DOCSLIB.ORG

IDF Signal & Electronics Corps in the Yom Kippur War, 1973

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
IDF Signal & Electronics Corps in the Yom Kippur War, 1973 IDF Signal & Electronics Corps in the Yom Kippur War, 1973 Version 2.02 Copyright © The Association for the Commemoration of the Fallen Soldiers of the IDF Signal Corps, Yehud-Monoson, Israel, 2018 Col. (Ret.) Daniel Rosenne 1 Yom Kippur War On Yom Kippur, the holiest day in Judaism, October 6th 1973, at 1400, Syria and Egypt launched a joint surprise attack on Israel 060805: Government decision – war not certain, no preemptive strike, limited reserve mobilization By morning, 7 October: Syrian forces made threatening advances into Israeli held Golan Heights Egyptian forces were successful in a massive crossing of the Suez Canal 2 Yom Kippur War: Main Events 3 IDF Forces Golan Heights, Rifat 11 Artillery Batteries Assad Oct 061400 177 Tanks Readiness since Sept 26: Morocco 051100: Highest level of readiness, as Soviet advisors & families returned to Russia Reinforcements: 7th Armored Brigade HQ Six Artillery Batteries 22 Tanks 060730: Intelligence warning 0805: political decision – no preemptive strike 061400: Syrian attack commenced Enemy Forces 115 Artillery Batteries 1,400 Tanks 4 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 1 Enemy Forces Sinai, 2,000 Artillery Pieces 2,000 Tanks Oct 061400, 50 Anti Aircraft Missiles Batteries Readiness since Sept 26: 051100: Highest level of readiness Forces deployed as planned: One Armor Brigade on the move, planning to deploy in the Suez Canal line at 061700 Two Armor Brigades concentrated in the rear area, awaiting developments Reinforcements: Two Artillery Batteries 25 Tanks 060730: Intelligence warning 061400: Egyptian attack commenced IDF Forces 10 Artillery Batteries Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command 5 in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 2 290 Tanks Syrian Breakthrough in the Golan Heights, Night of Oct 6-7 061400: airstrike by 100 Syrian aircrafts, coupled with a 50 minutes artillery barrage Mount Hermon stronghold and intelligence base was captured by the Syrians The reinforced Northern sector held, and the Syrian attack failed The Syrian forces achieved success in the Southern sector, and the Syrian armor tide placed the Israeli forces in a critical position The IDF’s high command decided to assign the highest priority to the Syrian front Focus on Air Force activity GHQ reinforcement 146th Armor Division − 6 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 3 Holding Defense in the Suez Canal, until morning of Oct 7 061400: air strike by 200 Egyptian aircrafts, coupled with a barrage of 2,000 artillery pieces for 53 minutes Egyptian infantry forces crossed the Suez canal in several places Several large bridgeheads were set in the Northern and Southern sectors, limited Egyptian success in the Central sector Egyptian helicopter-borne commando attacks is several places within Sinai, hampering movements of Israeli reserve forces Egyptian activity under cover of SAM (Surface Air Missiles) batteries on the West bank of the canal, limiting Israeli Air Force effectiveness Egyptian armor poured into the Sinai Peninsula over rapidly built bridges across the Canal Israeli 252nd Armored Division, commanding the 274, 460, 14 & 401 Brigades, fighting a defensive battle Only 100 tanks left in battle order Out of the 16 Israeli Suez canal outposts, 11 were evacuated and the rest encircled by Egyptian forces 7 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 4 Golan Heights, Noon, Oct 7 Reserve units reached the frontline and stopped the Syrian surge First armored reserve unit, 266 Battalion of 179 Brigade, engaged the enemy at 062300, nine hours after hostilities commenced Noon time: the front line was divided into two sectors – 36th Division in the North, 210th Division in the South Air Force attack on enemy SAM Afternoon batteries failed miserably Six planes lost to Syrian SAM batteries, only two batteries Since destroyed (out of 22) 1000 New tactic adopted: flying in low over Jordan, attacking the Evening Syrians in the flank and avoiding most of the SAM batteries 8 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 5 Suez Canal, Evening, Oct 7 850 Egyptian tanks on the East bank Egyptians consolidated their positions, bridgeheads enlarged by additional 4 km, Israeli attacks failed Israeli Air Force focused on the Golan Heights, Since noon: Air Force efforts divided between two fronts Great Evening: the reserve Armored Bitter rd nd Lake Divisions 143 & 162 arrive at the Gidi Pass battlefront Front line divided into three Divisional sectors Mitla Pass Preparation of a second defense line in the Mitla & Gidi mountain passes 35 Parachute Brigade deployed in Ras-Sedr Gulf of Suez Ras-Sedr 9 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 6 Southern Command Counterattack Plans for Oct 8 Counterattack by 162nd & 143rd 162 Armored Division A series of ill-coordinated attacks, which were met by stiff resistance, failed with heavy casulaties 143 Sagger ATGM’s (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles) had a devastating effect on Israeli armor counterattacks 252 Counterattack stalled, but South Egyptian advance was checked Command FCP Egyptian attacks on Oct 9 & 10 failed with heavy Egyptian casualties On Oct 12, the Israeli high command decided to wait for an opportunity to reduce Egyptian armor strength prior to canal crossing IDF Forces 162nd Div. – 190 tanks 143rd Div. – 245 tanks Map source: Shimon Golan, 10 Decision Making of Israeli High Command nd in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 8 252 Div. – 110 tanks Fighting in the Golan Heights, Oct 8 Morning counterattack by two Armored Divisions – 146th & 210th Successful counterattack, Syrian forces lost 250-300 tanks 36 Armored Division blocking in the Northern Sector Failure of 1st Infantry Brigade attack to recapture Mt. Hermon 11 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 9 Fighting in the Golan Heights, Oct 9 and 10 Syrian attack on 9 Oct failed IDF’s counterattack continues 100950: all Golan Heights area, except Mt. Hermon, back in Israeli hands By morning, Oct 10 : 900 Syrian tanks hit/abandoned on the battlefield As well as numerous artillery pieces and APCs 12 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 10 IDF’s Penetration in the Golan Heights, Oct 11-12 36th & 210th Armored Divisions counterattacking in the Northern sector 36th Division attack concluded as planned 210th Division attack met tough resistance, and the Division was reinforced by forces from the 146th Division 210th Division attack halted in the afternoon of Oct 12, by the arrival of a large Iraqi force Oct 130700: 40 Iraqi tanks destroyed in planned killing zone, with no Israeli causalities Oct 132230: Artillery shelling on Damascus Mezzeh airfield Disrupting Soviet military supplies airlift 13 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 11 Suez Canal, Oct 9-14 Oct 9 to 13: temporary stabilization Both sides refrained from large-scale actions Main Israeli effort – the Syrian front Night of Oct 10-11: Helicopter-borne M-102 105mm Artillery landed on Jebel Ataquah and targeted Signals site on Cairo-Suez highway and 3rd Army HQ, seriously disrupting Egyptian command & control Oct 14: major Egyptian attack, by 800-1000 tanks, failed Great 250 Egyptian tanks were hit, with limited casulaties to the Bitter Israeli forces Lake Gidi Pass Night of Oct 15-16 : counterattack & Mitla Pass canal crossing – Operation “Abirei Jebel Lev” Ataquah Through a gap between the Egyptian 2nd and 3rd Armies Gulf of Suez 14 Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 12 Suez Canal Crossing, Night of Oct 15-16 Night attack by 143rd Armored Division Heavy fighting in the East bank, as Egyptian forces tried to check Israeli advance 160130: 247 reserve Paratroop Brigade crossed the canal in rubber dinghies 160800: 16 tanks crossed to the West bank IDF Forces using Gillois amphibious tank-carriers 162nd Div – 140 tanks During the 16th: the force, almost 143rd Div – 230 tanks unopposed, attacked SAM sites, SC Reserve – 70 tanks Great supply convoys & logistic centers Bitter Lake in the West bank Attacks on SAM sites punched a hole in the Egyptian anti-aircraft screen and enabled the Air Force to strike Egyptian ground targets Map source: Shimon Golan, Decision Making of Israeli High Command 15 in Yom Kippur War, Modan Publishing House 2013, Map 13 Breakthrough in the West Bank, 21-22 Oct Bridges were set, and 143rd & 162nd Divisions tanks began crossing to the West bank Oct 17, afternoon: Uniflot bridge in service Fayid Oct 19, 0100: roller bridge in service Great Bitter Breakthrough in the West bank Lake Oct 17-18: 162nd Division crossed the canal & advanced South towards Suez, 252nd Division followed towards Cairo Oct 19: 143rd Division moving North towards Ismailia Oct 20: Fayid airfield captured and put into service by IDF Oct 22: Cairo-Suez road cut at km 101 by 252nd Division, Egyptian 3rd Army encircled, Adabiya port taken 16 Map
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Israeli Experience in Lebanon, 1982-1985
    THE ISRAELI EXPERIENCE IN LEBANON, 1982-1985 Major George C. Solley Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps Development and Education Command Quantico, Virginia 10 May 1987 ABSTRACT Author: Solley, George C., Major, USMC Title: Israel's Lebanon War, 1982-1985 Date: 16 February 1987 On 6 June 1982, the armed forces of Israel invaded Lebanon in a campaign which, although initially perceived as limited in purpose, scope, and duration, would become the longest and most controversial military action in Israel's history. Operation Peace for Galilee was launched to meet five national strategy goals: (1) eliminate the PLO threat to Israel's northern border; (2) destroy the PLO infrastructure in Lebanon; (3) remove Syrian military presence in the Bekaa Valley and reduce its influence in Lebanon; (4) create a stable Lebanese government; and (5) therefore strengthen Israel's position in the West Bank. This study examines Israel's experience in Lebanon from the growth of a significant PLO threat during the 1970's to the present, concentrating on the events from the initial Israeli invasion in June 1982 to the completion of the withdrawal in June 1985. In doing so, the study pays particular attention to three aspects of the war: military operations, strategic goals, and overall results. The examination of the Lebanon War lends itself to division into three parts. Part One recounts the background necessary for an understanding of the war's context -- the growth of PLO power in Lebanon, the internal power struggle in Lebanon during the long and continuing civil war, and Israeli involvement in Lebanon prior to 1982.
    [Show full text]
  • Lebanon ’82 of the Syrian Army and the PLO, Which Are Dispersed Throughout the Region
    Folio Series: Lebanon ’82 of the Syrian Army and the PLO, which are dispersed throughout the region. These two forces have some coordination limitations imposed one them. This is refl ected in the fi re support rules, which allows a limited support of a different faction. The Syrians also have SAM sites which can give the Israeli Air Force some pause as a hit from these will permanantly remove an air support unit from the game. There are six of these sites on the map. Only the Israeli Army receives reinforcements. These consist of the 96th Division. These units may use amphibious landing to fl ank the Syrian and PLO forces. One advantage that the Arab player has is that the Syrian Commandos and the PLO units are not affected by the Israelis ZOC. The game is potentially 30 turns , but is of variable length. The length of the game is a measure of the level of International Pressure exhibited. This is affected by Israeli and Syrian losses. Each depletion adjusts the turn end by one space and each elimination by two spaces. The Israelis win by destroying all of the Arab units and the Arabs win by remaining on the map. Simple enough. Turn 1 Both sides select their fi re support markers. The Israelis have their full 14 and the Arabs have a total of nine support chits. The Israeli player could attempt to knock out the SAM sites to free the Israeli Air Force from it by E.R. Bickford AAR of Lebanon ’82 as a threat.
    [Show full text]
  • Frank's Combined 1973 Handout
    October War 1973 1 Chadwick Handout ISRAELI DEFENSE FORCE, 1973 Pre-War Organization (Theory) Actual Wartime Organization 36th Armored Division (Eitan) Northern Front 212th Artillery Regiment 212th Artillery Regiment 179th Armored Brigade transferred to 210th Division 679th Armored Brigade 679th Armored Brigade 4th Mechanized Brigade transferred to 146th Division (+7th Armored Brigade, RA) (+188th Armored Brigade, RA) 143rd Armored Division (Sharon) Southern Front 214th Artillery Regiment 214th Artillery Regiment 421st Armored Brigade 421st Armored Brigade 600th Armored Brigade 600th Armored Brigade 875th Mechanized Brigade transferred to 252nd Division (+14th Armored Brigade, RA) 146th Armored Division (Peled) Northern Front (Strategic Reserve Division) 213th Artillery Regiment 213th Artillery Regiment 205th Armored Brigade 205th Armored Brigade 217th Armored Brigade transferred to 162nd Division 670th Mechanized Brigade 670th Mechanized Brigade (+4th Mechanized Brigade) 162nd Armored Division (Adan) Southern Front 215th Artillery Regiment 215th Artillery Regiment 7th Armored Brigade RA transferred to 36th Division pre-war* 460th Armored Brigade RA 460th Armored Brigade, RA (transferred to 252nd Division shortly before the war, then back to 162nd Division when the division reached the front.) 11th Mechanized Brigade transferred to Division Magen/Sassoon (+204th Mechanized Brigade, then transferred to Division Magen/Sassoon) (+217th Armored Brigade) (+500th Separate Armored Brigade) 210th Armored Division (Laner) Northern Front (formed
    [Show full text]
  • Arinternational SPECIAL FORCES and SWAT / CT UNITS
    arINTERNATIONAL SPECIAL FORCES And SWAT / CT UNITS ABU DHABI Emirate of Abu Dhabi Police Special Unit ========================================================================================== ALBANIA Minster of defence Naval Commandos Commando Brigade - Comando Regiment, Zall Herr - 4 x Commando Battalions - Special Operations Battalion, Farke - Commando Troop School Ministry of Interior Reparti i Eleminimit dhe Neutralizimit te Elementit te Armatosur (RENEA) Unit 88 Reparti i Operacioneve Speciale (ROS), Durres Unit 77 (CT) Shqiponjat (police) "The Eagles" /Forzat e Nderhyrjes se Shpejte (FNSH) - There are 12 FNSH groups throughout Albania . - Albania is divided into 14 districts called prefectures. There is one FNSH group assigned to 11 of these prefectures Garda Kombetare - National Guards ========================================================================================== ALGERIA Ministry of National Defence Units of the Gendarmerie National Special Intervention Detachment (DSI) / Assault & Rapid Intervention unit Special Brigade Garde Republicaine - Republican Guard (presidential escort honour guard & VIP) Units of the DRS (Research & Security Directorate) (internal security, counter- intelligence) Special Unit of the Service Action GIS, Groupe d’Intervention Sppeciale (Special Intervention Group), Blida Army Units - Saaykaa (Commando & CT), Boughar, Medea Wilaya - One Special Forces/Airborne Divisional HQ - 4 x Airborne Regiments - 18th Elite Para-Commando Regiment ('The Ninjas') - The Special Assault /Airborne/Recon Troops
    [Show full text]
  • NPRC) VIP List, 2009
    Description of document: National Archives National Personnel Records Center (NPRC) VIP list, 2009 Requested date: December 2007 Released date: March 2008 Posted date: 04-January-2010 Source of document: National Personnel Records Center Military Personnel Records 9700 Page Avenue St. Louis, MO 63132-5100 Note: NPRC staff has compiled a list of prominent persons whose military records files they hold. They call this their VIP Listing. You can ask for a copy of any of these files simply by submitting a Freedom of Information Act request to the address above. The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or damage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the information provided on the governmentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained from government agencies using proper legal channels. Each document is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the document in question. GovernmentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of documents published on the website.
    [Show full text]
  • From Cast Lead to Protective Edge: Lessons from Israel's Wars in Gaza
    From Cast Lead to Protective Edge Lessons from Israel’s Wars in Gaza Raphael S. Cohen, David E. Johnson, David E. Thaler, Brenna Allen, Elizabeth M. Bartels, James Cahill, Shira Efron C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1888 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9787-3 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover photos (clockwise): Nir Elias/Reuters; Amir Cohen/Reuters; Abu Mustafa/Reuters; Tsafrir Abayov/AP Photo Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report examines the Israel Defense Forces operations in Gaza from the end of Operation Cast Lead in 2009 through Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012 to Operation Protective Edge in 2014.
    [Show full text]
  • The IDF on All Fronts Dealing with Israeli Strategic Uncertainty ______
    FFooccuuss ssttrraattééggiiqquuee nn°° 4455 bbiiss ______________________________________________________________________ The IDF on All Fronts Dealing with Israeli Strategic Uncertainty ______________________________________________________________________ Pierre Razoux August 2013 Laboratoire de Recherche sur la Défense The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non- governmental, non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With office in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of the European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the author alone. ISBN: 978-2-36567-192-7 © Ifri – 2013 – All rights reserved All requests for information, reproduction or distribution may be addressed to: [email protected]. Ifri Ifri-Bruxelles 27 rue de la Procession Rue Marie-Thérèse, 21 75740 Paris Cedex 15 – FRANCE 1000 – Bruxelles – BELGIQUE Tel : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 Tel : +32 (0)2 238 51 10 Fax : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 Fax : +32 (0)2 238 51 15 Email : [email protected] Email : [email protected] Website : www.ifri.org “Focus stratégique” Resolving today’s security problems requires an integrated approach. Analysis must be cross-cutting and consider the regional and global dimensions of problems, their technological and military aspects, as well as their media linkages and broader human consequences.
    [Show full text]
  • Culture and Military Doctrine: the Israel Border Mission After the Arab Spring
    Culture and Military Doctrine : The Israel Border Mission after the Arab Spring By Amr Yossef The 2015 Israel Defence Forces Strategy,1 as the first published document of its type in Israel, has received warranted publicity in both public and academic discussions. The reactions to it focused mainly on strategic issues (principles of the use of force, command and control and the force build-up derived from Israel’s regional environment). They did not engage, however, with its tactical implications, particularly the new border defence mission. Though border security has always been a challenge to Israel since its establishment in 1948, the IDF has not had within its organization a separate unit for border security, except for a few months when the IDF had a Border Corps in 1949. The task was initially handled by the police through its Border Police unit, established in 1953. The Border Police worked in its early years on fighting infiltrators, by setting up ambushes, and conducting patrols and reconnaissance.2 However, it turned later to work essentially as a gendarmerie whereas current security along the borders was entrusted to the IDF territorial/ territorial defence field formations. Departing from this tradition, in February 2017, the IDF announced that it is establishing, within the Ground Forces Command, a new Border Defence Array (BDA) as “a single force to assume the responsibility of defending Israel’s borders”.3 In another announcement, the IDF specified the mission of the BDA as a one that “includes patrols and ambushes, pursuits, observation and security of settlements. The aim of the light infantry is to prevent hostile terrorist activity along State borders and to combat serious crime on the border”.4 Border defence, which ostensibly appears as a small component of the IDF Strategy, is a significant part of an overall organizational change.
    [Show full text]
  • UJ Law Professor Says Academic Boycotts Are Unconstitutional PAGE 3
    www.sajewishreport.co.za Friday, 10 June 2011 / 8 Sivan, 5771 Volume 15 Number 21 UJ law professor says academic boycotts are unconstitutional PAGE 3 Marchers representing the Jewish Agency for Israel, were among the 30 000 MARCH IN NEW 30 000 people who marched in the Celebrate Israel Parade in New York YORK'S ISRAEL PARADE City on June 5. (JEWISH AGENCY FOR ISRAEL) Theatre buff Maurice SAKS: Palestinian Award for Afrikaans Raymond Ackerman’s Father’s Podbrey builds SA / 4 denialism / 9 Anne Frank Diary / 2 UNISA doctorate / 5 Day / 13-15 YOUTH / 16 SPORT / 20 LETTERS / 12 CROSSWORD & BRIDGE / 18 COMMUNITY BUZZ / 7 WHAT’S ON / 18 2 SA JEWISH REPORT 10 - 17 June 2011 SHABBAT TIMES PARSHA OF THE WEEK June 10/8 Sivan June 11/9 Sivan Where the Beha’alotecha Starts Ends cloud dictated, 17:06 17:57 Johannesburg 17:26 18:20 Cape Town we followed 16:46 17:38 Durban 17:06 17:59 Bloemfontein 16:57 17:52 Port Elizabeth PARSHAT 16:51 17:45 East London BEHA’ALOTECHA Rabbi Larry Shain Director Ohr Somayach Published by RABBI DESSLER offers an insight into a hard- S A Jewish Report (Pty) Ltd, to-understand phenomenon found in Parshat PO Box 84650, Greenside, 2034 Tel: (011) 023-8160 Beha’alotecha. We are familiar with the fact that Professor Lina Fax: (086) 634-7935 the Jewish people were miraculously guided by Spies at the Printed by Caxton Ltd a “Cloud Pillar” throughout their 40-year jour- 2008 launch of ney through the desert, prior to entering the EDITOR - Geoff Sifrin Land of Israel.
    [Show full text]
  • The 1973 Arab-Israeli War
    APPROCVE D MCADn I eae0i00 ('-A DATE: 29-Aug-2012 ~/- EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrp for Release: 2012/09/04 EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs EO 13526 3.5(c) FOR PERSONAL ATTENTION OF: 2 A2drfC Intelligence Report The 1973 Arab-Israeli War. Overview and Analysis of the Conflict .erer SR IR 75-16 September 1975 Copy No 56 Approved for Release: 2012/09/04 Approved for Release: 2012/09/04 Approved for Release: 2012/09/04 ___________________________App roved for Release: 2012/09/04 APPROVED FOR RELEASE - CIA INFO DATE: 29-Aug-2012 -The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: Overview and Analysis of the Conflict This study examines the military operations of Egypt, Syria, and Israel during the 1973 Middle East war with a view to providing some indications of future force developments in the area. Key findings: Strategy. The Arabs had different goals and, consequently, different strategies. The Syrians wanted to liberate the Golan Heights and attempted to do so in one stroke. The Egyptians' main goal was to achieve a political effect, and they therefore planned for a limited offensive. The Israelis, because of overconfidence and because they failed to recognize that their occupation of the Suez Canal's east bank deprived them of advance warning of an Egyptian attack, did not react to mounting evidence of. Arab intentions. Performance of Troops. The Arabs were tough on defense but ill trained and poorly led on offense. The Israelis showed a depth of training and flexibility that enabled small units to withstand the initial shock of the Arab attack without breaking, and to recover quickly.
    [Show full text]
  • Metamorphosis in Conflict
    UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR, ISR Metamorphosis in Conflict Proceedings of the Israeli Armored Corps Association “Winning Land Warfare After the Second Lebanon War” Conference Russell W. Glenn August 2008 Prepared for the United States Joint Forces Command This document contains information exempt from mandatory disclosure under the FOIA. Exemption 5 applies. Distribution Statement C: Distribution authorized to the U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors, Israeli Government Agencies and their contractors, UK Government Agencies and their contractors, and Australian Government Agencies and their contractors. Other requests for this document must be referred to United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Urban Operations Office, 115 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435, Attention: Kristi Bibe, 757-203-3555. NATIONAL SECURITY RESEARCH DIVISION UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR, ISR UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY//REL TO USA, AUS, GBR, ISR This research was sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Urban Operations Office and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under contract W74V8H-06-C-0002. The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
    [Show full text]
  • Return of Private Foundation
    Return of Private Foundation OMB No 1545-0052 Form 990-PF or Section 4947(a)(1) Nonexempt Charitable Trust Treated as a Private Foundation 201 Department of the Treasury 0 Internal Revenue Service Note . The foundation may be able to use a copy of this return to satisfy state reporting requirements For calendar year 2010 , or tax year beginning , 2010, and endin C , 20 G Check all that apply: q Initial return q Initial return of a former public charity E] Amended return E] Address change E] Name change y Name of foundation A Employer identification numbff Wilson History & Research Center, Inc. 20-8069419 Number and street (or P 0 box number if mail is not delivered to street address) Room/suite B Telephone number (see page 10 of the instructions) 27 Rahling Circle D-14 501 -954-8000 or town, state, and ZIP code City exemption q c if application is pending, check here ► Little Rock , Arkansas 72223 Foreign q D 1 . organizations , check here ► H Check type of organization : El Section 501 (c)(3) exempt private foundation 2. Foreign organizations meeting the 85% test, check here and attach computation q Section 4947 (a)( 1 ) nonexem pt charitable trust q Other taxable private foundation ► E secction foundationchacs was terminated under c-4 Fair market value of all assets at J Accounting q Cash [D Accrual q sectiontion 507(b)(1)(A), check here ► end of year (from Part 11, col. (c), q Other (specify) _____ F if the foundation is in a 60-month termination q line 16) ► $ 6,274,093.00 (Part 1, column (d) must be on cash basis ) under section 507(b)(1)(B), check here ► ' Analysis of Revenue and Expenses (The total of (a) Revenue (d) Disbursements and (b Net amounts in columns (b), (c), and (d) may not necessanly equal expenses per ) investment (c) Adjusted net for charitable books income income purposes LAJ the amounts in column (a) (see page 11 of the instructions)) (cash basis only) w aQ 1 Contributions, gifts, grants , etc., received (attach schedule) 1,642, 155.00 " -' `' " ; o X 2 Check q if the foundation is not required to attach Sch.
    [Show full text]