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UXO Risk Assessment Factors 6 Alpha Associates Limited Quatro House, Frimley Road Camberley, Surrey GU16 7ER Tel: +44(0) 203 371 3900 Web: www.6alpha.com Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Threat & Risk Assessment with Risk Mitigation Strategy for Cable Installation Project: NorthConnect Client: MMT Report Number: P5530 Disclaimer This document is of UK origin and is copyright © 6 Alpha Associates Ltd. It contains proprietary information, which is disclosed for the purposes of assessment and evaluation only. The contents of this document shall not in whole or in part: (i) be used for any other purpose; (ii) be disclosed to any member of the recipient’s organisation not having a need to know such information, nor to any third party individual, organisation or government; (iii) be stored in any retrieval system nor be reproduced or transmitted in any form by photocopying or any optical, electronic, mechanical or other means, without the prior written permission of the Managing Director, 6 Alpha Associates Limited, Quatro House, Frimley Road, Camberley, GU16 7ER, UK. The material presented within this document is for information purposes only and comprises a declaration of the author’s professional judgement. It does not constitute a warranty or guarantee, expressed or implied, nor does it relieve any other party of its responsibility to abide by contract documents, applicable codes, standards, regulations or ordinances. 6 Alpha Associates nor any of its employees assumes any legal responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the source reference material used in the compilation of this document. 6 Alpha Associates nor any of its employees may be held liable in any way for any loss or damage incurred by third parties directly or indirectly deriving from the interpretation relating to geophysical, geological or geotechnical information held within this document. Client Final Version 2.0 Document Written by Review Issued Version 0.1 RG 18/01/2017 RR 25/01/2017 LA 25/01/2017 Version 0.2 RG 03/02/2017 RR 06/02/2017 LA 10/02/2017 Version 1.0 RG 22/03/2017 RR 28/03/2017 LA 31/03/2017 Version 2.0 RG 08/05/2017 RR 08/05/2017 RG 08/05/2017 P5530 NorthConnect ii Contents Contents ................................................................................................ iii Appendices ........................................................................................... vii Annexes ............................................................................................... viii Tables .................................................................................................... ix Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................. x Executive Summary .............................................................................. xiii 1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 1.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 1 1.2 UXO Threats in the North Sea. ................................................................................. 1 1.2.1 Munitions Migration ............................................................................................ 2 1.3 Marine Risk Management Framework ...................................................................... 2 1.4 Purpose ...................................................................................................................... 3 1.5 Client Intention .......................................................................................................... 3 2 Report Methodology and Best Practice ........................................... 4 2.1 Methodology .............................................................................................................. 4 2.2 Constaints and Limitations ...................................................................................... 4 2.3 Scope ......................................................................................................................... 4 2.4 Sources of Information ............................................................................................. 5 3 On-Site Operations ......................................................................... 6 3.1 Proposed Operations ................................................................................................ 6 3.2 Pre-Lay Operations ................................................................................................... 6 3.2.1 Offshore Geophysical UXO Survey .................................................................... 6 3.3 Marine Cable Installation .......................................................................................... 6 3.4 Cable Landfall ............................................................................................................ 7 P5530 NorthConnect iii 4 Sources of UXO Contamination ...................................................... 8 4.1 Generally .................................................................................................................... 8 4.2 Aerial Bombing .......................................................................................................... 9 4.2.1 Generally .............................................................................................................. 9 4.2.2 LOT A – UK Nearshore ...................................................................................... 10 4.2.3 LOT B – North Sea ............................................................................................. 10 4.2.4 LOT C – Norway Fjord ....................................................................................... 11 4.3 Sea Minefields (Axis and Allied) ............................................................................. 11 4.3.1 Generally ............................................................................................................ 11 4.3.2 Mine Clearance by Vessels ............................................................................... 11 4.3.3 Mine Clearance Analysis ................................................................................... 12 4.3.4 First World War (WWI) Minefields ..................................................................... 12 4.3.5 WWII Minefields ................................................................................................. 13 4.3.6 LOT A – UK Nearshore ...................................................................................... 13 4.3.7 LOT B – North Sea ............................................................................................. 14 4.3.8 LOT C – Norway Fjord ....................................................................................... 14 4.4 Training Areas ......................................................................................................... 15 4.4.1 Historical Training Areas .................................................................................. 15 4.4.2 LOT A – UK Nearshore ...................................................................................... 16 4.4.3 LOT B – North Sea ............................................................................................. 16 4.4.4 LOT C – Norway Fjord ....................................................................................... 16 4.4.5 Modern Training Areas ...................................................................................... 16 4.4.6 LOT A – UK Nearshore ...................................................................................... 17 4.4.7 LOT B – North Sea ............................................................................................. 17 4.4.8 LOT C – Norway Fjord ....................................................................................... 17 4.5 Coastal Defensive Features .................................................................................... 17 4.5.1 LOT A – UK Nearshore ...................................................................................... 17 4.5.2 LOT B – North Sea ............................................................................................. 18 P5530 NorthConnect iv 4.5.3 LOT C – Norway Fjord ....................................................................................... 18 4.6 Naval Battles ............................................................................................................ 18 4.7 Shipwrecks .............................................................................................................. 19 4.8 Munitions Dumping ................................................................................................. 20 4.8.1 Generally ............................................................................................................ 20 4.8.2 LOT A – UK Nearshore ...................................................................................... 21 4.8.3 LOT B – North Sea ............................................................................................. 21 4.8.4 LOT C – Norway Fjord ....................................................................................... 21 5 UXO - Seabed Conditions, UXO Migration, and Detonation .......... 23 5.1 Generally .................................................................................................................. 23 5.2 Local Sea Bed Conditions .....................................................................................
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