondence between herself and Frank Berryman, spanning some thirty years, are two letters, one dated 14 January 1918, the other undated but clearly from the war. Both are addressed to ‘My dear Muriel [from] Your pal, With much love Frank’.56 The first letter speaks of common friends and acquaintances while the second makes reference to ‘Frank’s’ wartime experiences, but with an eye to the scrutiny of the censor. It seems from both letters that ‘Frank’ and ‘Muriel’ were in frequent contact during the war. This of course then begs the question of when and how did they meet? Frank was at RMC in the years leading up to the war and presumably he spent his leave at home in Melbourne, but Muriel grew up in Sydney. The dated letter, however, makes reference to how much Frank enjoyed himself at Cronulla.

Conjecture aside, the relationship blossomed or was rekindled during the Sydney social seasons of the early 1920s. From even the earliest of the surviving correspondence Frank Berryman reveals an aspect of his personality that is sensitive, emotional and deeply devoted to his relationship with Muriel. This early correspondence also reveals one of Frank Berryman’s most successful tactics during their courtship, his close relationship to Muriel’s family. Berryman developed an intimate bond with the Whipp family and got to know them to the point where he became a regular caller at the family home even if Muriel was absent. In fact he had so

54 ‘Minutes of the Faculty of Science, 1919-1931, 30th June 1924’, University of Sydney Archives, Group 3, Series 3, item 3. See also Correspondence ‘Registrar, Sydney University to Major F. H. Berryman, 16th July 1924’. 55 Berryman could never have undertaken his course at Sydney University without the support he received from his commanding officer at Victoria Barracks, Major-General Brand, who also recognised the need to develop young officers outside of the Army’s immediate structure. See ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers - Frank Berryman 6 June 1924’, Frank Berryman- Australian Army Service Record, NAA, B2455. 56 These letters form part of the correspondence section that makes up a segment of the Berryman Family Papers, lent to the author by Sir Frank’s son Richard Berryman. 120 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

much contact with and confidence in this relationship with the Whipps’ that he felt happy to dispense news to Muriel about her own family while she was away on holidays.57

Berryman’s close relationship with the family was in many ways not surprising. His estrangement from his own family in Melbourne, whom he rarely corresponded with or visited after the war, left a large void in his support network. Muriel’s family, however proved, to be a very appealing alternative. Muriel’s father, James Henry Whipp had served as the inaugural President of the Burwood Returned Services League, as well as being mayor of Burwood from 1918-1922.58 Two of Muriel’s eldest brothers were close in age to Frank and both had seen service with the AIF during the Great War, Albert as an officer in the 30th Battalion and Rupert as a gunner in the 10th Field Artillery Brigade. Muriel’s brothers would undoubtedly have made the Whipp family

Figure 4.0 ‘It is simply that to me you are wonderful’ Studio portrait of Muriel Whipp, circa 1923/1924 (Berryman Family Archives)

57 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, 14 June 1923, BFP. 58 Burwood Municipal Jubilee Official Souvenir, Dixon Library, NSW, ML 92/1047. 121 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

home a more congenial experience with the shared experiences of war and comradeship to draw them together.59 These relationships may well have helped Berryman but it was Muriel’s mother’s support for Frank’s courtship, which eventually helped to seal the romance.60

During the early 1920s Muriel lived with her family on Enfield Road in Burwood. Muriel’s father, James Henry Whipp, originally worked for Grace Brothers, before taking redundancy due to health problems. After this he not only took to local politics, but used his finances to develop a real estate business and delve into property speculation, as a part of the Sydney real estate boom of the 1920s, that shortly enabled the family to move to Manly and acquire the use of a holiday house in Bowral. The family, like Frank Berryman’s, were of working class origins, but with firm middle class aspirations. Young Muriel was the member of the Whipp family who had the highest aspirations. She had her sights set on social advancement coupled with a desire for status and privilege.61

Berryman’s courtship of Muriel Whipp was never a case of mutual love at first sight but the story of a relationship built, at least initially, by fervent devotion to the cause shown by young Berryman. Muriel was a bright, intelligent and very attractive girl of the aspiring ‘class’ and she continued to keep her relationship options open right up until just before their engagement.62 This of course was disconcerting to Berryman, but it never made him doubt his feelings or commitment.63 He was ‘smitten’ with Muriel and his correspondence reveals the strength of his emotions built around his constant need for personal contact and communication with her.

59Stephen Garton, ‘Return Home: War, Masculinity and repatriation’, in Jo Damousi & Marilyn Lake (eds), Gender and War: Australians at War in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 191. 60 Interview, Ann Wills [nee Berryman], March 2004. 61 Ibid. 62 Muriel was a popular girl with a large circle of friends and a number of male suitors. Even up until 1925, only a month before her marriage to Frank Berryman, Muriel was receiving letters from a Royal Naval officer who was endeavouring to transfer to the Australian Navy in an effort to be closer to her. Surviving photographs also picture Berryman and ‘Robin’ standing together in uniform outside of Victoria Barracks, Sydney. (Muriel may well have met ‘Robin’ in 1924 when the Royal Naval Service Squadron visited Sydney). It is difficult to tell what Berryman made of such close competition and this may well have fuelled the sense of a lack of stability in the relationship that Berryman reveals in some of his correspondence. See, interview, Ann Wills [nee Berryman] March 2004; ‘“Robin”, HMS Dido, Portsmouth, England to Muriel Whipp’, 26 October 1925 & 8 November 1925, Berryman Family Papers. 63 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘F’, BFP [Note: a whole series of the letters in the Berryman Family Papers are undated and as such have been collected in the most recognisable chronological order and labelled alphabetically for ease of reference.] 122 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Berryman’s correspondence is full of his desires to see Muriel as well as his love and affection for her. Often he refers to the best part of his day as being ‘writing to you’, and that his separation from her left him ‘a little depressed’.64 At other times he struggles as he ‘can’t express what [he] want[s] to’.65 These sentiments as well as his behaviour in Muriel’s presence did, at times, cause friction in the relationship. This friction, on the part of Berryman, was systematic of what Stephen Garton calls the veterans ‘return to civilian life [and need] to come to terms with the feminine world’.66 For Berryman this was further complicated by his virtual removal from the feminine world starting from his entry into RMC in 1913. This was an issue that Berryman was fully conscious of. He noted to Muriel that his lack of social awareness with the opposite sex as largely a result of his service in the military; ‘if I’d had the company of girls like you … instead of seeing only soldiers & not even nurses I might have been different’.67

As the years and the relationship progressed Berryman’s words of affection grew more intense and it was clear that he was completely ‘in love’ from the outset, despite the fact that it took until October 1925 before he conveyed this deep emotional commitment in one of the surviving letters. After spending a weekend together in August 1925 he wrote, ‘It is simply that to me you are wonderful … and when I woke up but the sun was shining through the window on to your photo on the mantelpiece warming your shoulders and brightening your smile. Small wonder that I got up late’.68 There is little question that he was ‘completely lost in romanticism’.69

Frank Berryman’s letters to Muriel Whipp give us more that just an insight into their developing relationship. They also provide a window into his life during this period in Sydney. The letters provide a detailed description of a life that is dominated, not just by his love for Muriel, but by an active social life. The period after the Great War is often referred to as the ‘Roaring twenties’ and it seems that Frank Berryman and

64 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘B’, circa 1923, BFP, & ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘C’, BFP. 65 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘B’, circa 1923, BFP. 66 Garton, ‘Return Home: War, Masculinity and repatriation’, p. 192. 67 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘A’, circa 1923, BFP. 68 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, 24 August 1925, BFP. 69 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘G’, circa 1923, BFP 123 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

Muriel Whipp were doing their best to live up to that reputation. The correspondence reveals a packed social program of tennis, horse riding, hockey, swimming and golf during the days and dances, theatre and parties in the evenings. The pressing nature of these social engagements became intense enough for Berryman to announce to Muriel that he had banned himself from attending them during the week due to its detrimental effect on his university study and (presumedly) his budget.70

But while Berryman was living life to the full he was, especially during the early part of their relationship, dealing with the repercussions of his three years at war. The war was a troubling experience to all veterans, irrespective of rank, and Frank Berryman was no exception. One persistent theme during the early writing is the bouts of depression and sudden mood swings that Berryman suffered brought on by what seems be a sense of guilt at surviving the war unscathed.71

Berryman’s difficulties in the repatriation process were also a response to the ‘crisis of masculinity’ that was faced by returned soldiers. This ‘crisis’, as Stephen Garton argues, was a direct result ‘of the collapse of the masculine warrior ideals at the front; the loss of their special status on return [and] the confrontation with new and unfamiliar circumstances, public and private, on the home front’.72 Berryman and his fellow Staff Corps officers were hit particularly hard by this crisis. Not only had they lost their ‘special status’ they were attempting to reconcile their positions in the permanent military forces within a community that no longer valued militarism and looked on the military with suspicion.73

The evidence for Berryman’s mood swings and depression is revealed in his correspondence with Muriel. On numerous occasions in his letters he apologies for his behaviour during social engagements. He also admits to, at times, being ‘so blue …

70 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, correspondence 1923-1925, BFP. 71 See correspondence between Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp, circa 1923-1927, BFP. In the vast majority of these letters Berryman writes in a very emotive manner discussing both his feelings for Muriel and revealing his bouts of depression and mood swings. It is reasonable to assume that he may have been suffering from a degree of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder during this period as a result of his war experience. 72 Garton, ‘Return Home: War, Masculinity and repatriation’, p. 192. See also Garton, ‘War and Masculinity’, p. 91; here Garton quotes Lieutenant H.J. Moore, Assistant Director of Education in France in 1919, ‘…during four years of barbaric warfare and savagery… much had been forgotten of the refinement of social intercourse.’ 73 See page 81, ‘The Rejected Soldiers’ and Chapter 1 ‘The coming Man’, p. 12. 124 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

[that] I just wanted the ground to open up and swallow me’.74 In another letter he speaks of ‘being most depressed for not getting out to …’ visit his mates who have been wounded in the war and who are in hospital ‘… [but] I just wanted to get away by myself and let my feelings have their own way’.75 He goes on to explain some of the difficulties he faced when undertaking these visits. On one occasion:

As I walked in to see Bill I thought I heard a faint voice from across & found poor old Bertie Morgan looking terribly tired. He was knocked out at Hangard Wood in 1918 & ever since has had a rotten time. Yesterday they took his leg off right near the top & he told me he was only waiting for … when they would give him a sleeping draught. He has the heart of a lion & in spite of all his trouble is extremely considerate to other poor devils. Heaven was made for this sort & I thought how much had been spared me & what sort of fist was I making of my opportunities.76

For Frank Berryman one of the repercussions of the war was that, at times he was possibly overwhelmed by guilt, not just for surviving the war with little physical effects but also for enjoying himself in social activities that seemed to him frivolous in light of his previous experiences. But what troubled him most was the affect that these emotional outbursts had on his most treasured relationship. His trust and emotional confidence in Muriel allowed him to reveal the broad nature of his emotional difficulties to her. However at times his feelings were often manifested in what could be regarded as mild anti-social behaviour and served to only fulfil his sense of disappointment in himself;

I who know[s] full well the true conception of a Christian life, succeed in hurting the one who means everything, whose every movement strikes a vibrant chord with me, so heaven alone knows how much I fail. I am deeply penitent’.77

While in some respects their relationship caused personal difficulties to Berryman, Muriel provided a soothing outlet to his emotions. Their time together helped him feel stable and secure and Muriel provided him with sympathy as well as ‘play[ing] the roll of reformer’ by keeping him socially active, energetic and encouraging him to

74 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘I’, BFP. 75 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘K’, circa 1923, BFP. 76 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘L’, BFP. 77 Ibid. 125 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

‘speaking his mind’ and ‘express’ his opinions in social circles.78 Her efforts to get him to express his thoughts and feelings found an outlet in his letters, which he found ‘had an extraordinary … [effect] on me – … writing [to you] is such a relief for one’s pent up feelings’.79

Berryman also continued to find solace in religion. His faith, while not assuming such a large and prominent place in his life, was still nevertheless of great importance to him. While making reference to a sick friend, Bill Darvall, he revealed to Muriel that:

… still I hope[d] and pray[ed]. I’m a great believer in prayer – especially our mothers’ prayers. The knowledge that you are daily remembered in the prayers of those dear to you is a great comfort especially if you are a bit depressed – more so if you are inclined to be introspective. Padres say it is good for one but it is a curse as it leads to a negative attitude when one badly needs a positive outlook.80

Besides his relationship with Muriel and his religious beliefs Berryman found great support among the company of his fellow officers at Victoria Barracks. Alistair Thompson, who has written extensively on the Anzac legend, notes that ‘the fellowship of diggers was one important support network and a resource for the recognition and articulation of combat experience’.81 As Ross McMullin, Brigadier General ‘Pompey Elliot’s biographer, argues to many soldiers that brotherhood of mutual regard and interdependence… was for numerous ex-diggers, a sublime sentiment and the main redeeming feature of their terrible torture in the trenches… to comprehend it, to appreciate it, you had to be there.82

The sense of a shared experience and understanding that he received from his fellow officers at Victoria Barracks proved to be a tonic. He maintained a number of close relationships with officers in the mess and his position as secretary and later treasurer of

78 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘D’, ‘L’ & ‘M’, BFP. 79 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘K’, BFP. 80 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘G’, BFP. 81 Alistair Thompson, ‘A crisis of masculinity?’, in Jo Damousi & Marilyn Lake (eds), Gender and War: Australians at War in the Twentieth Century, (Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 146. 82 Ross McMullin, Pompey Elliot, (Scribe, Melbourne, 2002), p. 591. 126 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

the Officer’s Mess ensured that he remained active in the social life surrounding his profession.83

Berryman’s letters also provide us with an insight into his changing political affiliations since his time at Box Hill. During the 1923 electoral campaign Berryman noted to Muriel that:

… in spite of my sympathy for the legitimate aspirations of labor I fervently hope they get a smashing defeat at the coming elections. There is no doubt about the power of the communists in the labor movement & if it goes on increasing the result must be chaos.84

Berryman’s political hopes for the country were fulfilled with the re-election of the conservative government under a new Prime Minister, Stanley Melbourne Bruce, in February 1923 and the dominance of the conservative parties in federal politics in all but three years of the inter-war period.

Berryman’s letters also reveal a clear improvement over time in the nature of his personal well-being and social circumstances and his personal life finally found clear direction and stability when Muriel agreed to marry him in November 1925. Neither the details of Berryman’s proposal nor the reasons for the timing of his proposal are revealed in any of his correspondence. Certainly the most intriguing element that remains unaccounted for is the very short engagement of only a few weeks, ‘the quickest on record’ according to Berryman’s mother. 85 It may be that it simply stemmed from Berryman’s desire to claim his bride and his characteristic ‘make things happen’ attitude.

83 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence, circa 1923-1926, BFP. In his letters Berryman makes constant reference to fellow officers at Victoria Barracks, especially in terms of social engagements, friendships etc. 84 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, undated correspondence ‘E’, BFP. During the inter-war period a number of ‘secret armies’ (right-wing paramilitary organisations) were active in Australia. The most prominent of these in organisations in New South Wales was the Old and New Guards. It is unknown what if any association Berryman had with these groups and no evidence can be found linking him to these organisations. However a number of senior military officers including Thomas Blamey and Leslie Morshead were actively involved in ‘secret armies’. See Michael Cathcart, Defending the National Tuckshop, (McPhee, Melbourne, 1988) & Andrew Moore, The Secret Army and the Premier, (UNSW Press, Sydney, 1989). 85 ‘Anne Jane Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, 13 December 1925, BFP. 127 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

While the decision to marry may very well have seemed a logical step to the newly engaged couple, their friends and Muriel’s family, it came as a complete shock to the Berryman clan. Writing to Frank on 13 December 1925 his mother revealed that it took the family ‘some time to get over the shock and grasp the facts’ as the ‘telegram arrived with the exciting news of your marriage taking place the same day’.86

Berryman’s wedding day telegram reveals the extent of his estrangement from his family since he left for Duntroon. He neglected to inform his parents and siblings of his relationship with Muriel despite the fact that by the time of their marriage they had been together for over three years. Nor did he see fit to extend to his family an invitation to the wedding. His mother’s reply to the wedding day telegram also reveals that Frank had missed his younger brother’s wedding and a number of other important family celebrations. The letter is indicative of where Frank Berryman found himself in relation to his family in 1925. He was not just removed from them by a great physical distance but also socially, religiously and politically. His mother, however, took the step of writing to Muriel to welcome her into the family. Despite this friendly gesture the inauspicious nature of the start of Muriel’s relationship with the Berryman’s was something that she and his family never quite reconciled in the years to come.87

Despite the estrangement from his family Berryman found himself at the end of 1925 with very solid personal and social foundations. Muriel, a young lady possessing a strong, motivated and ambitious character, proved to be not only an example of the classic ‘strong women’ behind the man but she also earned a highly respected reputation in her own right in the years to come.88 Berryman’s relationship with Muriel reflected a pattern that Frank Berryman cultivated throughout his life. In his early years he looked to both his mother and older sister Ada to provide the strong feminine role that he desired. At school he found direction under the guidance of his female mathematics teachers who possessed similar strong qualities to those found within his family. Perhaps he even found it in his rumoured liaison with the French war widow during the First World War. Muriel Whipp provided Frank Berryman with the balance that his

86 ‘Anne Jane Berryman to Frank Berryman’, 13 December 1925, BFP & ‘Anne Jane Berryman to Muriel Whipp’, 13 December 1925, BFP. 87 ‘Anne Jane Berryman to Frank Berryman’, 13 December 1925, BFP. 88 Muriel was awarded an OBE (Order of the British Empire, Civil Division) in 1972 for charity and community work. 128 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

personal and family life so desired. She helped to sooth his war torn emotions, revealed to him a life beyond the military and provided him with a new family that seemed more in tune with his new found direction in life. Muriel proved to be a tonic to the more recalcitrant elements of Berryman’s character. Unfortunately long periods of separation from her during the Second World War, at times, diminished her positive influence.89

Berryman had married the ‘love of his life’ and his formal inclusion into the Whipp family drew him closer to his new in-laws. The Whipp family business which expanded during the early 1920s and provided the catalyst allowing Muriel to indulge in her socially expansive life style also formed an important part of Frank and Muriel Berryman’s financial support network. Berryman had already enjoyed the firm support of Muriel’s parents during their courtship and now they were married he and Muriel delved into property investment with her family. Soon, at the behest of Muriel’s father, the new couple owned a block of land in Manly and a part interest in a number of other properties.90

Berryman’s new found domestic bliss and financial security was also commensurate with the recognition that he was receiving in his professional career. In many ways a posting in Sydney, far away from Army Headquarters in Melbourne, could have been disadvantageous but Berryman’s dedication to his profession did not go unnoticed by both his immediate superiors and the army high command. In October of 1923 he passed his military subject ‘B’ for promotion to captain and subject ‘C’ for major the following year. In his annual confidential reports, for his period as IOO at Sydney, Berryman was described as a ‘conscientious, even tempered and self-reliant’ officer who ‘possesses tact’ as well as the ‘ability to inspire others’. While he may have battled at times with his emotions in his personal life during this period, on a strictly

89 For a discussion of the importance of this style of relationship and its influences see David Ellis, ‘Biography: Writing biography a colloquium’, Meridian, Vol. 16, No. 2, October 1997, p. 140-162, p. 151-152. For an more in depth analysis of the importance of personal relationships see, Jefferson A. Singer, ‘Characteristic Adaptations: Personal strivings and Defenses’, Personality and Psychotherapy, (Guilford Press, New York, 2005). Singer argues that ‘universal longings for home and romantic love that live in man are heightened by deprivations of war…’ p. 48 90 See ‘James Henry Whipp to Frank & Muriel Berryman’, 14 December 1926 & 14 February 1927, BFP. Berryman’s marriage is also reflective of the strong feminine influences on his life. This can be traced through this mother, his school teachers (see Chapter 2) and finally Muriel. Muriel had a major impact on Berryman during their courtship and her strong personality had a profound effect on his views and behaviour throughout the rest of his life. See correspondence Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, Berryman Family Papers, also interviews with Ann Wills (nee Berryman) & Richard Berryman. 129 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

professional level one of his outstanding qualities was, according to General Brand, his ‘strength of character’.91 It was on the basis of these qualities that Berryman embarked on the next phrase of his military service which was to confirm him as one of the rising stars in Australia’s inter-war army.

Imperial Service Australia’s experience during the First World War reaffirmed the close military relationship that had been established between Australia and the Empire after federation. As a result of the 1907 Imperial conference the Commonwealth Military Forces formally adopted the British military system and the new Australian Commonwealth headquarters staff became the ‘Australian Section’ of the newly created Imperial General Staff at the in London. As a result staff procedures for the Australian military replicated those laid down by the British military, but the small size of the Australian army and the lack of opportunities for the development of senior officers meant that Australia relied heavily upon the British army to provide specialist training.92

The principal avenue for the training of British officers for staff work and senior command was the Staff College located at Camberley, outside London, and Quetta in North West India (now in Pakistan). As early as the Crimean War the British military recognised that it had serious deficiencies in the training of senior staff officers. As a result the Duke of Cambridge was instrumental in establishing the ‘Staff College’ in 1858.93 The course for officers of the rank of captain or major was of two years duration and by the 1920s it was designed to give students an insight into the ‘nature of operational orders’ and the ‘cold analysis of the consequences of … movements in theory … [and] of the administrative difficulties involved’.94

As it was imperative that all officers received the same training throughout the British Empire, the War Office reserved a small number of places at Staff College for dominion officers. The first Australian selected for the Staff College at Camberley was

91 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers - Frank Berryman 6 June 1924, 14 May 1925, 18 June 1926 & 14 May 1927’, Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA, B2455,. 92 Horner, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief, p. 15. 93 F. W. Young, The Story of the Staff College 1858-1958, (Gale and Polden, London, 1958), p. 1. 94 A.R. Goodwin-Austen, The Staff and the Staff College, (Constable, London, 1927), p. 288. 130 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Captain Cyril , who went on to become a full General and Australia’s senior staff officer during the Great War and Chief of the General Staff (1920-1923).95 White’s success in his course at Camberley marked him out for advancement to a senior position in the Australia military and established ‘training at a higher defence college in England or India as an essential rung on the career ladder in the Australian permanent army’.96

Similarly for Berryman selection for Staff College, the ‘Mecca of military students’, was the key to a successful career.97 Competition among the small inter-war staff corps was fierce with many of his fellow classmates making claims by having similar or indeed more highly regarded qualifications and wartime experience. Berryman did benefit from his additional training at the Artillery College Woolwich in 1921-22; however the key to his successful application was the completion of the entrance examination. The exam, however, was a strenuous undertaking and finding time to study was of course difficult, especially given his full-time position at Victoria Barracks as well as study at Sydney University.

The entrance exam caused trouble for a number of Australian officers, many of the early candidates failing and had to be given an exemption to attend the course. Thomas Blamey became the first Australian officer to pass in 1911. The exam consisted of eight three hour papers covering a diverse range of topics which included foreign languages, political economy, chemistry, physics, the history of British India and movements by road and rail, as well as the basic subject areas of “training for war”, organisation and administration, and imperial organisation.98

The test was extensive and a failure would place a young officer’s career at risk. Horace Robertson, one class ahead of Berryman at RMC, devoted ‘most of the preceding

95 C. E. W. Bean, Two Men I Knew: William Bridges and Brudenell White: Founders of the A.I.F., (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1954), see also J. Beaumont (ed), ‘White, General Sir Cyril Brudenell Bingham (1876-1940)’, Australian Defence: Sources and Statistics, p. 162-163; Guy Verney, ‘General Sir Brudenell White’ in David Horner (ed) The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984), p. 26-43. 96 Verney, ‘General Sir Brudenell White’, p. 28. 97 ‘F.H. Berryman to Muriel Whipp, circa 1926’, Berryman Family Papers. 98 Jeffrey Grey, Australian Brass: The career of Lieutenant General Sir Horace Robertson, (Cambridge University Press, Victoria, 1992) p. 54. 131 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

twelve months working towards the examination’ to ensure that he gained entry for the 1923 intake.99 Berryman gave himself just two and a half months to prepare.100

Full-time work, part time study, a new wife and preparation for the Staff College exam placed an inordinate amount of stress on Berryman and he eventually admitted to Muriel that he had ‘taken on to much’.101 As a result he abandoned his studies at the University of Sydney. Added to this already heavy load was the news of his mother’s illness for which he was granted compassionate leave in order to visit her in Box Hill.102

Berryman worked hard at his military studies and although, the individual results of his entrance examination have been lost, he was one of only two of the eighteen officers who sat for the exam in Australia who passed. The staggering 72 per cent failure rate provides an indication of the difficulty of the exams. The Australian result, however, was comparable to the overall effort of the British and Commonwealth forces that recorded a 74 per cent failure rate. The worst performance was made by the British Cavalry Corps with 94 per cent of its candidates not achieving the minimum standard. The best results came from the more technically minded British Corps; signals, tank, artillery and engineers.103 A few months after the Examinations (March 1926) the Army announced that Brevet Major F. H. Berryman and Brevet Major J. J. D. McCall were selected for the course commencing at Camberley in 1927.104

Berryman’s selection for Staff College was recognition by the Army that he was an officer marked out for continued advancement and fitted to a senior role in the future. By 1927, eight RMC graduates had been selected for positions at Staff College. Berryman’s selection can, in relative terms of career progression, be favourably compared to contemporaries such as fellow classmate, George Vasey who qualified for the course starting at Quetta in 1928 and Sydney Rowell, a 1911 RMC entrant who

99 Ibid. 100 ‘F. H. Berryman to Muriel Whipp, circa 1926’, Berryman Family Papers. 101 Ibid. 102 ‘F.H. Berryman, Australian Army Service Record’, 1917-1942 NAA, B1538. 103 ‘Army School of Instructional Establishment: Staff College: Allotment of vacancies by competition’, Public Record Office London (PRO), WO 32/3090. A total of 447 candidates sat for the examination across the Empire with only 34 candidates attaining the minimum required marks. 104 ‘Defence. Military College Camberley.’, Letter 17 September 1926 & 22 November 1926 ‘Governor General to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs’, NAA A458 C337/9. 132 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

entered Staff College in 1925.105 Berryman’s relative ‘rank’ position in attendance at Camberley was also well ahead of many of his other fellow Staff Corps and RMC officers such as Leslie Beavis (1929), Edward Milford (1930) and John Chapman (1931).106 By the end of 1926 Frank Berryman had firmly placed his foot on the ladder of advancement in a small peace-time army.

A student at Camberley Frank and Muriel Berryman travelled to London in November of 1926. The College was situated next to the Royal Military College, Sandhurst and the Berrymans took a pleasant yet modest villa in the town only a few minutes ride away. Unlike the pre-war candidates from Australia, Berryman did not find himself in a ‘completely new world’.107 He had had considerable experience with the British military during the First World War and he had attended a number of courses at British Army instructional camps, including eighteen months at the Royal Artillery College, Woolwich. With a new wife eager to engage in the social life of Camberley, and with Frank holding an established and well respected war record, the Berryman’s found it relatively easy to adjust to their new surroundings. For Muriel however the greatest difficulty was the long term separation from her much loved family back in Sydney.

The traditional two year course for officers at the Staff College Camberley was reinstituted at the end of the First World War. The students were divided into the junior (1st Year) and senior (2nd year) divisions with approximately sixty students in each year and twenty instructional staff. The first year at the college was devoted to staff work based at the divisional headquarters level. The program also included outdoor exercises, discussion groups and formal written papers. Most of the work was carried out, for both years, in small syndicates where the students took turns carrying out the different staff duties for the scenarios that they were presented with by the instructional staff. These syndicates could be as small as two students or as big as twelve. The emphasis on syndicates was essential for teaching ‘team work, and … loyal[ty] to each other; two

105 ‘Prime Minister to Governor General- Staff College Camberley’, 10 October 1927, NAA 11804/1 RE. For Major Vasey’s posting to Quetta see Rowel, Full Circle, p. 24-25. 106 ‘Defence. Military College. Camberley.’, NAA A458 C337/9. 107 Horner, Blamey, p. 17. 133 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

necessities towards good army staff work’.108 The course also included a number of field trips, in first year this meant visits to four instructional schools, a week in mountain warfare and a four day staff tour.

Figure 4.1 ‘With a new wife eager to engage in the social life of Camberley and with Frank holding an established and well respected war record the Berrymans found it relatively easy to adjust to their new surroundings’. The Gates at Staff College Camberley, winter 1928 (Berryman Family Archive)

In the second year at Camberley the students moved into large scale operations and planning. The syndicate structure was maintained, additional students from the navy and airforce joined the course and field trips were made to naval bases, munitions factories and to mainland Europe for the ‘Foreign Battlefields Tour’. One of the highlights for the students was ‘when small parties of students were given money to go to France and Belgium in order to study some battle of their choosing, and then write a full report on it’.109 The students also received attachments to various British army units for summer exercises.

Despite this diversity in its curriculum, the Staff College course at Camberley had its critics. One senior RAF officer, Sir John Slessor, accused it of being concerned

108 ‘Papers of Major-General Douglas Wimberley’, London (IWM), PP/MCR/182, Reel 1, Memoirs, p. 223. Wimberley was a student at Staff College 1926-1927. 109 Ibid. 134 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

with ‘fighting the 1914-1918 war, with hunting and with living in a “fools paradise”’,110 thoughts echoed by the Australian militia officer Major-General Gordon Bennett even though he never attended the college.111 Certainly, as David French argues, the prevailing orthodox view of the British Army in the inter-war period was that it ‘turned [its] back on [the] hard won experiences’ of the First World War and returned ‘to the cosy familiarities of colonial soldiering’.112 Another criticism levelled specifically at the Staff College course at Camberley was that it lacked value for ‘an Australian application’.113

Certainly some aspects of the course at Camberley remained old fashioned as did some of its social mores and rituals. The memoirs of two of Berryman’s contemporaries at Camberley, C. H. Miller and Douglas Wimberley spend as much time describing their social life, especially the ‘Drag Hunt’ as they do reflecting on military theory or the standard of instruction that they received.114 While in 1927 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff lamented that the ‘standard of education at the Staff College since the war may be below average … owing to the fact that [a number of] the most promising young officers were killed during the war’.115

Historians could well qualify David French’s claims. As one of the Australian students in 1923 Sydney Rowell attested, both the instructors and the students were firmly committed to ‘the correct tactical doctrine for the war of the future rather than the war of the past’.116 The second year of the syllabus dealt with combined arms operations with the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force and included ‘lectures, many by distinguished people both inside and outside the service … war games and many visits

110 Sir John Slessor, The Central Blue, p.83-100, as quoted in J. M. McCarthy, ‘Australia and Imperial Defence: Co-operation and Conflict 1918-1939’, Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 17, No.1, April 1971, p. 23. 111 A. B. Lodge, ‘Lieutenant-General Henry Gordon Bennett: A Model Major-General?’, Horner (ed), The Commanders, p. 171. 112 David French, ‘Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2, 2001, p. 497. 113 J. M. McCarthy, ‘Australia and Imperial Defence: Co-operation and Conflict 1918-1939’, p. 23. Certainly a heavy emphasis was placed upon warfare in a European context and its application to the Pacific theatre would, in many respects, be questionable. 114 ‘Papers of Major-General Douglas Wimberley’, IWM, PP/MCR/182, Reel 1, Memoirs, & ‘Papers of Major-General C. H. Miller’, Diary 1928-1930, IWM, 78/20/4. 115 ‘CIGS Response to General Ironside’, Staff College: Report on higher education for war by General Ironside and reorganisation of Senior Division at Staff College, PRO, WO 32/4840. 116 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 26. 135 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

to army field formations and the establishments of other services’.117 These were activities that could hardly be described as 1914-1918 thinking.

Nor could the tactical doctrine at Staff College, based as it was on the British Field Service Regulations (FSR) be described as rooted in the ideas of 1914-1918. By 1924 the new FSRs, among other things, emphasised ‘close-co-operations between all arms’ and ‘the development of combined fire plan[s] … for attacking troops’.118 Meanwhile as early as 1919 the Director of Staff Duties was requested by the Staff College Camberley to produce training pamphlets on the use of ‘tanks, smoke, gas, aircraft and machine guns in open warfare’.119 Staff College was also used as a ‘think- tank’ where students were required to ‘consider and discuss … problems of tactics, organisation, etc …’ that could be ‘passed on for testing on the ground’ and student syndicates were asked to consider in their final essays ‘ideas about the future conduct of war’.120

One of the most important elements in the education that the students received at the Staff College was the thoughts, ideas and interpretations of tactics and doctrine provided by staff.121 In the 1920s the College’s instructional staff included some of the finest thinkers on military theory in the inter-war period as well as a selection of officers who went on to command at the highest level during the Second World War. They included renowned military thinker and commentator J. F .C. Fuller, Alan Brooke (Chief of imperial General Staff, WWII) and Bernard L. Montgomery. The latter two were referred to by Sydney Rowell as ‘brilliant intellects’.122

During Berryman’s time at Camberley he benefited not only from Brooke and Montgomery’s instruction but also other talented instructors including, Lt-Colonel Richard O’Connor, later Commander of the in North Africa

117 Ibid. 118 David French, ‘Doctrine and Organization in the British Army, 1919-1932’, p. 505. 119 Ibid, p. 506. 120 ‘Staff College Regulations, Camberley, 1921’, PRO, WO 32/3098,. See also J. Grey, The Australian Army, p. 95. Grey notes that ‘Contrary to popular belief the British Army was in the vanguard in thinking about and developing armoured forces during much of the inter-war period.’ See also Gordon Corrigan, Blood, Sweat and Arrogance: and the Myths of Churchill’s War, (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 2006), chapters 1 and 2. 121 For a list of Staff and students at the college each year see Owl Pie (Journal of Staff College Camberley), 1927 & 1928, British Library, P.P. 4004.db. 122 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 26. 136 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

(1940) and Officer Commanding-in-Chief, British Troops in Egypt, 1941. Major- General Wimberley who attended the college in the year ahead of Berryman regarded all of his ‘teachers … [as] very able men’ pointing out that a position as an instructor at Staff College ‘was regarded as the most highly thought of appointment in all the army’.123

Just as important were the relationships forged amongst the students. Wimberley believed that ‘we learnt almost as much from each other as we did from our teachers’.124 Berryman also reminisced in later years on his time as Staff College. It was he recalled: … a wonderful experience to meet officers from all arms and services of the British and Indian Armies and from all the who had served in the many different theatres of the First World War, and to study problems together. I did not realise how little I knew and how much there was to learn – and what a disadvantage Australian Regular Officers were at in peace-time, with no Regular Army to train and no annual manoeuvres.125

While historian John McCarthy professed doubts about the application of the teaching at Camberley to Australian officers, to Frank Berryman this was overcome by the fact that: At the Staff College we were trained in a common school of thought. The advantage of this was that in war we had the same doctrine of tactics and administration, which was essential if we were to work together. More than that, the officers who had to carry out their duties in co-operation formations knew each other personally.126

Such a situation produced great dividends for the Australian Army in both the Middle East and the Pacific theatres in the coming war.

During Berryman’s time at Staff College the British High Command were also experimenting with changing the nature of the course and the possibility of splitting the senior class into two divisions based on merit and ability. The theory being similar to the classical debates about selective schooling or selected streaming in schools. The

123 ‘Papers of Major-General Douglas Wimberley’, IWM PP/MCR/182, Reel 1, Memoirs, p. 224. 124 Ibid, p. 227. 125 Frank H. Berryman, as quoted by ‘Half Track’, Bulletin, 22 March 1961. See also D. Horner, High Command, p. 5-6. 126 Frank H. Berryman, as quoted by ‘Half Track’, Bulletin, 22 March 1961 137 THE BITTER SWEET YEARS

scheme was trialled with the senior divisions on a limited number of occasions in 1927 with the idea of introducing it into the College in Berryman’s year. However the trials proved unpopular with the staff and students for a number of reasons and the idea was shelved. It serves, however, to point out that the British High command was willing to experiment with innovative ideas not just with the syllabus but also the structure of the college if they believed it would have tangible results for the quality of education they were providing.127

Part of Berryman’s responsibilities while at Camberley was to provide a report to the Army Headquarters in Melbourne at the end of each term as well as submitting his final major essay from the course. It is unfortunate that neither Berryman’s nor his classmate J. J. McCall’s reports or essays survived.128 The only surviving documents relating to Berryman’s time at Camberley are his confidential reports written by the commandant, Major-General C. W. Gwynn, whom Berryman had last seen while he was one of the senior instructors at Duntroon prior to the First World War. Gwynn comments that he had the ‘highest opinion’ of Berryman and found him to ‘possess a considerable strength of character’. He was ‘popular with and commanded the respect of his fellow students … [would be suitable as] either a staff officer or a commander … [and was] completely devoted to the interests of his service’. Gwynn and the staff,

Figure 4.2 ‘Just as important were the relationships forged amongst the students. Wimberley believed that ‘we learnt almost as much from each other as we did from our teachers’. Frank and Muriel Berryman’s European Tour, 1928129

127 See, ‘Staff College: Report on higher education for war by General Ironside and reorganisation of Senior Division at Staff College’, PRO WO 32/4840 & ‘Staff Conference as the Staff College, 1927 & PRO WO 279/60, Staff Conference as the Staff College, 1928’, PRO WO 279/57. 128‘Register- Colleges Imperial & B1538 Berryman, F.H. 1917-1942’, NAA B1531, 435/3. 129 Frank and Muriel Berryman were able to spend the long mid term break from Staff College touring both the British Isles and Europe. Surviving photographs show the Berryman’s in France, Switzerland 138 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

(Berryman Family Archive) however, only rated Berryman as a class C or average student and also noted that he was ‘naturally highly strung … does not push himself … and might have done even better if he had not been almost over anxious’.130

At the beginning of the decade Berryman’s career, under pressure from low pay, poor conditions and a general neglect of the army by both the government and the community brought with it a sense of dislocation and bitterness. These difficulties were exacerbated by the degree of emotional turmoil surrounding Berryman’s life at this time. However by the close of the 1920s his prospects changed significantly. He found domestic security and happiness with his marriage to Muriel Whipp and this secure sense of self manifested itself in a new direction for his career that guaranteed a position of prominence, even in a small and under-funded Staff Corps. As Berryman’s time at Camberley came to an end he must have felt confident of his career and family for both the immediate and long term future.

and Belgium. This photography is from a 1928 trip and it includes Mrs Galloway. Mrs Galloway and her husband, Wing Commander Galloway, accompanied the Berryman’s on a number such holidays. 130 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman 2 March 1928, 1 December 1928, 12 April 1929’, Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA, B2455. 139 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

Chapter 5

‘Hard work and friends in high places’

Depression, Rearmament, and Resentment 1929-1939

The term ‘Depression’ is hopelessly inadequate to convey the magnitude of the disaster… the economic malaise paralysed government and threatened the social fabric. Yet it is with this beguilingly simple term that the emergency was understood and its remedy debated. Stuart Macintyre, ‘Succeeding Age 1901-1942’, Vol 4. The Oxford History of Australia

Australia’s man in London In 1929, following his two years at the Staff College, Berryman received the only other overseas posting available to an officer of his level in the Australian Army, as a staff officer at the Australian High Commission in London.1 Here Berryman came under the command of the Australian Miliary Liaison Officer, Major-General Julius Bruche and the Australian High Commissioner, Major-General .2 While his position consisted of mostly routine administration, there were considerable benefits, both politically and career wise, to be gained from remaining in London.

One of the greatest benefits for Berryman and his fellow officers who attended Staff College in either Camberley or Quetta were the networks they established among fellow officers from across the Empire. For Berryman this networking was not only beneficial from an Imperial perspective but also for his career in the Australian Army. With a limited number of Australian officers posted to Camberley, the Australian High Commission or the Imperial Defence College (IDC) in London, it was almost guaranteed that these officers would remain in contact on either a social and/or professional level. Without establishing connections of military patronage a middle ranking officer’s career could easily stall. An officer’s career path was not just set by his professional competence but also by being ‘noticed’ and supported by his superiors who were, themselves, on the rise in the army’s hierarchy. In London Berryman was lucky

1 ‘Minute, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, despatch No.142, Military Officers in England at Australia House’, NAA, A11458, 1929-1939. For a discussion on Australia House see Olwen Pryke, ‘Australia House: a little Australia in London’, JAS: Australia's Public Intellectual Forum, No. 84, 2005, p. 163-171, 254-256. 2 Major-General Bruche was appointed on 5 April 1929, see ‘Minute, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 20 February 1929’, Military Officers in England at Australia House, NAA, A11458. 140 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

enough to either develop or revisit contacts that were to provide a key to his career progression over the next decade.

The first of these contacts was Major General Julius Bruche, Berryman’s immediate superior in London. Berryman established both a close personal and professional relationship with Bruche during his time in London. In reviewing Berryman’s performance at Australia House, Bruche noted that Berryman was an officer of ‘high integrity … [,] great zeal [and] professional attainments of a high standard’. Besides his ‘special knowledge gained in connection with his artillery and specialist training … [his] persona grata with the officers in the War Office, at Woolwich, and the various branches outside meant that he was of the very greatest value in every way’.3 Bruche’s assessment of Berryman’s capabilities carried more weight than a review carried out by most commanding officers. Soon after he finished this report on Berryman he left England to take up the post as the Australian Chief of the General Staff (CGS).

Another officer whom Berryman almost certainly renewed contact with during his time in England was Colonel J. D. Lavarack. Lavarack attended the Imperial Defence College (IDC) during Berryman’s time at Camberley. Both these officers served together in the 4th FAB during the First World War and they formed a close professional relationship during the late 1930s and the early years of the Second World War. This professional connection and personal friendship ensured that Berryman maintained contacts at the highest level of the Army’s command structure during the inter-war period. Lavarack returned to Australia from the IDC to be appointed director of Military Operations, followed by Commandant of RMC and eventually CGS in 1935.4 From 1930-1939 both Chiefs of the Australian General Staff worked closely with Berryman at different stages of his career and both held him in the highest regard both professionally and personally.

The other two senior officers to serve in London at the same time as Berryman and with whom he was to form a close and influential relationship were Lieutenant-

3 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman 3 July 1930’, Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455. 4 ‘Lavarack, Lieutenant- General John Dudley’, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 339-340. 141 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

Colonels, Henry Douglas Wynter and Vernon Sturdee.5 These four officers had an important impact on Berryman’s career and his personal friendships with them allowed him to become drawn into the inner circle of the Army’s high command in the years leading up to the Second World War.

Figure 5.0 ‘In London Berryman was lucky enough to either develop or revisit contacts that were to prove to be decisive to his career progression over the next decade’ Berryman at the Anzac Day service, London 1931 (Berryman Family Archive)6

The other major benefit of Berryman’s posting to London was the continuation of his contacts with the British military. As the chief staff officer to Bruche in London Berryman was regularly in contact with senior British army officers and was thus privy to the latest developments in British military tactics and doctrine. This close relationship

5 Wynter completed the course at the IDC in 1930. In 1935 he became the Director of Military Training and was to become the centre of a high level military inquiry in the later 1930s during which time he was a close friend and confidant of the Berryman’s. The Berrymans became so close to the Wynters that they asked be the godfather to their daughter, Ann. See Correspondence ‘Douglas Wynter to F. H. Berryman’, circa 1937-1939, Berryman Family Papers. ‘Ann Wills to Author’, 12 September 2005. Sturdee was the Australian representative to the War Office from 1929 to 1931 and he attended the IDC in 1932 before returning to Australia to occupy the post of Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, then Director of Staff Duties. He was to later serve as the CGS during World War II. ‘WYNTER, Lieutenant- General ’, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 682. ‘STURDEE, Lieutenant- General Vernon Ashton ’, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 573-574. 6 Left to Right: Major-General Sir Granville Ryrie, Lieutenant Commander Fyrer, Major F.H Berryman, Squadron Leader Morsden, Sir Thomas Wilford (New Zealand High Commissioner), Captain Jess, Colonel Brett (background). 142 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

also allowed Berryman to participate in a number of British Army exercises that exposed him to the type of professional experience that was not available to officers stationed back in Australia. Furthermore as part of the staff of the Australian military representative to the War Office and the Imperial General Staff in London, Berryman was privy to the latest and highest level confidential military strategies and policies of both the Australian and British governments. He was, therefore, able to gain valuable experience in diplomatic relations between the allies and in the dealings of military policy at the highest echelon.

On a personal level Berryman and Muriel established a happy home and settled into the routine of work and social activities both at Camberley and later in London. They did, however, miss their family and friends back in Australia. The tyranny of distance that separated the young couple from their families was especially hard for Berryman during their first two years in London. Soon after their arrival, in December 1926, the news came of the death of Berryman’s mother. While he had in many ways distanced himself from the family in Melbourne he had remained in contact with his mother. She had always been thankful for ‘the kind letters’ that he sent and she never failed to remind Frank of the high regard she held him as a son.7 Berryman’s loss of his mother was compounded by the death of his father less than two years later as he neared graduation from Staff College.

While Berryman’s family news from home brought only sadness during these years, the prolific pen of Muriel’s parents provided at least some comfort. The Whipp’s sent a constant stream of letters containing news of family and financial matters but undoubtedly the most well received letter was the one containing the news of Muriel’s parent’s visit to London. The cost of travel to London during the 1920s was prohibitive and beyond the reach of average Australians, however, James Whipp’s prudent investments provided the financial security and necessary wealth for the very expensive cost of their travel to the United Kingdom in 1927.8

7 ‘Anne Jane Berryman to Frank Berryman’, 13 May 1926 & 27 August 1926, Berryman Family Papers. 8 ‘Mr. & Mrs. Whipp to Muriel and Berry’, Undated letter (circa December 1926), Berryman Family Papers. 143 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

While a visit from Muriel’s parents certainly helped to alleviate the sense of separation that the Berrymans felt while in London they were both set on establishing a solid social network during their stay. Muriel easily found her feet among the social set in Camberley. Staff College, with its generous holidays, set routine and active mess life, provided ample opportunities for her to make new friends and continue the social activities that she had come to love in Sydney during the early 1920s. Muriel’s social persona also undeniably helped Berryman to establish contacts within the British Army during this time.9 Camberley provided opportunities for Muriel and Berryman to mix with British officers from the more prestigious British regiments and those officers from the higher echelons of British society. Such contacts proved exceptionally advantageous and in July 1926 Muriel found herself on the guest list of a garden party with none other than Her Majesty the Queen Mary at .10

Despite a family visit and a full social calendar the separation from Australia and her family was a heavy burden for Muriel to endure. With the news of Berryman’s posting to the Australian High Commission in London, Muriel took the opportunity to travel back to Australia. She returned to London in late 1929 but only for a matter of months. After her return Muriel announced that she was pregnant and soon after it was decided that it would be wise for her to return home to her parents for the birth of their first child. Berryman’s posting to London meant that he did not see his daughter Ann, who was born on the 2 January 1931, until she was almost eighteen months old.11 The Berryman clan, however, expanded in the coming years. Sadly Frank and Muriel’s second child, Sally, was still-born in 1933.12 Events such as these can be devastating for some families and cause them to refrain from trying for more children. Frank and Muriel recovered from their great personal loss and in 1935 were rewarded with a son, Richard, who completed their family.

9 Berryman was regarded as an officer who was ‘well liked’ by his fellow students and he made some very valuable contacts. He did not, however, have the same impact on the College that he had while at Duntroon. At Camberley, unlike Duntroon, he does not figure at all in the student publication nor did he seem to make his presence felt in a number of sporting, social or academic areas. Perhaps the high level of competition at Camberley and his status as a Dominion Officer precluded him from having a more significant impact. See Owl Pie (Journal of Staff College Camberley), 1927 & 1928, British Library, P.P. 4004.db. 10 Invitation, ‘Lord Chamberlain to Mrs. F. H. Berryman’, July 1926, Berryman Family Papers. 11 Correspondence ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 1929, Berryman Family Papers; Interview, Ann Wills (nee Berryman), March 2004. 12 Ann Willis to author, 19 June 2005. 144 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

The turn of the new decade brought sadness to Berryman’s life with the first extended separation from his wife, and joy at the announcement of his impending first born. On a professional level, however, events were proving to be less than reassuring. Berryman’s time at Australia house was beset by a number of problems. Two months after his appointment to the High Commission the collapse of the Wall Street stock market heralded the onset of one of the greatest depressions in world history. Along with the devastating social effects that the depression had on Australian life it also caused a further strain on an already under-funded and neglected defence force.

The Scullin Labor government looked to cut spending in every area of service and in 1930 they sent P. E. Coleman, the Chairman of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Joint Committee on Public Accounts, to report on the organization of the High Commission in London. Coleman’s report noted that there were a number of areas in defence that could be streamlined to save costs. Coleman pointed out that the other Dominions did not maintain an Army representative in London and that a substantial cost could also be saved by the return of the Australian liaison officer at the War Officer (Lieutenant-Colonel V. Sturdee). Coleman recommended that both these officers should be returned (at a saving of over £2,500 per year in wages and travel expenses) and that a military clerk be attached to the High Commission staff on a salary of only £500.13 The same recommendation was made in regard to the navy and airforce representatives.14

In the end the government decided to abolish individual service representation at Australia house and appointed a single ‘Defence Liaison Officer’, Mr Thomas Trumble,

13 The Report noted that Major Berryman was currently on a salary of £920. 14 ‘Report upon the Organisation of the High Commissioner’s Officer, London and the activities associated therewith by Mr P. E. Coleman’, London, 14 August 1930, NAA AA1927/341 202. Major- General Bruche, the Army representative put up a spirited defence claiming that his role would exist even if the Australian High Commission did not. However Coleman’s recommendations carried weight especially as the High Commissioner was a major-general and the government believed that he could act in the capacity of military representative as well. The changes did, however, come slowly. Bruche was not replaced in his position when he returned to Australia to take up the position as CGS. Major Beavis replaced Sturdee when the later moved over to his course at the IDC. However, Berryman was retained longer than usual in his post, most likely to save the high cost of sending a replacement officer to London. See, ‘Minute, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 30 December 1930’, Military Officers in England at Australia House, NAA A11458/22. See also ‘Papers of Major-General Leslie Beavis’, AWM PR 91/009. After the announcement of the inquiry into Australia House Beavis was very skeptical about receiving his posting there in 1931. (See Correspondence: ‘L. Beavis to his Mother’ 26th October 1930’) Beavis also notes in a later letter (7 December 1930) how he wished to stay in London due to both the financial and professional benefits of service in England at the time. 145 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

a former Secretary of the Department of Defence, on 14 March 1931.15 One of the consequences of Bruche’s return and Trumble’s appointment was that in the last few months of his time in London, Berryman was the senior army liaison officer to both the High Commissioner and the British War Office.16 Berryman’s excellent service led Trumble to cable the Secretary of the Department of Defence that he regarded him as an ‘experienced officer worthy of special note’.17

As Berryman’s time in London drew to a close the effects of the depression on the already depleted Australian army gave him cause to consider his position in the military. London offered up a number of opportunities and now with prospects in Australia bleak, to say the least, Berryman was given an opportunity to pursue his career in an environment that promised not only higher wages but greater opportunities – the British Indian Army. It seems that while an unnamed British General18 was ‘pushing it hard’19 Berryman found the thought of leaving the Australian Army too great a challenge despite the fact that it would have almost certainly have lead to greater professional prospects. The number of negative outcomes for this move in the end proved too persuasive.

First and foremost amongst these was his family. As Berryman concluded to Muriel in letter just before his return to Australia, the transfer would see him having to spend ‘over half my time in India … and see very little of Ann & not so much of you’. Berryman concluded that ‘we have been apart quite enough now’ and while India

15‘High Commissioner, London, Annual Report 1931’, NAA A461/9, C348/1/6. This report also notes that Berryman attended all of the meetings of the Principle Supply Officers Committee, Supply Board and War Book sub-Committee with Trumble and that his ‘technical knowledge has been of much assistance’. See also Eric Andrews, The Department of Defence: The Australian Centenary of Defence, Volume V, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001), p. 73. 16 Berryman’s networking amongst the British Army and his interaction with British officers went to the very highest level. In one of the surviving letters from this time a senior British Officer at the War Office wrote to Berryman expressing his disappointment at not being able to see Berryman one last time and that if he did ‘he would have asked you to come say goodbye to the CIGS (Chief of the Imperial General Staff) as I knew him to be always pleased to see you’. See ‘Letter to F. H. Berryman 4 January 1932’, Papers of Lt-General F.H. Berryman, 1918-1938, AWM PR 84/370, Item 10. 17 ‘Memorandum Mr T. Trumble, Defence Liaison Officer, Australia House to The Secretary, Department of Defence, Melbourne, 29 December, 1931’, Papers of Lt-General F.H. Berryman, 1918-1938, AWM PR84/370, Item 10. 18 This may have been Major-General Gwynn who had been Berryman’s instructor at both Duntroon and more recently Staff College with whom Berryman remain in regular contact with during his posting to London. See Correspondence ‘Major-General Gwynn to Major F. H. Berryman’, Berryman Family Papers. 19 ‘F. H. Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, undated correspondence, circa late 1931, Berryman Family Papers. 146 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

offered the chance at ‘Big wars yes but now with you & Ann I am not so keen on looking for rebel bullets in the back or diseases & germs which India abounds’. Having made his decision and ‘burnt all [his] bridges to the British Army’ Berryman felt ‘glad that I am still an Australian [and] a little guilty at the thought of slipping away from my own regiment just when its fortunes were at the lowest ebb’. The other overriding motivating factor was his sense of duty and patriotism to Australia. Berryman was ‘ashamed… [by] so many things that are done and said in Australia … at the moment’ and this was ‘all the more reason for those of us with sound ideas to stick to our country to which we owe everything’.20

In January 1932 one year after the birth of his daughter Ann, Berryman finally relinquished his position at Australia house and made his way back to his family and home. Originally he had been slated to go to Army Headquarters on the staff of his former boss and now CGS in Australia, Major-General Bruche. However it was decided that in terms of his professional development it was much more important that he have some contact with troops in Australia.21 The only possible position available for Australian Staff Officers offering contact with troops was with an attachment to Australia’s part-time citizen forces, the Militia. On his return to Australia Berryman was posted as Brigade Major of the 14th Australian Infantry Brigade located in the Sydney suburb of Marrickville. It was the same posting with which Berryman ended his career in the AIF with some fourteen years before.

Berryman returned to an Australian military in a grave situation. Not one of the problems or issues that arose for the Army or the Staff Corps during the 1920s had been adequately addressed and the onset of the depression, in October 1929, led to a further reduction in the army’s already poor capabilities and the opportunities available to the permanent staff. The cuts that Berryman felt in the High Commission in London were but the tip of the iceberg in comparison to what happened back home in Australia. The end of the universal training scheme also saw a reduction in Militia numbers from 47,931 to 27,454 in just one year, while the financial pressure created by reduction in

20 Ibid. 21Major Berryman, D.S.O. in ‘Australians in Europe’, The British and Australian and New Zealander, November 5, 1931. A special note of thanks goes to Associate Professor Bruce Scates who collected these citations during his research for his book Return to Gallipoli: Walking the Battlefields of the Great War, (Cambridge, Melbourne, 2006). 147 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

the defence vote led to yet another round of personnel cuts with the number of permanent staff falling from 1,748 to 1,556 between 1929 and 1931.22

The lack of interest in defence matters and the financial pressure of the Depression meant that in 1931 the Defence Minister, Senator John Daly, ‘actually toyed with handing the RAN back to Britain, [and] amalgamating the Army and RAAF’.23 The funding cuts hit not just training and staffing, but pay and conditions as well. Staff corps officers were made to take eight weeks leave without pay or work the equivalent of a four day paid week and the Royal Military College at Duntroon was closed and moved to Victoria Barracks in Sydney.24 To compound these difficulties the Scullin government reiterated the government’s support of the Singapore Strategy and confirmed the Army’s role as restricted to the ‘defence of ports and harbours against raids’.25 In the estimation of one officer, the Australian Army had hit ‘rock bottom’.26

With no ‘permanent’ army in Australia, until the formation of the small Darwin Mobile Force in 1928, the militia provided the only field force available to the military during the inter-war period and at the time of Berryman’s posting in 1932 it was the victim of over a decade of neglect. The restrictive environment of the 1920s lead to an almost criminal disregard of the military and this poor state of military preparedness was now compounded by a world depression. The administrative and training problems that Berryman now faced, as the principle staff officer of the 14th Infantry Brigade, were of an almost insurmountable nature.

The equipment for the 14th Infantry Brigade, like militia units, consisted only of the surplus brought back by the AIF in 1919, most of which was either worn out or obsolete. There were no modern signals, anti-aircraft or fire control systems available and even if they had existed there was little that could have been achieved with the men required to attend only six days continuous and six days home training a year.27 The

22 Long, To Benghazi, p. 14. 23 Andrews, The Defence Department, p. 74. 24 Long, To Benghazi, p. 14; Grey, The Military History of Australia, p. 133; Rowell, Full Circle, p. 29. The 1930 graduating class at RMC consisted of just twelve officers with four being sent to the British Army and four to the RAAF, leaving just four to supplement the dwindling number of Staff Corps officers. 25Grey, The Military History of Australia, p. 133 26 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 30. 27 Grey, The Military History of Australia, p. 134. 148 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

other major issues facing the Militia included: high turnover rates, frequent absences, unsympathetic employers and operating strengths that were only one quarter of wartime establishments.28

During this ‘severe testing time for the Australian Army’ the system was held together by the dedication of a small group of Staff Corps and Militia officers.29 Berryman was exceptionally lucky that during his three years with the Militia he was to serve under two of the most talented and dedicated citizen soldiers that Australia produced during this period, Leslie Morshead and Arthur ‘Tubby’ Allen.

There was not always a harmonious relationship between Staff Corps and Militia officers. In fact during this period there was considerable tension between these two very distinct military castes. Some of this tension was a result of the militia believing that the permanent staff showed little patience towards their soldiers. Compounding this was the somewhat justified belief among many junior Staff Corps officers that they ‘held the militia together’. One Light Horse Regiment adjutant even claimed that it was, in fact, his function to ‘run the regiment’.30

Despite the strain of the Militia Staff Corps conflict and internal ‘politics’ within the army at this time there is little evidence to support anything but a generally smooth working relationship between Berryman and his commanding officers during this period. In his efficiency reports both Morshead and Allen have nothing but admiration for his qualities as a soldier and appreciation for the support that he provided during their commands. Morshead considered Berryman ‘in everyway … a most efficient officer … thoroughly reliable … [and] qualified for a more responsible appointment’. However Morshead believed that Berryman was not yet ready for another posting as ‘he had not had personal experience with the troops for some time’. Consequently Morshead believe that it would ‘be an advantage to him to have a further period as a Brigade Major’.31

28 Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 92-93. See also Grey, The Australian Army, p. 89. Turnover rates for Militia personnel were 43.5% in 1933 and did not dip below 25% until 1937. 29 Rowell, Full Circle, p. 29. 30 Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 88. 31 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman 20 July 1933’, Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455. 149 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

Morshead’s sound judgement highlighted one of the major problems that faced not just Frank Berryman, but all Staff Corps officers. While Berryman had received a considerable degree of professional military training, the lack of a regular army in Australia or of a large militia force prohibited Staff Corps officers from frequent contact with troops or command experience. This did not mean, however, that any senior militia officer was at any more of an advantage than any Staff Corps officer. The problems they faced in command experience were in fact almost as severe and their lack of formal military education in senior command courses was particularly prohibitive.

While Staff Corps officers more often than not lacked day to day contact with the troops, Militia officers, conversely, lacked the necessary professional training that was essential for the exercise of senior command. As Craig Wilcox points out ‘even regular armies in military-minded states were having trouble keeping up with advances in military technology and theory’.32 In Australia it was a struggle for the small professional class of officers to keep abreast of these developments even with the training and experience provided by exchanges and courses with the British Military. It was almost impossible, therefore, for citizen-soldiers, without this exposure to receive anywhere near the adequate level of professional development they required. With militia units parading with strengths of only 25 per cent of wartime establishment and with training consisting of only two weeks a year the opportunities for Militia officers above the rank of major to actually command troops on tactical exercises in the field were virtually nonexistent.33 This was compounded by the fact that war, as Jeffrey Grey points out, ‘was becoming too complex and technically demanding to be mastered on a part-time basis by all but a very talented few’.34

Berryman was exceptionally lucky to serve in the militia with Arthur Allen and in particular Leslie Morshead who were among the very few citizen soldiers capable of

32 Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 93. 33 Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 93 Wilcox notes that ‘much training had to be symbolic as well as basic’. 34 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 98. See also Coombes, Morshead of Tobruk and El Alamein, p. 82. ‘it was difficult enough for permanent officers, who dealt with the problems (of the changing nature of military technology and combat) daily, to keep abreast of ever-changing improvements, and it would have been an even more formidable task for part-time soldiers like Morshead’. See also Albert Palazzo, ‘The Way Forward: 1918 and the Implications for the Future', in Peter Dennis& Jeffrey Grey (eds), 1918; Defining Victory. Proceedings of the Chief of Army's History Conference, Army History Unit, Canberra, 1999, pp. 188-213.

150 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

overcoming such difficulties during the Second World War. Soon after Morshead’s first and only efficiency report on Berryman he left the 14th Infantry Brigade as a result of a transfer to Melbourne with his civilian employer. While his appointment was short it seems that there was nothing but excellent cooperation and mutual respect between these two soldiers. During this time Berryman and Morshead established the beginning of what became a life long friendship.

The incoming Brigade Commander Arthur ‘Tubby’ Allen was also aware of Berryman’s shortcomings in some areas of his training. He reviewed Morshead’s report on Berryman and concluded that this officer ‘thoroughly understands our men and system of training’ and while he had ‘been a Brigade-Major on service and periodically with troops in England … I must agree’ with the recommendation of Colonel Morshead.35 Interestingly Tubby Allen and Frank Berryman were men cut from a very similar cloth. Both were the sons of working class Methodist locomotive engine drivers and both were self-made men in their respective professions.36 As with Morshead, Berryman established a close working relationship with his new Brigade Commander that was built around mutual respect. Berryman’s relationship with Allen, like that with Morshead, was also to be of great value to his professional development.

As Stuart Braga, Allen’s biographer, comments ‘Allen’s most important contribution to the CMF was the training he gave to young officers such as Ken Eather (militia) and Frank Berryman, who was his Brigade Major’.37 Probably the greatest benefit that Berryman derived from both Morshead and Allen was the advice they had to offer from their experience of leading infantry soldiers. While Berryman’s First World War experience centred on the artillery and staff positions in infantry formations both Morshead and Allen spent the entire war in the infantry eventually rising to command battalions in the front line.38 Morshead’s biographer notes that he learnt,

35 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman 20 July 1933’, Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455. 36 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 6-7. 37 Ibid, p. 63. It is interesting how Braga refers to Berryman as a ‘young officer’, with the obvious intention of subordinating Berryman’s experience to that of Allen’s. However both Allen and Berryman were born in 1894. Allen had, on the balance of command experience and time on the front line and more service during WWI than Berryman. However Berryman’s 15 year professional inter-war experience would certainly have gone a long way to redressing this imbalance. 38 Morshead commanded the 33rd Bn AIF, 1916-1918. Allen commanded successively the 45th, 48th and 13th Battalions. 151 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

during the inter-war period, ‘man management and the art of relating to the men he commanded – most important attributes for a successful commander’. Undoubtedly Frank Berryman was able to learn from Morshead’s and Allen’s experiences and coupled with his own extensive artillery command and brigade headquarters staff experience during the First World War he had considerable command exposure from which to draw from.

The depth of Berryman’s military knowledge and the soundness of his abilities as an officer were commented on the following year by Tubby Allen. In fact Allen’s annual report for 1934 was the most insightful and accurate confidential report ever written on Berryman during his 40 years military career. Allen’s appreciation also provides a detailed insight into the type and style of military officer that characterised Frank Berryman throughout the Second World War. Allen’s report noted that Berryman:

… possessed outstanding ability and a very keen brain … of a very high standard of professional efficiency, with the energy to improve his personal knowledge and the power to impart such knowledge to others. His constant core is the advancement of the efficiency of the service … he has not spared himself. A very strong character … excellent judgement …very self reliant … expresses his opinions when necessary … understands our troops well and his power of command is excellent. I consider that he has the ability to perform any staff duty. Special tendencies: Training, several staff duties and command of troops.39

In spite of later accusations of conflict with, and bias against senior Militia officers during the Second World War, Berryman later recalled that from his time as a BM in the 1930s he developed a ‘great admiration for Militia officers like Morshead and Allen and others … [who] in spite of every discouragement, gave up their spare time to serve with the Militia when it was not fashionable to do so’.40 While Berryman was later to be critical of the capabilities of some Militia officers he undoubtedly saw in Allen and Morshead the same fanatical devotion to the service that he possessed and this earned them nothing short of his highest praises.

39 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman 25 September 1934’, Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455. 40 Frank Berryman as quoted in ‘Frank the Florist’ by Half-Track, Bulletin, 22 March, 1961. 152 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Cementing a position at the top Despite the praise Berryman was later to give to militia officers such as Colonels Morshead and Allen his experience with the poor state of the militia in general left him somewhat bitter. In 1935 he was posted to Army Headquarters (AHQ) in Melbourne as Deputy Director of Military Operations, responsible for ‘planning for mobilisation, strategic concentration, and with defence schemes’.41 Here Berryman was finally able to assist in the formulation and implementation of defence policy. However his appearance at AHQ in 1934 did not, at first, inspire the confidence that the army’s senior commanders placed in Berryman from mid 1935 onwards.

Initially the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Lieutenant Colonel Sturdee considered that Berryman was altogether ‘too serious and pessimistically inclined’ and that a more ‘optimistic outlook’ would ‘greatly enhance his value as a staff officer’.42 Sturdee, however, soon came to realise that, as the CGS Lavarack stated, Berryman was more serious than pessimistic. Despite the fresh edge provided to his career by the move to Melbourne, Berryman’s hard edge towards the militia and the poor state of the nation’s military preparedness was not alleviated by his time at Army Headquarters. If anything Berryman’s poor opinion of both the militia and government defence policy were sharpened to a fine point as he became firmly established among the small circle of the nation’s military leaders.

Berryman’s posting to Army headquarter in 1935 was his final step in becoming a fully fledged member of Australia’s military elite. In Melbourne between 1935 and 1939 Berryman worked closely with the army’s most senior officers and eventually took his place among them as one of the select few.43 As a result his opinions and

41 Ibid. Berryman’s role at AHQ was not restricted just to the office of the DMO&I. As a result of Berryman’s talent and interest in training as well as his close relationship with the Director of Military Training Lieutenant-Colonel Wynter, Berryman also spent a fair amount of his time at AHQ working in this directorate. For an example of his involvement see, ‘Tactical Exercises Snr officers Staff Corps 17/29 Feb 1936’, NAA B1535 929/24/138. 42 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman, 7 August 1934’, Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455. 43 Sydney Rowell, Berryman’s boss as DMO&I in 1937/38 notes in his memoirs that by the late 1930s the staff structure had been strengthened and that ‘for the first time early graduates of the RMC such as Robertson, Berryman, Beavis, Vasey, Milford and Bridgeford had risen to positions where, if they did not actually control policy, they could advise and press their points of view’. Rowell, Full Circle, p. 38. 153 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

outlook on defence policy and planning, like all Staff Corps officers of a similar vein, were virtually inseparable from that of the army’s high command. These officers, the CGS Major-General Lavarack, the Director of Military Training, Lieutenant Colonel Wynter and the Director of Military Operations, Lieutenant Colonel Sturdee, were, like all of the Staff Corps senior officers, engaged in a battle with the government over the nature of Australia’s defence policy.

By 1935 defence expenditure returned to pre-depression levels. However the government still refused to recognise the inherent weakness of the Singapore Strategy.44 The Army’s most senior officers fought consistently against this strategy. This ‘losing’ battle was played out in Lavarack’s bitter infighting with the government and the demotion of Berryman’s closest allies, Lieutenant Colonel J. D. Wynter.

Frederick Shedden (from 1937 Secretary of the Department of Defence), ably supported by the respective chiefs of the Australian Navy and Airforce both of whom throughout the inter-war period were senior British officers, produced a report in 1934 on defence policy which, unsurprisingly, supported the Singapore Strategy.45 Naturally Lavarack opposed Shedden’s views and immediately went on the offensive claiming that the government’s defence policy was flawed and that the government should make its own decisions using advice from its own military leaders. Relations between Lavarack, the Minister for Defence, Sir , and Frederick Shedden soured helped along by Lavarack who, ‘made it plain … how little he was prepared to suffer fools, even when they were his political or military superiors’.46 In August 1936 Parkhill rebuked Lavarack in the Council of Defence meeting for his criticism of defence policy and in November relations between the government and the army broke down over the controversy surrounding the dismissal from AHQ of one of Berryman’s

44 Long, To Benghazi, p. 16. Defence expenditure had increased as a result of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. 45 David Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the making of Australian Defence Policy, (Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, 2000) p. 46. See also Malcolm Murfett, ‘The Singapore Strategy’ [Informit online]. ‘most of the advice tendered to the Australian governments in the inter-war period was wholly supportive of the Singapore strategy…’ 46 ‘Lavarack, Lieutenant- General John Dudley’, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 339-340. For full coverage of the period of Lavarack as CGS see Brett Lodge, Lavarack: The Rival General, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1998). 154 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

close friends and superiors Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Wynter, who was accused of leaking sensitive defence reports to the leader of the opposition .47

Parkhill directed the Military Board to investigate and it was discovered that Wynter had been responsible for the wording of the specific section of the report that Curtin used in parliament.48 Parkhill demanded disciplinary action while Wynter counter-charged by demanding a formal court martial arguing that he had in fact broken no regulations.49 In what has been described as a ‘petty’50 move Parkhill pushed the Military Board into moving Wynter to the 1st Military District in Queensland, a demotion in responsibility and a reduction in rank, and on Shedden’s advice he (Parkhill) also withdrew his recommendation for Lavarack to be made a Companion of the Bath (CB).51

Throughout this incident Berryman remained a close supporter of both Lavarack and, in particular, Wynter. After his posting to Queensland Wynter noted to his Dear Berry …words cannot-express what your sympathy, confidence and active interest, and that of Mrs Berryman meant to us during the past three months. I can only hope that if occasion should arise I shall have the same moral courage and staunchness for a friend which you have shown.52

This incident demonstrates two important elements of Berryman’s character. First it is yet another example of the loyalty and devotion that Berryman showed to his superiors. Secondly it reveals his firm political affiliation with the senior Staff Corps officers at Army Headquarters during this period. The bitterness that Lavarack and Wynter as well as a number of other officers shared in relation to the government’s

47 Andrews, The Defence Department, p. 84. According to Gavin Long, Wynter, who had devoted himself to ‘examining and re-examining’ the ‘fallacy’ of the Singapore Strategy, was ‘perhaps the clearest and most profound thinker the Australian Army of his generation had produced’. See Long, To Benghazi, p. 8. 48 Horner, Defence Supremo, p. 48. Wynter had used the same terms in his lecture on defence policy to the Untied Services institute in August 1935. The final straw for Parkhill however was the revelation that Wynter’s son, a journalist, had published an article on defence policy in Sydney’s Daily Telegraph on 3 April 1936 that again used material similar to Wynter’s lecture. 49 Ibid. 50 ‘Parkhill, (Robert) Archdale,’ Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 456. 51 Andrews, The Defence Department, p. 84; Horner, Defence Supremo, p. 49. 52 ‘H. D. Wynter to F. H. Berryman’ 30 March 1937, Berryman Family Papers. A subsequent letter, 21 April 1938, discusses Wynter’s return to favour with his appointment to command the Staff School and reveals the depth of ‘politicking’ that senior officers were involved in during this time. 155 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

treatment of both the army in general, and the Staff Corps specifically, was shared just as unequivocally by Frank Berryman.53

Arguments persisted over defence policy amongst the chiefs of staff, the government and Shedden until the outbreak of war and while, as Eric Andrews argues, the ‘Army leaders might have been motivated by their own special interests … their arguments, pointing to the threat of Japan were logical’.54 A few years later the Army’s arguments were proved to be not just logical, but unnervingly correct.

The other major ‘political’ issue that was critical during the inter-war period and was to affect Berryman’s subsequent career, was the growing divide between the senior Staff Corps and Militia officers in the lead up to war. By the late 1930s the army was in effect a fractured institution and the tension, resentment and hostility between these two groups was played out during the Second World War.55

Militia V Staff Corps There were a number of issues that caused tension between these groups. They included Staff Corps resentment over their treatment at the end of the First World War, the different rates of promotion for the two branches of the service, the increasingly complex nature of military combat during the inter-war period and the debate over suitability for command56, to name but a few. Tensions began to mount as an Army with very strong traditions in citizen-soldiering faced the realities of an ever increasingly powerful permanent staff. These tensions reached their nadir during the lead up to and early years of the Second World War.

53 Another officer and close friend of Berryman, Leslie Beavis, was also transferred to a junior posting after expressing views that were ‘unacceptable to the government’. See David Horner, Crisis of Command: Australian Generalship and the Japanese threat, 1941-1943, (ANU, Canberra, 1978), p. 3. 54 Andrews, The Defence Department, p. 84 55 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 52. 56 Ibid. In 1921, immediately after the proposals for the reorganisation of the Army in Australia were announced, the embittered Militia brigadier and Member of Parliament Harold ‘Pompey’ Elliot declared that the new divisional structure was just a ploy to take commands from militia officers and hand them to the Staff Corps. This was in fact not the case and while Staff Corps officers dominated appointments in the administrative areas Militia officers continued to dominate operational commands throughout this period. Elliot’s resentment about missing out on a division during WWI was only resolved with his suicide in 1931. 156 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

In the hardships of the inter-war period relations between these two groups were compounded by the disparities that existed between the two streams of service.57 One of the areas of greatest tension was promotion. At the end of the Great War the permanent staff lost the rank and seniority they attained in the AIF. While able to wear the badges of rank attained in the AIF permanent officers did not receive the equivalent pay or conditions of service. This, however, was not the case with those AIF officers who chose to serve in the Militia. Furthermore, commissions were easily acquired in the militia and promotion was notably faster than in the Staff Corps leading to a number of Staff Corps officers being superseded by their much less experienced part-time colleagues. Cases of this were abundant in the inter-war army.

Berryman returned from the Great War as an AIF major but reverted back to the rank of lieutenant. He made captain in 1923, was finally fully promoted to major in 1935 (a brevet rank he had worn since 1917) and lieutenant colonel in 1938. By way of contrast, the Staff Corps officers saw promotion in the militia happen almost overnight. Ken Eather who served in 14th Infantry Brigade when Berryman was its Brigade-Major was commissioned a lieutenant in 1921 and made lieutenant colonel by 1935. Stan Savige, whom Berryman was in constant association with during the coming conflict, ended the First World War as a captain (one rank below Berryman), and by 1935 he was a full colonel and commander of the 10th Infantry Brigade.58 was commissioned into Sydney University Regiment in 1927 and was promoted lieutenant colonel in 1938, the same year as Berryman.59

In 1927 General Chauvel commented how the ‘disparity of opportunity and stagnation in promotion’ gave cause for concern given its negative impact on Staff Corps officers. In 1938 the new Inspector General Major-General E. K. Squires noted that amongst the Staff Corps:

57 David Horner, ‘Staff Corps versus Militia: The Australian Experience in World War II’, Defence Force Journal, No. 26, January/February, 1981, p. 14-15. 58 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 32. 59 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 99. Berryman was made a Brevet Lieutenant Colonel in 1937 and his promotion to Lieutenant Colonel was confirmed on 1 July 1938. Berryman’s promotion was originally slated to proceed as a result of the retirement of a fellow Staff Corps Officer. In the end his promotion was accelerated by the Military Board (MB) by ten months after the Minister of Defence approved the MB’s request for an additional 10 Lieutenant -Colonel places. (only six officers were eventually promoted after the minister gave his approval) See ‘Promotions and Selection Committee Papers No. 114/1938’, Promotions – Australian Staff Corps, NAA B1535 859/14/608. 157 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

the present conditions of service are such that … they had created amongst the officers now serving – and particularly those who are now approaching higher ranks – a feeling of despondency which cannot be but detrimental to the best interests of the service.60

Resentment against their supersession by Militia officers was compounded by public criticism of the Staff Corps by the Militia’s most senior officer, Major-General Gordon Bennett. In a series of newspaper articles Bennett launched such a damaging criticism of the Staff Corps that he was censored by the Military Board. Colonel Stanley Savige also made strong public criticisms of the Staff Corps and strained relations further by demanding that his Staff Corps Brigade Major be sacked for supposedly issuing orders beyond his authority.61

The appointment of Staff Corps officers to senior operational commands became one of the most contested areas of the dispute in 1938/1939. Bennett argued in his newspaper column that the Staff Corps were conspiring to take these commands for themselves. The Inspector-General and the Military Board, however, took the view that ‘insufficient use is being made of the knowledge and experience acquired by staff corps officers’.62 As a result Lavarack sought to extend the commands of Staff Corps officers not just to the administrative districts but into operational commands, especially divisions. This was a move that resulted in a ‘higher degree of resentment by senior citizen officers towards their regular counterparts’.63 The senior Militia officers were also ‘bitterly opposed’ to the section of the Squires Report that called for the formation of regular field units like the ‘Darwin Mobile Force’.64

60 ‘First Report by Lieutenant-General E.K. Squires, Inspector-General of the Australian Military Forces’, AWM 54, 243/5/58, as quoted in Grey, The Australian Army, p. 104. 61 Bennett ‘portrayed [the Staff Corps] as irrelevant to Australia’s military system’ see Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 102. For Savige see, Grey, The Australian Army, p. 101 and Australian Brass, p.78-79. The Staff Corps themselves however, contributed to this rift. The CGS Lavarack was the ‘champion’ of the Staff Corps cause in this dispute and from 1935 until the outbreak of war he worked on the principle that the Militia was a medium ‘by which the Regular officer was trained rather than the reverse’. See Horner, ‘Staff Corps versus the Militia’, p. 14. 62 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 100. 63 Coombes, Morshead, p. 83. 64 Wilcox, For Hearths and Homes, p. 102. Lieutenant General E. K. Squires arrived in Australia to take the post of Inspector General on 26 July 1938. His report into the technical development and efficiency of the Army submitted to the government on 16 December 1938 included a recommendation for the creation of a permanent force of all arms. However his ‘most important conclusions concerned the Staff Corps’. These included lower retirement ages, promotion by selection not seniority, improved pay and conditions and improvements to pensions. See Gray, The Australian Army, p. 103-105. 158 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Problems resulting from the lack of funding and support for the army, the poor pay and conditions of service for the Staff Corps, the demotion of Wynter and the growing disparity between the senior officers of the Staff Corps and the Militia were at the forefront of Berryman’s experience in the lead up to war. These, along with his close association with senior officers such as the CGS Lavarack, Wynter and Sturdee left him feeling bitter, frustrated and resentful. As the start of the Second World War loomed, these issues continued to play an important role in Berryman’s relations with senior officers from the Militia and the Staff Corps, and this was particularly true in the early years of the war.65

Berryman worked with his typical intensity during his time at Army HQ, and this intensity and hard work were rewarded with both early promotion and a recommendation to attend the Imperial Defence College. By the end of 1938 his hard work and close association with the CGS and other senior officers meant that he rose to a position of considerable prominence and influence within the Army. As the Director of Military Operations Lt-Colonel Sydney Rowell noted, Berryman worked himself in a most tireless fashion in an effort to help prepare the Army for the coming conflict.66 Rowell stated on his personal record that Berryman was an officer whose:

… personal characteristics are beyond reproach … The degree to which his opinion and assistance are asked for by other officers of all Branches affords ample evidence of the respect in which he is held… Lieut. Col. Berryman had now completed four years in his present appointment, a task which calls for continuos mental strain and does not afford the same opportunities for relaxation as many others. I feel that it would be in the best interests of the Service and himself that he should be released for duty with the troops as a General Staff Officer as soon as conditions permit.67

The CGS noted that:

65 Berryman remained, however, highly complimentary towards some senior militia officers notably Leslie Morshead and Arthur Allen. It is quite possible that Berryman saw these two officers as an aberration. 66 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman, 19 July 1938’, Frank Berryman- Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455. The conditions of service at AHQ at this time were described by one officer as ‘sweated labour’ with an ever growing amount of work and virtually no leave due to the shortage of officers. See Warren Perry, ‘The Australian Staff Corps’, p. 36. 67 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman, 19 July 1938’, Frank Berryman- Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455 159 HARD WORK AND FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES

I concur and can only confirm my previous opinion of Lt. Col. Berryman and express special appreciation of the knowledge, initiative and application with which he has continued to perform his very onerous duties. Already selected for accelerated promotion. Should be selected for I.D.S [sic] as soon as possible.68

Berryman however was never destined to reach the Imperial Defence College. By mid 1939 appeasement in Europe had failed and the world drifted closer to war. Back in Australia a woefully under funded army tried to repair the damaged caused by decades of neglect. The festering sore that was the Singapore Strategy remained and came under even more pressure. It pushed relations between the government and the military to the brink. Lavarack, Berryman and the other senior officers of the Staff Corps had represented the realist approach to Australian defence policy. Proving their judgements correct were, however, to win them no political favours. For Berryman his hard work, clear capacity in both the fields of military training, and staff work, marked him out by the Army’s most senior officers as destined for either a high command or a senior administrative post during the next conflict, regarded now as inevitable by the both the military and the government.

68 ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman, 31 August 1938’, Frank Berryman- Australian Army Service Record, NAA B2455. 160 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

The Architect of Victory Chapter 6

‘Friends, Colleagues and Conflict’

Colonel F.H. Berryman and the Preparations for War September 1939 – December 1940

‘Jockeying for preferment…is endemic in any hierarchical organisation such as the Army. Jealousies and professional differences seemed more than ordinarily marked in the 6th Division under Mackay’. Stuart Sayers in David Horner (ed), The Commanders: Australian Military Leadership in the Twentieth Century, p. 247

‘Given the tremendous pressures under which commanders operate in modern war it may be wondered that clashes between individuals do not occur more often. And it must be added that when the test of operations came, the headquarters of the 6th Division functioned efficiently and well’. Jeffery Grey, Australian Brass, p. 78.

War and Bitterness On 3 September 1939 Prime Minister Menzies, announced that it was his ‘melancholy duty’ to inform the country that Australia was at war. The stage was set for what was to become one of the greatest tests for Australia as a nation. Lieutenant- Colonel Frank Berryman stood at the threshold of the conflict that was to prove his capabilities as a professional. Despite the fact that this conflict was to cement his place in the national story Berryman’s part in this narrative remains an unreported part of our history. Compounding this neglect is the fact that the battles and campaigns during the early phases of the war in which Berryman played a major role have also been arguably the most neglected battles and campaigns in our memory of the Second World War.1

At the outbreak of war Berryman held the position of GSO1 (General Staff Officer Grade 1) of the 3rd Australian Division. The division, then under the command of Major-General E.A. Drake-Brockman was based in Melbourne. Berryman’s role as the GSO1 made him the senior Staff Corps officer in the division ‘responsible for

1 It was once argued that Australia’s New Guinea campaigns (post Kokoda) had largely disappear into a ‘Green Hole’. See Peter Stanley, ‘The Green Hole: exploring our neglect of the New Guinea Campaigns of 1943-1944, Sabertache, April-June 1993, p. 3-11. Stanley revived his thesis in 2003 highlighting the great advances made in covering this period of the war. The same cannot be said of the battles of the First Cyrenaica campaign along with Syria and Greece. They remain largely neglected by historians. 161 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

operational planning, intelligence, training and the preparation of orders and reports’.2 For all intents and purposes he was also the Division’s chief of staff being the commander’s ‘right hand man’, commander of the headquarters unit and responsible for the ‘coordination of all of its staff branches’.3

Berryman’s GSO1 posting to the 3rd Division was supposed to be a precursor to a move back to London to attend the senior officer’s course at the Imperial Defence College. Rowell, Lavarack and Drake-Brockman had been continually lobbying for such a posting on his behalf. However the onset of the war in September cancelled all such appointments. Meanwhile Berryman, like all officers, watched the government’s reaction to the onset of war with a great degree of professional curiosity. His initial reaction was one of despondency as the government failed to implement the army’s mobilisation plans that he and a team of other senior officers had worked exceptionally hard on in the years leading up to the war. While Berryman had pushed himself to the limit helping to prepare the country for war he believed that the government had ‘thrown the book away’.4 As late as 1940 the government continued to adopt a ‘business as usual’ approach.5

However the real issue at hand in the first few months of the war was the political manoeuvring for the command of the 2nd AIF. Berryman felt that the choice of commander fell to just three possibilities Thomas Blamey, the ex Staff Corps officer who had been Monash’s chief of staff in the last war, Lavarack the former CGS who now was in charge of Southern Command or Vernon Sturdee.6

2 David Horner, Strategic Command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s Asian Wars, (Melbourne, Oxford, 2005), p. 74. 3 Ibid. 4F.H. Berryman, as quoted in Horner, Crisis of Command, p. 103. 5 Grey, The Australian Army, p. 109. 6 Horner, Crisis of Command, p. 15-17. Berryman’s natural preference for a Staff Corps officer made it easy to see why he did not even consider the senior militia officer and well known critic of the Staff Corps, Major-General Gordon Bennett. But his inclusion of Sturdee, the Director of Staff Duties at AHQ, a very capable but still somewhat inexperienced Staff Corps officer, is a little harder to place. Berryman’s judgment was greatly influenced by his belief that the new commander had to have a grasp of administration and logistics, however, even considering these criteria it is interesting that he chose an officer who was not much senior to himself. Perhaps the admiration that he had developed for Sturdee while at AHQ clouded his judgment, or in Sturdee he had recognised a prodigious talent. But of greater interest was Berryman’s exclusion of Colonel Wynter. Berryman may well have excluded his friend, colleague and god-father to his daughter for the simple reason of his ostracism from the government over the Parkhill affair. 162 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

Irrespective of Berryman’s opinion, the government was going to make its own decision, free from the influence of the Australian Staff Corps. Blamey’s eventual appointment came as a ‘shock to some Australians’,7 but in the end he stood out as the only sound candidate. Bennett was too ‘difficult’ an officer and he had fallen out of favour as a result of his public criticism of the government’s defence policy, while Lavarack also suffered from a lack of political support due to his abrasive personality and Sturdee was clearly too junior.8

While Blamey’s appointment to command the AIF was not greeted with great enthusiasm by the Staff Corps there was a great deal of respect for his capabilities and Berryman ranked him as one of his top three candidates for the position.9 What did come as a major impediment to the ambitions of Berryman and his fellow Staff Corps officers was the announcement by Prime Minister that all the commands in the AIF would go to militia officers.10

According to one of Blamey’s biographers, John Hetherington, Menzies statement was not meant to preclude Staff Corps officers from ever exercising command in the AIF. It was merely a ‘casual remark’ to the CGS, General Squires that was repeated as fact to Lavarack and was then ‘repeated and enlarged on by Staff Corps gossips’.11 David Horner in his biography of Blamey argues that Menzies said it simply to preclude Lavarack from command of the AIF. However, as Horner has previously noted, this policy was practised down to battalion command level when the officers of the 6th Division, AIF were selected. Horner also notes that Brigadier Savige, commander of the AIF’s , believed that the policy was a result of Menzies dislike of the Staff Corps.12

7 John Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, (AWM, Canberra, 1973), p. 81. For a discussion of his appointment as commander of the AIF see also Horner, Blamey, p. 128-131. 8 Lavarack’s problematic personality was well known. For more details see, Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General and ‘Lavarack, Lieutenant-General John Dudley’, Dennis, (et al) Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 339-340. 9 Blamey had seen considerable service in the Militia in the inter-war period including as GOC 3rd Militia Division. 10 Long, To Benghazi, p. 45. 11 Hetherington, Blamey, p. 89. 12 Horner, Blamey, p. 130; Horner, ‘Staff corps versus the Militia’, p. 16. (See Horner’s footnote no. 20 for the references to Savige.) 163 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Menzies’ philosophy on Staff Corps appointments to the AIF in early 1940 was revealed in a letter to John Chapman, Major-General ’s biographer, after the war. Menzies noted that Mackay’s work in the Middle East, like that of Morshead, proved the value of the Australian citizen soldier. The amateur soldier, whether a school teacher, shipping manager, engineer [Morshead, Mackay, Monash] or anything else, has for Australia in two great wars been superbly successful. This phenomenon seems to have been peculiar to Australia (New Zealand and ), no doubt because these countries had a long tradition of “no standing Army.” But men like Mackay proved that, whereas the professional soldier acquires an immense technique and expertise, the actual command of troops, or that of any men for that matter, cannot be learned from text books or lectures.13

This letter clearly demonstrates Menzies’ preference for militia commanders over Staff Corps officers and that this belief was formed on the false assumption that Australians possessed natural military abilities. It was this very national mythology that had contributed to the pitiful state of military preparedness that Australia was in at the beginning of 1939.

Menzies decision had an electrifying effect on Australia’s small professional corps of officers: For nearly twenty years a sense of injustice and frustration had grievously affected the outlook of this corps…the effect of the omission of regular officers from the first list of appointments to AIF commands was to make the corps more firmly resolved than ever to defend its interests – in fact to make it to a greater degree a compact and defensive group within the army as a whole.14

The Staff Corps took Menzies’ decision ‘as a blanket veto against themselves’.15 Berryman, far from impressed with the government’s decision, saw it as a …damned insult to the professional soldier, calculated to split the army down the centre. We were to be the hewers of wood and the drawers of water. We, the only people who really knew the job, were to assist these militia fellows.16

13 ‘Robert Gordon Menzies to John Chapman’, 18 April 1968, Chapman Papers, AWM 3DRL 6433. 14 Long, To Benghazi, p. 45-46. 15 Chapman, Mackay: Citizen Soldier, p. 151. 16 Colonel F.H. Berryman as quoted in Chapman, Mackay: Citizen Soldier, p. 152. 164 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

There was a deep sense of professional injustice in this decision and this was further intensified by the fact that Berryman considered himself as one of those Staff Corps officers who were eminently qualified for a command in the new AIF.17 The consequence of Menzies’ narrow minded decision was the opening up of the festering wound between senior Staff Corps and militia officers.18

Berryman’s resentment at Menzies’ decision over command appointments to the 6th Division was not tempered by the offer of a staff position in the new force. In the closing months of 1939 he remained at the 3rd Division’s HQ in Melbourne working hard at implementing the government’s new training policy for Militia formations, but it was obvious that it would not be long before his talents were utilised. On 28 February 1940, with the announcement of the new 7th Division, a number of both staff and command positions became available. Berryman was Lavarack’s first choice as the new 7th Division’s senior staff officer. However, the creation of a corps headquarters had meant that the 6th Division’s GS01, Sydney Rowell, moved up to the senior corps staff position and Berryman was chosen as his replacement. Despite Lavarack’s disappointment Berryman was obviously thrilled at the appointment.19 Meanwhile his talents would be sorely missed in his hard pressed militia division. Len Roach, CO of 14th Battalion wrote to Berryman to congratulate him on his appointment but lamented that ‘we, who are left behind, will miss you very much. As a C.O. I can say that your reputation is an enviable one, and your kindly constructive criticism, and friendly advice, has always been in keeping with the ideal conception of a Staff Officer’.20

17 Horner, Blamey, p. 161. 18 The wholesale rejection of the Staff Corps from command appointments did not last long. In March 1940 the government decided to commit to a second AIF division as well as a corps headquarters. Blamey was immediately appointed to the corps command while Major-General Iven Mackay was selected as his replacement in the 6th Division. The new 7th Division was given to Lavarack who took a step down in rank from lieutenant-general to major-general to fill the post. Staff Corps officers also secured the command of the next two AIF formations. The 8th and 9th Divisions, AIF were given to Major-General Sturdee and Wynter respectively. However, these officers soon had to relinquish their commands to the militia. Sturdee was appointed CGS after an air crash killed General Brudenell White along with three government ministers. His command was taken up by to Major-General Gordon Bennett. Wynter relinquished his command to Major-General Leslie Morshead in the Middle East after succumbing to ill health. Despite these appointments only two Staff Corps officers were given initial command appointments below level of divisional command in the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th Australian Divisions. 19 Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, p. 86. 20 ‘Len Roach, C.O. 14th Battalion (The Prahran Regiment) to Lieutenant-Colonel F.H. Berryman, 6 Aust. Div’., 9 April 1940, Berryman Family Papers. This clearly demonstrates Berryman’s unpredictable relationship with Militia officers. At times he was critical of their capabilities and training but he also maintained close relations with a number of militia officers. It seems that the prejudices ingrained in Berryman regarding the militia could be tempered by individual officers. 165 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Farewells and old ‘friends’ Berryman was posted to the 6th Division in time to leave with the main contingent in May 1940, and while it is hard to imagine what thoughts were going through his mind in relation to the war, what he did make clear were his feelings about leaving his family. On 5 May 1940 he wrote: ‘My own darling Muriel, Ann & Richard: The sweet but poignant memories of last night are indelibly engraved in my mind & then on arriving on board I unpacked my attaché case & found a prayer book with a note from my dearest Ann & also my bible which a wonderfully Christian mother gave to her son. A lump came into my throat & my eyes welled up but of course I cannot allow myself such consolation what ever I feel I must appear imperturbable…the group photo is on a little bracket over my bed. Darling you are & have been a wonderful wife & mother & I know Ann will be a great help & comfort to you. Give Richard a hug for me. My deepest love to you all Daddie’21

This was a side of Berryman that most of his professional colleagues were not privileged to see. It stood in contrast to the hard exterior and uncompromising attitude to his work. What it does provide is an insight to his humanistic side. This was a side of his nature that lurked just below his professional veneer and was to reveal itself with more frequency as the war progressed, although never enough to soften most people’s opinion of his character.

Berryman had a few weeks at sea to lament his separation from his family before his arrival in Africa. Here, along with the commander 19th Infantry Brigade and fellow RMC graduate Brigadier Horace Robertson, he departed the convoy and traveled the length of the continent to Cairo. In an ironic twist Berryman, in concert with Roberson and his staff made the final leg of their journey to war in a German made Junker JU 52 transport aircraft.22

21 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel, Ann & Richard Berryman’, Sunday 5 May 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 22 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, Bulawayo, Rhodesia, 31 May 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 166 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

Figure 6.0 ‘We were to be the hewers of wood and the drawers of water. We, the only people who really knew the job, were to assist these militia fellows’. Senior Australian officers waiting at the embarkation of the second convoy AIF, Melbourne, April 1940.23 (AWM 001389/28)

While the Australians were training in Palestine and Egypt throughout 1940 the strategic situation for the British Empire had been steadily deteriorating. By the time of Berryman’s arrival in the Middle East the British Expeditionary Force in France was in full retreat in the face of the German Blitzkrieg that ended in their evacuation at Dunkirk. On 11 June 1940 the Italians had declared war on Britain and France and British Empire forces in Somaliland were soon overwhelmed by the Italian Army. On 22 June 1940 the French signed an armistice with Germany which meant that French forces around the world would be at best neutral, and at worst, hostile to British Empire forces. The Germans occupied Norway, Holland, Belgium, Denmark and France. Italy had declared war and Spain remained neutral but with firm leaning towards the Axis powers. By mid 1940, ‘The British Empire faced a disaster vaster than anything that could have been imagined when the war began a little more than nine months before’.24

In North Africa, the entry of Italy into the war drastically changed Britain’s strategic position. The Italian navy now competed for supremacy in the Mediterranean, while in Libya the Italians had massed an army of 250,000 troops made up of six infantry divisions and eight tank battalions along the border with Egypt. The British

23 Left to right: Lieutenant Colonel F. H. Berryman; Colonel (Col) S. F. Rowell; Col S. R. Burston; VX1 Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Sir Thomas Blamey; Lt Gen J. D. Lavarack. 24 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 95. 167 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

meanwhile could only muster 85,000 troops in four divisions, all of whom were short of equipment and some, like the 6th Australian Division, were yet to complete their training.25

On arrival in the Middle East Berryman spent a week ‘getting into the picture’ and he was glad to ‘see so many friends again - Tubby Allen, Stan Savige, Ned Herring, George Vasey and many others’.26 Berryman’s relationship with these officers was to prove critical in the coming months. Another and most significant relationship was to be with his new commanding officer Major-General Iven Mackay.

Berryman’s remarks that militia officers were ‘mere weekend soldiers’27 and his deep seated resentment at the government’s treatment of the Staff Corps over the issue of command appointments in the 6th Division did not auger well for his future relationship with Iven Mackay. But in fact the two men got on surprisingly well. Within a very short time of his arrival Berryman noted to his wife Muriel that; I’m getting to know my general better everyday – he is considerate & kind in many ways & I’m already forming a deep affection for him. He is a sterling Christian character & in the last war was a fearless fighter & worked his way up.28

Berryman was to comment after the war that ‘for moral and physical courage, few equalled him – none ever surpassed him. He was an educated and most knowledgeable soldier’.29 The relationship between these two men was to prove one of the smoothest between a chief staff officer and commander in an Australian Division during the war.30 Berryman had the greatest respect for Mackay as a divisional commander and despite his ingrained suspicion of the capabilities of senior militia officers he gave him his

25 ‘The Battle of Bardia: The A.I.F’s First Battle in World War II’, Directorate of Military Training, AHQ, see Papers of Lieutenant-General F.H. Berryman, AWM PR84/370, item 30, series 3, p. 2. 26 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, Thursday 20 June 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 27 ‘Colonel F.H. Berryman’ as quoted in Sayers, Ned Herring, p. 127. Stuart Sayers, ‘Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir : Joint and Allied Commander’, in D. Horner(ed), The Commanders, p. 247-8. 28 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 23 June, 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 29 Berryman as quoted in Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 166. 30 ‘Lieutenant-Colonel A G Fenton, Assistant Director of Public Relations, LHQ – Biographical notes on Lieutenant F H Berryman’, AWM 67 3/30 Part II. Fenton noted that ‘It would be hard to improve on the teamwork and harmony that existed between the General Commanding Officer, Maj-Gen Sir Iven Mackay, and Colonel Berryman’. See also ‘Biograhpical Notes: Lieutenant-General F.H. Berryman, C.B., C.B.E, D.S.O’, Manly Daily, 19 October, 1944. 168 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

absolute loyalty.31 In Berryman’s words they ‘worked together on a basis of absolute honesty and confidence’.32 He also noted that there were ‘several “growlers” among the division’s senior officers and that I was the only one completely loyal to Mackay’.33 In return Mackay was consistent in his praise for Berryman’s abilities and attempted to give him every opportunity to give his talents ‘full scope’.34 As Sir Arthur Smith commented to Mackay’s biographer, John Chapman, after the war; ‘I can emphatically say that – as usual – the “regulars” took Mackay as they found him. It did not make the very slightest difference that he was (what I suppose some would call) an amateur’.35

Despite the tension that had developed between the Militia and the Staff Corps in the inter-war period, Berryman managed to look past his deeply ingrained prejudices. Instead, he was able to reflect on his more positive experiences with the militia, such as his relationship with Leslie Morshead and Arthur Allen. The tensions remained but Berryman was increasingly able to assess fellow officers on their professional competence and dedication to the service as opposed to their mode of service. Throughout his time in North Africa, Syria (and later in the Pacific) Berryman was able to apply this standard of critical assessment, not just to Mackay, but to every other officer he was to come into contact with during the war. Odd habits and ingrained prejudices would, of course, ‘die hard’, and often they would lurk not far from the surface, but his professionalism, the competence of many of the militia officers and the demands of war meant that performance became the key indicator in Berryman’s judgements of his fellow officers.

On joining the 6th Division in the Middle East Mackay informed Berryman that his priorities were to ‘train the division for war’ and ‘train him [Mackay] as a divisional commander’.36 Mackay was giving Berryman ample room to demonstrate his proven

31 There is a least one piece of evidence concerning Berryman taking a negative view of Mackay. George Vasey the AA&QMG of 6th Division wrote to his wife on 26 October 1940 that ‘we [Berryman & Vasey] are one when it comes to our opinion of Iven…The point is Iven commands nothing. In peace I never mind acting for my commander but now it is different’. Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 71. 32 ‘Berryman to Lieutenant-Colonel Fenton 21 Nov 1944’. Papers of Lieutentant-General F.H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370. 33 ‘F.H. Berryman’ as quoted in Chapman, Iven Mackay: Citizen Soldier, p. 166. 34 Ibid, p. 166. 35 Sir Arthur Smith to John Chapman, April 1968, AWM 3DRL 6433. 36‘Berryman to Lieutenant-Colonel Fenton, 21 Nov 1944’. Papers of Lieutentant-General F.H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370. This statement could be regard by many was as rather arrogant and reflective of Berryman’s attitude to Militia officers. However, Berryman was most likely referring to the need, 169 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

effectiveness in training troops and his excellence in operational staff work. Berryman’s immediately set about transferring Divisional headquarters from an ‘office’ into an operational unit.37

Figure 6.1 ‘Despite the tension that had developed between the Militia and the Staff Corps in the inter-war period Berryman managed to look past his deeply ingrained prejudices’ Senior Officers 6th Division AIF Ikingi Maryut area, 1941.38 (AWM, Neg 044266)

Berryman’s harmonious relationship with Mackay was, however, not in keeping with the tenor of the First Libyan campaign. In many regards, Berryman’s relationships during this phase of the war were not helped by his forceful personality, his complete devotion to the service and the persona he adopted as the ‘strong man’ of the 6th Division.39 Colonel George Vasey, the division’s other senior staff officer in charge of administration and logistics, noted unfavourably that as soon as he arrived Berryman set

immediately after his arrival, for the Division to start to move from brigade to division level training. In reference to ‘train him as a divisional commander’ – Mackay was quite aware of his own personal lack of administrative and staff work skills and that he would have to rely quite heavily on his two senior Staff Corps Officers - Berryman for training and operational plans and George Vasey for the divisions administration. See also A.B. Lodge, ‘Lieutenant-General Henry Gordon Bennett: A Model Major-General?’, in Horner (ed), The Commanders, p. 173. Lodge states that ‘Mackay, unlike Bennett, was prepared to rely on his regular staff officers, especially Berryman (his GSO1), to guide him’. 37 ‘Notes of Lecture given by Berryman to 7th Div, 1941’ Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30 (Part 1). 38 Colonel F.H. Berryman (G.1.), Brigadier S.G. Savige (17 Bde), Col G.A. Vasey, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, Lieutenant General Sir Iven Mackay, Brig. H.C.H. Robertson 19 (Bde). Much can be said for the stern facial expressions of the two division staff officers, Berryman and Vasey. 39 Chapman, Iven Mackay, p.166. In an interesting family parallel Berryman comments in a letter home in December 1940 how his son Richard had appointed himself the title of ‘Tough Guy’. ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 15 December 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 170 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

about placing his stamp firmly on the division by adopted the ‘new broom touch’.40 It was, in essence, a classical situation: a shy, reserved and somewhat aloof Division commander supported by an uncompromising, hard nosed, yet brilliant chief of staff.41

One of the most important relationships at any divisional headquarters is the relationship between the two senior staff officers. Unfortunately Berryman and George Vasey were to remain at odds throughout the war. After the announcement of the raising of the 1st Australian Corps, Vasey had written to his wife Jessie that, ‘I shall get on alright with Berryman as GS01’.42 Shortly after his arrival in the Middle East, however, Vasey had changed his tune. On 28 June he wrote to Jessie that ‘his [Berryman’s] most noticeable characteristic at the moment is lack of co-operation. He goes ahead independent of everyone’. While at times Vasey could admit that ‘Berry is not as bad as he might be’43 as the weeks and months progressed so did Vasey’s criticisms. By November Vasey commented to Jessie that …Berry [grows] more tiresome daily. The trouble with the latter is that he is unable to grasp and tackle practical problems. He sticks to theory and principles and leaves their application to others [-] result confusion. Further he is a slave to procedure. Provided that is done correctly the results seem unimportant. He is as selfish as be damned too.44

There was much that these two professional soldiers had in common, not least their desire to preserve the interests of the Staff Corps.45 This should have brought them closer; but the rift between these two professional soldiers ran deep. Ned Herring, the division’s artillery commander (CRA), told the Official Historian after the war that the

40 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 65. 41 General Kurt von Hammerstein (1878-1943) notes that the ‘Typical staff officer is the man past middle life, spare, unwrinkled, intelligent, cold, passive, noncommittal; with eyes like a codfish, polite in contact but at the same time unresponsive, cool, calm and as damnably composed as a concrete post or a plaster- of-paris cast; a human petrification and without charm or the friendly germ’. As quoted in Tsouras (ed), The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, p. 449. Undoubtedly many of Berryman’s fellow senior officers in 6th Australian Division would have agreed with the application of Hammerstein’s description to their senior staff officer. 42 Horner, General Vasey’s War , p. 58. 43 Ibid, p. 70. 44 ‘George Vasey to ’, 3 November 1940, National Library of Australia (NLA) MS 3782, Box 2, Folder 11. See also 10 November, ‘Ivan and B are impossible and I said so’. 45 B.H. Travers, ‘The Staff Corps – CMF Conflict as seen by a young AIF officer’, p. 8. Travers notes that both Berryman and Vasey ‘were determined that the regular army would never again be put in the position which the community had put it in in the 1920s and 1930s. The post war army would be commanded by regulars and not by civilians’. See also , Tobruk, p. 52. Wilmot argues that ‘In many ways they were alike, though they are very different in temperament’. 171 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

‘trouble’ between Berryman and Vasey ‘went back to Duntroon days’46 and that they ‘never got on very well together’.47

At least part of the cause for their differences must have been professional jealousy. Both Berryman and Vasey had graduated from RMC in the same class, Berryman near the top and Vasey six places behind. They had very similar careers during the First World War, both serving in the artillery, but during the inter war period Berryman had been selected for staff college ahead of Vasey and was promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel over a year earlier. Berryman’s arrival at 6th Division’s headquarters as the senior staff officer would also have caused acrimony. Vasey had admitted to his wife, after the announcement of Rowell’s promotion to 1st Corps headquarters that, ‘I would really prefer it [the GS01 position] and it is the senior job on the staff here’.48 Having arrived with the advance party of the 6th Division he must have harboured hopes of receiving the post and would have been disappointed at the announcement of Berryman’s selection. The initial cause of the rift (if indeed, such a rift existed) at Duntroon remains unknown.49

Vasey’s problems with the 6th Division’s senior staff neither began nor ended with Berryman. They went well beyond old feuds and professional jealousies. In Vasey’s voluminous letters he reveals his troubles with all of the senior members of the division. He complains endlessly in his letters to his wife about the divisional commander, Iven Mackay. Vasey even went so far as to complain about Berryman and Mackay to another senior officer, Sydney Rowell, a most unprofessional act, and despite the almost continual rounds of gossip amongst senior officers this type of act was breach of the code of ethics and tradition that the officers corps prided itself on.50

46‘Edmund Herring to David Dexter’, Records of Gavin Long, 23 July 1956, AWM 67 3/167, Part II. 47‘Edmund Herring to David Dexter’, Records of Gavin Long, 12 April 1956, AWM 67 3/167, Part II 1954, p. 22. 48 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 58. 49 The rift was to remain throughout the rest of the war. Vasey noted to his wife in September 1941 that ‘Berry was as expected. I was sufficiently tackless to say at one stage that Ned [Herring] and Roy Sutherland had done more to help direct the [6th] Div than had ever been done before. I forgot as I said that, that Berry had been G1 most of that time. He didn’t appreciate it & I gather he thinks he should have got the job [GOC 6th Division] ahead of Ned’. Vasey Papers, NLA MS 3781, 8 September 1941. 50 ‘George Vasey to Jessie Vasey’, 17 November 1940, NLA, MS 3782, Box 2, Folder 11. 172 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

Vasey’s criticism did not end there. He found Ned Herring ‘very tiresome’51 and ‘Tubby Allen’, the 16th Brigade’s commander, both ‘aggressive and tiresome’.52 Vasey even found time to complain that the Commander-in-Chief, Blamey was ‘a tiresome fellow…swollen-headed & pig-headed beyond words’.53

As Stuart Braga notes ‘Vasey’s pen dripped in vitriol’ but his letters were more of a reflection of Vasey’s state of mind and his comments ‘were never intended to be considered judgement’.54 Nevertheless, Berryman and Vasey were never to develop a good working relationship during the war. At best they remained pleasant in disposition and co-operated where their work demanded, but often their mutual dislike of each other could break out into open hostility.

Other than Mackay the only other senior officers in the division that Berryman remained on good terms with throughout the campaign was the commander of the 19th Infantry Brigade and fellow Staff Corps officer, Horace Robertson. Robertson was a well known, popular and much admired officer amongst the Staff Corps. He was a ‘forceful and learned leader’ and he had a number of things in common with Berryman including that fact that he ‘did not drink much’, was ‘intensely professional’, had little room for the ‘cultivation of diplomacy’, and was devoted to his job.55 Gavin Long noted that both Berryman and Vasey ‘did all they could to enhance the prestige of Robertson, who was then the one exception to the rule that Staff Corps Officers could not hold commands in the AIF.56 Captain Vial of the 6th Division’s intelligence staff believed that both Berryman and Vasey gave Robertson ‘much cover’ at headquarters.57

Berryman’s relationships in the division were most strained, however, with the militia brigadiers, Herring and Savige. Both Berryman and Vasey had their issues with Brigadier Edmund ‘Ned’ Herring, the CRA ‘who spends his time running around corps or other HQ’s trying to wrangle things and wasting my or Berry’s time with all sorts of

51 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 68. 52 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 87. 53 Ibid, p. 92. 54 Ibid, p. 87. 55 ‘H.R.H Robertson – Impressions of interviewees’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/27. 56 Long as quoted in Grey, Australian Brass, p. 93. 57 Gavin Long and Brigadier R.R. Vial, as quoted in Grey, Australian Brass, p. 93. 173 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

ideas, which aren’t practical politics’.58 Conversely Herring found Berryman ‘obsessively secretive’, ‘a difficult man’ and a ‘trying colleague’.59 Relations between the two men did improve markedly once the division went into action. However, Berryman was later to be critical of Herring’s performance in the coming campaign.60

While Berryman’s relationship with Herring was ‘strained’ his relationship with another militia brigadier in the Division, Stanley Savige, would deteriorate to breaking point during the Libyan campaign. If there was any senior commander that Berryman was to vent his suspicions about the militia on it was Savige. During the inter-war period Savige had become a known critic of the Staff Corps, a trait that he had inherited from his First World War mentor Major-General Sir . Savige had clashed heavily with his Staff Corps Brigade-Major, Major Crombie, in 1935 and had publicly added to the negative comments about permanent officers made by Major- General Gordon Bennett.61 As a result both Berryman and Vasey had little time or enthusiasm for Savige62 and, while during the months leading up to December 1940 Berryman continually attended church parades in the battalions that made up Savige’s brigade, he never once mentioned his name in a letter home.63

There were other reasons for the animosity that arose between these two men. From Berryman’s perspective the most important qualification for respect was an officer’s suitability for either a command or a staff appointment. It was well known that Savige was a close friend of Blamey and it has been claimed that he owned his

58 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 68. Vasey also notes on 13 October 1940, that ‘both Berryman and I have…been fighting with Ned Herring’, p. 71. 59 ‘Herring to Dexter’, 23rd July 1956, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/167 PART III. S. Sayers, Ned Herring, p. 127. 60 Horner, Crisis of Command, p. 71. 61 Karl James, ‘“Uncle Stan” and the Staff Corps’, Sabretache, Vol XLV, No. 2, June 2004, p. 5-9. Horner, ‘Staff Corps versus Militia’, p. 15. Savige continued to be publicly critical of the Staff Corps after the end of the Second World War, See ‘Notes to Melbourne Herald 1946, Papers of Lieutenant- General S. Savige, AWM 3 DRL/035 62 In November 1941 Vasey notes in a letter to his wife that ‘Stan Savige came to see me this afternoon. Poor old STAN, what a fool he is not to realise that he just isn’t in the picture. As NED said he lives in a world of make believe in which he is the only one who believes in or is fooled by his actions – Why doesn’t he go home’. Vasey Papers, 9 November 1941, NLA ML3782. 63 See Correspondence, ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’ June – December 1940, Berryman Family Papers. Note: Berryman had very little to say about the personalities of the 6th Division in his letters home [unlike Vasey]. It is clear from his letters that he spent a lot of his free time by himself or with Mackay, Allen, or Disher , who all appear prominently in his letters. While Berryman makes his high opinion of Mackay, Disher and Allen known to his wife the other senior officers in the division especially Savige and Herring do not even rate one mention. Berryman never criticized any officer in his letters, but his silence on some speaks volumes for his relationship with them. 174 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

command of the 17th Brigade to this relationship.64 Towards the end of 1940 Vasey had labelled Savige as ‘under suspicion as a shooter of the Staff Corps’65, which meant that, both Berryman and Vasey ‘were quick to point out any of Savige’s shortcomings’.66 Savige countered, not by attempting to smooth relations with division HQ, but rather by fostering an atmosphere at his own HQ that was openly hostile to Staff Corps officers. By the time his brigade moved into the Western Desert the only Staff Corps officer (the Brigade Major) in the brigade had been posted to division headquarters and replaced by a militia officer at the request of Savige.67 Savige compounded these problems by fostering the notion that permanent officers should confine themselves to staff work, ‘that is an employment inferior to the real business of soldiering, namely command’.68

Berryman’s relationship with the other senior militia officer in the 6th Division, Brigadier Arthur ‘Tubby’ Allen, had a much deeper history and was more complex. Berryman had served as Allen’s Brigade Major in the 1930s and he held him in the highest regard. In Egypt, however, relations with ‘Tubby’ were to swing from one extreme to the other. Sayers argues that Allen and Savige ‘especially resented Berryman’s behaviour’ and ‘barely concealed their hostility’.69 Allen’s biographer Stuart Braga argues that Berryman was a ‘constant thorn in the flesh’ of the two brigadiers and ‘perhaps the strongest critic of the militia brigadiers’.70 Berryman conversely regarded Allen as ‘hot tempered and garrulous’.71

However, the relationship between these two men was not as strained as Braga and Sayers have suggested. While there were difficulties between the two men Berryman respected Allen as a commander and held his training of the 16th Brigade and Allen’s later performance at Bardia and Tobruk in the highest professional regard.72 As

64‘Interview with Lieutenant-General F.H. Berryman’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/107. Horner, Staff Corps Versus Miltia’ , p. 17. Horner, Blamey, p. 131 ‘Savige…had been a battalion and infantry brigade commander under Blamey in the 3rd Division, and was a friend and supporter’. 65 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 74. 66 Horner, ‘Staff Corps Versus Militia’, p. 17. 67 Savige’s original Brigade Major, Major B.W. Pulver a Staff Corps Officer was posted to 6th Div HQ and his place was taken by a militia officer Major G.H. Brock. See Grey, Australian Brass, p. 80. 68 Ibid. 69 Sayers, Ned Herring, p. 127. Sayers, ‘Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Edmund Herring: Joint and Allied Commander’, p.284. 70 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 87. 71 Ibid, p. 90. 72 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 2 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. Berryman wrote that ‘His [Allen’s] Brigade already has made a name for itself – first at Bardia then at Tobruk’. 175 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

with Mackay, Berryman could easily look past Allen’s ‘Militia’ tag as he had proven himself to be a competent professional. Their relationship was at times tumultuous and despite their professional and some times personal disagreements they generally enjoyed each others company in the mess and on any number of other social occasions. In fact they remained quite good friends during this period.

‘Tubby’ Allen is one of only a small number of 6th Division officers that Berryman refers to when writing home to his wife, Muriel. These letters have numerous references to social engagements between Berryman and Allen. On 13 July 1940 Berryman writes of going to a dance with Allen’s wife, who had taken up residence in Cairo. On 11 August 1940 Allen accompanied Berryman to dinner with British Brigadier Arthur Selby, a good friend of Berryman’s. On 31 August 1940 Berryman made the effort to meet Allen socially after the latter returned from leave, 20 October 1940 – Berryman shared a cake sent from home with Allen, Mackay, Vasey and , 6th Division’s chief medical officer.73

On 2 February 1941, Berryman comments to Muriel how he arranged, at Tobruk, to have dinner with Allen and his wife at their flat in Cairo. He goes on to comment that they had ‘a pleasant quiet evening…Mrs Allen (or Mona as I call her) shares the flat with Mrs Cunningham & daughter – Archie her husband is CO 2/1 Fd Amb [Field Ambulance] … after dinner the Allens walked [with Berryman] back to the house boat & we wished each other good luck – another period of collaboration between us having come to an end’. Berryman went on to comment that ‘His brigade [Allen’s] already has made a name for itself – first at Bardia then Torbuch [sic]’. This was all high praise from a man who spent the majority of his time writing home about the landscape, flora and fauna and left little space to the discussion of personalities.

During the Battle of Bardia the only comment in Berryman’s diary that makes reference to a fellow officer is – ‘Allen very successful all objectives’.74 This was also not the end of Berryman’s praise for Allen for his actions at either Bardia or Tobruk. In May of 1941 he commented to Muriel that ‘Tubby Allen has had the hard shows &

73 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 13 July 1940, 11 August 1940, 31 August 1940, 20 October 1940, 2 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 74 ‘Berryman Diary’, Friday 3 January, 1941, Papers of Lieutenant-General F.H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 1. 176 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

always been successful’.75 There are other numerous, positive references to Arthur Allen throughout Berryman’s correspondence during the war and none that contain negative assessments.76

Berryman’s relationship with Savige may well have been heavily influenced by both men’s respective positions on the Staff Corps-Militia debate. For the rest of Berryman’s relationships in the division the most influential factor was personality and competence rather than politics. Berryman was a somewhat quiet and reserved character.77 He often preferred his own company78 and took offence to officers who were loud, overly gregarious and drank excessively. This meant that he was endeared to Mackay who was known as a ‘reserved and unassuming character’79, ‘shy and diffident’ and, like Berryman, he possessing a ‘strong and resolute character’.80

It was exactly these characteristics that meant Berryman was not going to get along with everyone. Herring notes that Berryman and Vasey were ‘as different as chalk from cheese’ and this meant that it was ‘inevitable that these two strong personalities should not get on’.81 As Vasey himself lamented to his wife in June 1940, ‘I am afraid I am not quite in harmony with Mackay and Berry and one or two others…There is no congeniality and no common interest other than work and even in that we don’t always see eye to eye’.82 Vasey, or ‘Bloody George’, was renowned for his hard drinking, hard

75 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 18 May 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 76 Berryman Diary, Friday 3 Janurary 1941 and 26 January 1942, Papers of Lieutentant-General F.H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 1. ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 18 May 1941, Berryman Family Papers. Of parlicular note is Berryman’s lecture series to the officers of the 7th Australian Divison on Bardia. Here he painted a ‘vivid picture of the 16th Brigade’s advance, and of Brigadier Tubby Allen, now directing the operation, now firing a rifle himself’. See Russell, There Goes a Man, p. 206-207. Probably one of the most significant events that illustrates Berryman’s regard for Allen happened during the Kokoda Campaign. Berryman sent Allen a telegram congradualting him for the work that he had done with the 7th Division despite the fact that Allen had just been relieved of command. This as one review of Braga’s biography notes, showed both Berryman’s ‘intellectual honesty and bureaucratic courage’. See John Donovan ‘Book Review: Stuart Braga, Kokoda Commander’ Australian Army Journal, Vol III, No. 2 Winter 2006, p. 226. 77 Mr Neil Russell, DCM to Author, 17 June 2004. Neil Russell served as Berryman’s ADC in New Guinea. 78 Notebook, September 1944, ‘Interview with Major Travers’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/61. 79 Sayers, Ned Herring, p. 126. 80 Lieutenant Richard O’Connor as quoted in ‘Mackay, Lieutenant-General Iven Giffard’, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 372-373. 81‘Edmund Herring to David Dexter’, 23 July 1956, AWM 67 3/167, Part III. 82 ‘George Vasey to Jessie Vasey’, 26 June 1940, as quoted in Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 66. In March 1941 Vasey also commented ‘I think the old man really likes me [Mackay] – it must have been an attraction of opposites’. See also, ‘George Vasey to Jessie Vasey, 11 March 1941’, Vasey Papers, NLA ML MSS 3782. 177 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

swearing and colourful yet blunt manner.83 It was these very same qualities that caused much of Berryman’s difficulties with ‘Tubby’ Allen. One particular incident in the 6th Division’s mess, that George Vasey recalled, makes light of these particular personality clashes. I still find Berry rather tiresome – we just don’t mix and thereby hangs a story. I had Tubby to dinner a few days ago and late in the evening when he had had ‘a few’ he became loquatious (is that right) as is his custom and he started to tell B[erry] and me that we didn’t get on together. I had heard it all before and knew what was coming, but B became annoyed and went for Tubby who retaliated to some order. B, like a fool, instead of settling the matter, walked off with his nose in the air. Tubby was furious and went home. He and B have not yet spoken since.84

As Allen’s biographer notes, ‘Tubby’ would have done well to stay out of the ‘factionalism’ that marked Divisional HQ.85 Instead he had chosen to intervene into a personal conflict that had a long history and one that Allen had no chance of reconciling. Allen’s drunken interference was exactly the type of behaviour that Berryman found most offensive in a fellow senior officer. It is little wonder that he got defensive and stormed out after being vilified by a drunken Brigadier, even if it had been done with the best of intentions.

While Berryman may not have been popular amongst a number of the senior officers in the division this was not an issue that caused him the least amount of personal apprehension, chiefly because ‘popularity’ never rated as one of his personal or profession ambitions.86 To Berryman his personal attractiveness in some circles was irrelevant especially as no one was disputing his professional abilities. Ned Herring, while regarding him as a ‘trying colleague,’ noted that he was a ‘brilliant’ staff officer.87 John Chapman, Mackay’s biographer, spoke of Berryman’s ‘outstanding military talents’88, Robertson the ’s commander acknowledge him as the

83 Chester Wilmot, Tobruk, (Penguin, Ringwood, 1993), p. 53. 84 ‘George Vasey to Jessie Vasey, 23 August 1940, as quoted in Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 90. Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 67. 85 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 90. 86 Costa and McCrae argue that ‘agreeableness is not a virtue on the battlefield’, but rather an officer should be ready to argue for what they regard as the correct course of action rather than looking for acceptance and popularity. See P.T. Costa & R.R. McCrae, ‘Leadership’, in NO-I-R Professional Manual, (Odessa, Florida, 1992), p. 15. 87Sayers, ‘Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Edmund Herring’, p. 247 88 Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 166. 178 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

‘soundest planner in the AIF’89 and W.B. Russell, noted that even Savige regarded him as a ‘most brilliant, energetic and efficient officer’.90

Berryman was, however, not without his faults the worst of which was his obsessive secrecy.91 Berryman went as far as keeping his assistant at divisional HQ, Major Roy King, ‘largely in the dark’. King commented to Brigadier Savige that Berryman did not even give him ‘the time of the day’. 92 However it seems clear that Berryman and King had the very same personal clashes as did Berryman with a number of other officers. King was also known as a close friend and confidant of Vasey’s which meant that there was even less reason for Berryman to like or trust his subordinate.93

Berryman’s relationship with King was also a reflection of his obsession with restricting information to a ‘need to know basis’.94 Berryman could also be terse in speech95 and his, sometime, obstinate ways meant that many officers felt that ‘one never really knew where you were with him’.96 Beyond these traits Berryman was also strong in character, very exacting at his work, had great faith in his own abilities, and was not shy about expressing his opinions. While these characteristics could and did cause conflict, most of them are nevertheless deemed essential for a senior military commander.97 Berryman’s professionalism, however, meant that he rarely let a clash of personalities interfere with the conduct of operations.

89 H.C.H. Robertson as quoted in ‘Berryman, Lieutenant-General Frank Berryman’, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 96. 90 W.B. Russell, There Goes a Man, p. 207. 91 John Chapman, Mackay’s biography makes mention of how Brigadier Sydney Rowell, BGS, 1st Australian Corps commented that that 6th Division was noted for its ‘excessive secrecy’, especially Berryman ‘who was inclined to overdo the security angle to the nth degree’. Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 170. 92‘Lieutenant-General S. Savige to Gavin Long’, p. 13, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/348, Part II. 93 Ibid. See also Gavin Long’s interview with Major-General Jack Stevens. Stevens noted to Long that ‘Roy King & Arnold Potts are the two most difficult men in the army’. AWM 67, 2/105. 94 B.H. Travers, ‘The Staff Corps-CMF conflict as seen by a young AIF officer’. p. 7. It seems clear that Berryman and King had the very same personal clashes as did Berryman with a number of other officers. King was also known as a close friend and confidant of Vasey’s which meant that there was even less reason for Berryman to like or trust his subordinate. 95 Chester Wilmot, Tobruk, p. 53. 96‘Edmund Herring to David Dexter’, 23 July 1956, AWM 67 3/167, Part III. 97 Blamey believed that ‘great strength and resilience of body and mind’ were, as a result of his Middle East experience, the first qualities of Generalship. See ‘General T. Blamey to General V. Sturdee’, 5 August 1941, AWM 3DRL 6643 item 1/6A. The British Commander in Chief during the First Libyan Campaign, General Archibald Wavell; ‘the quality of robustness, the ability to stand the shocks of war’, See Archibald Wavell, Generals and Generalship, (Penguin, London, 1941), p. 15, as in G. Keating, 179 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Nevertheless jealousies and personal differences were a feature of life at 6th Division headquarters under Mackay.98 Vasey and Berryman obviously had a conflict of personalities which they were unable to resolve. They both clashed with Herring, who also had his own difficulties with Allen and Savige who treated him as an outsider. They, in turn, believed that Herring was using his position in the scene to advance his own interests and they resented his acceptance by most of the regular soldiers.99 Herring blamed much of the discord at 6th Division Headquarters on Berryman.100 Vasey in the end was critical of every one but especially of Mackay, Savige and Berryman. Allen and Savige were critical of Mackay, especially over their dealings with Berryman. Berryman clashed heavily with Savige as did Vasey and Horace Robertson,101 while Allen and Berryman’s relationship moved between friendship and enmity depending on each other’s mood.

There were few firm friendships amongst the 6th Division’s senior officers, but as Jeffrey Grey has argued few men who rise to rank lack strength of character and force of personality. Given the tremendous pressures under which commanders [and staff officers] operate in modern war it may be wondered that clashes between individuals do not occur more often. And it must be added that when the test of operations came, the headquarters of the 6th Division functioned efficiently and well.102

Lieutenant Colonel Jerram noted after the war that ‘I do not know to what extent the GOC had a say in picking his staff but whoever picked them picked the best divisional staff I ever served under’.103 Sir Arthur Smith noted to Mackay’s biographer in 1968

‘“The right man for the job”: an assessment of Savige as a senior commander’, (Hon Thesis, UNSW, ADFA, 1995), p. 14, AWM MSS 1604. 98 Sayers, ‘Lieutenant-General the Honourable Sir Edmund Herring’, p. 247. 99 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 91. 100 Ibid. 101 The which was initially allotted to make up the third manoeuvre element of the 6th Division had been sent to England. When the 6th Division was reorganized into a three battalion brigade structure the spare battalions, 2/4, 2/8 & 2/11, were allotted to the 19th Brigade which was sent to the 6th Division to replace the 18th Brigade. 102 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 78. Grey uses the comments of Colonel Jerram, CO of 7RTR to John Chapman to substantiate this claim. See AWM 3DRL 6433. 103 ‘Jerram to Chapman’, March 1968, AWM 3DRL 6433. 180 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

that ‘I hope your book will dismiss any suggestion that there was jealousy and rub in the fact that we all worked happily as a team’.104

Despite all the difficulties that surrounded the 6th Division’s senior staff Berryman ran a headquarters that was remembered amongst its members for its ‘checkers, chipping and cheeriness’.105 Captain Basil Travers, Mackay’s ADC was Assistant Camp Commandant at 6th Division HQ and thus in contact with all of the officers at headquarters.106 He noted how Berryman, Vasey, Disher (ADMS) and Mackay played checkers every night (Berryman or Disher usually won, Mackay never). Travers noted how the ‘chipping’ came mainly from Mackay, who liked to tease the headquarters staff. Berryman was no exception and became Mackay’s target when, during an exercise, Berryman became disorientated in the flat featureless terrain of the desert and got lost between his office and his dugout. Herring the CRA also suffered the same misfortune. But as Travers notes there was a general air of ‘cheeriness’ at HQ and in his view both Berryman and Vasey were happy to teach the inexperienced officers.107 Outsiders can also offer an interesting perspective and Lieutenant-Colonel Jerram of the observed that ‘above all there was an aura of complete calm and courtesy round HQ. In the month or so I was with them I never had a cross word from or to anyone’.108

Preparing for Battle While working relationships within headquarters ran smoothly Berryman was concerned on his arrival that it was not yet ready to function as a unit. Starting in early July, Berryman arranged for a number of training exercises for divisional headquarters so as to ‘dig out batmen, cooks, clerks & get them moving’. It was, he recalled at the

104 Sir Arthur Smith to Chapman, April 1968, AWM 3DRL 6433. Sir Arthur’s recollection might well be an example of the selective recall of memory that somewhat romanticises the past; however such a statement could not be far removed from the broad general feeling of the HQ during this period. 105 B.H. Travers, ‘The Staff Corps-CMF conflict as seen by a young AIF officer’. p. 6. See also Mr Neil Russell DCM to Author, 17 June 2003. Russell served as Berryman’s ADC in New Guinea and he commented that Berryman ran a ‘very happy HQ… a good team…wonderful atmosphere’. 106 Perhaps this says a lot about the partial and selective nature of memory that Divisional Headquarters held in his memory, but it seems that the junior officer may have been a little removed from the friction that affected the senior officers in the division. It seems that there were multiply layers of relationships that existed within headquarters. 107 ‘Interview with Major Travers’, Papers of Gavin Long, Notebook September 1944, AWM 67 2/61. B.H. Travers, ‘The Staff Corps-CMF conflict as seen by a young AIF officer’. p. 6. 108Letter, Lieutenant-Colonel R.M. Jerram to John Chapman, March 1968, Chapman Papers, AWM 3DRL 6433. 181 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

time, ‘quite a job’.109 Berryman’s reforms did not start or end with operational exercises. Always an active man himself, Berryman noticed that some of the junior members of the staff, notably Captain Charles ‘Spry (GSOIII) & Co’ getting no exercise’ so he made them walk to and from the mess through the Arab town to lunch (a 15 minute walk) and go for an hour swim with Berryman everyday between 4-5pm.110 A week after their first tactical exercise, headquarters engaged in an all night operation to enable Berryman to assess if they are ‘any good in the field’.111

Berryman’s activities were not just restricted to the training of the junior members of his headquarters. As a part of his own professional development Berryman, along with Tubby Allen and Ned Herring, travelled to Egypt in August 1940 to be briefed by the commander of the Western Desert Force, Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor.112 Berryman and Allen also managed to combine business with pleasure on the way to the Western Desert by stopping in Cairo to have dinner at the Savoy with one of Berryman’s close friends, Brigadier Arthur Selby.113 Their tour of the ‘front’ lasted two days and on returning to Cairo they lunched with officers of the Royal Navy and the following day with the British Commander in Chief, General Sir Archibald Wavell. Berryman had ‘learnt several lessons particularly dispersion and wide frontages, and became acquainted with conditions in the desert’.114 He found the experience ‘enjoyable & instructive though at times strenuous’.115

Berryman’s return from the Western Desert heralded another night exercise for Divisional headquarters and despite the ‘howling dogs’ and marauding ‘sandflies’ ‘they did reasonably well’.116 A little over a week later Berryman was back in the Western Desert this time visiting a number of officers from both Corps headquarters and the headquarters of the 4th Indian Division. Berryman could not help but draw comparisons between this British Indian Army regular division’s headquarters and his own all

109 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 13 July 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 110 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 23 June 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 111 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 20 July 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 112 The other officers to accompany this party were the OC 6th Division Cavalry Regiment Colonel M.A. Fergusson and the OC 2/1 Field Company. 113 Selby was an Australian officer serving in the British Army. 114 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert – notes of lecture given by Brig G.H. Berryman [sic], DSO (Late GSO 1 6 Aust Div)’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I. 115 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 11 August 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 116 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 31 August 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 182 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

volunteer formation. He wrote to his wife that ‘it is delightful being amongst such fellows as the spirit & efficiency is all that can be desired & it is so refreshing to be with fellows who really know and do their job’.117

In staff issues the 6th Australian Division, hampered as it was by a shortage of trained Staff Corps officers, appeared amateur alongside a professional formation like the 4th Indian Division. Time and rigorous training, however, was starting to unlock the enormous potential of both the staff and men of the new AIF. In September the Division began its concentration in Egypt and it set up camp at Helwan, south of Cairo.118 In late November and early December the Division began to move into advanced training and in two divisional exercises Brigadier Robertson’s 19th Brigade acted as enemy for Allen’s 16th and Savige’s 17th Brigades. Berryman noted how Mackay deliberately mixed up the attacking and defending forces and made junior officers sort out the problems. 119 Units were made to continue operations without orders, and a strong emphasis was placed on aggressive patrolling. As Berryman noted ‘most played the game and did well later [as a result]’.120 By 24 November 1940 he could state that ‘we were becoming fairly expert [and] the exercises began to weld the division’.121

After the exercises Berryman noted that by December ‘as a Division we could manoeuvre without creaking very badly’.122 The men, Berryman noted, ‘are good even though they included many tough customers who are equally good with a bayonet or a bottle’.123 In the field exercises they proved themselves ‘pretty tough & fit & [they] can march well & [they] are anxious to get a chance to have a crack at the Italians’.124 The exercises also highlighted a number of problems namely that the ‘desert presents many difficulties of an administrative nature, no roads, no water & long distances to be covered has set a slow tempo’.125

117 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 24 October 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 118 Chapman, Iven G Mackay, p. 162. 119 Ibid, p. 164. 120 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I. 121 Chapman, Iven G Mackay, p. 165. 122 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert – notes of lecture given by Brig G.H. Berryman [sic], DSO (Late GSO 1 6 Aust Div)’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I. He also noted that ‘The machine creaked but we could move and manoeuvre’. 123 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 15 December 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 124 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 8 December 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 125 Ibid. 183 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

These exercises also allowed the senior staff at 6th Division to observe the brigades and their commanders in the field, to discuss their capabilities and ‘to make judgements about their suitability for command in war’.126 All the brigadiers were given two chances to exercise their brigades and one to take the role of chief umpire.127 It was noted that Robertson was ‘doing very well here’128 and that the 16th Brigade under Brigadier Allen was well trained and ‘always displayed an aggressive boldness’.129 During the second exercise, Berryman and the rest of the senior officers at Divisional headquarters cast a close eye over events as 19th Brigade (Robertson) had completely routed the opposing forces (17th Brigade –Savige) and the commanding officer of the 2/5 Battalion was captured and released several times by sub-units of the 2/4 and 2/11 Battalions.130

While training advancing steadily it was greatly restricted by equipment shortages. As Berryman noted after the campaign ‘at this time [June to December 1940] we were about 30 on [the] priority list for [the] issue of eq[uipment]’, a situation which was not addressed until the 16th Brigade was warned of a possible move into the Western Desert in mid-December.131

The shortages in equipment were, nevertheless, understandable as priority had to be given to British Empire forces fighting in the Western Desert. On 10 September the Italian 10th Army under the command of General Bergonzoli was ordered by the Italian Commander in Chief Marshal Graziani to begin a cautious advance on Egypt. By 17 September the Italians had marched 60 miles inside the border to Sidi Barrani and here they stopped and settled into a series of fortified camps.132

One part of the British high command response to the Italian advance was to move the 6th Australian Division (minus the 19th Brigade) had been moved to Helwan training Camp near Cairo. The following month the division was again moved this time to Amiriya, at the edge of the Western Desert. Meanwhile British Empire forces, principally the support group of the 7th British Armoured Division, the famous ‘Desert

126 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 78. 127 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I. 128 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 78. 129 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I. 130 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 78. 131 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I. 132 Long, To Benghazi, p. 110-142, Sayers, Ned Herring, p. 137-139, Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 87- 88, 94-96. 184 FRIENDS, COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICT

Rats’, had been conducting harassing raids on the Italians since their entry into the war. These operations and the limited advance of the Italians convinced the British that their enemy were ‘poor tacticians and lack confidence, and their men possessed little spirit’. The only arm of Italian service to prove itself ‘well-handled’ was their artillery.133

In October the British Commander-in-Chief General Wavell, with the promise of further reinforcements from Britain, started to plan an assault on the Italian positions in Egypt utilising the Western Desert Force under the command of Lieutenant Richard O’Connor.134 The Western Desert Force comprised the 7th Armoured and 4th Indian divisions and would by December have the 6th Australian Division available for operations.135

General Wavell had been present at the 6th Division’s exercise on 21 November 1940 and two days later he invited Mackay and his senior staff officers and commanders to watch ‘Training Exercise Number One’ conducted by part of O’Connor’s Western Desert Force. This ‘live fire’ exercise took the form of an attack by a motorised infantry brigade from the 4th Indian Division supported by artillery and the ‘Matilda’ tanks of the 7th Battalion Royal Tank Regiment (7RTR). Later Berryman and his fellow officers were ‘astonished’ to discover that this ‘exercise’ was actually a dress rehearsal for the start of the British offensive on 9 December 1940.136

Personnel pressures caused by the rapidly expanding AIF were also leading to changes in the 6th Division. A number of officers were being transferred to newly formed AIF units and in mid-November Berryman was given notice of a possible move

133 Long, To Benghazi, p. 110. 134 The Western Desert Force would be renamed XIII Corps on 1 January 1941. 135 There was a great deal of speculation over the use of the 6th Australian Division from June to December 1940. The British, on a number of occasions, tried to detach the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade (the most well trained and equipped of the Australian units) from the 6th Division and to place it under direct British command. This move was vigorously opposed by the Australian GOC Lieutenant- General Blamey who did not want Australian units to be committed piece meal under British command. Blamey’s stance caused a great deal of uproar amongst the British command in Egypt and also in London, but Blamey stood firm under great pressure. The details of these political manoeuvres are well covered in the Official History and a number of other publications. See Long, To Benghazi, p. 109-130 & ‘Gavin Long to Brigadier H.B. Latham, Cabinet Office Historical Section’, 7 December 1950, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, 4/2/57, Kings College, University of London. 136 Sayers, Ned Herring, p. 139. 185 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

to the 7th Division.137 He was being promoted to brigadier and given command of the artillery of the 7th Division, news he confirmed to Muriel on 15 December. He told Muriel that ‘I shall be sorry to leave the Div & the General’. Yet his departure was not to be as rushed as he first thought.138 In a testament to his relationship with Mackay, and in recognition of his outstanding capabilities as a staff officer, Mackay lobbied the GOC, Blamey, for Berryman to remain as GSO1 until the end of the forthcoming campaign. Blamey relented and Berryman was ‘lucky’ to be allowed to remain until the end of January 1941.139

Meanwhile on 11 December 1940 Lieutenant-General O’Connor with the 7th Armoured and 4th Indian Divisions, using the very tactics that the Australians had witnessed two weeks before, captured the town of Sidi Barrani along with 38,300 prisoners. Wavell then decided to commit the 4th Indian Division to Abyssinia. The Australians, who had been warned of the possibility of a move to Maaten Bagush four days before the British offensive, were tasked to replace the Indian Division. The day after the British victory the first units of the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade began their move into the western desert. The remaining Italian forces which escaped from O’Connor’s assault withdrew into the fortified town of Bardia. The scene was set for Australia’s first decisive battle of the Second World War, a battle in which Berryman would play a crucial role.

137 ‘George Vasey to Jessie Vasey’ 17 November 1940, Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 74. In this letter Vasey tells his wife of a possible move to GSO1 6th Div as a replacement to Berryman. 138 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’ , 15 December 1940, Berryman Family Papers. 139 ‘Lieutenant-General Berryman to Lieutenant-Colonel A.G. Fenton, Assistant Director of Public Relations’, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370. Furthermore this surely must have caused resentment on the part of Vasey. Mackay’s request to keep Berryman at his post showed that he did not have complete confidence in Vasey to take over the position. See also ‘Frank Berryman to General’s Sturdee, Bruche Drake-Brockman, Wisdom & Northcott’, 14 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 186 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

Chapter 7

‘Planning for Victory’

Colonel F.H. Berryman and the Battle for Bardia December 1940 - January 1941

There is no doubt that the capture of Bardia is one of the greatest feats in Australian military history …The Italians had an overwhelming advantage in position, numbers and fire-power and our troops had to attack elaborately prepared and strongly fortified positions …Bardia’s capture was a triumph of brilliant tactics, courage, speed and the co-ordination of all forces.1 Broadcast by Chester Wilmot, ABC field unit with the AIF, 14 January 1941.

Battle Plans On 14 December 1940 Berryman and Mackay arrived at Lieutenant-General O’Connor’s Western Desert Force Headquarters. This was the start of an exceptionally close and smooth working relationship that developed between 6th Australian headquarters and Western Desert Force (XIII Corps) during the campaign. The foundation of this relationship was Mackay’s two senior staff officers, Berryman and Vasey. O’Connor had been one of Berryman’s instructors at Camberley and his chief of staff, Brigadier Harding, had been a fellow student at Staff College with Berryman, as had the Corps principal supply and administration officer, Colonel Navis.2 Berryman noted after the war:

When with 6 [Australian] Div in the Middle East, I knew most of the key officers in the British forces, while Vasey knew them in the Indian Division, so through personal contact the doors of cooperation opened easily – and General Mackay, our GOC, more than once said how greatly impressed he was by this advantage of staff college graduates knowing each other and by its value to the army.3

To Berryman this type of relationship was proof that:

1 Chester Wilmot, ‘The Capture of Bardia’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 14th January 1941, NAA SP 300/4/8. 2 ‘Frank Berryman to Major-General Wisdom, Major-General Drake-Brockman, et al’, 14 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. See also ‘Berryman interview’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 76 2/107. 3 ‘Lieutenant-General F.H. Berryman’, as quoted by Half-Track, Bulletin, 1961. 187 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

… the graduates of the Staff Colleges, Camberley and Quetta, are the cement that binds the parts of the Army into a homogenous whole, they are the axle on which the machine functions and many other things besides.4

The ‘Army’ which Berryman referred to was one that was a truly Imperial entity. Staff College contained officers from all parts of the British Empire and the bonds of this military fraternity transcended national loyalty.

By 20 December the first Australia units were in position opposite the Italian fortress of Bardia. Mackay ordered the immediate start of aggressive patrolling and the Australians began to dominate the area between the two opposing lines. Despite its commitment to the battle zone the 6th Division was still woefully short of equipment, especially transport and anti-tank guns. The division lacked one artillery regiment while the 2/2nd Field Regiment was still equipped with the 1914-1918 vintage 18 pounder gun. The divisional cavalry regiment was, with the exception of one squadron, detached for duty, while the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade would not arrive until 1 January 1941, just two days before the start of the assault on Bardia. These shortfalls were, however, somewhat offset by a number of British units that came under the Australian’s control when Mackay took over command of the Salum area on 21 December. The additional units included a machine gun battalion, 1st Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, and four regiments of artillery amounting to some 70 guns and howitzers.5

On Christmas Eve Mackay and Berryman were informed of O’Connor’s plan for the capture of Bardia. O’Connor had positioned the 7th Armoured Division to cut off the retreat of the Italians and to prevent their reinforcement or relief from Tobruk to the west while the 6th Australian Division were to form the spearhead of the assault on the fortress and town. Mackay was instructed to draw up plans for its immediate capture and while O’Connor stressed that no time be wasted in launching the attack he also commented that ‘it was NOT to be rushed’.6 Intelligence believed that the Italians had

4 ‘Frank Berryman to General Sturdee, et al’, 14 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 5 Long, To Benghazi, p. 145 & 155. 6 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 5. 188 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

between 20,000-25,000 troops in the fortress with an undisclosed number of guns, believed to be around 110’.7

The plans for this operation were one of the most crucial factors in the success of the 6th Australian Division at Bardia. After the conference with O’Connor, Mackay delegated the planning for the operation to Berryman.8 As Chester Wilmot the ABC’s Middle East Correspondent commented, it was clear that Mackay was making full use of his right hand … man. [It was] Berryman [who] gave point and substance to Mackay’s broad plan. The audacity of the tactics sprang mainly from Berryman and his efficient staff work was the prime factor in their smooth running.9

It was understood by all parties that this would not be an easy task and that the capture of the fortress would need a combination of ‘operations approaching those in France during 1916-1918’ as well as mobile operations to ensure victory.10 O’Connor promised every available support for the assault including a battalion of Matilda tanks (7th Royal Tank Regiment – 20-25 tanks), as much artillery support as possible and maximum cooperation from both the navy and air force. Yet O’Connor was insistent on the fact that only the 16th and 17th Australian Brigades be used in the assault and that the 19th Brigade be held back for a planned exploitation towards Tobruk.11

The defences at Bardia were exceptionally strong and Berryman was faced with a daunting task. The defensive line at Bardia stretched for 18 miles and consisted of an almost continuous anti-tank ditch supported by a double line of posts with rows of

7 Long, To Benghazi, p. 155. Berryman noted soon after the assault that O’Connor reiterated to him, on a number of occasions, that there were only 20,000 Italians in Bardia. See ‘Berryman to Lieutenant- Colonel Fenton 21 Nov 1944’. Papers Of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370 & ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 5-6. 8 ‘Berryman to Lieutenant-Colonel Fenton 21 Nov 1944’, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370. Berryman noted that ‘Sir Iven and my contemporaries have been generous in giving me credit for the planning but outside a few little is known of my actions during this battle and helping to bring it to a successful conclusion’. See also Chapman, Iven G Mackay p. 174: Wilmot, Tobruk, p. 53. Berryman’s role in planning this operation and the subsequent capture of Tobruk was also recognised by the media in Australia during the war. See ‘Brigadier Berryman’, SMH, 15 September 1941 & various newspapers articles in the Berryman Family Scrap Book, Berryman Family Papers. 9 Wilmot, Tobruk, p. 53. Berryman claimed directly to Gavin Long (Official Historian WWII) that ‘The tactics side originated with me’. See Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/107. 10 Long, To Benghazi, p. 154 -155. Long comments that O’Connor suggested an outline plan for the attack, i.e. that it be conducted on a narrow front to cross the anti-tank ditch. Berryman claims that he had already thought of this very idea and had discussed it with General Wilson, C in C British Forces Egypt. see Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/107. 11 Long, To Benghazi, p. 155. 189 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

barbed wire. In the outer defensive line the concrete lined posts were 800 yards apart. Each post was also equipped with its own 47 mm anti-tank gun and two or four machine guns. The posts offered almost complete protection to their defenders from all but direct hits from the heaviest of artillery. A second line, generally without the benefit of barbed wire or anti-tank guns occupied positions 400 yards to the rear. The southern sector was also reinforced by a ‘switch system’ (an additional row of parallel defensive works) that consisted of five more posts running from east to west. It was in this position that the Italians deployed the majority of their infantry and artillery.12

O’Connor’s headquarters estimated that the Italian garrison, with plentiful supplies and a constant flow of fresh water, would be able to withstand a long and protracted siege.13 O’Connor’s decision to leave the 19th Brigade out of the battle meant that Berryman’s plan could take into account only two infantry brigades or around 6,000 troops.14 Berryman did, however, have a number of aids to assist in his planning. At Sidi Barrani the British had captured a completed set of plans for the defences of Bardia and Tobruk. The Australians, since arriving in front of the defences, had undertaken a program of aggressive patrolling that was providing additional information to supplement the captured Italian plans and the Royal Air Force had provided a large number of up to date aerial photographs.15

The benefits gained here were offset by a number of difficulties faced by the Australians. The enemy held air superiority over most of the battlefield and the Australian troops as well as 6th Division headquarters were subjected to constant, if relatively ineffectual, bombing. Headquarters was initially a much improvised affair consisting of just a few trucks and shell scraps dug into the ground. The terrain had few distinguishing characteristics and this made it particularly difficult to navigate. Even short distances could be difficult as Berryman discovered when he found himself disorientated between the headquarters truck and his dugout one evening.16

12 ‘The Battle of Bardia: The A.I.F’s First Battle in World War II’, Directorate of Military Training, AHQ, AWM PR84/370, item 30, series 3, p. 2. Long, To Benghazi, p. 147. 13 ‘Western Desert Force Operation Order No.13, 31 Dec 1940’, 6 Australian Division General Staff Branch (6 Aust Div GS Branch), December 1940, AWM52 1/5/12. 14 Berryman had lobbied O’Connor for the use of 19th Brigade but O’Connor was adamant that there were only ‘18-20,000 Ities in Bardia waiting for you to get them’. ‘Interview with Frank Berryman’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/107. 15 Long, To Benghazi, p. 148. 16 B.H. Travers, ‘The Staff Corps – CMF Conflict as seen by a young AIF officer’. p. 6. 190 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

But the greatest difficulty that the Australians faced was the climate and the strains of living in a desert. Dust storms reduced visibility to zero for periods of up to a whole day, the nights were bitterly cold and the days hot. The weather was consistently ‘vile’ and

local memory [was] united in agreeing that the winter of 1940/1941 was the worst in recall … Misery abounded and only a species of confirmed optimists, such as infantry soldiers, could have found any grain of solace in the world at large. 17

There were few roads, water was a scarce and precious commodity and within a few days the men were suffering from desert sores and exposure to the elements.18

O’Connor recommended to Mackay and Berryman that they attack on a narrow front. This was an idea that Berryman had already considered and after making a detailed study of the plans and photographs he concluded that this was the only practical way to break the heavily protected anti-tank ditch around the defences.19 It was essential, he concluded, for the assault to achieve maximum surprise in order to ensure success.20 Berryman selected the area around Posts 45 and 47 as the point of attack. Although these posts were situated outside the Australian perimeter ‘he contended that an advance here would lead to high ground overlooking the Italian positions’.21

This position also offered a number of other advantages. Post 45 and 47 represented the junction of two sectors in the enemy defences thus an attack in this area would ‘cut … the enemy in two’.22 An attack at this point, the weakest in the Italian line, would disrupt Italian command and control, slow enemy reaction times and

17 Barrie Pitt, The Crucible of War Volume 1: Wavell’s Command. The Definitive History of the Desert War, (Cassell & Co, London, 2001), p. 131. 18 Long, To Benghazi, p. 147. 19 Long, To Benghazi, p. 154 -155. 20 See Appendix I for a complete copy of the 6th Australian Division’s Operational Order for the assault on Bardia produced by Colonel F.H. Berryman. 21 Long, To Benghazi, p. 156. 22 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 6; ‘6th Australian Division Operational Order No. 6, 1 Jan 1941’ & ‘6th Australian Division Operational Order No. 6, 1 Jan 1941- Appendix B – Trace Map Phase I & II’, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370; ‘The Battle of Bardia: The A.I.F’s First Battle in World War II’, Directorate of Military Training, AHQ, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR84/370, item 30, series 3, p. 2; Long, To Benghazi, p. 156 -157. 191 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

possibly lead the Italians into believing that the assault was being carried out by a much larger force.23

Berryman, however, knew that the 6th Division’s real trump card was the Matilda tanks of the 7RTR and his artillery. As a result, his plan was centred on both the distances that the tanks could travel and fight before needing to be resupplied and the range of the guns. This would avoid the need to relocate the artillery in the middle of the battle. Lieutenant-Colonel Jerram the CO of 7RTR advised Berryman that the tanks could only travel four to four and a half miles or ‘1000-15000 yards beyond [the] BARDIA –CAPUZZO Rd’. Therefore Berryman split the plan into two phases. During Phase I the 16th Australian Infantry Brigade with 2/1st Field Company would secure a crossing over the anti-tank ditch. Once across the ditch the 16th Brigade and 7RTR would exploit the break-in with one battalion moving south to the BARDIA – CAPUZZO road while the other two seized and held tactical positions overlooking the Italian lines to the north and north east. The limit of exploitation, that is, the extent of the advance, was also set to cover most enemy posts and their gun lines.24

The 17th Australian Infantry Brigade would be largely responsible for Phase II. During Phase I they were to ‘demonstrate’ with one battalion against the southern sector of the defences to distract the Italians, while providing one battalion as the divisional reserve to support the 16th Brigade’s assault. Once Phase I was complete the 17th Brigade (1½ Battalions) along with the remaining tanks of 7RTR would follow the 16th Brigade, wheel right and advance south down the inside of the defences from the Bardia –Capuzzo road to the ‘Switch’ line and then exploit as far as Post 11.25

The key to the whole operation was the element of ‘surprise and the rapid follow up once the “break in” was achieved’.26 Berryman noted that ‘we did everything to

23 ‘The Battle of Bardia: The A.I.F’s First Battle in World War II’, Directorate of Military Training, AHQ, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR84/370, item 30, series 3, p. 2; Long, To Benghazi, p. 156-157. 24 ‘The Battle of Bardia: The A.I.F’s First Battle in World War II’, Directorate of Military Training, AHQ, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR84/370, item 30, series 3, p. 2; Long, To Benghazi, p. 156-157. 25 Ibid. 26 ‘Comments on the Ops of 6 Aust Div at Bardia and Tobruch[sic]’, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR84/370, Item 27, series 3. 192 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

obtain it [surprise]’.27 The attack was made outside the Australian perimeter and no offensive patrols were allowed in the area of attack. Only reconnaissance patrols were allowed so that intelligence on the area could be gathered and the exact dimensions of the anti-tank ditch calculated.28 Berryman was adamant that the ‘plan of attack was known only to those officers who had to know’.29

Berryman ordered a comprehensive deception plan put in place. In the southern sector of the front, where the ‘demonstration’ to distract the Italians was launched, offensive patrolling was increased and artillery concentrations were fired at both dawn and dusk so the Italians would not know when an attack was coming. This artillery fire meant that the Italians were able to locate the Australians guns. So

prior to the attack, our arty [artillery] was moved by night into new positions where all movements by day was prohibited, whilst normal movement was maintained in the old posns [positions], and approximately the same amount of fire from a few of the old posns. The movement of the attacking tps [troops] was carried out in a similar manner and all preliminary dumping of amn [ammunition] was done at night.30

Aircraft were used to cover the sound of the movement of the tanks and the artillery was also required to register their targets using the survey method. No counter battery fire was to be carried out prior to the attack so as to keep the Italians on ‘ice’ to ensure that they did not relocate their guns.31

27 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 8. 28 Ibid. 29 ‘Comments on the Ops of 6 Aust Div at Bardia and Tobruch[sic]’, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR84/370, Item 27, series 3. 30 Ibid. 31 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 9. 193 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Map 4: Berryman’s Plan for Phase I and II at Bardia, 6th Division HQ (Berryman Family Papers)

The final stage of preparation was the rehearsals for the ‘break in’. Berryman highlighted these preparations in a letter he wrote, shortly after the battle, to Major- General Sturdee We constructed and [sic] anti-tank ditch of the same dimensions and of similar earth and rock, practised the engrs[engineers] in daylight in pulling down the bank and building tank crossings and then tested the crossings by passing I Tanks [Matildas] over them. Next the

194 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

engrs were practised in this in the dark. The leading Battalion, 2/1, was also required to rehearse the initial attack under similar conditions. We chose a perimeter defence at Azezi where the wire was practically the same, formed the Battalion up in the assembly area, moved them the same distance to the forming up place and then formed them up on the startling line, advanced them in exactly the same direction at exactly the same time in the morning exactly the same distance to the wire which they had to get through by blowing Bangalore torpedoes. The preparations for the key units, ie, those responsible for forming the tank bridge head were as thorough and complete as time would allow, the time being governed by when we could get up sufficient arty amn [ammunition]. This being our first engagement and the initiation of the 2nd AIF into battle, we could not risk a set back.32

Planning for Victory, Planning for Trouble Once Berryman had decided on the details of his plan he discussed it with Mackay. After this Berryman and Mackay held five conferences, one with Corps HQ and four with the commanders and staff of the 6th Division and attached units. During these conferences the plan was outlined and all the respective commanders were allowed to comment and make suggestions for its improvement. Only after the fourth conference was completed was a divisional operation order issued. A final conference was held the following day to confirm any outstanding details.33

While these planning conferences were very successful in coordinating the attack they also revealed Berryman’s lack of tact and his obsession with secrecy. The first of these planning conferences was set down for 28 December to cover phase 1 of the operations.34 As this section of the plan did not cover operations by the 17th Brigade Berryman left Brigadier Savige out of the discussion. His justification for absenting Savige was the need to maintain secrecy. Not only was this a politically unwise decision it was also militarily unsound. Savige needed to know the full details of the division’s plan in order to have his brigade conform to the overall concept of operations. Furthermore Berryman must have been naïve to think that Savige would not see his exclusion as an affront, particularly given the paranoia that he displayed over his relations with the division’s senior Staff Corps officers.

32 ‘Frank Berryman to General Sturdee, et al’, 14 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 33 ‘6 Aust Div GS Branch, January 1941, Part II’, AWM52 1/5/12. 34 The 28 December conference was held at divisional headquarters and was attended by Mackay, Berryman, Vasey, Jerram and Herring. 195 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

By far the greatest criticism that can be levelled at Berryman during the planning of the battle was his obsession with secrecy.35 Under Berryman’s leadership, the 6th Division headquarters was renowned for its ‘excessive secrecy’. Brigadier Sydney Rowell, Chief of Staff 1st Australian Corps, and close friend of Berryman36 noted that he ‘was inclined to overdo the security angle to the nth degree’.37 George Vasey, who had a major role in the administrative planning for the attack, believed that Berryman ‘was far too secretive … about the plan,’38 while John Chapman, Mackay’s biographer, argues ‘Berryman believed in restricting information to those directly concerned’.39 Berryman was to openly comment in the months that followed ‘the plan of attack was made known to only those officers who had to know’.40

Despite this obsession with secrecy some participants and historians, notably Stan Savige, Gavin Long and Stuart Braga, have placed too much emphasis on the 17th Brigade Commanders absence from this conference. In no way did his absence affect his ability to prepare his plan or his troops for the coming battle. At worst it wounded Savige’s pride as he felt ‘left … out of the general picture’.41 It has nonetheless become a point of contention in the historiography and has been much overplayed as an example of Berryman’s dislike and supposedly deliberate sidelining of Savige during the Battle. While an element of personal animosity may well have led to Berryman’s decision to exclude Savige a closer reading of the situation would point towards it being more of a reflection of Berryman’s obsession with secrecy.

Savige was present at the next conference on 30 December which dealt with the roles of both the 16th and 17th Brigade and all subsequent conferences. Despite this, after

35 Keating, Savige as a Military Commander, p. 20. 36 Berryman had developed a close relationship with Rowell during his time at Army Headquarters in Melbourne in the late inter-war period. It is possible that this friendship stretched back as far as their time together at RMC. Berryman thought so highly of Sydney Rowell that he had a photograph of him pasted into the inside cover of his 1940 diary. Berryman was to later take over from Rowell as BGS 1st Australian Corps when the latter was promoted. Rowell almost certainly was influential in securing this appointment for Berryman. 37 Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 170. 38 B. H. Travers, ‘Windows on a War’, unpublished manuscript, 1987, p. 83 in Keating, The Right man for the Right job: An assessment of Lt-General S.G. Savige as a senior commander, p. 22. 39 Ibid. 40 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long,AWM 67 3/30, Part I. Berryman reiterated this point in his lecture series on Bardia and Tobruk to the officers of the 7th and 9th Divisions in February and March 1941. 41 ‘Savige to Long’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/348, Part II. 196 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

the war, Savige claimed to the Official Historian, Gavin Long, that the conference on 30 December ‘was the only one I attended’.42 However in the same letter Savige contradicts himself and notes that ‘A further conference was arranged for the next day. Those present were Berryman, Herring, Lucas (CRE) and myself’.43

Savige was also very critical of the time spent discussing the operations of his brigade during these conferences. He notes that on 31 December ‘We met about 5 pm and the time spent in conference would be little more than half an hour’.44 The time spent in discussion however was entirely up to Savige. This particular conference was called so as to concentrate on his brigade and after outlining his plan ‘no queries were raised by Berryman, or anyone else’.45 The conference, as Savige points out, then covered the artillery fire plan, intelligence and the role of the engineers. Surely as none of the other officers at the conference were unsatisfied with the plan it fell to Savige, the brigade commander, to raise any doubts or problems that he had. If no objections or questions were raised why would the conference have lasted any longer than it had to?

At times Savige’s inaccurate criticisms seem to border on the paranoid. In his letter to Long, Savige claims that ‘I was not present at [the 2 January] Conference’ and later that ‘so far as the conference of 2 January is concerned the first I knew of it was on reading your narrative’.46 This is an odd observation given that all commanders were present at the 2 January conference at divisional headquarters. It is also interesting to note that during this conference the operations of the 17th Brigade occupied the majority of the conference’s discussions. The conference notes not only reveal that Savige was indeed present, but also that no less than ten of the conference’s fifteen points were devoted to the operations of Savige’s brigade. One, point nine, reveals that a sub- conference was held during the meeting between Savige, Berryman and Jerram to discuss the fire plan of the 17th Brigade.47

42 ‘Savige to Long’, Records of Gavin Long , AWM 67 3/348, Part II, p. 6. He also claims that virtually the whole conference on 30 December was devoted to the role of the 16th Brigade. 43 Ibid, p. 7. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid, p. 10-11. 47 ‘Final Conference held at HQ 6 Aust Div 1430hrs 2 Jan’, War Diary 6th Australian Division General Staff Branch, Part II, January 1941, AWM 52 1/5/12 6. 197 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Savige’s criticisms expose his paranoia towards Staff Corps officers and his personal feelings of victimisation at Bardia. After the war these manifested themselves in his ‘false’ memories of the past which he expressed to official historian Gavin Long.48 What is most disconcerting, however, is that Savige’s criticisms regarding Bardia and later Tobruk have been used extensively by Long and other historians. Despite warnings from other senior officers Gavin Long took a number of Savige’s comments at face value. After the war Lieutenant General Sydney Rowell wrote to Chester Wilmot that ‘Berryman is furious about’ Long’s partiality to his nemesis Savige and that ‘Gavin [Long] seems to have accepted all of Stan Savige’s papers as being gospel, when everyone knows he only wrote them to justify himself’.49 Gavin Keating in his 2006 biography of Savige as a military commander notes that ‘Savige was quite right in thinking that members of the Staff Corps were out to get him removed [after Bardia], but their reasons centred more on their views of his military competence than on Staff Corps ambition alone’.50 Gavin KeatingLong was also warned by Lieutenant-General Herring and Major-General Wilton not to be overly reliant on Savige’s version of events. The situation eventually deteriorated so badly that ‘Rowell told John Hetherington [Blamey’s biographer] that Berryman and Lieutenant General Robertson were so critical of Long’s history of the Bardia action that at one stage they planned to publicly contest the account after it was published’.51

Despite these warnings to Long regarding the use of Savige’s account Stuart Braga has demonstrated a unilateral acceptance of Savige’s arguments in his biography of Arthur Allen. Braga’s acceptance of Savige’s views reveals his own unfair assessments of Staff Corps officers whom, later in the war, he holds accountable for ending Allen’s career. By deferring to Savige’s views of Bardia and Tobruk, Braga is trying to establish a pattern of behaviour whereby Staff Corps officers deliberately denigrated their militia comrades to further their own careers and positioned themselves as the dominant ‘clique’ in the army hierarchy. However in this case, (Berryman and Savige), this type of self serving and malicious behaviour simply did not exist. Braga’s interpretation is simply too broad, it ignores the impact of individual personalties and

48Gavin Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job: Lieutenant-General Sir Stanley Savige as a Military Commander, (Oxford, Melbourne, 2006), p. 50. 49 ‘Rowell to Wilmot, 8 October 1953’, NLA MS 8436, Box 19, Series 4, folder 87. 50 Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job, p. 50. 51 Keating, Right Man for the Right Job, p. 3. ‘Berryman to David Dexter, 21 February 1952’ Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370 item 3. 198 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

professional competence and stands in contrast to the relationship, before, during and after Bardia between officers such as Berryman and Mackay and Berryman and Allen.

The interpretation of the battle proposed by Savige and largely adopted by Long and Braga has meant that virtually all of Berryman’s plans and actions at Bardia and Tobruk have come under criticism. Braga’s biography and Gavin Long’s Official History contend that Savige’s brigade had been given a ‘perilously complicated’ role at Bardia, ‘especially for inexperienced though well trained troops’52 while Savige has argued that the orders he was given ‘lacked the simplicity of those describing the role of the 16th Brigade’.53 These and other criticisms by Long and Braga have held even more historical weight given that Long’s view which is often perceived to be the ‘official’ history and Braga’s contribution is one of the very few contemporary histories that describes these events in any detail.

On the surface the criticism of Berryman’s plan as being complex does seem to hold some substance. While the 16th Brigade was able to operate as a self contained unit in a small area of operations the role allocated to the 17th Brigade was much more diverse and over a much larger operational space. The plan, however, needs to be viewed in context. In the first place Western Desert Force or XIII Corps as it became known on 1 January 1941 made it very clear to Mackay that only two brigades could be allocated to the assault on Bardia with the third held back for the exploitation toward Tobruk. This meant that Berryman had to devise a plan using only the 16th and 17th Brigades.

The construction of a plan using only two infantry brigades or six battalions was especially difficult given both the geographical size of the fortress and the number of Italian defenders. Even allowing for XIII Corps estimation of only 20,000 Italians in Bardia the attackers were outnumbered by the defenders by over three to one, a reverse of one of the general principles of war. This also meant that Berryman had to achieve a diversion, a break in and the exploitation with a very small number of troops. Given these restrictions the operational plan had to be complex, unless of course Berryman

52 Braga, Kokoda Commanser, p. 105, Long, To Bengahzi, p. 160. 53 Long, To Benghazi, p. 183, 159, 160. The British Official History also comments on the ‘somewhat complicated approach march [of the 17th Brigade] I.S.O. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East: Volume 1 The Early Success against Italy, (Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, London, 1954), p. 286. 199 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

chose to undertake the only other viable option, a frontal assault through the Italians most heavily defended southern sector.

To meet the requirements of the divisional plan the 17th Brigade’s main assault had to wait until the 16th Brigade had successfully carried out all of its allocated tasks. These included breaking into the fortress, handing over the supporting forces (7RTR) and the bulk of the artillery to Phase II.54 While the 17th Brigade had to wait for its chance to attack, the restriction of employing only two brigades in the attack meant that the 17th Brigade also had to provide the division’s reserve during phase one. This meant that for at least one battalion (2/5th Battalion) of Savige’s Brigade there would be both a long approach march to the assembly area and a long approach march to its start line before the attack. These long approach marches were also heavily criticised by Savige. He argued that they put undue stress on the troops and meant that even before the assault they were fatigued and had been awake for most of the preceding day.55

Such long approach marches were a consequence of the poor state of the transport in both the 6th Australian Division and XIII Corps. Significant movement of the infantry by foot was in fact unavoidable and it was the only way Berryman could position both Allen’s and Savige’s brigades so as to achieve operational surprise and to attack the weakest point in the Italian line. The transport shortage meant that what little was available was used to move essential supplies such as artillery ammunition as opposed to troops. As it was, the shortages in transport meant the assault was delayed for 24 hours.56

Long approach marches by the infantry have been used in warfare for centuries to obtain tactical or strategic advantage and on a relative scale of assessment the distances travelled by the brigades of the 6th Division at Bardia were not excessive. The

54 Both Berryman and Mackay felt that the break-in phase was ‘the most critical of the battle’ and should be allocated to Brigadier Allen’s 16th Brigade, the most experienced and well trained in the Division. A failure in the initial assault would mean that the operations of the 17th Brigade, with the exception of the diversion of the 2/6th Battalion, could not be carried out. It was widely regarded in the Division that the training of the 17th Brigade was inferior to that of the 16th and even 19th Brigade. See ‘Comments on the Ops of 6 Aust Div at Bardia and Tobruch[sic]’, Papers Of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 27, p. 5. See also Berryman’s handwritten notes on both these battles in this file for further comments on training. Travers, ‘Staff Corps versus Militia’, p. 11; Keating, Savige as a Military Commander, p. 21 & Grey, Australian Brass, p. 78. 55 ‘Savige to Long’, Records of Gavin Long AWM 67 3/348 part II, p. 6. 56 Playfair, The Mediterranean and the Middle East, Vol. 1, p. 284. 200 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

Australian infantry had been well prepared for such marches during their training and Berryman was particularly aware of their strength in this area. It was this knowledge that gave him the confidence to prepare a plan that took advantage of the troop’s physical toughness and endurance.57 Furthermore long approach marches were not confined to the 17th Brigade at Bardia. Brigadier Robertson’s Brigade had to travel over 320 miles in 24hrs to reach Bardia before the attack, leaving behind their anti-tank guns and Bren-Gun carriers. Immediately after their arrival they carried out long route marches so as to conduct their attack on the morning of 5 January.58

In fact obtaining tactical surprise through the manoeuvring of the division’s battalions was a hallmark of the campaign. During the 6th Division’s next battle, Tobruk, the 16th Brigade’s battalions moved over 100,000 yards in 35 hours, distances far in excess of the 17th Brigade at Bardia.59 As historian Barrie Pitt observed of the Australians at Bardia in the first of his three volume study of the Desert War, The Crucible of War, ‘military lore has long had it [that], the more sweat, the less blood’.60 The use of the infantry’s marching power at Bardia allowed the 17th Brigade to assault the Italian fortifications in the flank or the rear.61

One of the other critiques of the plan is that Berryman’s ‘orders were far too detailed and left far too little scope for his brigade commanders’.62 Here, in many respects, Braga and Long’s observations are very valid. In fact, as a point of contrast, Berryman praised the role of XIII Corps in its support of the assault on Bardia, especially for the way they gave a general task to 6th Division and then did not interfere in the planning of the operation. Neither Mackay nor Berryman displayed the same faith in their brigadiers. However, while the Divisional plan was highly structured and

57 Gavin Long was to note that ‘it is doubtful whether in the succeeding five years any Australian force was fitter for battle that the 6th Division at Bardia’. See Long, To Benghazi, p. 204. 58 ‘Operations of 6 Aust Div’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, p. 5. Grey, Australian Brass, p. 80- 81. 59 ‘Colonel F. H. Berryman to Major-General Sturdee, et al’, 14 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. At Tobruk 6th Division staff estimated that the 16th Brigade covered over 100,000 yards, 19th Brigade in excess of 72,000 yards and 17th Brigade 54,000 yards. 60 Pitt, The Crucible of War: Wavell’s Command, p. 129. 61 The 16th Brigade carried out extensive forced marches both during and after Tobruk. Neither Brigadier Allen nor his staff complained about the need for their troops to march long distances to conform to Berryman’s plan. 62 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 99. 201 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

specified tasks down to the battalion level were allocated63 this was only done after extensive input from all commanders.64 Once a general concept of operations was established Berryman held two conferences before orders were issued (28 & 30 December) and two afterwards (1 & 2 January).65 This was done to ensure input from all stakeholders and at the initial conferences the units of each brigade were not specifically named, this only being done after input from the Brigade commanders.66 Conversely the advantage of this approach was that the brigade commanders were able to write their orders in advance of the formal divisional order and enough time was allowed before the assault to overcome any clashes. In other words the fine details of the plan were, in fact, a collaborative effort by the headquarters staff, brigade commanders, the artillery commander and the commander of 7RTR.

The lack of freedom that Berryman and Mackay gave to their brigade commanders does however warrant further appraisal. There are several major points that need to be taken into consideration when assessing the restrictive control put in placed by 6th Division Headquarters. Firstly Berryman, Mackay and the whole of the 6th Australian Division were very conscious that in their first battle they would have to live up to the exceptionally high standards that had been set by their forefathers in the war of 1914-1918. ‘With the experience of Anzac and Fromelles, Pozieres and Bullecourt behind …’ the 2nd AIF, Mackay, Berryman and the staff at 6th Division headquarters were at pains to ensure that the mistakes made through poor planning in the 1st AIF were not repeated at Bardia.67 As a result they were not willing to delegate the authority for planning such an attack to men who lacked staff experience and, in the case of Savige, did not even have a qualified Staff Corps officer on his headquarters staff. Secondly given the nature of the initial operations, something akin to a First World War ‘set piece’ battle, structured planning and conferences, such as those carried out by 6th Division, offered considerable advantages and were a method generally favoured during

63 Savige was particularly critical of having his battalions allocated to tasks by Division. See ‘Savige to Long’, Records of Gavin Long AWM 67 3/348 part II, p. 6. 64 See conference notes 6th Division HQ, 28, 30 December 1940 & 1 January 1941. ‘6th Australian Division GS Branch’, December 1940, part II, AWM 52 1/5/12. See also ‘6 Aust Div OP Instn No. 4’, 1 January 1941, AWM 52 1/5/12, part II. 65 There were actually 5 conferences if the meeting Savige called with Berryman, Herring and Jerram on 31 December 1941 is included. 66 See drafts of the Berryman’s plan and the conference notes from 6th Div HQ conferences 28, 30 December. 67 ‘The New A.I.F. is blooded’, Sydney Bulletin, 17 April, 1946. 202 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

the later part of the last war.68 Finally, the brigade commanders themselves were unknown quantities. While both had considerable experience in the First World War, the nature of warfare had changed by 1940/1941 and they were yet to prove themselves as capable brigadiers in this new conflict.69

Certainly during the coming days as more ‘mobile’ and fluid operations developed, centralised and overly detailed planning by division was not a key feature of the battle. After a highly successful assault on the first day by the 16th Brigade, Berryman gave Allen great latitude to plan his own assault on Bardia town on the following day. The same confidence was shown in Robertson for his planning of the 19th Brigade’s attack during the final phase of the operation. The case of Brigadier Savige however was to prove very different. During the course of the battle he would ignore a number of orders from headquarters and prove himself incapable of being able to plan or properly control his brigade at Bardia. This in itself, in many ways, justified the decision by 6th Division HQ to keep a tight control over the initial phases of the operation. These disagreements, over the planning and preparation for the battle however, could only be put to test in the heat of battle.

In Great Shadows We Walk Mackay and Berryman had fixed the support measures with Corps headquarters in their conference on 30 December 1940. By 2 January 1941 the 19th Australian Infantry Brigade, the division’s reserve, finally arrived in the battle zone. On 2 January the Royal Navy, with elements of the Royal Australian Navy, along with the Royal Air

68 ‘Frank Berryman to General Sturdee, et al’, 14 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 69 Braga is also critical of Berryman for informing Allen that there must be ‘no movement by day’ at the point of the planned break-in so as to maintain secrecy. Braga then interprets this comment as an affront to Allen’s professionalism. Allen with his far greater ‘front line action than Berryman’ would ‘… hardly have relished the advice of a man junior in rank though, as a professional staff officer, more experienced in staff work’. (Kokoda Commander, p. 98-99). While Berryman may have had less ‘front line’ experience than Allen during World War I he had served in all of the major campaigns of the Western Front and, with the exception of a few weeks at a divisional headquarters, all his service was in the ‘front line’. In terms of knowledge and understanding of military tactics and technology in the period of 1919- 1939 Berryman had served as a full time professional soldier with extensive service overseas including a posting to Staff College, whereas Allen had been restricted to very limited part time soldiering. As for promotion, the only reason Berryman remained junior in rank to Allen was the well known difficulty of promotion in the Staff Corps compared with the militia during the inter-war period. But most significant is the fact that this comment was not made by Berryman, as Braga claims, but in fact made by the 6th Division’s Commanding Officer Major-General Iven Mackay. (Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 174). Chapman clearly states that ‘Mackay stressed to Brigadier Allen it was absolutely imperative that the enemy should not know the point of break-in … therefore there must be no movement by day’. [authors emphasis] Chapman’s biography is recorded as Braga’s source for this statement. 203 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Force carried out attacks on the town of Bardia. At 5:30am on 3 January 1941 the artillery barrage opened. Not long after, in the bitter cold, the engineers of the 2/1st Field Company blew the gaps in the wire and the infantry of Brigadier Allen’s 16th Brigade started to pour through. The engineers constructed six breaches in the anti-tank ditch and at 0650 the first tanks emerged on the other side with guns blazing. Despite the heavy and accurate Italian artillery fire:

… the Australians pressed on towards the first objectives, firing their Brens from the hip at the flashes of machine-guns seen through the thick clouds of dust and smoke being churned up by the exploding shells. At many places the Italians fought well, firing until the Australians finished them off with the bayonet.70

Phase I went almost entirely to plan. Berryman had placed an armoured forward observation post (OP) near the point of the break in. This meant that Division HQ received an ‘almost ball to ball description of the battle’.71 Mackay had also stressed to both Allan and Savige the need to provide a continuous flow of information. By 8:30am the entire 16th Brigade’s objectives were captured along with approximately 8000 prisoners and 50 guns. At 9:00am Major Ian Campbell, BM 16th Brigade, spoke to Berryman over a phone line from Post 40 and gave him a complete summary of the action so far.72 Despite the 16th Brigade’s success, it was very clear that Corps HQ had vastly underestimated the number of Italians at Bardia.73

The attack, as planned, was then halted until 11:30am to allow the tanks of the 7RTR to reform and replenish and the infantry of the 17th Brigade to move to their start line and it is here that Berryman’s plan has, again, come under attack. Allen’s biographer, Stuart Braga, has raised questions about the three hour delay between the end of phase I and the start of phase II. Braga argues that the ‘inflexibility of the plan is remarkable … Mackay and Berryman do not appear to have taken into account the possibility that for three hours the troops of the 16th Brigade would be subject to attack from Italian artillery … the result was unnecessary delay and avoidable casualties’.74

70 Chapman, Iven G Mackay, p. 182. 71 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 10. 72 Ibid. 73 Long, To Benghazi, p. 172. 74 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 99. [Author’s emphasis] 204 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

In this case Braga’s criticisms ignore some of the basic principles of war and demonstrate a lack of understanding of the nature of the operations at Bardia. The three hour delay that Braga talks about was a necessary evil so as to reallocate the division’s limited assets, namely the 7RTR, to support the 17th Brigade’s attack. This delay, from the end of phase I to the beginning of phase II, was a specific request of the commander of the 7RTR, Lieutenant-Colonel Jerram.75 As Berryman noted in his lecture to the officers of the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions in February 1941: CO 7 [Royal Tank Regiment] guaranteed he could go down to 1000- 1500 yds beyond BARDIA-CAPUZZO RD, ie 4 to 4 ½ miles. Could NOT go to switch-line. Limiting factor would be amn left and no[number] of tks [tanks] left – NOT petrol. Zero hour for Phase II was fixed by time required for tks to rally and replenish.76

This three hour delay was deemed necessary to allow for the reorganisation and rearming of the remaining tanks so as to continue into phase II. It also allowed enough time for the units of the 17th Brigade to complete their approach marches and form up in their assembly areas and on their start lines. As it was the three hour reorganisation and preparation was not enough time for 7RTR. Jerram noted: There is no doubt that the survivors were late for the third attack [17 Aust Inf Brigade] and that there were few of them. I must take some responsibility for the lateness myself, not because we went too far in the second attack but because my selection of a rallying point was based too much on what was suitable for the first attack and also because I had not fully appreciated from the map how very much broken ground was inside the perimeter …77

Jerram was also critical of the role that Allen’s 16th Brigade played in this delay:

When we came to rally every nulla was chocked with prisoners, wounded and somewhat out of hand Australians…We were also delayed at the rallying point by requests to tow fightable but immobile tanks to the head of nullas … to deal with possible counter –attacks by enemy tanks.78

The only way to avoid this three hour pause in order to consolidate and prepare for phase II was to have XIII Corps provide an additional battalion of I tanks (which were

75 ‘R.M. Jerram to Chapman’, March 1968, Chapman Papers, AWM 3DRL 644. 76 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 7. 77 Extract of a reply to General Playfair (British Official History) from Jerram RE Bardia in ‘R.M. Jerram to Chapman’, 3 March 1968, AWM 3DRL 644. Note:- Jerram counts the first attack as the break through the anti-tank ditch by the infantry and engineers and the second as the 16th Bde’s advance into the fortress. 78 Ibid. 205 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

not available) and additional artillery support (which was limited). The other alternative was to hold a good portion of the limited number of tanks and artillery out of the 16th Brigade’s attack, dispensing with the principle of concentration, so as to support 17th Brigade.

While Braga argues that this delay demonstrates the plan’s ‘inflexibility’ in fact, as a result of the delay of the tanks, it actually shows the degree of Berryman’s farsightedness and the scope of his contingency plans. Berryman consented to the three hour pause to allow their key weapon, the Matilda tanks, to reform for the 17th Brigade’s assault. However, he organised the artillery plan for the 17th Brigade’s advance to fire at a rate that was consistent with an assault without tanks. During the planning phased both Berryman and Mackay expressed concern over the number of tanks that would be available for phase II. As a result Berryman planned on a worst case scenario basis which, as events unfolded proved to be exceptionally accurate.79

Phase II: Bad Luck and Bad Tactics With Brigadier Savige’s 17th Brigade being one of the major formations in the assault on Bardia, and his account of this operation being so integral to later historical interpretations of the battle, it is imperative that the role of the 17th Brigade as well as Savige’s relationship with Berryman, Mackay and his fellow senior officers in the 6th Australian Division is investigated in detail. The 17th Brigade’s assault was to be characterised by not only bad luck, but more importantly by bad tactics and a loss of control by Brigadier Savige and his headquarters.

About the only thing that did go according to plan with the 17th Brigade’s attack was that it started right on time. However the delaying in reforming the tanks meant that they missed the start of Phase II. As the 2/5th Battalion crossed the start line their HQ was hit by a heavy concentration of Italian artillery fire and their commanding officer was evacuated badly wounded. The Italians had also had time to prepare for the

79 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 7. 206 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

next phase of the assault and the 17th Brigade had the unfortunate distinction of assaulting into the more heavily defended sector of the Italian defences.80

Only four tanks of 7RTR were eventually able to support the 17th Brigade’s assault and cooperation between these two units was poor. The Italian defences proved more resilient than those against the 16th Brigade. Two companies of 2/7th Battalion were also late reaching the perimeter and Brigadier Savige lost contact with a number of his units. To compound these already less than desirable outcomes 17th Brigade failed to keep Division HQ informed of their progress.81

From the start of phase II at 1130hrs till 1500hrs nothing was heard at 6th Division Headquarters from the 17th Brigade. At 1500 Mackay contacted Savige over the telephone to request an update. Savige was unable to provide a clear picture of his brigade’s operations. Furthermore at 1600hrs when Berryman set out from HQ to visit the 16th Brigade he noted that two companies of the 2/7th Battalion were only just crossing the Capuzzo-Bardia road and as a result would get no further than the perimeter by nightfall. When 17th Brigade did finally get in contact with division to update them on their progress, some five hours after phase II commenced, Savige was still unable to clarify the position of his subordinate units. During this discussion Savige revealed the extent of his trouble by requesting ‘aeroplane recce[reconnaissance] before dark’, not, as it would have been assumed, to locate the enemy, but in fact to ‘ascertain [position] of our [troops] in 17 Aust Inf Brigade sector’.82 This lack of information followed by a bizarre request for aerial reconnaissance to find his own troops confirmed

80 Long, To Benghazi, p. 172- 184; Chapman, Iven G Mackay, p. 184-185; Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 104-105. They did have the distinct advantage of attacking the Italian fortification in the flank and rear unlike the 16th Brigade’s initial assault. 81 Only two reports were received from 17th Brigade during this period. One alerting division to the fact that the 2/5th Battalion had arrived at their assembly area on time, the second claiming, incorrectly, that Post 11 had been captured by the 2/6th Battalion. Conversely From 0703 on the first morning till the end of phase I at 1130hrs 16th Brigade made contact with Divisional HQs no less than seven times. On two occasions the 16th Brigade’s BM, Major Campbell, spoke to Berryman directly to fully update him on the brigade’s progress See ‘Official 6th Division G1 Battle diary, 2-5 January 1941 ’, Papers Of Lieutenant- General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 74, series 5, p. 36. 82 ‘Official 6th Division G1 Battle diary, 2-5 January 1941 ’, Papers of Lieutenant-General Frank Berryman, Papers Of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 74, series 5, p. 39. 6th Division passed the request onto Corps HQ was it was denied due to the late hour of the request. [author’s emphasis] 207 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

to Division that Savige had lost control of his units and that his brigade was disorganised.83

Meanwhile at the southern end of the perimeter the 17th Brigade’s other assault, designed to distract the Italian’s attention during Phase I, turned into a disaster. Despite being ordered by Division only to ‘demonstrate’ against the defences the 2/6th Battalion’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel A H Godfrey, launched his battalion into a full scale frontal assault against the most heavily defended portion of the Italian line, Post 11. With only one regiment of obsolete artillery in support Godfrey heavily committed his unit, despite orders to the contrary. It resulted in the loss of the better part of ‘two [who] were cut to ribbons’ for no tactical advantage. This action cost the 2/6th Battalion 36 killed or missing and 26 wounded.84

The disaster surrounding the ‘demonstration’ of the 2/6th Battalion had at root derived from a misinterpretation and a fragrant disobedience of the orders issued by the 6th Australian Division. Brigadier Savige had delivered his own orders to his battalion commanders on 1 January before receiving the final set of the instructions from division later that night. Both Savige and Allen were able to issue orders in advance of the formal Divisional Operational Order (OO) due to the formal conferences they had attended at division on 28, 29, and 30 December. However on release of the formal order Savige noted what he believed were a number of changes made to his tasks and, as a result, he sent an immediate protest to Berryman with a specific request that they be considered by Mackay.

Albeit Berryman’s Operation Order No 6 had changed some elements of the 17th Brigade’s role, they were not as significant as the overreaction of Savige and his staff would suggest. Savige, however, went as far as to claim that the orders were ‘completely at variance with [the] plan and [the] method decided’.85 Berryman’s revised OO issued on 1 January called for:

83 Ibid, p. 38. While neither Mackay or Berryman went to Savige’s headquarters, at this time, if they had it would only have served to confirm what little information 17th Brigade headquarters had regarding its own units. 84 ‘Interview with Major Travers’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/62; Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, p. 49. 85 ‘War Diary, 17th Australian Infantry Brigade’ as quoted by Savige in, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/348, Part II, ‘Savige to Long’, Records of Gavin Long, p. 12. 208 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

Two coys 2/5 Battalion and one coy 2/7th Battalion exploit eastwards with tanks. Remainder of 2/7th Battalion pass through 2/5 Battalion and advance along perimeter with tanks until contact gained with 2/6 Battalion. DEMONSTRATION to be staged by 2/6 Battalion in SW corner of Southern Sector at 0530hrs.86

The major change to the 17th Brigade’s operations was that they were now to exploit all the way down the perimeter to Post 11 using the companies of the 2/7th Battalion which had originally been left in reserve. Savige’s main opposition to this variation was the already long approach march of the 2/7th Battalion, the possibility of the 2/7th Battalion being subjected to heavy fire from enemy artillery, the fact that they (2/7th) were strangers to the locality and the possibility that there existed a ‘grave danger of casualties being created amongst own tps[troops] by each other [sic]’.87

Map 5 Detail of Phase II of Berryman’s plan as at 1 January 1941. (Berryman Family Papers)

Savige was right to be critical of changed orders that arrived at his headquarters after he had issued brigade orders, and he was well within his rights to question these

86 ‘Operations –Bardia “G” Branch 6 Div’, War Diary 6th Australian Division General Staff Branch, Part II, January 1941, AWM 52 1/5/12. Berryman’s decision to change this part of the plan may well have been a result of a reconsideration of the 17th Brigade’s attacking strength. The addition of these 2 companies would mean that Phase II would be carried out by 2 full strength battalions instead of only 1 ½. This would have, however, compromise the division’s only reserve infantry companies. 87 ‘Savige to Berryman, 0100 hrs 2 January 1941’ , War Diary 6th Australian Division General Staff Branch, Part II, January 1941. AWM 52 1/5/12. 209 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

changes. Berryman noted the changes and presented them to Mackay first thing the following morning. Mackay assented to the majority of Savige’s requests; Berryman issued ‘Operational Instruction[s] No. 5 & No. 6, 2 January 1941’88 to that effect and arranged for Mackay to visit Savige to clear up any problems. Savige was also able to discuss these issues at the full staff ‘Final Conference’ later that afternoon.

What is clear from these events was that, while Berryman had modified the plan, he had done so with ample time and space to allow these measures to either be put in place or, as it turned out, reviewed and changed. This disagreement did not have any major effect on the 17th Brigade’s preparations for the assault except, perhaps to ‘excite’ 17th Brigade headquarters and, as Savige commented, my ‘staff and I lost a lot of sleep and we were pretty tired before the battle opened’.89

But these modifications to the plan were not what really made Savige and his staff anxious. What Berryman’s modification threatened was an alternative plan to that which Savige and his staff had drawn up, contrary to divisions orders, for the capture of Post 11 in the extreme south western corner of the fortress. Savige’s operational order, as issued on 1 January 1941, called for the 2/6th Battalion not to just ‘DEMONSTRATE’ against the south west corner of the fortress, as ordered by division, but to carry out a full scale attack to ‘Occupy WADI EL MAUTERED’. Savige, without orders, outlined his plan to ‘Advance’ through WADI EL MUATERED and Post 11 up to the road at SIDI HASSEN and then mop up the Italian artillery in the ‘vicinity of coast between MARSA ER RAMIA and BIR TUTUFAHIM’ linking up with the 2/5th Battalion as they advanced to the switch line and beyond.90 Savige had planned that the objectives set by Berryman to the two additional companies of the 2/7th Battalion were to be taken by the 2/6th Battalion’s ‘attack’. To conform to Berryman’s operational order Savige would have either had to call off the 2/6th Battalion’s ‘attack’ or risk a friendly fire incidence between the 2/7th and 2/6th battalions.

88 ‘6 Aust Div OP Instn No. 5 & 6’. , War Diary 6th Australian Division General Staff Branch, Part II, January 1941. 89 ‘Savige to Long’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/348, Part II, p. 12. 90 ‘17 Aust Inf Brigade O.O. No.2, 1 January’, War Diary 17th Australian Infantry Brigade, AWM 52 8/2/17. 210 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

In Savige’s orders to the 2/6th Battalion he does not at any stage use the phrase ‘DEMONSTRATION’ as clearly laid down by division. Instead he used directive terms such as ‘Occupy’, ‘Advance to’ and ‘Mop up’.91 Savige also claimed, in his protest to Berryman that by the time of the main assaults ‘the 2/6 Battalion should be at least on the NORTH face of the WADI shortly after the battle commences’.92

Map 6 Savige’s plan for 17th Brigade at Bardia (Original map, Long, To Benghazi, p. 188) The Black arrows and lines show the position of the 17th Brigade at dusk on day 1 of the Battle. For the benefit of the reader I have overlayed in red arrows and lines Savige’s ‘roles 4(a) and 4(b)’ for the 2/6th Battalion as outlined in 17 Australian Infantry Brigade Operational Order No.2. The blue arrows detail Berryman’s plan for the capture of Post 11 and the southern forts by the 2/7th Battalion.

When Berryman and Mackay reviewed Savige’s orders they must have been horrified to see that he had ordered the 2/6th Battalion to launch an all out attack on the strongest point of the Italian line with only one obsolete artillery regiment in support.93

91 Ibid. 92 ‘Savige to Berryman, 0100 hrs 2 January 1941’, War Diary 6th Australian Division General Staff Branch, Part II, January 1941, AWM 52 1/5/12. 93 After the battle ABC correspondent Chester Wilmot reported that ‘Post 11, [was] the most strongly fortified of all the 84 strong-posts which held the perimeter of Bardia, … it seemed almost impregnable and it was held by some of the best regular troops which Bergonzoli had’. See Neil McDonald, Chester Wilmot Reports: Broadcasts that shaped World War II, (Sydney, ABC Books, 2005), p. 55. 211 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Berryman made it very clear to Savige that while Mackay agreed with him on the use of the 2/7th Battalion that ‘At 0530hrs 2/6 Battalion will stage a demonstration as stated in para 19 6 Aust Div OO No. 6’.94 Captain Travers, from HQ 6th Division, recalled how ‘at the final conference GOC [Mackay] said 17 Brigade weren’t to attack on the 2/6 Battalion front.95

Savige did however get permission to occupy the WADI ‘should a favourable opportunity occur’ but he was warned that the 2/6th Battalion should ‘NOT adv to Rd SIDI HASSEN before 1130 hrs, D1’.96 Berryman also reminded Savige that in the areas that he proposed to ‘mop up guns’, i.e. around grid square 521387, that allied artillery would be undertaking counter battery fire until 1130hrs. Interestingly when Savige issued his Operational Instruction No 4 to clarify to his battalion commanders the revised orders from division he adopted part of Berryman’s proposal and one company of the 2/7th Battalion ‘under command Major Wrigley MC [was ordered to] advance from the NORTH, supported by tanks … [to] POST 15’.97

Fatally, however, Mackay had left the door open for Savige. Savige’s Operational Instruction No. 4 ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Godfrey (2/6th Battalion) that ‘an attack will NOT be launched on Wadi Muatered’. Godfrey however told his battalion that it was to capture Posts 3 to 11 as per his original orders.98

Sgt Henry (Jo) Gullett of the 2/6 battalion recalled that:

Colonel Godfrey … gave his orders … They were quite unequivocal. “D Company will attack and capture Post 11”. He went on to add that “No matter what happens to us, when we go forward we shall give the enemy such a thrashing that they will never willingly stand up to an assault by Australian infantry again … I will see you then in Post 11 …, or I shall not see you at all.”99

94 ‘6 Aust Div Op Instruction No. 5 2 Jan 41’ , War Diary 6th Australian Division General Staff Branch, Part II, January 1941, AWM 52 1/5/12. 95‘Travers to Long’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/62. 96 ‘6 Aust Div Op Instruction No. 5 2 Jan 41’ , War Diary 6th Australian Division General Staff Branch, Part II, January 1941, AWM 52 1/5/12. 97 ‘17 Aust Inf Brigade Op Imstr No.4, 2 January. 41’, War Diary 17th Australian Infantry Brigade, AWM 52 8/2/17. 98 Keating, Savige as a Military Commander, p. 22-23. 99 Henry Gullet, Not as a Duty Only, (MUP, Melbourne, 1976), p. 14. See also Michael McKernan, The Strength of Nation, p. 93. 212 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

The result on the morning of the battle was a shambles. Godfrey launched his attack and the better part of a company was cut to ribbons. As Sergent Gullet, one of the few survivors of the attack claimed, ‘tactically it was not [a] very well planned or carried out operation’.100 Savige and Godfrey, it was claimed, decided to launch the attack to teach the Italians a lesson and to ensure the superiority of the Australian soldier over the Italian.101 It was this very type of thinking that saw thousands of men sacrificed on well prepared positions with little support in the last war. The 2/6th Battalion found out, just like their fathers in the First World War, that courage and determination could not overcome machine guns and concrete emplacements. As the historian Barrie Pitt has so eloquently commented they [2/6 Battalion] were supposed to attract violence but not instigate it … they had little support and no armour, no plan for the attack which they carried out – nothing, in fact but their romantic determination to outshine their fathers exploits twenty-five years before … The Battlefield is a place for ruthlessness, fear, anger and hatred; not for romance.102

Tragically Godfrey was killed at El Alemein in 1942 and this also meant that the controversy surrounding the 2/6th Battalion’s assault was never resolved. The 2/6th Battalion was pinned down in front of Post 11 until the fort was eventually captured after being surrounded by elements of Robertson’s 19th Brigade. Robertson’s men approached the fort from the rear on Day 3 in an operation similar to the one Berryman originally allocated to the 2/7th Battalion which Savige had argued against before the battle.

Both Berryman and Mackay were furious over the attack of the 2/6th Battalion and it caused a ‘row between Berryman and 17 Brigade’.103 Berryman claimed that Savige had ‘almost torpedoed the Div[ision] plan’ and Mackay ‘was getting terribly annoyed because 17 Brigade were getting all the casualties and giving no details of what they were doing’.104 Savige later defended Godfrey by claiming that he had to

100 ‘Gullet to Chapman’, 10 May 1968, Chapman Papers, AWM 3DRL 6433. 101 Ibid. 102 Pitt, The Crucible of War, p. 138. 103 ‘Interview with Major Travers’, September 1944, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/61. [Long also notes that Travers had his 1941diary with him during the interview to support his statements.] 104 Ibid. 213 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

occupy the wadi on the grounds that that area of the fortress did not lend itself to a demonstration. This in itself then became the justification for Godfrey’s attack:

We [Savige & Godfrey] arrived at the conclusion that once the Troops had entered the Mautered from Littler and Rowan Wadis they must move to the Northern Bank. We realised, too, that once in, we would be forced to clear the enemy from the Posts in order that we gain a foothold on the Northern Bank to facilitate any advance which 2/6 Battalion may be called upon to make. With this I concurred. 105

Savige covers himself by arguing that ‘I was anxious that the whole of 2/6 Battalion should not be pinned down unnecessarily, which I stated repeatedly and stressed in my Op instruction No. 4’. Savige then goes on to say that ‘what happened [during 2/6 Battalion’s attack] is difficult to say’ and he then blames Godfrey for losing control of his battalion. His own lack of information about the 2/6 Battalion, he claimed, was caused by his liaison officer ‘Lt Gray… [who] returned to Bde Hqrs about dusk with his face swollen and his eyes almost closed which was caused by concussion’.106

Savige may well have stated his intention for the 2/6th Battalion not to get ‘pinned down’ at Post 11 in his revised operational instruction but it could not be said he repeatedly stressed this part of the plan. It must be remembered that he changed the role of the 2/6th Battalion from demonstration to attack in his initial orders and only revised this position after a direct order from division. The question must also be raised that if Savige, who ‘followed the patrolling of …’ the areas for 2/6th battalions attack ‘with [the] closet interest’, had arrived at the conclusion that the area was not suitable for a ‘demonstration’ then why was this never raised with Berryman or Mackay when the plan was outlined?

At best it could be said that Savige ignored the orders he received from Division and when this was pointed out he made the minium necessary adjustments but lost control of his subordinate units. However the evidence points to the possibility that Savige deliberately ignored orders. When this was discovered, and he was ordered to conform to division’s plan, he deliberately left the door open for Godfrey to attack as they had originally discussed. Either way Savige issued orders that he knew were not

105 ‘Savige to Long’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/348, Part II, p. 14. 106 Ibid. 214 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

officially approved by division. This endangered both the divisional plan and the lives of his men and was far removed from what is required from a competent brigade commander. This, however, was not the only time at Bardia that Savige was willing to ignore orders.

Map 7: Bardia at dusk on 3 January 1941 (Long, To Benghazi, [insert] p. 70-71)

215 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Phase III: The Assault of the 19th Brigade Towards the end of the first day it became clear that while the 16th Brigade had secured all of its objectives the 17th Brigade was going to fall well short of its objectives. As a result Mackay ordered the 2/8th Battalion from Robertson’s 19th Brigade into the perimeter to come under command of the 16th Brigade to protect its right flank. At 1615 Berryman then went out to Allen’s HQ to discuss the situation. Berryman along with Allen and Jerram (CO 7RTR) decided on a plan for the following day. Berryman decided to support the 16th Brigade with Jerram’s tanks and the bulk of the artillery so they could push forward and capture the town. Despite the difficulties facing the 17th Brigade Berryman was confident that they would contain the majority of the Italians in the southern portion of the fortress. Allen agreed with Berryman’s plan but challenged Berryman on his authority to order the assault. Berryman told Allen that as ‘there’s no other plan in the field’ he would assume complete responsibility and he ordered Allen to make the preliminary arrangements. Berryman returned to HQ and Mackay endorsed his plan immediately.107

During the night while 16th Brigade made its preparations, Berryman contemplated the Division’s next move. While he was confident that the 16th Brigade’s attack the following day would be a success, what would happen if the enemy continued to resist on 17th Brigade’s front? Berryman was, by now, acutely aware that XIII Corps had seriously underestimated the enemy’s strength. The 17th Brigade’s battalions were intermixed and the brigade seemed ‘confused’ and ‘disorganised’. Furthermore both the division’s brigades would be exhausted by the end of the next day.108 The more ‘I pondered the problem’ he later wrote:

the more convinced I was that on the morrow we should carry out preparations for a plan to be put into execution on the third day should the enemy still be holding out in 17 Brigade sector. As soon as I woke the next morning I arranged for the CRA and Comd 19 Brigade to meet me after breakfast. At this meeting I outlined a plan

107 Long, To Benghazi, p. 183. Berryman also noted in his diary that ‘Allen very successful all objectives.[sic] 5Bn disorganised on SL and two coys 2/7th Bn did well in getting where they did. Other 2 Coys 7Bn did not get into perimeter till after dark. Were crossing CAPUZZO-BARDIA Rd at 1615hrs 2 ½ miles from perimeter and moving NW’. See ‘Berryman Diary, 3 January 1941’, Papers Of Lieutenant- General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, Item 1. 108 ‘Interview with F. H. Berryman’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/107. ‘Interview with Major B. H. Travers’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/61. 216 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

for an attack by 19 Brigade on the third day in a SE direction against the rear of the enemy opposite 17 Brigade.109

Organising such a move, however, was no easy feat. 19th Brigade was being held back for operations against Tobruk and Berryman would have to undertake an assessment of the operation with the CO of 19th Brigade and the CRA and then convince Mackay to take the plan to the Corps Commander, Lieutenant-General O’Connor. Both Herring and Robertson agreed with Berryman’s plan, but Mackay again reiterated the corps commander’s direction that the 19th Brigade was not to be used in the assault on the fortress. By sheer stroke of fortune O’Connor arrived at 6th Division HQ and Mackay allowed Berryman to outline his plan. O’Connor ‘readily agreed’ but would not allow the Australians the use of an additional squadron of tanks that had been requested. The assault therefore had to be carried out with whatever tanks remained of 7RTR.110

As Berryman outlined his plan to O’Connor the 16th Brigade launched its assault supported by the majority of the artillery, the remaining six tanks of 7 RTR and the Bren Gun carriers of the Division’s cavalry squadron. Earlier that morning Allen had expressed to Berryman some of the difficulties he was encountering in putting this operation together and he requested the cooperation of Savige’s 17th Brigade. Berryman replied ‘they had been instructed to do what they could, but [Allen should] NOT rely on them.111 The 16th Brigade battled on alone and by 1420 Allen reported that his operations had been a success.112 The rapid collapse of the Italians in front of the 16th Brigade demonstrated that there was little resistance left in the defenders in the northern sector and over 10,000 prisoners were taken. In the south, however, the 17th Brigade continued to meet determined resistance.113

109 ‘Berryman to Lieutenant-Colonel Fenton 21 Nov 1944’., p. 2. Papers Of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370 & Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part II. 110 ‘Berryman to Lieutenant-Colonel Fenton 21 Nov 1944’., p. 2. Papers Of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370 & Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part II. See also ‘Operations – Bardia “G” Branch 6 Div’, War Diary 6th Australian Division General Staff Branch, Part II, January 1941, AWM 52 1/5/12. 111 ‘Battle Diary, 0630hrs 4 January 1941, 6th Australian Division G Branch – Intelligence Summaries’ AWM 52 1/5/12. 112 ‘Operations 6 Aust Div in Western Desert’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I, p. 12. 113 Long, To Benghazi, p. 197. 217 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

In the meantime Herring and Robertson set out immediately for a reconnaissance114 while Berryman held a 1030 conference with the CO of 16th British Brigade to arrange the relief of 19th Brigade from its duties of collecting prisoners and providing rear area protection. At 1035 Berryman contacted Allen to discover the number of Infantry (Matilda) tanks that would be available to support the assault.115

Map 8: The Attack of the 16th Brigade AIF, 4 January 1941. (Long, To Benghazi, p. 194)

At 1100hrs Berryman sent a liaison officer to the 7th Armoured Division and at 1130 he called in Lieutenant-Colonel Lucas (CRE) to discuss the role of the engineers in supporting 19th Brigade’s attack. At 1140 orders were issued by Headquarters to all of the Division’s units, including the 17th Brigade. The order called for the 17th Brigade to halt operations after the capture of Posts 10, 12, 13, and 15 and at 1700hrs the 2/5th Battalion of the 17th Brigade was to come under Robertson’s command to assist with

114 Ibid. 115 ‘Official 6th Division G1 Battle diary, 2 -5 January 1941 ’, Papers of Lieutenant-General Frank Berryman, Papers Of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370. 218 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

his attack on the following morning. A liaison officer was immediately sent out to 17th Brigade, arriving at midday, to confirm the signal at 1140hrs.116

However the new divisional plan did not accord with Savige’s own view of the battle. Savige wished to keep the 2/5th Battalion under his control for a planned night assault and he sent the liaison officer from Division, Captain Grieve, back with his plans for the use the 2/5th battalion. Savige asked for reconsideration of Division’s plan in light of his proposed night attack and requested a decision by 1700hrs. According to Savige’s version of events Brigadier Robertson arrived at 1600hrs and asked when the 2/5th Battalion were available. Savige refused to hand over the battalion on the claim that he had not yet heard back from division.117

An argument broke out between Savige and Robertson and the matter was not resolved until 2000hrs. The Division’s G1 Battle Diary reveals that Savige’s request for the use of the 2/5th battalion in his night attack was received from Captain Grieve at 1500hrs (3pm). In response Berryman radioed a message to all commanders at 1530hrs stating: Continuation of my 0/126 [order for 19th Brigade attack sent at 1140hrs]. 1 RNF [British Machine Gun Battalion] less two coys A Sqn [6th Div Cav Reg] and 2/5 Battalion come under comd 19 Brigade forthwith. Reps report post 34 before 1700 hrs tonight. 2/5 Battalion will remain in battle pos. 19 Brigade assume responsibility from 1700 hrs.118

In the meantime Savige continued to prepare for his night attack which included moving the 2/5th Battalion, which he had already been ordered to hand over to Robertson. Savige’s actions were not only a clear violation of the initial order from his commanding officer, but also of the clarification signal sent out by 6th Division headquarters. It is clear from the signal that only two things could have happened. Either Savige ignored this clarification from Berryman or his own headquarters staff failed to inform him of this confirmation signal. Despite this ambiguity what is clear is that Savige was being obstructionist. He received an order and supposedly lacking

116 Ibid, p. 196-197. 117 ‘Savige to Long’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/348, Part II, p. 31. See also ‘19th Infantry Brigade, Diary of Events, Libyan Campaign by Brigadier H.C.H Robertson’, Papers Of Lieutenant- General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, part 78A, p. 3. 118 ‘Official 6th Division G1 Battle diary, 2-5 January 1941 ’, Papers Of Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370. Emphasis added. 219 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

clarification of his request he should have made all the necessary arrangements to carry out that order. This episode clearly demonstrates Savige’s obstinacy at Bardia. Whenever orders from divisions clashed with his own narrow view of operations he thought it his prerogative to override or question those orders.

Robertson’s attack, supported by the remaining six tanks of the 7RTR, began on the morning of 5 January. The tanks penetrated the enemy gun line and a short time later a stream of prisoners began to file through the 19th Brigade. While a success, the assault did meet with considerable opposition and one Italian redoubt held out strongly for almost the entire day.119 At 1130 hrs Post 11 finally surrendered to the 2/6th Battalion after having held out since their ‘demonstration’ on the first morning of the battle and by 1330hrs all resistance ceased.120

The Problematic Brigade Commander The cause of the majority of the problems at the Battle of Bardia had emanated with the HQ 17th Infantry Brigade. Responsibility for these difficulties during the course of the battle does not lie with Berryman, Mackay or the plan but rather the poor performance of Brigadier Savige. The failure of the 17th Brigade to achieve its objectives on the first and subsequent days was the result of number of factors: the over commitment of the 2/6th Battalion at post 11, the failure of the 7RTR to reform on time, the unfortunate loss of the commanding officer of the 2/5th battalion on the start line, poor cooperation between 7RTR and the 17th Brigade, heavy Italian resistance and a loss of control by HQ 17th Brigade.

Savige’s brigade was not as well trained as the 16th Brigade or the 19th Brigade and its leadership was below standard. Savige failed to issue orders that conformed to the Division’s original plan and he then overreacted when Berryman made modifications to aspects of his brigade’s tasks. He failed to obey Mackay’s specific request for a constant flow of information to division during the course of the battle. He lost control of his units during the early part of phase II, from which he never recovered, and he defied a direct order by refusing to hand over command of 2/5th Battalion to Robertson’s 19th Brigade. It was the actions of Savige, his headquarters and

119 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 105. 120 Grey, Australian Brass, p. 82-83. 220 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

the friction of war that sealed the 17th Brigade’s fate. Gavin Keating who has made the only study of Savige as a commander, concluded that:

[the]conflict over the order on 1 January was unsettling, but Savige had the best part of a full day to clarify matters … the … two charges, about being held back and handing over of the 2/5 Battalion to Robertson, owe more to wounded pride than sound judgement. The 19th Brigade was brought into the battle for the simple reason that the 17th Brigade’s attack was badly bogged down, and Robertson’s presence ended the battle quickly and with minimum loss of life … Savige’s tendency to issue instructions which he knew had not been officially approved by divisional headquarters created confusion and tension, and he failed to keep control of the attack in the north …The problems encountered at Bardia, and during the Western desert fighting in general, suggested Savige was not well suited to the fast pace of modern warfare … Berryman believed that [Savige] had been “lucky beyond all expectations” [in that his brigade did not suffer even more setbacks losses at Bardia due to his poor performance], and it is difficult to disagree.121

Keating concludes that one of the major reasons for Savige’s failure at Bardia was the lack of a highly trained Staff Corps officer in his brigade; Savige was without a senior staff officer during the battle which came to be presented as his most questionable performance of the war … such staff support was to be a significant factor in all of his subsequent commands.122

Savige’s poor performance at Bardia did not go unnoticed. Mackay sent letters to all of his senior officers after the battle. He heaped praise on Allen, Berryman, Jerram, and Herring. However, to Savige he noted ‘I would to you all [Savige and his staff] say, that extremely valuable experience has been gained and that, looking to the future “there are other days.”’123 Vasey summed up the feelings of Berryman, Robertson and himself in a letter to his wife, ‘Had Iven [Mackay] any real go Stan [Savige] would get a bowler hat [sacked]’.124 Lieutenant-Colonel Jerram who was full of praise for the staff and commanders of the 6th Division wrote to the British Official historian that ‘[17 Aust Inf Brigade] did not reach its objectives and what’s more I was never given any indication that our support [7RTR] had not been satisfactory … I leave

121 Keating, The Rightman for the Right Job, p. 50-52. 122 Ibid, p. 27. 123 ‘Mackay to Savige, 6 January 1941’ AWM 3 DRL 2529, item 21. 124 ‘George Vasey to Jessie Vasey’, 6 January 1941, Vasey Papers, ANL MS 3782, Box 2, Folder 11, p. 2. 221 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

out here some remarks about one of the Brigade commanders [Savige] which are better forgotten’.125

Berryman, along with Robertson and Vasey, criticised Savige heavily for his part in the capture of Bardia. One of the consequences of this was that Savige began to ‘entertain the idea that the Staff Corps was out to advance its own men and that he was in the way’.126 Berryman, however, was critical, not for the sake of supporting the Staff Corps, nor as a result of an ingrained aversion to the Militia, but rather as a reflection of Savige’s poor handling of his brigade. Indeed Keating concludes that ‘his [Savige’s] performance at Bardia was not a success’ and by the end of the year even Savige’s strongest supporter, Blamey, assessed that Savige was unequal to the strains of modern warfare and this ‘must be seen as conclusive’. 127

Savouring Victory The Australian victory at Bardia was a great feat of arms. Despite XIII Corps persisting in the belief that there were only 20,000 Italians in Bardia, the Australians captured over 40,000. Included in this haul were 400 guns of various calibres, 127 tanks and 708 motor vehicles. The British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden commented that never had ‘so much been surrendered by so many to so few’.128 For the Australians one

125 ‘Jerram to Chapman, 3 March 1968’, Chapman Papers, AWM 3 DRL 6433. The extract of Jerram’s comments to the Official British historian, General Playfair, were included as part of his letter to Chapman. 126 Russell, There Goes a Man, p. 206. 127 Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job, p. 82. Three years later, in the Pacific campaign, Berryman was to finally prove to Savige that he judged performance and not the ‘man’ or the type of service from which he came. During the of 1943 Berryman, then Deputy Chief of the General Staff, was sent by the Commander in Chief, General Blamey, to Savige’s 3rd Division headquarters outside of Salamaua. Berryman’s task was to assess the situation at the front and pass judgement on Savige’s performance. As Brigadier Moten noted, ‘ “Berry” came up to give a bowler hat [to fire from command] either to Savige or me if unsuccessful or to Herring for not knowing what was going on. (see Moten to Dexter, 11 April 1951, p. 2. AWM 172, Item 13) Keating has noted; ‘Berryman was sent forward … [most] importantly, to pass judgement on Savige’s handling of the campaign’. The fact that Berryman was to have Savige’s career in his hands is particularly important, given their past clashes. As one officer who accompanied Berryman wrote ‘it was an open secret that Berryman had a very low opinion of Savige’s military competence’. After a careful judgement of all of the issues and events Berryman’s report fully supported Savige’s position. It is interesting to note too that Berryman was sent on this mission by Blamey, Savige’s most forthright supporter during the war. Blamey, who by now was close to both men, knew first hand the ‘difficulties’ between Savige and Berryman yet he trusted Berryman to provide a balanced assessment of the situation and to draw a conclusion that was in the best interests of the Army. 128 As quoted in Mark Johnston, Fighting the Enemy: Australian Soldiers and their Adversaries in World War II, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 9. 222 PLANNING FOR VICTORY

of the most important outcomes of Bardia was that the ‘men of the Second AIF have shown that they are made of the same fibre as the First AIF’.129

A detailed analysis of the Battle for Bardia, an ‘anatomy of the battle’, reveals Berryman as one of the most gifted planners in the AIF and it brings to light those attributes that marked him as an officer with a proven capacity for senior command. Bardia cemented him as not only a staff officer renowned for thoroughness in preparation but also as a flexible officer able to adapt midway through an action as a result of changing battle conditions. His plan had demonstrated an excellent grasp of the capabilities of the troops and their equipment as well as a balanced knowledge of the strengths and limitations of the Australian infantry. His co-ordination of the armour, artillery, engineers and logistic support was also a hallmark of the operation and he displayed a readiness to get forward to the front line during the battle to get a feel for conditions and progress, to consult with frontline commanders and issue orders for the next stage of the assault, just as he had done as a Battery commander and a staff officer during the First World War.130

During the course of the battle Berryman maintained a close eye on operations while at the same time he kept himself a step ahead in terms of planning. It was Berryman who left headquarters to tour the front to oversee the events on the afternoon of the first day. It was his decision to allocate the resources to the 16th Brigade to capture Bardia town after it became apparent that Savige’s brigade had failed to reach all of its objectives. Furthermore, it was Berryman’s farsighted assessment of future operations on the night and morning of 3-4 January that lead to the plan for the commitment of the 19th Brigade on 5 January, to ensure a quick and decisive victory at Bardia.131 General Mackay noted that ‘Berryman’s outstanding ability and systematic planning contributed very largely to the success at Bardia…’.132 The Official History

129 NAA Sp 300/4 / 8, Chester Wilmot, ‘The Capture of Bardia’, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 14th January 1941. Casualties among the Australians were also very low. Only 130 Australians were killed and 326 wounded since the first units of the Division entered the line on 12 December. See Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, p. 128. 130 Wilmot, Tobruk, p. 7. 131 Colonel E. G. Keogh, editor of the Australian Army Journal noted in his book on the Middle East campaigns that the ‘audacious and careful planning developed the maximum potential of all participating elements, and gave the attacking troops the best possible chance of success’. Keogh, E.G. (Colonel), Middle East 1939-1943, p. 85. 132 Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 204. 223 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

commented that ‘It was [amongst other things] a victory for … audacious yet careful planning’.133

The plan was, in some senses, unavoidably complicated but on the same score it was very achievable. Even so Berryman was far from infallible. He should have ensured that Brigadier Savige was included in the first planning conference for the attack on Bardia and he should have consulted Savige before issuing modified orders on 31 December. With the exception of these two incidents, Berryman’s planning and impact on the course of the operations at Bardia and Tobruk were exemplary.

Berryman also possessed a capacity for the mastery of the less tangible factors in war. He established a flair for guessing the enemy’s intentions and he was not without a degree of luck. Napoleon was once asked what qualities he looked for in his generals, and he replied, ‘just one - that they be lucky’.134 While this may be true in many cases Berryman’s luck was more akin to Field Marshal Von Moltke’s argument that it was a gift ‘given only to the efficient’.135

Berryman’s talents and luck must also be set against his imperfections. He was a painstaking officer. Not just in his attention to detail but also in his relations with other officers. He was cool, calm and in control but also highly critical, overly secretive and at times unfriendly and difficult. For Berryman, winning the battle was more important than winning friends. All officers, from the most junior to the most senior, have their less amicable attributes and their idiosyncrasies. Mackay, at times, lacked decisiveness, Vasey was vitriolic to all and sundry, Robertson was vain, Allen stubborn and Savige paranoid. Berryman’s personal traits may have made him difficult to work with, but in no way did they impede his skill and capabilities. In the end, the ultimate test of a military officer is success, and at Bardia Berryman’s operational success was decisive.

133 Long, To Benghazi, p. 205. 134 ‘Leadership and Luck’, Centre for Politics and Public Affairs, Franklin and Marshall University, http://www.fandm.edu/x3920.xml [10 May 2006] 135 Tsouras, The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, p. 280. 224 THE PERFECT BATTLE

Chapter 8 ‘The Perfect Battle’ Tobruk, January 1941

The first day of the battle of Tobruk…was one of the most stirring days I have ever spent…before dawn I drove around the Australian lines still 15 miles out side Tobruk town … by dusk I stood with the most advanced Australian troops less than half a mile from the centre of the town. Broadcast by War Correspondent Chester Wilmot, ABC field unit with the AIF, 23 January 1941.

Tobruk Tobruk is a name that sits comfortably within the annals of great Australian feats of arms. It is a name, more often than not, that is spoken in the same breath as those of Gallipoli, Kokoda and the Western Front when politicians and the media call upon the Anzac legend. A mere whisper of the battle invokes images of , the Africa Korps and the man who seems to personify the ruthless efficiency of the German army in the African desert – General . From an unromantic but purely strategic point of view Tobruk is one of the most important ports in Cyrenaica for an army moving in either direction ‘because of the role it could play in shortening an army’s logistic lines’.1

As the months of 1940 /1941 came and went the strategic value of the fortress would not change, only the nationality of the soldiers who sat in its bunkers seeking cover against the unrelenting pounding of artillery and air bombardments. In January 1940 Tobruk was the main defensive position of the Italian army in Cyrenaica protected by 27,000 Italian troops backed up by 220 guns and 65 tanks under the command of General Petassi Manella.2

1 ‘Tobruk, Siege of’, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 589. 2 Long, To Benghazi, p. 209. The exact size of the Italian force holding Tobruk was not known to the Australians. In the lead up to the assault they received some conflicting reports. Documents captured on Boxing Day 1940 indicated that the fortress was held by some 44,969 officers and men. Interrogations of Arabs in the Mbassas-Goelia area however indicated that the ‘Italians do not intend to hold Tobruch [sic] [and] that 75% of garrison has been evacuated’. See ‘6 Aust Div Intelligence Summary No.7’ AWM 52 1/5/12, January 1941, Part II, Appendix 20. 225 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Bardia had proved to be a mixed bag for the Australians. On one hand it was an outstanding victory that netted large numbers of Italian prisoners and equipment, but on the other the Italians proved that a number of them could fight with great determination and resilience. It also became apparent to the Australians that the Italian artillery formed the backbone of their forces and that they fought with much greater tenacity than the Italian’s conscripted infantry.

Again a close ‘anatomy’ of the Battle of Tobruk serves to be exceptionally revealing. Most of the planning and operational problems that occurred at Bardia were able to be overcome by the increased size of the attacking force. Tactical issues that arose at Bardia were rectified as were the disputes over the receipt and interpretation of orders between headquarters 6th Division and the 17th Brigade. Captain Travers’ observed that; Berryman…made certain that there could be no possibility of any misunderstanding about order for the battle of Tobruk. At every conference he had a stenographer present and he confirmed, mostly over the General’s signature, every discussion held. The confirmatory notes were made at once and then sent out by the quickest means [and] a copy was put in the War Diary. But a copy was also put into his tin dispatch box which he kept under his table in the HQ. He told me that there was no way he would be caught out again by people saying that he had not issued orders correctly or that they had not received them. Further, during the battle itself he kept a minute by minute diary of what was occurring; this was also included in the war diary. So I learnt the valuable lesson ‘about guarding one’s tail’.3

The major inhibiting factor for the Australian attack at Tobruk was the strain placed on the increasingly stretched British and Australian supply lines. Despite this, the assault on Tobruk by the 6th Australian Division supported by the British 7th Armoured Division went so well that Berryman later described it ‘as the perfect battle’.4

There were a number of similarities between the 6th Division’s assault on Bardia and Tobruk and some notable differences. The enemy had not changed, except perhaps that their morale had declined further after their recent heavy defeats. The terrain was similar and the Italian fortifications were almost identical to Bardia except that the anti- tank ditch on the outer rim of the defences was not as elaborate and in some cases a

3 Captain Travers as quoted in Keating, Savige as a Military Commander, p. 85. 4‘F. H. Berryman to Lt-Col A G Fenton, Assistant Director of Public Relations’, 21 November, 1944, Berryman Papers, AWM PR 84/370. 226 THE PERFECT BATTLE

wadi was used in place of a formal obstacle. At Bardia there were eighty posts along a seventeen mile perimeter, at Tobruk it was 128 posts along a thirty-mile front.5

On face value, Tobruk seemed to present a much greater obstacle than Bardia. Whereas Bardia was a delaying position it was clear that Tobruk was the main defensive location.6 The Australian troops had received some much needed combat experience at Bardia, morale was high and they had a firm belief in their superiority over the enemy. However, difficult conditions made operations both gruelling and tiresome. The men, while in very good spirits, were constantly exposed to very cold temperatures, frequent severe dust storms and Italian shell fire. The food was monotonous, there was little water, and many of the men had desert sores and lice.7 As the Australians closed up on the fortress at Tobruk the confidence of the senior commanders evident at Bardia began to waver.

The operational instructions for the advance to Tobruk were issued by Berryman while the fighting at Bardia was still underway. The plan called for an advance by the 19th Brigade and A Squadron 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment the day after the capture of Bardia. Despite the diversion of the 19th Brigade to the attack on the Bardia perimeter it was still able to carry out this operation as planned.8 Prior to the movement of the 19th Brigade, the British 7th Armoured Division had already started to probe the defences of Tobruk and in the days following the fall of Bardia both of these now battle hardened units closed up around the Italian fortress.

In the period 6 January to 15 January 1941 both the 6th Australian Division and the 7th Armoured Division gathered their forces around Tobruk and built up their supplies for the impending assault. The Australian infantry took up position on the eastern face of the fortress with the 16th Brigade on the left, the 19th on the right and the 17th Brigade in reserve. The 7th Armoured Division formed up on the western side of the

5 ‘War Diary 6 Australian Division General Staff Branch- XIII Corps Intelligence Summaries’, January 1941, part 2, appendices, AWM52 1/5/12; Long, To Benghazi, p. 210. 6 McDonald, Chester Wilmot Reports, p. 64. 7 Long, To Benghazi, p. 212. 8 ‘War Diary 6 Australian Division General Staff Branch’, January 1941, part 2, appendices, AWM52 1/5/12. See also ‘Tobruch [sic] 21 Jan 41, (Notes of Lecture given by Brig. F. H. Berryman to Offrs of 7 and 9 Divs in Palestine Feb 1941), Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30 Part I, p. 1. (Hereafter Tobruk Lecture) 227 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

fortress. In the week leading up to the attack the Australians, as at Bardia, conducted a program of aggressive patrolling while supplies were brought forward.9

General O’Connor’s plan called for a demonstration by the support group of the 7th Armoured Division along the western face of the fortress and an assault by the 6th Australian Division east of the El Adam road. Berryman’s plan at Tobruk used the best features of the assault at Bardia and applied the lessons that had been learned from that battle. Surprise was again to be one of the keys to the success of the operation, but this time, rather than dispersing units of the 6th Division to provide a demonstration to distract the Italian defenders, this was provided by the 7th Armoured Division. Furthermore, for Tobruk there were no restrictions placed on the use of the Australian forces and thus all three brigades of the division were available from phase I.10

The basic concept of operations for the 6th Division, however, remained the same at Tobruk as for Bardia. The position chosen for the attack was again on the seam of the Italian defences and the 16th Brigade was again given the task of breaking into the Italian defences with support provided by the tanks of 7RTR. But this time, with an extra brigade available, Berryman allocated Robertson’s 19th Brigade with the exploitation task within the perimeter. The 17th brigade was fragmented and used to reinforce the 16th brigade, provide for a small diversion on the eastern edge of the fortress and provide the division’s reserve.

Besides the advantages in planning provided by the additional brigade Berryman also varied the tactics at Tobruk by planning for the 19th Brigade to drive deep into the centre of the Italian position rather than attacking the perimeter posts from the flank or rear. There were three major reasons for his decision. First the most useful information that Berryman and the 6th Division had garnered from Bardia was the effectiveness of the Italian artillery. The plan, therefore, called for a greater emphasis in the 6th Division’s artillery plan for counter-battery fire as well as a rapid exploitation by the 19th Brigade into the interior of the position to capture the Italian artillery lines. This, it was hoped, would eliminate the difficulties the 17th Brigade encountered during Phase II

9 Ibid. Tobruk Lecture, p. 1. 10 ‘War Diary 6 Australian Division General Staff Branch’, January 1941, part 2, appendices, AWM52 1/5/12. See also Tobruk Lecture, p. 1-3, 6. 228 THE PERFECT BATTLE

at Bardia when faced with determined resistance from the Italian gunners.11 Secondly, the deep thrust by the 19th Brigade would hopefully set up the division for the capture of the key objective within the fortress, the port. Finally the plan had to be varied enough from Bardia to assure surprise as ‘it was logical to assume that [the Italians] would have some knowledge of our methods’.12

Preparations for the attack on Tobruk proceeded steadily and the troops displayed all the confidence that comes from a sense of superiority over the enemy after a major victory. Many of the senior officers, however, did not share their men’s confidence and displayed doubts over the impending operation. These reservations went all the way to the highest echelons of the Australian command in the Middle East. Lieutenant-General Blamey, the Australian GOC, wrote to Mackay on 20 January ‘telling him NOT to hurry and urging caution in [the] plans for [the] attack [on Tobruk]’.13

There was much for Blamey and the senior officers of the 6th Division to worry about. Lieutenant Colonel Jerram’s tanks were again to help spearhead the 6th Division’s assault; however they could only muster 16 serviceable tanks as opposed to the 24 on the first morning of Bardia and they were ‘all long overdue for a major overhaul’.14 Despite the bonus of having only one major perimeter line to break through the planning for the attack was hampered by a lack of aerial reconnaissance photographs because of the heavy Italian anti-aircraft defences. Compounding these problems was the only limited support available from the navy due to the enemy’s strong coastal defences. This disadvantage was not easily overcome as these defences were positioned

11 ‘F. H. Berryman to Major-General Sturdee (et al), 14 February, 1941’, Berryman Family Papers. Berryman commented to Sturdee that he ruled out attacking Tobruk from a flanking position, similar to that chosen at Bardia. This was due to the presence of the Italian General Bergonzoli, (who had been at Bardia on January 2) in Tobruk and the fact that Berryman thought that ‘it would have been very difficult administratively’. See also ‘Comments on the OPS of 6 Aust Div at Bardia and Tobruch [sic], 16 March 1941’, Papers of Lieutenant-General F. H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item, 27 ‘Interview with Major Travers, September 1944’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/61. 12 ‘Comments on the Operations of 6 Australian Division at Bardia and Tobruk’, Berryman to Mackay 16 March 1941, Papers of Lieutenant-General F. H. Berryman, AWM 84/370, item 27. See also ‘Interview with Major Travers, September 1944’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/67. 13‘Berryman Diary, Monday 20th January 1941’, Papers of Lieutenant-General F. H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 1. 14 ‘Comments on the OPS of the 6 Aust Div at Bardia and Tobruch[sic]’, Papers of Lieutenant-General F. H. Berryman, AWM PR 84 /370, item 27, p. 2. 229 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

away from the perimeter which meant the Australian Division could not deal with them on the first day of the battle.

As a result of General Bergonzoli escaped from Bardia Berryman ruled out repeating an assault on the defences from the flank. He was also dissuaded by the administrative difficulties of such an attack at Tobruk.15 Mackay expressed his reservations about the length of the enemy’s perimeter at Tobruk and the difficulty in selecting a point of entry to assault the fortress. One of the 6th Division’s junior staff officers noted that Mackay stated, ‘Tobruk [will] be a harder nut than Bardia’.16 Berryman was to comment just after the battle that:

As a theoretical problem Tobruch [sic] was not so easy to solve as Bardia. There was no key position within a mile or so of its front line. The nearest escarpent[sic] form [sic] which we could get commanding observation meant a penetration of over five miles and meant attacking him where he was strongest, particular in arty. The inf Brigs.[Savige, Allen & Robertson] were not so confident of the plan as at Bardia and told me I had got the wrong spot. My answer was ‘NO – “We will get surprise and go straight on the bulk of his arty which is the chosen sector and once the backbone of his resistance will be gone [sic]. To attack further west would allow him to swing the bulk of his arty on to our attacking troops and it would take them much longer to reach his fd arty.”17

Mackay and his infantry brigadiers were not alone in their reservations. George Vasey noted that: Berry is still here- he remains for the battle that starts tomorrow and I may say that I am glad I have not taken over from him just prior to it. I have a feeling it may not be another Bardia and I am glad to be out of that [operations] side of it.18

Needless to say Vasey was still keen for Berryman’s departure to the 7th Division, and at the end of the battle he commented that ‘Tomorrow I sit in B[erryman’s] office and learn how it is done! ... and I hope within three or four days to be rid of him’.19

15 ‘F. H. Berryman to Major-General Sturdee (et al), 14 February, 1941’, Berryman Family Papers & ‘Tobruk Lecture’, p. 2. 16 ‘Interview with Major Travers, September 1944’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/67. 17 ‘Brigadier F .H. Berryman to Major General Sturdee [et al]’, 14 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 18 ‘George Vasey to Jessie Vasey’, 20 January, 1941, NLS MS 3782. 19 Ibid. 230 THE PERFECT BATTLE

While Berryman displayed absolute confidence in his plan and the point of assault that he had chosen, he had reservations of his own. Not with belief in the division’s ability to capture a second major Italian fortress, but with the 17th Brigade. After Bardia, Berryman ‘stated privately’ that ‘Savige’s formation could not be trusted’ and his plan at Tobruk reflected this belief.20 The 17th Brigade was given the role of the reserve formation, its units were committed piece meal and on a number of occasions the battalions of Savige’s brigade were allocated to other brigades. The 17th Brigade’s war diary commented that ‘As at Bardia 17 Aust. Inf. Bde. were denied any opportunity for spectacular success but had ample opportunity for work of real value’.21

Recriminations abounded after the disagreements between Berryman, other senior officers and Savige and his 17th Brigade following Bardia. Both sides set out to ensure their version of events made their way, not just to fellow officers in the AIF, but into the public record. Soon after the battle the commanding officers of the 2/6th and 2/7th Infantry Battalions and the 2/2nd Field Regiment wrote personal testimonies praising Savige’s performance at Bardia. These were passed on to Mackay by the 17th Brigade’s Brigade Major, Major Brock.22 This type of support shows the depth of resentment felt amongst the senior officers of the 17th Brigade but nonetheless it was an extraordinary move. Vasey commented to Mackay that:

Why does Brock address you on anybody’s behalf but his own? What are Brock’s qualifications for knowing whether Savige did a good job or not? ... Deliberations or discussions by officers or soldiers with the object of conveying praise, censure or any work of approbation towards their superiors or any other of the Military Forces are prohibited.23

Stuart Braga rightly points out that Vasey’s stance was somewhat contradictory given that ‘exactly two months earlier Vasey had sent Rowell a blistering written

20 G. Keating, ‘Savige as a Military Commander’, AWM MSS 1604, p. 27. Keating’s assessment is based on Travers’ ‘Windows on a War’, p. 86. Brigadier Robertson held a similar opinion of Savige, see, ‘19th Infantry Brigade: Diary of events – Libyan Campaign by Brigadier H.C.H. Robertson D.S.O’, Papers of Lieutenant-General F. H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 78A, p. 7-8. 21 ‘Battle of Tobruch - 17th Infantry Brigade, January 1941, Reports, part 1 of 2’, AWM 52, 8/2/17. 22 Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 193. This ‘petition’ was apparently collected at the instigation of Major Brock. 23 Ibid. 231 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

indictment of both Mackay and Berryman’.24 Yet despite Vasey’s similar failings Brock had no place organising such a ‘petition’. Vasey was correct in asserting that this act was inconsistent with the conduct of officers and normal operations and, in fact, Brock was not in a position to judge Savige’s performance. His opinion and that of his fellow officers involved in the 17th Brigade’s attack at Bardia were inherently biased and did not take into account the overall picture of the brigade’s place within the division’s plan.

It is also interesting to note that Major Travers, who was on the staff of 6th Divisions headquarters at Bardia, blamed most of the problems that arose between 6th Division and 17th Brigade on Brock. He stated to the Official Historian, Gavin Long, that ‘I think Brock was at the bottom of all this trouble he would say one thing to Div[ision] and another to Savige’.25

Despite Brock’s attempts to influence 6th Division headquarters, a lack of confidence in Savige’s capabilities remained firmly entrenched. On 15 January Travers recorded in his diary that ‘Savige seems to be making a nuisance of himself [and] Berryman and Vasey [are] fed up. Berryman: [said that] the plan for the attack on Tobruk is based on the fact that 17 Bde could not be trusted’.26 Berryman was not alone in his assessment of the situation. Vasey argued that ‘To my mind the whole thing [17th Brigade’s performance at Bardia and Brock’s petition] indicates a most wrong – if not dangerous – state of affairs in the Bde and demands a searching investigation’.27

All of these factors were present in the mind of the senior officers of the 6th Division when the first of the planning conferences for the assault on Tobruk got underway on 13 January 1941. The planning stages for Tobruk followed a similar pattern to that which had been established at Bardia. Major conferences were held on 13, 16, 17 and 20 January prior to the assault on the 22nd. At the first conference the ‘GOC outlined the plan’ which called for a break in by the 16th brigade in phase one,

24 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 106. For Vasey’s comments see Vasey Papers, 10 and 17 November 1940. Braga, however, inaccurately accords Vasey’s changing view to his ‘new appointment as Mackay’s GSO1 … immediately after the Battle of Bardia’. Vasey, in fact, did not take over from Berryman until immediately after Tobruk - three weeks later. 25 ‘Interview with Major Travers’, Records of Gavin Long, Notebook, September 1944, AWM 67 2/61. 26 ‘Interview with Major Travers’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/61, Notebook, September 1944. 27 ‘Vasey to Mackay, 12 January 1941, p.1-2, AWM 6850 item 100, Mackay, Iven G (Lieutenant General, Sir, KBE, CMG, Goc-In-C Home Forces, High Commissioner in India). 232 THE PERFECT BATTLE

reminiscent of Bardia, followed by a move by the 17th Brigade to secure the eastern section of the fortress and then a drive by the 19th Brigade into the centre of the fortress during phase II.28

It was clear from Berryman’s plan that the 17th Brigade was being sidelined and the really crucial roles were going to Allen and Robertson. The 17th Brigade was to carry out a diversion of the eastern side of the fortress. The 2/6th Battalion of 17th Brigade would be detached to 16th Brigade for phase I and during phase II the 17th Brigade would clear the eastern sector of the fortress and provide the division’s reserve. Like Bardia this meant the fracturing of Savige’s brigade but this time it was not done for operational necessity but due to a lack of trust by Division (i.e. by Berryman and Vasey) in his capabilities.

Mackay outlined the general concept of operations that Berryman had formulated and at the end of the ‘formal conference’ Berryman held discussions with Allen, Robertson, Herring and Jerram to discuss the needs of phase II of the operation. The officers agreed that a delay of one hour would be necessary between the operations of the 16th and 19th Brigades to ‘enable some arty to move fwd and to enable the 19 Aust Inf Bde to organise the attack’. The detail of the operations, however, would not be finalised ‘until more information is available about the nature of the inner perimeter’.29

At Tobruk the stress and fragility of an army on campaign was an unrelenting presence on the battlefield. This stress manifested in innumerable ways, and for the senior commanders of the 6th Division, it was no more evident that in the vitriolic relationships that festered between these men. While Berryman finalised his plan Mackay tried to play peacemaker. Leaving Berryman to get on with the preparations for the attack, he took Savige aside and said ‘Stan, you had all the slugging work at Bardia and none of the spectacular so I want you to study these maps as I intend you should go on and take Derna [after Tobruk has fallen]’. Savige ‘thanked him, and assured him that

28 ‘Note of Conference Held at HQ 6 AUST DIV 1430hrs, 13 Jan 41’. Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I. 29 Ibid. 233 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

we [17 Bde] did not seek the spectacular, and my Bde was content in fulfilling whatever job he cared to give us’.30

Later that evening Berryman outlined the plan to the division’s engineering commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Lucas and they discussed the need to conduct reconnaissances and to prepare plans for the breaching of the anti-tank ditch.31 Further to Berryman’s modus operandi at Bardia the conference notes included, in the last section, a reminder to all officers that ‘these notes … are NOT to be disclosed to any offrs than Senior Staff Offrs of those Comds present’.32 Once again Berryman displayed his keen desire to maintain secrecy and control all information regarding the division’s operations.

Preliminary moves were carried out during the next few days. On 16 January Mackay and Berryman went to O’Connor’s headquarters for a conference to finalise the details of cooperation and support with XIII Corps.33 The following day the Division’s senior officers met again to discuss the plan. ‘Mackay gave the latest situation’ and then again handed over responsibility so as the ‘GI [Berryman] should confer with Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde [Allen], CO 7 R Tanks [Jerram], and CRA [Herring] and hammer out the plan’.34 Robertson, the commander responsible for phase II recognised, in contrast to Savige’s attitude regarding phase II at Bardia, that ‘Chief attention [at this conference] was naturally directed initially towards the 16 Bde plan, and other than giving an objective to the 19 Bde, little was done regarding phase II at this stage’.35 Berryman, Allen, Jerram and Herring then ensured that ‘the details of phase I were fixed’ and the debate over the point of entry was finalised with an attack be carried out at ‘Post R 55 and R 57 in [the] first line’ and Berryman issued the orders for the operation over the

30 ‘Savige to Gavin Long – “The Capture of Tobruk”’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67, 3/348, part I, p. 4. 31 ‘Note of Conference Held at HQ 6 AUST DIV 1430hrs, 13 Jan 41’. Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, Part I.. 32 Ibid. See also ‘Conference HQ 6 Aust Div 1000hrs 17 Jan 41’, War Diary 6th Australian Division, January 1941, Part II, Appendix 31, AWM 52, 1/5/12. 33 ‘Conference HQ XIII Corps 1130hrs 16 Jan 41’, War Diary 6th Australian Division, January 1941, Part II, Appendix 29, AWM 52, 1/5/12. 34 ‘Conference HQ 6 Aust Div 1000hrs 17 Jan 41’, War Diary 6th Australian Division, January 1941, Part II, Appendix 31, AWM 52, 1/5/12. 35 ‘19th Australian Infantry Brigade: Diary of Events – Libyan Campaign – by Brigadier H.C.H. Robertson’, Papers of Lieutenant-General Sir F. H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 78A, p. 7. 234 THE PERFECT BATTLE

next two days.36 D-Day was set at 20 January but this would be delayed, as it had at Bardia, due to the overstretched Australian supply lines.37

The attack on the morning of 21 January 1941 began with the largest artillery concentration seen so far in the Western Desert. The engineers had spent the previous night skilfully dismantling the series of booby traps that the Italians had set up to protect their anti-tank ditch and, under cover of the artillery barrage, they blew large gaps in the wire to allow the battalions of the 16th Brigade to assault the enemy posts. Within a short time the 16th Brigade captured five enemy positions. The 2/6th Battalion and other elements of the 17th Brigade started to reduce the eastern section of the fortress and at 0755hrs the leading elements of the 19th Brigade passed through.38

The 19th Brigade then fanned out and drove deep into the enemy positions until the left flank of the brigade was held up by a number of determined enemy posts using dug in tanks, machine guns and artillery to protect the headquarters of the Italian 22nd Corps. Ferocious assaults by Robertson’s brigade overcame these positions and the fortress commander General Petassi Manella was captured. By nightfall the 6th Division had seized virtually all the eastern section of the fortress.39

During the course of the day things ran exceptionally smoothly for Berryman. Reports flowed in continually updating headquarters as to the progress of the brigades. Berryman kept a close eye on the movements of all units and at 1000hrs he spoke to Savige to alert him of Mackay’s decision to place his 2/5th Battalion under Robertson’s command and for it to move into the fortress at post R78. Soon after, the 16th Brigade informed Berryman that it had secured its final objective ‘a long time ago’ and that the Italian posts were held by ‘17 men as against 60 at Bardia. Casualties light. PWs [prisoners of war] estimated at 7000’.40

36 ‘Phase I (less Arty)’ at 2100hrs on 18 January and the artillery plan were issued the following afternoon. ‘Operational Instruction No. 15’ detailing the diversionary and cut role of the 7th Armoured Division to the west as well as support from the RAF, RAAF and Navy was issued on the 18th and Phase II orders we issued in a similar fashion to Phase I on 19 and 20 January. ‘Tobruk Lecture’, p. 4. See also ‘6 Aust Div OP Instrn No 15’, War Diary 6th Australian Division, January 1941, Part II, Appendix 33, AWM 52, 1/5/12. 37 ‘Tobruk Lecture’, p. 4. 38 Long, To Benghazi, p. 220-238. 39 Ibid. 40 ‘Battle Diary – 6th Australian Division’, 21 January 1941, War Diary 6th Australian Division, AWM 52 1/5/12, January 1941, Part II, Appendix 41. 235 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Map 9: ‘Had fast tanks been available we could have taken Tobruch [SIC] at this juncture before the oil tanks, etc., were fired’ The Situation at Tobruk at the end of the first day, 21 January 1941 (John Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, p. 50 Map A.)

The deep drive of the 19th Brigade continued and in doing so bypassed one of the major Italian positions. Berryman noted with some displeasure in the Headquarters ‘Battle Diary’, that Lieutenant Mills and his Bren-gun carriers reached the last escarpment and were ‘overlooking Tobruch[sic] at 1020hrs, but without inf could NOT go fwd as he would isolate himself. (Had fast tanks been available we could have taken Tobruch [SIC] at this juncture before the oil tanks, etc., were fired)’.41

Berryman spent the afternoon talking to the brigade commanders and organising the next phase of the division’s assault. At 1605hrs he visited Robertson’s 19th Brigade, whose headquarters unit had remained in place until Berryman’s arrival, to advise them on further artillery support and to give orders for the following day. Berryman then went around visiting ‘Tubby’ Allen, Jerram and Savige to issue orders for the night and

41 Ibid. Berryman notes that a report to this effect was made by Major- Macarthur-Onslow, CO of 6th Division’s Cavalry Squadron after the battle. 236 THE PERFECT BATTLE

22nd January. These verbal orders received ‘later confirmation by Divisional Order 408’.42

In the morning the brigades set about preparing themselves for the final blow; however it soon became apparent that the remainder of the garrison had little interest in continuing the fight. At 1000hrs Mackay and Vasey visited the division’s units which were carrying out the task of rounding up prisoners who eventually totalled over 25,000, as well as 208 guns, 23 medium tanks and 200 vehicles.43 At Tobruk the ‘butcher’s bill’ for the Australians was exceptionally small in comparison to the victory. Less than half of the number of Australians were killed at Tobruk, 49 compared to 130 at Bardia, although the number of wounded was roughly the same.

Tobruk has been free from the controversy that dogged Berryman at Bardia. While his critics have tried hard to find fault they have been unable to make a case of even minor significance. Savige complained about being restricted to a ‘relatively minor role’ and again he attempted to convince the Official Historian of his misguided convictions.44 He also ranted to about ‘order[s], counter order[s], marches and counter marches, sandstorms and confusion; achieving nothing but a completely exhausted [my] Unit which was already suffering from battle fatigue’.45 Savige’s criticisms, like those at Bardia, fail to hold up under scrutiny. Berryman’s decision to leave out the 17th Brigade was entirely justified given the performance of its commander at Bardia. Both the 16th and 19th Brigades, under Allen and Robertson, had shown themselves to be first class units with exceptional commanding officers and to gamble with the problematic Savige was well beyond Berryman’s considered military appreciation. In the end the decision may have seemed harsh to the men of the 17th Brigade but from an operational and planning perspective it made complete sense.46

42 Ibid. 43 Long, To Benghazi, p. 238. 44 Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 199. 45 ‘Savige to Long – The Capture of Tobruk’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/348 part I, p. 13. 46 Savige’s criticisms of his brigades’ ‘marches and counter marches … [and] exhaustion’ hold little credibility when compared to the efforts required of the division’s other two brigades. The 17th Brigade at Tobruk marched less than half the distance of the 16th Brigade whose 62 miles by its battalions came in well under the 78 miles covered by the battalions of Robertson’s 19th Brigade. See ‘Tobruk Lecture’, p. 11. 237 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Map 10: Tobruk the Final Phase, 22 January 1941. (John Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, p. 50 Map B.)

In the end it is difficult to argue against such a complete victory. As Chapman pointed out, Berryman’s ‘planning could hardly have been more successful, nor cheaper in terms of casualties.47 Between the British victory at Sidi Barrani and the dual Australian victories at Bardia and Tobruk the first Libyan campaign was almost over. In the three battles the Australians and British captured over 100,000 Italians, 800 guns and over 300 tanks leaving the Italian army in North Africa decimated. All that was left was the pursuit of the remaining Italians out of Cyrenaica.48

Questioning the outcome As a result of the Australian’s spectacular success, and with the benefit of hindsight, many commentators have questioned the resolve of the Italian army during

47 Ibid. 48 Long, To Benghazi, p. 199 & 238. 238 THE PERFECT BATTLE

the first Libyan campaign ascribing much of the success of the Australians at Bardia and Tobruk to the poor performance of their enemy. In many respects this was a significant factor in the success of the Australian operations, especially when viewed in the light of the impact that the entry of the German Africa Corps had on operations in North Africa following the First Libyan Campaign.

Not long after the campaign, a myth of a demoralised Italian army started to gain momentum as a major factor in the Australian success. Margaret Barter in her history of the 2/2nd Battalion at war argues that the idea that Bardia was a ‘flimsy fortress … defended by toy soldiers’ was given credence by senior AIF officers who had seen service during the Firs World War, but were not present at Bardia. This was a myth that both the Official Historian Gavin Long and the 6th Division’s cavalry regiment’s historian, Shawn Leary have sought to dispel.49 As Long forcefully argues at Bardia, ‘O’Connor had set the Australians a task which would have tested the keenest and most experienced troops’.50

As the Australians first experience of battle in the Second World War Bardia revealed two competing interpretations of their Italian enemy. On the whole, as Mark Johnston has shown in his work, Fighting the Enemy: Australian Soldiers and their Adversaries in World War II, the ‘the average Italian soldier was poorly trained, poorly led, poorly fed and poorly armed’.51 Johnston’s work, however, like that of Long, Barter and O’Leary, illustrates the complex relationship that developed between the Australian and Italian armies.52

After Bardia the Italians emerge as an enemy who ‘are poor fighters, [with] the gunners being the only ones amongst them that are putting up any sort of show at all’.53 Another soldier noted that ‘A few [Italians were] made of sterner stuff, Italian artillery

49 Margaret Barter, Far Above Battle: The Memory and Experience of Australian Soldiers in War 1939- 1945, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1994), p. 47. 50 Long, To Benghazi, p. 203. 51 Mark Johnston, Fighting the Enemy: Australian Soldiers and their Adversaries in World War II, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000), p. 9. See also Keogh, E. G. (Colonel), Middle East 1939-1943, (Wilke & Co., Melbourne, 1959), p. 94-95. 52 Ibid, p. 12. See also Michael McKernan, The Strength of a Nation, p. 98. McKernan argues that ‘It would be wrong to give the impression that this desert warfare was something of a cake walk for at times the Australians did encounter stiff resistance’. 53 Ibid. 239 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

wallahs, had to be bayoneted’. However the Australians also showed great respect for the Italian fortifications at Bardia and Tobruk.54 The 16th Brigade’s War Diary noted of the Italians at Bardia that they:

ONLY threw down their arms after our troops had weathered the storm of their forward guns and SAA barrage and had them at bayonet point. The Italians shot it out with our men right up to their doorsteps as it were … nobody gave out until rooted out, e.g. every position had to be out-manoeuvred.55

In the end an analysis that relies solely on Italian weakness as the key to Australian success is fundamentally unsound. The 16th Brigade’s experience amply demonstrates the fact that at both Bardia and Tobruk the Italians in their immensely strong fortifications were defeated more by superior planning, tactical organisation and the training of the Australian troops than by their own poor performance. This is no more amply demonstrated than by the experience of the 17th Brigade with its ill fated attack on Post 11 at Bardia. Savige underestimated the Italians and his brigade suffered severely. While the attack failed and caused scores of needless casualties, the Italians held out, very resiliently, at Post 11 until the third day of the battle. They only surrendered after they were cut off and surrounded by Brigadier Robertson’s 19th Brigade.

The twin victories of Bardia and Tobruk were significant beyond their immediate impact on the operations of the British forces in North Africa. They were important to Australia and particularly to the 2nd AIF because of the continuity that the victory provided between the 1st and 2nd AIFs. After Bardia and Tobruk, the 2nd AIF had ‘proved itself beyond doubt as a formidable fighting force … [taking] its place in history with justifiable pride’.56 This view, expressed in the 2/2nd Battalion’s history, reflects that of the whole 6th Division. The 16th Brigade’s BM recorded that the ‘members of this division are equal as fighters and as common men of Australia with any corresponding Australian unit that fought in the Great War’.57 The ghost of the AIF past that had haunted Berryman, Mackay and the men of the 6th Division at the start of

54 Ibid, p. 12-14. 55 War Diary 16th Australian Infantry Brigade, 5 January 1941, as quoted in Barter, Far Above Battle, p. 47. 56 Purple Over Green and Roland Hoffman as quoted in Barter, Far Above Battle, p. 46. 57 War Diary 16th Australian Infantry Brigade, 5 January 1941 as quoted in Barter, Far Above Battle, p. 46-47. 240 THE PERFECT BATTLE

the Cyrenaican campaign could now be put to rest. The 2nd AIF could now move confidently into its future, the men knowing that they had their own legends to forge rather than past legends to live up to.

Tobruk – The Final Analysis. At Tobruk Berryman had profited from the lessons of the 6th Division’s first action, put into place procedures to rectify even the most minor faults and formulated a plan that made the best use the division’s capabilities as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy. Despite opposition it was Berryman who pushed through the point of attack and planned the deep thrust of the 19th Brigade into the fortress and it was this planning that proved so decisive to the outcome of the battle.

Mackay praised his staff officers, lead by Berryman, ‘who initiated their plans. Followed them up, and saw them through’.58 He singled out ‘Berryman’s outstanding ability and systematic planning [that] contributed very largely to the success at…Tobruk’.59 Berryman’s role also did not go unnoticed in the press back in Australia. It was consistently reported that he was ‘something more than Mackay’s right hand’ and ‘responsible for the detailed planning of the assault on Bardia and Tobruk’ and ‘credited with a very big share in the planning of these brilliant operations’.60

The commander of 7RTR Lieutenant-Colonel Jerram commented that the 6th Division were:

… the best divisional staff I have ever served under … I rather think the G1 Berriman [sic] was the only regular soldier among them [sic]. He was absolutely first class and so were the others … one of the things that impressed me about 6 Div was that [the] GOC & [his] staff had a feeling for machinery, something I had never experienced before … everything followed the same good pattern. Pre-attack conferences were run like orders groups with no whiff of a bloody committee meeting. Orders were short and clear with everything there that ought to be there and nothing that oughtn’t.61

58 Chapman, Iven Mackay, p. 192, 204. 59 Ibid, p. 204. 60 ‘A.I.F. Honours’, Sydney Morning Herald 1941, Berryman Family Scrapbook, p. 1. For more press clippings on Bardia see the Berryman Family Scrapbook p. 3, 7, 9, 39, et al. See also ‘The Festival Man’, People, 12 September, 1951, p. 16. 61 ‘Jerram to Chapman, 17 March 1968’, Chapman Papers, AWM 3 DRL 6433. Jerram was not the only British officer to recognise Berryman’s contribution. Berryman Diary, 24 Janurary 1941. 241 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Berryman noted in his diary that ‘Gen O’Connor personally thanked me and presented me to the C in C [Wavell] who also said how pleased he was & patted me on the back’.62 The accolades for the 6th Division continued back in Australia. The Army Minister, , said that the ‘operation was brilliantly conceived and executed’ and the excitement back in Australia over the victory led to a ‘decree that flags would be flown on all public buildings’.63

The honours that Berryman received were well deserved. It was Berryman’s plan and Mackay allowed him to follow it through during the course of the battle. His bold but meticulous preparation ‘left nothing to chance at all; he [Berryman] thought of as many points as he possibly could. Checked and rechecked until everything was clear and as fool proof as it could be’.64 This typified Berryman’s approach to war. As one junior officer would later commented, ‘Berryman had an eagle eye for detail’ and ‘nothing would escape his attention’.65

Despite Berryman’s achievements Stuart Braga poignantly asks why, at Bardia, did Mackay ‘allow his subordinate to take the initiative at a critical moment’ on that afternoon of the first day and allow this situation to be repeated at Tobruk?66 This is one of his key questions on the battle, but it fails to recognise that Berryman in fact took the ‘initiative’ days before the start of the battle for Bardia when Mackay ‘delegated’ virtually the entire role for the planning of the assault to Berryman.67 It was, in the end, Berryman’s and not Mackay’s plan. Berryman discussed the idea of taking Bardia with General Wilson before the division moved into the Western Desert, ‘I said narrow front & rapid exploitation. He said rehearse it, whatever you do’.68 Berryman drew up the plan, he organised and ran the planning conferences and during the course of the assault Mackay let him run the battle, make the crucial decisions and plan the division’s operations for the entire three days.

62 Berryman Diary, 24 Janurary 1941. 63 Chapman, Iven Mackay, p.190. 64 ‘The Campaign in the Western Desert from 10th December 1940 to 7th February 1941’, Records of Gavin Long, Notebook September 1944, AWM 67 2/61. 65 ‘John Salmon to Author’, 2 September 2005. John Salmon served as a Captain during the war and was Berryman’s ADC in 1948. 66 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 106. 67 Berryman claimed directly to Gavin Long (Official Historian WWII) that ‘The tactics side originated with me’, See, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/107. 68 ‘Interview- Lieutenant General Berryman’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 2/107. 242 THE PERFECT BATTLE

At Tobruk, despite the fears and misgivings of Mackay and the infantry brigadiers, Berryman persisted in his point of attack and carried through his plan of action. During Tobruk it was Berryman, as at Bardia, who went out to the key positions towards the end of the first day to assess the situation first hand and issue orders. At Bardia Allen challenged Berryman’s authority to do so, but Berryman reassured him that Mackay would approve his plans in their entirety. It was understandable, therefore, at Tobruk, on that first afternoon, that there was no question about the authority with which Berryman spoke to each of the infantry brigadiers.

Why did this happen? The exact reason for Mackay’s abdication of power remains unclear. Perhaps it is as Braga contends that

Berryman, having found Mackay pliable, ran rings around him from then on. It was the same story in New Guinea in January 1943. The moment T.A.B [Blamey] left N.G.F [New Guinea Force Headquarters] Berryman felt himself able to issue any orders he likes. Mackay didn’t know what was going on.69

Or perhaps it was as Berryman contends. That Mackay, recognised his deficiencies in staff work and planning, acknowledged that he still had a lot to learn as a division commander and thus it was Berryman’s job to ‘train him [Mackay] as a divisional commander’.70 Gavin Long noted that the regular officer is inclined to say that a militia officer can rise to command of a unit and success…but that commands of formations should as a rule be reserved for professional officers. The coordination of all arms and the staff work is a task beyond all but the most exceptional amateur officers.71

69 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 107. 70 ‘Berryman to Lieutenant-Colonel Fenton, 21 Nov 1944, Papers of Lieutenant-General Frank Berryman, AWM PR 84/370. This comment was repeated after the war in press articles and on at least one occasion is was reported that ‘Berryman is modest about this tribute, [and] thinks it illustrates Sir Iven’s great human qualities’. See ‘The Festival Man’, People, September 12, 1951, p. 16. See also A. B. Lodge, ‘Lieutenant-General Henry Gordon Bennett: A Model Major-General?’, in D. Horner (ed), The Commanders, p. 173. Lodge states that ‘Mackay, unlike Bennett, was prepared to rely on his regular staff officers, especially Berryman (his GSO1), to guide him’. 71 ‘Gavin Long - Impressions of Arthur ‘Tubby’ Allen’, Records of Gavin Long AWM 67 2/27. Berryman would have most certainly subscribed to such a view. During the War most of the highly successful Australian Division commanders were all Staff Corps officers (Vasey, Robertson, Wooten, Lavarack and Bridgeford). The obvious exception to this rule was Leslie Morshead. Certainly, as Long argues, ‘Allen… [was] a better Brigadier than a Division commander and not suitable as a corps commander’. 243 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

While Mackay’s biographer notes that he ‘refused to be mesmerized by them [Staff Corps Officers]’, it was also recognised that he relied heavily upon his two senior Staff Corps officers, especially Berryman who was his ‘right hand man’.72 Certainly the recognition of the dominance of Berryman in the relationship with his GOC was shared by others. Vasey noted to his wife on 26 October 1940 that ‘we [Berryman and I] are one when it comes to our opinion of Iven … The point is Iven commands nothing. In peace I never mind acting for my commander but now [in war] it is different’.73

This is not to say that Berryman did not appreciate the qualities that Mackay brought to his command. During the war Berryman was to note to a fellow officer that Mackay’s ‘qualities as a man were outstanding. His honesty of purpose, his complete lack of self interest, his fearlessness and his kindly patience with his brigadiers were dominant factors in moulding the division’.74 Just as revealing, however, is what Berryman did not comment on: planning, Mackay’s conduct of the battle, his operational foresight or his tactical appreciations. These were all areas that Mackay had left in the very capable hands of his chief subordinate, Colonel F.H. Berryman. Irrespective of the reasons for the style of relationship that developed between Berryman and Mackay at Bardia, and later at Tobruk, it proved to be remarkably successful and Berryman demonstrated that he was not a meek officer working ‘behind the scenes’ as so many staff officers are characterised but rather, in terms of operations, the man who was running the agenda.

The 6th Division’s operation at Tobruk was Berryman’s ‘swan song’ with the formation. Mackay could not hold him back from his promotion and posting to the 7th Division any longer. One of Berryman’s last acts as GS01 of 6th Division placed a further strain on his relationship with Brigadier Savige and drove a wedge even deeper into the growing conflict that Savige perceived as being a direct result of his ‘militia’ status. On the afternoon of 21 January Mackay, Berryman, and Vasey called at Savige’s headquarters. During the visit Mackay took Savige informed him that the 19th Brigade

72 Horner (ed), The Commanders, p. 173. Lodge states that ‘Mackay, unlike Bennett, was prepared to rely on his regular staff officers, especially Berryman (his GSO1), to guide him’. See also Chester Wilmot, Tobruk, p. 52. 73 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 71. 74 ‘Berryman to Lt-Colonel Fenton’, 21 November 1944, AWM PR87/370. 244 THE PERFECT BATTLE

would be leading the advance on Derna.75 One of Berryman’s last jobs as GS01, in concert with Vasey who relaced him, was to plan for the Division’s advance and they both of these officers obviously felt that Savige could not be trusted to carry out a leading role in this operation. As Savige commented to Gavin Long ‘There was no need for Mackay to tell me … [of the] other influences [that had] caused him to alter his original intention’.76

Regardless of the ongoing tensions in the division on the night of 23 January Mackay held a farewell dinner for Berryman attended by all of the divisions senior officers and some invited guests that ‘went off’, as Brigadier Savige remarked, ‘with a bang’.77 Berryman was particularly pleased to have the chance to say farewell to Robertson and Lucas, the engineering commander, as well as to a number of the headquarters junior officers of whom he had become quite fond. During the course of the night Berryman ensured that he caught up with ‘Tubby’ Allen to arrange for dinner with him and his wife in Cairo where both officers would be later in the month.78

After his departure from Cyrenaica, Berryman made his way . On Saturday night he went to the Union Club for dance night and in company with the club’s chairman they kicked on, ‘gate crash[ing]’ the party of a British Brigadier. Berryman’s foray back into the senior officer’s social scene in Egypt was, however, to prove much less successful than his campaign in the Western Desert. As Berryman related to his wife:

The Brig asked me a few questions & I told him I had spent the previous night with Arthur Selby [Berryman’s friend and a British army Brigadier] & he asked me what Selby was going to do [?] When I told him his jaw dropped as Selby was getting his job & he did not know about it & I felt like a cuckoo in the nest as I spoiled his

75 ‘Savige to Long – Battle of Tobruk’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/348 part 1, p. 16. 76 Ibid. 77 Russell, There Goes a Man: The Biography of Sir Stanley G. Savige, p. 209. To some extend Berryman and Savige were to at least maintain an atmosphere of cordal relations. When Berryman was promoted to command 1st Australian Corps in November 1943 Savige wrote to him and said; ‘We have had our honest differences of opinion … [but] I cannot express in writing how glad I am…[I have] developed towards you a feeling of real affection…This, I think, is due to your downright honesty of purpose, hard unremitting work to make yourself the man you are, guts, experience and a complete absence of “careerism” so evident in some quarter. You are what you are by the help of God and your own toil and ability’. ‘Savige to Berryman’, 4 December 1943, Berryman Family Papers. 78 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’ 2 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 245 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

evening. The dance finished early and I got away as quickly as I [could].79

If only Berryman planned his social outings with as much care and precision as he planned the operations at Bardia and Tobruk he could have avoided the embarrassment and his early retreat.

79 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, Sunday 2 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. See also Berryman Diary, 25 January 1941. 246 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

A Fighting Leader Chapter 9 ‘Commanding from the Front’ Operation Exporter & the Battle for Merdjayoun January 1941-June 1941

Never in all my military experience was a military operation planned as bad as the invasion of Syria. As soon as the centre column found opposition at Merdjayoun, Wilson and company promptly handed control to the Australian Corps Major-General Jack Stevens, ‘A Personal story of service as a citizen soldier’1

I DO NOT have to tell you who won the war. You know our artillery did General George S Patton Jr2

A Change of landscape Berryman’s transfer to the 7th Division heralded not just a coveted promotion, but also a sea change in climate and atmosphere. Not only was he departing the Western Desert for the familiar training grounds of Palestine he was also moving to a unit that was socially and politically very different. For Berryman, headquarters 7th Australian Division was a more harmonious and cooperative environment. The higher proportion of Staff Corps officers in the division meant that Berryman was able to socialise with a number of both junior and senior officers with whom he had already established agreeable long term relationships. The most important of these was with the 7th Division’s commanding officer, Major-General Lavarack.

On arrival at 6th Division Berryman had to spend his early days not only finding his feet but also warming to his unknown commander. His arrival at 7th Division headquarters in early 1941 could not have stood in greater contrast. Lavarack’s biographer, Brett Lodge, noted that ‘he [Berryman] was an exceptional officer [and] was a most welcome addition to the division’.3 Furthermore Berryman and Lavarack had a working history that went back to the Western Front in 1916 where they served

1 Stevens Papers, AWM 3 DRL/3561 2 As quoted in Peter, Tsouras, (ed), The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, (Greenhill Books, London, 2000), p. 43. 3 Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, p. 101. 247 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

together in the same field artillery brigade. At the time Berryman was the 4th FAB’s adjutant and Lavarack commanded the Brigade’s howitzer battery. Since then their paths had crossed numerous times including postings in London and Melbourne. The relationship was cemented when Berryman worked for Lavarack at army headquarters when he was GCS.

Besides Lavarack, a number of the 7th Division’s officers were drafted from the Staff Corps. This made Berryman feel more relaxed around headquarters and his letters to Muriel during this period make numerous mentions of Staff Corps officers known to the family.4 The other significant factor contributing to Berryman’s increased sense of security within the ranks of the 7th Division’s senior officers was his role as the commander of the division’s artillery. Berryman did not feel compelled to play the role of the ‘hard man’ or take the ‘new broom’ touch as he had in the 6th Division. As Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) he was a brigadier, he had his own headquarters staff and his rank and significance placed him in a position equal, if not senior, to the infantry brigadiers.5 Berryman’s status was immeasurably enhanced by the fact that when he arrived at the division he was the only senior officer who had seen active service in the 2nd AIF.6

As CRA he was responsible for the 2/4th, 2/5th and 2/6th Field Regiments along with the 2/2nd Anti-Tank Regiment and a small headquarters staff with the Brigade Major Royal Artillery (BMRA) as his principal staff officer. Berryman was responsible for the ‘training and technical direction of its artillery units, and during operations he [was responsible for] their employment, including the preparation of

4 See letters ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, February to May 1941, Berryman Family Papers. These officers included John Chapman (GSO1), Cyril Clowes (CCRA), Alan Boase (7th Div AAQG). Berryman also socialised with a number of militia officers he had known before the war. In particular he was close to Alan Spowers (2/24 Bn) (Berryman diary entries reveal their close contact during this period) along with Peter Gebbardt (2/24 Bn – Militia), Bill Turner, Bishop Riley. (Berryman generally only mentions these officers briefly and their selection is also generally related to Muriel having met them in Australian prior to the war.) 5 George Vasey was also soon promoted to the rank of Brigadier. He notes in a letter to his wife soon afterward that ‘Berry (unfortunately) and I are now the only two Staff Corps officers holding brigadier’s commands & that is something even if I don’t like the company’. ‘George Vasey to Jessie Vasey’, 19 March 1941, NLA MS 3782, Vasey Papers. 6 Brigadier was at this time still an appointment as opposed to a rank. Berryman, who had been a Colonel since his appointment as GSO1, 6th Division ranked as the 7th Division’s senior brigadier. 248 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

divisional fire plans’.7 Initially the post of BMRA was held by Major Hugh Harlock but by March he had been promoted and appointed as CO of the 2/1st Field Regiment. Harlock’s deputy and fellow Staff Corps officer Major John Wilton took over as BMRA on 19 March. Wilton, who remained as Berryman’s BMRA until the end of the Syrian campaign, was an outstanding junior officer who ended his career in the post- war period as CGS.8

Wilton first met Berryman in 1931 when, as a young Staff Corps lieutenant, he travelled to England for artillery training. Due to a transport mix up Wilton’s first introduction to Berryman was on the receiving end of a dressing down. Berryman simmered down quickly, took Wilton and his companions under his wing and ‘looked after [them] like an uncle’.9 Wilton thought that Berryman was a ‘ruthlessly efficient … officer,’10 who would be a ‘good chap to work under’.11

Berryman formed a close relationship with Wilton. He saw him as a very capable young Staff Corps officer, and just as his career had been helped by the patronage of senior officers, so too Berryman set about building close relations with junior officers who lived up to his exacting standards. Berryman remained close to Wilton for the rest of the war, and he followed and helped nurture Wilton’s career. However, while Berryman was ‘keen to advance the careers of other Staff Corps officers, such as Wilton’12 he did not restrict his favours to the Staff Corps exclusively. Berryman also kept a keen eye on those militia officers who were proving to be just as efficient and capable.13

7 David Horner, Strategic Command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s Asian Wars, (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005), p. 60. 8 Ibid, p. 60. 9 Wilton as quoted in Horner, Strategic Command, p. 25. 10 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 25. 11 Wilton as quoted in Horner, Strategic Command, p. 59. 12 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 60. 13 Berryman praised a number of militia officers in his letters home including Major Denzil Macarthur- Onslow (6th Cavalry Regiment, later Brigadier), Major Ken Eather (later Major-General), Major J. N. Abbott (2/3 Bn later Lt-Col) , Lt-Colonel V.T. England (Later Brigadier). See ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 16 March 1941, Berryman Family Papers. During the Syrian campaign he also formed close relations with a number of militia officers including Lieutenant-Colonel O’Brien, Lieutenant -Colonel Windeyer, Lt VC, and Lt-Colonel Moten, amongst others. This followed from the patronage Berryman showed to a number of junior officers on 6th Division HQs especially those attached to 6th Division HQ from the engineering corps (Lieutenant P. R. Gilmore & Lieutenant G. Beckingsale & Lieutenant Molly from Signals Corps). See Berryman Diary, 24 January 1941. 249 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Berryman’s move to the 7th Division also meant a change in emphasis and pace. Wilton noted how ‘Berry’ was under ‘a great strain’ at Bardia and Tobruk and soon after his arrival Lavarack ordered him to a convalescent depot on sick leave due to physical exhaustion.14 Berryman took the time to write to his family and reflect on his new situation and change of circumstance: ‘I shall go back in a couple of days & then take it easy. My military heart however is beyond Derna with my old division [6th] & I’m sorry that I’ll not be there’.15

Berryman recovered quickly from his exhaustion. He spent the first few days of February on a tour around Palestine with Captain Holden, adjutant of the 6th Cavalry Regiment, and Captain Wier, adjutant of 2/24th Battalion. By 4 February 1941, he was fit enough to attend a luncheon with the Prime Minister Robert Menzies, Frederick Shedden (The Defence Secretary) and General Blamey (Commander AIF). At lunch Berryman sat between Blamey and Menzies, the latter complimenting him on his performance at Bardia. Interestingly, Berryman notes in his diary that during the day he was approached by Shedden who offered him the position of Deputy Chief of the General Staff in Australia. Berryman declined the offer arguing that he ‘preferred to stay here [Middle East]’.16 What is remarkable about this conversation is that Shedden, a senior defence public servant, thought that he could influence appointments at the most senior levels of the army.17

The next day Berryman returned to his core business, training his artillery units and applying his knowledge and skills to forge his new command into a fighting force. Berryman’s active service in Cyrenaica had a profound effect on his command as CRA of the 7th Division. He put his recent combat experience to good use by spending a large portion of his time in February 1941 writing and delivering lectures to the officers of both the 7th and 9th Division’s AIF on the battles at Bardia and Tobruk. Each lecture took almost two and a half hours to deliver and was attended by ‘practically all our [Australian] officers in Palestine’ including Major-Generals

14 Wilton as quoted in Horner, Strategic Command, p. 60. See also ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 2 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 15‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 2 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. See also Berryman Diary, 28 January 1941 ‘was feeling rotten with a cold … After dinner crawled into bed’. 16 Berryman Diary 4 February 1941. See also David Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the making of Australian Defence Policy, (Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 2000), p. 99. 17 Horner, Defence Supremo, p. 99. 250 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

Morshead and Lavarack along with all the senior brigadiers.18 To Berryman these lectures were a total success, assessed as they were by the ‘attention and applause’ that he received.19

The lectures were undoubtedly useful to all those who attended them. Berryman had presided over the planning for two of the three British and Commonwealth Armies’ victories so far in the war and he passed on a great deal of knowledge to the 7th and 9th Divisions, both of whom were soon to move to the front line. To Berryman, this was also a part of his ongoing commitment to developing the professional character of the broader Australian army. He saw his responsibilities as extending beyond the immediacy of the war and was using the conflict as a tool to institute reform and integrate a professional approach across a range of tasks and areas of responsibility. Part of this included honest appraisals of the army’s successes and failures. As a result in a manner typical of Berryman’s blunt and forthright personality, he left no stone unturned in his lectures including his analysis of the failings of the 17th Brigade and its commander. His criticisms of Savige struck a negative a cord with a number of officers including Brigadier Jack Stevens (CO ) who later recalled that:

Col. Berryman … addressed all my officers on the operations at Bardia and Tobruk. He created a very unfavourable impression by his most constant criticism of Brigadier Savige and his 17th Brigade in the Bardia attack and this destroyed to some extent, the undoubted value of much of the information he gave. Later, I heard the 17th Brigade side of this story of Bardia. It differed quite appreciably from Berryman’s version.20

Berryman’s remarks about Savige were the one slight on his lectures which were a ‘tour de force’ in Palestine. It demonstrated everything that was unappealing about his personality and it clearly illustrates why, at times, he was referred to as ‘Berry the bastard’. His admonishment of Savige was dogged and determined. He felt that it was not just his prerogative, but his duty to set the record straight - the record according to Berryman. While his criticisms were on the most part insightful, his pursuit of Savige

18 Berryman Diary, February/ March 1941. Berryman notes that he gave these lectures on: 12, 13, 18, 22 February and 9 March 1941. 19‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 23 February 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 20 ‘A Personal Story of the Service, As A Citizen Soldier, Of Major-General Sir Jack Stevens, KBE, CB, DSO, ED’, A Memoir, AWM 3DRL/3561. 251 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

meant that many of his valuable lessons were clouded by vitriol. However despite, this negative aspect of his assessments, on the whole Berryman’s lectures served to further enhance his already well deserved reputation for competence and efficiency amongst the 2nd AIF.

The value of the lectures aside, Berryman’s primary role during this period was to prepare his artillery units for war. Using his experience in the desert he placed a great deal of emphasis on operating over open sights against enemy tanks, the use of alternate positions and his regiments operating independently. Unfortunately Berryman’s tasks were consistently set back by the shortage of equipment. To overcome this problem Berryman instigated a vigorous training program based on a staggered use of the equipment that only allowed rest days for his units when they coincided with his program for the rotation of essential equipment.21

What Berryman’s new command may have lacked in training and equipment they made up for with an abundance of enthusiasm. Berryman noted that the shortages ‘acted rather as a spur to the development of ingenuity and the practice of improvisation, both most necessary qualities in war’.22 In March he noted to Muriel that ‘at the moment life is very pleasant here – in fact too pleasant to last long. The Off[icers] & men are anxious to get into action but I tell them to make the most of the present as they will get their turn & plenty of it in due course’.23

The men’s excitement was also fuelled by rumours of action. The British had decided to send troops to support their Greek allies in defending their homeland against an impending German assault. General Wavell originally planned for the 7th Australian Division to make its way to Greece to support the 6th Australian Division and the New Zealand Division, but while the first Australian troops reached Greece by 19 March the movement of the 7th Division was delayed by shipping shortages until May.24

21 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 16 March 1941, Berryman Family Papers. See also Berryman Diary February / March 1941 for notes on training. 22 Berryman, F. H. ‘Foreword’, O’Brien, John, Guns and Gunners: the story of the 2/5th Australian Field Regiment in Word War II (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1950), p. vii. 23 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 3 March 1941, Berryman Family Papers. On 30 March Berryman also notes that while his gunners and NCOs were keen many of them had not fired rounds in Australia. 24 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 61. 252 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

The 7th Division, however, was destined to never reach Greece. On Friday 4 April Major-General Lavarack was briefed by the British Commander in Chief, General Wavell, on the renewed offensive by the German Africa Corps in the Western Desert. Wavell ordered Lavarack to send the 18th Brigade from the 7th Division to Tobruk and to move the remainder of the division towards the Egyptian frontier.25 By 7 April the situation in the Western Desert was serious. The 2nd Armoured Division had lost most of its tanks and the 9th Australian Division were ordered to fall back to Tobruk. Rumours also abounded that Generals O’Connor and Neame were both killed (they were in fact captured).26 As part of 7th Division’s redeployment to counter Rommel’s offensive Berryman’s artillery was ordered to occupy the fortress at Mersa Matruh.

In some respects the movement to Mersa Matruth could not have come at a worse time for Berryman’s artillery regiments. His units were in the midst of a general reorganisation of the artillery aimed at streamlining the field batteries into two troops of six guns. In addition these same units were just beginning to be reequipped with the 25 pounder artillery piece.27 The first 25 pounder guns had only arrived on 7 April and although they were greeted by ‘great excitement amongst our men … [who were] heartened tremendously to get some modern equipment at long last’ the timing of their arrival only compounded already overstretched work loads.28 A week later the 7th Division’s artillery started to move into the fortress.

Mersa Matruth stood midway between Alexandria and the Egyptian frontier and before the war had served as the forward British base in the region. The base was the ‘core of the outpost defence of Egypt proper’ and was the focal point for any British offensive in the Western Desert and the main defensive position should Tobruk be by- passed.29 As one of Berryman’s battery commanders noted, ‘if Matruth should fall, there would be nothing much left for the defence of Egypt and Palestine’.30

25 Diary of Lieutenant General Sir John Lavarack, 4 April 1941. (Hereafter Lavarack Diary). This Diary was very kindly provided to the author by Sir John Laravack’s son Mr James W. Lavarack. 26 Ibid, 7 April 1941. 27 Horner, The Gunners, p. 273. 28 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 7 April 1941, Berryman Family Papers. 29 John O’Brien, Guns and Gunners, p. 40. 30 Ibid. 253 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Berryman arrived on 14 April to take command of the British anti-aircraft force, coastal batteries and searchlights. By 20 April the three artillery regiments of 7th Division had also arrived. While the regiments sorted out their defensive positions and started to familiarise themselves with their new guns, Berryman and his BMRA, Major Wilton, set about planning and coordinating the defensive fire plan.31

Berryman and the artillery saw no action at Mersa Matruth but they were subjected to air raids which caused a number of casualties and they were exposed to very unpleasant conditions. Berryman and his artillery units remained in the fortress for five weeks and the lack of operations gave his units time to continue their training. At Mersa Matruth, as Berryman noted:

… training became more realistic and sterner … guns were calibrated and defensive fire and other tasks were practised over our own infantry. I purposely sited the wagon lines in a difficult wadi- intersect area, so that driving became a test of skill … Troop, battery and regimental exercises were held day and night, well outside the fortress, in an area were the wadis had precipitous sides as they reached the coasts.32

The occupation of Mersa Matruth also gave Berryman time to assess the commanders and their men. During this period, Lieutenant Colonel John O’Brien took command of the 2/5th Field Regiment. At only 32 years of age he was reputed to be the youngest commanding officer in the AIF, but despite his age Berryman considered him a ‘worthy successor whose dash, cheerfulness and enthusiasm permeated all ranks’.33 Major Rau took command of the 2/4th Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph Day provided some continuity having remained with the 2/6th Regiment and Lieutenant- Colonel Ray Monaghan, a regular officer, commanded the 2/2nd Anti-Tank Regiment.34 By May orders were received to prepare to hand over the fortress to the 9th Division’s CRA, Brigadier Ramsay. The 7th Division, minus the 18th Brigade in Tobruk, then prepared to concentrate for a new assignment.

31 HQ RAA 7 Division, War Diary, 23 April 1941, AWM 52, 4/1/14. See Also Horner, Strategic Command, p. 61. 32 Berryman, F. H. ‘Foreword’, Guns and Gunners, p. viii-ix. 33 O’Brien, Guns and Gunners, p. viii 34 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 62. 254 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

Operation Exporter By June, it was beginning to seem that the First Libyan campaign might well be the only victory the British and Commonwealth forces would achieve in 1941. In the months since the Australian’s success at Bardia and Tobruk, the war in the Mediterranean moved into a new phase. General Archibald Wavell, the British C-in-C, was beset with difficulties including the end of the disastrous expedition to Greece, the German invasion of Crete and General Erwin Rommel’s siege of Tobruk. While Wavell was combating the resurgent Axis on his northern and eastern fronts, he came under increasing pressure from the Free French Government and British Headquarters (London) for action over Vichy French controlled Syria. The urgency for an operation against Syria, despite the seriously overstretched nature of the allied war effort in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, stemmed from the belief of an imminent German airborne invasion. Support for an immediate response to the ‘Syrian problem’ was endorsed by Charles De Gaulle (the Free French President) and the British both of whom were under the misguided belief that Vichy forces would surrender at the mere sight of Allied troops.35

The desires of both the British high command and the Free French for quick and decisive action over Syria lead to an operation that became synonymous with misguided assumptions, ill-conceived allocation of resources, poor intelligence, planning, command structure, and leadership. The invasion of Syria in June 1941 was yet another example of the British high command not fully appreciating the strategic and tactical necessities for a campaign. It was further proof that at this stage of the war they had not reflected upon, nor learnt from similar poor decisions made in the campaigns in France, Africa, Greece and Crete.

The Syrian campaign was successful largely through luck, tactical adaptation and the dogged determination of the, mainly Australian troops. As General Wavell argued to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alanbrooke and the British Prime Minister, Churchill, ‘[the] Force is not anything like as large as desirable

35 Allied ‘ULTRA’ intercepts during this period served to mainly reaffirm the regularity of Vichy French- German co-operation. After Crete the British Air Ministry forecast another German airborne assault with Syria as a likely target. See Ralph Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, (William Morrow & Co., New York, 1989), p. 64. 255 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

and [the] operation is obviously in [the] nature of a gamble, [and] dependent upon the attitude of the Vichy Syria’.36

It was within this optimistic and hopelessly ill-informed climate that ‘Operation Exporter’, code name for the invasion of Syria, was conceived. On 20 May Wavell ordered the British commander in Palestine, General ‘Jumbo’ Wilson to assemble a force for the assault. The proposal was readily endorsed, and after some prompting by the Australian government, it was decided the invasion would take place with the 7th Australian Division (21st & 25th Brigades) forming the main striking force.37

Wilson’s plan called for a three pronged attack into Syria. The consisting of the 5th Indian Brigade and Free French Forces would advance on Derra, Ezraa, Kuneitra, Fiq and . The central and western forces fell under Major- General Lavarack’s 7th Australian Division. The central thrust ( AIF) was to advance through Mettua, Merdjayoun and Rayak. The western force (21st Brigade AIF) was to advance up the coast road to .38

Despite the urgency displayed by the British high command they were only willing to back the operation with limited resources. Lavarack was hampered as his third brigade (18th Australian Infantry) were locked up in the Tobruk defences. To make up for these losses he was allocated considerable divisional troops for the assault. These included three regiments of artillery, two cavalry regiments, an anti-tank regiment, a machine gun battalion, a pioneer battalion and the promise of the 2/3rd and 2/5th infantry battalions as the campaign commenced. Additional allocations included a British mechanised regiment (Scots Greys), one armoured squadron (6th Australian Cavalry) and a light anti aircraft regiment.39

36 ‘C in C, Middle East (General Wavell) to The War Office- Private for Prime Minister, cipher 0/70288’, 5 June 1941, Alanbrooke Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London. 37 David Day, The Politics of War, p. 138; David Horner, High Command, p.108-109; J. McAllester & S. Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble, p. 9; J. Grey, A Military History of Australia, p. 158-159; J. Robertson, ‘The Distant War: Australia and Imperial Defence, 1919-1941’; M. McKernan & M. Brown (ed) Australia Two Centuries of War and Peace (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1988), p. 239. The Australian government under Menzies urged Churchill to occupy Syria. The Australian government feared the arrival of German aircraft in Syria, which had proved so decisive in Greece and Crete, where thousands of Australians had become POWs. The Australian government also feared a pincer movement by the Germans through the Soviet Union. 38 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 333-344. (see map 11 p. 240) 39 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 333-344. 256 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

Figure 9.0 ‘As Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) he was a brigadier, he had his own headquarters staff and his rank and significance placed him in a position equal, if not senior, to the infantry brigadiers’. 7th Division HQ. Hill 1284, Syria. 1941-10-06. (AWM Neg. 020824)40

Although these forces look considerable at first glance, many of the divisional troops were under strength as a result of the fighting in Greece and the force lacked one crucial necessity, a considerable armoured contingent. This was especially significant as the Vichy French Forces had the equivalent of half an armoured division at their disposal.41

In the air, the Allied forces faired no better. Despite Churchill’s desire to ‘demonstrate as much air power as possible’ the British could only muster 50 front line aircraft as opposed to the 100 Vichy French aircraft of which about 60 were fighters.42 Furthermore, Churchill was adamant that the preparation and allocation of forces for Operation Exporter could not in any way hamper the preparations for the planned offensive in the Western Desert. As Churchill noted to Wavell ‘Nothing must prejudice

40 From The Left:- Brigadier J.E. Stevens, Brigadier E.C. Plant, Sir , Lieutenant- General J.D. Lavarack, Brigadier F.H. Berryman. 41 See G. Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 338 & McAllister (et al), & Largely a Gamble, Chapter 1. 42 ‘Prime Minister (Churchill) to C in C, Middle East (Wavell)’, 3 June 1941’, Alanbrooke Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, Kings College, University of London. 257 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Brusier [Battleaxe]’.43 One senior British Officer commented in late June 1941 that the decision to launch simultaneous attacks upon Libya and Syria was a:

flagrant violation of the elementary principle of concentration … it was a grave error not to concentrate a bigger force against Syria … the correct action would have been to allow Libya to wait, and to strike hard at Syria.44

Alongside these deficiencies was an equally grave underestimation. The British and Free French were confident that an invasion would lead to the swift surrender of the Vichy French military. This position was both arrogant and ignorant. To Major-General Lavarack, the Australian commander, there was little indication of Vichy French surrender and he emphasised that the Vichy French army in Syria was a:

…compact modern army, equal in numbers, armed with, and supported by, almost up-to-date modern weapons, and fighting on their own ground, carefully prepared for defensive warfare and for counter attack.45

Invasion The invasion of Syria was the first time in two world wars that ‘British’ troops launched an attack on a peaceful frontier.46 The invasion got underway in the early hours of 8 June 1941 against light but determined Vichy resistance. Berryman divided his artillery to support each of the Australian thrusts, and for a short time he also provided a battery from the 2/5th Field Regiment to support the Free French with its drive on Damascus. The majority of the 2/5th Field Regiment and the 2/2nd anti-tank Regiment (less two batteries) along with HQ CRA was held in reserve behind the central thrust. Berryman’s other major unit, three troops of British anti-aircraft troops, were used to support his field regiments.47

In the coastal sector the 21st Brigade with the support of the 2/4th Field Regiment and a battery of the 2/2nd Anti-Tank Regiment made steady progress and captured Tyre

43 Ibid. ‘Battleaxe’ was the British offensive in the Western Desert against Rommel that started on 14 June 1941. 44 ‘Strategy in the Middle East’, 22/6/1941, Kennedy Papers 4/5, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London. 45 ‘J.D. Lavarack to Gavin Long’, 1 October 1952, AWM 67, 3-209, Records of Gavin Long. 46 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 345 47 War Diary, 9 June 1941, HQ CRA 7 Australian Division; Horner, Strategic Command, p. 63. 258 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

by mid afternoon and closed on the Vichy main line of resistance. The 25th Brigade’s central thrust under Brigadier Baxter-Cox with support from the 2/6th Field Regiment and an anti-tank battery met with immediate resistance and found itself stopped only a short distance from the frontier.48

As a result of the slow progress, Berryman moved forward on 9 June to help coordinate the 25th Brigade’s fire plan to support the Brigade. Lavarack arrived at Baxter-Cox’s brigade HQ in the early hours of 9 June expecting to hear of the results of the attack he had ordered for the previous evening and to watch the attack of the 25th Brigade’s other column that morning. On arrival at 25th Brigade’s HQ, Lavarack discovered that the night attack had not taken place and that Baxter-Cox had no intention of attacking. Baxter-Cox was, Lavarack said, ‘jittery’ and gave the ‘absurd excuse of exhaustion of his men’.49

Furthermore Lavarack was totally displeased with Baxter-Cox’s plans for an attack later that day, especially his use of artillery. As a result he removed the 2/6th Field Regiment from Baxter-Cox’s command and ordered Berryman to move his headquarters and the 2/5th Field Regiment forward, take command of the 2/6th Field Regiment and a company of the 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion and liaise with Lieutenant-Colonel Porter (CO 2/31st Battalion) to take Merdjayoun.50

Berryman who had been forward the previous day with Brigadier Allen to assess the situation on Baxter-Cox’s front noted that the 2/31st Battalion had attacked without the use of covering fire from the 2/6th Field Regiment. He later noted that ‘he did not know what Lavarack had told Baxter-Cox’, just that he was ordered forward to coordinate the attack. In the face of continued inactivity from Baxter-Cox, Berryman ‘was taking the leading role on the 25th Brigade front’.51

It was now that Berryman began to impress upon the campaign his increasingly familiar hallmarks of creative command and determined leadership. Again we see how a close ‘anatomy’ of a campaign reveals his progress as a commander. Conscious of the

48 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 355-356. 49 Lavarack Diary, 9 June 1941. 50 Ibid, See also Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, p. 154. 51 Lodge, Lavarack, p. 156. 259 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

need to get forward with the men as well as the need to inspire confidence in troops seeing action for the first time, Berryman seemed to be everywhere along the 25th Brigade’s front. On 9 June he organised for his regiments to shell Fort Khiam and then supported the 2/33rd Battalion’s assault on the village. On the following day Berryman conducted a reconnaissance for a deliberate assault to take Merdjayoun on 11 June. At Berryman’s instigation a force of Bren-gun carriers with a light tank was sent to test the strength of the defenders at Khirbe, the first of the objectives to be taken by 2/31st Battalion the following day. The force, under the command of Lieutenant Millard, met with considerable resistance and took heavy casualties.52

Meanwhile, after consultation with a ‘very pleased’ Lieutenant Colonel Porter, Berryman issued his orders for the artillery support for the attack on Merdjayoun at 2200hrs, 10 June 1941. Both Berryman and Porter advanced well beyond the infantry’s forward defensive line in their reconnaissances, and Berryman noted how the pair of them planned the attack from a ‘stand 800 yards in advance of our infantry’.53 Lavarack arrived back at 25th Brigade’s HQ at 0130 hrs on 11 June to be present for the attack and found Baxter-Cox ‘in the depths of dejection, unable to control his voice & full of pessimistic attitude’.54 Lavarack noted in his diary that Baxter-Cox was ‘not an ideal leader’.55

The plan for the capture of Merdjayoun consisted of a flank attack on the high ground of Ibeles Saki to the east of the town by the 2/25th Battalion and an assault along the main road to Merdjayoun through Khirbe, Qleaa and then Merdjayoun by the 2/31st Battalion. With two field artillery regiments present the attack was supported by the heaviest artillery bombardment of the campaign so far. Starting at 0230 hours the attack made good progress and Berryman, keen to maintain his presence with the troops, pushed forward dragging his BM, Major Wilton, with him and entered Khirbe with the infantry personally capturing 12 prisoners.56

52 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 370. 53 ‘Berryman to A G Fenton’, Berryman Papers, AWM PR 84/370; Records of Brigadier S H Porter, AWM 67 3/317, p. 4. 54 Lavarack Diary 11 June 1941. 55 Ibid. 56 Berryman Diary, 11 June 1941. 260 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

Berryman was, however, dissatisfied with his morning’s work and he continued to press forward under heavy fire. At one point Wilton, who was under fire for the first time, noted that he:

heard an unmistakeable swishing noise and I saw Brigadier Berryman make a dive into a ditch, so I did likewise … these mortars fell 50 yards away from us but it was an advisory precaution. I couldn’t help feeling at the time that it was rather undignified for a brigadier to throw himself in a ditch like this.57

Berryman, a combat veteran of the Great War and the First Libyan campaign, knew that in these instances discretion was the better part of valour. Artillery and mortars have no respect for a man’s rank, position or status. Berryman, however, was not always ‘undignified’ in the face of the enemy’s indirect fire support. A few days later at Merdjayoun, Berryman’s HQ unit came under French artillery fire for the first time. During this bombardment Berryman ‘disregarded such shelling’ by calmly continuing to eat his breakfast ‘in the midst of flying brick dust and bursting shells’, asking one subaltern to shut the door to keep out the dust. Berryman recalled how Captain Eyers from his headquarters noted that this incident ‘had a great effect on him and helped him to take artillery shelling in the proper way’.58

Despite the risks that he was running Berryman continued to press forward with Porter and his troops and he entered Merdjayoun at 1300 hours and accepted the towns surrender.59 Berryman immediately moved his headquarters into the town. This culminated in one of the more bizarre instances in the campaign. Lieutenant-Colonel O’Brien, CO of 2/5th Regiment reported to Berryman that the rough country beyond Merdjayoun was making it difficult for his observation posts to locate the enemy artillery. Berryman’s staff noted that they could see the enemy gun flashes from the

57 Wilton as quoted in Horner, Strategic Command, p. 64. 58 ‘Berryman to A. G. Fenton’, Berryman Papers, AWM PR 84/370 59 ‘Record of Brigadier S H Porter’, AMW 67 3/317, p. 6-7. Porter noted that ‘I had just finished directing a platoon to seize a post from which an anti-tank gun poked… after that we were cordially welcomed by a deputation of townsmen who told us that the mayor, or equivalent, was waiting for us at the “Town Hall”. Just then Brig, Berryman overtook us (I was always glad to see him) and we quickened our pace through the narrow lanes, to be showered with rose petals thrown from the upper floors of houses. Brig Berryman had produced his cap with red band; and soon he was the centre of attraction. As we approached the civic centre, the flag of Lebanon broke at a mast head; and we were invited to partake champagne. In the middle of drinks, Monaghan started sniping once more; but the ever-alert “Berry” again rose to the occasion and sent him a signal –how I don’t know. At all points, the shelling ceased; and silence reigned for a brief while’. 261 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

second story of the HQ building. Berryman and O’Brien went upstairs and started to immediately engage the French guns from an upstairs window sending orders back to the 2/5th Field Regiment by phone. Berryman, Wilton and O’Brien then went out onto the balcony to observe the fall of shot. It must be the one, if not only time during the war that an Australian Divisional Artillery Headquarters also acted as a forward observation post for one of their artillery regiments.60 For most senior officers coordinating a major assault, entering the objective with the leading troops and then fulfilling the role of forward observer would seem more than enough for one day but Berryman, showing an abundance of energy, did not rest on his laurels and set off in the late afternoon to tour his batteries and to check on his men.61

The attack at Merdjayoun was a direct result of decisive action by Lavarack, Berryman and Porter. It left the GOC 7th Australian Division in little doubt that Baxter- Cox was a poor brigade commander whose ‘despondent tendencies have a bad effect on his energy and judgement and also on his subordinates’.62 Lavarack was lucky that Berryman was on hand to coordinate the attack and push it through with his characteristic drive and energy. As Brett Lodge has argued ‘Lavarack felt that the laurels of the day belonged to Berryman, who was clearly the driving force on the 25th Brigade front’.63 By rights Lavarack should have replaced Baxter-Cox after this debacle.

Meanwhile on the coastal sector the 2/4th Field Regiment was proving the value of Berryman’s unorthodox training methods in Palestine and Mersa Matruth. The 2/4th provided admirable service to Brigadier Steven’s 21st Brigade which included a duel with two Vichy French destroyers and on several occasions the regiment’s 25 pounders were sent forward to engage French tanks over open sights.64 On both fronts the artillery, quite unconventionally, pushed both its gun lines and observations posts well forward and more often than not they operated without the protection of infantry to their

60 ‘Divisional Artillery Headquarters as observation post for Field Regiment - Experience of HQ RAA 7 Australian Division in Syrian Campaign (Jun 1941)’, AWM 54 531/2/16. The report notes that ‘For the first time a Divisional Artillery Headquarters had been the observation post for one of its own Regiments’. 61 Berryman Diary, 11 June 1941. 62 Lavarack Diary 11 June 1941. 63 Lodge, Lavarack: Rival Commander, p. 156. 64 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 345-371. 262 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

front. Berryman’s emphasis on these types of operations in training paid significant dividends from the very first hours of the campaign.

Figure 9.1 ‘Lavarack felt that the laurels of the day belonged to Berryman, who was clearly the driving force on the 25th Brigade front’. Brigadier’s Allen, Berryman & Baxter-Cox celebrate the capture of Merdjayoun, 11 June 1941. (Berryman Family Archive)

The fall of Merdjayoun significantly improved Lavarack’s’ strategic position. Its capture meant that not only did he now have two deep thrusts into French territory but he had also secured his right flank. As the country beyond Merdjayoun was not especially suited to offensive operations Lavarack decided to leave only a token force to protect the town and send the bulk of the 25th Brigade and Berryman’s artillery to . Lavarack’s decision to send the majority of his forces in the central sector the 10 miles to Jezzine was a bold move. The movement, through the Lebanon Mountains, was complicated by the winding roads and their precipitous cliff faces. In addition, it further split the Australian forces.

The spearhead of the 25th Brigade started the advance to Jezzine in the afternoon of 13 June. Berryman remained behind until 0200hours to organise the disposition of his regiments before joining the column. Soon after rejoining the 25th Brigade Berryman became frustrated at the incessant delays in the advance. As a result he moved forward along the column to urge on the troops, but he too discovered that in places the roads were so steep that his guns had to be unlimbered from their trucks and manoeuvred around the sharp bends by hand.65

65 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 65. 263 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

By morning the advance guard of the brigade, consisting of the 2/31st Battalion supported by a troop from the 2/6th Field Regiment and a battery of the 2/2nd Anti-tank regiment, reached Kafr Houn. Soon after Lavarack arrived at 25th Brigade headquarters and as a result of his deteriorating confidence in Baxter-Cox, he approached Berryman and ordered him ‘to get Jezzine that night’.66 As they closed in on the town, the Australians came under fire and patrols reported that Green Hill, the dominant high ground that held the key to taking the town, was strongly held by the enemy. Berryman discussed the situation with Baxter-Cox and then moved forward to coordinate an attack with Porter, who despite having been shot through the thigh by a French at midday refused to be evacuated.67

As Porter’s men closed in on Green Hill Berryman arranged for a troop of guns to close within 1000 meters of the feature to support the assault. Despite the difficult terrain the attack proceeded at 1800hrs and was a complete success with casualties being surprisingly light. Berryman, continuing to show his aggressive and thrusting approach to the campaign, moved forward to the objective soon after it was secured. Porter, whose movement was restricted due to his wound, was unable to move forward to assess the situation. Berryman arrived on Green Hill to find the 2/31st Battalion consolidating its position and as Wilton later recalled, We [Berryman and Wilton] looked down and ‘saw the town of Jezzine – beautiful location – nestling there. We could see the road leading out to the north-east, and, as we were looking, we saw a big column of French troops moving to the north-east, some marching and some mounted.68

Taking the initiative Berryman ordered the artillery forward observer to shell the French column. Much to Berryman’s disgust he discovered that the telephone line to the guns was down so he turned to the nearest company commander and said, ‘Well, you can see that they’re pulling out – go down and occupy the town’.69 The company set off down the precipitous cliff face ‘swinging down the terraces with the help of vines and the branches of trees, sometimes falling’.70 Unwilling to be left behind Berryman, with Wilton in tow, moved off with Sergeant Gardner’s platoon leading the advance.

66 Lodge, Lavarack, p. 161. 67 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 388-389. 68 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 65. 69 Berryman as quoted by Wilton in Horner, Strategic Command, p. 65. 70 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 390. 264 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

Berryman and Wilton then waited on the road as Gardner’s men approached the town. Berryman, becoming anxious as the light started to fade, announced that he was tired of waiting and again set off to lead the advance.71

Figure: 9.2 ‘Capt Eyer’s told my drivers that the “CRA is waiting in Djezzine” and they immediately drove on’. ‘The Mad Mile’ – Djezzine, Lebanon 1941 ( AMW 27683)72

Berryman halted inside the town as the troops moved further among the streets to clear them of the enemy. By now the sun had faded and soon afterward, through the darkness, Berryman and Wilton heard the unmistakable rumble of approaching tanks. Berryman knew that no tanks had accompanied the force to Jezzine. Assuming that they were French tanks that had moved down from Damour to resist the Australian advance he took action. Wilton later recalled what happened: There were some rather broken down farmhouses on the side of the road, so Berryman said ‘We’ll hide ourselves in here behind the wall … I think there are only two tanks’. We looked back and there were just these dark objects coming along the road about 25 yards apart with the turrets open and the tank commander standing up and looking out the turret. Berryman said ‘I’m a reasonable shot with my revolver and I presume you are with yours. These chaps are going to pass about 6 feet from here; we’re about 15 yards apart; you let the first tank go past you, I’ll shoot the bloke in the second tank’. We crouched there with our pistols cocked. The tanks rumbled along and

71 Ibid, see also Horner, Strategic Command, p. 65. 72 ‘Berryman to Fenton- 1944’, Papers of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3/30, part 2. 265 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

just before the first tank passed me we heard a good Australian voice saying, ‘bloody this (or whatever) and there’s the place, it can’t be far now’. It was a troop of tanks from the 9th Australian Division Cavalry, which by this time had got to the road junction which led from Damour to Jezzine, and they’d been sent out to make contact with our little party. But they didn’t tell us, and those chaps were only about ten seconds away from being shot.73

Berryman and Wilton rode the tanks into the town where they found the leading infantry platoon drinking wine with the town’s Mayor. Berryman and Wilton then sat under a fig tree, and according to Wilton they picked ‘the most delicious figs I’ve ever eaten’.74 Defensive positions were soon established around the town before any French reinforcements arrived.75

Berryman’s daring advance forestalled the French commander’s plan to occupy the town in strength the following day. The next day Berryman ordered his headquarters into the Hotel Jezzine. As his men tried to move into the town held up movement of the Australian forces. Captain Eyer who commanded the column told the drivers that ‘the CRA is waiting in Djezzine[sic]’ and they ‘immediately drove on’. All other transport waited until a detachment had liquidated the snipers.76 Upon arrival the artillery again deployed its guns forward and its observation posts out in front of the infantry’s positions. These forward positions allowed Berryman’s artillery regiments to smash a French column that had tried to manoeuvre into a position to attack the town from the north-east later in the day. These tactics, however, were not without great risk to officers and men. One observation officer, Captain Thomas, was exceedingly lucky to escape when ‘a party of sixty enemy entered the Monastery where he had his O.P’.77

The advance on and capture of Jezzine proved to be a daring gamble, carried off with audacity, that took the French totally by surprise. As at Merdjayoun, in the absence of genuine leadership from Baxter-Cox, Berryman became the energiser of the force,

73 Wilton, as quoted in Horner, Strategic Command, p. 65-66. 74 Ibid. 75 Berryman’s role in the capture of the town did not go unnoticed by the local population. Forty years later, at the time of Berryman’s funeral in 1981, the Lebanese Ambassador to Australia, Raymond Heneine wrote in , ‘the inhabitants of Jezzine will never forget General Berryman, who liberated their town from the forces of the Vichy French in collaboration with the Italian and German forces. He was for them not only a great general but also a great benefactor who provided them with food supplies and medical care. In fact he was the example of humanitarianism,’ Canberra Times, Monday 8 June 1981. 76 ‘Berryman to Fenton’, AWM PR 84/370, p. 4. 77 Ibid. 266 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

leading from the front, seizing opportunities as they arose and backing them up with sound judgements and planning within limited operational time frames. The credit however was equally shared with the men of the 2/31st Battalion and the supporting artillery who went without food or sleep for the preceding 24 hours.78

Berryman’s capture of Jezzine could be seen as some what of a paradox. An officer renowned for his meticulous planning and his painstaking attention to detail instead put in place a creative response that bordered on that of an outright gamble. Certainly Berryman ensured that the attack was not undertaken without a cohesive plan and support from his artillery but it was nevertheless a high risk operation and one that could be seen as outside of the bounds of his military temperament. However rather than being seen as a paradox or an anomaly, Jezzine should be viewed as a demonstration of Berryman’s growing confidence in himself to appreciate and analyse tactical problems in a fast paced, mobile and very fluid operation. The confidence born of his successes at Bardia, Tobruk, and Merdjayoun was encouraging him to trust his instincts and to act (and react) quickly and decisively. Berryman’s confidence was helping him to become a more aggressive and decisive commander. However, these factors could, and subsequently did, also lead to a degree of overconfidence, which is one of the scourges of military command that can easily lead to gambles and mistakes that cost soldiers lives.

The Vichy French Counter Strike The Syria campaign took a dramatic turn for the worse on 15 June when the Vichy French forces launched a series of counter-attacks. The French drove in the British forces in the east capturing Ezrra and Kuneitra, some 35 miles in the rear of the British position. This move had profound strategic consequences as these forces threatened to cut off the allied forces near Kiswe. The second blow of the French counter offensive fell on the small covering force around the town of Merdjayoun.79

The possession of Merdjayoun was vital to the Australian advance. While the country to the north of the town held little prospect for an advance, the long Australian supply lines to Jezzine ran through the area and if the Vichy French could advance in

78 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 390. 79 Ibid, p. 395. 267 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

this sector they threatened to cut off the Australian forces in the coastal region. By gambling on an advance to Jezzine to support the 21st Brigade on the coast, Lavarack, with only two brigades at his disposal, had left himself dangerously exposed. The French counter attack now threatened the entire Syrian operation.

The forces protecting Merdjayoun on the morning of 15 June were a weak consignment of infantry and cavalry operating under three separate command arrangements. Toddforce consisted of two light cavalry units, the Scots Greys (Lieutenant Colonel Todd) forward of the town along Route B and the 6th Division Cavalry squadron (Major D. Macarthur-Onslow) along Route A. The bulk of the protecting force, made up of the 2/33rd Battalion under Lt-Colonel Monaghan, was on the right flank. The companies of this battalion, however, were widely scattered. Monaghan, despite having the role of masking enemy troops left only one company of infantry from the 2/5th Battalion to occupy the town and one company from his own battalion at Khiam. The remainder of his force (three companies) were used to conduct a wide flanking manoeuvre to test the Vichy French defences. In support of these units were No. 10 battery, 2/5th Field Regiment, part of the 2/2nd anti-tank regiment and some engineer and anti-aircraft units.80 The forces to Todd and Monaghan’s rear (consisting mainly of the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion) near the Litani River were under the direct command of 7th Australian Division HQ.

The Vichy French struck Merdjayoun at 1500hrs on the afternoon of 15 June. Two columns, one on each of the major approach routes, known as A and B, advanced using tanks and infantry. They were preceded by a heavy artillery and mortar bombardment. In the face of these attacks the British cavalry regiment, the Scots Greys ‘broke completely’ and the Australian 6th Cavalry were forced to withdraw.81 The 2/33rd battalion was widely scattered and some of its sub-units were out of contact with battalion headquarters. Monaghan, originally a cavalry officer, later commented that this operation taught him a valuable lesson. Namely, that unlike a horse the infantry only has two legs not four.82

80 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 393-400. 81 MacAllester & Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble, p. 95. 82 Lodge, Lavarack Rival General, p. 164. 268 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

The Australian forces resisted stubbornly, but their only defence against the French tanks were the guns of the 2/2nd Anti-tank Regiment. These guns knocked out 13 enemy tanks at the cost of two guns but intense machine-gun fire forced them to withdraw. The infantry, who lacked any viable defence against the tanks, were forced to follow suit. The situation was becoming critical and as reports that enemy ‘tanks had broken through’ wrongly circulated and a ‘wave of panic set in amongst some of the men’ behind the forward positions. Some units withdrew while others received no orders. The units near the town were forced to withdraw to Qleaa while the 2/33rd Battalion conducted a fighting withdrawal to the area of Bmeriq. By the evening the French had taken Merdjayoun, Ibeles Saki and Khiam and were probing along the road to Qleaa.83

Map 11: ‘The Vichy French Counter Attack’ (detail), 14-16 June 1941. (Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, p. 58, map B).

This double pronged Vichy French attack ‘transformed the situation’ in Syria and brought to a halt the drives on and Damascus. In the western and central sectors Lavarack acted decisively. All his reserves were dispatched to protect his rear echelon against a further advance by the enemy from Kuneitra. This placed further

83 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 398. 269 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

pressure on the forces around Merdjayoun and meant he had to withdraw units from his thrust on Jezzine to reinforce this front. Lavarack decided to leave the 25th Brigade at Jezzine but removed all but one battalion, the 2/31st, from Baxter-Cox’s command. The remainder were ordered back to Merdjayoun.

The Vichy French counter-attack had far reaching consequences on the command arrangements for Operation Exporter. Within three days of the French counter-attack, the British General Maitland Wilson handed control of the whole front to Lavarack who was promoted (once again) to Lieutenant-General and 1st Australian Corps Headquarters was brought into operation. Lavarack handed control of the 7th Australian Division to the newly promoted Major-General Allen, meanwhile Lavarack made Berryman commander of all of the forces operating around Merdjayoun and east of the Litani River. These units were known as ‘Berryforce’ after their commanding officer.84

Berryforce At 0100 hours on the morning of 15 June Berryman finally decided to get some rest after his exhausting actions at Merdjayoun and Jezzine over the preceding two days. Just as he retired, Major Grace, 7th Division’s senior liaison, officer arrived to inform Berryman of the French counter attacks and to pass on Lavarack’s order for him to move back to Merdjayoun, take command of the forces there and stop the enemy from crossing the Litani River. Berryman instantly made plans to move to his new sector and called in Lieutenant-Colonel O’Brien (CO 2/5th Field Regiment), and ordered him to move to the right hand sector near Khiam and assess the situation on Berryman’s behalf.85

Berryman departed Jezzine an hour later, rather fortuitously as it turned out as later that morning the French bombarded the Hotel that had served as Berryman’s headquarters completely destroying it. At first light Berryman conducted a reconnaissance of the western and central parts of his sector and met O’Brien at the headquarters of the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion to discuss the situation on his right around

84 Originally ‘CRAforce’ it was renamed ‘Berryforce’ two days later. 85 ‘Merdjayoun: Report on the Operations of Berryforce 16 Jun- 29 Jun 41’, Papers of Lieutenant-General F. H. Berryman, AWM PR 84/370, item 75. Hereafter ‘Berryforce Report’. See also ‘Berryman Diary’, 16 June 1941. 270 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

Khiam. O’Brien managed to confer with the commanders of the Scots Greys (Lieutenant-Colonel Todd), 6th Division Cavalry Regiment (Major Macarthur-Onslow) and 2/33rd Battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Monaghan). While Todd proposed a withdrawal to Metulla, O’Brien was greatly relieved by the confidence shown by Macarthur-Onslow and Monaghan both of whom ‘had the situation on [their] flank fairly well in hand’.86 Berryman was not totally convinced, noting soon after that ‘to the east the situation was fluid & we had lost Fort Khiam & Bmeriq’. It was however, ‘too far away from where I was to reinforce, even had I wanted to… fortunately the enemy was concentrating his efforts along the main road [to Qleaa]’.87

At 0630 Berryman meet with Lieutenant-Colonel Wellington (2/2nd Pioneer Battalion) and although his orders confined his command to the west of the Litani River he took the initiative and ordered Wellington to position one of his companies on the ridge between Merdjayoun and Qleaa. At 1000hrs the French maintained the pressure by launching an attack down the main road which was defeated by the guns of the 2/2nd Anti-Tank regiment with support from a company of the 2/5th Battalion. Confused fighting however continued on the 2/33rd Battalion’s sector near Khiam. Later in the morning the 2/5th Field Regiment and a troop from the 2/6th Field Regiment arrived and Berryman immediately put them into action to help contain the French.88

While Berryman’s command only extended to the western side of the Litani River and his task was a defensive one he concluded that the ‘quickest way of checking the enemy in the Khiam sector was to wrest the initiative from the enemy by attacking him at Merdjayoun’.89 Lavarack arrived at Berryman’s temporary headquarters at 1500 hours and Berryman pushed to be allowed to conduct a limited offensive. Lavarack concurred and extended Berryman’s command to all of the forces in the area around Merdjayoun.

Berryman forces now consisted of the 2/33rd Battalion on the right flank around Bmeriq and Khiam, one company of the 2/5th Battalion and the 2/2nd Pioneers at Qleaa

86 O’Brien, Guns and Gunners, p. 66-69. 87 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, 28 June 1941,’ Berryman Family Papers. 88 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 401, 404. 89 ‘Berryforce Report’, p. 2. See ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, 28 June 1941,’ Berryman Family Papers. 271 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

supported by the remainder of the Scots Greys and the 6th Division Cavalry Squadron. Artillery support in this sector was provided by one battery of the 2/5th Field Regiment and another from the 2/6th Field Regiment was moving into position. On the left, near the Litani Crossing, Berryman established his headquarters. Moving towards his position was the 2/25th Battalion and the remainder of the 2/5th Field Regiment.

Map 12: The situation at Merdjayoun, 16 June 1941. (Adapted by author from original, Gavin Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, [insert] p. 386) The red symbols and arrows display the movement of Vichy French Forces and the blue, Berryforce units. Standard military symbology has been used.

‘Berryforce’ as this collection of units became known was similar in composition to a large infantry brigade group consisting as it did of two infantry battalions, a pioneer battalion, a mechanised regiment, a cavalry regiment, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, and artillery.

The major problem with this arrangement however was that Berryman’s headquarters was not fitted out like that of an infantry brigade. He lacked both staff officers and signalling equipment and to make matters worse not one of the units in his

272 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

command had operated together before. Berryforce’s units were drawn from different brigades and in the case of the Scots Greys, the British army.90

Berryman knew that he faced at least two French battalions well supported by artillery and, most importantly, tanks.91 To overcome this problem for his attack Berryman ordered the 2/25th Battalion to advance over the Litani and approach Merdjayoun from the North West cutting the supply roads leading out of the town. The 2/2nd Pioneers were to launch a diversionary assault up the main road from Qleaa in support. The attack was to take place at 0530hrs on 17 June: meanwhile the artillery would commence registering targets and restricting movement in and out of the town.92

Berryforce’s first assault ran into a number of problems before it even managed to develop. The 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion was not an infantry unit and although it had received training in basic infantry field craft up to this point that training was somewhat limited. The unit lacked the specialist support units organic to an infantry battalion and it possessed only one automatic weapon per platoon. For the 2/25th Battalion the problems were entirely different. The unit was ‘fresh’ in that it had not seen any significant fighting during the campaign, but it had been continuously on the move in a theatre of operations for 10 days. The biggest obstacle it faced, however, was the terrain during its approach march. The area that Berryman had selected for the assault was somewhat ‘tank-proof’ and did provide for a flanking assault, but this also meant that it was difficult country, even for light infantry. The 2/25th Battalion marched over five miles to its concentration point including a descent of 1,200 feet into and back out of the

90 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 66. Gordon Corrigan notes how such ‘ad hoc’ formations were no where near successful in the British army as they were in the German army during World War II. Corrigan argues that ‘In the British army, apart from there being little or no experience of combined arms training, units could not operate jointly until they had spent a lengthy period of training together, so that major British operations took far longer to prepare than German ones’. Corrigan argues that this is a direct result of a lack of formal British doctrine until 1996. The Germans however had army-wide SOPs (Standard Operating Procedure) and thus units unknown to each other could instantly operate together. Corrigan, Blood, Sweat and Arrogance, p. 362. 91 The French reinforced their units at Merdjayoun in response to Berryman’s assault so by 21 June 1941 their forces consisted of 3rd Battalion 6th Regiment Foreign Legion, 2nd Battalion 16th Regiment Tirailleurs Tunisiens, 1st Battalion 22 Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens, 2nd Battalion 9 Regiment Tirailleurs Algeriens, 1st Battalion Chasseurs Libananis, Det 631 Pioneer Battalion, three artillery batteries, 15th Squadron Tcherkess (Medium Tanks) 16th Squadron Tcherkess, 38th Squadron Partisans, One Squadron Mechanised Cavalry. See War Diary HQ 7th Division, RAA, AWM 52 4/4/14. This is the equivalent of four infantry battalions with medium tank and artillery support. 92‘Berryman to Fenton’, Berryman Papers, AWM PR 84/370, p. 5. 273 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Litani Gorge, crossing the fast flowing river in the process.93 Most of the country was traversed in single file with the men stumbling and slipping as they went. The river was also fast flowing and chest deep. This meant the advance along the Merdjayoun plateau was carried out soaking wet. Despite the problems that the 25th Battalion was experiencing at 0530 hrs the artillery barrage came crashing down and the Pioneers moved out on their assault on the Merdjayoun Fort. As the barrage crept forward the shells made little impact on the 15ft thick wall around the fort. As the artillery lifted the Pioneers were met with a hail of fire. The assaulting company under Captain E. F. Aitken was pinned down within 30 yards of the fort and was losing men rapidly. B Company, which was supporting the advance, now got sucked into the assault and was also under 94Map 13: 2/2nd Pioneer Battalions Attack 17 June 1941 fire. (McAllester, Largely a Gamble, p. 99)

‘The Pioneers went in with all the gallantry in the world’ noted Sergeant Len Torney (2/5th Battalion) ‘but against such fortifications their task was hopeless’.95

93 ‘A Talk by Brigadier Berryman 13 January 1942 [Chester Wilmot ABC Radio talk Script], NAA SP300/4, item 128. 94 There is some disagreement over the role that the 2/2 Pioneer Battalion played during this attack. Largely a Gamble implies that the Pioneers were to make the main effort while The Official History argues that the second company was to follow through and ‘exploit the success of the first’. Berryman, however, maintains that this was a supporting operation and that the 2/25th’s assault was the main effort. He argues that ‘he never intended the Pioneers to become this involved. That it was meant only as a demonstration’. See ‘Berryman to Gavin Long’ AWM PR84/370, 18 August 1952. This is supported by the Operational order prepared by Major Wilton that states ‘1 Coy 2/2 Pnr Bn will attack fort with patrols from SW. (emphasis added) The 7 Div Report on Operation however talks of an attack by ‘one coy and to exploit with another coy’. Gavin Long recorded in his notes that ‘the 2IC [second in command] of the [2/2 Pioneer] Battalion pushed in the company detailed for exploitation’ as the lead company was checked on some wire. See Records of Gavin Long, ‘Syrian Narratives, No.2 – Berryforce’, AWM 67 11/37. 95 McAllester, Largely a Gamble, p. 99 274 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

The decisive blow was struck when French tanks emerged from the fort and lacking anti-tank weapons the Pioneers were easily overcome. Not only were these two attacks soundly defeated, but twenty nine men of the Pioneers including Captain Aitken and two platoon commanders were taken prisoner. The situation for the Pioneers was hopeless. In response Berryman got the artillery to fire a 100 round barrage on the fort to cover their withdrawal.96 Thirty eight members of the Battalion were captured during the tank assault and the survivors hung on until dusk when they withdrew to a line 800 yards from the fort under the protection of the 2/2nd Anti-Tank Regiment’s guns.

The tragedy of the Pioneers was made even more acute when it was realised that the main assault by the 2/25th Battalion did not even get underway. The Battalion had not reached the upper section of the Merdjayoun plateau until three hours after dawn and with all surprise lost the attack was cancelled. The Pioneers committed two companies to a frontal assault on a heavily fortified and defended position in what was supposed to be only a one company supporting operation. It cost the unit 27 killed, 46 wounded and 29 prisoners.97

Things proved to be no more successful on the 2/25th Battalion’s front. Lt A.R. (Roden) Culter, one of the 2/5th Field Regiment’s forward observation party attached to the 2/25th Battalion, noted that ‘The general factor that affected a successful advance that day was that the difficulty of the ground from the river to the start line was not realised …’.98 Both of the battalions were given almost impossible tasks.

96 War Diary, HQ CRA, 7th Australian Division. 97 Long, Greece, Crete, and Syria, p. 409. 98 J. McAllester & S. Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble, p. 103. 275 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Figure: 9.3 ‘The Pioneers went in with all the gallantry in the world’ noted Sergeant Len Torney (2/5th Battalion) ‘but against such fortifications their task was hopeless’ ‘Merdjayoun’ by Harold Herbert. A reconstructed view of action at Merdjayoun Syria 1941, (AWM ART 30059)

The events of this day were not helped by the presence of the Vichy French Airforce and the total absence of Allied air cover. This situation was to persist for most of the campaign. It became apparent that Merdjayoun was now a ‘murderous slogging match’ where warfare was reduced to the ‘most primitive level’ with individual soldiers stalking each other among rocks and ravines and guns being man handled into positions where no vehicle could pass.99 Berryman realised that a victory in this sector would be a hard fought and costly affair. At Merdjayoun the entire allied invasion learned the truth about the British high command’s supposed ‘walkover’ of the Vichy French Syria.100

The Australian forces, however, did secure one victory on 17 June. Late in the afternoon Berryman, with Lavarack’s approval, ordered a concentrated artillery bombardment on the fort and shortly afterward its magazine exploded and the ‘place lifted skywards’101 creating a tremendous spectacle for the Australian troops and the visiting Corps and Divisional commanders (Lavarack and Allen). 102 Both of these officers urged Berryman to continue his attacks as they regarded Merdjayoun as a ‘key

99 ‘Syria: World War II Campaign against a Former Ally’, Reveille, June 1, 1966, p. 13-14. 100 Ibid, p. 13. 101 Brett Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, p. 167. 102 ‘Merdjayoun: Report on the Operations of Berryforce 16 Jun – 29 Jun 41’, AWM PR84/370, p. 2-3. 276 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

position’.103 However, further assaults were delayed until extra gun ammunition was brought up and further reconnaissance was complete.

On 18 June Berryman made a personal reconnaissance over the ground on which the 2/25th advanced the previous day. A few days later Berryman was to confide to his distant wife the hardship and difficulties that this seemingly simple task involved; The climb down the Litani & up again to the front was most tiring but we did our job [conducing a reconnaissance under fire] & then set back on our return … we waded back across the river and being very tired found it difficult to keep our feet … O’Brien and I were both exhausted by the time we got [back] but managed it as we had to complete our plans and issue orders. That night I was so physically tired I could not sleep.104

This was a severe test not only of Berryman’s physical endurance but his mental state as well. Seven continuous days in combat with little sleep, a high stress environment and physical exhaustion must certainly have been taking its toll. This was especially so for a senior officer such as Berryman who believed in constantly working to capacity, pushing himself (and his staff) with a demanding schedule as well as being determind to continue his presence in the frontline.

Berryman had decided that a further assault was warranted on the 2/25th’s axis and in consultation with the battalion’s commanding officer he set the artillery support and the objectives for the following day. The main premise for this decision lay in the concentration of Berryman’s only ‘fresh’ battalion on this flank and the apparently ‘tank-proof’ country in this region.105

Berryforce’s second attack began much in the manner intended for the first undertaken two days previously. The 2/2nd Pioneer battalion provided a ‘demonstration’ in front of the fort area while the 2/25th attacked from the north east. The assault however soon ran into difficulties. A Company (2/25th) on the right made it into the

103 ‘Major-General Allen to Gavin Long’, 11th October 1952, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3-6 & ‘Lavarack to Gavin Long’, 26 September 1952, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 3-209. As a result of the French counter-attack at Merdjayoun and on the Damascus front General Wilson handed command of the Syrian operation over to the 1st Australian Corps. As of 19 June 1941 Lavarack was promoted to Lieutenant-General and GOC 1st Australian Corps, Major-General ‘Tubby’ Allen became GOC 7th Australian Division. 104 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, 28 June 1941’. Berryman Family Papers. 105 ‘Berryforce Report’, p. 3. 277 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

outskirts of the town and B Company advanced on their left into the cemetery. Both companies were soon held up by very heavy fire and the French responded by counter- attacking with their tanks. With no effective anti-tank weapons the battalion was struggling.106 It was eventually the bravery of the artillery forward observation party from the 2/5th Field Regiment, under Captain C.A. Clarke and Lt Roden Cutler, that almost won the day.

Cutler along with Lance Corporal Pratt opened fire with Boyes anti-tank rifles at the tanks and drove them off and then used Bren guns to remove the threat of the attacking French infantry. The tanks however soon reappeared. Their second shot killed Captain Clarke and wounded Gunner Grayson forcing the Australians to withdraw. However Cutler was convinced that the position could be taken. At 1630, 12 hours after the initial assault started, Cutler led a patrol into the town meeting only limited resistance. However an attempt by the Cutler and infantry to exploit this success resulted in their being cut off from their own forces when the tanks returned at 1930hrs.107

The survivors of the assault hung on until dark and Berryman’s plan to eliminate the tanks that night in the town using sticky bombs came to nothing when they could not be brought forward in sufficient time. In the end they had to withdraw with Cutler’s party fighting through the French positions. The attack had come extraordinarily close to being a success. The 2/25th Battalion got into the town but again the French tanks proved decisive. The terrain offered protection against this obvious French advantage but once inside the town they were too difficult to overcome with inadequate Boyes anti-tank rifles. The decisive factor, however, was the exhaustion of the troops. Cutler believed that the town could have been taken that afternoon had the ‘attacking troops been fresh and well rested’.108 The skill and tenacity of the defending troops however must also be given due credit.

106 The battalion’s only defence against tanks was their Boyes anti-tank rifles that were proven during the campaign as being completely useless against the French medium tanks. The terrain around the Litani Gorge made it impossible for the Australians to bring their 2 pounder anti-tank guns into action. 107 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 444. 108 McAllester, Largely a Gamble, p. 105. 278 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

The second assault on Merdjayoun cost the attacking forces 25 killed in action and 73 missing in action, plus a number wounded. Berryman reported that ‘the attack surprised … the enemy and he suffered casualties at least equal to our own. He put in at least one fresh battalion and continued to be apprehensive about his right rear’.109 The battle for the town was indeed a close encounter. Berryman noted that ‘the 2/25 battalion had been magnificent’ and they were ‘robbed of a victory by enemy tanks’.110

Despite a second failure this attack had a profound effect on Berryman’s conduct of the battle. Berryman noted that …our attacks had halted the enemy thrust to the east whilst a battalion I put across the Litani Gorge threatened the enemy’s right rear and thus I had wrestled the initiative from him and could proceed more deliberately with my plans to recapture M[erdjayoun].111

The advance by the 2/2nd Pioneers and in the centre along with the 2/25th Battalion on the flank moved the Australian lines considerably closer to the French positions. This allowed the Australian artillery to bring effective fire onto ‘Route B’ one of the two French supply lines into Merdjayoun, closing it to traffic.112

As early as 14 June Berryman ordered that an observation post from the 2/6th Field Regiment with one battery in support establish itself at Kafr Houn to keep both the Litani River and the road leading from Merdjayoun-Qaroun (Route B) under observation. This OP and the troop of guns were used to support the 2/25th battalion principally by denying the enemy the use of the road to reinforce and supply their forces. By 20 June the OP reported to Berryman that ‘the enemy had given up using the road during daylight and that the presence of destroyed vehicles on the road indicated that he [Vichy French] did not use it at night’.113 This meant that the French were now reliant on only one of the two supply routes to Merdjayoun. If Berryman could position

109 ‘Berryforce Report’, p. 3. 110 ‘Syrian Narratives, No.2 – Berryforce’, Records of Gavin Long, AWM 67 11/37, p.24. Berryman also noted in his diary that the 2/25th Battalions ‘form was excellent’. 111 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, 29 June 1941’, Berryman Family Papers. 112 Berryman did issue an order that the 2/25th Battalion and the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion were to hunt down and destroy the remaining French tanks on the night of 19 June using’ Sticky bombs’. Berryman believed that there were only five remaining enemy tanks and this was the sole reason that the enemy were able to maintain their control of the town in the face of the Australian assaults. This plan was cancelled when the ‘sticky bombs’ could not be made available to the battalions on time. See ‘CRA Force OO No.3’, AWM 52 2/2/7. 113 ‘Berryforce Report’, p. 4. 279 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

his artillery to bombard the second road he could close the French supply lines which would force them to abandon the town or risk encirclement. This would also mean that Berryman could avoid a counter-attack by the French tanks. The key to this new strategy was the high ground to the east of Merdjayoun known as Ibeles Saki.

Despite the strain of two weeks of intense campaigning and his command of three major battles, Berryman did not loosen his grip on his command, diminish the pace of his workload nor restrict his command’s operations.114 He used the following two days to relocate his headquarters to a more central position on his front, visit all of his commanding officers and conduct personal reconnaissances along his front. On 22 June Berryman employed aggressive patrolling around Merdjayoun to keep the French occupied as well as patrols around the Khiam area to confirm that both Khiam and Bmeriq were unoccupied by the enemy.115 When satisfied that a number of routes through the area around Khiam offered sufficient protection from tanks he contrived to launch an assault with the 2/33rd Battalion, AIF who had held this area since before the French counter-attack. The 2nd Battalion King’s Own Royal Rifle Corps who had been sent to Berryforce by Lavarack to replace the exhausted 2/25th Battalion were to support this operation.116 Berryman also moved in the 2/5th Field Regiment to his right flank leaving only one troop of the 2/6th Regiment behind ‘so that the enemy would NOT know we were moving the bulk of our artillery’.117

Berryman’s first two attacks on the town were specifically aimed at wrestling the initiative from the Vichy French and distracting them from his disorganised right flank. These attacks while not securing Merdjayoun still achieved both of these aims. However both Berryman and the CO of the 2/33rd Battalion remained wary of their open right flank. Berryman’s solution to this problem proved to be rather unorthodox. After a patrol from the 2/33rd Battalion captured 50 French cavalry horses Berryman ordered the CO of 6th Cavalry Regiment to form a horsed squadron to operate in the rugged terrain on Berryforce’s right flank. The unit which quickly became known as ‘The

114 1st Merdjayoun (9 June – 12 June), Jezzine (13 June- 15 June), 2nd Merdjayoun, Phase 1 (15 June – 19 June, 2 major attacks). Berryforce was about to conduct the first major attack of Phase 2 (20 June – 24 June, 2 attacks) and it was to finish with a further attack in Phase 3 (25-29 June, 1 attack) before it was withdrawn and disbanded. 115 ‘War Diary’ HQ 7th Div RAA, 22 June 1941, AWM 52 4/1/14. 116 Berryman Diary, 20-23 June, 1941. 117 ‘Berryforce Report’, p. 4. 280 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

Kelly Gang’ provided great service, not just to Berryforce, but throughout the rest of the Syrian campaign rendering flank protection, protecting forward observation posts and conducting reconnaissances.118

Map 14: Situation on Berryman’s right flank, Merdjayoun 18-22 June 1941 (Adapted from original in William Crooks, The Footsoldiers; the story of the 2/33rd Australian Infantry Battalion, A.I.F., p.103)119

118 See Peter Dean, ‘Kelly Gang Reborn’, Wartime, No. 24, 2003, p. 48-49. 119 William Crooks, The Footsoldiers; the story of the 2/33rd Australian Infantry Battalion, A.I.F., (Printcraft Press, Brookvale, 1971), p. 103. Kelly Gang Patrol area added from map in ‘War Diary, 6th Australian Cavalry Regiment’, AWM 54 531/2/27. The ‘Report on “Kelly Gang” Patrols in Syrian Campaign’ notes that: ‘one of the greatest difficulties which presented itself was adequate flank protection to the inf[sic] moving along the BANAYS-MERDJAYOUN RD and their ops in the KHIAM area …and the steep escarpment rising almost directly from the road … It was from those rugged hills that the inf feared an outflanking movement by enemy Horse Cav or Inf. The use of tracked vehicles was quite impossible … The solution to the problem came when … Berryman ordered that the [captured enemy] horses be used to form a tp of horsed cavalry … drawn from “C” Sqn 6 Aust Div Cav … Between 23 Jun 41 and 2 July 41 the “KELLY GANG patrolled the BMERIQ-HAMANE-KARF CHEBBA- 281 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

On 22 June Berryman was visited by Lavarack and Allen who approved his plan for the taking of Ibeles Saki. Later in the day Berryman went forward with the CO 2/33rd Battalion to set the objectives for the following day. The terrain around Ibeles Saki was dominated by two features know as the ‘Pimple’ and the ‘Little Pimple’. Berryman’s plan called for one company of the 2/33rd Battalion to attack and secure the ‘Little Pimple’. Two companies of the 2nd Battalion King’s Own Rifle Regiment (KORR), which had been expressly sent forward by Lavarack to continue the advance at Merdjayoun, would then pass to the left of the ‘Little Pimple’ to attack and secure the dominant high ground. Once this feature, the ‘Pimple’, was secure the remaining two companies of the 2nd Battalion KORR would secure the village of Ibeles Saki. With the town and high ground secure Berryman’s guns could be brought forward and ‘Route A’ leading into Merdjayoun could be closed.120

Map 15 Attack of 2/33rd Bn & 2nd Bn KORR – 23 June 1941. (Adapted from original in William Crooks, The Footsoldiers; the story of the 2/33rd Australian Infantry Battalion, A.I.F., p.108)

MAZRAAT ISLAM IYE area. The country was so rough that on occasions horses had to be left … and patrols continued on foot’. See AWM 54 531/2/27. 120 ‘Berryforce Report’, p. 5. 282 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

At 0430hrs on 23 June C Company of the 2/33rd Battalion moved forward to capture the ‘Little Pimple’. It was, as it turned out, to be the only ‘company “set-piece” attack that the Battalion ever staged in the war’.121 With Vickers machine guns firing from the olive grove at the base of the objective and the guns of the 2/5th Field Regiment pounding the objective the men set out on their daring task. The 2/33rd Battalion’s history provides a riveting description of the ensuing action:

With 900 yards to go, the four forward sections were in amongst the French trenches … None was expecting the strong opposition from the French. Holding firm in their trenches the French fired rapidly and quickly. Soon the attack was a clustered melee of clubbing and grunting men. Corporal Kelly and Lance-Corporal Wood both shot down crews of French M.G’.s … Sergeant Neil Henderson … charged into a 37mm anti-tank post, shot two of the crew, turned the gun around to fire into an M.G … [and] as he fired his second shot he was killed by a bullet through the head. In 13 Platoon Micky Wood was herding a group of twelve Algerians, who had put up their hands in surrender, into a trench, when one of them picked up a rifle and shot Mick dead. Lieutenant Dark, incensed at this treachery, clubbed the Algerian to death with the butt of his pistol.122

William Crook’s description of C Company’s attack clearly illustrates the consequences and results of the decisions Berryman was making. Always present in the forward areas for each of his attacks Berryman looked on as the hand to hand fighting on the feature continued for over half an hour until the French withdrew or surrendered. This however was not the end of the ordeal for C Company. At 0545 the French pounded the hill with artillery, mortar fire and machine gun fire which was immediately followed up with a counter attack by some 50 French soldiers. ‘This attack, as were others, was thrown back by two-inch mortars, L.M.G’s and grenades’.123

It was soon revealed that C Company had taken a French two company position that included five medium machine guns, twelve light machine guns, three mortars and a 37 mm anti-tank gun. The whole morning cost C Company five killed and sixteen wounded. It was without doubt an extraordinary effort. After securing the hill a white

121 Crooks, The Footsoldiers, p. 106. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid, p.107. 283 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

success flare was fired and the four companies of the 2nd Battalion KORR set off for the Pimple and Ibeles Saki.124

Berryman had every confidence that the second phase of the attack would be a success. The 2nd Battalion KORR was a pre-war British regular army battalion who had formed a lasting impression on the Australians when debussing at the HQ of the 2/33rd Battalion the previous day. ‘All polished brass and starched khaki’, they had formed up ‘in column of route, in [a] quick and soldierly fashion [before] march[ing] off on orders, all in step, up the road to their position’.125

On the morning of the 23 June however the KORR’s parade ground precision was missing. While starting on time the battalion ‘formed up at 0815, fifteen minutes behind the barrage’.126 By falling behind the barrage, the men of the KORR were pinned down under a hail of fire from the French defenders and only managed to make it half way up the hill. Berryman, who was on hand to watch the assault, moved quickly to intervene when he saw the CO of KORR attempting to commit his reserve companies. As Berryman noted

Had the CO King’s Own been allowed to carry out his plan of continuing [with] his third and fourth companies down the road without a proper fire plan he would have suffered many more causalities with very little chance of success. I was on hand and stopped this.127

Berryman organised the guns to provide covering fire to allow the KORR to withdraw a small distance so as to resume the advance the following day.

During the night Berryman ordered Major Rickard and Lieutenant Cutler to move a 25 pounder artillery piece into position to provide direct fire support for the resumption of the KORR’s attack the following morning. As the Battalion formed for

124 Ibid, p.107-108. The French attempted two more counter attacks on this feature during the course of the day. 125 Ibid, p. 102. 126 Captain Cotton, 2/33 BN, as quoted by Berryman in ‘Berryman to Long 18 August, 1952’, p. 4, AWM PR 84/370. 127 ‘Berryman to Long, 18 August 1952’, p. 4, AWM PR 84/370. Berryman had in fact been forward to the KORR position three times during the day and sent Major Macarthur-Onslow, CO 6th Division Cavalry Regiment and an officer to whom Berryman was close, to see the KORR five times during that day. 284 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

the attack the French unleased a mortar barrage that landed among the rear companies of the KORR and caused numerous causalities. The Battalion paused, believing incorrectly that it was the Australian artillery falling short, but after Lieutenant Cutler moved forward through the enemy barrage to the Battalion to sort out this misunderstanding the assault got underway against minimal French resistance. By 0940 patrols from the KORR and the 2/33rd Battalion had entered Ibeles Saki.128

It was clear that after the assaults on 23 June the French realised that their hold over Merdjayoun was becoming tenuous. On the morning of 24 June as the KORR and the 2/33rd Battalions moved into Ibeles Saki the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion reported enemy movement in the town. Patrols from that unit soon reported that the position was abandoned and the battalion moved in to occupy the township. Merdjayoun had fallen to the Australians once again, ten days and four indomitable attacks after the French counter-attack had retaken it.129

Berryman decided to follow up and test the new French position which rested on Col’s Ridge, three miles north east of Merdjayoun. Berryman was mindful that as yet they had not reclaimed all the territory lost during the French counter-attack and that on 23 June the C in C, General Wavell, had stressed to Berryman the importance of maintaining depth to his positions.130 Berryman spent 25 June consolidating his new positions and on 26 June he held a conference at Merdjayoun with Lieutenant-Colonel Wellington and Captain Camm of the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion to formulate a plan for this unit to test the French positions on Col’s Ridge.

Berryman’s plan called for an advance by Camm’s company from the 2/2nd Pioneers to attack Col’s Ridge from the north, or extreme right of the French position. The company would then move along the ridge, supported by the guns of the 2/5th Field Regiment and two platoons from the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion to roll up the enemy’s position. The attack the following morning started well and Camm’s company took the first knoll without casualties and captured two prisoners. However, as soon as the supporting barrage finished, Camm’s company came under immediate counter-

128 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 448; ‘Berryforce Report’, p. 5-6. 129 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 448 130 ‘Berryman to Long, 18 August 1952’, AWM PR 84/370, item 73 285 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

attack. Camm and a number of other officers were killed and, faced by far superior numbers, the survivors wisely chose to withdraw covered by the guns of the 2/5th Field Regiment. The ridge, it was discovered, was the main French position held by two battalions. These units had withdrawn over the hill during the barrage and immediately counter-attacked when it finished. Camm’s company suffered 27 killed and 30 wounded.131

The attack by the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion on Col’s Ridge was the last major action by Berryforce. It also meant that the Pioneer’s had born the brunt of Berryman’s mistakes. Berryforce’s first and last attacks had demonstrated what would happen when his new found confidence and aggression overcame his usual meticulous planning. It is not surprising that the failure of both of these attacks went hand in hand with Berryman’s overconfidence in the momentum of his operations, his lack of personal reconnaissance and, in the case of the first assault, orders that were somewhat ambiguous. Berryman’s aggression and decisive action were best served when it was supported by all of those qualities that had earned him his reputation as the ‘soundest planner’ in the AIF and one of its most talented staff officers.

As a result of the heavy resistance that the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion had met on Col’s Ridge Berryman ‘decided to strengthen our present positions, adopt a vigorous patrolling policy and harass the enemy with arty fire particularly his FDLs [forward defensive lines] and btys [artillery batteries]’.132 Meanwhile the capture of Merdjayoun, the success of British operations to the east, plus General Wavell’s allocation of additional resources to the invasion lead to a redistribution of areas of responsibility.

The central sector around Merdjayoun was handed over to the 23rd British Brigade and the 7th Australian Division concentrated on the coastal flank for the drive to Beirut. As a result Berryman handed over command of his sector to Brigadier Galloway and moved to the coast to once again take command of the 7th Division’s artillery.133

131 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 405, Aitken, The Story of the 2/2 Pioneer Battalion, p. 54-60. 132 ‘Berryforce Report’, p. 6. 133 Berryman Diary, 28 June 1941. Berryman notes in his diary that Galloway arrived at his headquarters at 2000hrs, two hours late. 286 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

MAP 16: Berryforce dispositions and the attack on Col’s Ridge, 25-29 June 1941. (Adapted from Long, ‘Greece Crete and Syria’,[insert] p.386. ) Berryforce: Counting the Cost of Victory While Berryforce initially had a defensive role in accordance with the orders given to the 7th Australian Division, the need to recapture the town was not lost on Lavarack, Allen, Berryman or indeed Wavell. The French counter-attack threatened to cut off the coastal sector and the capture of the town greatly reduced both supply lines and lateral communications between the allied sectors. All the senior commanders therefore recognised the importance of recapturing the town and they constantly pressed Berryman to maintain his assaults.

The recapture of Merdjayoun by Berryforce was a particularly hard fought battle. It took Berryman ten days and five separate assaults to achieve his objective and in the period of 16-29 June Berryforce suffered almost 500 casualties.134 The casualties

134 McAllester, Largely a Gamble, p. 111. This included: 8 Officers and 81 other ranks killed, 14 officers and 205 other ranks wounded and 6 officers and 203 other ranks ‘missing’. Most of the missing were captured and recovered at the conclusion of the campaign. 287 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

were not surprising given the difficulties that Berryman faced. The most significant of these was that although his force was the largest in the coastal and central sectors during this time, it always fell well below that of the enemy. During the early phases Berryman was faced by three French battalions supported by tanks and by 21 June this had increased to five French battalions. The French also had the advantage of fighting from the dominant high ground and fighting a largely defensive battle, during the course of which they maintained air superiority.135

Despite these obstacles Berryman’s assault using the 2/25th Battalion on 19 June came extremely close to success. Although they were defeated by French tanks, this attack and the one previously undertaken by the 2/2nd Pioneers took the initiative from the French, forced them to reinforce their position and allowed Berryman’s artillery to close one of the two major supply routes into the town. Berryman’s next major assault on Ibeles Saki also came very close to success on the first day and the capture of the key high ground was only frustrated by the poor performance of the 2nd battalion KORR. The strategy however was completely successful. The assault removed the tactical advantage that the French held with their tanks and the operation successfully enveloped the town causing the French to withdraw in the face of encirclement.

As David Horner argues ‘Berryman was the energising force behind the attacks’.136 His constant energy, personal reconnaissance - which at times took him well forward of the Australian frontline, as well as his encouragement of the officers and men under his command was outstanding. Berryman was to note to Lieutenant-Colonel Fenton that Brigadier Dorman-Smith, Commandant of the British Staff School at Haifa, ‘visited me during this attack [2/33rd & KORR’s assault on Ibeles Saki] and later used it as a successful example of personal leadership’.137 Berryman’s personal drive,

135 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p, 451. These battalions were: III/6th Foreign Legion, II/16th Tunisian, I & II/22nd Algerian, and II/29th Algerian. It would be difficult to find too many other occasions during the war that a unit of the AIF fought an offensive operation of strategic importance while out numbered, out gunned, and lacking air superiority against well entrenched enemy positions with a superiority in heavy weapons and tanks. Added to this was the ad hoc nature of ‘Berryforce’ and the limited staff and communications equipment available. 136 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 67. 137 ‘Berryman to Fenton, 21 November 1944’, AWM PR 84/370. Given the fact that Berryman’s artillery HQ was not equipped to anywhere the same degree as an infantry brigade HQ to carry out combined arms operations, and especially given Berryman’s lack of signalling equipment, it was a both a wise and prudent decision for him to spend the majority of his time not at HQ but rather closer to the frontlines liaising directly with his sub-unit commanders. 288 COMMANDING FROM THE FRONT

especially after 19 June meant he maintained first hand knowledge of both the conditions and tactical issues faced by his troops. It also allowed him to intervene when necessary to either push units forward or stop them from becoming overly committed and thus suffering needless casualties. This ability to push forward to the frontline, his bold and aggressive use of his artillery as an offensive weapon and his ability to instil confidence in his soldiers in the face of enemy shelling are reflective of his experiences as a battery commander and as an infantry brigade staff officer in the later stages of the First World War. Berryman was able to build on this formative combat experience and adapt and relate these experiences to modern warfare.

Despite the significance of Berryforce’s achievements at Merdjayoun the battle remains largely forgotten. The efforts of the commander and the men of Berryforce were marginalised in the Australian official history and the battle has been relegated to the status of a secondary action, buried deep within a backwater campaign. The lack of publicity for the Australian, British and Free French forces involved in the invasion of Syria started before the first shot was even fired in anger. The political ramifications of fighting the Vichy French, launching an invasion over a peaceful frontier and both the lack of resources and poor planning provided by the British headquarters in London and the Middle East all conspired in clouding the operation in obscurity. Merdjayoun was a hard fought battle against a very skilled and determined enemy who fought from a position of both tactical and numerical superiority. This battle, and the Syrian campaign more generally, deserves much more recognition in Australia’s collective memory of the Second World War.

The importance of the town and its central role in the campaign was, however, foremost in the minds of senior commanders on both sides of the conflict during those long hot June days in 1941. Merdjayoun was a major strategic asset that ‘if given to the enemy’ would have allowed the French ‘into Palestine with disastrous consequences’.138 The recapture of the town allowed the 7th Australian Division to concentrate on the coast for their drive to Beirut with the knowledge that their right and rear was secure from attack. Berryforce also caused the enemy to concentrate his forces in the central sector and this reduced the number of enemy units available to withstand

138 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 451 289 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

the Australian’s ‘final blow’ at Damour. While not an ‘outstanding’ victory the accomplishment of Berryforce was, nonetheless, considerable especially when the superior enemy force, lack of heavy equipment, poor air cover, and other adverse conditions are taken into consideration. Merdjayoun however was only the beginning of the end of French resistance in Syria. There was still one more major battle for the Australians to fight before victory was secured and one more opportunity for Berryman to prove his capabilities as an officer and commander of excellence.

290 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

Chapter 10 ‘Artillery Commander’ The Battle for Damour, July-August 1941

The Vichy French, whatever they had to say about the Australian infantry, made it clear in their reports that they feared the artillery more than any other arm of the service’ Jim McAllester & Syd Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble: Australians in Syria June-July 19411

While the common soldiers [in Syria] made glowing tributes to each other, the tributes from their superiors were more problematic. Publicity for the campaign generally, and for the Australians in particular was meagre …The British played down the offensive and the Australian’s importance in it [due to the] embarrassment that the campaign was not the anticipated walkover; discomfort at fighting a recent ally; and a tendency to regard Australian and other Dominion troops as British … [it soon became evident that] the 7th [Division in Syria] was being forgotten. Mark Johnson, The Silent 7th: An illustrated history of the 7th Australian Division 1940-1946.2

The Battle for Damour Berryman did not have time to pause and reflect on the operations at Merdjayoun as he set out immediately for the coastal sector. Here the French had set their forces for the defence of the last natural barrier before Beirut, the Damour River. The country in the region surrounding the river posed a daunting proposition to the Australian forces. John Coates, author of the Atlas of Australia’s Wars and former Chief of the Australian General Staff has noted that ‘the country north and south of the Damour River was rocky, almost sheer in parts, and some of the worst going in the region’.3 With the difficulties posed by the terrain, and the very effective defence that the Vichy French had proven themselves capable of, no one on the Australian side of the lines, from the humblest private to Lieutenant General Lavarack, doubted the difficulties that they would face in breaching these defences.

1 McAllester and Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble, p. 228. 2 Johnson, The Silent 7th, p. 74. 3 Coates, Atlas of Australia’s Wars, p. 156. 291 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Immediately on arrival at the Damour River Berryman visited the HQs of Brigadier Jack Stevens and his 21st Brigade and made a ‘detailed reconnaissance’.4 Berryman was now involved in helping to prepare plans to break the Vichy French positions on the Damour River. Lavarack decided that his main thrust would come within the coastal sector with the 6th British Division holding the central and eastern flanks. Their task was to tie down the Vichy French forces in their areas.5 As a result Lavarack brought the 7th Australian division up to strength by adding the 17th Brigade Headquarters (Brigadier Savige) who would command the 2/5th Battalion, 2/3rd Battalion and the 2/2nd Pioneers. The Australian’s right would rest on Jezzine where the 25th Brigade supported by the 2/6th Field Regiment would operate while the 21st and 17th Brigades would form the strike force for the attack on Damour.6

After conducting his reconnaissance Berryman was displeased with the artillery preparations in the 21st Brigade’s area. He was particularly dissatisfied by the positions of the guns and observations post which ‘were to [sic] far back’. He was also appalled by some of the practices in the coastal sector. He recalled that:

I remember walking forward with Wilton and Captain Gooch, 4th Field Regiment, and noticing how nervous Gooch became. On asking Gooch why he was nervous he told me that we were already 800 yards in advance of our F.D.Ls [Forward Defensive Lines] and he feared that we might run into a patrol. I said surely we could deal with an enemy patrol as we were armed and could see a good distance ahead. We then sat down and I examined the enemy position and much to my surprise [I] counted twenty six of the enemy working on a small area of their El Atiqa defences. I asked Gooch if it was customary to allow the enemy to work unmolested and said that it was quite common for them to see such parties at work; … You can imagine my surprise having just come from a fighting sector to find a certain amount of the policy of ‘live and let live’.7

Berryman’s in-depth account in this letter of the difficulties that he faced at Damour is critical in revealing the type of officer that he had become. Forthright and aggressive Berryman went straight to the 7th Division’s commander, General Allen, to insist that

4 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 68. 5 Berryman noted to Gavin Long that once Berryforce was replaced by the 23rd British Brigade aggressive patrolling activities ceased and this allowed the French to transfer a battalion from Merdjayoun to Damour. 6 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 148. 7 ‘Berryman to Long, 18 August, 1952’, AWM PR 85/370, item 76. 292 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

the F.D.L. be moved closer to the river so that his OPs could be put to proper use.8 Berryman reaffirmed his request at a conference at Steven’s headquarters the following day but Stevens refused. Berryman, growing ever the more frustrated by what he saw as a total lack of understanding of such a crucial aspect of the plan, ‘pointed out that the full effect could not be made of our artillery unless our OPs could get forward to see the river bank. I suggested we should hold the nearest ridge to the river so as to see the banks’.9 He was, however unable to impress his will on the commander of the 21st Brigade or General Allen. The sole recompense to his arguments was an offer by Stevens to provide section escorts for the Ops which Berryman regarded as ‘NOT satisfactory’.10

Berryman, in his typically dogged manner, refused to concede the point and renewed his argument for a movement of the F.D.L on 4 July. This was one too many times for Stevens whose attitude, not surprisingly, ‘changed from passive to aggressive’.11 As in Cyrenaica, Berryman’s forthright personality was causing friction amongst the senior officers of the division and this was exacerbated when Berryman felt that some senior officers were affecting his ability to carry out his duties.

While Stuart Braga, Allen’s biographer, sees this as a continuation of Berryman’s ‘dissension’ played out in Libya on Savige and now in Syria on Stevens, Allen and Chapman (GSO1, 7th Australian Division)12 Berryman’s frustration was completely understandable. The decision not to push the infantry line closer to the river meant he was not able to utilise the full capabilities of his artillery. With a lack of tank support for the invasion Berryman’s guns provided the only hard-hitting firepower in the division and their utilisation in the F.D.L.s was a significant factor in the Australian success at Merdjayoun, Jezzine and during Berryforce’s operations.13

Braga, ever critical of Berryman’s performance, claims that his posturing ‘ignored the fact that in very rugged terrain, mortars were of greater value than

8 Ibid, see also ‘Berryman Diary, 1 July 1941’. 9 ‘Berryman to Long, 18 August, 1952’, AWM PR 85/370, item 76. See also ‘Berryman Diary, 2 July 1941’. 10 ‘Berryman Diary, 2 July 1941’. 11 ‘Berryman Diary, 4 July 1941’. 12 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 148. 13 Ibid, p. 150. 293 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

artillery...’.14 While undoubtedly mortars did provide some advantages in rugged terrain they were none the less far less capable of effecting the outcome of the campaign than Berryman’s artillery regiments. This was especially the case at Damour where by 4 July Berryman had in place some 60 guns to support Allen’s assault that included the 2/4th and 2/5th Field Regiments, one troop of the 2/6th Field Regiment (44 guns, all 25 pounders), two troops of the 2/9th Army Field Regiment (eight 4.5 inch Howitzers), and the 212th Medium Battery, Royal Artillery (eight 6 inch Howitzers). These units were augmented by the inclusion in Berryman’s order of battle of the 1st Survey Regiment deploying a survey troop, flash spotting troop and a sound ranging troop.15 This was especially significant as it allowed Berryman to group his 25 pounder guns together as one unit and ‘with the help of the survey troops and a recently-formed counter battery staff the division was able to mount effective counter battery operations’16, a capacity that far exceeded the capabilities of short range, low calibre infantry mortars.

Berryman’s frustration with Stevens and Allen was understandable given the restrictions that were placed on his units, but as always personalities helped to shape events. Lavarack noted after the war that ‘he [Berryman] and Jackie Stevens struck off a few sparks between them, as was only natural when two such good hard bits of stuff came into contact’.17 Yet despite the friction between Berryman and Stevens they proved themselves capable of forming a very effective team. The day after the issue of the Ops came to a head at Stevens’ HQ Berryman moved his own HQ next to Stevens to ensure that cooperation with, and support for, the infantry was maintained.18 As the coming battle unfolded both Stevens and Berryman came to admire each other professional qualities. Thereafter they formed a long and lasting friendship.19 Berryman became an avid supporter of Stevens during the Pacific campaigns and Stevens noted that ‘Berryman was a fine soldier, who served Blamey particularly well’.20

14 Ibid. 15 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 67; Horner, The Gunners, p. 67-68. 16 Horner, The Gunners, p. 282. 17 ‘Lavarack to Long, 14 February 1945’, AWM 67 3/209 Part I. 18 ‘Berryman diary, 5 July 1941’. 19 Richard Berryman to Author, January 2002. Richard commented that he always enjoyed the visits of ‘Uncle Jackie’ to his father’s house after the war and that Jack Stevens and his father were close friends. Berryman also spent time socialising with Stevens at the end of the campaign. See ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, 19 July 1941, 19 August 1941, 14 September 1941’. 20 ‘A personal story of service as a citizen soldier’, Stevens Papers, AWM 3 DRL/3561, p. 45. Stevens was, however, observant of Berryman’s character faults and he further noted that ‘he [Berryman] was a harsh critic of all and sundry, and without humour’. Despite some misgivings at Damour, Berryman also 294 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

Berryman maintained positive relations with the other senior officers in the Division throughout the campaign in Syria. The issue over the infantry holding the ridge closest to the river so that Berryman’s guns could have adequate observation of the enemy to support the crossing was a matter of professional necessity and, given his capacity as CRA, Berryman quite rightly pushed his argument with the utmost force. The inability of Berryman’s OPs to observe the enemy’s positions on the far side of the Damour River was to cause unnecessary casualties among the attacking infantry when the assault began. This was particularly frustrating as the artillery’s report into the operations in Syria pointed out that ‘the ridge in question was visited after the battle and from there it was possible to pick out in detail most of the enemy fwd posts’.21

Berryman’s discussions concerning the artillery’s use at Damour were just one element in a much broader plan. Allen’s proposal for the capture of Damour was based on Brigadier Stevens’ original plan. Allen, however, was able to deploy a much stronger force than that originally allocated to Stevens. Since Berryman’s capture of Merdjayoun the coastal sector had been considerably reinforced and in the period from 23 June to 2 July the number of Australian battalions in the area was increased from three to nine. Allen proposed that the 21st and 17th Brigades box in the town of Damour using the sea as one side of the box, the 21st Brigade were to provide the southern and eastern sides and the 17th brigade should swing around to close off the city from the north. The 25th Brigade meanwhile would continue its operations from Jezzine and protect the right flank of the main assault.22 The major support arm of these operations was to be the combined weight of the 7th Division’s artillery.

remained a firm supporter of Allen during the Syrian campaign. In June Berryman commented to his wife, Muriel, that ‘Arthur Allen is here with a view to taking over from General Lavarack … I look forward to working with him and I think the division will do well under him’. (‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, 8 June 1941’, Berryman Family Papers.) While Berryman disagreed with Allen on a few occasions over the next two weeks it was little more than some minor professional disagreements. Certainly Berryman does not enter in his diary ‘a harshly negative assessment of Allen’s performance’ as Braga claims. (Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 149). If Braga is referring here to Berryman’s comments over the ‘lack of virile leadership in the front line’ (‘Berryman Diary 11 July 1941’) Allen was actually agreeing with Berryman that the advance should not have halted. 21 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part II, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 6. 22 Johnston, The Silent 7th, p. 66. 295 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

By 4 July Berryman had assembled all of his artillery in the Qassouba area. He went to great lengths to ensure that the enemy did not realise that his force had increased from 24 to 62 guns. All movement was undertaken under the cover of darkness and the British medium battery was not allowed to fire until the beginning of the main bombardment. The biggest restriction to Berryman’s preparations, besides his fight over the positions of the OPs, was that none of his 25 pounder guns were calibrated prior to the campaign and as a result there could be no silent registration of targets.23 All guns had to be registered on target prior to firing a regimental or divisional concentration or barrage. To avoid this problem the regiments registered their guns by battery at irregular intervals over a 24 hour period.24

Despite some limitations, Berryman’s guns and his brilliant and aggressive handling of them were one of the decisive factors in the ensuring battle. As McAllester and Trigellis-Smith’s work on the Syrian campaign, Largely a Gamble, points out:

Brigadier Berryman [was] welcom[ing] the opportunity to exercise his full responsibilities as CRA 7 Division … [and]to place sixty artillery pieces and supporting vehicles in suitable positions in an area served by few roads was a considerable achievement.25

Beyond difficulties in calibration Berryman and his artillery were also faced with considerable obstacles in this part of the campaign. The difficult nature of the terrain they encountered around Merdjayoun and Jezzine was similar to that in front of Damour. The French employed a particularly strong artillery force at Damour and both ammunition, supply and communications were difficult. Offsetting these problems, however, was the concentration of artillery on hand and the ability, for the first time in the campaign, to undertake effective counter-battery work thanks to the arrival of the divisional survey troop. The survey troop proved ‘invaluable’, especially as it allowed

23 Calibration of the guns meant that data could be collected for performance and shell flight paths each of Berryman’s artillery pieces. Calibration meant that ranging shots did not have to be fired before a bombardment and thus the element of surprise could be added. 24 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I - p. 8, Part II – p. 1, AWM 54 531/2/10. The Corps Artillery Report noted that ‘the lack of calibration data in connection with many of the guns was a serious handicap at times’. See ‘Report on Artillery Operations during the Campaign in Syria, 1941’, AWM 54 431/2/8. 25 McAllester and Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble, p. 192. 296 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

for confirmation that the Damour 1/25,000 map was accurate and thus it could be used for ‘prediction in the arty program for the Damour battle’.26

The allocation of counter-battery (CB) staff for the first time in the campaign provided almost instant dividends. The French artillery was very active in the days leading up to the Battle for Damour and the CB staff immediately began work on locating these guns and organising a program of CB fire, but their effectiveness was only proved after the initial phases of the battle.27

Figure 10.0 ‘The allocation of a counter-battery (CB) staff for the first time in the campaign provided almost instant dividends’. Gunner A.M. Weaver, Bombardier R.J. Triglone And Gunner W.A. Mckenzie Manning A Flash Spotting Post Of The 2/1st Australian Survey Regiment, El Ain, Syria. 1941 (AWM Neg. 021682)

The arrangements for the actual fire plan for the battle were made by Berryman in consultation with Stevens. The plan provided for bombardments and concentrations on known and suspected enemy locations, enemy batteries as well as barrages to cover the forming up and assault of the 2/16th battalion. Additional barrages were provided for

26 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part II, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 1. 27 Ibid, Part I - p. 8 & Part II, p. 3; Horner, The Gunners, p. 283. 297 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

flank protection and Berryman detailed forward observation offices to move with the attacking columns of both the 2/16th and 2/27th battalions.28

The Battle of Damour started when Berryman’s concealed concentration of guns unleashed all their strength at 0035hrs 6 July 1941. The barrage lasted for the next six hours switching between counter-battery fire, supporting the Australian advance and bombarding known and suspected enemy positions. During this time the Australian 25- pounder guns fired 249 rounds per gun, the 4.5 inch howitzers 351 rounds per gun and the British medium regiment’s 6 inch howitzers 195 rounds per gun.29 Berryman, in his typically understated manner, recorded in his diary that it went off, ‘according to schedule’.30

Units of Stevens’ Brigade crossed the Damour River in the morning and after stiff hand to hand fighting the 2/16th battalion took the El Atiqa Ridge. The fighting undertaken by the Australian infantry on 6 July and the following days was some of the most ferocious of the campaign. The 2/16th battalion was successful in reaching its objectives, but at the cost of 40 per cent casualties. In a measure of the ferocity of the assault the Vichy French reported on 6 July that they were under attack by no less than four battalions when in fact the 2/16th battalion could muster just 263 men.31

Berryman’s guns fired defensive tasks for the 2/16th during their assault but the Vichy French artillery fire continued to hamper the Australian’s progress. Berryman retaliated by firing all 60 guns in a counter-battery role at 1800hrs for five minutes which silenced the enemy’s guns for the next six hours.32 Berryman’s guns also fired in support of the 2/27th Battalion during the day and by that afternoon the battalion had secured their second objective.33 Berryman was yet again personally active during the day and twice he went forward to sort out problems with the advance. In doing so,

28 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 9; Horner, The Gunners, p. 282-283. 29 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 9. 30 ‘Berryman Diary, 6 July 1941’. 31 Johnson, The Silent 7th, p. 67. 32 ‘Berryman Diary, 6 July 1941’. 33 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 9 298 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

Berryman pushed the 2/5th Field Artillery Regiment forward with the advancing infantry ordering them to engage the enemy over open sights.34

It was during these reconnaissances of the front line that Berryman became critical of the 2/16th Battalion. He recorded in his diary that:

today was a classic example of when commanders should have been forward to see the situation … I visited 2/16 HQ at 1800hrs, Company and HQ [were all] clustered in one building & [the ] CO had not been in touch with his forward company all day and was “burnt out”. … My action established touch with [the] enemy and gave me room to get 2/5 [Field Regiment] in action. G1 [John Chapman] was very upset … 2/27Bn succeeded, 2/16 never got near [their] barrage. A Bad Plan which gave artry [artillery] hard task & did not make full use of arty.35

Berryman’s diary entry reveals his frustration over the arguments that he had with Stevens regarding the use of the artillery prior to the battle. Berryman also made some very valuable points about the need for commanders to move forward and observe their troops, especially the HQ 2/16th battalion, but in Stevens’ case this was especially difficult to do as he had to contend with a multi-front advance. Berryman on the other hand could concentrate his energies on the actions of the 2/16th Battalion.

Meanwhile the advance of the 2/17th battalion was a resounding success. As a result, Stevens committed his reserve battalion, the 2/14th, to continue the advance through the night opening up the way for Savige’s 17th Brigade to pass through and put the ‘lid’ on Damour.36 The battle continued unabated the following day with the Vichy French making great use of their own artillery fire to disrupt the Australian’s operations. Berryman attached the 2/5th Field Regiment to support Savige’s advance and the 2/4th Field Regiment to support Stevens’ brigade. By mid afternoon, after the infantry advanced to a position where there were no longer accurate reports of their forward positions, Berryman restricted the areas in which his guns could fire.37

34 ‘Berryman Diary, 6 July 1941’. 35 Ibid. 36 Johnson, The Silent 7th, p. 69-70 37 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 9 299 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Map 17: The Battle for Damour and the end of the Syrian Campaign 4-13 July 1941. ( Coates, An Atlas of Australia’s Wars, p. 59 Map A)

By the morning of 8 July elements of the 2/14th battalion had entered Damour from the east, units of Savige’s 17th Brigade advanced around to the northern parts of the town and the Vichy French abandoned their positions in front of the 2/27th battalion who were threatened to cut the corridor through which the 21st and 17th Brigades had 300 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

advanced. During these actions the FOO’s (Forward observation officers) of the artillery regiments continued to make valuable contributions to the advance and one party from the 2/4th Regiment even managed to position themselves in the rear of the enemy before calling fire down on the Vichy French positions.38

By 9 July the town was encircled and the Australians pushed forward their advance both along the coast and further inland. Over the last two days the situation had become more fluid and Berryman allocated his regiments to support the different brigades while maintaining a strong central reserve to support major assaults and to conduct counter-battery fire. During these fluid operations Berryman again moved forward to assess operations from the front line and by mid morning he was involved in an action that caused some controversy and again raised the issue of his deteriorating relationship with Brigadier Savige.

During the morning of 9 July Berryman moved forward through Damour to the outskirts of the town. There he met Lieutenant Colonel Macarthur-Onslow, CO 6th Cavalry Regiment, and Lieutenant Colonel Monaghan, CO 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion, who along with one company of the 2/5th Battalion were stopped along the coast road and out of contact with the enemy. According to Berryman:

MacArthur-Onslow and Monaghan asked me what they should do and I said that our tactical doctrine laid down that contact with the enemy should be maintained and that Macarthur-Onslow should patrol forward to gain contact and that the infantry should follow and form a base to support the patrols.39

MacArthur-Onslow and Monaghan subsequently pushed forward and made contact with the enemy at a road block near the Khalde wireless mast which was a mile ahead of their previous position. Berryman and MacArthur-Onslow conducted a personnel reconnaissance of the position and Berryman decided, without authority, to direct MacAthur-Onslow to push up the infantry to turn the Vichy French’s flank on the high ground to the right. Berryman then went to Deir Mar Jorjos to make contact with the HQ of the 2/5th Battalion (17th Brigade – Savige) and ordered him to push a number

38 Ibid. 39 ‘Berryman to Long 17 September 1952’, p. 7-8, AWM PR84/370 item 73. 301 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

of companies forward. The CO of the 2/5th, Lieutenant-Colonel King, however, was unwilling to overcommit himself.40

Berryman also moved up a troop of guns from the 2/5th Regiment and ordered them to engage the position over open sights. With these orders in place Berryman returned to 7th Division HQ at 1300hrs to ‘accept responsibility for actions being undertaken by 2/5 Bn’.41 The G1, Colonel Chapman was ‘very upset’ by Berryman’s action as Major-General Allen had ordered no advance in the coastal sector that day and he was presently absent from HQ (at Jezzine).42 Berryman, however, did not end his report there. Rather he made it clear to Chapman and later Allen that he believed that ‘there was no control in the forward area’.43

Chapman then rang Brigadier Savige’s HQ to inform him of Berryman’s decision regarding the use of his battalion (2/5th). Savige later wrote that Chapman informed him ‘that Berryman had taken control and had run amok and instructed me to take over the forward area and straighten things out’.44 For Savige, Berryman’s actions were a stinging attack and with both men already on bad terms and Savige still reeling from his perceived mistreatment at Bardia, he visited the front and put a halt to the moves at Khalde and then returned to 7th Division HQs to ‘have the position of command and role properly clarified. I wasn’t having another Bardia experience’.45

According to Stuart Braga this was just another case of Berryman vilifying militia officers. He argues that ‘Berryman bypassed Allen’ on 9 July and that it was simply:

Berryman’s good fortune that the French had abandoned the centre position south of Beirut. Indeed Lavarack suspected that the French withdrawal and subsequent approach for an armistice were a trap. Had they counter-attacked as they did at Merdjayoun, Berryman, his gunners

40 ‘Berryman to Fenton’, p. 7; ‘Berryman Diary, 9 July 1941’; ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 10. 41 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 10. 42 ‘Berryman Diary, 9 July 1941’; ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 10. 43 Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job, p. 76. 44‘Savige to Long’ as quoted in Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job, 2006, p. 76. 45 Ibid, p. 77. 302 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

and their guns would have fallen into French hands. He had only two companies of infantry in support. His decision to move his guns forward took no account of the plan decided the day before, and of which he had a copy. Nevertheless Berryman was able to claim that his action was bold and decisive, whereas Allen was timid, indecisive, and remained at headquarters too far back to be in touch with the action as it developed. It is a contention that needs to be set against Vasey’s judgement of Berryman some months earlier. “The trouble with [Berryman] is that he is unable to grasp and tackle practical problems. He sticks to theory and principles and leaves their application to others – result confusion … He’s as selfish as be damned too.”46

How then should be see this incident? Braga has argued that this was yet another example of Berryman’s vitriolic campaign against militia officers and that he was extremely lucky in his military assessment of the situation. But as I have shown there was no conspiracy on the part of Berryman against militia officers and instead Berryman maintained a very healthy working relationship with Allen and the overwhelming majority of senior militia officers in both Libya and Syria.47

In terms of a military appraisal of this incident Braga has made some significant miscalculations. Berryman did not bypass Allen, but rather Savige, and when he gave his orders to the troops on the frontline it was to Allen that he went to accept full ‘responsibility’. As for the concern over a French counter-attack this could hardly have been more misplaced. The French were in nowhere near the same position as when they launched their counter-attack on 15 June. By 9 July they had suffered major defeats at Merdjayoun, Jezzine, Damascus and Damour. Their force was depleted and their tank strength was only a shadow of its former self. As Lieutenant-Colonel O’Brien, CO 2/5 Field Regiment, later wrote, ‘The road to Beyrouth [Beriut] (on 9 July) lay open. The French were on the run, but the only Australian forces anywhere near were two captured tanks manned by the 6th Cavalry Regiment’.48

46 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 150-151. 47 It is interesting to note here that in 1942, during the Owen Stanley Campaign in New Guinea, Berryman was one of the few to recognise Allen’s achievements. From his position at Army Headquarters in Melbourne, Berryman sent to Allen, a man who had just been relieved of his command for alleged failure to perform, a congratulatory telegram to praising Allen’s, ‘intellectual honesty and bureaucratic courage’. Braga however fails to mention this important telegram in his biography. What Braga does argue during this section of his biography is that ‘Berryman… was always glad to see the back of any and every commander who was not a member of the Staff Corps’. Braga, Kokoda Commander , p. 272. See also John Donovan ‘Review: Stuart Braga, Kokoda Commander’, Australian Army Journal, Volume III, Number 2, 2006, p. 226. 48 O’Brien, Guns and Gunners, p. 129. 303 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

While Berryman did ignored the orders set down the day before he sensed an opportunity and believed that the enemy should be continually pressed. Lavarack’s concerns over a trap had nothing to do with the actions on 9 July north of Damour. As Brett Lodge argues, Lavarack was in fact concerned that the French overtures for an armistice were ‘designed to reduce the willingness of his troops to take risks near the end of the campaign, [and] he [Lavarack] ordered his commanders to maintain the fullest pressure on the French’.49 Berryman’s actions at the wireless station on 9 July were in exact accordance with his senior commander’s wishes. What Braga fails to record in his biography is that when Allen returned to 7th Division HQs at 1400hrs on 9 July Berryman spoke to Allen who Approved the CRA’s actions. GOC [Allen] then summoned a conference of Brig [Brigadiers] at 1530 hrs and issued verbal orders [confirming Berryman’s dispositions] which were later confirmed by 7 Aust Div Op Instn No 21 dated 9 July.50

Despite Allen’s endorsement, by this late stage the opportunity to take the wireless station and to advance to Beyrouth was lost. The French too had sensed the vulnerability of the position. The delay caused by the arguments over orders and command structures meant that the enemy were able to reinforce their position. This led to costly attacks on the French defences during the next two days and, as Berryman later pointed out, ‘we did not pass this point when the armistice put an end to hostilities’.51 Berryman’s assessment of the situation on the morning of 9 July was, in fact, entirely correct.52

Berryman’s real ‘issue’ on 9 July was with Brigadier Savige. On 11 July Berryman noted in his diary that ‘Div commander (Allen) called at lunch. Said it was never his intention to call a halt on 9th July. He said only no advance without orders. 17

49 Lodge, Lavarack: Rival Commander, p. 186. 50 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41’, Part I, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 10; ‘Berryman Diary 9 July 1941’; ‘Berryman to Fenton’, p. 7. (Emphasis added) 51 ‘Berryman to Fenton’, p. 7. 52 As for the claim that Berryman was ‘unable to grasp and tackle practical problems he sticks to theory and principles and leaves their application to others – result confusion’. (Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 151) This criticism relates to Vasey’s observations of Berryman’s staff work, as opposed to operational command, while Vasey’s comments regarding Berryman’s selfishness related to their disagreements over the use of clerks and equipment at headquarters’. (‘Vasey to Jessie Vasey, 3 November 1940’, as quoted in Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 72.) Berryman, as already mentioned, enjoyed a harmonious relationship with Allen throughout their time in the Middle East and in fact Berryman supported his appointment to command the 7th Division. (See ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, 18 May, 8 June, 31 July, 19 August, 24 September, 27 October, & 23 November 1941’, Berryman Family Papers) 304 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

Bde could not reach obj [objective] this afternoon. On 9 July not occupied by enemy! Another wasted opportunity due to a lack of virile leadership’.53 Berryman criticised Savige for being too far in the rear during the battle and lacking decisive leadership. This mentality, Berryman also believed, infected some of the 17th Brigade’s sub-units and was made evident by his clash with the commanding officer of the 2/5th battalion on 9 July. While a number of Berryman’s criticisms are valid they were certainly driven by his negative assessment of Savige that he formed in the Western Desert.

The most balanced and accurate assessment of this incident is provided by Gavin Keating, Savige’s latest biographer. Keating claims that:

Berryman’s criticism of Savige being too far in the rear during the battle ignored the fact that the nature of the terrain tended to turn actual fighting into a series of company and platoon clashes. Damour was not Bardia or Tobruk. It is difficult to see, under these circumstances, how a brigade commander could have exercised better control by being forward …Whatever the truth in Berryman’s claims about Savige’s failure to seize the moment on 9 July, it is evident that Berryman was not fully aware of Allen’s orders, something he later admitted to the official historian. … the original plan for the pursuit … was to hold in the coastal sector and continue forward via the inland route. This was only reversed, probably on the afternoon of 9 July and after Berryman’s visit forward … in this respect, Berryman may well have been right, and a more intuitive commander might have seized the moment … What it did show, however, was that Berryman continued to view Savige’s performance unfavourably and, in this case, as least, somewhat unfairly … and ultimately [the action before Beyrouth] had no significant bearing on the fighting.54

53‘Berryman Diary, 11 July 1941’. (emphasis in original) Braga’s attempts to paint Berryman as an officer highly critical of Allen and the militia in general do not end here. Later in his chapter on Allen in Syria Braga goes into some detail regarding Allen’s involvement in the arrest of a number of Vichy French officers. The actual task of arresting the officers fell to Savige and Berryman took a dim view of Savige’s performance when he allowed the French officers to keep their side arms. (See ‘Berryman diary 7 August 1941’). Braga however again sees Berryman’s poor relationship with Savige as a reflection on Allen claiming that ‘to Berryman … this incident was all of a piece with Allen’s inept handling of the campaign from beginning to end’. (Braga, p.159). This is guilt through flimsy circumstantial evidence. According to Braga, Berryman’s negative assessment of Savige’s military capabilities means that he must therefore be critical of Allen as well, because both Savige and Allen are militia officers. Braga tries this line of ‘guilt by association’ at Bardia, Tobruk, Damour and during the arrest of the French generals in Syria. In all of these cases the evidence points to a Berryman – Savige conflict which does not involve Allen. Braga’s evidence for this last incident is nothing more than the fact that Berryman recorded in his diary that he had drinks with Brigadier Herring (whom Braga also claims had it in for Allen) ‘from time to time’. See Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 159, footnote No. 123. 54 Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job, p. 77. 305 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

The armistice came into place on the night of 11 July and the guns fell silent over Vichy French Syria at 0200hrs 12 July 1941. What Berryman did not know was that this was the end of his active campaigning in the Middle East.

Syria - An Assessment An assessment of Berryman’s performance during the Syrian campaign must take into account three major areas: the performance of Berryman’s command (7th Division Artillery) during the campaign, his personal leadership as well as his performance as an independent brigade commander with Berryforce.

Berryman took over as CRA 7th Australian Division at a pivotal time in its training and development. He had gained a reputation in the 1930s as a very competent trainer of troops and he was fresh from his success at Bardia and Tobruk. Berryman instilled not just technical competence into the artillery regiments of the 7th Division he also fostered self reliance, an aggressive spirit, and the ability to operate independently. He drove home the importance of operating in alternate roles, including against tanks, and operating over open sights. All these facets in his training of the regiments came to the fore during the operations in Syria and were some of the most important elements in the artillery’s success during the campaign. In the end Berryman’s appointment proved to be an inspired choice.

Berryman’s focused training was especially important in Syria as, given the almost total absence of armour and air support, the artillery was the virtual sole support arm of the invasion. Berryman’s report into the operations at the end of the campaign noted that while ‘the success of the campaign was due to the cooperation by all arms [the] artillery was the main supporting arm. In all attacks during the campaign wherever an effective concentration of arty fire was brought to bear, the attack was successful’.55 Lavarack commented to Berryman that he believed that the artillery in Syria were a ‘campaign winning factor’.56

55 ‘RAA 7 Aust Division, Report on Operations, Campaign in Syria – 7 Jun – 12 Jul 41, Part II: Comments, Lessons and Recommendations’, AWM 54 531/2/10, p. 6. 56 ‘Berryman to Fenton’, p. 7. 306 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

Despite the lack of recognition for the superb performance of the artillery in the official history there have been numerous other plaudits for their work.57 Mark Johnston’s monograph on the 7th Australian Division noted that ‘the supporting artillery … was vital to the Australian success throughout the campaign’.58 The best overview of the importance of the artillery in Syria, however, is provided by Jim McAllester and Syd Trigellis-Smith. McAllester and Trigellis-Smith in writing the only detailed study of the campaign, other than the official history, note that:

On the brighter side the Australians were magnificently served by the artillery. The guns were up with the infantry, the forward observation officers taking part in the riflemen’s battles, ever ready to give support and ready to go tank-hunting when the need arose … The Vichy French, whatever they had to say about the Australian infantry, made it clear in their reports that they feared the artillery more than any other arm of the service.59

These assessments of the artillery are backed up by numerous acts of personal sacrifice and bravery from both the officers and men of the artillery regiments, none more so than that of Lieutenant Roden Cutler. After his exploits at Merdjayoun, Berryman noted in a conference on 28 June 1941 that the ‘real highlight [of the battle] was the exploit of Capt Clarke and Lieut Cutler’ and that he was ‘recommending Cutler for the highest award that the Army could bestow’. Berryman added that ‘Cutler’s was the most outstanding individual effort he had heard of in this campaign’.60 Cutler’s exploits, however, did not end there. A few days later it was Cutler who directed the movement of a 25 pounder artillery piece forward of the infantry lines to engage the enemy over open sights to support the attack of the 2/33rd Battalion and:

Later, at Damour on 6 July when our forward infantry were pinned to the ground by heavy hostile machine-gun fire, Lieut. Cutler, regardless of all danger, went to bring a telephone-line to his Observation Post when he was seriously wounded … necessitating the amputation of his leg.

57 In To Benghazi, Gavin Long’s sole reflection on the importance of the artillery to the campaign states, ‘more and better artillery boldly used – though the Frenchman’s excellent heavy mortar largely offset the Australian guns in mountain fighting’., p. 527. This reflection has more to do with Long’s personal views of Berryman and the dominance of the infantry in the official histories of both World Wars than the performance of the artillery and its commander during the campaign. 58 Johnston, The Silent 7th, p. 73. 59 McAllester and Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble, p. 228. 60 ‘Conference HQ Berryforce, 28 June 1941,’ AWM 54 4/1/14 307 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Throughout the campaign, this officer’s courage was unparalleled and his work was a big factor in the recapture of Merdjayoun.61

Cutler remains, to this day, the only member of the Royal Australian Artillery Corps to be awarded the nation’s highest military honour, the Victoria Cross.

Cutler’s honour can at least be partly attributed to Berryman’s ideas of aggressiveness and leadership from the front that he instilled in both his commanders and the men of his artillery regiments. In this area Berryman was at the forefront of the campaign. He displayed a leadership style that personified leading by example and leading from the front irrespective of rank. Berryman was at the front of the advance into Merdjayoun and in doing so provided effective leadership for the infantry in an area that was sorely lacking as a result of the breakdown of Brigadier Baxter-Cox. Berryman followed these actions up with a similar display at Jezzine. Lavarack noted to the official historian that the infantry, ‘had been poised on the brink [of taking the town of Jezzine] for part of the day, [and] eventually took the plunge … due to the initiative of Berryman, who as Artillery Commander was, as usual, well up on things [that] were happening’.62

Berryman showed a steady nerve and strong leadership when his headquarters came under artillery fire; he conducted close and detailed personal reconnaissances of the enemy’s positions at Jezzine, Merdjayoun, Ibeles Saki, and Damour. He personally led the infantry assault into the towns of Jezzine and Merdjayoun and captured prisoners at Khirbe with his revolver. Overall the artillery’s performance in Syria and Berryman’s personal leadership during the campaign can only be described as excellent.

Apart from the overall performance of the artillery in Syria, Berryman’s command at Merdjayoun provides an opportunity to analyse his abilities as a commander of a combined arms unit. Between 16 June and 29 June Berryman commanded the largest force in the 7th Australian Division and the largest brigade size unit during the campaign. During these operations Berryforce conducted five attacks,

61 Extract from Cutler’s Victoria Cross citation as quoted in, McAllester and Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble, p. 202. 62 ‘Lavarack to Long, 14 February 1945’ AWM 67 3-209 Part I. 308 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

controlled two field regiments, two cavalry regiments, three infantry battalions, one pioneer battalion, plus anti-tank, engineer, machine gun and anti-aircraft elements.

Berryman acted decisively upon hearing the news of the French counter-attack. Despite being informed at midnight on 15 June, by 0200hrs on 16 June Berryman sent the commander of his 2/5th Field Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel O’Brien orders to conduct a reconnaissance of the position to the east of the Litanti river and, along with the HQ 7th Division artillery, Berryman was already making his way to the battlefield. On arrival Berryman quickly grasped the operational and strategic importance of the position at Merdjayoun and did not hesitate to exceed his authority by ordering one company of the 2/2nd Pioneer Battalion to occupy the ridge between Qleaa and Merdjayoun.

After speaking to a number of commanding officers in the area and being briefed later in the morning by O’Brien, Berryman decided that the best form of defence would actually be to attack. Berryman resolved to attack the French at Merdjayoun to seize the initiative and draw attention away from his exposed and disorganised right flank. With the approval of Lavarack, Berryman launched the 2/2nd Pioneers on a diversionary assault while the 2/25th battalion carried out a wide outflanking assault from the right rear.

Berryman’s first assault on Merdjayoun was a tactical disaster. The tasks that he gave to both battalions, but especially the 2/25th, have been described as ‘imposing’ but were really almost impossible.63 While the decision for a wide flanking attack over rough terrain was prudent, given the decisive French advantage in armour, the haste in which it was carried out left little time for reconnaissance and coordination. This resulted in the 2/25th battalion not even making their start line and confusion in the 2/2nd Pioneers who over committed themselves and suffered heavily.

Despite these tactical setbacks Berryman’s assault on the morning of 17 June had far reaching operational and strategic consequences. Not only had Berryman seized the initiative from the French, but as Lavarack concluded:

63 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 408. 309 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

I firmly believe that two things prevented [the French continuing their offensive] … from Merdjayoun to Sidon – firstly the French belief in the existence in a strong British reserve (the mythical ‘Exporter Force’) behind our forces and second our [Berryman’s] immediate counter attack on Merdjayoun.64

These events had a significant effect upon the campaign as a whole but the cost for this success was high.65

When the attack failed to retake the town, Berryman put his guns at the forefront of his plans and unleashed a devastating bombardment on the Merdjayoun fort that culminated in the fort’s magazine exploding and lifting the place ‘skyward’.66 Berryman then took two days to replenish his stocks of ammunition, reposition his troops and conduct a personal reconnaissance of the terrain in front of the 2/25th battalion. On completion of these preliminary moves he resolved to continue the advance along his previous axis.

Unfortunately Berryman’s second attack did not succeed in retaking the town. This attack, unlike the first, was well planned and made maximum use of the terrain and supporting artillery and it came exceedingly close to success. The 2/25th battalion and the Pioneers both entered the town but the ‘numbing weariness’ of the 2/25th battalion begun to take its toll. Although this was their first major action of the campaign the battalion ‘had had little rest’ since the campaign began.67 However, the decisive factor in the failure to take the town was not the tiredness of the infantry or a lack of aggression rather it was the dominance of the French armour for which the Australians had no effective counter. Credit should also go to the doggedness and spirited defence put up by the French Foreign Legion troops.68

Despite this further setback Berryman was determined to retake the town. Realising that the rough terrain and close fighting within the town was no protection

64 ‘Lavarack to Gavin Long, 1 October, 1952’, AWM 67, 3-209 Part I. 65 McAllester & Trigellis-Smith, Largely a Gamble, p. 99. 2/2nd Pioneer battalion lost 27 killed, 46 wounded and 29 taken prisoner 66 Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, p. 167. 67 Ibid. 68 Long, Greece, Crete and Syria, p. 446. 310 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

against the French tanks, Berryman changed his plans to an indirect approach that concentrated on the strength of his artillery. It was at this time that Berryman showed the finer points of his military capabilities. Berryman had used his artillery on the left flank to close one of the two French supply routes into the town and now he was determined to take the high ground to the right of the town, in more tank-proof country, to move his artillery regiments forward and close the only other supply route available to the French.

In his third and fourth assaults Berryman used the 2/33rd battalion and a British battalion, 2nd KORR, to seize Khiam and Ibes Saki, thus outflanking the French, closing their final supply line and forcing them to withdraw from the town. It was necessary to conduct a fourth assault to achieve these goals only because of the British battalion’s failure to capitalise on the work of the 2/33rd battalion and to execute the plan correctly. The fifth and final assault on the high ground to the north of the town, however, only confirmed the continued French strength in the area and the need to direct further offensive operations elsewhere.

During his time at Merdjayoun Berryman showed a clear grasp of the operational and strategic importance of the position. He acted decisively, especially in the critical early hours after the French assault. While his initial offensive plans were hasty they nonetheless proved to be of immense operational and strategic importance. The second, third and fourth assaults showed Berryman’s military command potential at its best. His clear and detailed plans, excellent artillery support and detailed knowledge of objectives born from comprehensive personal reconnaissances all demonstrated his capacity to perform to a very high standard at this level of command. Berryman’s leadership from the front lines allowed him to maximise his command decision and impose his will almost immediately on his subordinates. His presence forward provided a moral boost and his energy, confidence, enthusiasm and belief in the Australian’s ability to be victorious even when outnumbered and outgunned were outstanding features of his command at Merdjayoun and throughout the campaign.

Berryman demonstrated his sound military judgement by refusing to allow the CO of the 2KORR to commit his remaining companies to the attack on Ibeles Saki. By being present on the front lines he was able to prevent this pointless move when it

311 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

became apparent that the 2KORR had failed to follow the barrage and was pinned down under French fire. One of the key features of Berryman’s leadership of both Berryforce and the artillery in Syria was the balance he struck between the need to coordinate from headquarters and the importance of providing a presence in the frontline.69 Furthermore, Berryman’s lateral thinking and vision in response to military problems led to the use of captured enemy cavalry horses and the formation of the ‘Kelly Gang’. This unit provided outstanding service to both Berryforce and later to the Australian forces in the coastal sector.

Despite these achievements Berryman was not without his faults. During the first and last assaults at Merdjayoun he demonstrated his greatest drawback as a commander; the propensity, at times, to be over-anxious and to over-commit his forces in an attempt to maintain the momentum of events and to impress his senior commanders. Berryman’s decision to commit to a hasty attack in the face of a superior enemy force was reminiscent of Major-General Gwynn’s comments at Staff College that Berryman was ‘naturally highly strung … and might have done even better if he had not been almost over anxious’.70

Certainly his over-anxiousness was at least partly responsible for Berryman’s decision to commit to the assault on Col’s Ridge by the 2/2nd Pioneer battalion after the town was recaptured. The enemy had abandoned the town due to Berryman’s superior tactical position. The French still retained considerable strength in the area and they had not fallen back in disarray, but rather made a measured retreat to the next piece of key terrain. Berryman’s commitment of only one under-strength Pioneer company to an assault on a key position held in strength was neither a wise nor prudent decision.71

69 Wass de Czege, ‘A Comprehensive view of leadership’, p. 29. Wass de Czege argues that one of the key aspects of military leadership for a field grade officer (Lieutenant-Colonel / Brigadier) is the balance between direct and indirect leadership. ‘The leaders must choose carefully for there are pitfalls to spreading too thin as well as to staying too near the headquarters’. In Berryman’s case he stuck an excellent balance during the campaign. 70 NAA, B2455, ‘Annual Confidential Report on Officers- Frank Berryman 2 March 1928, 1 December 1928, 12 April 1929’, Frank Berryman, Australian Army Service Record. 71 After the war Berryman tried to cover his actions at Col’s Ridge by arguing to Gavin Long that it was an assault to test the enemy’s defences and that as a result of the loss of Captain Camm and a number of his company Berryman had his recommendation to stabilise the front accepted. If this is the case the assault by the 2/2nd Pioneers was very ‘expensive’ (in terms of casualties) way of ascertaining the strength of the French positions. It would have been much wise to carryout proper reconnaissance and conduct patrols in the area to discover the extent and strength of the forces on Col’s Ridge. See ‘Berryman to Long’ 18 August 1952, Papers of Lieutenant General Berryman, AWM PR84/370 item 76. 312 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

However the actions at Merdjayoun on 17 June and Col’s Ridge on 26 June were small, tactical mistakes rather than disasters in an otherwise excellent performance. Any consideration of Berryman’s performance at Merdjayoun must also take into account the complexity of the task and the difficult circumstances in which it was undertaken.

Berryman’s HQ lacked staff officers, signalling equipment and transport making it ill suited to commanding large combined-arms brigades. The enemy held the high ground, consistently outnumbered his forces and possessed a considerable number of tanks, a decisive weapon to which the allies lacked an effective counter-weapon. The terrain was not ideal for offensive operations; the battle field was limited in scope and provided little room for manoeuvre. The French Air Force maintained air superiority over the front during the entire period and Berryman’s force lacked offensive hitting power (with the possible exception of his artillery). One third of his infantry strength was under-trained (in infantry minor tactics) and ill-equipped for the tasks. The units in his command came from two separate armies and from three different brigades. Given these factors Berryman’s achievements over the two weeks, while not spectacular, were nevertheless remarkable and he deserves vastly more recognition.

Why then has Berryman’s performance at Merdjayoun and throughout the campaign been largely overlooked? From a broader perspective, the campaign as a whole has been overlooked as has the role of the 7th Australian Division. Churchill was determined to play down the campaign lest it revealed the true extent of the poor planning, lack of strategic vision and inadequate resources. Furthermore the Australian Commander in Chief, General Blamey, resolved to play down the success of the 7th Australian Division lest it gave his arch rival Lieutenant-General Lavarack publicity or accolades. The nature of the political ramifications of fighting the Vichy French also meant that it received much less attention from the British government, high command and media than it deserved.72

Berryman meanwhile regarded the ‘forgotten’ nature of his valuable contribution to the victory in Syria as yet another example of his underplayed and

72 Long, To Benghazi, p. 525-536; Mark Johnston, The Silent 7th, p. 74. 313 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

inadequate positioning in Gavin Long’s official history. Berryman considered Long’s first volume, To Benghazi, as blatantly biased towards Savige’s view of events and in this he was supported by other senior officers such as Robertson, Herring, Rowell and Wilton.73 General Rowell stated to journalist and historian Chester Wilmot after the war that ‘Berryman is furious about’ the official history’s account of the Cyrenaica campaigns as ‘Gavin [Long] seems to have accepted all of Stan Savige’s papers as being gospel, when everyone knows he only wrote the to justify himself’.74 Berryman certainly felt that the official history did him no favours and was partial to the views for Savige. He noted to David Dexter, the author of one volume of the official history in the Pacific campaigns, that ‘after the biased account of Bardia and its many omissions I feel I should not pull my punches’.75

It could easily be argued that Long’s volume covering the Syrian campaign extrapolated his earlier negative appraisals of Berryman. During the drafting of the text for the Syrian campaign, Long was unrelenting in stating that Berryman’s actions and ‘persistent hammering at Merdjayoun achieved small results in the campaign as a whole’.76 Long was also critical of Berryman, whom he claimed was undertaking offensive operations, despite the fact that the 7th Division was ordered by Corps headquarters to adopt a defensive posture during the drive to Damascus. Berryman claimed that ‘after stating the results of the loss of Merdjayoun [Long presents]… a constant strain of implied criticism’.77

Berryman consistently opposed Long’s view during their correspondence throughout the writing of the official history and at times he wrote letters upwards of 12 pages to argue his point.78 Long’s criticisms flies in the face of the evidence he was provided with from the other senior officers of the campaign and the campaign reports of the time. Lavarack stated to Long that:

73 See Keating, The Right Man for the Job, p. 59. Keating recounts that ‘Long’s account of the Bardia action was later severely criticised by Robertson and Berryman, and it is possible that the official history was overly influenced by Savige’s perspective’. Keating also states that ‘Herring… cautioned [David] Dexter about relying on Savige’s report and recollections’ and Keating concludes that ‘it is not unfair to say Savige’s comments and records did help his historical perspective’, p. 3. 74 ‘Rowell to Wilmot 8 October 1953’, NLA MS 8426, Box 19, series 4, Folder 87. 75 ‘Berryman to Dexter 2 February 1954’, Berryman Papers, AWM PR84/370, Item 3. 76 Long’s draft as quoted by Berryman in ‘Berryman to Long, 18 August 1952’, AWM PR 84/370, item 76. 77 Ibid. 78 In particular see ‘Berryman to Long’, 18 & 28 August 1952, AWM PR 84/370, item 76. 314 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

The decisive reason for keeping up our efforts to oust the French from Merdjayoun was the need for freeing Allen’s right and rear from the threat of attack from that strong point during the advance from Jezzine and north along the coast. To render that advance feasible as soon as possible after the fall of Damascus we had to have Merdjayoun. Hence my persistence with the attacks in Merdjayoun.79

Neither Berryman nor any of the other senior officers saw Merdjayoun as the ‘decisive’ battle of the campaign but, unlike Long, they recognised its vital strategic importance. Berryman argued with Long insisting that ‘Merdjayoun was the strategic centre of the campaign’.80 Berryman argued his case by pointing out to Long that:

An enemy advance in the Coastal, Jezzine or Damascus sector would not necessarily endanger any other sector but an enemy penetration at Merdjayoun would enable an advance on Nabataye thus cutting communications of coastal and Jezzine forces whilst an advance on Rosh Pinnah or Qouneitra would cut out communications to Damascus … Generals Lavarack and Allen said it was necessary to recapture Merdjayoun and get sufficient depth so as to safe guard operations in the Jezzine and Coastal sectors. Lavarack and Allen visited me constantly and all operations at Merdjayoun were carried out in accordance with their orders or agreement.81

General Allen supported Berryman’s position arguing that ‘Merdjayoun was a key position and its recapture was most important … [and that] Berryman skilfully used his artillery and I feel he was justified in his determined effort to recapture the town’.82 As Mark Johnston argues, Berryman was ‘following the aggressive intentions of his superiors Wavell, Lavarack and Allen’.83

The recapture of Merdjayoun forced a halt to the coastal drive of the 21st Brigade which was designed to be the primary focus of the 7th Division. The Vichy French counter-attack was, as Gavin Keating points out, ‘the critical point of the

79 ‘Lavarack to Long, 26 September 1952’, AWM 67 3-209 Part I & II. Long made a pencil note in the margin of this letter from Lavarack that states ‘changes also at FHB (Frank Horton Berryman) suggestion’. 80 ‘Berryman to Long, 18 August 1952’, AWM PR 84/370, item 76. (Emphasis added) 81 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the Command in Chief General Wavell accompanied by Lavarack and Allen visited Berryman’s forward headquarters at Merdjayoun during the battle and gave his personal endorsement for the attack to continue and the town recaptured. Berryman later noted to Long that ‘I was constantly urged to redouble my efforts to recapture Merdjayoun’. 82 ‘Allen to Long, 11 October, 1952’, AWM 67 3-6 Part II. 83 Johnstone, The Silent 7th, p. 64. 315 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

campaign … for the 7th Division’.84 Without the ‘recapture of Merdjayoun and its retention by adequate forces … consideration could not be given to the resumption of the advance in the coastal sector’.85

Despite all the evidence to the contrary, Long refused to radically alter his position. Although he did change the harsh nature of his language in relation to Berryman and Merdjayoun, Long’s published text was hardly conciliatory. He makes constant reference to the casualties at Merdjayoun and the length of the time taken to recapture the position and although he does support the notion that an advance by the French in this sector would have had ‘disastrous consequences’ he makes no attempt to present Berryman’s, Lavarack’s or Allen’s views on either the importance of re-taking the position or its overall strategic value to the campaign. Long’s perspective lacks vision and balance especially as he carried over his opinions of Berryman, largely formed by Savige, into his treatment of Berryman’s performance and that of his command in the campaign as a whole.

This evidence makes it easy to concluding that Berryman’s observations of Long’s bias were largely correct. Berryman deserves much greater recognition for his roles as both a staff officer and the driving force behind the attacks at Bardia and Tobruk as well as one of the most proficient and inspiring Australian commanders in Syria.86 Long’s negative treatment and under-representation of Berryman in the official histories is one of the major contributing factors to Berryman’s relegation to the sidelines of the history of these important campaigns in the Middle East.

An Armistice and New Directions At the end of the campaign in Syria, just as he had done at the end of the First Libyan campaign, Berryman fell ill from exhaustion. Despite feeling unwell he dragged himself to a party at Brigadier Stevens’ headquarters on the night of 14 July where General Blamey ‘asked me would I like a staff job again but I said I preferred my command’.87 The next day Berryman was evacuated to hospital. Brigadier Sydney Rowell came to see Berryman to tell him that he was being sent back to Australia to

84 Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job, p. 72. 85 ‘7th Divisions Report on Operations, 29 June to 14 July 1941’, p. 1. AWM 3 DRL2529, item 19. 86 See Chapter 7 & 8. 87 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman 19 July 1941’, Berryman Family Papers. 316 ARTILLERY COMMANDER

become Deputy Chief of the General Staff and that Berryman was to replace him as Brigadier General Staff (BGS – chief of staff) 1st Australian Corps under General Lavarack.88

While recognising its importance this was not a posting that Berryman coveted. He had already told Blamey that he wished to stay in command of the 7th Division’s artillery and he had also written to his wife, after Rowell came to see him, that

it will be wretched to leave [my] CRA [Commander Royal Artillery 7th Division] job’ and that ‘a command to me is more pleasant than a staff job … however the B.G.S. job is a very important & responsible one & many would like it. I have not sought it at all – it has just come to me. When General Blamey asked me about resuming staff work I told him I preferred my present job & I thought that might have caused him to change his mind but it apparently had little effect. However I am very glad I’ve had nearly 6 months in a command including an independent one at Merdjayoun with Berryforce.89

Berryman’s success in Syria spelt the end of his active campaigning in the Middle East and brought to a close this phase of his career. He finished, like he started, in a staff position that he did not necessarily want and still desperately coveting a major command. By the completion of the Syrian campaign he had demonstrated that he was a highly professional and competent staff officer and commander, but in the minds of the Army’s high commander his value in the former role far outweighed his aptitude in leading men in battle. This was to be a ‘curse’ that was to continue to beleaguer him for the rest of his career. By 1941 however he had served his apprenticeship. The events July 1941 were a culmination of Berryman’s rise from humble working class origins in rural Victoria to that of the army’s senior operational Staff Officer in the Middle East. The die was cast, and by 1941 his personal and military character was set. These were to

88 ‘Berryman Diary 13-17 July 1941’. 89 ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman, 21 & 31 July, 1941’, Berryman Family Papers. Berryman was given two weeks off before taking up his posting as BGS from Rowell as BGS on 5 August 1941. For his leave Berryman made his way to Cairo and spent time visiting with Generals Blamey, Mackay, and Maxwell (British Army). He also found time to reminisce and relax with Brigadiers Herring, Robertson and Rowell. One of his most pleasing experiences during his leave was spending some time with Major- General ‘Tubby’ Allen as well as catching up with General Allen’s wife to do some shopping in Cairo and relax on the houseboat he had visited on a number of occasions over the previous ten months. (‘Berryman Diary, 23 July – 5 August 1941’. See also ‘Frank Berryman to Muriel Berryman’, 31 July 1941). In this letter Berryman also explains to Muriel how he went to a dance in Cairo with General Allen’s wife and had tea and toast in her flat. Hardly the type of event that would point to Berryman holding General Allen in such disregard as Braga claims. This letter also mentions Berryman’s various appointments with senior & junior Staff Corps and Militia officers in the preceding days. 317 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

be the factors that were to decisively mould his performance and career during the Pacific War that Australia and the Allies were to be thrust into during the December 1941.

318 IN REFLECTION: 1894-1941

Conclusion ‘In Reflection’ 1894-1941

‘You are what you are by the help of God and your own toil and ability. …This, I think, is due to your downright honesty of purpose, hard unremitting work to make yourself the man you are, guts, experience and a complete absence of “careerism” so evident in some quarters’. ‘Major-General Stanley Savige to Major-General Frank Berryman’, 4 December 1943, Berryman Family Papers.

Berryman and military biography The end of the Syrian campaign was to be a defining point in Berryman’s career. His posting to 1st Australian Corps as Chief of Staff in July 1941 marked him out as the senior brigadier in the Australian forces stationed in the Middle East area of operations. It also spelt the end of his relationship with operational units at the brigade and divisional level. From this period onwards Berryman was to operate as a staff officer to Corps or Army size formations in Java, Australia and the South West Pacific Area. His only deviation from these roles was to be his position, for a few short months, as commander of the 1st and 2nd Australian Corps AIF during the Huon Peninsular campaign.

Post Syria Berryman’s career was to move in different directions and the experiences that were to prove his ‘making’ as a General drew to a close. This study has deliberately focused upon these seminal years from 1894 till 1941 in an effort to account for Berryman’s rise to prominence. More often than not biographical studies of military commanders skate precariously and quickly over these formative experiences. They limit their analysis to the ‘end point’ of a career without showing due respect or providing proper analysis to the often difficult, tortuous and unpredictable experiences that decisively moulded these individuals on the road to become highly accomplished military professionals.

319 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

As General Montgomery Megis has argued, the early phases in a military officer’s career are critical as this is where ‘basic tactical competence and confidence’ develops and this serves ‘as the foundation of …operational decisions [and successes]’.1 For Berryman his military education and the practical application of his craft up to the 1930s combined with his ‘wide experience of staff work [and command] in the Middle East had given him an excellent practical grounding for his tasks [as a General] in the Pacific War’.2 It was during this formative period that Berryman had set his reputation, confirmed his professionalism, his staff work and command pedigree and had cemented, for better or worse, his relationships with the Army’s leadership.

While this style of approach to a life such as Berryman’s is not original, it is nevertheless unorthodox, especially for the study of a senior Australian military officer. As noted in the introduction, this emphasis on personality formation, formative inter- personal relations, social agents and early career experiences has been pioneered by the work of historians such as Geoffrey Serle, Ross McMullin and David Horner in their respective studies of Generals Monash, Elliot and Wilton.3 However Serle’s, McMullin’s and Horner’s work remain as ‘exceptions to the rule’ in the senior Australian army officers biography genre.

This research is also unorthodox in that it highlights the career path of a regular army officer and RMC graduate. These officers, a sub-culture of the military establishment for a number of years, have often been neglected by military historians in Australia. Their importance to the military establishment, however, transcends the personal experiences of the individuals who made up this group. A small ‘fringe’ element in the military establishment in the pre First World War army, they emerged during the inter–war period and the early years of the Second World War to become the most influential faction within the upper echelons of the Army’s hierarchy by 1942. This was a path that was blazed by Berryman and his RMC contemporaries and any

1 Megis, ‘Generalship: Qualities, Instincts and Character’, p. 3. 2 Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, p. 295. 3 Another excellent Australian Army biography that provides a very good coverage of an officer’s early career and formative experiences is Peter Sadler’s., The Paladin: A Life of Major-General Sir John Gellibrand (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2000). Sadler’s coverage of Gellibrand’s early life prior to the First World War accounts for only one fifth of the monograph.

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biographical study that focuses on Staff Corps officers of Berryman’s generation during these years helps to reveal the nature, struggles and process in this take over of power by Australia’s professional military elite.

This research does, however, sit squarely within the boundaries of an orthodox military biographical tradition in a number of crucial ways. David Horner has argued persuasively that military biography is different to normal biography in that ‘an assessment of outcome cannot be ignored and for that reason military biography is primarily concerned with evaluating and judging performance’.4 Horner further argues that:

unlike all other professions except medicine, the professional of arms requires its practitioners to be successful on every occasion when put to the test.5

Horner’s medical analogy serves to highlight one of the essential cores of this thesis. In order to evaluate and judge the performance of a military officer it is vital to undertake detailed and thorough research on the battles and campaigns in which that officer fights. Thus only through this ‘anatomy’ of a battle approach, detailing actions blow by blow, decision by decision that a thorough analysis can be made and crucial judgements be arrived at.

In the course of evaluating and judging Berryman’s performance and career in the heat and stress of battle, this thesis has had at its core Berryman’s roles in three crucial military campaigns. His command and staff positions as a junior officer in the 1st AIF on the Western Front and his role in two of the Australian Army’s most influential, but largely forgotten, campaigns in the Middle East during 1940-41, Cyrenaica and Syria.

Berryman’s responsibilities during the early years of the 2nd AIF’s operations in North Africa and Syria have also provided the chance to reappraise many of the broader

4 David Horner, ‘Australian Military history in the 1980s: Genres – Military Biography’, Journal of the Australian War Memorial, No. 19, November 1991, p. 23. See also Horner, ‘Introduction’, The Commanders, p. 1-13. 5 Horner, ‘Australian Military history in the 1980s: Genres – Military Biography’, p. 23.

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aspects of these campaigns. The ‘anatomy’ of battle approach to this thesis has also allowed for the issues of planning, initiative, alternative leadership models, the relationships between senior officers in the 6th and 7th Divisions AIF as well as the role and place of staff officers and the artillery to be addressed. This investigations has shed light on some important aspects of Australia’s military past and has challenged many conventional historical viewpoints.

Contemporaries, commentators and peers While in many respects Berryman has been a much neglected historical figure (just like the battles in which he fought during the years covered in this thesis), opinions within the senior ranks of the Australian and British armies at the time were entirely different. By the time Berryman had left for the Far East, and then Australia, he had cemented himself within the military hierarchy. This process was a result of a long personal and professional journey. As a professional he had delved into the art and science of war starting with his entry into the RMC, he had cut his teeth as a junior officer in the slaughter that was the First World War and had proven his capabilities as a senior officer in inter-war period and in the Middle East during the Second World War. These experiences were paramount in his development as a senior military officer.

Yet despite all of the analysis that a historian can muster, some of the most enduring evaluations are always those made by contemporaries and those who had the opportunity to form a professional or personal relationship with the individual being investigated. These reflections often cover the broadest range of professional capabilities and personal idiosyncrasies. There is no denying that Berryman was, at times, cold, sarcastic, reserved and opinionated. One of his closet colleagues, Major- General Jack Stevens noted after the war that ‘he [Berryman] was a harsh critic of all and sundry, and without humour’.6 While for many individuals this assessment could only be regarded as a negative indictment of his personality this it not necessarily the case for a career army officer. It has been demonstrated the characteristics that determine a ‘pleasant’ personality are not always those required for military success and it has been revealed Berryman’s ‘professional’ character was often far removed from his

6 ‘A personal story of service as a citizen soldier’, Stevens Papers, AWM 3 DRL/3561, p. 45.

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private persona. What then is also needed, as Horner has argued: are judgements based on performance and outcomes.

It has already been noted that General Lavarack considered Berryman a highly capable officer. Lavarack’s biographer, Brett Lodge, concurred with this assessment noting that Berryman ‘was an exceptional officer [and] was a most welcome addition to the [7th] division on his appointment as CRA in January 1941’.7 In a letter to Francis Forde MP (Minister of the Army), not long after the end of the Syrian campaign, Lavarack noted that Brigadier Berryman was a; good strong fighting [man] of real experience in successful battle, and …equipped with forceful character, brain and loyalty. Berryman…has the advantage of being a highly trained and experienced staff officer. [He] could fill a Divisional Command at once and would probably go higher after that experience. Berryman, in addition, could fill the appointment of Major-General, General Staff, to an Army commander.8

Other plaudits refer to Berryman as ‘an outstanding staff officer’9, ‘ruthlessly efficient and ambitious’10, ‘the soundest planner in the AIF’11 and as an officer possessing ‘outstanding military talents’.12 He was also, as David Horner has noted, ‘keen to advance the careers of other[s]… as long as they met his demanding standards of efficiency’.13 One of those officers that Berryman had gone out of his way to advance the career of was Colonel John Wilton, later CGS during the . Wilton was to note at the end of the War that ‘Berry was really first rate here [as GOC Advance Land Headquarters]…Taken all round, he is easily our most capable soldier’.14

John Hetherington, General Blamey’s biographer and an acquaintance of Berryman, noted that; He [Berryman] worked prodigiously hard and had a well tempered military brain and a gift for foretelling the enemy’s intensions [and]

7 Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, p. 101. 8 Lieutenant-General Lavarack, as quoted in Horner, Crisis of Command, p. 58. 9 Horner, Blamey: The Commander in chief, p. 372. 10 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 59. 11‘H.C.H. Robertson’ as quoted in BERRYMAN, Lieutenant-General Frank Berryman’, Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 96. 12 Chapman, Iven G Mackay: Citizen Soldier, p. 166. 13 Wilton as quoted in Horner, Strategic Command, p. 60. 14 Ibid, p. 128.

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although Berryman was a staff officer of uncommon ability he preferred commanding the field.15

Hetherington also noted that he also had ‘a special talent which made him of high value…in the circumstances of the time…’ that is the ability to work with closely and cooperatively with Australia’s allies.16 One of Berryman’s subordinates in Cyrenaica and Syria, Brigadier Denzil Macarthur-Onslow, went so far as to tell Gavin Long in October 1942 that: ‘You cannot go past Robertson, Berryman and Herring when looking for a C in C. None have the strength, brains and integrity to surpass these’.17 By 1942/43 Berryman was well on the road to earning his reputation as the ‘finest staff officer in the army, even by some who did not care for him otherwise’.18 By the end of the war Berryman had only grown in statue. Despite Berryman moving on to serve his bitter rival, General Blamey, Lieutenant General Lavarack commented to Gavin Long in 1945 that: I consider Berryman the best combination of fighting leader, staff officer, and administrator that I have met so far in our army, and I should think he would be hard to beat anywhere.19

Character, Personality & Performance Lavarack’s comments on Berryman’s performance stand in contrast to those of Major-General Steven’s post war observations of his personality.20 Both Lavarack and Stevens served with Berryman in the Second World War and they both formed close professional and personal relationships with Berryman. Their comments, however, serve to highlight the links that can be formed between character, personality and performance.

The strengths that Lavarack and his contemporaries highlighted regarding Berryman are deemed as some of the most important characteristics required for both

15 Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, p. 343. 16 Ibid, p. 295. 17 As quoted in Lodge, Lavarack: Rival General, p. 241. 18 ‘Berryman, Lieutenant-General Frank Horton’, Peter Dennis (et al), Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, p. 96. 19 Ibid. 20 ‘A personal story of service as a citizen soldier’, Stevens Papers, AWM 3 DRL/3561, p. 45.

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command and senior staff positions.21 Yet while the plaudits of contemporaries are a particularly apt measure of an officer’s career performance, to provide a more exhausting analysis one of the other key areas that must be considered in assessing Berryman’s command and leadership abilities is his personality. As Horner has noted in his reflections of military biography, the ‘personal factor in war cannot be over looked’ and that at the ‘heart of the military problem is the personality of the commander’.22

Too often the developments of personality and character have been a neglected area within the historiography of Australia’s senior military officers. This may be because, as Shelford Bidwell has observed, that the problem of discovering what actually happens in battle and how people react to combat must lead us to some ‘flirtation’ with psychology.23 But as Richard Holmes has argued that despite the difficulties ‘no study of an individual in battle can be complete without it’.24 It is essential therefore to draw some conclusions about the nature of Berryman’s personality and character and assess how this affected his performance as a military officer.

Luke McCormack and David Mellor’s recent study of personality in leadership in the Australian army has highlighted the importance of this neglected field of investigation. It argues that the most successful officers display a number of similar personality characteristics. These included high conscientiousness, low extraversion, high openness, low neuroticism and low agreeableness.25 Berryman, despite his somewhat ‘hard edged’ personal qualities fits the target descriptors exactly possessing

21 Suffice to say that the characteristic that it is argued for a successful command apply almost identically to that of a successful staff officer, especially one involved in the operational staff work. As Mathew Hughes has argued ‘Leadership requires personal courage…Command has become increasingly become a matter of good staff officers’. Mathew Hughes, ‘Book Review: G.D. Sheffield (ed) Leadership and Command: The Anglo American Experience since 1861’, in Defence Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 173-174. 22 Horner, The Commanders, p. 9, 1. 23 Shelford Bidwell as quoted in Holmes, Firing Line, p. 19. 24 Holmes, Firing Line, p. 19. 25 McCormack & Mellor, ‘The Role of Personality in Leadership: An application of the Five-Factor Model in the Australian Military’, p. 192-194. This study uses selection to Command and Staff College for officers as a bench mark for leadership excellence. This study was done using 99 serving defence personnel. Given that leadership training and the selection of officers in the Australian army has changed little since the inception of the first class at RMC this can provide a relatively accurate measure of Berryman’s personality and its relationship to command performance. These assessments like all psychological models have their problems. McCormack and Mellor’s model is at the forefront of contemporary thinking in this field of study. See also The Making of a General: Lost Years Forgotten Battles, ‘Introduction’, p. 6-8.

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all of the traits and characteristics that this study argues are essential for a highly successful senior military officer.

The two key factors in this model of leadership success are high conscientiousness and low extraversion. As this thesis has shown Berryman was an exceptionally conscientious officer. His hard work and dedication to his profession were highlights of his career and all of his officer efficiency reports comment on this aspect of his personality. Highly conscientious officers like Berryman, as McCormack and Mellor note, are generally ‘purposeful, strong willed and determined’. They are also generally reserved characters and low extraversion leads to a high degree of independence which is deemed as ‘beneficial for military officer[s] who are required to make decisions in isolation and not become overly attached to those under their command’.26

The other key features of McCormack and Mellor’s study were openness, low neuroticism and low agreeableness. Openness particularly relates to the ability ‘to grasp technical knowledge’ and to be ‘inventive [and] versatile’.27 Berryman, an artillery officer, was well known for his technical skill and he amply demonstrated in the Middle East his ability to adapt to the changing nature of warfare on the modern battlefield. His versatile use of tactics, equipment and training was one of the hallmarks of his time with the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions. Berryman, as it has been revealed, was also far from ‘excitable’ and always presented an outwardly calm persona.

Low agreeableness was an unlikely factor (and low determinate constraint) in the study. But as some psychologists have argued ‘the readiness to fight for one’s own interest is often advantageous, and agreeableness is not a virtue on the battlefield’.28 Being the ‘hard man’ or ‘Berry the bastard’ to some officers may not have lead to wide spread popularity (never a goal in Berryman’s career), but it was, in many ways,

26 Ibid, p. 193. 27 Ibid. 28 P.T. Costa & R.R. McCrae, ‘leadership’ in NEO-PI-R Professional manual, (Odessa, Florida, 1992), p. 15.

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beneficial in determining his ability to perform as an effective leader.29 As once stated, ‘in war you don’t have to be nice; you only have to be right’.30

So why is it then that Berryman suits McCormack and Mellor’s personality descriptors for senior command so well? It is not simply that Berryman was ‘issued’ with, nor given a ‘course’ on these attributes with his promotion to Major-General in 1942. His personality and character had been shaped by his life experiences before his combat performances in the Second World War. It is therefore Berryman’s ‘journey’ to this point that that is the paramount experience. It is this epoch of his life that is most empowered to reveal his personal attributes.

Berryman’s personality has been revealed in this thesis as a product of his humble working class origins and strict Methodist upbringing that had provided him with his notions of hard work, conscientiousness and the desire for self improvement. These characteristics were all fostered, along with his natural intellectual capabilities, by his family and school. It was at school where he had found academic, sporting and military rewards for this approach to life. It is these institutions and activities that harnessed early dominant 20th century Australian middle class values such as nationalism, militarism and Empire that was so fundamental to Berryman’s enculturation into the military.

RMC reinforced these values and ideas and after 1913 Berryman derived his sense of self from the army and measured his achievements though the image of a military life. During the First World War, Berryman got his chance to show his emerging leadership qualities and during the course of the war he demonstrated that he had the makings of both a first class staff officer and commander. The hallmarks of his abilities were his dedication to the service, his leadership from the front and his staff work which was clear, concise and meticulous.

29 McCormack and Mellor’s research has been supported by studies of West Point Cadets. In this instance the five factor model was again used and it results were very similar. It also pointed to high cognitive scores in entrance exams (like Berryman’) as a key indicator of leadership performance. This study also highlighted the importance of ‘hardness’ which involves ‘a high sense of commitment to life and work, a strong belief in one’s ability to control events and influence outcomes and greater openness to change and challenges in ones life’. All factors that is clearly evident in this study of Berryman’s first 47 years. 30 Churchill as quoted in Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job, p. 49.

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Despite this promising start, post war events may well have transcribed a very different outcome for Berryman. His career trajectory was not pre-ordained and the sense of narrative and chronology that historians can impose on a life often belies the fragile nature of circumstance and agency. He survived the war, but he may well have not survived the post war army. While he endured the funding and personnel cuts during this period his relationship with the military changed. It was no longer a source of stability nor did it become his only means of self realisation.

The adjustment back to a much maligned peacetime army and the effects of mental strain caused by the horrendous experience of war all took their toll. Evidence points towards Berryman being seemingly adrift in his personal life during this period, a very different character from the confident, self assured young officer cadet at RMC and battery commander on the Western Front. His search for a grounded sense of self led him to flirt with further study, but his life remained unsettled. It was not until he formed a lasting relationship with Muriel Whipp that the ripples caused by the war and the changing role of the military in post war Australia were finally smoothed over. His marriage to Muriel gave Berryman an emotional outlet quite unlike anything that any institution could offer.

By the mid 1920s, Berryman had redefined himself not just in the image of the Army, but also in the image of his wife and her family. Muriel provided him the strong feminine influence that had been absent in his life since he had left for RMC. Her social aspiration and upper middle class family provided Berryman with a strong sense of personal security and cultural inclusion. It solidified his new found sense of class, status and social values. This was especially significant given his estrangement from his family in Box Hill. Muriel and the Whipp family provided him with the social foundations upon which to refocus his professional life. Soon after their marriage Berryman left university and set his mind on his aspiration to attend Staff College.

Berryman’s relationship with Muriel Whipp and her family in many ways reveals a different side of his character. One that is loving, warm and engaging. This is,

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however, the same Berryman as the one we see in his military career. The desire for self improvement, the desire to be a conscientious husband, and later father, is the result of the same dynamic at work. However this dynamic now also found a social and cultural environment for Berryman that encompassed different goals and achievements.

It was only with the establishment of a harmonious personal and family life in the mid 1920s that Berryman could once again focus on his military career. Berryman’s move to Camberley marked him out as a rising star in the inter-war army and his posting to London allowed him to form links with some of the most influential senior officers in the Australian Army. During the 1930s, through hard work and this patronage network, Berryman was able to position himself at the centre of the military elite in the Australian army. This meant that at the outbreak of the Second World War he was virtually assured of a senior command or staff appointment with any expeditionary force.

All of these experiences are paramount to the development of Berryman’s personality which, as McCormack, Mellor and others have convincingly argued, is essential when assessing the life of a military professional. As a result it can be argued that not only was Berryman widely regarded as an effective officer by his contemporaries, but that this argument can also be broadly supported by his suitable ‘fit’ into archetype personality descriptors for any senior military officer.

Leadership and Command While personality and character formation has a lot to do with the development of an officer, it is crucial only as a tool in deriving judgements that are fundamentally based, as Horner has argued, on ‘outcomes’. Here there are number of critical factors that must be addressed in assessing the performance and path to senior command of a military professional. While it is difficult provide for an objective assessment of leadership and command it is necessary to apply some of the more common methodologies to Berryman’s career between 1913 and 1941 so as to reflect on his performance and assess his attributes at the time of his return to Australia which heralded his promotion to Major-General.

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There are an infinite number of differing opinions on command and leadership traits. Some of the widely accepted characteristics are ‘intellect, energy, selflessness, and humanity,’31 that being the ‘ability to motivate people [and] instil confidence in his superiors, peers and subordinates’.32 As noted in the ‘Introduction’ Field Marshal Wavell made similar observations and added that other qualities essential in a good commander were: …robustness, the ability to withstand the shocks of war, boldness – the ability to make decisions based on a careful calculation of risk… the ability to judge character …and excellence in administration.33

Berryman’s intellect has already been established, as well as his seemingly limitless capacity for work. In addition he was ‘a very keen and thrusting officer’ whose energy on campaign was abundant.34 He was an ‘energising force’35 and his capacity to push himself to the limit is reflected in the fact that he suffered from fatigue at the end of his time in Libya and Syria, the latter campaign necessitating his hospitalisation with physical exhaustion.

Berryman’s selflessness emanated out of his love and dedication to the Army. At the beginning of the First World War it was noted how ‘we used to say of Berry that he would cut his grandmother’s throat if it was in the interests of the army’.36 In the Second World War Berryman’s personal assistant would note that he ‘would turn his own mother down if her interests were troublesome’.37 During this later conflict he would win the respect of a number of senior officers including the nation’s most senior

31 Megis, ‘Generalship: Qualities, instincts and character’, p. 15. 32 Moor, ‘Junior leadership training and development in the Australian Army’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 130, May/ June 1998, p. 39. 33 Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell as quoted in David G. Blackwell, ‘Command and Leadership in the Australian Army’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 130, May/June 1998, p. 23. 34 Major Wilton, BRMA 7th Division Artillery and BM Berryforce, as quoted in Horner, Strategic Command, p. 65 35 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 567 36 Horner, General Vasey’s War, p. 11-12. 37 Horner, Blamey: The Commander in Chief, p. 372-373.

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Australian soldier (Blamey) by his capacity to forego his personal desires and interests for the benefit of the Army.38

Selflessness, General Megis argues, goes beyond these paradigms to include physical and moral courage, something that Wavell also lists as an essential element in combat leadership. Berryman’s personal courage as a junior officer has been documented in chapter 3. He built this reputation on: his leadership of his batteries from the gun line, his willingness to push forward into the infantry frontline to conduct reconnaissances to improve cooperation, the effectiveness of his artillery and the self effacing nature of his command. These characteristics were also a trademark of his command in Syria which included the capture of twelve prisoners at Khirbe, his assault on Green Hill, his capture of Jezzine and his stoic yet realistic conduct under shellfire.39

At Tobruk, Berryman demonstrated his moral courage by refusing to alter his plan in the face of mounting disquiet from senior commanders. However Berryman’s actions at the Battle of Damour demonstrate most effectively his sense of selflessness. At Damour, Berryman argued with Allen and Stevens over the artillery support for the battle and especially the placement of his observation posts. Despite the rejection of his argument that they were too far back, he ‘execute[d] a course of action with which [he] did not complete[ly] agree [with]’. As Meigs argues, although ‘one may know a better way[,] one may have even offered that alternative to the boss, and may have even argued for it strongly…Even when faced with a less than optimum decision…we each must execute [it] loyally and with enthusiasm’.40 At Damour despite his disagreements with Allen and Stevens Berryman still executed the plan with all of the skill, energy and enthusiasm he could muster and his artillery proved to be one of the decisive weapons of the battle.

38 See Dean, ‘The forgotten man: Lieut.-General Sir Frank Berryman’, ‘Major-General Stanley Savige to Berryman’, 4 December 1943, Berryman family Papers and Chapman, Iven G Mackay: Citizen Soldier, p. 166. 39See Chapter 9, p. 243-252. 40 Megis, ‘Generalship: Qualities, instincts and character’, p. 7.

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Berryman also possessed the ability to ‘instil confidence in his superiors, peers and subordinates’.41 He developed close relationships with Mackay, Lavarack and Allen during his time in the Middle East. This experience was built on the back of his good relationships with his commanding officers (both civil and military) at Australia House, London, his relationship with Lavarack, Wynter and Sturdee and at Army Headquarters in the lead up to war as well as his performance under Morshead and Allen when serving as a Brigade Major with the militia. Loyalty to his commanding officer, even when it was not always in his own interest, was to be a hallmark of Berryman’s career and this, along with his ‘ruthless’ efficiency42 and his ‘outstanding abilities’43 were to be the building blocks of his relations with all ranks.

Berryman instilled confidence in subordinates by his military bearing, quiet confidence and high standards. He led by example and demonstrated personal courage. He also exerted power on the battlefield through his personal presence and he seemed more often than not to be at the ‘right place at the right time’.44 Wass de Czege argues that one of the key aspects of military leadership for junior field grade officers (Lieutenant-Colonel / Brigadier) is the balance between direct and indirect leadership. ‘The leaders must choose carefully for there are pitfalls to spreading too thin as well as to staying too near the headquarters’.45 This balance has been a key factor in exercising leadership for thousands of years and personal presence on the battlefield ‘remains a crucial aspect of Generalship to this day’.46

In Berryman’s case he stuck an excellent balance between direct and indirect leadership during both of his campaigns in the Middle East. This was nowhere more evident in the period of his career that covers the Syrian campaign. He spent more time up forward during the early stages to the assault and divided his time between headquarters and the front while commanding Berryforce. In the lead up to the Battle of Damour he spent most of his time at his own headquarters as well as those of 7th

41 Moor, ‘Junior leadership training and development in the Australian Army’, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 130, May/ June 1998, p. 39. 42 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 59. 43 Chapman, Iven G Mackay: Citizen Soldier, p. 166 44 Megis, ‘Generalship: Qualities, instincts and character’, p. 8. 45 Wass de Czege, ‘A Comprehensive view of leadership’, p. 29. 46 Megis, ‘Generalship: Qualities, Instincts and Character’, p. 4.

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Division and Steven’s brigade. Once the ‘set-piece’ battle was won and operations became more fluid Berryman handled over a large measure of tactical control to his regiment commanders and then went forward to the ‘critical points’ of the battlefield to personally influence events.

The final characteristics that Wavell notes as essential for high command are robustness and boldness. Berryman continually expressed his ability to be unflappable, adaptive and bold. His plan at Bardia, to attack on the flank and outside of the Australian perimeter, was an audacious, yet calculated risk as were his attacks at Green Hill, Jezzine and Merdjayoun in Syria. However his pre-eminent demonstration of these characteristics was undoubtedly his command of the artillery in Syria. His emphasis on using his guns aggressively, over open sights, pushing his observations posts in advance of the forward defensive lines and his cool and calm demeanour under fire was the highlight of his performance in this operation. In both of his Middle East campaigns he also demonstrated that he could easily slip between the roles of operational staff officer and commander.

Staff Corps, Militia & Personalities This is not to say that Berryman was in any way shape or form a ‘perfect’ fit or match in terms of the characteristics and personality necessary for operational or high command. Like all officers he had his idiosyncrasies and weaknesses. He was overly secretive, to the point where ‘even his own subordinates did not always know what was going on’47 and while his personality had all of the hallmarks of an excellent officer he could be hard and abrasive.

It has been noted how he was a warm and engaging character with a number of his fellow officers, however, it was only a select few that got to see this side of Berryman, who more commonly reserved this persona for his wife and children. To most in the army he was ‘cold and sarcastic’ which meant that many of his fellow officers ‘admired him rather than liked him’.48 While this was never a problem for Berryman it did affect his ability to communicate with his fellow officers and effective

47 Hetherington, Blamey: Controversial Soldier, p. 295. 48 Ibid.

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communication could be one of the most essential elements to military success. This must, undoubtedly, be seen as Berryman’s gravest weakness as a staff officer and commander. Yet too often this aspect of Berryman’s character has been the focal point of historians. These points, however, are relatively insignificant when viewed in the context of his broader career achievements and his important contributions to the development of the Australian Army.

The greatest criticisms of Berryman during the war stem from his supposed stormy relationship with a number of militia officers in the Middle East during 1940-42. It is, however, totally unjust to argue (as some have) that Berryman ‘was always glad to see the back of any and every commander who was not a member of the Staff Corps’.49 Berryman has been noted as a harsh ‘critic of all and sundry’ and he made no allowances amongst senior officers for their deficiencies. It is true that he saw much to be troubled by in some senior militia officers. This was cemented through his knowledge and understanding of the levels of training in the militia during the inter-war period. Early on Berryman’s views of the militia were coloured by his personal experiences with the militia and the opinions of other senior Staff Corps officers, especially Lieutenant-General Lavarack. These perceptions were not helped by Menzies decision to appointment only militia officers to command positions for the 6th Division when it was raised in 1940. Given these experiences it is easy to see why officers like Berryman Vasey and Robertson harboured resentment towards senior militia officers in the 6th Division.

Despite this list of complaints it is too simplistic to use them to characterise Berryman’s relationship with the militia officers of the 6th and 7th Divisions in the Middle East and during the rest of the war. Berryman, despite his initial prejudices, formed a close working relationship with Mackay. He respected and admired Mackay’s leadership qualities as well as his physical and moral courage. Their relationship was to be characterised as one of the smoothest between a chief staff officer and commander in an Australian Division during the war.50

49 Braga, Kokoda Commander, p. 272. 50 ‘Lieutenant-Colonel A G Fenton, Assistant Director of Public Relations, LHQ – Biographical notes on Lieutenant F H Berryman’, AWM 67 3/30 Part II. Fenton noted that ‘It would be hard to improve on the

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Berryman’s relationship with Brigadier, later Major-General, ‘Tubby’ Allen has been completely misrepresented in some accounts. Berryman’s personal correspondence with his wife reveals that the two men had a close personal relationship that easily withstood their professional disagreements. Berryman liked and admired Allen, praising his performance at Bardia to his wife Muriel as well as professing his belief that the 7th Division would perform well under his command in Syria. He also acknowledged that he was looking forward to working for Allen. Under these circumstances it is certainly hard to imagine that either of these two men would continue a personal relationship that included numerous dinners and social engagements if the level of hostility between them was any where near as venomous as has previously been reported.

While Berryman remained on good terms with Mackay and Allen his relationship with Savige certainly deteriorated during his time in the Middle East. Berryman’s initial temperament towards Savige was undoubtedly affected by the rumours surrounding Savige’s appointment over more qualified officers due to his relationship with Blamey, not to mention Savige’s outspoken criticisms of the Staff Corps before the war. On arrival in the Middle East Berryman was unimpressed by Savige’s demeanour as well the training of his brigade. Berryman’s suspicions of Savige’s abilities were confirmed by his poor performance at the Battle of Bardia. This, the ultimate sin in the eyes of an officer like Berryman who set very high standards and expected all and sundry to meet them, cemented his negative appreciation of Savige as a commander.

Berryman was also bitter over Savige’s condemnation of his planning and conduct at Bardia and consequently he pursued his criticism of Savige with doggedness. It was to Berryman’s discredit that he allowed this relationship it to colour his otherwise excellent appraisal of the campaign in the lectures that he delivered to the officers of the 7th and 9th Divisions in Palestine during the early months of 1941. However, while teamwork and harmony that existed between the General Commanding Officer, Maj-Gen Sir Iven Mackay, and Colonel Berryman’. See also ‘Biographical Notes: Lieutenant-General F.H. Berryman, C.B., C.B.E, D.S.O’, Manly Daily, 19 October, 1944.

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Berryman may well have been harsh critic of Savige’s military capabilities, this appreciation was also held by a number of senior Australian officers. By the end of the Syrian operation, Savige’s critics included his major benefactor, Lieutenant General Blamey. As Savige’s biographer, Gavin Keating has noted, ‘Blamey’s belief that Savige had provided honourable service but was unequal to the strains of modern warfare must be seen as conclusive’.51

The role that Berryman played in the strained relations between a number of the Staff Corps and militia officers in the Middle East should not be relegated to broad generalisations. As I have demonstrated there was tensions between Staff Corps and militia officers in the 6th Australian Division during 1940 / 1941, but there were also divisions within the Staff Corps ranks (notable between Berryman and Vasey) and within the militia (notably between Herring, Allen and Savige).

Certainly Berryman was, to some extent, embittered by the differences between the two modes of service within the Australian army and the prejudices he saw against the more highly trained Staff Corps officers. But to make accurate and clear assessments of these issues, a more convincing methodology to use is to look at the individual relationships between these officers rather than generalising about their mode of service. Berryman has been tagged by some historians as the most aggressive and parochial of the critics of the militia, but as this thesis has revealed this interpretation belies the nature of his relationship with senior officers like Arthur Allen, Iven Mackay and Leslie Morshead and junior militia commanders like, , Dezil MacArthur- Onslow, Roden Cutler, and John O’Brien.

At the core of Berryman’s analysis (of any officer) was performance on the battlefield. Berryman was to be unrelenting in his judgemental approach to all of his fellow officers throughout the war. His dislike of Savige was driven fundamentally by an appreciation of his military abilities, although without a doubt it was more concentrated as a result of Savige’s criticism of the Staff Corps both before and during the war. Berryman’s arguments with Savige were to be reconvened on the battlefields of

51 Keating, The Right Man for the Right Job: Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Savige as a Military Commander, p. 83.

336 IN REFLECTION: 1894-1941

New Guinea during the Pacific war. In August 1943 Berryman was sent by the C in C Blamey to investigate Savige’s conduct as a divisional commander during the Salmaua campaign. To everyone’s surprise, including his own, Berryman concluded that Savige was justified in his actions and that the blame lay with his Corps Commander Lieutenant-General Herring.52 This incident was to prove to Savige and the army alike that his judgements were fundamentally based solely on an officer’s performance on the battlefield.

The Forgotten Man Personal disagreements and debates over performance have dominated Berryman’s legacy. In mid 1941, however, Berryman was oblivious to the machinations of the historians that would follow in the wake of the Second World War. Instead, in the months following the collapse of the Vichy French resistance, the Australian troops in the Middle East were concentrated in Syria for a rest and to protect the area from a possible German attack through Turkey and Berryman, as BGS, was working closely with Lavarack in formulating plans for the defence of the country based on the use of the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions. Berryman’s relationship with Lavarack was much more orthodox than when he had worked as chief of staff to Mackay. Berryman was, however, still given discretion to implement a range of contingency plans for the Corps and helped to direct its training. As the winter months approached he conducted extensive reconnaissances of the entire country, established the AIF ski school, and even found time to record a radio broadcast for the ABC on the Battle of Merdjayoun.53

By the time Japanese forces attacked the US naval base at Pearl Harbour the 1st Australian Corps was well established in their winter quarters in Syria. Berryman greeted the news with a typical understated diary entry, ‘Heard Japan declared war on Britain and USA’.54 Within days fellow senior officers were paying visits to Berryman to bid him farewell as they were posted back to Australia to help rebuild the under prepared Citizen Military Forces to fight the Japanese. Berryman followed soon after.

52 Keating, The Right man for the Right Job, p. 132. 53 ‘Berryman Diary, August-November 1941’. See also Ken Raymond, ‘Aussie Soldier of the Snow’, Ski Australia, June 1963, Vol 4, p. 42-45, 75-80 & C. F. Coady, ‘Ski Troops in the AIF’, Reveille, 1 October, 1964; ‘'A Talk By Brigadier Berryman' - 13 Jan 1942, Chester Wilmot ABC radio talk script’, NAA SP300/4, item 128. 54 ‘Berryman Diary, December 8 1941’.

337 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

The Australian government had decided to transfer 1st Australian Corps, Australia’s only properly trained and equipped formation, to the Pacific.

Berryman served, briefly, in Java as BGS 1st Australian Corps as the collapse of British military power in the Pacific reached its nadir before returning to Australia in March 1942. In April he was appointed as a Major-General. Fittingly his first appointment as a general officer was as Major-General General Staff (chief of staff) 1st Australian Army, again under the command of Lavarack. But Berryman’s posting was not the command position that he desired and the 1st Australian Army was a backwater. It was not until his promotion to Major-General was finally made substantive on 1 September 1942 and he was transferred to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff that he would once again be at the forefront of the Army’s operations. It was to be another three years before Berryman was able to stand on the quarter deck of the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay and stare down Foreign Minister Shigemitsu during the surrender of the final Axis power in the Second World War. During that time he was to only receive one active command appointment.

While Berryman was building on his reputation as an excellent staff officer and a commander of troops in the Pacific, his Middle East campaigns had already slipped from memory. The country had shifted focus to the Pacific War and the campaign in Cyrenaica was overshadowed by the heroic defence of Tobruk by the 9th Australian Division and the victory at El Alamein in November 1942. Meanwhile General Blamey had gone out of his way to down play the Syrian campaign for fear it would give his arch rival Lavarack too much credit.

The lack of coverage for the Australian victory in Syria was evident early on, even in Australian Army publications. In late 1941 the book Active Service published for the AIF by the Australian War Memorial covered the campaigns and battles of the 6th and 9th Divisions but the 7th Division’s role in Syria did not rate a mention. No campaign medal was struck for Syria and the men of the 7th Division felt that there was

338 IN REFLECTION: 1894-1941

a general misconception that the campaign was a walkover.55 Syria was lucky to get more than a passing reference in most histories of the British or Australian armies’ operations in the Middle East and Mediterranean. Furthermore, in the years since the end of the war the campaign failed to capture the imagination of the media, public and historians alike.

This ‘drift’ from memory of Australian’s campaigns in the Middle East during 1940-41 is reflective of the way that the whole of Berryman’s career has been seen. At the end of the war Berryman missed his chance to take the highest position in the Army, Chief of the General Staff. Despite Berryman’s proven capabilities Blamey’s recommendation of Berryman to the government and his close association with the unpopular former C in C work against him. In a decision designed to distance themselves from Blamey, the Chifley Labor government chose Lieutenant-General Sturdee as CGS in 1946, followed by Lieutenant-General Rowell in 1950. In typical style Berryman accepted his appoint to GOC Eastern Command graciously serving Sturdee and then Rowell with all of his customary loyalty and energy.

In the post war Berryman became more recognised for his civic programs than his war service. He made a name for himself in the broader community during the 1950s for his community work. His environmental program to improve the physical appeal of Eastern Commands bases earned him the nickname ‘Frank the Florist’. During the late 1940s and 1950s he was also well known as one of the founders of the War Widows Guild, as Director of the Silver Jubilee celebrations and as Director of the Royal Tour in 1954. After retirement from public service he remained in public eye as Director and CEO of the Royal Agricultural Society of NSW until 1961.

Memories of war were soon forgotten and civic accomplishments fade from memory swiftly. From the early 1960s onwards Berryman slipped from the public eye. In the broader context Berryman could easily be regarded as not just as a ‘forgotten man’, but the ‘forgotten man’ who, for a large part of his military career, served in forgotten branches of the service (artillery & Staff Corps), in roles that have been

55 Mark Johnston, The Silent 7th, p. 74.

339 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

largely overlooked and in campaigns that few recall. The struggle for recognition in these circumstances, both at the time and after the war, was almost impossible. There is still much to be written about the summit of Frank Berryman’s military and civic career as well as his influence on shaping important parts of Australia’s history. This thesis has highlighted Berryman’s early career, the crucial journey to his pinnacle. This path held many achievements that deserve recognition in their own right, and without it, his career that followed cannot be properly recognised nor understood.

340 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Appendix A: The Early Generations of the Berryman Family1

JOHN BERRYMAN M. ELIZABETH ANN MARTIN (4 March 1851 Kilkhampton, Cornwall, England) b. 1.5.1825 Bradworthy, Devon b. 16.1.1825 Kilkhampton, Cornwall SAMUEL MARTIN * RICHARD BAKER WILLIAM LEE JOHN THOMAS GEORGE HENRY LOUIS JOSHUA ALFRED CALEB ERNEST EDWARD

Arthur John Beatrice Eliz. Emilie Mabel Cecil John James John John Ernest John Charles Ernest d. 1927 d. 1890 d.1918 War George William Harold John Ada Florence Gertrude Sarah Mabel Frances Herbert Walter George Edward d. 1891 Alice Eliza Thomas Ethel Annie Ernest William Stewart Elizabeth Ann Ethel Ann

Lewis Richard Agues Ethel Frank Horton Mary May Elizabeth Ann d. 1887 Gertrude Eliza Alice Evelyn , William Alf. Elise Grace Alfred Thomas

Alfred Samuel Richard William Raymond George Gertrude Amy Albert Norman

______Alfred Ernest Ethel Ruth

(Jean) Cordelia Emily George Louis

Sidney Alex. Irene Mary Francis John

Ronald Edwin Alexander Ivy Beatrice Polwarth Norman Franklin Lily Isabell

Olive Wilhelm'a Percy William 1906-07 Violet Jean

* FANNY JANE b.25.3.1854

1 Dorothy Johnston, The Berryman Story: John and Elizabeth Berryman, p. 83

341 APPENDIX

Appendix B: The 6th Division's Operation Order For The Capture Of Bardia

THE 6TH DIVISION'S OPERATION ORDER FOR THE CAPTURE OF BARDIA

SECRET Copy No, 21 1 Jan, 41. 6 AUST DIV 00 No. G-

Ref Maps:

BARDIA North and South 1/50,000. CIRENAICA 1/100,000 Sheets 29, 30 and 40. CIRENAICA 1/1,000,000.

INFORMATION 1. Enemy as per 6 Aust Div Int Summaries.

2. (a) Own Tps. Supporting action of Royal Navy, RAF, WDF, and 7 Armd Div is given in 6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 3, dated 31 Dec, 40.

(b) Moves to assembly areas and groupings of units 6 Aust Div are given in 6 Aust Div Op Instn No. 4, dated 1 Jan, 41.

INTENTION 3. 6 Aust Div will attack and capture the Central and Southern sectors of the BARDIA defences on 3 Jan.

METHOD The attack will be carried out in two Phases.

PHASE I 4. 16 Aust Inf Bde, with one Coy 1 NF and A Sqn 6 Aust Cav under comd, and 7 R Tanks will carry out the attacks in this Phase.

5. Objectives: 16 Aust Inf Bde and A Sqn 6 Aust Cav are shown on TRACE A. 7 R Tanks are shown on TRACE B.

6. 6. Arty: Arty plan is shown on TRACE C. 7. 7. Engrs: Engr tasks are shown on TRACE D. 8. 2/1 Bn will cross the SL at 0530 hrs and will form a tank bridgehead by capturing the objectives shown on TRACE A and on arrival 4 Tp 7 R Tanks will capture their final objective.

9. 2/1 Fd Coy will follow 2/1 Bn and will build tank crossings as shown on 342 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

TRACE D.

10. (a) 7 R Tanks will pass the inf SL at 0640 hrs, cross A Tk ditch at 0650 hrs, and send 4 Tp to assist 2/1 Bn in capturing their final objective. On completion of task, 4 Tp will come into res under comd 7 R Tanks.

(b) 7 R Tanks less 4 Tp, after crossing ditch, will attack with three Tps fwd as shown on TRACE B. Each fwd Tp will be followed by a Coy of 2/2 Bn.

(c) After capture of objective, 7 R Tanks will rally in area of Post No. 40.

11. 2/2 Bn will pass SL at 0629 hrs and as 7 R Tanks cross the ditch fwd Coys will take up their posns and follow their respective Tp of tanks. 2/2 Bn will assist tanks in mopping up and will capture objective shown on TRACE A.

12. 2/2 Fd Coy will follow 2/2 Bn into the perimeter and will move down the perimeter to carry out the tasks shown on TRACE D.

13. 2/3 Bn will pass SL at 0734 hrs and capture objective shown on TRACE A.

14. A Sqn 6 Aust Cav will follow 2/3 Bn and capture objective shown on TRACE A.

15. One Coy 2/7 Bn will move into the perimeter and occupy the sector shown on TRACE A after 7 R Tanks and 2/2 Bn have captured their objective.

16. 2/5 Bn will cross the perimeter by 0800 hrs and occupy a fwd assembly area as shown on TRACE A.

17. RESERVE: Until zero for Phase II, 2/5 Bn will be at call of Comd 16 Aust Inf Bde for a purely defensive role in the event of serious enemy penetration of his front.

343 APPENDIX

18. Arty: Plan shown on TRACE C.

(a) Summary of Programme. Time Target No. of guns Rate rpgpm Remarks hrs 0530-0555 Posts 45-47 52-25prs 3 Incl 8-6in Hows In 43 12-25prs 3 to 0545 hrs. 1st 49 4-4.5 guns 2 Line

Posts 42 12-25prs 3 At 0545 hrs 8- In 44 4-4.5 guns 2 6in Hows lift on 2nd 46 4-60prs 2 to these Posts. Line 0555-0620 Posts 42, 44, 46 36-25prs 3 to 2 Fd arty. & Posts to N E & Remainder arty. 3 to 2 Med arty. S 2 to 1 0620-0655 Box around tank All arty. 1 to 2 Fd arty. bridgehead 1 to 1 ½ Med arty. 0655-0730 Arty concentra- 12 guns on each Arty tion moves South post for 10 mins. concentration to to each Post in move SE at rate turn to Posts 25, of 5 mph. 24, 26 0655 Enemy btys. Selected onwards Med btys.

(b) From 0730 hrs to zero for Phase II arty will engage targets by observation. F Bty RHA and 104 Regt RHA in support of 2/1 Bn. 2/1 Fd Regt in support of 2/2 Bn. 51 Fd Regt in support of 2/3 Bn. 2/2 Fd Regt in support of 17 Aust Inf Bde.

19. DECEPTION: At 0530 hrs 2/6 Bn. will stage a demonstration against the SW corner of the Southern sector of the perimeter. 2/2 Fd Regt will support this demon- stration by engaging the following targets:-

0530 Posts 4, 6, 7, 8, Concentrations of 6 guns on to 9, 10, 11, 13. each Post in turn. 0545 hrs.

Thereafter 2/2 Fd Regt will fire regtl bursts on enemy btys and Posts 22, 24, 25, 26, 27 until 0730 hrs.

20. A Tk PROTECTION: 16 Aust Inf Bde will be responsible for A Tk protection within the perimeter from incl Main Rd BARDIA-CAPUZZO to the LEFT of their objective. P Bty RHA, less two Tps, will be responsible from excl Post 53 to the WEST.

344 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

21. AIR: 208 Sqn RAF under Corps control are providing the following sorties on 3 Jan:- Tac R (a) Three sorties at 0700, 0930 and 1200 hrs. Area BARDIA perimeter. Tasks (i) Report posn of own fwd tps. (ii) Report dispositions of enemy forces within perimeter, with reference to enemy AFVs.

Reports by W/T and message dropping on HQs 6 Aust Div and 16 Aust Inf Bde.

Arty R (b) Two sorties at call of CRA 6 Aust Div from 0730 Ins.

ADM 22. Adm Instns will be issued separately.

INTERCOMN 23. HQ 6 Aust Div remains present location.

Adv H.Q. 16 Aust Inf Bde opens on track in assembly area 50903953 0500 hrs 3 Jan and will open a report centre at Post 45 after its capture.

After 2/2 and 2/3 Bns have captured their objectives, Adv Bde HQ will move to Post 40. Rear HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde opens at Pt 206 50783833 at 0500 hrs. HQ 17 Aust Inf Bde remains present location. HQ 19 Aust Inf Bde opens 0500 hrs 3 Jan at Pt 208 50673842 (old HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde).

W/T TENDER: 208 Sqn RAF will send one RAF tender to report to HQ 6 Aust Div by 1400 hrs 2 Jan.

FREQUENCY FOR Tac R 2750 kcs.

CALL SIGNS 7 Armd Div XY 16 Aust Inf Bde SS 6 Aust Div SM Adv HQ WDF LO

POSN FWD INF WHITE CROSSES will be displayed at HQs of leading Coys 6 Aust Div when halted to indicate to air posn reached by fwd tps.

345 APPENDIX

LOs One Div LO and one LO 19 Aust Inf Bde will be at HQ 16 Aust Inf Bde from 1600 hrs 2 Jan. 16 and 17 Aust Inf Bdes will arrange LOs with each other.

SYNCHRONIZATION Reps formations and units will synchronize watches at HQ 6 Aust Div at 2100 hrs 2 Jan. ACK. Time of signature: 1600 hrs.

F. H. Berryman, Colonel, GS, 6 Aust Div.

Method of Issue: LOs and Sigs.

Distribution Copy No. 16 Aust Inf Bde 1 17 Aust Inf Bde 2 19 Aust Inf Bde 3 RAA 6 Aust Div 4 RAE 6 Aust Div 5 Sigs 6 Aust Div 6 A Sqn 6 Aust Cav 7 7 RTR 8 WDF 9 7 Armd Div 10 GOC 11 G 12 A 13 Q 14 AASC 15 Med 16 Ord 17 1 Aust Corps 18 File 19-20 War Diary 21-22

NOTE.-PHASE II will be issued separately.

346 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

SECRET 6 AUST DIV 00 No. 6 (Continued) Copy No. 24 1 Jan, 41.

PHASE II

24. The attack will be resumed at 1130 hrs 3 Jan by 17 Aust Inf Bde, A Sqn 6 Aust Cav (less one VMG Tp), and 7 R Tanks supported by arty.

25. (a) Objectives & SL 2/5 Bn and A Sqn 6 Aust Cav (less one VMG Tp) shown on TRACE E. (b) A Sqn will protect left of 2/5 Bn and exploit enemy btys from rear after tanks have passed. (c) 2/5 Bn will send one coy fwd to exploit in rear of left fwd tp, 7 R Tanks.

26. 7 R Tanks. Objectives and SL shown on TRACE F. On completion of tasks 7 R'I'anks will rally in area Post 34, 500 yds north of cross rds 5135923, and remain within the perimeter to deal with any tank counter attacks.

27. As attack of 2/5 Bn or 7 R Tanks progresses, 2/7 Bn will enter the perimeter and carry out the tasks shown on TRACE E.

28. Arty. (a) At 1130 hrs will open on Posts 24 and 25, and then move SE on each post in turn finishing on Posts 17, R 11 and enemy bty 51923898 at 1325 hrs. 12 guns for ten mins and 36 guns for last three mins will fire on each post in turn. (b) Rate of Adv arty fire-100 yds/3mins. (c) Enemy btys east of Posts 19 to 24 will be engaged by med arty from 1130 to 1325 hrs. Fire of med btys will be co-ordinated to move SE with arty fire on Posts. d) From 1325 hrs onwards fire by observation. 2/1 Fd Regt in support of 2/5 Bn. 2/2 Fd Regt in support of 2/7 Bn.

29. Air Bombardment. Enemy btys in centre of Southern sector will be subjected to intermittent air bombing from 0830 to 1130 hrs.

30. 2/2 Bn will support left of 2/5 Bn attack by fire by observation at 1130 hrs.

(a) At 1600 hrs an engr party of two sub-secs 2/8 I'd Coy with escort will be prepared to move into BARDIA to seize water and engr installations. (b) Escort Comd -OC VMG Tp 6 Aust Cav. Tps -One VMG Tp 6 Aust Cav One P1 2/2 Bn.

31. 17 Aust Inf Bde will be responsible for protection of Southern Sector, i.e. from excl main rd BARDIA-CAPUZZO.

347 APPENDIX

32. Protection of 7 R Tanks in rallying area Post 34 during 3 Jan and night 3/4 Jan will be responsibility 16 Aust Inf Bde.

ACK.

Time of Signature: 1900 hrs.

Method of Issue: LOs & Sigs. F. H. Berryman, Colonel, GS 6 Aust Div. Distribution Copy No. 16 Aust Inf Bde 1 17 Aust Inf Bde 2 19 Aust Inf Bde 3 RAA 6 Aust Div 4 RAE 6 Aust Div 5 Sigs 6 Aust Div 6 A Sqn 6 Aust Cav 7 7 RTR 8 WDF 9 7 Armd Div 10 GOC 11 G 12 A 13 Q 14 AASC 15 Med 16 Ord 17 1 Aust Corps 18 File 19-20 War Diary 21-22

348 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

Appendix C: Career Details – Lieutenant General F. H. Berryman 1913 – 1946.1

Name: BERRYMAN, Sir Frank Horton Life Span: 1894/1981

Final and Decorations: Lieutenant-General KCVO, CB, CBE, DSO, Medal of Freedom (US), psc, pac

Date and Place of Birth: 11 April 1894, GEELONG Vic

Education: Melbourne High School, RMC Duntroon, Staff College

Occupation: Officer, Australian Staff Corps. CEO & Director RAS NSW 1954/61* (Who’s Who in Aust 1977)

Religion: Methodist Physical Description: 5’-7 ½” 10st 7lbs (1915)

Marital Status: Married 30 November 1925, Muriel (CBE, 1972) daughter of J.H. Whipp – 1 son & 1 daughter.

Last Known Address: 17 Wentworth Street, Point Piper NSW

Details of Military Service:

6 years cadets, and 6 months Citizen Military Forces prior to RMC Duntroon

Results of entrance examination to royal Military College Duntroon, held November 1912: - Berryman, F.H. 946.6 marks of a possible 1100 (First Place) - ---

10 March 1913: F.H. Berryman entered RMC Duntroon

29 June 1915: AMF. The following appointments are made to the Permanent Military Forces from the Royal Military College Duntroon: to be Lieutenants: ------No. 82 Sergeant Frank Horton Berryman

1 July 1915: AIF. The following appointments are made to the AIF ---- Lieutenant F.H. Berryman ----

12 November 1915: AIF posted to 12 Battery 4 – Field Artillery Brigade

1 Summary sheet as recorded in, Papers of Lieutenant General Berryman, AWM PR 84/370. * Royal Agricultural Society of New South Wales 349 APPENDIX

18 Nov & 15 Dec 1915: Embarked for service overseas and disembarked SUEZ respectively –

8 : Transferred to 4 Brigade Ammunition column

14 & 19 March 1916: Embarked Egypt to join BEF in France and disembarked MARSEILLES respectively

1 April 1916: To be Temporary Captain

1 May 1916: Attached to 10 Battery

13 May 1916: Transferred to 2nd Divisional Ammunition Column

10 June 1916: F. H. Berryman reverted to rank of Lieutenant

11 June 1916: Transferred to 4th Field Artillery Brigade

10 July 1916: AIF Appointments and Promotions. Artillery 2nd Division Arty – Lieutenant F.H. Berryman to be temporary Captain - Promoted to substantive Captain subsequently continued W.E.F. the same date

5 January 1917: AIF Training for Staff Employments. Training of Staff Captain HQ 6th Infantry Brigade: Captain F.H. Berryman from 2nd Division Artillery.

N.B. CARO Service Record show same but HQ 7th Infantry Brigade

21 January 1917 AIF Allotment of Officers of Australian Field Artillery: 2nd Division Artillery ---- Captains ---- F.H. Berryman, Adjutant 4th Field Artillery Brigade ----

7th February 1917: AIF Arty, 2nd Aust Division. Lieutenant A G Horton to be Adjutant 4th Fd Arty Bde vice Captain F.H. Berryman seconded to Staff Training

1 September 1917: AIF Aust 6th Army Field Brigade Aust. Fd. Arty. Captain F.H. Berryman from 2 – Divisional Artillery is granted temporary rank of major while commanding a battery.

10 September 1917: AIF Arty 6 – Army Field Brigade. Aust Fd Arty to be Major: - Captain (T/Major) F.H. Berryman

6 January 1918: AIF to Battery Commanders Course, SHOEBURYNESS, England :- Major F.H. Berryman

350 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

19 February 1918: Major F.H. Berryman re-joins 6th Army Field Artillery Brigade

4 May 1918: Transferred to 2 Aust Divisional Arty AIF (as above)

* Mentioned in Despatches:- L/G 28/5/8 No. 30706 AIF Artillery:- Berryman F.H.

19 & 23 September 1918: Wounded in action (gun-shot wound right eye) and from hospital to duty respectively

28 October 1918: AIF (3MD) Berryman Major F.H. 2nd Div Artillery to be Brigade Major 7th Inf Bde vice Major J.L. Lee MC 45th Inf Bn for duty in Staff Duties Directorate, War Office

*Mentioned in Despatches: - L/G 31/12/18 No. 310889 3 MD Major F.H. Berryman 14th Bty, 4th Aust Fd Arty Bde

DSO:- L/G 1/1/19 No. 31092 3 MD Major Frank Horton Berryman 5th Fd Arty Bde for valuable service in connection with operations in France and Flanders

26 April 1919: To London and to France duty on 14 May 1919

5 June 1919: To Repatriation and Demobilisation

19 June & 18 August 1919: Embarked UK and disembarked Melbourne respectively

10 October 1919: AIF appointment terminated 3 MD ---- Majors ---- F.H. Berryman DSO ----

Updates: AMF Permanent Military Forces. The under mentioned officers are on notice for the Brevet rank of Major on promotion to the substantive rank of Captain: Lieutenants: - F.H. Berryman DSO

10 September 1917: AMF Permanent Mil Forces. The under mentioned officer are granted the honorary rank of Major from the duties stated: ---- Lieutenants ---- F.H. Berryman DSO, 10 Sept 1917 ---

5 April / 25 June 1920: School of Gunnery. No.2 Short Course. Certificate Awarded as shown --- Lieutenant (H/Major) F.H. Berryman DSO, RAFA, 2nd CE Certificate

1st October 1920: AMF Transfer of Officer to Staff Corps --- Lieutenant (H/Major) F.H. Berryman DSO

351 APPENDIX

6 November 1920 / 5 January 1922: Courses of Instruction Abroad: Lieutenant (H/Major) F.H. Berryman DSO: Ordnance Course

3 June 1921: Artillery College. The following officers have been selected for the first year of 39 Advanced Course which commenced 3 June 1921: ---- Lieutenant (H/Major) F.H. Berryman DSO

27 February 1923: Staff Corps. Allotment for duty. Staff Appointments, District Bases: Inspector Ordnance Officers (IOO) S.O. Grade 3B Lieutenant (H/Major) F.H. Berryman DSO

1st May 1923: AMF Staff Corps, Promotions: to be Captains ---- Lieutenant (H/Major) F.H. Berryman DSO: - Promotion subsequently confirmed the same date

February & May 1926: Staff College Camberley and Quetta. Results of entrance examination held February and March 1926 ---- Captain (Brevet Major) F.H. Berryman DSO

22 November 1922: AMF Relinquishment 2MD Ordnance Dept Captain (Brevet Major) F.H. Berryman DSO, Staff Corps relinquish the appointment as IOO on 22 Nov 1926 on embarkation S.S. THERMISTOCLES at Sydney on the same date to attend the Staff College Camberley for period of 2 years.

1 June 1929: AMF Allotment of officers of the Staff Corps. High Commissioners Office, S.O. Grade 2A Captain (Brevet Major) F.H. Berryman DSO for a period of 2 years vice Captain (Brevet Major) E.J. Milford Aust. Staff Corps.

Undated: Staff College Camberley. The undermentioned officers of the Aust. Staff Corps graduated at the Staff College Camberley at the course which terminated Dec 1928: Captain (Brevet Major) F.H. Berryman DSO and J.J.L. McCall DSO (AAO 149 of 1929)

1 January & 2 April 1931: AMF Allotment of Officers of the Staff Corps. High Commissioners Office London. Captain (Brevet Major) F.H. Berryman DSO is re-appointed Administrative Staff Officer Grade C 1 June 1931 and appointed Army Representative SO Grade C 2 2 April 1931

1 January 1932: AMF Return to Australia. Captain (Brevet Major) F.H. Berryman DSO having completed duty in England returning to Australia on R.M.S ORONTES and disembarked Sydney 11 February 1932.

352 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

3 March 1932: AMF Appointment of officers of the Staff Corps. 14th Inf Bd, Brigade Major, S.O. Grade F: Captain (Brevet Major) F.H.Berryman DSO

4 April 1934: AMF Appointment of officers of the Staff Corps. Army HQ, GSO Ops, S.O. Grade C: Captain (Brevet Major) F.H. Berryman DSO

1 March 1935: AMF Appointment of officers of the Staff Corps. To be Major Captain (Brevet Major) F.H. Berryman DSO

1 April 1936: AMF Appointment of officers of the Staff Corps. Army HQ GSO 1st Grade Ops:- Major F.H. Berryman DSO – change of designation of appointment

12 May 1937: AMF To be Brevet Lieutenant Colonel: Majors: - F.H. Berryman DSO

4 April 1938: AMF Allotment of Officers of the Aust. Staff Corps. GSO1 Ops, Army HQ, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Berryman – re appointed

1 July 1938: AMF Aust Staff Corps to be Lieutenant Colonels: --- Majors F.H. Berryman

8 December 1938: AMF Allotment of Officers of the Aust Staff Corps, GSO1, Grade B, 3MD, HQ 3rd Division, Lieutenant Colonel F.H. Berryman

4 April 1940: AIF, 1st Aust Corps, 6 Division HQ, To be Colonels: Lieutenant Colonel F.H. Berryman DSO and to be GSO 1st Grade

5 April 1940: 1. Attesting for AIF Army No. VX20308, rank:- Colonel, and to be on strength HQ 6 Division

2. Embarked for overseas service (via ), Colonel F.H. Berryman

14 June 1940: Disembarked Middle East and to Palestine

14 December 1940: AIF Artillery- to be temporary brigadier and to command 7 Division Artillery: - Colonel F.H. Berryman

7 January 1941: During the Cyrenaican Campaign Colonel F.H. Berryman DSO was GSO1 HQ 6 Division when his conduct at the Battles of Bardia and Tobruk earned him the award of CBE.

28 January 1941: Brigadier F.H. Berryman DSO to 7 Division Royal Australian Artillery. NB. Despite AAO of 30/6/41 Brigadier Berryman was still serving as GSO1 HQ 6 Division on 21/22 January 1941.

353 APPENDIX

3 August 1941: AIF General List. Colonel (t/Brigadier) Berryman CBE DSO is appointee Brigadier General Staff HQ 1st Aust Corps vice Colonel (T/Brigadier) Rowell. Commanded “Berryforce” in Syrian Campaign

MID: 30/12/41 No. 35396 Brigadier Berryman CBE DSO in recognition of services in Middle East Feb / July 41 (i.e. operations in Syria against Vichy French)

21 January / 26 February 1942: Brigadier Berryman accompanied Lieutenant General J.D. Lavarack to Batavia, emplaning Middle East 21 January 1942 and deplaning Batavia 26 January 1942. Returned to Australia by air 21 February 1942.

6 April 1942: AMF Colonel (T/Brigadier) Berryman CBE DSO from Brigadier General Staff HQ 1st Aust Corps is appointed Major-General General Staff First Aust Army and to Major-general (temporary)

1 September 1942: To be substantive Major-General

14 September 1942: AMF Major-General VX20308 F.H. Berryman Major-General General Staff First Aust Army is appointed Deputy Chief of the General Staff at Land HQ.

9 October 1942 / 26 February 1943: During this period Major-General F.H. Berryman was attached to Advanced Land HQ New Guinea, Land HQ Australia, First Aust Army, Sydney, Melbourne and Iron Range.

18 March 1943 / 17 July 1943: Periods of detachments (as above)

15 August 1943: To HQ New guinea Force

3 September 1943: AMF VX20308 Major-General F.H. Berryman CBE DSO appointed Major-General General Staff HQ New Guinea Force in addition to his appointment as Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Land HQ

20-21 January 1944: AMF VX20308 Major-General F.H. Berryman CBE DSO General List relinquished the appointment of Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Land HQ and is appointed GOC 2 Aust Corps and to be temporary Lieutenant General

12-13 April 1944: Lieutenant General F.H. Berryman CBE DSO General List relinquished the appointment of GOC 2 Corps 12 April 1944, is appointed GOC 1st Aust Corps 13 April 1944

354 THE MAKING OF A GENERAL: LOST YEARS, FORGOTTEN BATTLES

24 July 1944: AMF General List Lieutenant General F.H. Berryman CBE DSO from GOC 1st Aust Corp is appointed Chief of Staff Adv Land HQ

NB: Between relinquishing appointment of GOC 1 Aust Corps and assuming appointment of GOC Eastern Command (4 march 1946) Lieutenant General F.H. Berryman CBE DSO held the following appointments a) Chief of Staff Adv Land HQ 24/7/44 – 11/10/45 b) Chief of Staff Adv HQ AMF 12/10/45 – 12/12/45 c) Chief of Staff Morotai Force 13/12/45 – 3/3/46

CB: Colonel (T/Lieutenant General) F.H. Berryman CBE DSO General List in recognition of services in the South West Pacific Area up to 30 march 1944 – for gallantry and distinguished service in Papua – New Guinea

4 March 1946 AMF VX20308 Colonel (T/Lieutenant General) F.H. Berryman CBE DSO General List from Chief of Staff Adv Land HQ is appointed GOC Eastern Command and Commandant 2MD and retains the rank of temporary Lieutenant General.

355 BIBLIOGRAPHY

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