Hoc Rules.Indd 1 1/31/13 12:29:08 PM Heights of Courage, SCS #16

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Hoc Rules.Indd 1 1/31/13 12:29:08 PM Heights of Courage, SCS #16 The Gamers, Inc. Standard Combat Series: Heights of Courage ©2013. Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Game Design: Steve Newhouse Scale Series Design: Dean Essig Counter and Entry Area Initial Game Developer: Ernesto Sassot Turns 1-3 are half day, Turns 4-10 are Final Game Developer: Dean Essig one day and Turns 11-17 are two days Ownership Playtesting: Tim Armstrong, John Best, of historical time. Each hex is one mile. The Syrian player controls the Syrian Sergi Diez, Dean Essig, John Essig, Tim Units range in size from platoon to (light brown), Moroccan (light green), Gritten, Hans Korting, Bill Krasner, Albetro brigade. Israeli task force size units are Iraqi (light yellow) and Jordanian (olive Roldán, Ernesto Sassot, José Antionio approximately one-half battalion. green) units. The Israeli player controls Pacheco, Max Workman the Israeli units (blue). Israeli Order of Battle: Carl Fung (and a very special thank you from Steve for Carl’s Israeli Entry Areas are marked with great work!) the Israeli flag, Syrian Entry Areas are marked with the Syrian flag. Introduction Combat Shifts Heights of Courage is a game covering Artillery, Air Points and HQs the Golan Heights front during the 1973 create shifts on the Combat Table for Arab-Israeli War. One player controls regular attacks and overruns. Resolve the Syrians and their Arab allies, while any combat shifted off the left or right the other player controls the Israelis. ends of the Combat Table on the last This is the sister game to Yom Kippur available column. Shift based on the and can be played together in tandem. actual Combat Table column, not the However, because the systems are raw odds. For example, a 10:1 attack different; unit and Air Point transfers with two left shifts is resolved on the 4:1 between them are not permitted. column. The defender must announce his total shifts before the attacker and For simplicity, the term “Syrian” is both must do so before computing the employed to mean all Arab forces, odds. both Syrian national and other Arab Regardless of the number of country. Every mention of any other shifts applied (which has no limit), the Arab country by name means the maximum net shift is 3 columns in rule only applies to the mentioned either direction. Any shifts in excess of nationalities. The term “Syrian” (with this value are wasted on that combat the underline) applies only to actual and cannot be applied elsewhere. Syrian nationals and not to the other Arab contingents. Shifts from HQs, Artillery and Air Points can be used for regular attacks, but only HQs and Air Points can be Quality Wargames Since 1988 used to shift an Overrun attack, never Artillery. M M P Multi-Man Publishing Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108 © 2013 All Rights Reserved. Page 1 HoC Rules.indd 1 1/31/13 12:29:08 PM Heights of Courage, SCS #16 1.0 General Special Rules 1.1 Stacking Up to four Israeli or three Syrian units can stack in a single hex. Exception: Four Syrian units can stack if they all belong to the same brigade. HQs, Strongpoints and the Israeli “Force Zvika” unit do not count for stacking. Arab units of different nationalities cannot stack or attack together. Enforce stacking as per SCS rule 4.0a. Destroy any units found to be in excess of the Stacking Limit, owning player’s choice. 1.2 Units 1.2a Leg and Mech Movement. Units with White Movement Allowances are Leg and use the Terrain Effects Chart “Leg” columns. Units with Black Movement Allowances use that Chart’s “Mech” columns. 1.3 Special Terrain Effects 1.3a Fortifications. Map-printed fortifications cannot be destroyed. They are hexside features that affect units attacking across their hexside into the hex with the flag in it. Fortifications do not affect attacks out of their flag fortification hexsides (friendly meaning with the side’s appropriate flag in the hex. hex). Units starting their move in such an EZOC can move, but the first hex they enter cannot have any sort of EZOC in it (rigid or not). 1.3b International Borders. No unit can cross the border into Lebanon or 1.3e Kuneitra (25.15). Kuneitra is an open city. Any unit in that hex has its Jordan. Destroy any unit forced to do combat strength x1/2. Ignore the regular Town Terrain Effect. so. Design Note: Because of potential ambushes, both sides were hesitant to move 1.3c Ignoring Retreats. Some into Kuneitra. The Syrians never occupied it and the Israelis moved very few terrain types (as well as Israeli troops through it and never defended it. Strongpoint units) allow units to ignore retreat results. The player can choose 1.3f Multiple Terrain Types. Some hexes have more than one terrain type to accept the retreat result (in which within them. In those cases, use only one. Terrain effects are not cumulative. case the whole result applies) or ignore 1) For movement, use the type with the highest MP cost (and remember that it entirely. Roads negate other terrain features for units moving along them). 2) For combat, use the type which most benefits the defender. 1.3d Rigid ZOCs. Israeli ZOCs projected across the anti-tank ditch are rigid, meaning Syrian units entering them must stop their movement. This also applies to ZOCs projected by Israeli or Syrian units through friendly Multi-Man Publishing, Inc. 403 Headquarters Drive, Suite 7, Millersville MD 21108 Page 2 © 2013 All Rights Reserved. HoC Rules.indd 2 1/31/13 12:29:09 PM The Gamers, Inc. 1.4 Sequences of 1.5 Headquarters 1.6 Supply HQs have the ability to supply 1.6a Commando units, Airborne Play friendly units and affect combat odds. units, Israeli Strongpoints and any unit They have no attack strength but a stacked with a Strongpoint unit are A) Normal or ‘Fast defensive strength of one (1). always supplied—they do not require Tempo’ Sequence a supply trace. Other units need either (see 1.9) 1.5a HQs can only take a step loss an HQ for supply (1.6d) or have to if all other units in their hex have been make their own supply trace (1.6c). Pre-Turn: destroyed. Air Point Phase (both sides) 1.6b Prohibited terrain, enemy 1.5b An HQ is not destroyed when units and unnegated EZOCs block Syrian Player Turn: it takes a step loss. Instead, remove the supply trace. Use the Mech terrain costs Artillery Recovery Phase HQ from its hex and place it in any Road to determine if terrain is Prohibited or Reinforcement Phase hex closer to any friendly Entry Areas not. Movement Phase than where it was lost. The owning Supply Phase player can choose any such hex as he 1.6c Units on their friendly side of Israeli Exploitation Phase desires. The hex cannot contain or be the anti-tank ditch are supplied if they Combat Phase adjacent to any enemy units. There is no can trace as per SCS rule 12.1 from the Exploitation Phase effect of enemy units, EZOCs or terrain unit to a friendly Entry Area. Note that Supply Phase between the two hexes involved. the “Purple Line” extends north and south of the end of the Anti-Tank (AT) Israeli Player Turn: 1.5c If an HQ is stacked with Ditch and makes a small salient around Artillery Recovery Phase units making an attack or defense, Strongpoint 107. Use the Purple Line Reinforcement Phase shift the Combat Table one column for this rule in those areas. If a unit is Movement Phase in that side’s favor (this would be in in a hex containing the Purple Line, Combat Phase addition to the defensive strength point it is considered to be on the friendly Exploitation Phase they contribute). The HQ qualifies as side. Supply Phase ‘participating’ in the combat and can advance after combat. 1.6d Units on the enemy’s side Turn End For an HQ to apply in an Overrun, of the anti-tank ditch are in supply Cease-Fire Phase it must start the phase stacked with the only if they are at or within a supplied Advance Turn Marker attacking or defending units. friendly HQ’s range (in hexes). The An Out of Supply marked HQ HQs, themselves, are supplied if they B) ‘Slow Tempo’ cannot provide a combat shift. can trace a path of no more than 3 hexes to a hex adjacent to the AT Ditch OR to Sequence 1.5d The number in brackets on a Road that leads to the AT Ditch (once (see 1.9) the bottom left of the counter is the following a Road, the trace path must HQ’s supply range (see 1.6d). follow a contiguous line of Road hexes Pre-Turn: to a hex adjacent to the AT Ditch). Once Air Point Phase (both sides) 1.5e Subordination Lines. Some the trace makes it to the AT Ditch, it Syrian units have a horizontal stripe. follows 1.6c for the rest of the distance Syrian Player Turn: The color of that stripe shows that the to an Entry Area. Artillery Recovery Phase unit belongs to a specific divisional HQ Reinforcement Phase (the one with the same colored stripe). 1.6f Nationality and Organizational Movement Phase Those without a stripe are independent Requirements for HQ Supply. Supply Phase and not assigned to a particular division. • Israeli HQs can supply any Israeli Israeli Exploitation Phase Subordination affects what units the unit.
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