Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 16 NO. 04 19 FEBRUARY 2014 Contents

Analytical Articles

THE SOCHI OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE RISE OF COSSACKS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS 3 Tomáš Baranec

MONGOLIA'S FORMER PRESIDENT PLOTS POLITICAL RETURN DESPITE CORRUPTION CONVICTION 7 John C.K.

PUTIN MAKES THE CIRCASSIAN ISSUE PART OF RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST 11 Valeriy Dzutsev

THE TURKIC COUNCIL: WILL THE TURKS FINALLY UNITE? 15 Alim Bayaliyev

Field Reports

KYRGYZSTAN'S PRESIDENT ANNOUCES 2014 AS YEAR OF STRENGTHENING STATEHOOD 19 Jamil Payaz

TAJIKISTAN RATIFIES AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA ON TAJIK LABOR MIGRANTS 21 Oleg Salimov

GEORGIA AND RUSSIA PLAN FOR PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL MEETING 23 Eka Janashia

KYRGYZSTAN'S NEW UNITED OPPOSITION MOVEMENT 25

Arslan Sabyrbekov THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analyst’s pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 3

THE SOCHI OLYMPIC GAMES AND THE RISE OF COSSACKS IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS Tomáš Baranec

On December 5, 2013, Patriarch Kirill publicly supported the plans of Stavropol governor Valery Zerenkov to resettle the Semirechensk Cossacks from Kyrgyzstan to the North Caucasus. This was the most recent in a series of signs showing the steady rise of official support for the Cossacks in the region. Initially this development was frequently attributed to the need for increasing the security of the upcoming Olympic Games in Sochi, highlighted by the recent terrorist attacks in Pyatigorsk and Volgograd. However, the amount of support the Cossacks have started to receive suggests that they may play a much more important role in the Kremlin's strategy.

BACKGROUND: In the 2012, the supplement the thirty already in creation of Cossack militias could be existence. easily attributed to security challenges The Kremlin also plans to create four during the Olympic Games. However, new, solely Cossack brigades within developments in the last two years the Russian army, and as the Chief of give reasons to believe that the General Staff of the Armed Forces reappearance of Cossacks in the region Nikolai Makarov stated, some of them is linked more to developments in could be mounted in observance of Makhachkala (Dagestan) than to Sochi tradition. In the context of these calls and is more than simply a temporary for resettling Cossack families to the pre-Olympic measure. North Caucasus, it appears that the Firstly, the amount of projects linked Cossacks are expected to preserve the to the Cossacks in the Caucasus Slavic presence in the region rather exceeded the local needs of pre- than just prevent Circassian Olympic Sochi. In March 2013, demonstrations in Olympic Sochi. following the example of Krasnodar, The Kremlin has in the last two the Mayor of neighboring Stavropol decades adopted a significant number Krai, Valery Zerenkovand, presented a of bills that officially support Cossack plan to grant legal status to the movements, with the aim of taming the existing Cossack patrols, infamous for well organized and often radical various incidents with Caucasian Cossacks rather than support their newcomers. By September 2013, the rise. In the early 1990s, the activities state funded Cossacks already of Cossacks ranged from the patrolled half of the Krai. On a federal establishment of “the Union of level, authorities launched a series of Cossacks of Russia” to the creation of projects such as the establishment of several illegal militant groups, open new Cossack cadet schools to demands for the creation of Cossack Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 4

Caucasian origin. However, while the population of Stavropol Krai increased by 2 percent between 2002 and 2010 (including immigration from Dagestan), Dagestan’s population grew by 16 percent in the same period, an issue of serious concern to the Kremlin. As a result, not only traditional Cossack and Slavic areas of

Dagestan around Kizlyar have come republics and revolts in South Russia under the pressure of "Caucasian re- during the late perestroika period. The colonization," but lines of compact apparent recent U-turn in well- Dagestani settlements have formed established policies toward Cossacks also in some regions of southern and acceptance of the risks linked to Stavropol Krai over the last two their support can hardly be explained decades. The earlier attempts by the simply by the Sochi Olympic Games. Stavropol government to repatriate Taking a closer look at both the scope some Dagestani newcomers back to of Kremlin-backed plans for the Dagestan, coupled with the tightening development of Cossack activities in of laws regulating migration to Russia South Russia, and the simple fact that and between its regions, adopted by the state which has sought to suppress the Russian Duma in January 2013, Cossack organizations now supports clearly demonstrate the Kremlin’s them implies that the roots of the concerns over the changing ethnic map “Cossack revival” have had little to do of South Russia. with the Olympic Games. Swift developments have also taken IMPLICATIONS: The rise of the place in Makhachkala, where the short Cossacks is better explained by two experiment to apply soft power in factors, namely the outflow of the Dagestan, represented by a policy of Slavic population from the North open dialogue with non-militant Caucasus and their replacement by Salafists and the Commission for the native Caucasians, and the failure of Adaption of Former Insurgents, ended attempts to apply tools of soft power after Magomedov’s resignation in in Dagestan during Magomedov’s January 2013. On a regional level, this presidency. policy represented an attempt by the Stavropol Krai neatly illustrates, on a Kremlin to address local socio- small scale, the processes that are economic difficulties through the occurring throughout the whole development of local tourist Northern Caucasus. Stavropol, which infrastructure. This project, headed by has a predominantly Slavic population Achmed Bialov (a close associate of of 2.8 million, borders Dagestan to the Magomedov), seemed to go hand in Southeast with a population of similar hand with developments in size, around 2.9 million people of Makhachkala. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 5

Though possibly steps in the right short and unsuccessful flirtation with direction, neither could bring stability soft power, the rising anti-Caucasian to the volatile region without a sentiment in Russian society demands liberalization of local conditions. decisive action rather than slow and Former insurgents did not register expansive reform, and the Kremlin is with the commission for adaptation as therefore returning to the old policy of there was no proper legal framework crushing any resistance by crude force. ensuring their safety. Opening a Current developments suggest that dialogue with the Salafists could not armed Cossack groups are becoming prevent local security forces from the newest innovation of this policy. kidnapping local – often secular – CONCLUSIONS: The Kremlin’s residents for ransom, thus initiating a flirtation with the Cossacks as a circle of blood feud, which significantly repressive colonizing tool, to tame the swelled the ranks of the insurgents turbulent North Caucasus and to through new recruits. Finally, no delimit the changes to its ethnic map, improvement of the local seems to signal an awareness of its socioeconomic situation is foreseeable, inability to address the roots of since the local population lacks the regional instability. There are, ability to legally oust the Moscow however, two main reasons to believe backed, clan-based, ruling elites that that a full adoption of this pseudo- siphon off money from similar state colonization policy risks triggering projects. increased instability. First, the It seems that the Russian government traditional relationship between has realized that none of these policies Cossacks and Mountaineers is would be effective without a characterized by a significant level of liberalization of the political situation mutual distrust, even without state in the region. Yet the democratization interference. As Cossacks, backed by of the region, which would break the the Kremlin, become more self- symbiotic bond between the Kremlin confident, conflicts with locals will and local elites, would endanger the become much more frequent, possibly federal government's control and is increasing the non-Slavic population’s therefore not a valid choice for Putin’s alienation from Moscow even further. administration. This was illustrated Second, a frequently overlooked through the adoption of indirect problem is the independence of the elections of Heads of Republics, which Cossacks themselves. Although the was probably specially designed for Kremlin's official policy and the the North Caucasus. traditional worldview of the Cossacks Putin’s administration appears to are currently consistent, the Cossacks count on the Chechenization of have not turned into Moscow's problematic republics, which may help servants. They maintain their ability to suppress the symptoms of instability, self-organize and are prepared to but ultimately this policy will not openly oppose the government if address its roots. Therefore, after a needed. Such cases have been rare so Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 6 far, but the Cossacks present a well organized, dynamic and active force that nobody can guarantee will remain under the full control of the government when unleashed. Therefore, the Kremlin’s decision to cut the Gordian knot of instability in the Caucasus through Cossack shashka may yet have an unpredictable aftermath. AUTHOR'S BIO: Tomáš Baranec is a graduate of Charles University in Prague. His research interests include nationalism and factors of ethnic conflicts and separatism in the Caucasus. He currently lives in Georgia where he continues his field research into current separatist movements in the region and monitors the situation on the South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 7

MONGOLIA'S FORMER PRESIDENT PLOTS POLITICAL RETURN DESPITE CORRUPTION CONVICTION John C.K.

In 2012, Mongolia’s former Prime Minister and President Nambaryn Enkhbayar was convicted of graft, embezzlement, misappropriation of government properties and misuse of his position, and received a seven year prison sentence, with three years commuted. Denouncing the charges, Enkhbayar said that the legal actions were a pretext to stop him running for political office, commenting, "In all countries where the political opponents are removed from contesting elections, the leaders of that country use corruption as an excuse ... This just shows that corruption is a very charged political word to fight against political opponents."

BACKGROUND: Enkhbayar was Communism in 1990, Mongolia’s arrested on April 13, 2012 in a government has sought international televised raid by dozens of police after investment to develop its investigators from the Independent mineralogical reserves, given the Authority Against Corruption of government’s fiscal shortfalls. Mongolia alleged that he had failed Mongolia could invite former Soviet repeatedly to turn up for questioning. allies, its rising eastern Asian neighbor Enkhbayar, who served as prime China, or seek Western capitalist minister and then president until he investment, but ultimately decided on lost office in a 2009 poll, denied all the the last option, with decidedly mixed charges and called them politically results. motivated. On 1 August 2013, How to develop these riches to best Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin benefit Mongolian society has been the Elbegdorj pardoned Enkhbayar, prime economic political issue for releasing him from serving the rest of more than a half decade. In 2006 his jail term. Now, following the Mongolia's Mineral Law was amended pardon, Enkhbayar has announced his to increase government royalties and intention to return to politics. licensing fees, reduce tax incentives, Corruption charges swirl around the set limits on exploration licenses and development of the country’s provide for up to 50 percent mineralogical assets. Unlike most of its government ownership of strategically post-Soviet neighbors, foreign important resources when jointly investors are not seeking funded by the state and private hydrocarbons in Mongolia but investors. minerals, including copper, silver, gold On August 25, 2009, the Ulsyn Ikh and coal. After abandoning Soviet Khural (State Great Hural, or Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 8

ownership and the Mongolian government retaining a mere 34 percent. The Oyu Tolgoi mining project is the largest financial undertaking in Mongolia's history and is expected upon completion to account for more than 30 percent of the country's gross domestic product. IMPLICATIONS: Since Mongolia rejected Soviet Communism, it has been effusively praised in the West for Parliament) finally repealed the 68 its transition to democracy. However, percent windfall profit tax, effective that transition has not been a smooth from 1 January 2011, setting the stage one, as rampant corruption and a for massive foreign investment. Quite growing rich-poor divide are causing aside from energy reserves in the form mounting public frustration, as many of coal and minerals such as copper Mongolians have yet to see the and gold, according to a 2009 U.S. benefits of economic growth. While Geological Survey, Mongolia has 31 democracy and privatization were million tons of rare earth reserves, or written into the country’s new 16.77 percent of the world’s total, constitution, the economic collapse exceeded only by China, currently the after Soviet subsidies ended resulted world's largest producer of rare in widespread poverty and earths. unemployment. Mongolia’s two largest mining sites are Mongolia is currently one of the the 7.5 billion ton Tavan Tolgoi or world's fastest growing economies, "Five Hills" massive coal coke deposit driven by foreign direct investment. It and the US$ 7 billion Oyu Tolgoi gold reported a 17 percent growth rate in and copper mine, the world's largest 2011, and 16.7 percent in the first untapped copper deposit, which is quarter of 2012. expected to produce 1.2 billion pounds During a September 2011 Discover of copper, 3 million ounces of silver Mongolia forum in the capital Ulan and 650,000 ounces of gold annually in Bator, Rio Tinto’s country director its first decade of operation. Cameron McRae essentially threatened Oyu Tolgoi was discovered in 2001 those nationalist Mongolian politicians and is now being developed as a joint who felt that the current 66/34 venture between Turquoise Hill percent split on the mine favoring Resources (a majority owned Ivanhoe was inequitable, saying “If subsidiary of international mining even a few voices call for Mongolia’s concern Rio Tinto, which bought out commitments to be broken and the original developer, Canada’s agreements to be changed, there is a Ivanhoe Mines) with 66 percent risk that this will undermine investor Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 9 confidences. These few will have to from the "country's profit" a 1.5 answer to the many Mongolians whose million tugrik (US$ 1,043) grant. jobs will be on the line, and the local In the long term the most negative businesses whose prospects will be effect of Enkhbayar’s pardoning may jeopardized. We are confident that be to weaken the average Mongolian’s Mongolia will not let this happen; that respect for the rule of law as being stability and the rule of law will both equitable and just. Enkhbayar’s prevail; that Mongolia’s long-awaited leniency stands in stark contrast to the economic promise will become a sentences handed out to six reality.” environmentalist nationalists. Disputes over the iniquitous Oyu On 16 September 2013 the leaders of Tolgoi contract terms continued to Mongolia’s Gal Undesten (“Fire fester through 2012 and continued as Nation”) environment and human a political issue in Mongolia, when the rights coalition organized a mass government suggested to Turquoise protest in front of Parliament). The Gal Hill yet again that it was interested in Undesten demonstrators were renegotiating the contract terms. In a concerned that MPs were preparing to 22 September Parliamentary session, amend the 2009 "Law to Prohibit the Mongolian government Mineral Exploration and Mining determined to seek to increase its Operations at the Headwaters of share of the Oyu Tolgoi mine but Rivers, Protected Zones of Water Turquoise Hill again firmly rejected Reservoirs and Forested Areas" in the government’s efforts to seek favor of foreign corporate mining renegotiation of the terms. interests, with the demonstrators The CIA estimates that more that 36 noting that many protected lands had percent of Mongolia’s population lives already been mined despite the law, below the poverty line, with an annual which was intended to preserve the per capita income of US$ 2,900. integrity of Mongolia’s environment. Developing the country's mineralogical Six Gal Undesten leaders were arrested resources over the last several years at the peaceful demonstration. acquired distinct political overtones; On 21 January 2014 the six were during the June 2009 parliamentary sentenced to prison. Five received campaigns, the opposition Ardchilsan sentences of 21 years and six months, Nam, or Democratic Party, promised reduced from 22 years and six months each Mongolian a 1 million tugrik (US$ for time served, while one received a 696) "share of treasure." The two-year sentence for supplying successor to the former Communist weapons, arrows symbolically fired at Party, the ruling Mongol Ardyn the parliament. The discrepancy Khuv'sgalt Nam, or Mongolian People's between Enkhbayar’s treatment and Revolutionary Party, subsequently the sentences meted out to the Gal topped the DP's largesse, promising Undesten leaders could not be more that each Mongolian would receive pronounced. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 10

Finally, Enkhbayar’s reemergence AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. John C.K. Daly is complicates Mongolian domestic an international correspondent for politics, further muddying the UPI and Central Asia-Caucasus country’s political life, and implying Institute non-resident Fellow. that corruption charges can be used for political vendettas, hardly an encouraging development for Mongolia’s political life. CONCLUSIONS: Even before his conviction on corruption charges, Enkhbayar in 2012 played the populist card on Oyu Tolgoi, calling for the contract terms to be renegotiated to grant better terms to the government while pressing for the Tavan Tolgoi coal mine, potentially one of the world's biggest coal suppliers, to remain in local hands. Enkhbayar’s political reemergence will introduce a further complicating element into future foreign investment in Mongolia. That said, this year the Mongolian economy is projected to grow by 15.3 percent and the International Monetary Fund expects it to be the world's fastest-growing economy over the next decade. Accordingly, Enkhbayar’s populism may yet result in the Mongolian people receiving more equitable arrangements for their mineral riches than before. Whether Mongolians will get an increased share of the profits from the country’s mineral riches remains to be seen. Enkhbayar’s pardoning is no doubt convincing many Mongolians that their government is more concerned with cozy relationships with foreign mining international than public welfare, and the sentences handed out to Gal Undesten leaders underline that relationship. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 11

PUTIN MAKES THE CIRCASSIAN ISSUE PART OF RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST Valeriy Dzutsev

As the international community started to pay greater attention to the North Caucasus because of the Sochi Olympics, ethnic minorities’ complaints in the region significantly increased. In particular, the Circassians became highly vocal about their grievances. Given the authoritarian and increasingly nationalist regime in the Kremlin, the Russian government perceives the rise of activism among Circassians as a security threat. The Olympics served for Moscow as a certain type of litmus test that pointed to the areas of Russia’s vulnerability in the North Caucasus. Now, the aggrieved minorities and the central government appear to be entering a path of confrontation in already volatile region.

BACKGROUND: On February 10, Including, of course, unfortunately the Russia's President Vladimir Putin for Olympics project and as an instrument the first time publicly mentioned the – using the Circassian factor,” Putin Circassian issue as related to the said at a meeting with civil Olympics in Sochi. In accordance with organizations of the city of Sochi. The the worst traditions of the Soviet Russian president then went on to regime and the Russian Empire, Putin reassure his audience that the claimed that there was no Circassian attempts to undermine Russia’s issue as such and that hostile foreign development using the Circassian forces were trying to use the locals to factor “simply had no prospects” as the harm Russia. Russia’s leader blamed Circassians were extremely loyal to the West's Cold War era containment Russia. policy against the Soviet Union that The authorities in Kabardino-Balkaria was now used against Russian that has the largest proportion of Federation to stall its development. Circassians in the North Caucasus “Regretfully, we see the atavisms of apparently did not share Putin’s that theory of containment now, as optimism. On February 7, the police they surface here and there. When cracked down on Circassian activists Russia demonstrates some positive that protested against the start of the development, this understandably Olympics in Sochi. Dozens of people indicates the appearance of additional went out into the streets with the strong players, competitors and slogan "Sochi is the Land of Genocide!" overall causes [the West] to be The security services broke up the concerned about its economy, politics protesters’ ranks, detaining them and security. And attempts to contain along with some bystanders. The Russia appear here and there. majority of the detained people were Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 12

in genocidal practices in historical Circassia in the nineteenth century. Circassia of that time extended to Sochi and far beyond. Russian historians and eyewitnesses have documented fairly well that Russia’s policy toward the Circassian population around the Black Sea was especially harsh, as Moscow

considered this a strategically released after intensive questioning, important region and wanted to but several people remained in replace the local Muslim population custody. The authorities also with Christian, mainly ethnic Russians. announced they would deport three Putin’s statement on the absence of Circassian students from Syria who say grievances among the Circassians is an they did not participate in the protests. ominous sign. Given the previous Circassian activist Abubekir Murzakan history of the impunity of the Russian told the news agency Caucasian Knot: security services in the North “During the questioning they asked us Caucasus, this means that the Russian why we are against the Olympiad and government is bound to continue its the leadership of the country, about crackdown on civil organizations and our attitude toward the last three activists. Although the Kremlin does governors of Kabardino-Balkaria. Also not favor civil organizations in the they asked us about our faith and the country in general, ethnically based Circassian national movement.” organizations and expressions of A dozen prominent Circassian activists ethnic culture in the North Caucasus were previously taken into brief police are considered especially dangerous. custody in December 2013. After Moscow's attitude was demonstrated taking them to the capital city of the in the government’s promises to Krasnodar region, where the Olympics feature an element of Circassian are held, the police questioned them culture as an indigenous people of about the whereabouts of an obscure Sochi in the opening ceremony. member of the insurgency in the North However, at the opening of the Caucasus and quickly released them. Olympics, the Circassians discovered The harassment of Circassian leaders to their dismay that they did not may have prevented them from staging occupy even the slightest portion in large protests, but young Circassians, the presentation of Sochi to the world. largely unaffiliated with the existing This came as a shock to many civil organizations, still self-organized Circassians, including among via Facebook and delivered their individuals that are entirely loyal to message to the public on February 7. Moscow and supported the Olympic IMPLICATIONS: Many Circassians Games in Sochi from the very believe that Russian Empire indulged beginning. One such Circassian leader, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 13

Asker Sokht, said that “The organizers they will confirm Putin’s assertion that of the Olympic Games clearly Circassians are being used "to contain demonstrated that contemporary Russia.” Absent such support, Moscow Russia is wary of its multiethnic, multi will feel more comfortable to proceed religious character,” while “playing with its plans to crack down on along with the xenophobic attitudes of Circassian activists after the Olympics. a marginal part of Russian society is Hence, Putin’s warning is essentially a becoming the state policy.” Within rhetorical tool to place the West in an days after this statement, on February inconvenient zugzwang position that 14, the police arrested Asker Sokht and should prevent greater Western he was promptly sentenced to 8 days engagement with the North Caucasus, in prison for “resisting the police.” in particular with regard to the Despite the fact that the Olympics will Circassian issue. soon be over, the profound effect it had CONCLUSIONS: As the Olympics put on the Circassians is unlikely to the spotlight on the Circassians in the dissipate any time soon. This result is North Caucasus, Russia has become due not only to the grievances especially concerned about foreign currently harbored by Circassians, but involvement in the region. The also to the rising Russian nationalism pretense invoked by President Putin that prevents Moscow from pursuing and more generally by the Russian accommodating policies toward ethnic government, dates back at least to the minorities, especially those located in 19th century and includes denial of the North Caucasus. Circassian internal problems, claiming foreign activism will inevitably be seen by meddling in Russia’s affairs, and a low Moscow as “treachery” and a security profile campaign of violence against threat to Russia, so more government the leaders of the opposition pressure against locals is likely to movement. Despite all the trump cards ensue. Moscow has in its hands, Circassian Putin’s statement practically rendered activism is unlikely to subside soon, the Circassian issue as part of Russia’s because apart from widely shared traditional struggle against Western grievances, the Circassians along with imperialism that is depicted as both other North Caucasians, contemplate extremely dangerous as well as the rise of ethnic Russian nationalism. decadent. The statement was most Having the benefit of extensive ties likely addressed to both the domestic abroad among the Circassian Diaspora audience and the West. For the and some freedom of movement, the domestic listeners, Putin’s words North Caucasian Circassians appear to imply that the Russian government face a long campaign to win plans to eliminate the handful of concessions from Moscow. Circassian activists that are unhappy AUTHOR’S BIO: Valeriy Dzutsev is a with Moscow’s policies in the region. Senior Non-Resident Fellow at The message to the West is that if they Jamestown Foundation and Doctoral provide support to the Circassians, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 14

Student in Political Science at Arizona State University.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 15

THE TURKIC COUNCIL: WILL THE TURKS FINALLY UNITE? Alim Bayaliyev

In early June this year, Turkey will host the fourth Summit of the Turkic Council, an intergovernmental organization that brings together Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey. Presidents Ilham Aliyev, Nursultan Nazarbayev, Almazbek Atambayev, and Abdullah Gül will discuss a wide range of issues related to multilateral cooperation among their countries as well as other matters pertaining to the broader regional context. While the Council has since its establishment in 2009 made meaningful progress on institutionalizing the interaction among the engaged Turkic states, it will take more time and a concerted effort to build a strong, vibrant, and sustainable political alliance.

BACKGROUND: The modern Turkic Believing history had offered it a nations trace their origins back to unique chance to assert itself in the historical Turkic peoples, states, and region, Turkey under late President empires, which dominated the Central Turgut Özal moved swiftly to Eurasian landmass during the Middle strengthen its ties with the new Ages and early modern times. The republics, primarily through apex of the Turkic dominance in investment and education initiatives. Eurasia and Northern Africa was However, not only did the frequently presumably the 16th century when the repeated slogans of the time Ottoman, Safavid, Baburid, and promoting “the Turkic world from the Mamluk Empires, all led by Turkic Adriatic to the Great Wall of China” or dynasties, exerted power over various claiming that “the 21st century will be parts of the Old World. The Turkic the century of Turks” annoy other peoples and states, however, were international actors in the region, as rarely united and continuously clashed one would expect, but they were also with each other, in their Central Asian met with caution in the newly homeland and beyond. Ultimately, the independent states. Turks were subdued, their territories In 1992, these leaders joined President partitioned and incorporated into Özal in Ankara for the First Summit of peripheral empires. the Presidents of the Turkic Speaking In 1991, five independent Turkic States as early as 1992. This first republics emerged in the heart of summit was followed by nine more, Eurasia after the downfall of the Soviet but the only multilateral outcome of Union. Together with the already these meetings was summit existing Republic of Turkey, there declarations that consisted of mostly were now six sovereign states that non-binding provisions. The newly were Turkic in nature. emergent Turkic republics spent the first two decades of independence Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 16

heritage, each of the Turkic Council member states joined the alliance for hard-headed reasons. Most importantly, the underlying aim is to sustain and promote the members’ position as subjects rather than objects of the geopolitical relations in Eurasia in a unified effort. Although the primary focus of the

Turkish foreign policy under the AK consolidating their sovereignty, Party government has been to showing little interest in committing (re)build ties with the immediate themselves to any sort of multilateral neighborhood, including the Middle cooperation or regional integration. East, Balkans, and Caucasus, Yet in 2009, at the Ninth Summit of the strengthening relations with Turkic Presidents of the Turkic Speaking republics maintains a special States, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, importance on the list of priorities. The Kyrgyzstan, and Turkey signed the mood has changed from the 1990s as a Nakhchivan Agreement on the more pragmatic and realistic modus establishment of the Cooperation operandi has supplanted romantic and Council of the Turkic Speaking States, a excessively enthusiastic expectations permanent structure for Turkic of the first decade. Turkic republics collaboration. Turkmenistan and and more generally Central Eurasia Uzbekistan, the two remaining Turkic will always be one of the key states, dropped out of the integration directions of Turkish foreign policy as process along the way and chose not to the country is keen to capitalize on the join the Nakhchivan Agreement. advantages of its geostrategic location, IMPLICATIONS: The overarching historical experiences, and cultural goal of the Turkic Council is to affinity with all relevant regions to the promote comprehensive cooperation greatest extent possible. among the member states, in the The idea of establishing the Turkic political, economic, and cultural Council is unanimously ascribed to spheres. To this end, the international Kazakh President Nursultan organization also functions as an Nazarbayev. Nazarbayev is also the umbrella body for all other only Head of State who has autonomous collaboration participated in all Turkic summits mechanisms like the Parliamentary since 1992. This should come as no Assembly of Turkic Speaking Countries surprise since Kazakhstan, once the (TURKPA), International Organization most Russified of the non-Slavic Soviet of Turkic Culture (TURKSOY), and republics, has strived to strike a Turkic Academy. balance between different powers and Apart from honoring the common geopolitical interests. Kazakhstan's historical, linguistic and cultural multi-vector foreign policy has been Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 17 instrumental in serving the nation’s Sea. Kazakhstan, on the other hand, economic interests as well as avoiding has become a major strategic partner significant tension with any country. of the Kyrgyz Republic. The Turkic vector and particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have multilateral cooperation within the hitherto abstained from joining the framework of the Turkic Council is, Turkic Council but it is clear that, in therefore, viewed as an important the final analysis, the jigsaw puzzle of dimension diversifying Kazakhstan’s Turkic integration will not be complete foreign policy “basket” and opening up without them. additional room for maneuver. During the past decade, the young President Nazarbayev’s talk on Turkic Turkic republics have solidified their unity in the context of the Russia-led independence and are now skilled, Eurasian project is a clear illustration albeit to varying degrees, at the game of multi-vector diplomacy in action. of multi-vectoring. Thus the Turkic One particular example of these geography is different from what it “Turkic orations” that stirred up was two decades ago with a multipolar debate was Nazarbayev’s speech configuration now in place, featuring during his official visit to Turkey in relatively affluent Turkey, Kazakhstan, October 2012 in which he maintained and Azerbaijan. This provides a better that “Kazakhs live in the motherland of and more stable ground for coalescing. all Turkic peoples" and that "after the Challenges also exist since the regicide of the last Kazakh khan, countries stretch across three crucial Kazakhstan became a colony of the and unstable or potentially volatile Russian Empire and subsequently the regions: the Central Asia, the Caucasus, Soviet Union”. Another example was and the Middle East. They also rely on Nazarbayev's proposal at the meeting different security alliances: NATO in of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Turkey’s case and the CSTO and SCO Council in October 2013 to admit for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Turkey to the Customs Union in order Complicating matters even more is the “to cease speculations over Russia’s fact that Kazakhstan is a member of plans to rebuild the Soviet Union”. the Customs Union with Russia and The diversification incentive is also Belarus while Turkey still aspires to true for Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan. becoming part of the EU. Turkey has become Azerbaijan’s major CONCLUSIONS: In 1991, the vast strategic partner, and strengthened swath of Central Eurasia was ties with other Turkic republics are drastically reshaped by the considered beneficial considering the reemergence of Turkic states. The country's uneasy environment and its establishment of the Turkic Council as predicament over Nagorno-Karabakh. a permanent broad-gauge cooperation Cooperation in developing transport mechanism among these states is, no corridors and energy pipelines is doubt, the most important milestone another motive for Azerbaijan to of Turkic integration. Differing from develop relations across the Caspian the emotional sloganeering of pan- Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 18

Turkists, this integration is being carried out in a coolheaded, pragmatic, and businesslike manner. Its architects have been at pains to persuade external powers the Council was not conceived as an alliance against third parties, but that countries which share so much in common should naturally desire to form a union of some sort and promote collective identity. This tendency constitutes the raison d'être of the Turkic Council, which, in the words of Halil Akinci, the founding Secretary-General of the organization, has become the first voluntary alliance of Turkic states in history. Whether this alliance will evolve into a comprehensive union possessing significant geopolitical clout depends on a number of factors, most importantly on the strategic vision and political will of the national elites. The fact that the geostrategic context of Eurasia as well as the global tectonic shifts, including the rise of regionalization, call for strengthened bonds, cooperation, and coordination does not ensure that the right strategy and policies will be implemented. Turkic integration will have to be buttressed by sound intellectual groundwork, effective structures, and appropriately educated and motivated domestic and international bureaucracies. AUTHOR'S BIO: Alim Bayaliyev is an expert employed by the Turkic Council.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 19

KYRGYZSTAN'S PRESIDENT ANNOUCES 2014 AS YEAR OF STRENGTHENING STATEHOOD Jamil Payaz

On January 30, President Almazbek through balancing the central and local Atambayev signed a decree governments’ powers; and at announcing 2014 as the year of preventing political extremism, strengthening statehood. He stated regionalism, and nationalism. that the main threats to Kyrgyzstan’s In fact, the prospect of arrests for statehood emanate from tensions organizing protests advocating within the political elite and nationalization of the Kumtor gold irresponsible activities of some mine, which resulted in a hostage politicians that jeopardize national taking and violent clashes with the security and people’s unity. The decree police last year, effectively muted comes at a time when the opposition many opposition leaders. This is has grown increasingly weak after a especially true for the Ata Jurt faction number of corruption cases have been in the parliament, which enjoys major launched against its leaders. Critics support in the country’s south. Former say the government’s campaign for Ata Jurt MP Sadyr Japarov, who spent enforcing the rule of law and against over a year in prison and was stripped corruption are applied selectively. of his MP mandate, left for Minsk, In his decree, President Atambayev Belarus, in October following an anti- identified the state of the political elite Centerra protest in Karakol, Yssyk-Kul, as the main problem and a source of apparently mobilized by him and his major challenges to the state. He relatives. There the protesters, some faulted some members of the elite for on horseback, kept the governor of the lacking a statesmanlike approach and province, Emil Kaptagayev, as a using populist rhetoric in order to gain hostage in a gasoline-soaked car, access to state resources or avoid which, local authorities stressed, justice for abuse of power committed belonged to Japarov’s sister. Shortly as former officials. He stressed that a after this incident, another vociferous special category of politicians has opponent of the government who has emerged who possess the manpower likewise lost his MP mandate, and control of media outlets to Kamchybek Tashiev, was cowed into destabilize some regions by fuelling silence after his teenage son was interregional, tribal, and interethnic caught with a petty crime. issues. The decree recommends that Practically, the absence of these ardent the parliament and the government critics of Atambayev in the parliament streamline the legislation and take helped the government to pass measures aimed at ensuring the rule of controversial deals through the law and effective state management legislature, including the sale of Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 20

Kyrgyzgas to Russia’s Gazprom and the and embarking on reconstructing the new arrangement with Canada’s city’s infrastructure, as well as erecting Centerra over the Kumtor gold monuments of Kyrgyz heroes in the mine. city. As the only high-ranking official It is clear that the opposition Ata Jurt who remained in his position after the party, which harbors many former ousting of the Bakiyev regime in April officials once close to the former 2010, Myrzakmatov was viewed as president’s regime, asymmetrically unbridled by Bishkek as he single- suffered from the anti-corruption handedly ran the country’s second- campaign, as some key members of the largest city, criticized the central current cabinet are believed to have government, and buttressed committed equally grave crimes. Ata Keldibekov’s supporters in the south. Jurt’s two MPs, Nurlan Sulaimanov and It is not clear what awaits Kurmanbek Osmonov, left Kyrgyzstan Myrzakmatov, but he will likely lose following news of their possible control of the OshTV channel. The arrests on embezzlement and decree coincides with a criminal case corruption charges. The election launched against the channel for authority has recently stripped allegedly inciting interregional hatred Sulaimanov of his mandate for failing while covering the January 15 mayoral over 30 times to take part in elections. Representatives of law parliamentary sessions. Yet, the most enforcement agencies have already publicized case of all is the arrest of said that the channel’s ownership another Ata Jurt MP, Akmatbek documents, controversially signed in Keldibekov, who is accused of 2010, are under review and that its corruption, abuse of power, and fraud antennas will be dismantled. In the while he headed the Social Fund in wake of the June events, Myrzakmatov 2005 and the State Tax Service in reportedly took over the channel from 2008, and was the Speaker of the an ethnic Uzbek owner. Up until the parliament in 2010. Few doubt his elections, the channel was used to feed guilt, but his wealth and a network of his popularity and counterbalance his supporters in the south might pose coverage in the state channels. In real challenges to the government in spring, when Myrzakmatov has the event of his conviction. promised to resume his political The decree also comes two weeks after activity, he might have no means to the mayoral elections in Osh, which wage his media campaign. resulted in the victory of a pro- On February 12, the fragmented Atambayev candidate, Aitmamat opposition groups joined a United Kadyrbaev, over the controversial Opposition Movement, to oppose what mayor Melis Myrsakmatov. they called a revival of Myrsakmatov gained popularity in authoritarianism, one-man rule, and Osh, particularly among ethnic Kyrgyz, economic crisis. A pro-U.S. MP, following the June 2010 interethnic Ravshan Jeenbekov, was elected leader clashes by using nationalist rhetoric of what looks like a discordant Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 21 movement, harboring conflicting views on major issues including the Customs Union, foreign investment, and minority issues. However, Atambayev’s failure to show impartiality in enforcing laws and fighting corruption might easily generate a wide support for this group.

TAJIKISTAN RATIFIES AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA ON TAJIK LABOR MIGRANTS Oleg Salimov

As reported by an official press release Tajikistan, which can now remain until on February 12, 2014, Tajikistan's 2042 free of charge. In exchange, parliament ratified the recently signed among other conditions, the Russian "Protocol of amendments to the side promised to revise the conditions Tajikistan-Russia governmental for tariffs-free export of fuel to agreement on labor activities of their Tajikistan and introducing migratory citizens in the host countries." This preferences for Tajik labor migrants. protocol came in addition to an earlier Besides the extended work permits, an agreement signed on October 16, extension of unregistered stay in 2004. The ratified amendments extend Russia for Tajik citizens up to 15 days the validity of work permits issued by was introduced, an 8 day increase Russia to Tajik labor migrants from from the standard 7 days for other one to three years. Tajik labor foreigners. Also proposed for migrants can now stay in Russia amendments were the provision of longer, without needing to leave and Russian assistance for Tajik migratory reenter the country every year as was centers preparing migrants for labor provisioned by the initial agreement. activity in Russia, exchange of The protocol of amendments is part of information on labor market demands, a larger set of memorandums signed and the creation in Tajikistan of a by Presidents Vladimir Putin and specialized Russian-funded Emomali Rakhmon in October of 2012. educational institution to prepare The most critical part of these professionals for Russia’s needs. memorandums was the extended When lobbying the ratification of the terms for the Russian military base in amendments in Parliament, the Tajik Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 22

Minister of Labor, Migration, and largest groups of Tajik migrants, Employment Sumangul Tagoeva respectively amounting to 418,000 and emphasized that the amendments 65,000. Altogether, Russia hosts would bring relief for Tajik labor almost 1 million Tajik migrants. By migrants who could continuously stay encouraging its able-bodied in Russia for up to three years. The population to stay out of Tajikistan, the interest in allowing Tajiks to stay government can disable and control longer in Russia, expressed by the the protest movement in the country. Minister of Labor, can be considered as At the same time, for Tajik labor out of the ordinary unless the migrants, the extended stay abroad Minister’s priorities have shifted from can result in a detachment from creating jobs and controlling migration realities back home, which serves a to outsourcing Tajikistan's workforce similar purpose. Therefore, labor to Russia. A possible explanation for migration is partly a way for this official position can be found in at Tajikistan's government to soften least two benefits that the Tajik demands to implement economic and government envisions from the democratic reforms. extended employment of Tajiks in While Tajik labor migration provides Russia. relief for migrants’ families in the short First, the remittances sent by labor run, it also accelerates Tajikistan's migrants to Tajikistan comprise a deprivation in the long run. First, Tajik significant part of Tajikistan's labor migration contributes to economy and the country’s income. consolidating an economy dependent According to World Bank, the total on remittances, preventing the country amount of annual remittances to from developing a production sector Tajikistan in 2012 exceeded US$ 3.3 and adequately engaging in billion. Tajikistan's GDP in 2012 was international trade. It also makes US$ 6.9 billion, meaning that labor Tajikistan an easy target for Russian migrants sent home an amount manipulation as the last agreement on corresponding to nearly half the the military base has shown. Second, country's GDP. Although it can be as a developing country, Tajikistan assumed that not all remittances were should retain its workforce and sent from Russia, Tajikistan's develop human capital rather than government cannot afford losing this export its human assets. source of money influx to the country. Finally, with a large portion of its Second, keeping large masses of adult workforce dislocated, Tajikistan's men, who constitute the major share of government can afford to concern the labor migration, outside of itself less with problems pertaining to Tajikistan alleviates the internal social the stalled economy or the political pressures created by unemployment system - a recipe for an increasingly and a crumbling economy. According stagnant, unproductive, and to Russian Immigration Services, men increasingly authoritarian and women age 18 to 29 make up the government. Overall, the increased Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 23 incentives for mass labor migration the presence of labor migrants in that are created under the recently Russia generates social tension in the ratified agreements risks becoming a host country, which is reflected in the complex problem covering multiple rapid rise of xenophobic sentiments in sides of life. Besides the economic and Russia. political consequences for Tajikistan,

GEORGIA AND RUSSIA PLAN FOR PRESIDENTIAL LEVEL MEETING Eka Janashia

Georgian authorities have expressed Responding to a question from their readiness to prepare for a top- Georgian journalists whether he would level meeting between Georgia's and meet the Georgian president Giorgi Russia's presidents. The last time the Margvelshvili, Putin said “Yes, if he two countries’ presidents met was in wants; why not.” Putin's statement July 2008, prior to the August war was followed by one from Russia's between Russian and Georgia. Deputy Foreign Minister Gregory On February 6, the Russian president's Karasin, indicating that he would spokesperson Dmitri Peskov did not discuss the details of a possible high- “rule out” the possibility of a meeting level meeting in the format of a between the presidents during the bilateral dialogue, scheduled for Olympic Games in Sochi. Peskov March, with Zurab Abashidze, the refused to elaborate on the issue, Georgian Prime Minister’s noting that Russia's president Vladimir Representative for Russian Relations. Putin would welcome anyone “who After that statement, Georgian comes as a guest” to the event. authorities confirmed that they were Georgia's presidential administration ready to have a direct dialogue with was quick to decline a meeting in Sochi Kremlin. “Such a meeting – on such a as the Georgian official delegation did level and after such a long pause – not plan to attend the Winter Olympic requires very serious preparation and Games. planning,” Georgian Prime Minister The topic gained new momentum Irakli Gharibashvili said when while Putin said during the event that commenting on Putin’s remarks. He the Olympic Games contributed to also noted that Western partners rapprochement between Russia and expect Georgia to take positive steps Georgia and wished success to towards Russia and intensify its Georgian athletes participating in it. constructive dialogue with Moscow. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 24

Likewise, President Margvelashvili opposition and some analysts as an said that issue should be analyzed attempt by the PM to downplay cautiously. In the Rustavi 2 TV talk Moscow’s role as a conflict instigator. show Position on 14 February, Another important step is the Margvelashvili said that he does not agreement in January by Georgian expect the Kremlin to mount pressure authorities to extradite the North on Georgia to refrain from signing an Caucasian Mikhail Kadiev to Moscow. Association Agreement with the EU. Kadiev is wanted in Russia and was Margvelashvili stressed that since arrested for illegal acquisition and there is no military solution to restore possession of weapons and explosive Georgia's territorial integrity, the substances by Georgian law Georgian government might show enforcement in July 2013. Georgia's Moscow that it is ready to discuss “in a Ministry of Refugees and rational context what might be Accommodation did not grant him Russia’s interest.” political asylum. Kadiev’s lawyer, Gela In January, apparently under Nikolaishvili, insists that Georgian instructions from the Kremlin, authorities plan to deport other North Abkhazia’s de facto government Caucasian suspects of extremism to redrew its so-called “border zone” Russia in order to please Moscow. with Russia almost by 11 kilometers Another development that Moscow deeper into region to enlarge the might have appreciated is the security area around Sochi and to appointment of UK citizen Ryan Grist reinforce safety measures ahead of the as the deputy Head of the European Olympic Games. It is not clear whether Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia the “border zone” will be reverted to (EUMM). Grist publicly blamed the its initial boundaries after the event. Georgian government for launching Despite this move, Gharibashvili military actions in August 2008, while confirmed Georgia's willingness to he held the post of Deputy Head of the cooperate with Moscow on security OSCE mission in Georgia. He assessed matters ahead of the Sochi Olympics at the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali as the Munich Security Conference on “completely indiscriminate and February 1. According to Ekho disproportionate.” Terhi Hakala, then Kavkaza, prior to the opening of the Head of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, Olympics, Georgian border guards dismissed his comments. The Georgian restricted entry for some North government has not expressed Caucasus residents via the Upper Larsi concerns regarding Grist’s checkpoint located at the state border appointment. between Georgia and Russia. At the Instead, Tbilisi insists that its steps Munich conference, Gharibashvili also and rhetoric correspond with its declared that Georgia has an declared policy to normalize relations unresolved conflict with its brothers, with Russia. However, sometimes the Abkhazians and South Ossetians, initially stated “normalization” looks which was interpreted by the political more like an “appeasement” policy Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 25 reflected in the lack of a clearly possible high-level meeting between defined agenda stating what Georgian and Russian counterparts. In objectives should be reached and addition, Tbilisi should ensure that what concessions can be tolerated. direct dialogue will not undermine the Thus, in order to work toward the multilateral format of the Geneva goal of normalization, Georgia needs Talks, in which Georgia-Russia to develop a more coherent approach negotiations are conducted in the based on clearly defined national presence of partner countries. interests, especially ahead of a

KYRGYZSTAN'S NEW UNITED OPPOSITION MOVEMENT Arslan Sabyrbekov

At a meeting on February 12, the their names are not yet known to the leaders of several political parties in wider public. Kyrgyzstan established a United In the words of the movement’s leader Opposition Movement and elected an Jeenbekov, the newly united opposition member of the Kyrgyz opposition movement pursues three Parliament, Ravshan Jeenbekov, as its fundamental goals. “The first and far leader. most important objective is to reinstate the current Constitution. It is The newly created opposition in fact not bad but the Kyrgyz movement is highly representative in president has completely violated it its membership. It includes the with an objective of consolidating his recently defeated ex-mayor of Osh, power,” Jeenbekov stated. Melis Myrzakmatov and his Uluttar The movement's second objective is Birimdigi party, General Omurbek the establishment of a purely Suvanaliev, former Kyrgyz MP parliamentarian form of government Kamchybek Tashiev, former which, in the words of the movement’s Prosecutor General Azimbek members, “proved itself to be an Beknazarov, and the leader of efficient and more democratic way of Kyrgyzstan’s Peoples’ Democratic organizing and running the state.” Party Artur Medetbekov. Reportedly, Jeenbekov defined the movement's several other acting members of the third objective as a continuous Parliament have also expressed their struggle against the authoritarianism willingness to join the movement, but of the state power. He stated that “the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 19 February 2014 26

President has done nothing over the than 4,500 followers. His supporters past two and a half years, his promises consider him to be a truly spirited and our hopes are melting like the liberal democrat, constantly calling for spring snow and his power is merging progressive reforms. He also recently with crime. Having created the new attended and spoke at the Euromaidan movement, we will fight against the in Kiev, supporting the country’s ruling regime and constructively commitment to democracy and its suggest our vision for the country’s integration with the EU. Local media future development, before it becomes was quick to judge Jeenbekov's too late.” decision to attend a rally in support for According to local political analysts, another country’s opposition and has the movement can indeed turn into a made allegations that he possibly met real force against the current ruling with U.S. Senator John McCain during regime, which has lately sustained his Ukraine visit. heavy criticism for its alleged failure to For others, Jeenbekov is a skilled reach an agreement that safeguards politician, who has worked for both of Kyrgyzstan’s national interests with Kyrgyzstan’s ousted regimes and Canada’s Centerra Gold over the always assumed top positions ranging ownership of the Kumtor mine, its from a member of the government to selective and politically motivated Kyrgyzstan's Ambassador to Malaysia. arrests of politicians on corruption Furthermore, critics assert that charges, the release of criminal boss Jeenbekov was at the forefront of Aziz Batukaev from prison and a Kyrgyzstan's privatization in the number of other developments raising 1990’s while heading the State Agency concerns among the Kyrgyz public. for Property Development and that he Some do not exclude the possibility privatized for himself a number of that the movement can in the near then state owned properties. In one of future turn into a single political party, his speeches, Kyrgyzstan’s President ready to compete in the upcoming Almazbek Atambayev indirectly parliamentary elections scheduled for described Jeenbekov as a multi- next year. millionaire, who made his fortune As for the newly elected leader of the while working for the government. The United Opposition Movement, public President implied that in Kyrgyzstan, it opinion displays divisions as well. For is never possible to acquire wealth as a some, Jeenbekov is a young, reform government official, unless one minded politician, an independent MP engages in corruption. who has left his fraction due to strong Time will tell how Kyrgyzstan's politics ideological differences. He is a will evolve with a new player in its graduate from the MIT Sloan School of political arena. In the meantime, the Management and an active user of United Opposition Movement is social media, who personally responds developing concrete plans to be to all the comments posed by his more presented in the near future.