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Turkish Political Parties and the European Union How Turkish Mps Frame the Issue of Adapting to EU Conditionality

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Turkish Political Parties and the European Union How Turkish Mps Frame the Issue of Adapting to EU Conditionality Turkish Political Parties and the European Union How Turkish MPs Frame the Issue of Adapting to EU Conditionality Joakim Parslow ARENA Report No 7/07 Turkish Political Parties and the European Union How Turkish MPs Frame the Issue of Adapting to EU Conditionality Joakim Parslow Copyright © ARENA ARENA Report Series (print) | ISSN 0807-3139 ARENA Report Series (online) | ISSN 1504-8152 Printed at ARENA Centre for European Studies University of Oslo P.O.Box 1143, Blindern N-0317 Oslo, Norway Tel: + 47 22 85 76 77 Fax: + 47 22 85 78 32 E-mail: [email protected] http://www.arena.uio.no Oslo, June 2007 i Abstract Turkey’s relations with the European Union (EU) are at a critical juncture. As of 2002, the process of adapting Turkey’s legal framework to the EU’s political membership criteria began in earnest. The legislative amendments carried out in this respect amount to one of the largest, most wide-ranging reform processes Turkey has ever experienced. At the level of legislation, it involves updating Turkey’s laws to ensure that the prerequisites of a stable, pluralist democracy are in place, and that human rights are respected. In order for these amendments to be passed, however, the reforms must also be continuously justified vis-à-vis key constituencies. In this respect, the reforms are not only interesting from the perspective of EU-Turkey relations. They come at a crucial time in Turkey’s domestic politics, and pose a challenge to some of the most fundamental divisions in the country’s political party system. For the secularist state elite, supporting the reforms entails loosening their grip on the state, and allowing the public expression of Muslim and Kurdish identities. For the Islamic party elites, it involves modifying their anti-Western rhetoric, and reconciling their interests with the universalist norms expressed in the EU’s membership criteria. Thus, successfully following through with the legal prerequisites of EU membership requires not only legal engineering, but also a radical shift in Turkey’s political culture. Against this background, this thesis addresses the question of how representatives of Turkey’s largest political parties have framed the reforms in public discourse. Specifically, using a qualitative and quantitative content analysis, it analyzes the debates in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly regarding a selection of key adaptation packages, and measures to what extent Turkish MPs, when justifying or opposing the amendments, have distanced themselves from the antagonistic ideologies with which they have been associated in the past. The analysis finds that they have. In general, all of the parties have moderated their antagonistic discourses, and have emphasized the inherent and universal validity of the norms underlying them. The only clear exception is the far-right Nationalist Action Party, whose MPs see the reforms as a threat to Turkey’s unity. Interestingly, the analysis also finds that among the more moderate parties, those traditionally associated with the secular, Westernized state elite have had the most difficulties in adapting to the EU’s criteria. The Islamic parties, including the Justice and Development Party currently in government, have consistently emphasized the need for strengthening civil society and guaranteeing the freedom of speech and conscience. Although this may to some extent be a matter of self-interest, there are also indications that this is not the case. ii Sammendrag Tyrkias relasjoner med Den europeiske union (EU) er ved et avgjørende vendepunkt. Prosessen med å tilpasse Tyrkias lovverk til EUs politiske medlemskapskriterier begynte for alvor i 2002. Lovendringene som er blitt gjennomført i denne sammenhengen utgjør en av de største, mest omfattende reformprosessene Tyrkia noen gang har opplevd. På et juridisk nivå innebærer endringene å oppdatere Tyrkias lovverk slik at det garanterer et rammeverk for et stabilt og pluralistisk demokrati hvor menneskerettighetene respekteres. For at disse lovendringene skal kunne gjennomføres må imidlertid reformene samtidig rettferdiggjøres overfor viktige velgergrupper. Reformene er derfor ikke bare interessante i forhold til Tyrkias EU-relasjoner; de kommer på et kritisk tidspunkt for landets interne politikk, og utgjør en formidabel utfordring for noen av de mest grunnleggende konfliktlinjene i partisystemet. For den sekularistiske statseliten innebærer det å støtte reformene at de løsner grepet om staten og tillater at muslimske og kurdiske identiteter kommer til offentlig uttrykk. For de islamske partielitene innebærer det å dempe den anti-vestlige retorikken til fordel for en retorikk som er i samsvar med de universalistiske normene som ligger bak EUs medlemskapskriterier. Om reformene skal bli vellykkede er det derfor ikke nok å utforme lover; også Tyrkias politiske kultur må gjennomgå dyptpløyende endringer. På bakgrunn av denne situasjonen tar denne oppgaven for seg hvordan representanter for Tyrkias største partier har presentert reformene i sin offentlige diskurs. Den analyserer debattene i Tyrkias Nasjonalforsamling omkring et utvalg av de viktigste lovendringspakkene, og vurderer i hvilken grad Tyrkiske representanter har fjernet seg fra de fiendtlige ideologiene som de har vært assosiert med tidligere når de rettferdiggjør eller motsetter seg lovendringene. Analysen avdekker at nesten alle partiene har moderert seg i forhold til de tidligere fiendtlige diskursene, og at de generelt sett har vektlagt den universelle gyldigheten av normene som ligger bak lovendringene. Det eneste klare unntaket er representantene til det høyreekstreme Det nasjonalistiske bevegelsespartiet, som ser på reformene som en trussel mot Tyrkias enhet. Analysen avdekker også det overraskende faktum at de partiene som assosieres med den sekularistiske, vestliggjorte statseliten har hatt størst vanskeligheter med å tilpasse seg EUs kriterier. De islamske partiene, inkludert Rettferdighets- og fremskrittspartiet som nå sitter i regjering, har gjennomgående lagt vekt på behovet for å styrke det sivile samfunn og garantere ytringsfriheten. Selv om dette til en viss grad kan skyldes egeninteresse, finnes det også indikasjoner på at dette ikke er tilfelle. iii Acknowledgments If I have learned one thing from writing this thesis, it is that writing a good thesis is never done alone. Academic work is a social endeavor, and I have been lucky enough to benefit from an engaging and supportive community of scholars. Professor Roar Hagen at the University of Tromsø discussed my ideas and commented on several drafts at an early stage in the process. Although the final result is far from what we discussed, I benefited greatly from our correspondence. In addition, I have received support from several people throughout the writing process. In addition to my advisor, Professor Bernt Brendemoen, researchers and students at ARENA - Center for European Studies at the University of Oslo, Norway, have read drafts, listened to presentations, and given invaluable criticism and encouragement. In particular, Jonathan P. Aus has patiently helped me clarify my thoughts, and has guided me through the painful task of discarding bad ideas and ill-conceived beginnings. I am very grateful to all. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for the final result. Research and studies at Bogaziçi University in Istanbul, Turkey, were made possible by a grant from the Norwegian-Turkish Cultural Exchange Agreement, mediated through the Norwegian Research Board. I have also enjoyed financial support from ARENA, who in addition provided me with office space, unlimited printing, and free cappuccinos during the writing process. All are gratefully acknowledged. Contents Abstract…………………………………………………………………… i Sammendrag……………………………………………………………… ii Acknowledgments……………………………………………………….. iii Chapter 1 Introductions……………………………………………………………… 1 The Copenhagen criteria and the NPAA……………………………. 2 Why study the parliamentary discourse of Turkish political parties?.... 6 The structure of the thesis…………………………………………… 10 Chapter 2 Issue framing ……………………………………..……………................. 13 Frames and issue framing ………………………………….…............ 13 Issue framing in the TGNA ………………………………................ 16 Chapter 3 Methodological considerations …………………………………………… 19 Thematic analysis…………………………………………………….. 21 Argument analysis……………………………………………....……. 22 Sampling……………………………………………………………... 25 Chapter 4 Center-Periphery and Universalism: Themes in Turkish Party Politics….. 27 Center-periphery and universalism ……………...…………………... 27 The Republican People’s Party………………..…........................ 30 The Democratic Left Party........................................................... 32 The Nationalist Action Party……………………………………... 33 The Motherland Party ………………………………................... 34 The True Path Party..................................................................... 35 The Felicity Party ………………..………………………………. 36 The Justice and Development Party……………………….……... 37 Conclusion…………………………………………………………… 38 Chapter 5 Analysis ………………………….………………………………………... 39 Coding dimensions…………………………………………………... 39 Quantitative results…………………………………………………... 43 Interpreting the results……………………………………………….. 46 The Republican People’s Party…………………………………... 46 The Democratic Left Party…………………………………......... 51 The Nationalist Action Party…………………………………….. 55 The True Path Party…………………………………………….. 61 The Motherland Party……………………….…………………… 63 The Felicity Party………………………………………………… 66 The Justice and Development Party……………………………… 70 Chapter 6
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