Spaces and Borders Religion and Society

Edited by Gustavo Benavides, Kocku von Stuckrad and Winnifred Fallers Sullivan

Volume 51

De Gruyter Spaces and Borders

Current Research on Religion in Central and Eastern Europe

Edited by Andra´sMa´te´-To´th and Cosima RughinisX

De Gruyter This publication is supported by REVACERN project which has received research funding from the European Union - Sixth Framework programme - under Priority 7 “Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-based Society”.

Expert advisers: De´nes Kiss (Cluj-Napoca), Viktor Yelensky (Kiev)

ISBN 978-3-11-022813-7 e-ISBN 978-3-11-022814-4 ISSN 1437-5370

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Spaces and borders : current research on religion in Central and Eastern Europe / Andra´sMa´te´-To´th. Cosima Rughinis (eds.). p. cm. - (Religion and society, ISSN 1437-5370 ; v. 51) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-3-11-022813-7 (hardcover : alk. paper) 1. Europe, Central - Religion - 21st century. 2. Europe, Eastern - Religion - 21st century. I. Ma´te´-To´th, Andra´s, 1957- II. Rughinis, Cosima. BL980.C39S63 2011 200.943-dc23 2011017189

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

” 2011 Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin/Boston Printing: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, Göttingen ϱ Printed on acid-free paper Printed in Germany www.degruyter.com

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 1

Experiencing Religion ...... 5 GÁBOR ATTILA FELEKY: The Vague Borders of New Age ...... 7 TOMÁŠ HRUSTI+: Values and Ethnicity – Religious Conversions of Roma in Eastern Slovakia to the Watchtower Society ...... 23 MICHAELA ONDRAŠINOVÁ: The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” ...... 33 RAFAL SMOCZYNSKI: ISKCON Folk Devils Fight Back. The Dynamics of Counter- Stigmatization Strategy ...... 49

Strategies of Religious Elites ...... 63 ÖNDER ÇETIN: Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade ...... 65 MILAN FUJDA: Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga ...... 81 DUMITRU MINZARARI: The Interaction between Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia ...... 103 FRANTIŠEK ŠÍSTEK: Clericalization of Nationalism ...... 117 Religion and Politics ...... 131 MILDA ALIŠAUSKIEN7: Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis ...... 133 vi Table of Contents

BRANKO AN+I): What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations in Central and Eastern Europe ...... 151 VICTOR CEBOTARI: Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence from Eastern and Western Europe ...... 169 DAVOR MARKO: Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam ...... 191 DOROTA HALL: Attitudes towards National Identity and National Values among Polish Catholic Youth ...... 207 BOGDAN MIHAI RADU: Religious Determinants of Democratic Values ...... 221 COSIMA RUGHINIk: Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries ...... 235 TAMÁS SZILÁGYI: Quasi-Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing Radical Ideology ...... 251

List of Contributors ...... 265

Index of Objects ...... 271

Introduction

ANDRÁS MÁTÉ-TÓTH COSIMA RUGHINIk

In Eastern and Central Europe, the regional specificity of religiosity derives from the historical experiences of three generations. After the Second World War, the young people were socialized by parent and teachers with deeply held Christian beliefs, and religion was a visible reference and support in their lives. After communist regimes enhanced their political strength, a second generation was schooled in an atheist spirit and in open hostility to religion. It was also a period in which Churches have adopted different strategies to accommodate and to resist state policies. After 1990, democracy was gradually reinstated alongside a broad religious landscape – and this is how a third generation learned to make sense of their lives. There is a contemporaneous tension between three different historical traditions concerning religiosity, atheism and secularity, as regards fundamental questions of human life, and it can also be observed in the academic community. Contributors to the present volume belong to the third generation, sometimes described, with criteria taken from the past, as post- communist, post-totalitarian or post-secular. Perhaps one could just say that they are contemporary young scholars of religion. Their religious interests and perspectives are different from other generations. If much of previous literature in the region is centered on the dominant traditions, such as Christianity or Islam, and on the conflict between national state policies, church strategies, and individual existential orientations, the younger generation focuses more on the pluralistic religious landscape. The political turning point around 1989–1991, the so called system-change, does not play for them anymore the central hermeneut- ical role it had for the former scholar generations. Previously, researchers have often been concerned with the problem of national identity re/construction, holding that religious beliefs and practices were central in shaping these processes. Young scholars contributing to this volume are not so much concerned with the relation between ideas of “the nation” and religion, and they position themselves in a distinctive topo- graphy of issues. 2 András Máté-Tóth, Cosima Rughinió

The articles published in this edited volume are the best works emerging from the Exchange Program of REVACERN (Religion and Values – Central and Eastern European Research Network) coordinated by Prof. András Máté-Tóth and supported by European Union’s 6th framework program (2007–2009). After a rigorous selection process, twenty applicants out of seventy two were granted academic and financial support for completing their own research on religion in Cen- tral and Eastern Europe. Apart from high scientific quality, one of the most important requirements in the Call for applications was the international comparative approach, meaning that the scholarly work had to cover at least three societies. After the first research semester, grantees presented their projects and findings in a workshop held at the Univer- sity of Szeged, where they were also involved in an intensive academic writing course. Based on these presentations, fifteen young scholars were selected for a second semester of research support, in order to refine their findings. The contributions address three broad topics, which also inspired the sections comprised in the title of the volume. Gábor Attila Feleky, Tomas Hrusti², Michaela Ondrašinová, and Rafal SmocziÚszky discuss religious experiences, with a focus on conversion to new religions, addressing the challenging topic of new religious movements. Onder Çetin, Milan Fujda, and Dumitru Minzarari concentrate on questions related to the strategies of religious elites. Milda Ališauskien½, Branko An²i°, Victor Cebotari, Marko Davor, Dorota Hall, Bogdan Radu, Co- sima Rughinió and Tamás Szilágyi analyze the interactions between religion and politics with topics and data drawn from a multiplicity of social milieu. This diversity of interests is still tightly bound around a dominant theoretical concern – namely, the creation, maintenance and transgres- sion of religious boundaries. In a time of pluralism and synergy of spiritual experiences, currents of thought and organizations, when democracies acquiesce changing institutional arrangements of integration and separation between the public sphere and various forms of religiosity, the issue of observing, establishing, traversing and challenging boundaries becomes increasingly relevant. The articles in the first section, religious experiences, address this critical issue of border creation and maintenance between different communities. Distinctions between religious beliefs, ethnic or other social categories are often employed to support one another. For example, Hrusti² discusses the use of ethnic border maintenance devices, such as stereotypical discourses, as a procedure of differentiation between Jehova Witnesses from other religious communities. Comparing Introduction 3 interview data with accounts published in magazine articles, Ondraš- inová explores strategies for defining oneself as a spiritual traveler in counter-distinction to church-based Catholic religiosity. The author argues that interviews differ from textual accounts in that they construct the distinction between “spirituality” and “religion” through a careful classificatory work in which respondents mark some forms of spirituality and some forms of Catholicism as illegitimate, thus establishing positions with finer granularity. Furthermore, as illustrated by Hrusti², borders are observed, interpreted and further employed, as discursive boundaries, to re/produce other borders: the “Yoga versus Catholicism” debate is a field in which different Yogic schools strive to assert their superiority. SmocziÚszky traces changes in the antagonistic differentiation strategies targeted against the new religious movements (NRMs) in Poland, focusing on the International Society for Krishna Consciousness – ISKCON, and the new social ties that bridge old moral panic divides. The distinctiveness of NRMs and spiritual journeys is also a matter of methodological concerns for scholars interested in tracing their formation and changes. Tackling these issues, Feleky discusses the operational definitions of New Age beliefs in surveys, assessing the common ground covered by several pieces of research. The papers in the second section follow the thread of the use of differentiation strategies by religious elites, through looking at their strategic interactions with formal political institutions. Çetin examines the positions of religious elites concerning the relationships between Mus- lims and non-Muslims in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Serbia, to discuss how distinction between “religious” vs. “non-religious” spheres of life bears upon the recommendation to distance or engage across confessional borders. Internal diversification within the Muslim community is brought about by the introduction of different Islamic interpretations, and is mutually reinforced with references to ethnic and political distinctions. Fujda traces the development of Czech traditions of Yoga by following the work and relationships of several movement leaders. The author dedicates particular attention to both the influence of communist policies and resistance to the regime’s impositions on the development of Yoga movements. Minzarari explores the shape of Church – State boundaries and their influence on political institutions, in relation to the Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia. The third section of the volume includes contributions that are particularly oriented towards the position of religion and religious experiences in the public arena, exploring various patterns of influence between religiosity and other areas of life, with a focus on public opinion. Ališauskien½ discusses liberty of religious expression in the Baltic State, 4 András Máté-Tóth, Cosima Rughinió tracing legal changes and public discourse transformation, especially regarding new religious movements. An²i° evaluates religiosity levels estimated in comparative international surveys, and people’s expectations towards religious guidance in personal and public matters. Cebo- tari explores national pride among majority and minority religious communities in Eastern Europe. His analysis brings together considerations of religious, ethnic and national identity. Hall discusses the multi- layered patchwork of national and religious identities among students and highly educated individuals in Poland. Radu identifies multiple patterns of coexistence of religious belief and political values, and Rughinió discusses methodological and sociological accounts of varia- bility and even inconsistence about secularity by drawing on a public opinion survey. Moving towards a more structured political level, Marko discusses media reports on Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina, identifying an apologetic discourse, a secular-religious clash discourse, and an Islamophobic discourse. Finally, Szilágyi evidences the variable relationships between radical right wing groups and Christian churches in Eastern Europe countries. Overall, the contributions of this volume indicate that media accounts and political projects are structured on clearer lines of demarcation between religious beliefs as compared to personal experiences and public opinion – in which finer nuances can be identified in relations to borders within and around religious communities. Boundaries are often invoked and often experienced, but they are also resisted and redefined. Religiosity and spirituality is lived on a rugged terrain, in which heterogeneous parties compete for influence and autonomy, in a heavily regulated but sometimes surprisingly changing social arena.

Experiencing Religion

The Vague Borders of New Age Methodological Comparison of Studies Concerning New Age in Central and Eastern Europe

GÁBOR ATTILA FELEKY

Introduction

The mapping of borders between New Age and other religions is an especially hard task. The concept of New Age and approaches towards it differ significantly in the works of different scholars, therefore one can find a vast variety of the operationalization of the notion. Methodological problems are not hard to find in studies concerning spirituality in CEE, nevertheless their comparison – and lessons drawn from researches carried out in other regions – can lead to a better understanding of New Age.

Empirical Studies about the Holistic Milieu in CEE

When comparing different studies concerning New Age, one must be aware of the proliferation of the definition of certain notions, especially New Age itself. To illustrate the situation, York enumerates several descriptions from “a blend of pagan religions, Eastern philosophies, and occult-psychic phenomena” (Michael York) through “forms of religious movement most closely associated with the New Age are occult, neopagan, and Asian” (William S. Bainbridge), to “endlessly entertaining saturnalia of ill-defined yearnings” (Harold Bloom). Relation and overlapping between terms like New Age, (subjective-life) spirituality or holistic milieu varies study to study, sometimes used interchangeably sometimes making clear differentiation between them1. Scholars use different definitions, or – quite frequently – opt to avoid any definition at all.2

1 In present paper, these notions are used as synonyms. 2 York, Michael. 2001. New Age Commodification and Appropriation of Spirituality. Journal of Contemporary Religion 16 (3):361–372. 8 Gábor Attila Feleky

It must also be stressed that only few empirical studies have been carried out concerning New Age beliefs. Scholars investigating New Age can’t stop complaining that the claims and arguments concerning New Age are in many cases based mainly on personal observations and experiences, or on personal opinions – even in academic environment. Some of them call for a radical “sociologisation” in the research of New Age and spirituality.3 The few existing studies applied different approaches, and the comparison (if possible at all) requires a good deal of creativity. In order to demonstrate these problems, we briefly summarize the most important available studies concerning New Age.

Qualitative Studies

Under the label of qualitative studies we can mention Dorota Hall’s examination and Barbara Potrata’s study. Both scholars carried out numerous in-depth interviews, and were active in participant observation as well. Dorota Hall’s two investigations titled Space in the New Age Culture and New Age – Between Belief and Wisdom were carried out in 2000–2002 and 2002–2004, respectively. With the help of 30 students of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology she was engaged in fieldwork research in Warsaw alternative medicine fairs, esoteric-like shops and galleries, and offices of therapists and fortune tellers advertised at the previously mentioned places. The investigations were based on participant observation and in-depth interviews. Hall gathered about 500 interviews and observation descriptions. Apart from that, she analyzed the relevant literature, focusing on the content- analysis of one popular monthly magazine. She avoids the definition of New Age.4 Barbara Potrata’s fieldwork was conducted in Slovenia between 1998 and 1999, and was reinforced by further investigations in the subsequent three years. She mapped a New Age network by employing the “snowball” sampling method. She participated in numerous New Age related events and carried out about 70 interviews. According to

3 Höllinger, Franz. 2004. Does the Counter-Cultural Character of New Age Persist? Investigating Social and Political Attitudes of New Age Followers. Journal of Contem- porary Religion 19 (3):289–309; Aupers, Stef, and Dick Houtman. 2006. Beyond the Spiritual Supermarket: The Social and Public Significance of New Age Spirituality. Journal of Contemporary Religion 21 (2):201–222. 4 Hall, Dorota. 2005. Life-as Spirituality as the Third Option? A View from the East- European Perspective. Manuscript. The Vague Borders of New Age 9

Potrata, the interviewees were involved in about 50 types of New Age activities.5

Quantitative Studies

In this part we give a short overview of four New Age related quantitative studies in the CEE region – three of them focusing on university students. Franz Höllinger conducted an empirical study – titled Religion and Esotericism among Students – in 1999 in five European (Austria, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal), one North American (USA) and four Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay). The investigated population was reduced only to university students because of the presupposition that the reception of New Age literature and esoteric techniques is higher among them than in the rest of the population – although his choice must have been influenced by the easy and low-cost availability of the students. The inquiry also focused on the relationship of academic disciplines and religious worldviews. Höllinger finds that both Christian religiosity and esoteric beliefs are more popular among students of languages, arts, health and social sciences, while students of natural sciences and law are likely to reject these teachings and practices. In intercontinental comparison, Latin-American and US students are more likely to believe in occult phenomena and esoteric methods than European students. Results also show that most students have experiences of esoteric practices, nevertheless only a small proportion practices these regularly.6 As part of a wider range survey carried out by Education Faculty at the University of Maribor (Slovenia), the acceptance of New Age ideas was measured during four subsequent years, from 2001 till 2004. Miran Lavri² finds that in spite of their popularity, New Age ideas show less vitality than those of Catholicism, as a widely accepted religious tradition of the country. According to the scholar, the New Age movement – with specific regard to its eclectic and individualistic views – cannot be a bearer of a spiritual revival.7

5 Potrata, Barbara. 2004. New Age, Socialism and Other Millenarianisms: Affirming and Struggling with (Post)socialism. Religion, State & Society, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 2004. 6 Höllinger, Franz, and T. B. Smith. 2002. Religion and Esotericism among Students: A Cross-Cultural Comparative Study. Journal of Contemporary Religion 17 (2):229–249. 7 Lavri², Miran. 2005. Measuring New Age Ideas among Slovenian Students. In Ústav pre vzt’ahy štátu a cirkví, edited by M. Morav²íková. Bratislava: New Age. 10 Gábor Attila Feleky

Tadeusz Doktór’s study The New Age worldview of Polish students 183 students (of art, humanities, technology, social sciences and agriculture) were asked with the help of a questionnaire distributed during the lectures. The study had five fields of examination: worldviews, personality traits, relations with parents, future expectations and mysticism. New Age positively correlated with mysticism, anxiety and self-esteem, and negatively with the father’s religiosity. The role of the individual self in the construction of the New Age worldview, the lack of certainty of these beliefs and their magical and mystical orientation are interpreted in terms of narcissism, a trait fostered by the deinstitutionalization and the subjectivization of modern culture. Doktór interprets the results suggesting that New Age worldview might be considered to be a loosely structured belief system, individually constructed by way of bricolage, “this-worldly” in orientation, and emphasizing experiential legitimation.8 In 2005 a survey was carried out by the Department of Sociology at the University of Szeged. It used a sample (N=1390) representative for the population of the city of Szeged (Hungary). 336 cases of the sample (24,2% of the total sample) were aged 30 years or less. The results show that the correlation between age and spiritual belief is not straightforward. Although esoteric beliefs are harder to find among the elderly than among the youth, several beliefs (in healing powers and in telepathy) are the most popular in the second and third quintile. Results also show a strong positive correlation between the level of education, and the involvement and belief in spiritual techniques.

Methodology of the Quantitative Researches

In the following lines we give a brief insight into the methodology of the mentioned studies in order to find out what kind of comparison is possible among them, and to spot the available best practices. The overview aims to help scholars willing to carry out New Age related studies, thus ensuring the prevention of certain “incompatibility problems” in the future.

8 Doktór, Tadeusz. 1999. The “New Age” Worldview of Polish Students. Social Com- pass 46(2):215–224. The Vague Borders of New Age 11

Defining the Key Terms

As we will see, in the analyzed studies normally there is not even a working definition of what New Age is. Moreover, it also has to be noted that some scholars frequently, and commonly use notions like New Age, esotericism, subjective-life spirituality or Holistic Milieu interchangeably, meanwhile others make a distinction. For Höllinger New Age is “the new forms of spirituality and esotericism”. He enlists under this label the following: Therapies for improving one’s health and psycho-physical well-being (e.g. homeopathy, Shiatsu, spiritual healing); spiritual and meditation techniques (e.g. Yoga, Tai Chi, Zen); methods based on ‘paranormal’ powers (e.g. geomancy, telepathy); methods for predicting events and analysing the personality of human beings (e.g. astrology, Tarot cards).9 Lavri² confesses that New Age is “difficult to define or measure”, and “there is no clear and universal definition of New Age.” Nevertheless, he argues that New Age (ideas) can be measured by examining the acceptance of its fundamental beliefs – labelled mystical, holistic and millenaristic themes10. Tadeusz Doktór affirms the difficulties of defining the exact meaning of “New Age”, and thinks that an operational definition (indicating methods required for its measurement) can make up a good solution. He finds three common points in the definitions and interpretations of the New Age: content, structure and function. Since Doktór is to give an operational definition, the item used in his research (and enlisted later on) will give a clue about his notion on New Age.11 The elaborators of the Szeged Studies 2005 questionnaire did not have a clear definition of New Age in mind, therefore only the applied items may get us closer to get to know what they actually meant by New Age.

9 Höllinger, Franz. 2004. Does the Counter-Cultural Character of New Age Persist? Investigating Social and Political Attitudes of New Age Followers. Journal of Contem- porary Religion 19 (3):289–309. 10 In his earlier works, Lavri² used two more basic themes: syncretism and counter- cultural character. Lavri², Miran. 2005. Measuring New Age Ideas among Slovenian Students. In Ústav pre vzt’ahy štátu a cirkví, edited by M. Morav²íková. Bratislava: New Age. 11 Doktór, Tadeusz. 1999. The “New Age” Worldview of Polish Students. Social Com- pass 46(2):215–224. 12 Gábor Attila Feleky

Applied Instruments and Sampling Methods

Franz Höllinger conducted his study with the help of a standardized questionnaire, which was distributed during lectures. The process took place at seventeen universities (and involved 3,569 students.), and followed the same sampling procedure: courses from four to eight academic disciplines were selected with the only criterion of including at least two disciplines from the exact sciences and two disciplines from the human sciences. This sampling procedure resulted in samples representative12 neither for university students of a given country, nor for the students of the universities where the data were collected. The only university in the CEE region participating in the study was the Austrian Karl-Franzens-Universitat in Graz. (Höllinger and Smith 2002) For Lavri²’s work a wider range survey was introduced in four subsequent years, from 2001 till 2004 to trace among other issues, the attitude of university students towards New Age. The research instrument was a self-administered questionnaire – including a New Age item battery – filled in the classrooms. The sample was around 1000 students of the Maribor University, with quota sampling – taking into account the faculty, the gender and the year of the study.13 In Doktór’s study the questionnaire was distributed during lectures as well. The majority of the items were based on the World-View Questionnaire developed in Finland. The subjects (N = 183) were students of art, humanities, technology, social sciences and agriculture in Warsaw.14 The questionnaire used in the Szeged Studies 2005 contained more than 100 items, a battery of religious and esoteric questions was introduced. The applied random sampling procedure resulted in a sample (N=1390) representative for the population of the city of Szeged (Hungary). In a contrast to the other studies described here, it was not self administered, but carried out with the help of trained commissioners (students of sociology).

12 Even Höllinger himself puts it: “This sampling procedure did not necessarily lead to a representative sample” (Höllinger 2004) and “Even if the resulting samples are not representative for the population of the respective universities, all kinds of students […] were included in the sample” (Höllinger and Smith 2002). 13 Lavri², Miran. 2005. Measuring New Age Ideas among Slovenian Students. In Ústav pre vzt’ahy štátu a cirkví, edited by M. Morav²íková. Bratislava: New Age. 14 Doktór, Tadeusz. 1999. The “New Age” Worldview of Polish Students. Social Com- pass 46(2):215–224. The Vague Borders of New Age 13

Operationalization

Bearing in mind the mentioned variety of approaches, one can imagine that a well-elaborated and used-by-everybody method or scale to trace or measure New Age doesn’t exist. Since – as it was mentioned before – the majority of the investigations lack the definition of New Age, it is of crucial importance to examine how New Age is operationalized in these studies. Höllinger in his cross-cultural comparative study used a questionnaire with the following items to measure occult beliefs and New Age activities. Items examining beliefs in nature spirits (fairies, etc.), spirits in old houses, contact with the dead, psychic healers, telepathy, clairvoyance, astrology and healing energies of stones made up the “occult belief“ battery (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.85). Items measuring involvement in fortune-telling, Tarot cards, Runes, I-Ging, horoscope- interpretation and dream-interpretation were categorized under the label “esoteric methods for predicting events and for analyzing one’s personality“. Involvement in Asian techniques (Yoga, Tai Chi, etc.), meditation and massage techniques were components of the “body- oriented spiritual techniques“ scale, while the item battery to trace involvment in alternative medicine (homeopathy, Bach flower remedies, etc.), psychic healing, acupuncture, observation of moon phases and psychotherapy was called “alternative healing methods“. Items belonging to the three latter categories made up a “New Age activities“ scale (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.72). Activities were measured by the frequency of practicing it (the available answers being: regularly, several times, once or a few times, never), meanwhile concerning beliefs, the possible answers were the following ones: believing, not believing and undecided.15 As a result of his previously mentioned idea, according to which New Age ideas can be measured if you examine the acceptance of certain fundamental beliefs, Lavri² used the following items in his questionnaire. The scale “occultism” (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.74) contained three 5-point Likert–scale ranging from total agreement to total disagreement: “the destiny of an individual is influenced by the position of stars and planets“; “after death of an individual, his soul moves into another body“, and “it is possible to harm people by magic spells“. The “New Age“ scale (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.72) included the following Likert-type items: the entire Universe is an expression of a

15 Höllinger, Franz, and T. B. Smith. 2002. Religion and Esotericism among Students: A Cross-Cultural Comparative Study. Journal of Contemporary Religion 17 (2):229–249. 14 Gábor Attila Feleky unified spiritual energy, spiritual powers; each individual has a higher spiritual self, which can be awakened and lead to personal enlightenment; and we are facing times of rapid spiritual growth of human consciousness.16 The questionnaire items in use in Doktór’s study can be categorized within five basic groups, one of them being “worldview“ with 85 items related to various religious, irreligious, parareligious and para- scientific beliefs. Doktór constructed a New Age scale of eighteen items related to oriental religious beliefs, occultism, and magic, based upon the factor analysis of these items. The questionnaire measured the degree of agreement with the content of different statements17 on a 5- point Likert-scale (0 – absolutely no agreement, 4 – total agreement). According to Doktór, the New Age scale seems to be a reliable tool for the measurement of the cluster of beliefs and practices related to New Age.18 In the Szeged Studies 2005 the following questions were put to trace the acceptance of spiritual beliefs: Do you believe … in the existence of healing powers? / … that there are spiritual powers one can make contact with? / … in reincarnation? / … in life after death? / … that curses may be effective? / … in telepathy? / … in fortune-telling? Beliefs were measured with a binary variable (the available answers being yes or no). The consistency of this “spiritual beliefs“ scale is quite high (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.81). To measure involvement in spiritual activities, the following questions were introduced: Have you ever used the services of a

16 Lavri², Miran. 2005. Measuring New Age Ideas among Slovenian Students. In Ústav pre vzt’ahy štátu a cirkví, edited by M. Morav²íková. Bratislava: New Age. 17 The statements were the following: Although most people do not believe it, some kinds of nature-spirits do exist, in the old days these were referred to as fairies or elves. / Telepathy or thought transference is possible. / There is some truth in astrology. / It is possible for certain people to get information about hidden things through clairvoyance. / It is possible that ghosts may exist in certain old houses, although most people do not believe so. / The astrological sign under which one was born may be of great importance for the development of one’s character. / I believe in reincarnation/ I know that I have a lucky number. / I know that there is a special date or day in a week which brings bad luck to me. / It is possible in certain cases to make contact with the dead. / It is probably true that UFOs or “flying saucers” have visited our planet/ I have had at least one experience of telepathy or thought transference. / It is likely that humans originate from another planet. / Evil spirits exist and may harm people who let themselves be influenced by them. / I have or have had an amulet or good luck charm which has brought good fortune to me. / Animals have a soul. / I have sometimes felt a premonition or a hunch that something was going to happen, and it proved to be true. / Humans are born into life in order to realize themselves, and are born again and again until the goal is reached. 18 Doktór, Tadeusz. 1999. The “New Age” Worldview of Polish Students. Social Com- pass 46(2):215–224. The Vague Borders of New Age 15 fortunteller? / Have you ever participated in psychomancy, table-turning? / Have you ever asked for the help of an astrologist? / Have you ever been involved in reiki? / Have you ever asked for a Feng Shui counseling? / Have you ever asked for the help of a naturopathic practicioner? (the available answers being: never, once, several times, and more or less regularly). These six items made up a “spiritual involvement“ scale (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.60).

Results – Conclusions of the Comparison of the Operationalizations

As we can see, scholars apply items measuring the level of acceptance of certain statements and/or the engagement in different activities. Although the overlapping among the items used in the examined studies is not overwhelming, we can find numerous common points. Comparison of the item shows that the following themes appeared in two or more studies (see Table 1). The picture showed by Table 1 may seems brighter then it is in reality, since even the same (or similar) items were formulated differently, making the comparison harder. To illustrate the problem, we will give a comparison of several items of three of the mentioned four studies (see Table 2). As it has been shown in the previous lines, a handful of studies concerning New Age have been carried out in the previous years in CEE. These studies differ from each other in several ways, nevertheless common points are not too hard to find. Among the four examined investigations there is a significant overlapping concerning the main themes, the items that were used to operationalize New Age. Notwithstanding we still face two problems, firstly, these items, even if searching for answers for the same question, are put in different way, which makes comparisons less unambiguous. Secondly, the sampling seems to be of secondary importance to scholars, although the validity of the statements can be challenged when the sample cannot be considered to be representative for a given population. Three of the analyzed studies focused on university students, meanwhile in the Szeged studies there is no special focus on this group. The Austrian, Polish and Slovenian data represent only one university in each case (Karl-Franzens-Universitat Graz, University of Warsaw and University of Maribor, respectively), so it cannot reflect the opinion of students of all universities of the given country. And even if representative samples were used, the results would be valid only to a 16 Gábor Attila Feleky number of university students, and would not say anything of a broader population. Nevertheless, due to the peculiarities of the sampling, the results and conclusions of the three mentioned studies on university students must be treated cautiously.

Table 1: Frequency of New Age themes in the examined studies (elaborated by the author)

Höllinger’s Lavri²’s Doktór’s Szeged Frequency study study study Studies

Astrology 4 x x x x

Fortune-telling 3 x x x

Reincarnation 3 x x x

Spirits (in old 3 x x x houses, etc.)

Telepathy 3 x x x

Alternative 2 x x medicine

Asian techniques 2 x x

Clairvoyance 2 x x

Contact with the 2 x x dead

Curses 2 x x

Nature spirits 2 x x (fairies, etc.)

Psychic healing 2 x x

Self-realization 2 x x

Spiritual forces 2 x x

The Vague Borders of New Age 17

Table 2: A comparison of items applied in the examined studies (elaborated by the author)

Lavri²’s study Doktór’s study Szeged Studies

The destiny of an There is some truth in astrology. Have you ever asked for individual is The astrological sign under which the help of an Astrology influenced by the one was born may be of great astrologist? position of stars importance for the development of and planets. one’s character. It is possible to Do you believe that Curses harm people by curses may be effective? magic spells.

I have sometimes felt a Do you believe in premonition or a hunch that fortune-telling? Have Fortune- something was going to happen, you ever used the telling and it proved to be true. services of a fortune- teller? After death of an I believe in reincarnation. Humans Do you believe in individual, his soul are born into life in order to realize reincarnation? Do you Reincarna- moves into another themselves, and are born again and believe in life after tion & body. again until the goal is reached. It is death? life after possible in certain cases to make death contact with the dead.

Each individual has Humans are born into life in order a higher spiritual to realize themselves, and are born Self- self which can be again and again until the goal is realization awakened and lead reached. to personal enlightenment. It is possible that ghosts may exist Do you believe that in certain old houses, although there are spiritual most people do not believe so. powers one can make Although most people do not contact with? Have you Spirits believe it, some kinds of nature- ever participated in spirits do exist. In the old days psychomancy, table- these were referred to as fairies or turning? elves.

Telepathy or thought transference Do you believe in is possible. I have had at least one telepathy? Telepathy experience of telepathy or thought transference.

18 Gábor Attila Feleky

Measuring New Age in Northwest Europe

Being aware of the methodology of New Age studies conducted outside our region can be fruitful for future researches on spirituality in CEE. Therefore, hereby we give a short introduction of several studies, with a major focus on the opertionalization issue. One of the most extensive researches on New Age is the Kendal Project, which aimed to collect information on activities related to alternative spirituality (the holistic milieu) – and also to the activities of church and chapel (the congregational domain) – in the city of Kendal (UK). The fieldwork started in October 2000 (by an initial pilot study) and ended in June 2002. The first step in the exploration of the holistic milieu was the mapping of associational activities (groups, one-to-one encounters) not related to the congregational domain. This was followed by more detailed qualitative research, including the determination of the grade of “spiritual dimension”, which facilitators and practitioners attribute to the mapped 126 holistic activities. Afterward a questionnaire was given to facilitators and participants of all associational activities which had at least a minimum level of spirituality. The holistic milieu questionnaire19 was divided into four sections. The first section examined if the person was involved in the certain therapies and activities20 (during the week prior to the study, or before that). The subject also had to decide whether he or she regarded the activity as having spiritual dimension (possible answers being yes and no). Concerning activities another question was introduced in the questionnaire (Do you ever do any of the following at home?), but in this

19 Available at: htp://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/kendal/documents/Holistic Questionnaire.rtf 20 Acupressure / acupuncture / Alexander technique / aromatherapy/ art therapy or group / astrology / Bahai group / Buddhist group / CancerCare group / Chinese Col- lege of Physical Culture (sic!) / chiropractice / circle dancing / counselling / cranio- sacral therapy/ energy management workshops / flower essences therapy / foot massage / GreenSpirit group / healing or spiritual healing / herbalism / homeopathy / hypnotherapy / Indian head massage / inter-faith group / Iona Group / kinaesiology / massage / meridian therapy / metamorphic technique / naturopathy / nutritional therapy / osteopathy / pagan activities / palm readings / play therapy / psychic con- sultancy / psychotherapy / rebirthing / reflexology / reiki / relaxation therapy / Sai Baba group / sea of faith group / shiatsu / spinal touch therapy / Tai Chi or Chi Kung / Taize singing group / Tarot card reading / true vision group / universal peace dancing / vision therapy (not opticians) / wild women group / women’s spirituality group / yoga / other (please state). Source: http://www. lancs.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/kendal/ documents/HolisticQuestionnaire.rtf, downloaded on 08.08.2008. The Vague Borders of New Age 19 case only seven possible answers21 were given. The questionnaire also included a list of beliefs22 (available answers being: yes/no/don’t know). The holistic questionnaire of the Kendal project investigated special personal experiences by asking people if given experiences23 have happened to them, and – in case of positive response – if they consider them religious, spiritual or neither.24 Granqvist and Hagekull chose a different way to grasp New Age. When investigating attachment and emotional compensation among New Age members, they constructed a so called “New Age Orientation Scale” using 22 items grouped into 10 overlapping content areas.25

21 Meditate / pray / yoga / Tai Chi / massage (give or receive) / healing (give or receive) / other spiritual or therapeutic activity (please write in). 22 Life after death / reincarnation / heaven / hell / the power of prayer / miracles / special healing powers / that humankind is entering a new age of spiritual evolution / a true self / a soul / some sort of spirit or life force that pervades all that lives / chakras / subtle energy (or energy channels) in the body / extra sensory perception / precognition / God / Jesus was the son of God / Jesus was just a man / Jesus was just a story / sin / the devil / angels / other holy or higher beings / a spirit world / UFOs / ley lines / other (please state). Source: htp://www.lancs.ac.uk/fss/projects/ieppp/kendal/documents/HolisticQuestionnaire.rtf, downloaded on 08.08.2008. 23 An awareness of receiving help in answer to prayer / a feeling of being in touch with someone who had died / an awareness of spirits or ghosts / an awareness of the presence of God / a sacred experience of nature / a pattern of events in your life that convinces you that they were your destiny / a pattern of events in your life that convinces you that they were controlled by a higher power / a sense of great peace / an extraordinary feeling of inner bliss / an out of body experience / a near-death experience / an extraordinary inner experience triggered by giving birth / an extraordinary inner experience triggered by having sex / an extraordinary inner experience triggered by taking drugs / an accurate precognition of future events / extra sensory perception of events or someone’s thoughts / other (please state). 24 Heelas, P., and L. Woodhead. 2005. The spiritual revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality. Malden: Blackwell 25 A conviction that the individual’s „intuition” is a reliable source of knowledge (and outperforming science-based knowledge) / a belief that a new age is approaching, with dramatic implications for science, the evaluation of human nature, etc. / a belief in the efficacy of „alternative” treatments (potentially outperforming regular medical treatments) / a belief in parapsychological and occult phenomena / an emphasis on personal development and spirituality, as well as an interest in the „alternative” literature on these issues / a favorable evaluation of pseudopsychological and pseu- dophysical jargon / an emphasis on nature and cosmos as animate / an emphasis on Eastern holism (as opposed to „Western reductionism”) activities and beliefs / a favorable evaluation of religious syncretism and of practices of „forgotten” cultures and traditions, coupled with an unfavorable evaluation of mainstream Western religion / an emphasis on being an „open seeaker” (as opposed to absorbed by the „dogmas” of institutionalized religions) to whom „the new age” is personally valuable. Granqvist, Pehr, and Berit Hagekull. 2001. Seeking Security in the New Age: On Attachment and Emotional Compensation. Journal for the Scientific Study of Relig- ion 40 (3):527–545. 20 Gábor Attila Feleky

A previous study, Michael J. Donhaue’s investigation on the prevalence of New Age beliefs among members of six American protestant denominations is also important. His survey included several items to trace New Age ideology, among them after the factor- analysis seven belief statements26 proved to make up a consistent New Age belief factor.27 Houtman and Mascini underline that New Age is “notoriously difficult to operationalize” and they used a twofold instrument to do it while investigating the correlations New Age – rationalism and New Age – individualism. Firstly, he followed the practice of former Dutch New Age investigations by presenting the respondents with activities, ideas closely related to New Age (and New Age namely), and asking them to what extent they are involved in astrology, New Age, yoga, oriental religions and reincarnation. Apart from that, the scholars added five Likert-type items (based by a former investigation by Gussenhoven and Van den Maagdenberg) that – according to them – express four core ideas of New Age. The idea holism appeared in the following statements: “one’s character is strongly determined by the stars and planets“ and “one can predict one’s future to a large extent by reading the lines in one’s hand“. Spiritual trasformation was represented by the item “after death, one’s soul passes to another human being or animal“, syncretism by “one should search in different religions oneself to make one’s own religion“ and perennialism by “the one and only true religion does not exist, but there are truths one can find in all religions of the world“. The combination of all the 10 items produced a consistent scale (Cronbach’s alpha: 0.78), thus Houtman and Mascini regarded it as a valid measure of affinity with New Age.28

26 Human nature is basically good / I believe in reincarnation – that I have lived before and will experience other lives in the future / I believe in astrology / through meditation and self-discipline I come to know that all spiritual truth and wisdom is within me / I am in charge of my own life – I can be anything I want to be / it is possible to communicate with people who have died / an individual should arrive at his or her own religious beliefs independent of any church. 27 Donahue, Michael J. 1993. Prevalence and Correlates of New Age Beliefs in Six Protestant Denominations. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 32 (2):177. 28 Houtman, Dick, and Peter Mascini. 2002. Why Do Churches Become Empty, While New Age Grows? Secularization and Religious Change in the Netherlands. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 41 (3):455–473. The Vague Borders of New Age 21

Conclusions

These different ways of measuring New Age reflect the authors’ distinct concepts about it, nevertheless, there is notable overlapping among them. We can conclude that basically four main approaches can be identified in the endeavours to trace New Age. The first one concentrates on the involvement in spiritual techniques and/or methods, the second one is based on investigating different spiritual/religious beliefs, the third one focuses on transcendent experience, while the forth one searches for signs of pluralistic religious views and individualistic characteristics. Nevertheless, even if the same approach is used in different studies, the comparability cannot be guaranteed due to different operationalization of the same notions. Therefore, we suggest to incorporate the best practices from New Age researches, and to elaborate an ontology – an inventory of potential items with several “must-use” ones. As an annex to it, a description of where and how – and with what results – these were previously applied would be also of great use. This ontology could guarantee the comparability of future researches. Several methodological guidelines should also be observed – and formulated if deemed necessary – in order to ensure that the result of future researches be unquestionable.

Values and Ethnicity – Religious Conversions of Roma in Eastern Slovakia to the Watchtower Society

TOMÁŠ HRUSTI+

Introduction

In this chapter I will describe how the conversion of Roma in one specific locality of Eastern Slovakia to the Watchtower Society brings about the transformation of values and how this transformation affects ethnic identification. Roma in this region compose approximately ten percent of the population. This locality is multi-confessional and the religious market there consists of various Christian churches and religious movements, including the Roman Catholic Church, the Eastern Catholic Church, the Slovak Orthodox Church, the Hungarian Reformed Church, Adventists of the Seventh Day, the Watchtower Society and a few Pentecostal and Charismatic denominations. Most of the Roma in the locality are formally affiliated with one of Catholic churches1. At the end of nineties the Greek Catholic church began focusing activities on Roma in one of the villages and these activities brought some partial successes and several Romani families intensified their faith and Catholic affiliation. Also Pentecostal and Charismatic movements play a crucial role for Roma2 in this locality. In

1 However, this affiliation is just formal, with Roma seldom attending services Although it would be a mistake to say that these Roma do not believe and have no faith. Slovak ethnologist Tatiana Podolinská describes this religiosity as cultural approximation of Christianity employing various processes of selective appropriation and reinterpretation of, for example, Catholicism. See more in Podolinská, T. 2009: „Nová rómska duchovná identita. Charizmatické hnutia medzi Rómami na Slovensku“. In: Kiliánová, G. – Kowalská, E. – Krekovi²ová, E. (eds.): My a tí druhí v modernej spolo²nosti. Bratislava: Veda. 175–216. 2 For references about the influence of Pentecostalism on Roma in Slovakia see Po- dolinská, T. 2009: „Nová rómska duchovná identita. Charizmatické hnutia 24 Tomáš Hrusti² the end of nineties it was the international movement Word of Life and then the Romani Pentecostal movement Devleskero Kher which caused quite serious religious revivals among Roma in Eastern Slovakia. In this paper I will focus on the Watchtower Society and the role it plays among Roma. There were already some Jehovah´s Witnesses (non-Roma) in this district during the period of socialism, however, they were persecuted for their belief. In the beginning of the nineties, after the fall of socialism, they could conduct missionary activities freely without persecutions and significant numbers of new believers joined the movement. Many of the new converts were Roma. Interestingly, in the locality of my research, most of the Roma converts to Jehovah´s Witnesses come from the Roma living integrated among the majority non-Roma population. Analyzing the change of values among converted Roma and non- Roma to Jehovah´s Witnesses in Eastern Slovakia I will focus on these changes from the perspective of ethnic identification and the transformation of ethnic stereotypical representations of converted non-Roma towards their Romani co-believers. I will refer to data and material I gathered during several field research visits in a few WS congregations in Eastern Slovakia with a number of Roma adherents. The Watchtower Society is known for being strict about many moral principles and restrictions.3 In this paper I do not want to focus on describing these principles in detail. However, many of these strict restrictions severely affect the Romani way of life, or in many cases, collide with some traditions of those groups of Roma who converted. For example, Jehovah´s witnesses should be especially cautious about various norms influencing sexual behavior, like avoiding adultery and fornication. In this strict sense any sexual contact between persons not in official marriage is considered immoral and should be strictly avoided. Thus also many Roma marriages with just traditional Romani wedding rituals without an official ceremony are considered as immoral because the partners have sexual contact and are not married officially. These

medzi Rómami na Slovensku“. In: Kiliánová, G. – Kowalská, E. – Krekovi- ²ová, E. (eds.): My a tí druhí v modernej spolo²nosti. Bratislava: Veda. 175– 216. Plachá, O. 2007: Dosah pôsobenia letni²ných a charizmatických hnutí u Rómov – so zameraním na transformáciu emického vnímania rómskej etnickej identity, Mas- ter theses, Bratislava: Univerzita Komenského Bratislava. 3 Holden, Andrew 2002: Jehovah´s Witnesses – Portrait of a Contemporary Religious Movement. London: Routledge; Beckford, James A. 1975: The Trumphet of Prophecy – A Sociological Study of Jehovah´s Witnesses. Oxford: Blackwell; Mann, Brenda J. 1972: “The Great Crowd – Ethnography of Jehovah´s Witnesses”. In: Spradley, James – McCurdy, David (eds.): The Cultural Experience (Ethnography in Complex Society). New York: Waveland Press. 157–168. Values and Ethnicity – Religious Conversions of Roma ... 25 partners are urged to undergo an official wedding ceremony4 if they want to become full members of the Watchtower Society. At most of the congregation meetings these principles are emphasized and often are explicitly articulated. For example at one of the congregation meetings one of the overseers emphasized that there is one legitimate reason for divorce which is adultery and he quoted numerous biblical citations to support the statement using the biblical words to warn the congregation members against sexual misconducts like adultery and fornication. Later after the meeting he told me that he addressed his words mostly to Romani families present at the meeting emphasizing to me that young Romani families without official weddings live in fornication which is a serious problem. He was aware that according to Romani tradition these couples are husband and wife but they are not married officially and thus they live in sin. He said to me that they try to guide these families to arrange official marriages. In many instances these families and couples sooner or later arrange an official wedding ceremony. However, there were some families that were excluded from the Watchtower Society because they refused to undergo an official wedding – mainly because one from the couple had not converted and he or she refused to have a Jehovah´s witness wedding ceremony. Speaking about marriages, another interesting phenomenon is the selection of partners, especially for those young Roma who have been raised in Watchtower Society families. These young people find it more difficult to find their life partners among their counterparts in their communities especially when these potential partners are not converted Jehovah´s Witnesses. Among Romani Jehovah´s witnesses in Slovakia there are many young married Roma couples, both partners Jehovah´s witnesses, coming from distant municipalities and from communities which did not have any natural bonds and contacts before. These couples met at large national or regional gatherings of Jehovah´s witnesses. Several Romani families confirmed to me that they visit these large gatherings not only strictly for religious reasons, but because these gatherings play an important social role and especially for young Roma, serve as a great opportunity to meet their potential life partners. Many scholars speak about the fact that the Watchtower Society strictly rejects emphasizing of ethnicand social differences among its believers. For example, the statistical data following various socio- demographic factors of Jehovah´s Witnesses spanning from 1972 to 1994 in the United States show fairly equal representation of ethnic

4 In Slovakia, the Watchtower Society is one of the officially registered churches with the right to perform weddings and other civic ceremonies. 26 Tomáš Hrusti² groups in the Watchtower Society.5 According to internal statistics of Jehovah´s witnesses in Slovakia there are approximately 1200 Romani Jehovah´s witnesses. This means that the number of Roma in the Slovak branch of the Watchtower Society is almost precisely in accord with the overall percentage of the Roma population in Slovakia. Bryan Wilson analyzing narratives of Jehovah´s Witnesses in Kenya denouncing racism and tribal division of society comes to the point that this verbal rejection of ethnic differences is also reflected in the real representation of various tribes and ethnic groups at the Society.6 According to social anthropologist A.L.Epstein, the Jehovah´s Witnesses emphasizing equality and verbally denying ethnic differences reject stigma associated with some ethnic groups. As he uses the words of one of his informants: “in our faith we do not say that one is Ngoni and the other is Bemba, we are simply brothers and sisters”.7 This change in perception of ethnicity and the balancing of the differences within the process of becoming “brothers and sisters” is on a practical level the same also in balancing the social differences within the process of getting literal, verbal and economical skills for those Witnesses who did not have these skills. As he emphasizes, the Witnesses acquire positive self-identification in this process.8 In the Slovak context, as indicated in my research materials, there is almost identical perception of balancing ethnic differences among the Roma and non-Roma Jehovah´s Witnesses. Former or active Jehovah´s Witnesses state in their conversion narratives many examples of declarations esteeming ethnic equality reflecting also practical occasions. At the same time, these declarations were in strong contrast comparing their experience with the situation in the Catholic Church where most of the Roma Witnesses originated: Yes, I attended the sermons in the church. But I didn´t like it, because once I was walking to the church and I have heard them (non-Roma co-believers) gossiping about me. So I quit it and I did not go there anymore…. (they gossiped) that I am a Gypsy and going to church. So, I quit. If they do not want a Gypsy attending sermons, the Gypsy don´t have to attend the sermons. I didn´t say

5 Stark, Rodney – Iannaccone, Laurence 1997: “Why the Jehovah´s Witnesses Grow so Rapidly: A Theoretical Application”. Journal of Contemporary Re- ligion 12/2:133–157. 6 Wilson, Bryan R. 1974: “Jehovah´s Witnesses in Kenya”. Journal of Religion in Africa 5: 128–149. 7 Epstein, A. L. 1986: „The Millenium and the Self – Jehovah´s Witnesses on the Copperbelt in the ´50s“. Anthropos 81: 545. 8 Epstein, A. L. 1986: „The Millenium and the Self – Jehovah´s Witnesses on the Copperbelt in the ´50s“. Anthropos 81: 546–547. Values and Ethnicity – Religious Conversions of Roma ... 27

anything, because I didn´t want to gossip anyone – we learn that it is bad to gossip. And then, later these women asked me: “Why don´t you go to church?” And I said to them: “Why should I when you gossip about me!?” We can see similar attitude in balancing ethnic differences between Roma and non-Roma Jehovah´s Witnesses also in narratives of non- Roma Witnesses. For example, a women in her eighties strictly rejected any differences stemming from different ethnicities. She answered my question if there are any differences in how Roma and non-Roma Witnesses perceive their religion and faith in following words: It is not true. Who believes to the teachings, if he or she is Roma or so (non- Roma), it is the same, there is no difference! If it is Black, Roma, Russian, there is no difference. There is no difference within God´s organization, God judges according to the heart not according to the skin! This statement was not only verbally declared, but everyday practical life was reflected in it, since this women regularly organized prayers and Biblical studies and Roma and non-Roma witnesses attended these meetings. According to my observations non-Roma and Roma had equal positions and there was no differentiation according to ethnic background visible at these meetings. After one of Bible study meetings (where more than 20 people were present and half of them Roma) I initiated debate about ethnicity and belief in God. All present believers have emphasized that ethnicity doesn´t play any role in their religion and that they do not differentiate. The leader of this prayer group, who is Roma, has patiently explained this situation: This is precious, listen to me. The reason why Roma come to our organization dwells in the fact that there are no differences. In other churches it is a visible and important difference. They differentiate (according to ethnicity). But not we, we are brothers and sisters; there are no differences among us. If a Rom needs help, we help him or her. Or, the other way around. There are no differences among us. The one who would differentiate could not stay with us – he or she would not pass the test. And even if he or she would pass the test with us, she or he would not pass the test with Jehovah. As it is in the Revelation 7:9, “great crowd, which no man was able to number, out of all nations and tribes and peoples and tongues, standing before the throne and before the Lamb“.9 How did I read it? What nations? All nations! Moreover, of all tribes! Peoples and tongues! Not only nations but also tribes! As it stands there, of all nations, tribes, tongues! Of All!

9 Cited from the Watchtower Society´s translation of the Bible: http://www.watchtower. org/e/bible/index.htm 28 Tomáš Hrusti²

After general expressions of agreement with this statement, another believer in the room, an elderly non-Roma woman, emphasized that Jehovah´s Witnesses do not make any differences: If I could say something, I want to say that there are many of our Roma brothers. There are no differences and we see how clean they are, how proper they are, they are truthful – and if it happens sometime, no one is perfect, we also err sometimes, but they are people and may be some of the Roma are more proper than normal people, for example in their dress codes and their speech. So we are all brothers and sisters and there is no difference between us. We do not divide according to that one is Rom and one is another. This statement is very interesting in the sense that she strictly rejects the differences between Roma and non-Roma believers; however, her reasoning is unconsciously influenced by commonplace ethnic stereotypes about Roma. On conscious level she denies these stereotypes – they are clean (stereotypical representation that Roma do not keep hygienic standards), they are truthful (stereotypical representation that Roma cheat, reflected also in Slovak vocabulary “cigániõ” = to cheat, derived from “cigán” = gypsy). As we can see on this statement, in these stereotypical representation there is frequent phenomena of differentiating oneself from the ethnicity of others (in this specific geographical circuit mostly Roma) according to ethnic categories of “us” and “them”, reflecting the representation of normality – we are normal people, they are abnormal.10 In spite of emphasizing that there are no differences between Roma and non- Roma, even long-time Jehovah´s Witnesses have these stereotypical representations deeply rooted in their minds and they automatically refer to them in their narratives, as we can see on previous example. However, these negative stereotypes are present also among Romani Jehovah´s Witnesses, in this specific example among Roma living integrated with non-Roma in the same living standards than their non- Roma neighbors and co-believers. They show similar disrespect to Roma living in a close segregated settlement and their stereotypical representations are identical with the representations their non-Roma

10 Slovak ethnologist Eva Krekovi²ová emphasizes that one of the important aspects of creating auto-images and hetero-images is also reflected hierarchism of groups, ethnic groups. There is also important factor of evaluator and evaluatee (imagining subject and imagined object) according to categories of „us“ and „them“. Judging according to these categories resulting into social, cultural or confessional hierarchy is a primary feature of these auto-images and hetero-images. Krekovi²ová, Eva 2005: Mentálne obrazy, stereotypy a mýty vo folklóre a v politike. Bratislava: Ústav etnológie SAV, 15.

Values and Ethnicity – Religious Conversions of Roma ... 29 neighbors hold about them. Moreover, they accept these stereotypical representations, acquire them and subjectify them with their own romipen – the quality of being Roma, with their ethnic identification, mainly when they confront themselves with non-Roma majority. We can clearly see this phenomenon at the example of reaction of Roma Jehovah´s Witnesses on previous statement of their non-Roma elder sister, acquiring these stereotypes and confirming them: And we sometimes used to do that, I know that a Rom steals and so, but now, they have left their old personality and act according to biblical commandments…. After you bath you do not dress into old and dirty clothes, but clean! If you dressed up in the dirty clothes, your bath would be useless. In this case, self-identification process with these ethnic stereotypes was possible only because these Roma undergone deep change stemming from their conversion to the Watchtower Society and through this religious conversion their outer form was transformed – as it is illustrated in the image of taking “new and clean clothes”.11 Their romipen (subjectively perceived quality of being Roma) had been unchanged but got rid of subjectively perceived “uncleanness” reflected in stereotypical representations and got dressed into clean clothes worn also by their non-Roma neighbors and at the same time these clothes were given to them by Jehovah. These clothes, unless they pollute them by not perceiving all nations, tribes and tongues as equal, can secure for them the salvation. The group leader, a Rom himself, closed this discussion about nonexistence of ethnic differences by anchoring these principles with Biblical quotations12 and came to the point that there are differences

11 An elderly Roma, long-time Jehovah´s Witness, while discussing her self- identification principles, stated at the first place that people in her village do not take her as Roma, because she doesn´t steal and she can take care of her family: „People do not take me as a Roma here, I am like White here. They like me here. They are never suspicious with me, for example, when somebody looses potatoes. And the police asked the mayor (while investigating one specific case), ´where does this family live?“ And the mayor stands up for us, ´I stand up for them, they grow their own vegetables, they have all what they need, they would never steal. Go there and check it yourselves, they have geese at their yard, cow, swine, field full of vegetables.´ We have all that we need. We do not need to steal. And we cannot steal.“ 12 Acts 10:34–35, „at this Peter opened his mouth and said: “For a certainty I perceive that God is not partial, 35 but in every nation the man that fears him and works righteousness is acceptable to him.“ Revelation 7:9, „a great crowd, which no man was able to number, out of all nations and tribes and peoples and tongues, standing before the throne and before the Lamb...“. Cited from http://www.watchtower.org/e/bible/index.htm 30 Tomáš Hrusti² among people, but differences stemming from the precondition if an individual works for God or doesn´t work for God. No, no, brothers. Let´s speak this way. The truth is, and it was already in the Jewish nation, and it is now, that the more zealous one is, the more he or she works for God and the zeal urges him or her. But in the other way, we are all equal, there are no differences among us. The Lord Jesus didn´t say that if a wealthy man would come he would be seated at the table and if a poor would come he would be seated on the ground. But He says no! All are equal. They must all be equal, we must not make differences. One of the values that have been changed dramatically after the conversion to Jehovah´s Witnesses is the perception of ethnic differences between Roma and non-Roma co-believers. Jehovah´s Witnesses adopted a strict concept that all people are equal and there are no differences between Roma and non-Roma. This transformation of values is clearly not only declared verbally by converts within both ethnical backgrounds, but is visible in everyday interaction in the congregation of Jehovah´s Witnesses. As the deeper analysis of narratives reflecting equality shows us, the deep grounded stereotypical representations are still present on unconscious level; however, it is transformed within religious symbolism of new-born individual united in the same and equal “flock of God´s sheep”.

Conclusions

The Watchtower Society has a neutral attitude toward Roma, or does not develop specific activities in pursuit of pastoration of only Roma. Their attitude toward Roma could be characterized as ethnically indifferent, in its mission they focus equally on the non-Roma and the Roma as potential candidates for teaching and in their missionary work they particularly do not distinguish by ethnicity. However, ethnicity and identity of members has a relevant importance. Taking into account the relationship of ethnic identity and religious identification, for Jehovah’s Witnesses, the ethnic differences seem to be negated. Moreover, those Roma who have undergone conversion to the Jehovah’s Witnesses significantly redefine their value system. It therefore appears that membership of a religious movement or religious identity is often a tool for constructing new forms of social and ethnic relations. It appears that this emphasis on wiping their ethnic identity is a universal feature of Watchtower society converts. Knowing the importance of perception of “brotherhood” and “sisterhood” in traditional Romani communities, the concept of ethnic Values and Ethnicity – Religious Conversions of Roma ... 31 brotherhood is transformed to religious “brotherhood”. New brothers and sisters are not identified according to Romipen, but according to shared spiritual status.

The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” The Case of the Czech Spiritual Milieu

MICHAELA ONDRAŠINOVÁ

Introduction

Increasing attention of sociologists to forms of religiosity1 not exclusively connected to a particular religious organization (a church, denomination, etc.) can be detected from the second half of the 1980s, with its precursors already in the 1960s2. The study of these cultural forms – called variously New Age or the New Age movement3, alternative spirituality4, reflexive spirituality5, subjective-life spirituality6, etc., and termed detraditionalized spirituality in this study7 – developed often in close relation to the belief

1 In this study, the term “religiosity” is used in a neutral sense as a label for diverse religious forms regardless of whether they are connected to the spiritual (holistic) milieu or to a specific religious organization. 2 Especially Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion: The Problem of Religion in Modern Society (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967). 3 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought (New York: State University of New York Press, 1996); Paul Hee- las, The New Age Movement: The Celebration of the Self and the Sacralization of Modernity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1996). 4 Steven J. Sutcliffe and Marion Bowman, eds., Beyond New Age: Exploring Alternative Spirituality (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000). 5 Wade Clark Roof, Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of American Religion (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 6 Paul Heelas, Linda Woodhead et al., The Spiritual Revolution: Why Religion is Giving Way to Spirituality (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005). 7 To distinguish the concept of “spirituality” which refers to forms of unchurched detraditionalized religiosity, from “spirituality” used as a label for specific religious expressions within churches or other religious organizations, I use the adjective “detraditionalized”. By it I apply the notion of detraditionalization elaborated by John B. Thompson. See John B. Thompson, “Tradition and Self in a Mediated World,” in Detraditionalization. Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity, ed. Paul Heelas, Scott Lash and Paul Morris (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, 89–108). Thompson refers to the transformation of traditions caused by the spread of printed and, later on, electronic media. Under this influence, traditions, originally local phenomena maintained by face-to-face interactions, have become globally available arti- 34 Michaela Ondrašinová about the limited character of the secularization process. This perspective on secularization can be described as the acknowledgement both of the decreasing societal and personal importance of established religions and of the parallel transformation of religion into new forms that persist or even thrive in contemporary society.8 It can be also assessed as being conducive to the growing scholarly interest in detraditionalized spirituality and as useful for justification of this topic as a relevant research area. Moreover, this idea about secularization can be interpreted as indicating a radical difference between religion connected to established religious organizations (considered to be in decline) and “a new social form of religion”9 (detraditionalized spirituality) the existence of which is sometimes regarded as a sign of new sacralization10. The latter idea can be illustrated by the perspective of Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead which is based on the notion of two forms of religiosity: a life-as form (identified with institutionalized religion, or the so-called “congregational domain”) and a subjective-life form (identified with spirituality outside religious organizations, within the “holistic milieu”).11 In Heelas and Woodhead’s account, these two types represent clearly differentiated forms of religiosity that attract different types of subjects. In other words, it can be inferred that people attracted by the “subjective-life” (detraditionalized) spirituality do not identify with churches and denominations and with values promoted by them. This kind of argumentation evokes an image of a participant in the spiritual milieu as somebody who is not interested in institutionalized religion or who is anti-religious. The boundary between institutionalized religion and detraditionalized spirituality seems to be clear-

cles. Consequently, individuals (and collectivities) can choose and combine elements from diverse de-localized and mediated traditions – a feature that is typical for detraditionalized spirituality or the so-called “spiritual seeking”. In addition to the term “detraditionalized spirituality”, I use the “spiritual milieu” concept in this study (see e.g. Stef Aupers and Dick Houtman, “Beyond the Spiritual Supermarket: The Social and Public Significance of New Age Spirituality,” Journal of Contemporary Religion 21/2 (2006): 201–222). By this notion I mean the networks in which various ideas and techniques related to detraditionalized spirituality are invented, transformed and exchanged among its participants. 8 For an overview of the basic argument and of its diverse elaborations see James A. Beckford, Social Theory and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 52–59. 9 Luckmann, op. cit. 114; Thomas Luckmann, “The Privatization of Religion and Mo- rality,” in Detraditionalization. Critical Reflections on Authority and Identity, ed. Paul Heelas, Scott Lash and Paul Morris (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996, 72–86), p. 73–76. 10 Heelas, Woodhead et al., op. cit. 9–10, 77–128, 149. 11 Heelas, Woodhead et al., op. cit. 13–32. The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” 35 cut. This distinction between “religion” and “spirituality” is supported also by the common identification of the spiritual milieu participants with persons who declare they are “spiritual but not religious”12. Such approaches might however be linked to an a priori employment of a “religion versus spirituality” dichotomy which is, as was also pointed out by Matthew Wood, a rather problematic methodological tool.13 Consequently, the research project presented in this study was based on the aim to open the opposition between institutionalized religion and detraditionalized spirituality to scrutiny, or in other words, to “denaturalize” it. Thus, this study focuses on processes of construction and deconstruction of borders between detraditionalized spirituality and institutionalized religion. Rather than studying these processes at the level of the academic discourse itself, it concentrates on emic discourses available within the Czech spiritual milieu. Furthermore, comments on a comparison of the Czech situation with the Polish spiritual milieu are added so that the influence of wider social and historical contexts on the analysed discourses can be adumbrated. In other words, this paper analyses the ways of inventing, maintaining as well as challenging the boundaries between an established religious organization (the Roman Catholic Church in particular)14 and the spiritual milieu. My approach to this issue is shaped by the constructionist theory of meaning connected to discourse studies (especially to Foucauldian approaches)15; thus, I do not regard a particular delimitation of domains of the Roman Catholic Church and the spiritual milieu as natural, fixed or immutable, but as a discursive construct that is context-dependent.

12 Wade Clark Roof, “Religion and Spirituality: Toward an Integrated Analysis,“ in Handbook of the Sociology of Religion, ed. Michele Dillon (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2003, 137–148), p. 147. 13 Wood leads his criticism from a slightly different angle; he criticizes theories of subjectivity applied by some authors (mainly, but not only, by Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead), particularly the notion of the self-authority (linked to the “holistic milieu”) and its alleged opposition to the external authority (associated with “religion”). Nevertheless, Wood’s comment on this issue is highly relevant for this study too: “Constructing a continuum where external-authority and self-authority lie at each extreme, sociologists have separated religion from spirituality and thereby constructed yet another problematic binary opposition in social theory.” Matthew Wood, Possession, Power and the New Age: Ambiguities of Authority in Neoliberal Socie- ties (Aldershot/Burlington: Ashgate, 2007), 63. 14 The Roman Catholic Church is a dominant religious organization both in the Czech Republic and Poland. 15 Margaret Wetherell, “Debates in Discourse Research,” in Discourse Theory and Prac- tice: A Reader, ed. Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates (Lon- don: Sage 2001, 380–399), p. 393. 36 Michaela Ondrašinová

More specifically, this paper is concerned with these questions: How are the borders between “spirituality” and “religion” constructed and/or contested by discourses present in the spiritual milieu? In what way is a distinction between “religion” and “spirituality” employed in self-presentation (construction of identity) of participants in the spiritual milieu? How is an interaction between “spiritual” and “religious” identity managed and justified?

Methodology

A theoretical base for the research and analysis lies in the discourse studies. To be more specific, I am influenced by the perspective of Michel Foucault on issues of subjectivity, discourse and power16, but at the same time follow the re-articulations of his approach that take into account the individual agency in relation to a discourse. It means that they pay more attention to issues such as the identification of an individual (or the lack of it) with a particular, discursively constructed, “subject position”, the individual performing of this position, or his/her resistance to dominant discourses.17 Concerning the methods, I employed qualitative textual analysis and qualitative interviews. Firstly, in order to study discourses on “religion” and “churches” available to the broader public attracted by detraditionalized spirituality, I analysed one volume of the Czech magazine called Dotek: Nezávislý m»sí²ník pro duchovní kulturu [The Touch: The Independent Monthly for Spiritual Culture]18, and a web- based discussion that evolved under the topic “Christianity and

16 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” in Power. Essential Works of Foucault 1954– 1984, Volume Three, ed. James D. Faubion (London: Penguin Books, 2002, 326–348); Paul Rabinow, ed., Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth. Essential Works of Foucault 1954– 1984, Volume One (London: Penguin Books, 2000). 17 Stuart Hall, “Introduction: Who Needs ‘Identity’?” in Questions of Cultural Identity, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage, 1996, 1–17), p. 10–14. See also Nigel Edley, “Analysing Masculinity: Interpretive Repertoires, Ideological Dilemmas and Subject Positions,” in Discourse as Data: A Guide for Analysis, ed. Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates (London: Sage 2001, 189–228); Bronwyn Da- vies and Rom Harré, “Positioning: The Discursive Production of Selves,” in Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader, ed. Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor and Simeon J. Yates (London: Sage 2001, 261–271). 18 Volume 13 (2004), issues 1–12. This magazine aims to provide information on “the best from spiritual traditions of the world” (as stated at its back cover). The founder and chief editor of the magazine promotes – mainly via his regular editorials – a discourse that emphasizes personal experience, belief in oneself, anti-dogmatism, tolerance to diversity, exploration of the self and the individual spiritual journey. The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” 37

Churches” on the websites DušeCZ.com& Esoterika.cz19. These sources were later complemented by a discussion on the case of the Catholic requiem mass which was held for Eduard Tomáš, one of the best known Czech Yoga teachers. Secondly, I conducted semi-structured interviews with individuals engaged in detraditionalized spirituality. My goal was to explore one potential aspect of their presented identity, which could be defined by their relations to institutionalized religion (represented mainly by Roman-Catholic Christianity in these interviews). In the course of the project, I concentrated on cases of those spiritual milieu participants who were simultaneously members of the Roman Catholic Church. An analysis of four such cases is presented in this study.20 Concerning these cases, I was particularly interested in discourses and strategies these persons used to cope with their position “in between” a churched religion and detraditionalized spirituality, a position which might be considered unusual from the perspective of some “spiritual” as well as academic21 discourses.

Results

Constructing and Challenging the Borders: Discourses of the Czech Spiritual Milieu on “Religion”

In this part, results of an analysis of the first group of sources (the Dotek magazine and the websites DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz) will be pre-

19 “Kìesõanství a církve. Diskuze na DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz” [Christianity and churches. A discussion on DušeCZ.com & Esoterica.cz], available at http://www. esoterika [accessed 10.6. 2009]; comments from July 2003 to April 2009 were analysed. The DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz websites are presented as the “information server for spiritual development and personal growth”. They mediate various services and topics such as fortune telling, reiki, su-jok, oriental dance, astrology, magic, channel- ing, dream interpretation, mythology and religion. See DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz, http://www.esoterika [accessed 10.6. 2009]. 20 These interviews were conducted with two women and two men aged between 27 and 38 approximately during the period between April and August 2009. Both women were baptized in their childhood while the men have converted to Catholi- cism recently. All of them keep a connection to detraditionalized spirituality: they preserve and develop specific beliefs (in reincarnation, energy centres and canals in the body, cosmic force or energy, etc.) and techniques (yoga, tai chi, su-jok, various types of meditation, aliquot singing, macrobiotics, Chinese medicine). In order to secure anonymity of my informants, fictive names (Paula, Jane, Martin, Peter) are used when referring to them. 21 Heelas, Woodhead et al., op. cit. 38 Michaela Ondrašinová sented. These findings on a discourse publicly available in the spiritual milieu will be then confronted with data from the interviews with “people in between”. The analysis of the Dotek magazine and the web discussion showed that the justification of the “spiritual” identity was connected to distancing oneself from institutionalized religion and a church organization (Catholicism and the Catholic Church, occasionally Christianity in general), which is in accord with expectations of most sociologists of religion. However, I aimed to go beyond this basic statement and to explore it more deeply in order to reveal the ways the “spiritual subject position” was presented, transformed or questioned. The modes this basic distinction was expressed can be schematized in two following oppositions: 1) a churched religion/Catholic Christianity versus the individual spiritual development, inner faith and direct experience of God; 2) a churched religion/Catholic Christianity versus the early Christianity and Jesus‘ teachings. The churched religion (Catholicism) was generally conceived as opposing the individual spiritual development and obstructing a direct experience of God. This idea was supported by frequent evoking the topic of “crimes” of the historical Church, including a persecution of persons who were believed to have a direct spiritual experience (e.g. Christian mystics, such as Meister Eckhart), of women accused of sorcery, or illegitimate and opportunistic censorship of the Scripture.22 Furthermore, the features of passivity and obedience to dogmas were ascribed to Catholics; they were constructed as the homogenous “other”, as a “herd”. These characteristics were contrasted with the active spiritual seeking which was at the same time presented as a higher stage of human development: In my opinion, the church is a good institution for those who are content with being in herd and being led. Not everybody has enough inner power and discipline to set out for a journey individually.23 A similar strategy was identified in the case of the second outlined opposition. The notion of the early or “original” Christianity referred especially to Jesus and his teachings, or to his first disciples. Referring to Jesus was relatively frequent and was connected to his generally

22 For an example see Helena Blochová, “Stìedov»ká mystika a mysticismus moderní fyziky” [The medieval mystique and the mysticism of the modern physics], Dotek 13/12 (2004): 6–9. 23 “Kìesõanství a církve. Diskuze na DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz” [Christianity and churches. A discussion on DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz], a comment from 11. 7. 2003 9:44; available at http://www.esoterika [accessed 10. 6. 2009]. The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” 39 positive valuation. This estimation was related to interpreting Jesus as, for example, a developed spiritual master or a spiritual person with direct communication with God. By this kind of reinterpretation, the figure of Jesus was removed from the Catholic doctrine and connected with the ideal of spiritual seeking. Consequently, Jesus and his teachings were often contrasted with the Catholic doctrine, and the Catholic Church was criticized for deviating from values ascribed to Jesus’ mission. The fact that Christian teachings and the New Testament, which I regard rather as an esoteric guide for the journey of high spiritual initiation, were later on abused for the church aims is a different issue. When I comment on Christianity I mean the original teaching as was preached by the Christ. (...) The fact that churches later on discredited and abused the teaching for their power objectives does not according to me degrade the original principles according to which it is possible to work spiritually quite fairly even today. However, personally I practise Buddhism.24 This critique of the church does not exclude a possibility of being connected to Christianity or using elements of Christian teachings and practices for personal “spiritual growth”. Nevertheless, the form of Christianity referred to was clearly distinguished from a dominant, “official” Catholic tradition and was identified with esoteric Christi- anity, Christian mysticism or with the early phases of Christianity.25 These “legitimate” forms of Christianity were interpreted as techniques capable of causing a personal transformation and leading to personal spiritual development. Elements of Christian practice (e.g. the Lord’s Prayer, reading the Bible) or important Christian figures (God the Father, Jesus Christ, Virgin Mary, Christian saints) were thus put in a framework of promotion of the discourse about an inner experience, individual spiritual transformation and individual spiritual journey. Hence, the analysed discourse admits the legitimacy of interaction with beliefs and techniques identified as Christian, however mixing of the participation in the spiritual milieu with the involvement in the Catholic Church is regarded rather as a fruitless version of a “spiritual journey”. Consequently, when analyzing the interview cases I looked

24 “Kìesõanství a církve. Diskuze na DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz” [Christianity and churches. A discussion on DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz], a comment from 24. 3. 2007 22:07; available at http://www.esoterika [accessed 10. 6. 2009]. 25 The esoteric and mystic Christian sources were portrayed as legitimate also by comments about persecution of their sympathizers by the “official” church (see especially issues 4 and 12, vol. 13 of Dotek). In addition, the early Christian teachers were made attractive for the spiritual seekers by being labeled “spiritual masters” or “experts on spiritual practice” (Theodore J. Nottingham, “Setkání s nestvoìeným” [An encounter with the uncreated], Dotek 13/4 (2004): 5–8, p. 6). 40 Michaela Ondrašinová for strategies for justification of a parallel belonging to the Catholic Church and involvement with techniques and ideas of the spiritual milieu. On the basis of my very first suppositions, I expected these “people in between” to stress the coherence of the churched religion and detraditionalized spirituality. Nevertheless, the analysis showed a more complex picture of their argumentation. In fact, in most cases26 the distinction between “spirituality” and “religion” was preserved; they were attributed with different functions and thus prevented from competing with each other: I just feel the need to divide the queries about my spiritual journey a bit because it has in fact two aspects, yeah, one is some generally spiritually- alternative which may be for me the way to myself, as if the way to become aware of myself. And the second way is the one which in fact has recently culminated for me by this baptism, and this is in fact a way to God. With this, that these journeys cannot be separated absolutely but are somehow directed a bit differently (...).27 Moreover, the interviewees did not stop at the level of this basic difference between Catholicism and detraditionalized spirituality and continued their classifications within each of the fields. This more detailed classification was more important for the interviewees’ self- positioning than setting a contrast between “religion” and “spirituality” as between two homogenous wholes. This method thus made their argumentation different from the discourse of the analysed textual and internet sources (Dotek and DušeCZ.com). To be more specific, in all interview cases (even though in varying degrees) there were acts of classification that made some forms of detraditionalized spirituality as well as some forms of Catholicism illegitimate. This strategy was congruent with interviewees’ emphasis on diversity within the Catholic Church and thus also the possibility to find a suitable place in it. In their narratives, this seeking was personified by their searching for a Catholic priest whose opinions would fit their values (promoted in the spiritual milieu). In addition, another difference from the discourse of Dotek and DušeCZ.com&Esoterika.cz lies in the relative importance the inter- viewees28 attributed to the (mainstream, non-esoteric) Catholic

26 In one case (Peter), this distinction was not formulated. However, the concept of difference can be found within Peter’s narrative about his spiritual life: in using the concept of “energy” in earlier phases of his story and the concept of “God” in phases in which his ties to Christianity became an important topic in the story. The latter however does not mean that Peter rejects the spiritual milieu activities. 27 The interview with Martin from 23. 4. 2009; transcript p. 2. 28 Especially Jane, Martin and Paula. Peter’s connection to a Christian tradition was expressed indirectly; by his identification with a Christian from the ancient times. The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” 41

Christian tradition or a Christian cultural history of their region. While Martin perceived its influence at the level of language, Paula pointed out the broad availability of churches and facilities for common practice. This “physical presence” of Catholic Christianity was a feature that Paula missed in the case of Buddhism or other “Eastern” systems, even though these systems (consumed mainly as philosophies and techniques) were highly significant for her worldview29: (...) simply a person feels to be integrated to this Catholicism in the culture yeah and simply the churches fascinate you, simply the Middle Ages, somehow the Baroque in some way and you simply have to cope with it and this is the first thing to meet yeah and hmm the Buddhism is still too much far even though it may be ideologically close to you, so you rather redefine this Catholicism so as you can live in it, so as it fits in to that of yours (...).30 Nevertheless, what can be identified as a similar feature across all cases of analysed discourses is the type of values that were promoted. In other words, the interviewees supported the same values as did the authors of articles in the Dotek magazine and debaters on DušeCZ.com& Esoterika.cz. To be more specific, the importance of individual experience, inner and living faith, anti-dogmatism, openness and tolerance to diversity of ways and opinions were stressed across the studied cases. The justification of interviewees’ engagement with Catholicism was based on the attribution of these values to parishes and priests they were in contact with. These values also functioned as a norm for reinterpretation of some Catholic practices or elements of the doctrine (e.g. the Sunday mass, the concept of sin, the concept of God, the Lord’s Prayer), as have already been shown above. Applying these values and stressing the diversity within the Catholic Church enabled interviewees to distance themselves from negative images of being a member of the church, constructed by some discourses in the spiritual milieu. This distance was expressed by criticism of some aspects of the churched religion, but also aspects of the spiritual milieu, which were proclaimed not to fit the norm established by these values. Thus, the “other” was created; it was not, however, identified either with a “religion” or with “spirituality”, but went across them. It provided a tool for constructing a meaningful

However, this figure of an early Christian corresponds rather to conceptions of the esoteric or “non-mainstream” forms of Christianity (and is thus closer to the discourse of the Dotek magazine and DušeCZ.com & Esoterika.cz websites). 29 Paula identified especially with the expression “Catholic Buddhism”. However, she also described herself as “non-affiliated”, “open” or as seeking “her own alternative”. 30 The interview with Paula from 29.6. 2009; transcript p. 11. 42 Michaela Ondrašinová position of interviewees – the position of somebody who is able to identify and overcome the deficiencies present in both fields and who can transfer the positives of one field to another.31 Consequently, the ability to draw from both fields was established as valuable.

Pragmatic Nature of the “Spirituality – Religion” Dichotomy

My starting point for this section might be thinking about differences between the interviewees, mainly differences in a degree of importance that was attributed to the topic of the interview and degree of criticism directed against the Catholic Church.32 In what follows, I explore further the presence of these variations in attitudes within the spiritual milieu while understanding them as illustrations of the pragmatic or political nature of delimitation of “religion” and “spirituality”. To clarify this issue, I will use one specific discursive case – a discussion which developed around the topic of the Catholic requiem mass that had been served for Eduard Tomáš, one of the most popular Czech Yoga teachers, in 2002. This event was brought to the fore by another Yoga teacher, Jiìí Vacek, who related this issue to the question of acceptability of interactions between Yoga and Catholicism.33

31 For example, Paula suggested a combination of Catholic liturgy with meditation, tantric or yogic techniques; Martin proposed an introduction of “spiritual” techniques of self-awareness and personal development to the Catholic Church and of the concept of transcendence to the spiritual milieu. 32 These differences might be related to the variety of contexts and personal histories the respondents were embedded in. On one imaginary pole of the scale I would place Martin for whom the topic of the interview was highly relevant as he was undergoing a life phase of reflection on his position within both fields. Factors contributing to it include his recent conversion to Catholicism as well as his colleagues and friends from the meditation centre (where Martin lived and worked) who challenged the value of Catholicism for a spiritual seeker and spurred Martin to discuss his Catholic identity. On the other pole, Jane attributed only little importance to the theme of the interview and regarded it to be relatively difficult to speak about. A conflict with her (Catholic) mother-in-law about Jane’s engagement with detraditionalized spirituality had been calmed down several years ago and Jane preferred to keep the present state of quiet tolerance, which enabled her to participate in both fields without a need to discuss and justify it. 33 Vacek had commented negatively on this event in his memoirs published in 2003. Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl sebe: Vlastní životopis, 7. díl [How I searched for the God and found myself: The autobiography, 7th volume] (Praha: Jiìí Vacek, 2003), 135–137. In following years, he was expressing his stance on this issue on his websites http://www.jirivacek-satguru.cz/. The discussion that is analysed in this study started at the end of 2003 with publication of an article condemning Va- cek’s opinion in the Dotek magazine (Martin Paìík, “Jak jsem hledal sebe a nalezl boha. Nad pam»õmi Jiìího Vacka – apologie zesnulých i žijících“ [How I searched for The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” 43

Implicitly, the issue was connected with the long-term tension between Vacek and Tomáš and their followers.34 The discursive exchange between these two camps revealed how differently the boundary between “religion” and “spirituality” can be constructed by people involved in a similar kind of “spiritual” technique (Yoga in this case). On the one hand, especially Jiìí Vacek and some of his sympathizers constructed clear borders between Yoga and Catholic Christianity and interpreted their violation (as appeared in the case of the requiem mass for Tomáš) in terms of raising doubts about the power of Yoga to lead to liberation.35 On the other hand, especially followers of Eduard Tomáš contested such firm borders and presented Tomáš as a “builder of bridges”36 between people of diverse confessions, including the Catholics. The requiem mass was interpreted by them as a Catholic way of saying goodbye to Tomáš and expressing respect for him. In addition to the stress on tolerance to diversity of confessions, the emphasis was put on mystical or spiritual experience that transcends a formal affiliation to a specific confession.37 These opinions on a relation between Yoga and Catholicism could hardly be separated from their pragmatic or political context, i.e. from a particular conflict between two Yogic schools. Supporting or challenging the opposition between Yoga and Catholicism was inseparable from taking a position within the whole conflict and influencing its progress. The “Yoga versus Catholicism” theme was used as an argumentation tool which was refined to disprove arguments of the other side and to win the competition.

myself and found the God. Over the memoirs of Jiìí Vacek – an apology of deceased and living], Dotek 12/12 (2003): 12), and was revived in 2005 by re-publishing of Paìík’s article on the websites of Jitìní zem» [the Matutinal Land] (http://www. jitrnizeme.cz/view.php?cisloclanku=2005081601). A parallel debate appeared also on the websites Christnet.cz (http://www.christnet.cz/diskuse/archiv/tema_1910.html). The bulk of discussions analysed here took part in October and November 2005. 34 For more information on Eduard Tomáš and Jiìí Vacek, see Milan Fujda, “Accultura- tion of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga” in this volume. 35 Jiìí Vacek, “Neznalost neomlouvá” [Ignorance is not an excuse], 2005, available at http://www.jirivacek-satguru.cz/clanky/clanky-rok-2005/Neznalost-neomlouva; [accessed 15.8. 2009]; Jiìí Vacek, “Naposled o zádušní mši” [For the last time about the requiem mass], 2006, available at http://www.jirivacek-satguru.cz/clanky/clanky- rok-2006-i/Naposled-o-zadusni-msi [accessed 15.8. 2009]. 36 Honza Jedli²ka, “Mám rád Eduarda i Mílu Tomášovy” [I like Eduard and Míla Tomášs] – a discussion entry under the subject “the Requiem Mass” (28.10. 2005 10:11:33), available at http://www.christnet.cz/diskuse/archiv/tema_1910.html [accessed 15.8. 2009]. 37 Paìík, op. cit. note 34; Petr Pavlík, “Co k tomu dodám” [What I will add] – a discussion entry under the subject “the Requiem Mass” (2.11. 2005 11:35:39), available at http://www.christnet.cz/diskuse/archiv/tema_1910.html [accessed 15.8. 2009]. 44 Michaela Ondrašinová

The Polish Perspective and its Challenges

Due to the nature of qualitative research, my exploration has concentrated on the Czech spiritual milieu. However, in this section I will make several comments that arose when another spatial context (Poland) had been taken into account. These comments are mainly meant as suggestions of topics worthy of further investigation. The following discussion has been influenced by the idea about the importance of local contexts to which globalized elements of culture are re-embedded, and thus about regional differences in the character of detraditionalized spirituality.38 This point can be applied to distinctions within the Central European region as well. In this sense, Poland is a valuable case for comparison with the Czech Republic due to the dissimilar position of the Catholic Church in that society as well as potentially divergent meanings attributed to “being a Catholic”,39 which influence the conceptualization of a relation between religious affiliation and involvement in the spiritual milieu. Concerning the discourse of the Polish spiritual milieu, one of its features significant for the topic of this study is the number of references to the Catholic Church representatives engaged in techniques of detraditionalized spirituality. As Dorota Hall in her analysis of the Polish spiritual milieu magazine called Nieznany gwiat [The Unknown World] shows, these references were used in reaction to criticism from the Catholic Church as justifications of various techniques and ideas of detraditionalized spirituality.40 In the Czech materials analysed in this study, no explicit polemic exchanges of this type or articles about Catholic Church representatives involved in any sort of the spiritual milieu technique were visible. Even though this point would need further checking (analysing more magazines and websites related to detraditionalized spirituality) I will outline one possible explanation of this difference. It might be related to dissimilar positions of „Catholicism” in historical discourses that were

38 Dorota Hall, “UFO in the Countryside: The Case of Wylatowo, Poland,” in Religions Churches and Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe, ed. Irena Borowik (Kraków: NO- MOS, 2006), 221–230. 39 According to European Value Survey data (1999) for Poland, 94% of the whole population declared that they belong to the Catholic Church, which was 98.6% of those who identified with a religious group. In the Czech Republic, only 29.6% of the whole population declared the affiliation to Catholicism, which was however nearly 85% of those who identified with any religious denomination. 40 Dorota Hall, “The New Age in Poland: Lines of Conflict” (paper presented at the CESNUR conference Religious Movements, Globalization and Conflict: Transnational Perspectives, Palermo, June 2–5, 2005); available at http://www.cesnur.org/2005/ pa_hall.htm [accessed 20. 8. 2009, cited with the permission of the author]. The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” 45 employed in the construction of the Polish and Czech „nation“. While for the notion of the “Polish nation“, the emphasis on its Catholic identity was in many aspects constitutive, for the “Czech nation” construct, the anti-clerical and anti-church discourse became significant. This Czech nationalist discourse was predominantly related to anti-Catholicism, as Catholicism was the confession of the ruling elite of the Hapsburg monarchy. In addition, the myth of the “democratic Protestant” Czech nation (evoking the idealized Hussite movement) that was later violently recatholized played an important role in promotion of the negative representation of the Catholic Church in the Czech lands.41 From this point of view, it would be interesting to explore in detail the ways these regional and historical divergences have influenced the contemporary discourses of the spiritual milieus in both countries. Moreover, such an exploration would also provide a check on the existence of a common (global) discourse of detraditionalized spirituality, or in words of Paul Heelas, of the “lingua franca” constitutive of the New Age movement.42

Conclusions

The aim of this study was to “denaturalize” the borders between a churched religion (represented by the Roman Catholic Church) and detraditionalized spirituality. It means that instead of a priori considering these borders to be clearly fixed, the exploration of processes of their establishing, maintaining and transgressing was seen as necessary. The approach chosen for this task was a qualitative and discursive one – I analysed discourses present in the spiritual milieu and

41 David Václavík, Náboženství a moderní ²eská spole²nost [Religion and the modern Czech society] (Praha: Grada, 2009), 52–74; Jiìí Malíì, “Sekularizace a politika v ‘dlouhém’ 19. století [Secularization and politics in the ‘long’ 19th century], in Seku- larizace v ²eských zemích v letech 1848 – 1914 [Secularization in the Czech lands in 1848 – 1914], ed. Lukáš Fasora, Jiìí Hanuš and Jiìí Malíì (Brno: CDK, 2007, 11 – 24). Another important aspect can be seen in the relationship between contemporary detraditionalized spirituality and vernacular religiosity – an aspect which seems to be of great importance for the Polish spiritual milieu. Dorota Hall in particular speaks about a “peculiar continuity between Polish traditional religious patterns and the sensibility promoted by the new trends of spirituality” (Hall, op. cit. p. 229; see also Dorota Hall,“Life-As Spirituality as the Third Option? A View from the Polish Perspective,” Journal of Alternative Spiritualities and New Age Studies 4 (2008): 3–16). Although a deeper exploration of this issue in relation to the Czech context would be necessary, this connection to traditional popular religiosity is, in my opinion, of far less importance for the Czech spiritual milieu when compared to the Polish one. 42 Heelas, op. cit. p. 2–29. 46 Michaela Ondrašinová the ways they are working in creating, questioning or deconstructing these boundaries. One of starting points for my research was a depiction of differences between (institutionalized) “religion” and (detraditionalized) “spirituality” in a sociological discourse expressed by Paul Heelas and Linda Woodhead43 and reflection on usefulness of the emerging opposition between these two forms of religiosity. In the following lines I will summarise what my findings say about this “religion versus spirituality” dichotomy, or about the opposition between “religious” and “spiritual” identity. Firstly, presenting the identity of the spiritual milieu by putting it in contrast to the institutionalized or churched religion was relatively common in the studied textual sources (but not in interviews). However, this discursive construction of the “religious other” does not exclude participating in “religious” (Catholic) practices or accepting some Catholic beliefs. These “religious” practices, beliefs or persons can be legitimately talked about in a positive way also within the “spiritual” discourses (which was also the case of the analysed interviews). The condition for it is nevertheless their reinterpretation, their linking to specific ideals supported by the spiritual milieu discourses (tolerance of diversity, anti-dogmatism, primary role of personal experience, self-awareness and personal development). To put it differently, these values were used as discursive tools of justification not only when referring to the spiritual milieu but also in connection with (some parts or aspects of) Catholicism and the Church. Beside this, it is possible to say that also some members of the Catholic Church make reference to these values (the case of my interviewees), and thus that the life within churches might be influenced by the “subjectivization”44 processes more than is usually admitted.45 Secondly, the construction of differences between “religion” and “spirituality” in discourses of the spiritual milieu participants does not necessarily imply their anti-religious attitude or their indifference to “religion”. It can be connected, as was visible in the interviews, with the promotion of an “exchange” between a churched religion and detraditionalized spirituality, and thus with justification of a personal involvement in a religious organization.

43 Heelas, Woodhead et al., op. cit. 44 Heelas, Woodhead et al., op. cit. 45 This is rather a suggestion for further research than a strong claim. I am aware that the group of my interviewees is not a representative sample of members of the Catholic Church (as it was not the aim of my research). The Negotiation of Borders between “Religion” and “Spirituality” 47

Thirdly, the “other” against whom a “spiritual seeker” establishes his/her identity (with regard to questions discussed in this study) is not necessarily a “religious” other, i.e. related to institutionalized religion, but can also be linked to some aspects of the spiritual milieu. The “other” of my interviewees included some expressions of Catholicism (e.g. “rural” Catholicism) as well as some forms of detraditionalized spirituality (e.g. spiritism, fortune telling). Thus, according to my results I would argue that a differentiation from institutionalized religion is not a stable feature of the spiritual milieu and is not a necessary precondition for claiming the identity of a “spiritual seeker”. Strengthening or contesting the borders between detraditionalized spirituality and institutionalized religion appears rather as a tool which is available within the spiritual milieu discourses and which can be used and refined in particular situations. In other words, definitions of the relationship between “religion” and “spirituality” are connected to politics of a particular situation (as was illustrated by the discussion on the requiem mass held for the Yoga teacher Eduard Tomáš). Furthermore, the act of employing a specific definition of borders does not signify that this definition expresses a stable opinion or theory of the person who used it. In the material I studied, it was similarly used as a tool for argumentation against the other side, which also means that a different conceptualization of such borders might be applied in future. The opposition between “religion” and “spirituality” thus functions as an effective discursive device which can (but does not have to) be used in adequate situations for justifying one’s lifestyle and supporting certain interests and values. Moreover, beside the pragmatics of a particular situation, the history of conceptualizations related to themes such as “religion” or “church” in a relevant region/society needs to be reflected (as was suggested in the section about the “Polish perspective”). It represents a wider context that shapes the spiritual milieu discourses on “religion” and “spiritual seeking”. Consequently, the exploration of such histories of concepts in diverse contexts (regions, localities) might provoke further the reconsideration of the image of a “spiritual seeker” as a “spiritual but not religious” person and the universal relevance of this image.

ISKCON Folk Devils Fight Back. The Dynamics of Counter-Stigmatization Strategy

RAFAL SMOCZYNSKI

Discussion

One of this paper’s main aims is to examine how, and with what effects new religious movements folk devils involved in the anti-cult moral panic adopted symbols, social practices and ideologies when they have been trying to overcome borders between “hostile worlds” view that dominated in Poland during the 1990s. The “hostile worlds” view situated antagonistic borders between stigmatized NRMs and mainstream values advocates, most notably represented by Catholic Church members. This paper analyzes the ISKCON fighting back strategy, which attempted to challenge antagonistic framework of a “we-they” borders, and consequently, transformed collective identities of actors involved in moral panic occurrences.

Introduction

This paper seeks to contribute to the studies on changing societal reactions to new religious movements in Poland. Analysis starts at the point where the majority of the scholarship on NRMs in Poland ends its exploration1, that is to say, in the beginning of the 2000s, when the heated anti-cult moral panic of the 1990s has lost its impetus. Since then various coercive state apparatuses, which had been established earlier in order to control NRMs activities have moderated their articulations or simply have dissolved their functions. Importantly, the mass media have ceased to carry allegations on the menace posed by NRMs what has corresponded to the period of decreasing media attention related to

1 See Tadeusz Doktór, Innowacje religijne: ruchy, uczestnicy, reakcje spoÙeczne (Olsztyn: Mantis, 2002); Zbigniew Pasek, „State and Local Government Policies towards New Religious Movements in Poland, 1989–2004” in Religions, Churches and Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe, ed. Irena Borowik (Kraków: Nomos, 2006). 50 Rafal Smoczynski the religious minority oriented conflicts. Bearing in mind Critcher’s2 research which shows that the significant number of moral panics is currently being played out in the media, the absence of their sustained cycle of attention3 unambiguously has marked the failure of moral panic and the advent of new intersections between NRMs and the agents of the public sphere. The challenge for this paper is twofold. Firstly, it aims to bring some insights on the discursive landscape of the post-anti cult moral panic, when the functional differentiation of the Polish society was deepening, strong affective association of Catholicism with a national collective consciousness was loosing its relevance and consequently NRMs folk devils ceased to act as an embodiment of social deviancy. Secondly, this paper is concerned with the non-passive role of the NRMs, who actively attempted to reject label of moral panic’s stigmatization. This point requires the employment of proper analytical tools, which will uncover a hegemonic strategy of aligning social subjects of different persuasions in the loose institutional network, which was capable of introducing counter-hegemonic activity of NRMs and eventually overcome the status of folk devils. In order to grasp some insights on the renewed picture of changing societal reactions towards NRMs from 2000 onwards, and demonstrate the evolution of the ideological agenda of actors involved in moral panic struggle I have to limit the scope of this exploration and choose a precise representative of the former decade’s minor religious folk devils. Relying on the existing empirical data one has to assert that the ISKCON was one of the major sinister organizations of the negative stereotype formulated especially by the anti-cult movements associated with Catholic Church. ISKCON was targeted as a leading folk devil that embodied otherness. Krishna members were accused of brainwashing, corrupting children and youth, undermining Catholic tradition of Poles etc.4 This stereotype was framed in the media, rumors, urban legends, social control discourse. There is also another important aspect of ISKCON relevance for this study, that is, Polish Krishna devotees may serve as an empirical example of minor religion which since the end of the 1990s has considerably changed its self-presenting image as well as policy towards anti-cult moral panic agents, what in turn, has re-shaped their

2 Chas Critcher, Moral Panics and Media (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2003). 3 Anthony Downs, Political Theory and Public Choice (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 1998), 38–50. 4 See Michaela Pawlik, ZÙudne uroki duchowoïci wschodu (Warszawa: Michalineum, 1993) ISKCON Folk Devils Fight Back 51 collective identity. I will examine in detail this changing ISKCON discourse taking up different ideological positions on the issue of the renewed role of minor religion in the broader cultural context of Polish society in the state of modernization. This paper should be perceived as an instrumental case study5 in which I am seeking to broaden research on moral panic theory through a development of insights about the hegemonic decision-making as articulated in Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory.6 From the perspective that the very possibility of society is conditioned by its intrinsic contingency and antagonism I draw my attention to the hegemonic construction of collective identities and moral regulations in the context of overcoming anti-NRMs moral panic in Poland. The Gramscian term “hegemony” is applied to these social occurrences where a group manages to transcend its particular position onto a universal terrain of social demands.7 As a consequence of the successful hegemonic intervention new inter-subjective meaning is introduced and consequently new subject positions emerge.

Methodology

The proposed approach lies at the heart of the most recent research on moral panics which according to Ben Yehuda is focused on “how different moral ideas and concepts struggle for attention and domination in a social and cultural landscape that allows and tolerates such rivalry”.8 Therefore for explaining the evolution of societal reactions towards NRMs in Poland it becomes crucial to examine how social actors competed for constituting different cognitive structures in expanding multicultural setting and eventually how hegemony over interpretative schemes of established religious norm and religious deviancy has been achieved. Applying hegemonic approach to the evolution of societal reactions towards NRMs in Poland may be of particular value when we consider the present scholarship on moral panics which shows that the original

5 Robert Stake, “Case Studies” in Handbook of Qualitative Research, eds. Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (Thousands Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999), 236–247. 6 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985). 7 Antonio Gramsci, Notes from Prison (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971). 8 Nachman Ben Yehuda, “Moral Panics 36 Years On.” The British Journal of Criminology 49 (2009): 1–3. 52 Rafal Smoczynski model9 was formulated in a homogenous moral culture10 and therefore constrained the analysis on active role of the folk devils. Later formulations asserted that model should pay more attention to the interactions between moral panics entrepreneurs and folk devils who try to fight back and overcome stigmatization.11 This paper attempts to develop these insights and analyze how in the context of rapid social change in Poland interactions between social control agents, mainstream Churches and minor religious groups were being played out, negotiated, challenged to mark distinct social relations. Insofar as contemporary pluralist society as Claude Lefort asserted is characterized by “the dissolution of the markers of certainty”12, that is, it cannot be grounded in any essence or transcendental centre13 and it is impossible to define a substantive common good and shared moral values that would be valid for all members of the social field14, this the time when the concept of hegemony enters the scene as it examines the social logic of construction of “contingent foundations” for governance practices and construction of subject positions. What is at a given moment deemed “legitimate”, “acceptable”, “thinkable” is not a result of any pre-discursive essence but is the “naturalized” effect of the hegemonic articulations. The establishment of the hegemonic “common sense” which resonates with the public creates an ideological interpretation of reality and constitutes ground for the social conduct and the exercise of power.15 Within such a perspective this paper put stress upon NRMs folk devils’ discursive strategies which aimed at influencing social macrostructures, institutions and cognitive structures in order to construct new set of meaning and through this novel articulation overcome sedimented interpretative framework of the moral panic agents; these efforts also effectively constituted precarious “contingent

9 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: the Creation of Mods and Rockers (London: McGibbon and Kee, 1972); Stuart Hall et al, Policing the Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1978). 10 Jock Young, “Moral Panic. Its Origins in Resistance, Ressentiment and Translation of Fantasy into Reality.” The British Journal of Criminology 49 (2009): 4–16. 11 Sarah Thornton and Angela McRobbie, “Rethinking Moral panic for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds.” The British Journal of Sociology 46/4 (1995): 559–574 12 Claude Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 19. 13 See Ernesto Laclau, “The Impossibility of Society.” Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, 7 (2003): 21–24; Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference (Chicago, The Chicago University Press, 1978). 14 Chantal Mouffe, Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993). 15 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 96. ISKCON Folk Devils Fight Back 53 foundations” that rendered possible counter-hegemonic interventions and consequently redefinition of ISKCON‘s collective identities. We have to be aware that this “cult”, which apart of Satanists has generated the most public antagonism of all NRMs during 1990s16, eventually has conformed to some degree to mainstream norms of Polish society, but on the other hand, “fighting back strategy” deliberately employed by its members has also tempered “folk- devilling” discourse of social control agents. This operation took place at the level of hegemonic struggle when the rules of the language games were contested and negotiated.17 Thus it is especially of value to dissect symbolic content of the intertwining ideological articulations of both parties of the hegemonic struggle at the threshold of XXI century: Catholic anti-cult activists and ISCKON actors. Further, this paper will demonstrate that the set of ideological strategies of two mentioned groups were substantially reworked in order to fit the new imagery of growing functional differentiation of Polish society. I will draw on empirical findings related to societal reactions towards ISKCON in Poland collected during the 2008–2009 REVACERN project “Position and Mutual Relations between the State and Minority Religious Communities: Example of International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in Croatia, Poland and Slovenia” conducted by Ankica Marinovic and Dinka Marinovic Jerolimov, and I will use my own empirical data collected during the REVACERN Exchange Programme. The source of data for this analysis consisted of archival materials (e.g. annual reports from the major anti-cult organization in Poland, that is, The Dominican Information Centre on the NRMs and Cults, ISKCON archives, press cuttings), as well as qualitative interviews were conducted with the representatives of anti- cult movements and NRMs officers (Polish branches of ISKCON and The Diamond Way Buddhism). Research involves historical processes and such dynamic events may be disentangled through the use of discourse analysis techniques by which event sequences are clarified.

Mapping 1990s Moral Panic

Setting out for new deductions I have to recapitulate some basic facts related to the 1990s moral panic in Poland which have led to the

16 Tadeusz Doktór “Factors Influencing Hostility Towards Controversial Religious Groups.” Social Compass 49 (2002): 553–562. 17 Jacob Torfing, New Theories of Discourse (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999). 54 Rafal Smoczynski emergence of heterogenic anti-cult formation composed of a variety of particular social subjects. Moral panic articulations were located in the institutional settings (e.g. the mass media, politicians, Catholic Church officials, child supporters, secular counter-sect oriented experts, psychotherapeutic industry, social services, state bureaucratic complex, law enforcement agencies), which affected the way public identified folk devils who allegedly opposed the cherished normative system.18 Also atrocity tales were widely disseminated in order to expose sectarian movements as wrongdoers who attempted to undermine the position of traditional family and corrupt children who were depicted as the major victim of sectarian sinister invasion. As Golderger, Greskova, Hall and Smoczynski19 in their detailed paper on societal reactions towards NRMs in Poland demonstrated, the publicly expressed concern about the alleged threat posed by “sects” was translated to administrative decisions discriminating NRMs. Unconventional religious communities were refused to obtain permissions to organize their fests; they were very often unable to rent proper venues for their meetings due to widespread anti-sect bias circulating among local authorities; members of NRMs experienced also discriminatory practices on regular basis (they were victimized by various acts of vandalism and hooliganism).20 Importantly, the multi-positioned anti-cult hegemonic project which has been able to establish dominant interpretative schemata on religious norms and deviancy in 1990s not only has influenced discriminatory decisions made by local authorities, but also, it has managed to alter nation-wide public regulations. Since the beginning of the 1990s, social concern over NRMs, triggered by the mass media reports and the activity of anti-cult groups, had been growing, and became a subject of closer interest for policy makers. Finally, as a consequence of anti-cult moral panic pressure, in 1997 the amendment of the act on the guarantees of the freedom of conscience and religion was passed. Several religious associations have been refused for registration because of the “lack of religious features” in their doctrine, or the menace they would possibly pose to public morals. Furthermore, new governmental agendas designed for dealing with the issue of

18 Goran Goldberger, Julia Greskova, Dorota Hall and Rafal Smoczynski, “Societal Reactions towards New Religious Movements in Croatia, Poland and Slovakia” in New Religious Movements and Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Dorota Hall and Rafal Smoczynski (forthcoming). 19 Ibid. 20 Agnieszka Mikulska, Wolnoï° sumienia i wyznania: raport z monitoringu (Warszawa: HelsiÚska Fundacja Praw CzÙowieka, 2002). ISKCON Folk Devils Fight Back 55

NRMs were established: in 1997 – the Interdepartmental Team for New Religious Movements, and in 2001 – the Department for Psycho- Manipulation Groups (within the structure of the Ministry of Interior and Administration) which produced highly biased reports on allegedly destructive NRMs’ activities. As a result of rapidly growing social concern over NRMs tightened rules were introduced into legal acts regulating relationship between NRMs and state.21 Following discourse theory approach22 it is proper to place anti- NRMs campaign in the context of the anomie crisis in the post- communist Poland while existing narrative frameworks have lost their efficiency in providing an ideological legitimacy for the subject positions in society at large.23 Process of post-communist transformation with the rise of social insecurity, economic crisis, and the weakening of traditional authorities accounted for the dislocation of the symbolic universe.24 According to Laclau25 the category of dislocation relates to the situation where the elementary conditions of the traditional communities, political codes are rapidly changing and new collective identities are being born. At the same time dislocatory crisis leads to the hegemonic actions employed by the traditional agents aiming at the suturing the contingency which was opened in the social field.26 In the given empirical example, the anti-cult moral panic should be considered as a hegemonic struggle exercised mostly by the Catholic agents in order to recompose the dislocated structure of social field. Such a struggle always involves an antagonistic component in a fashion defined by Carl Schmitt, who suggested that the construction of every collective identity should be perceived within the perspective of the

21 Goldberger at al, Societal Reactions towards New Religious Movements in Croatia, Poland and Slovakia. 22 See David Howarth and Jacob Torfing, eds., Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); David Howarth, Discourse (Basingstoke: The Open University Press, 2000). 23 See Dorota Hall and Rafal Smoczynski, “Introduction” in New Religious Movements and Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, eds. Dorota Hall and Rafal Smoczynski (forthcoming). 24 See Anita Miszalska and Andrzej Piotrowski, eds. Obszary Ùadu i anomii: konsekwencje i kierunki polskich przemian (RódĊ: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ródzkiego, 2006); Krystyna Szafraniec, „Anomia okresu transformacji a orientacje normatywne mÙodzieČy. Perspektywa mi¿dzygeneracyjna” in Kondycja moralna spoÙeczeÚstwa polskiego, ed. Janusz MariaÚski (Kraków: WAM and Komitet Socjologii PAN, 2003); Piotr Sztompka, ed., Imponderabila Wielkiej Zmiany (Warszawa/Kraków: PWN, 1999). 25 Ernesto Laclau, New Reflections on Revolution of Our Times (London: Verso, 1990), 39. 26 Ibid. 56 Rafal Smoczynski friend-enemy relation.27 To put it briefly: the reconstruction of the dislocated mainstream “we” informed mostly by Catholic ideology was located in opposition to a minor religious “them”. Keeping with this theoretical framework anti-NRMs articulation has provided the mythic surface, which on the one hand, created a locus for inscription of social-control decisions by producing identifiable NRMs deviants, on the other hand, it has offered interpretative schemes for re-articulating the traditional normative system which was threaten by the sudden inflow of contingent elements.28 A mythical structure is always required in the practice of confrontation with dislocated structures of the contingent world, which does not refer to anything complete.29 Following this definition on the function of the myth, the formation of anti-cult hegemonic practices should be viewed in terms of a prevailing mythical logic through which a social reality was transformed into meaningful and teleological entity. Moreover, anti-NRMs myth introduced a universal point of view that provided ground for the constitution multi-positioned moral regulation policies that dominated in Poland during the 1990s, this mythic structure has organized also the dominant interpretative scheme for presenting the image of NRMs in Poland.30 It has formed and naturalized “we”-“they” framework, that has defined stable collective moral contours for the significant segments of Catholic society.

Counter-Hegemonic Strategy

Although since late 1990s the institutionalized anti-cult moral panic articulations have disappeared it does not mean that the ideological infrastructure imposed by the moral panic actors has simply vanished from the public sphere. It would be probably more accurate to state that moral panic’s ideological components have been substantially displaced. The recent survey conducted by UKSW has shown that 57 percent of Polish population is concerned with the presence of new religious movements. The respondents perceive NRMs as groups which may pose

27 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976), 35–37. 28 See Ernesto Laclau, ed., The Making of Political Identities (London: Verso, 1994). 29 See Roland Barthes, Mythologies (Paris: Editiones de Seuil, 1957); Leszek KoÙakowski, Obecnoï° Mitu (WrocÙaw: Wydawnictwo Dolnoïlskie, 994). 30 See Mariusz Gajewski, ABC o sektach (Kraków: Civitas Christiana, 1999); A nna Robaczewska, Henryka RomaÚczuk and Janusz ZawaÙ, MÙodzieČ a destrukcyjne kulty (Lublin: RORiJ, 1999). ISKCON Folk Devils Fight Back 57 a menace towards society. However at the same time 69 percent of the population asserts that the state should not crack down on the NRMs; the majority of Poles assumes that NRMs should be tolerated in the public sphere.31 These ambiguous findings indicate to the longitude differentiation dynamics which displaced to some degree the coherence of the former “we-they” structure, that substantially blocked the possibilities for forming less antagonistic oriented subject positions during the previous decade. Consequently, newly established post-moral panic ideological strategies could have been deployed. Starting from the late 1990s we may detect appearing new subject positions of ISKCON and Catholic agents who have been able to provide new interpretative schemata for constitution inter-cultural actions. The emergence of the renewed interactions created a complex social setting in which causal dynamics is not immediately apparent. The dislocation of the anti-cult hegemonic structure was not challenged by the all encompassing counter-hegemonic struggle. By contrast to the spectacular moral panic events of the 1990s, the dissolution of anti-cult politics has occurred gradually according to the Gramscian logic of a war of position which was organized through minor day to day social and cultural re-articulations, which involved legal battles, public relation policy, adoption of certain symbols, marking boundaries, establishing distinct categories of social relations etc.32 Thus carrying out this exploration it is important to elucidate the inchoate discursive strategies which slowly dismantled the sedimentated moral panic framework, that is to say, far from being doctrinally coherent day-to day articulations finally constituted new subject positions, which have managed to overcome antagonistic relations of the enemies and have decisively terminated the anti-cult hegemonic language game. Starting from the late 1990s on ISKCON has put into practice various strategies that contributed to the dismantling antagonistic features of the anti-NRMs mythic field. One of them was conscious strategy of reducing moral panic cognitive scheme through employing a specific communication policy. For example they began to turn down any invitations to the TV shows or radio where the anti-cult campaigners were present. Such TV shows represented usually anti-cult profile and facilitated the reproduction of the anti-cult myths within the

31 Family Religion Society (Report conducted by the Department of Sociology at the Stefan Cardinal WyszyÚski University, Warsaw, 2009). 32 Allan Dreyer Hansen and Eva Sorensen, “Polity as Politics: Studying the Shaping and Effects of Discursive Polities” in Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance, eds. David Howarth and Jacob Torfing (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 58 Rafal Smoczynski pubic domain.33 This response to dominant anti-cult hegemony gave born to new abilities and created dislocatory effects that started to challenge the scope of the anti-cult stereotype. On the other hand, ISKCON sued one of the anti-cult groups which produced and distributed defamatory bulletin about the movement and after 4 years of legal battle they won the case. Besides bringing the case to the court they regularly were writing letters to the newspapers to correct defamatory information and false data.34 This policy which has attracted the media attention has marked the turning point within the prevailing anti-cult “we-they” structures. The self-defining strategy and new policy skills accelerated the tempo of counter-hegemonic effects which eventually along with the macro-structural dynamics of social differentiation have dislocated the anti-cult hegemony in Poland. In practical terms it means that nowadays ISKCON is able to organize their feasts without ant controversies what during the 1990s occurred on daily basis: ISKCON events were often disrupted by the anti-cult movements, local Catholic vicars advised regular church goers to avoid places where “sectarian movements were giving their presentations”. The situation has definitely changed since 2000 onwards. As the result of the anti-cult campaigns many researchers started to scrutinize our activities what has brought many profound studies on ISKCON in Poland. Due to all this probably we are the most transparent New Religious Movement in Poland. We have been open for any possible request coming from students, social scientists, applied scientist who were interested in examining our rituals, dietary habits, everything. The stereotype which described us as a destructive sect has lost its efficiency and it does occur very rarely in the Polish media nowadays. Even some former anti-cult movements have changed their mind. For instance I have taken part recently in the conference organized by the Dominican Information Centre on the New Religious Movement which was attacking us a couple years ago. They admitted that they were inaccurate in many cases while providing information on our alleged destructive attitude.35

33 Ankica Marinovic and Dinka Marinovic Jerolimov, “Position and Mutual Relations between the State and Minority Religious Communities: Example of International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in Croatia, Poland and Slovenia” (REVACERN paper, 2009); Private communication with Agnieszka Nowak, ISKCON representative, October 2008. 34 Ibid. 35 Ankica Marinovic and Dinka Marinovic Jerolimov, “Position and Mutual Relations between the State and Minority Religious Communities: Example of International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in Croatia, Poland and Slovenia” (REVACERN paper, 2009); Private communication with Agnieszka Nowak, ISKCON representative, October 2008. ISKCON Folk Devils Fight Back 59

ISKCON was not single out in this counter-hegemonic struggle which eventually blocked the stigmatization practices of anti-cult movements. It is proper to show broader relevance of fighting back strategy through pointing out to another Polish NRM that was targeted as folk devil of moral panic of the 1990s, namely, the Diamond Way Buddhism of Karma Kagyu Tradition. According to one of their teachers they similarly like ISKCON have had certain problems with renting proper venues for their fests and lectures. Some years ago we rented a venue for our lecture in little Polish town. I came there in order to give a lecture and it occurred that our rental agreement was cancelled by local authorities. Unofficially we were told that those authorities were under the pressure made by the local Catholic priests who did not like us. Of course we were able to find other place in this town to continue our activity so it was no big deal. We have had such problems also in other towns, mostly during the 1990s.36 The Diamond Way Buddhism also faced some defamatory incidents produced by the anti-cult movements they decided to employ legal battle policy to stop this practice. Some anti-cult movements have attempted to defame us. They have published books in which they tried to align Buddhism with Satanism, devil worship, black magic, brain washing etc. There is a Catholic nun, sister Michaela who used to specialize in this sort of targeting us. A couple years ago we decided to sue her for this defamation. We won the case and court ruled out that all copies of her book must have been destroyed. Sometimes, this type of anti-cult inspired articles appears in the newspapers, and usually we write letters to the media and explain our position. When it goes too far then we act on the level of the court. But generally Buddhism has a good reputation in Poland, so those people who attack us are rather uneducated, primitive individuals.37 Also in the case of the Diamond Way Buddhism this deliberate counter- hegemonic policy contributed to the day to day re-articulation of the anti-cult stereotype and brought about dislocatory effects in the field of moral panic ideology. The renewed post-moral panic imagery obviously affected also anti-cult movements. Qualitative interviews conducted with the representatives of the major Catholic anti-cult movement (Dominican Center) revealed the substantial shift in its discursive strategy. Nowadays Dominican personnel’s articulations are deliberately balanced when it refers to major NRMs, including ISKCON. Anti- cultists refrain from judging ISCON on doctrinal basis, they avoid also

36 Private communication with Wojciech Tracewski, representative of the Diamond Way Buddhism in Poland, October 2008 37 Ibid. 60 Rafal Smoczynski using medicalized jargon of social control what was practiced on daily basis in the 1990s. According to director of the Dominican Centre in Warsaw the principle anti-cult strategy which was at work a few years ago at the moment is useless. We try to operate beyond the denominational scope. Naturally those oriental NRMs have nothing to do with the Catholic teaching but it does not matter in our practice. Those groups like ISKCON are not socially destructive, we do not receive reports from ex-members on their allegedly mind control activities anymore. There is much more tolerant attitude among us comparing to what was going on a decade ago. The time has changed.38 The renewed strategy that apparently operates in the Warsaw Dominican centre does not necessarily applies to other Dominican centres in Poland, nor to other anti-cult groups, which may function within the former “we-they” antagonistic interpretative framework. But what has unambiguously disappeared in 2000s is a hegemonic feature of the anti-cult idiom. Firstly, the antagonistic signifiers of the 1990s ceased to be effective in interpelating subjects and secondly, their possibility for constituting points of resonance with the universal social demands was significantly limited.

Results

The dynamics of gradual removal of anti-cult language game may be also examined through the analysis of changing particular signifiers, which marked the shift from the anti-NRMs mythic field and consequently have laid the surface for new social interactions and the emergence of the new ISKCON collective identities. The 1990s anti-cult field was organized around the following signifiers: “brainwashing”, “destructiveness”, “psycho-manipulation”, “mind-control”, which served as a point of identification for various moral panic participants and also has created points of resonance with the wider public.39 Since the late 1990s new set of signifiers have emerged in the public domain which gradually were giving the rise to the refreshed ISKCON collective identities. Reference to the non-sectarian signifiers started to function as a point of renewed identification not only for ISKCON campaigners. These new signifiers acted as the revived nodal points of

38 Private communication with the director of Warsaw Dominican Centre, July 2009. 39 Goldberger at all, New Religious Movements and Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe; on logic of “points of resonance” see also Mary de Young, The Day Care Ritual Abuse Moral Panic (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2004). ISKCON Folk Devils Fight Back 61 reference also for the public what marked the advent of the inverse process of installing new subject positions of NRMs in Poland. As a consequence of this process of differentiating meaningful social relations, former idioms popularly used by the anti-cult formations (“destructivness”) etc. were not able to influence wider public and were loosing their universal signification. This sequence of events represents the basic hegemonic logic: the re-articulated social objects have managed to transcendent their particular position and resonated with the universal cognitive structures of public.40 The stereotype which described ISKCON as a destructive sect has lost its efficiency and since the late 1990s it occurs rarely in the Polish media. Since the stereotype of destructive sect has faded away we are experiencing the growing interest in our activities. People are willing to learn yoga techniques; we are famous for our vegetarian cuisine, so this is a hook for many people who are visiting us. ISKCON is regarded as a religious denomination as well as an organization that presents Indian culture. People come to us not only to learn about religious doctrine and spiritual guidance but also in search for some cultural flavour. Some time ago I gave a lecture in vocational school about Indian dressing style, we are asked sometimes to provide vegetarian food for the parties. We are perceived as a small piece of Indian culture in Poland. We enjoy this role. We just want to be a well established religion of Indian provenance in Poland.41 The revision of the folk devil stereotype made way for the constitution of a new discursive image in the media. Believers of Krishna are represented in a neutral way in the press coverage and their profile usually relates to Indian culture. This data is not underpinned with biases as it often happened during 1990s. Analysis of the media cuttings concerning ISKCON reveals the growing presence of the new nodal points that are organizing positive points of collective signification: “Indian culture”, “vegetarian cusine”, “yoga techniques”, “little Polish India”. On the one hand, it appears that signifiers like “little Polish India” has begun to resonate with the universal cognitive structures, on the other, the anti-cult idiom returned to its particular residual position which is generally relevant to committed anti-cult campaigners. Among all press cuttings from Polish newspapers collected in 2008 (around 60 pieces) which were related to ISKCON just a few articles

40 See Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (London: Verso, 2005). 41 Ankica Marinovic and Dinka Marinovic Jerolimov, “Position and Mutual Relations between the State and Minority Religious Communities: Example of International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON) in Croatia, Poland and Slovenia” (RE- VACERN paper, 2009); Private communication with Agnieszka Nowak, ISKCON representative, October 2008. 62 Rafal Smoczynski were reproducing anti-cult stereotype from 1990s. The majority of press releases were bias free. All of biased pieces were published in the Catholic magazines, or were produced by the well known professional anti-cult campaigners. Some of the Catholic oriented anti-cult authors also demonstrated the increasing tendency of disseminating paranoid information what probably has reduced their reliability as universally respected experts.

Conclusions

The analyzed example of post-moral panic language games demonstrated how re-marking borders of collective identities by means of symbols establish a distinctive “discursive space” that constitutes meaningful surface for differentiated social practices. These new reshaped borders have emerged from complex processes involving moral panic actors’ instrumental actions, as well as the broader macrostructural variables characteristic for post-communist Poland were at work. As a consequence of reworking antagonistic borders new social ties were instituted and consensus based on a common symbolic terrain among legitimate opponents was erected. The described above post-moral panic process is still in statu nascendi but it is highly unlikely that the differentiated social practices will be stopped from making their way across Polish public sphere.

Strategies of Religious Elites

Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade

ÖNDER ÇETIN

Introduction

The relationship between territory and identity has been central to the majority of the theoretical and empirical literature on national identity.1 Within the context of Bosnia, as a “frontier” between Europe and Islam,2 the construction of the Self and the Other has been further underpinned by a complex geopolitical imagination and “geo-pious practices.”3 While Bosnian Muslims have challenged the modern Westphalian geopolitical order through their membership to the supraterritorial and transnational community of the global Islamic umma,4 as well as the “House of Europe,” they have reinforced the discourse of this order by underlying the “Bosnian” experience of Islam. Moreover, power relationships between the centers of the Bosniak Islamic religious hierarchy in the region crystallized the “national” borders separating particular Muslim Bosniak identities. Drawing on the theoretical framework of popular geopolitics, which is mainly concerned with everyday construction of boundaries

1 See, for example, Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Gertjan Dijkink, National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain (New York, Routledge, 1996), Anssi Paasi, Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border (Chichester: Wiley, 1996), George W. White, “Place and its role in Serbian identity,” in Derek Hall and Darrick Danta (eds.), Reconstructing the Balkans. A Geography of the New Southeast Europe. (Chichester: Wiley, 1996) 2 See Malcolm Anderson, Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996); and Ahmet DavutoÂlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin UluslararasÍ Konumu (Istanbul: Küre, 2001). 3 Lari Nyroos, “Religeopolitics: Dissident Geopolitics and the ‘Fundamentalism’ of Hamas and Kach,” Geopolitics 6 (2001): 141. 4 For a recent conceptualization of umma as a nation, see, Robert A. Saunders, “The ummah as a nation: a reppraisal in the wake of `Cartoons Affair,“ Nations and Na- tionalism 14 (2)(2008): 303–321. 66 Önder Çetin around the concepts of identity by (re)producing patterns of inclusion and exclusion, this article explores how identity boundaries of Bosnian Muslims were constructed over “maps of meaning” by the Bosnian ulama at the intersecting boundaries of Muslimhood, Bosniakhood and Bosnianhood.5 The first part of my work will focus on how the hegemonic construction of religio-national identity of Bosniaks has been maintained by the official ulama representing the traditional hanafi approach through religious advisory opinions [fatwas]. The second part will focus on the dynamics of power relationships between the two approaches of “One Community (for) One Nation” and “One Community (for) one State,” shaped among Sarajevo, Novi Pazar (Sandžak) and Belgrade.

Methodology

This work is grounded on the methodological framework of discourse- historical CDA approach.6 Based on three fundamental conceptual frameworks, e.g., power, history and ideology, it is adopted to analyze the discursive construction and deconstruction of two fundamental identity frames: (a) Muslim Bosniak religio-national identity, (b) the idea of Bosnia and Serbia as the homeland. These two levels of identity constructs are analyzed in terms of three main macro strategies7 and three sub-categories by using the two- dimensional analysis of contents and strategies adopted from Wodak et. al. (1999, 31–35) and De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak (1999, 160–166). These are (a) constructive strategies, which “attempt to construct and to establish a certain national identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as differentiation;” (b) strategies of transformation, “which aim to transform a relatively well-established national identity and its components into another identity,” and; (c) dismantling or destructive strategies, which “aim at dismantling or

5 See, Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), and Simon Dalby and Gearóid Ó Tuathail (eds.), Rethinking Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 4. 6 See, Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (London: Sage, 2001), Ruth Wodak et. al., The Discursive Construction of National Identity (Edin- burg: Edinburg University Press, 1999), De Cillia, Rudolf, Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, “The discursive construction of national identities,“ Discourse & Society 2 (1999): 149–173. 7 Here, macro-strategy signifies a “more or less accurate plan adopted to achieve a certain political, psychological or other kind of objective.” See, Wodak et.al. (1999), 33. Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade 67 disparaging parts of an existing national identity construct.”8 Basic sub- strategies that serve these macro-strategies, specified by Chilton, are: coercion, legitimization and delegitimization, representation and misrepresentation.9

The Language and Politics of Inclusion and Exclusion over Fatwas, Fatwa-Like Religious Advice and Resolutions

In the first part of my work, I basically adopt a two-fold, two- dimensional analyses, drawing on the patterns of sameness and differences on the one hand, and continuity and change on the other hand, to analyze of the role of religious advisory opinions in the conceptualization of Muslim Bosniak identity by the official ulama through such advices published in bi-monthly Glasnik (The Herald) and bi-weekly Preporod (Renaissance). The fundamental characteristics of these advisories can be summarized as follows: First, in terms of the content itself, both patterns of continuity and change are observed. When compared with a total of 23 questions answered by Husein /ozo from mid-1960s to the later 1970s, 12 questions answered by Abdurrahman Huki° and Muharem Omerdi° between 1985 and 1992 mark a decreasing interest on the issues of other religions and relations with non-Muslims. Those issues were again brought back into the agenda of Muslims by a total of 24 questions in the post-war period. However, we see that this newly rising interest can be explained by the fact that eight out of eighteen questions were asked by those from Bosniak Diaspora, which affirms decreasing interest on that issue within Bosnia. Secondly, within the former category, there was basically a distinction between pure social relations and relationships with religious characteristics. Where the Bosnian ulama presents its position in favor of good relations with non-Muslims within the context of a common Bosnian society, including for instance greeting their religious holidays, participating their burials – with the exception of the participation in non-Muslims’ religious rituals,10 giving donations to a non-Muslim,11 or praying God for a non-Muslim,12 it strictly draws the

8 Wodak et. al., ibid., 33. 9 Paul A. Chilton, Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice (London: Routledge, 2004), 45–47. 10 Preporod 10 (2002): 11. 11 Preporod 9 (1999): 13. 12 Preporod 18 (2001): 11. 68 Önder Çetin border where blurring of religious norms starts to challenge their distinctive religio-national identity. While, for instance, participation in a non-Muslim wedding ceremony held in church is allowed, it is not permitted to attend the religious ritual or dinner after the wedding where alcohol or pork would be served.13 A similar approach was presented as a response to a question about New Year`s celebrations, where it was stated that “Muslims have their own religion and tradition, and they must not substitute [non-Muslims traditions]”14 However, one of the strictest approaches, unsurprisingly, was seen in the issue of mixed marriages. Revealing a theoretical or principal opposition to the notion of mixed marriages, that issue was emphasized to be “categorically forbidden,”15 by underlying that they “do not meet all the necessary preconditions to successfully function in particular conditions and environments in which there are inter- communal and inter-religious tensions, as the case in [Bosnia].” It was further added that in case of marriage to a non-Muslim woman, it should be judged “according to situation, person and circumstances.” Dr. Enes Ljevakovi° referred to a previous fatwa on that issue. This fatwa, issued about mixed marriages in 1939, was modified during war conditions by underlying that although marriage of a Muslim man to a non-Muslim woman is categorically permitted, it is not allowed on the basis of general interests of Muslims [masleha ‘amme]. Moreover, it was argued that Muslims were forced to engage in inter-marriages, which were used as a “political or ideological tool” during Socialist Yugo- slavia.16 Here, the special reference to identity in the second category is related to the issue of having a non-Muslim name. Muharem Omerdi°, replying such a question asked by a Muslim whose parents gave him/her a non-Islamic name, asserted that “members of other faiths preserve their tradition in that respect more than Muslims.” He strictly argued that this is “a religious duty” and an “Islamic name is one of the primary signs that someone belongs to Islamic umma,”17 advising the reader to change it with a Muslim name. Omerdi° reiterated the same approach as a response to a question asked seven years later.18 When compared to the former category, questions regarding non- establishment groups represented a significant increase in terms of

13 Preporod 16 (2003): 13. 14 Preporod 24 (2002): 11. 15 Preporod 17 (2002): 11. 16 Preporod 23 (2006): 11. 17 Glasnik 4 (1990): 102. 18 Preporod 12 (1997): 7. Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade 69 frequency and diversity.19 While a total of 16 questions were asked during the post-war period, three questions were on the IZ`s attitude concerning Islamic schools of law and the adoption of the Hanafi school of law in this category;20 one question on the Ahmediyya movement;21 three questions on Wahhabism and the Wahhabis;22 five questions on Sufi orders and the position of the IZ towards them;23 and four questions on divisions in the congregation.24 Considering the two categories together, while the issue of situating themselves vis-à-vis non-Muslims lost its significance in the post-war period, particularly within Bosnia, a greater debate started over alternative approaches and groups challenging the very core of the Bosnian Muslim tradition. In answering the questions related to the two aforementioned “other” of the traditional Bosnian Muslim religio-national identity, the line of Islamic reformism has been common to /ozo`s fatwas and those answered by his successors. The fatwa-givers mainly drew on Qur`an in line with Hanafi school of thought, beside the practice of Prophet and his companions, as well as simple answers without reference to specific sources mainly representing the heritage of ijtijad in Bosnian Islamic legal thinking accompanied by the idea of common good [maslaha]. Common good backed by the basic Qur`anic resources and the practices of the Prophet praising the unity of the community have also been the crucial elements for legitimizing the IZ`s position as the interpreter and representative of the Bosnian Islamic tradition and guardian of the unity of Muslim community. Furthermore, it was stated that besides the principle of respect for the continuity of the

19 During 1965 and 1979, out of 8 questions, 6 questions asked to Ðozo were about he Ahmadiyya movement, in addition to one question on Wahhabism, and one question on Sufi orders and turbes [tombs]. See, Glasnik 5–6 (1969): 257–259, Glasnik 9–10 (1969): 459–460, Glasnik 9–10 (1972): 481, Glasnik 7–8 (1973): 348, Glasnik 11–12 (1973): 513–515, Glasnik 9–10 (1975): 461–462; Glasnik 9–10 (1973): 425–427; Glasnik 9–10 (1975): 468–470. During the period of 1985–1992, only two questions were asked. These were one question on the nature and logic of different Islamic schools of law and one on Sufi orders, tekkes and the IZ’s position. See, Glasnik 1 (1990): 69–70, and Glasnik 5 (1991): 589–590. For a comparative analysis of the questions answered by official, peripheral and oppositional ulama from 1960s up to present, see, Onder Cetin, “Ulama and Fatwas: Dissemination and Diversification of Religious Authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Christian Moe (ed.) Administration of Islamic Affairs in Secular States-South East European Experience (Leiden: Brill, forthcoming). 20 Preporod 12 (2001): 11, Preporod 20 (2002): 11, Preporod 20 (2002): 11, Preporod 7 (2006): 12. 21 Preporod 18 (2003): 13. 22 Preporod 4 (1999): 11, Preporod 11 (2004): 13, Preporod 1 (2006): 13. 23 Preporod 10 (1997): 7, Preporod 14–15 (1997): 7, Preporod 7 (2000): 11, Preporod 9 (2002): 11, Preporod 18 (2004): 13, Preporod 3 (2006): 19. 24 Preporod 15 (1996): 7, Preporod 3 (1997): 11, Preporod 3 (2001): 9, Preporod 18 (2003): 13. 70 Önder Çetin

Hanafi tradition institutionalized during the Ottoman era, basically what was aimed at was the provision of legal certainty and the avoidance of confusion within the community.25 Here, initiatives leading to the fragmentation of the Bosnian Muslim community have been criticized by saying that the greatest evil is to target the heart of its unity represented in the institutionalized form of the IZ and trying to build parallel forms of authority by demolishing the already recognized authority by consensus.26 Pluralization of Islamic legal thinking has actually accompanied by the controversial processes of the democratization of the Muslim mind vis-à-vis alternative interpretations at the level of Muslim religious leadership, while it already revealed the revitalization of the inherited sense of monopoly in the interpretation of Islamic thinking and governing of religious affairs. While for the former, Reisu-l-ulama as the main authority shaping the approach of the IZ, blamed these challenging figures in a relatively balanced approach even by abstaining to label them either by using the phrase of those who doesn’t have the knowledge or sense of the Bosnian Muslim experience in this part of Europe or calling them as “new Muslims” of Bosnia, the IZ also for instance called for the political authorities not to permit any authorities to be legally established which would situate itself like a parallel establishment. However, while the Islamic community faced a challenged within Bosnia in terms of the emergence of alternative interpretations, it found itself in the midst of another challenge of authority over the split of the Islamic community in Serbia between Sandžak and Belgrade.

Parallel Islamic Communities in Serbia in between Three Centers and Two Visions

Through the constitutional reform realized on 12 April 1990, the IZ was declared as a “united” and “independent” religious community belonging to all Muslims in Yugoslavia.27 While local bodies preserved their function, the Islamic hierarchy was reorganized on the basis of four regional headquarters [Meshikhats] in Sarajevo, Priština, Podgorica and Skopje with Rijaset of the IZ, with its residence in Sarajevo,

25 Preporod 7 (2006): 12. 26 Preporod 15 (1996): 7. 27 Muhammed Salki°, Organizacija i administracija Islamske Zajednice [Organization and Administration of the Islamic Community] (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 2003). 89. Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade 71 representing the leadership at state level. Drawing on the fact that the 1990 Constitution provided “almost full prerogatives for the organization of religious life” to Meshikhats, the IZ could function in case of Yugoslavia’s sudden dissolution.28 In accordance with the decision made at the meeting of the IZ with representatives of prominent Bosnian Muslim intellectuals on 1 April 1993, the Reconstituting Congress of the IZ (Obnoviteljski Sabor) convened on 28 April 1993 and adopted an interim Constitutional Decree [Ustavna odluka], which was declared to be valid until the end of the war.29 Within the reorganized hierarchy, the IZ had now been transformed into a “united” and independent” religious institution of all Muslims in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bosnian Muslims temporarily or permanently living in foreign countries.30 While now, the Presidency of the IZ, Rijaset was replaced by Meshikhat of Bosnia, the aforementioned Article 1 also provided the IZ of Bosnia and Herzegovina the legitimacy to present itself as the religious community of all Bosniaks within Bosnia and abroad. Similarly, the Meshikhat of the IZ in Serbia was founded in Novi Pazar, Sandžak, on 30 October 1993. In this Islamic Congress (Sabor), Muamer Zukorli° was chosen as the president of the Meshikhat of the IZ in Serbia and the Grand Mufti and Mufti of Sandžak,31 the latter with more than 80% of Bosniak population in Serbia.32 A subsequent meeting, closely linked with today’s question of legitimacy among the Islamic communities in Serbia, was held in Istanbul, Turkey in October 1994. The Islamic Council for East Europe held between 28 and 30 October was attended by the Rijaset of the IZ in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Presidency of the IZ for Kosovo, Meshikhat of the IZ of the Republic of Macedonia, Meshikhat of the IZ of Sandžak, Meshikhat of the IZ of Croatia and Slovenia and Meshikhat of the IZ of Montenegro. In this meeting the abovementioned

28 See, Fikret Kar²i°, “Administration of Islamic Affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,“ Islamic Studies, 4 (1999): 547. 29 Kar²i°, Ibid., 547. 30 Art. 1, cited in Salki°, Ustavi Islamske Zajednice [Constitutions of the Islamic Community]. (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 2001), 325. 31 According to Constitution, the other members of the Meshikhat were the vice president of the Meshikhat, president of the Congress, muftis of Serbia, Preševo, and Novi Sad; the dean of the Faculty of Islamic Studies and the director of Gazi Isa-beg Medrese, as well as eight members, who are chosen by the Congress after being recommended the President of the Meshikhat . 32 According to the 2002 census, 125.000 Bosniaks live in Sandžak out of the total Bosniak population of 150.000. Bosniaks represent the majority in three municipalities – Novi Pazar, Sjenica and Tutin – out of the six municipalities with the total population of 240.000. 72 Önder Çetin participants recognized each other as legal successors of the IZ in former Yugoslavia. 33 Although this structure operated unchallenged since then, the rivalry mainly between the Sandžak leadership held by Zukorli° and Belgrade-centered Islamic community head by Mufti of Belgrade Hamdija Jusufspahi° started after the law on the position of Churches and Religious Communities in Serbia was adopted in Serbian Congress in 2006, referring “the traditional” Islamic Religious Community to be recognized in Serbia (Article 11).34 Following these initial attempts to set up autonomous administrative bodies, the first proposal to unite the two centers was made by Mufti Zukorli° in fall 2006. The model that Zukorli° proposed was the preservation of the status quo regarding the authority of Sarajevo, with the recognition of the religious center in Belgrade as well as the Meshikhat in Preševo Valley and Vojvodina. He insisted on keeping Novi Pazar as the centre of Serbian Muslims’ religious hierarchy, “because it has the largest community of believers and a developed infrastructure,” while offering „seat number two” to be set up in Belgrade.35 However, this was occasionally rejected by the Mufti of Belgrade Jusufspahi°. Following the Congress held in Belgrade on 29 January 2007 with the participation of delegates from 52 municipalities, Jusufspahi° convened the Congress of the IZ of Serbia at Bajrakli Mosque in Belgrade on 19 February. In this meeting, draft constitution of the IZ of Serbia was unilaterally adopted and Mufti Jusufspahi° was appointed as acting Reisu-l-ulema of the IZ of Serbia.36 While this marked Jusufspahi°’s will to present his Islamic Community as a higher and legitimate authority before Belgrade vis-à-vis Zukorli°, it also meant its independence from Sarajevo.37 However, this move was interpreted by the Deputy Mufti of Sandžak and the chairman of the Committee for Unification of the Serbian IZ, Mevlud Dudic as “unserious and illegal,” describing it as “an initiative adopted at an informal gathering in Belgrade.”38 This

33 Preporod 11 (1994): 1, 3. 34 The law is available on http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL(2006)029-e.asp; last accessed on 13 September 2009. 35 Danas (30 January 2007). 36 Beta news agency (21 February 2007). 37 HINA news agency (19 February 2007). The statement released then underlined that “the supreme administrative body of the Islamic Community of Serbia should be within the borders of the Republic of Serbia,” by pointing out “the legal and territorial integrity of [Serbia].”See, Glas javnosti (22 February 2007). 38 Beta news agency (1 February 2007). Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade 73 initiative was also refused by the IZ in Sarajevo, by underlying its “[obligation] to take care of the Meshikhat of the IZ in Sandžak as its integral part” as well as the need to include the Meshikhat of the IZ in Sandžak in this newly constructed IZ as a legitimate part of it.39 A significant attempt in opposition to Jusufspahi°’s move was the decision to convene a meeting on 27 March 2007 for the unification of the Serbian IZ, with the participation of representatives from Sandžak, Preševo Valley and Vojvodina, except the community in the Belgrade mosque and Mali Zvornik.40 However, the decision to convene the Unifying Congress in Novi Pazar was interpreted by Abdulah Numan, deputy of the Belgrade Reisu-l-Ulema Jusufspahi° as “colonization.”41 The Unifying Congress was held in Novi Pazar during which the IZ in Serbia has been founded as “one unified organization of all Muslims who live in Serbia,” under the four administrative Mufti districts. Showing his support to Zukorli°, Reisu-l-Ulema of the IZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina Mustafa Ceri°, as well as Sulejman Rexepi from Mace- donia and Rifat Fejzi° from Montenegro participated in the Unifying Congress. Zukorli° was elected as the Grand Mufti and the Chairman of the Meshihat of the IZ in Serbia for a period of one year, until the next elections.42 The constitution of the IZ in Serbia was also approved in that meeting. However, the most interesting event in that four-year conflict occurred in October 2007. A group of Sandzak imams, headed by Adem Zilki°, imam from Tutin, gathered on 3 October, while Mufti Zukorli° was in Morocco. They announced that Mufti Zukorli° was stripped of his duties in the IZ after six-hour deadline to resign.43 Zilki° was appointed as the new Reisu-l-Ulema of the IZ of Serbia and Hasic Suljovi° as the new head of the Meshikhat of Sandžak, while Jusufspahi° was declared as the honorary Reisu-l-Ulema of the IZ in Serbia.44 While the IZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina refused to recognize this development,45 Zukorli° denounced it as illegal and “an assocation of UDBA [security service], Sulejman Ugljanin [the Mayor of Novi

39 Dnevni avaz (20 February 2007). 40 Dnevni avaz (20 February 2007). 41 Dnevni avaz (27 March 2007): 2. 42 See, http://www.islamskazajednica.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view &id=266&Itemid=721. 43 Oslobodjenje (28 October 2007): 26–27. 44 Beta news agency (5 October 2007), Politika (8 October 2007). 45 Blic 5 October 2007; Beta news agency (5 October 2007). 74 Önder Çetin

Pazar and head of the Democration Action Party (SDA) in Sandžak], and the Jusufspahi° family in Belgrade.46 Zukorli° held an extraordinary enlarged congress in Novi Sad on 6 October and annulled the decisions adopted in the meeting of the IZ of Serbia. He also called all imams who supported Zilki° to repent by 12 October.47 However, it was just a day before the deadline that Jusufspahi° handed Menshura to Zilkic, which formally signified his appointment as the Reisu-l-Ulema of the IZ of Serbia. Throughout these developments in the last three years, the parties attempted to ground their legitimacy on three basic frameworks. These are mainly the secular and the Islamic law, the historical legitimacy, and socio-political conditions. While Jusufspahi° proposed that Rijaset should be located in Belgrade, by arguing that “it is legitimate under Shari’a law and secular laws as well,”48 Zukorli° mainly referred to the internal legal arrangements of the-then IZ of former Yugoslavia to delegitimize the position of the newly declared honorary Reisu-l-Ulema Jusufspahi°. He occasionally stated that Jusufspahi° was removed from his post as the Mufti of Belgrade by the Meshikhat of Kosovo, Serbia and Vojvodina in 1991, thus claiming that “even as a Mufti [Jusufspahi°] is illegitimate because he has never been reinstated.”49 Regarding his dismissal from the post of the head of the Meshikhat of the IZ in Serbia, he described it as illegal by referring to the IZ’s constitutional framework. He emphasized that “the mufti is appointed and dismissed by an electoral body of over 70 members,” adding that there were “between six and 20 people out of this entire body at their meeting.”50 The reference to the “traditional” aspect of religious communities in the law led up to the historical dimension of the debate. According to Jusufspahi°, recognition of Islam as “one of the religions that can be freely expressed in the country,” in May 1868, followed by the issued Menshura “giving authority to the supreme leader of the IZ in the Princedom of Serbia,” by the Sheikh-ul-Islam in Istanbul provides the historical legitimacy for the existence of an IZ centered in Belgrade.51 On the other hand, by drawing its legitimacy on the historical existence of religious hierarchy in Bosnia, Zukorli° presents the Novi Pazar- based IZ as a “traditional religious community” and Sarajevo as “the

46 Radio Naba website (5 October 2007). 47 Blic (10 October 2007): 4–5. 48 Oslobodjenje (31 March 2007): 8–9. 49 See, Oslobodjenje (24 March 2007): 8–9, FoNet news agency(27 March 2007). 50 Blic (10 October 2007): 4–5. 51 Oslobodjenje (31 March 2007): 8–9. Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade 75 spiritual centre of Muslims” while considering Belgrade-centered religious hierarchy as “upstarts.”52 Finally, the two religious leaderships diverged in their position toward the political actors in Belgrade and Sarajevo. Following the Congress of the IZ of Serbia in Belgrade, Serbian Ministry for Religious Affairs Radomir Naumov received Adem Zilkic, who was appointed as the new Reisu-l-Ulema of Serbia. This was criticized by the leader of the Sandzak Democratic Party (SDP) Ljajic and Mufti Zukorlic as “state interference”53 in religious affairs and an attempt by the Serbian state to provide legitimacy to the IZ of Serbia. While this led Zukorlic to accuse Naumov to be responsible in the crisis between the two communities, the Congress held in Novi Pazar in March 2007 led Belgrade-centered IZ to voice their pro-Serbian approach. Both Jusufspahi° and the leader of the Party of Democratic Action in Sandzak (SDA), Sulejman Ugljanin presented their discontent with Zukorlic`s aim to strengthen ties with Sarajevo, which had been revealed clearly in the presence of Reisu-l-Ulema of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Congress held in Novi Pazar. On the other hand, Mufti of Belgrade, Muhamed Jusufspahi° explicitly stated their pro- Serbian position: “This is Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina is across the Drina.” He further asked the Serbian state to “support a unified community,” while “[committing] itself to the concept of a community that affirms Serbia as its motherland.”54 However, while Belgrade-based IZ virtually reacted to division of Muslims along ethnic lines and any intervention from the neighboring countries, Zukorli° was insistent on the supremacy of Sarajevo toward Belgrade, accusing Belgrade-based IZ of lacking “numerical strength and spiritual infrastructure.”55 While these recent developments seem to deteriorate the relations between the two communities, for many regional actors such as Sead Biberovi°, coordinator for Urban In, the conflict has been entirely of political nature tracing back to early 1990s.56 Zukorli° has usually been considered to become the Mufti of Sandžak in his early twenties following his study in Algeria in 1993 with support of Ugljanin, who positioned himself then as the leader of

52 Oslobodjenje (28 October 2007): 26–27. 53 Beta Week (11 October 2007). 54 Politika (8 October 2007). 55 Oslobodjenje (28 October 2007): 26–27; and Glas javnosti (10 October 2007). 56 Maksimovic Zoran,” Political Feud Divides Sandzak’s Muslims,” Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (20 December 2007). 76 Önder Çetin

Bosniaks in Sandžak.57 However, Ugljanin`s call for first autonomy in 1990, and later a special status for Sandžak under international supervision not only strengthened his position as a regional lord but also led the Belgrade regime to declare him as an enemy.58 He had to leave the country when he was charged with “terrorism, undermining the constitutional order and intent to carry out secession.”59 His absence led Zukorli° to become a Bosniak leader by extending the religious realm. He revived the infrastructure of the IZ and founded new educational and other sort of institutions. Since 1993, three madrasas (two for girls and one for boys), the School for Islamic Studies and the International University of Novi Pazar, as well as kindergartens at pre- school level were founded. These marked a revolutionary turn for the IZ when compared to its position in 1993. Zukorli° for instance argues that when he became Mufti in 1993, the IZ only meant funeral ceremonies, reading hatmas and Jasin [reading Qur’an together with the imam in the mosque], alongside “petty profiteering among imams, the struggle to survive and rotten ceramides on buildings.”60 Moreover, Zukorli° managed to get the support of the newly emerging economic elites, who have built their wealth mainly through illegal activities under the international embargo on Miloševi° regime.61 For many analysts, financial issues caused the main disagreement between the two leaders when Ugljanin came back to Sandžak in 1996.62 However, Zukorli° has usually accused Ugljanin of attempting to control the IZ for his political goals. He argued that “[Ugljanin`s] old dream is to turn the Islamic community into his own voter service,” adding that this is the main reason between his opposition to Zukorli° and alliance with Jusufspahi°. 63 Zukorli°’s conflict with his former ally has led the political aspect of the question to lead the debate. Other former political allies of Ugljanin such as Rasim Ljaji° now became an opponent of Ugljanin and a close partner of Zukorli°. It was even stated that “Zukorli° was the one who

57 See, Muhamed Jusi°, “Muslims in Serbia: Two paralel Islamic Communities in Serbia,” in Globalia Magazine, available at http://www.globaliamagazine.com/?id=509. 58 See, Maksimovic, ibid., and Oslobodjenje (28 October 2007): 26–27. 59 Jusi°, ibid. 60 Oslobodjenje (28 October 2007): 26–27. 61 See, “Serbia‘s Sandzak: Still forgotten,” International Crises Group Report No. 162 (8 April 2005). 62 See, “Sandžak politi²ko bure baruta,“ Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (24.12.2007). 63 Zukorli° further claimed Ugljanin forced imams in early 1990s to preach that “who does not vote for Ugljanin’s party is not a Muslim.”Cited in Oslobodjenje (24 March 2007): 8–9. Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade 77 brought Ljaji° to political stage and made him politically relevant.”64 However, Zukorli° explained this relationship by referring to respect between the political and religious elites allowing each other to do their own job. By calling this as “a correct relationship,” he argued that they would also establish such a relationship with Ugljanin “if he were to accept a correct relationship.”65 However, recent developments brought the political dynamics in Belgrade into the center of that intra-Bosniak rivalry. Although Ugljanin gained his power mainly through his political career as a Bosniak nationalist, he allied with Serbian nationalist Vojislav Kostunica in “People`s Bloc” during local elections held in September 2006. This alliance provided Ugljanin chairs in state authorities, such as the post of the Deputy Speaker of the Serbian Parliament.66 He further aimed to use this political alliance to influence the course of the religious conflict in favor of Zilki°, counting on the discontent of the Serbian political elites in Belgrade because of Zukorli°`s relationship with Sarajevo. Zukorli° described these moves as a plot against him and the IZ in Serbia, organized by the Serbian secret service, some politicians and the “traitors from within,” namely Ugljanin and Jusufspahi° family.67 Moreover, he soon became a close partner of the late Prime Minister /in¶i° in Sandžak. This alliance not only provided him the support to establish the above mentioned International University of Sandžak, but also led him to participate in diplomatic visits abroad.68 Each having their political allies in Belgrade and Sandžak, the Islamic religious affairs in Serbia have been run by the two parallel Islamic communities under different administrative districts. While the IZ in Serbia is organized in four Mufti regions of Sandžak, Belgrade, Novi Sad and Preševo, the IZ of Serbia is organized in the Meshikhats of Serbia, Sandžak, Preševo established under the Rijaset of Serbia. Beside claims for legitimacy and support at the top-level religious and political leadership, both parties continue to claim that they have the support of the majority of imams.69

64 Jusi°, op. cit. Muhamed Jusufspahi°, for instance, claims that Ljajic “provides for a mass turnout at Muamer Zukorlic’s gatherings through his party committee members who are often also [Zukorli°’s] comrades-in-arms.” See, Politika (8 October 2007). 65 Oslobodjenje (24 March 2007): 8–9. 66 See, Beta Week (11 October 2007), and Ivana Mili°, “Close to Belgrade, Far from Sara- jevo,” Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (20.12.2007). 67 See, Beta Week (11 October 2007), and Oslobodjenje (24 March 2007): 8–9. 68 See, Jusi°, ibid. 69 See, Oslobodjenje (28 October 2007): 26–27, and SRNA news agency (27 March 2007). 78 Önder Çetin

These recent developments have revealed that the conflict within the Islamic community in Serbia is closely connected to the political dynamics both in Sandžak and Serbia. Thus, it does not seem possible to reach a resolution in the near future among Islamic communities unless the relations among the political elites both in Sandžak and their allies in Belgrade are stabilized. In addition to occasional conflicts in everyday life in Sandžak from mosques to cafes, and simultaneous functioning of the two IZs, the Serbian government has already complicated the issue by interpreting that the aforementioned article of the law allows both IZs to be registered.70 However, participation of Ugljanin and Ljajic in the Serbian government following the last parliamentary elections points out the potential on the way to resolve the religious conflict. The recent attempt of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs to resolve the conflict between the two political parties has further strengthened that potential.

Conclusions

The two cases of this article represent how the religious and political issues are intermingled in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Despite internal diversification through the introduction of different Islamic interpretations in Bosnia, the IZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to hold the support of the majority of the local Muslim population and determine the geo-pious practices in Bosnia. While fatwas were instrumentalized to legitimize this tradition and the historical heritage of Bosnian Muslim identity shaped in inter-communal coexistence, they were also used to delegitimize alternative approaches by claiming to sow discord among Muslims. Moreover, the leadership of the IZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina particularly instrumentalized two Resolutions in March and November 2006 to underline its determination “to protect the uniqueness of the centuries-long tradition of Bosnian Muslims“ and support “an institutional interpretation of Islam in this region, based on Quran and Sunna and the traditions of the Bosnian Muslims.“71 These constructive strategies have occasionally been backed by either transforming strategies, such as including non-Bosniak Muslims into Bosnianhood as “new Muslims“ of Bosnia72 or dismantling strategies by rejecting intermarriages or delegitimizing alternative groups using

70 For the reaction of Zukorli° to that interpretation see, Preporod 19 (2008). 71 For these two Resolutions of the Rijaset on “the interpretation of Islam,” see, http://www.rijaset.ba. 72 Cited in the Friday sermon of Reisu-l-Ulema issued in Kaljina on 6 February 2009. Muslims, Bosnians and Bosniaks Shaped among Sarajevo, Sandžak and Belgrade 79 coercive instruments by characterizing them as those “[having] neither the knowledge nor a feeling for the fate of Islam and Muslims in [their country].”73 In addition to these internal strategies, furthermore, current constitutional structure rewarding ethno-politics and lack of a unified Bosniak leadership have allowed the religious leadership to claim and position itself as the guardian of both religious and national interests of Bosniaks. In Sandžak, while we see a similar relationship between the political and religious elites, politics seems to be determinant in shaping the nature and course of the conflict. Moreover, while official ulama generally adopted a moderate, constructive strategy in Bosnia, religious actors in Sandžak often adopted coercive strategies backed by the strategies of misrepresentation and delegitimization. Nevertheless, similar to the ethno-political conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the religious conflict between the supporters of Bosniakization of the IZ in Serbia and Serbianization of the IZ of Serbia seems to become another deadlock, or “frozen conflict”74 in the Balkans, with the possibility of its resolution dependent on external dynamics.

73 Rijaset of the IZ in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ibid., Article 6. 74 See, Jusi°, ibid.

Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga From Freedom to Totality and Back Again

MILAN FUJDA

Introduction

The acculturation of Hinduism and the accommodation of Yoga in Czech lands have a long tradition that reaches back to the end of 19th century. Various Hindu inspirations were widely utilized in the occult milieu during the first half of the 20th century. The most important proponents of various „Hindu” spiritual disciplines and notions came from two strong associations of the period, namely the Theosophical Society and the Psyche Club. Even though they were both dissolved soon after the Communist seizure of power in 19481, they did continue to shape an occult milieu in Czechoslovakia in subsequent years. This paper analyzes and presents continuities and discontinuities in the development of acculturation of Hindu-inspired religiosity in Czechoslovakia during the second part of the 20th century, and shows certain specifics of this development in periods of totality and the transition to democracy. It maps shifting boundaries within the occult milieu and Yoga movement (which arose from it), deals with the role of Communist censorship practices in this process, analyzes the reshaping of borders after the fall of Communism, and points out the relevance of national borders for the development of unchurched religious movements in Eastern and Central Europe. Methodologically, this paper is based on a historical study of autobiographies, memoirs, and controversies connected with the period and social milieu under scrutiny. My attention, however, is focused mainly

1 A note in the secret material of State Security Service from 1951 concerning the dissolution of the Theosophical Society (at that time, the Society for Mystic Studies) says: “...the club ought to be viewed as one of religious sects, it is necessary to control its activities so that it does not revive its activities illegally.” (“Teosofická spole²nost”, location mark IX/0103, Carton No. S2-02.06, Department of Domestic Affairs, Associations’ register, Prague City Archives [Archiv hlavního m»sta Prahy]). 82 Milan Fujda on the social organization and the social boundaries in Yoga movements. The interpretation of the named sources is directed by results from my previous research on the acculturation of Hinduism in Czech occultism during the last years of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century; that is, by the finding that the spreading of and the access to printed media was (1) a prerequisite to the possibility of using Indian inspirations in occultism, and (2) a crucial factor in shaping the character of occultism itself. These results are embodied in the terms of „detraditionalization” and „individualization” which I will use here. The two concepts are closely interrelated. On the one hand, the spread of mediated communication allows individual reading, permits a free flow of information, undermines traditional structures of authority, and thus effectively increases possibilities of manipulation with symbolic systems. On the other hand, this results – apart from the internalization or psychologization of religious teaching and morals – in individual ‘bricolage’ and the decomposition of tradition. As a consequence, bits and chips of various traditions are used and combined in new syncretic aggregates composed of components which would not come into contact other than in the virtual world of media and a new reading public.

Prelude

After the disruption caused by the seizure of power by the Communist Party, the occult tradition shaped by Hindu inspirations completely lost its previous organizational base (club structure and a secure position in the public sphere) and retained the form of small, unsteady communities whose members gathered in private houses. They still copied and distributed samizdat materials, yet always living under the threat of being persecuted for spreading “idealist” ideologies and thus “undermining the people’s democratic regime”. The influence of the founder of the Psyche Club, Karel Weinfurter, was still felt during the times of Communist oppression, even though he had died in 1942 already. He continued to affect the occult milieu in three ways: (1) through his personal influence on people who became prominent spiritual leaders after 1948 (especially František Drtikol [1883–1961], Jaroslav Ko²í [1908–1989], and partly Kv»toslav Minaìík [1908–1974]); (2) through his books and translations in which he Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 83 introduced to the Czech society Sw¬mÎ Vivek¬nanda2 and (3) the tradition of Ramakrishna Math, as well as, later on, Paul Brunton and his guru Ramana Maharishi. These books could hardly be found on the market after 1948, but they were still owned and used by a number of practitioners, including those without direct connections to the Psyche Club. The introduction of Paul Brunton proved to be particularly important. In successive generations, Ramana Maharishi, introduced at first through Brunton’s presentation in Weinfurter’s Mystic Anthology3 and his translation of Brunton’s A Search in Secret India4, became the main reference point for Czech yogins-mystics. His form of Advaita Ved¬nta and the practice of ¬tmavic¬ra5 came to be the core teaching and practice both during the Communist era and after the Velvet Revolution. However, the Yoga-Ved¬nta inspired by Brunton and Ramana Maharishi was not the only Yoga tradition which developed in socialist Czechoslovakia. Following the pattern of the older occult tradition, the Czech Yoga tradition was usually not exclusively oriented towards Maharishi. Various other Indian as well as „Eastern” and „Western” sources were utilized. Furthermore, a strong tradition of Hatha-Yoga was being developed particularly since the 1970s. Due to specific features of Hatha-Yoga (in comparison to the path following Maharishi and understood by its practitioners as „mysticism”), the conditions of its development were different which is why this second tradition followed a different pattern of development during the Communist era and after its fall. Both these forms of Czech „Hinduism” will be analyzed here with the goal to point out some specific features of the development of individualized and detraditionalized religiosity in a Communist system and after its fall.

2 As for the transcription of terms from Indian languages, I use the simplified English pattern in which lengths of vowels are marked, differences between retroflex and dental consonants are not indicated, palatal consonant „c” is transcribed as „c”, and sibilants are transcribed palatal as „ï”, dental as „s”, retroflex as „sh”. To imitate a semi-vowel character of „v” and the common way of transcribing it into English, it is written as „w” between consonant and vowel and as „v” after vowels or in the beginning of the word. 3 Karel Weinfurter, Mystický sborník [A Mystic Anthology] (Praha: Edice Psyche, 21936). 4 Paul Brunton, Tajnosti indické [trans. of A Search in Secret India (1934) by Karel Wein- furter] (Praha: Edice Psyche, 1937). 5 %tmavic¬ra (literally “investigation of ¬tman [self]”) is a practice ascribed to Ramana Maharishi. Through this practice one realizes one’s identity with God (brahman) by posing questions like “who thinks?”, “who is in doubt?”, “who am I?” in one’s mind while waiting to get an answer from within. 84 Milan Fujda

Psyche Club and the Brunton-Maharishi Tradition

Karel Weinfurter brought into the Czech context his knowledge of grÎ R¬makrishna, whom he introduced in his very first original work Divy a kouzla indických fakirþ (Wonders and Magic of Indian Fakirs, 1913). He translated various works of Sw¬mÎ Vivek¬nanda and made this tradition known while being in a long-term correspondence with Sw¬mÎ Abhed¬nanda. In the 1930s, however, he discovered Paul Brunton whose A Search in Secret India he made public in 1936. Brunton had immediate success among members of the Psyche Club and arrangements for his visit started. In September 1937, he came to Prague and stayed there for about a month, which was long enough to gather around him a group of close devotees. As we know from the notes of Milada +apková (the wife of one of Psyche’s seniors and later translator of Brunton’s Hidden Teaching beyond Yoga, Arnošt +apek), these devotees recognized him as a great spiritual Master, a guru.6 Because of this major success, Weinfurter started having some discords with Brunton and criticized him for presenting the teaching of Ramana Maharishi as his own. According to +apková, Weinfurter had a picture of Maharishi in his house and treated him like his guru. In one meeting, after Weinfurter had pointed to a picture of Maharishi, Brunton is said to have pointed to his heart saying: „My guru is here”.7 Brunton won over an important, though not large, part of the Psyche members (from Prague as well as from Brno) and thus undermined Weinfurter’s authority. While Weinfurter was working on the translation of the Sayings of Sri Ramana Maharishi, some of his former friends and co- operators, like Josef Hoznourek and Otakar +apek, together with the teacher of English Jiìí Podborák, took over the translation and publication of Brunton’s works The Quest of the Overself (1939), The Secret Path (1938), and The Hidden Teaching beyond Yoga (1947), even though Weinfurter had already been contracted with the publication of a part of the last book. In the few following years, Brunton himself never realized that his visit had caused a split and years of heated quarrels between Weinfurter and some Psyche members. Though this polarization entailed deep troubles in the Psyche Club, it helped to form the specific character of the evolving mystical tradition in Czechoslovakia. Brunton’s works really started a search for “Indian wisdom”. While Weinfurter emphasized Western Theosophical (Boehmian) and Rosicrucian traditions (though he did translate

6 Milada +apková, Vzpomínky na Paula Bruntona [Memoirs on Paul Brunton] (Frýdek- Místek: IRIS, 2005), 15–35. 7 Ibidem, 17. Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 85

BhagavadgÎt¬ and various Yoga scriptures, and popularized R¬makrishna and Vivek¬nanda as well), in autobiographies of such important personalities of the later-day Yoga-Ved¬nta tradition as Eduard Tomáš (1908–2002) or Jiìí Vacek (†1931) we read about their initial inability to believe in the existence of great domestic masters because, for them, great masters seemed to only be present in India. Furthermore, since religiosity depending on book mediation could be either a world-view without practice, or something which had to be directly realized and practically effective (as a kind of magic or mystic experience), Brunton’s practical guidelines exercised great influence. They filled the gap which Weinfurter had tried to bridge with Yoga guides and with his own method presented in the Man’s Highest Purpose8, but which still remained to be filled for the simple fact that printed books cannot easily provide answers to practical questions. Brunton’s presentation of Ramana Maharishi proved to be important as well. Maharishi, as the source of Brunton’s teaching and practice and because he was Indian, became a more authoritative figure than Brunton himself. His practice of ¬tmavic¬ra started to dominate the practice of spiritual Yoga in Czechoslovakia. Partly this may be a consequence of the fact that Raman¬ïram in Tiruvannamalai was ready to communicate with Czech disciples and maintained a regular correspondence with them. It was again Weinfurter who started exchanging letters with the ¬ïram. Later on, especially Jiìí Vacek (who still leads meditation groups in the Czech Republic) received a number of books (free of charge) from the ¬ïram and spread many of them in samizdat editions during the years of oppression. The later popularity of Ramana Maharishi was, however, incited also by Brunton’s direct disciple Josef Hoznourek. His small book on Ramana Maharishi9 was one of few available Czech sources on Maharishi. Eduard Tomáš, who became the most influential figure in the field of detraditionalized and individualized religion in the years following the Velvet Revolution, kept an intimate relation to this book which represented a very rare and rich source of wisdom for him.10

8 Under this title Weinfurter’s book Ohnivý keì (Praha: Zmatlík a Pali²ka, 1923) was published in England. 9 Josef Hoznourek, Sri Mahariši. Jeho život a u²ení [Sri Maharishi. His Life and Tea- ching] (Praha: Eduard Weinfurter, 1940). 10 Eduard Tomáš, Pam»ti mystika [Memoirs of the Mystic] (Praha: Avatar, 1998), 48. 86 Milan Fujda

Czechoslovak Yoga-Ved¬nta

As indicated above, the Czechoslovak Yoga-Ved¬nta tradition started with the visit of Paul Brunton in Prague and with consequent split in the Psyche Club. The personal visit of Paul Brunton seems to be an important factor of further viability of this tradition. Apart from the fact that his works were translated into Czech, his personal presence was understood by his disciples as the presence of an enlightened master with exceptional authority. Concurrently, Weinfurter maintained a similar kind of authority. He published a number of books and remained the unquestioned leader and teacher of the Psyche group. On the other hand, he was the only one with this kind of rank for decades, and his school had, of course, its limitations. Particularly his limited utilization of Indian sources and his clinging to “Christian mysticism” as well as to a path in which occult symbolism played an important role, could not satisfy all interested people in Czechoslovakia, where (especially in the Czech part) anticlerical attitudes were an important part of national ideology. In this context, the authority of Brunton, backed by his training among Indian s¬dhus and his emphasis on a more direct path in which symbolic mediation was not so important, could attract precisely those who stayed with Weinfurter more because of the lack of alternative choices than because they fully agreed with him. At this point, Brunton was physically present and spent much time with his new devotees. His followers based their spiritual identity on a strong opposition to all those who disagreed11, thus a strong sense of community and of belonging to his tradition could develop among them. Yet this advantage was partly lost when his second visit had to be postponed due to the World War II. The time gap between his first and second visit amounted to eleven years. In 1947, he came back to Prague where he spent, again, about one month. His further visits were made impossible by the Communist takeover in 1948. From time to time, he was able to meet some of his followers in Vienna or elsewhere. Moreover, he maintained some of his correspondence, especially with

11 Apart from long ongoing quarrels with the Psyche Club, Bruntonians where viewed with little respect by followers of František Drtikol. František Hein refers to a situation when Irena Kellnerová (a Bruntonian and member of the Theosophical Society) apparently upset Drtikol while attending a meeting in his villa and speaking of „her Master”. Drtikol immediately made her leave the house using impolite expressions concerning her master (František Hein „Z mých vzpomínek na FráÜu Drtikola z let 1942–1961 (Psáno záìí, ìíjen 1966),” in Mystik a u²itel František Drtikol, ed. Karel Funk (Praha: Fontána), 264. Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 87 the leading figure among the Czechoslovak Bruntonians, Josef Hoznourek. Brunton thus initiated a kind of tradition in Czechoslovakia, but its viability as a distinct movement had been problematized and was made even more problematic by the events of 1948. The Communist regime was not in favor of any “idealist” world-views, any signs of a civic society, nor any forms of privately organized communal life12. Clubs and associations were dissolved or forced to dissolve themselves “willingly”. Group meetings, from then on, could be held only with great difficulties, and the communities could not grow due to the constant danger of getting into the sight of the secret police. On the other hand, rich contacts between similar-minded people developed all the time, however dangerous and impermanent they could be. The element of control and oppression was new and certainly put new dynamics to the development of traditions. On the other hand, with the exception of large clubs like Psyche or the Theosophical Society, occult groups had never before grown really large and used to remain relatively small circles of friends exchanging their personal experiences and using techniques and experiments according to descriptions found in literature.13 The Literature was indeed an essential medium of communication, face to face communication was rather derivative. Consequently, the second important problem caused by the Communist regime was the lack of a free information market and literature. Such writings were available only in old editions – that were not officially distributed any more – or in samizdat. Keeping, transcribing, and handling over “idealistic” literature was always a dangerous endeavor which could result in a prison sentence. This change should be grasped in order to fully understand the further development of the Czechoslovak Yoga-Ved¬nta tradition. On the other hand, historical roots of this tradition lie in the pre-1948 past, and this fact should no be overlooked. The important constituents of this past were the Psyche and the Theosophical Society (or the Society for Mystic Studies). The first one has been dealt with above, while the second one is going to be described in a following section on Hatha- Yoga. At this point, I would like to introduce two personalities with exceptional significance: famous avant-garde photographer František Drtikol and Jaroslav Ko²í. Both of them were believed to be masters

12 Which used to be labeled as prohibited public assemblies. 13 Milan Fujda, „Individualizace, detradicionalizace a moderní religiozita: Okultismus jako dþsledek a projev moderniza²ních zm»n” [Individualization, Detraditionalization and Modern Religiosity: Occultism as Consequence and Manifestation of Moderniza- tion Changes], Religio. Revue pro religionistiku 16 (2008)/1: 78. 88 Milan Fujda who achieved Realization, both exemplify the vivid intermingling of Yoga-Ved¬nta and Mah¬y¬na Buddhism in their teaching, both can be treated as founding figures for further generations. However radically their backgrounds differed, a teacher-student relationship existed between them. The fact that Ko²í and Drtikol could become student and teacher despite their different identities and orientation can be seen as a sign of the universalistic orientation of the occult milieu. While Drtikol understood himself as a Buddhist and translated (yet mostly without publishing) Buddhist works like the Tibetan Book of Death or Vedantic Asht¬vakragÎt¬14, Jaroslav Ko²í started his career with experiments in hypnotism and later turned towards experiments with somnambulism according to Weinfurter’s prescriptions in Animal Magnetism and towards Weinfurter’s Christian Mysticism. His neighbor František Boìík first took him to the Psyche Club in 1928 and introduced BhagavadgÎt¬ and Vivek¬nanda’s Raja Yoga to him.15 While Drtikol was a convinced Communist (he noted once: “Buddhism = Communism”16) and familiar with an idea of Emptiness of all phenomena and the composite character of all existence (which he interpreted in terms of atheism17 despite speaking of the God), Ko²í was a Catholic Christian, who initially could hardly accept the idea of a direct unity with “the inner Self” (identical with God).18 Drtikol regarded Ko²í’s mystical visions as the obstacle towards realization and convinced him of the enlightened state of every man and the ultimate non-difference between sans¬ra and nirv¬na. Drtikol’s discipline was, according to him, a simple one. He started thinking about the world as follows: ‘And saw the Lord that it is good’: so I have begun. In that case I do not have any right to criticize His Work, to vituperate it or to despise it. This idea made my path very simple. [...] In order to proceed from mere thinking to certainty I started to ponder anew over things which were passing around. In order to overcome my attachment, I rooted it in His Divine Light. And He was returning it to me clarified, illuminated by His Wis- dom. A realisation arose out of that: I stopped to think of Him and started to think through Him, act through Him, and speak through Him. I stopped

14 Eduard Tomáš, Pam»ti mystika, 80. 15 Both works in Weinfurter’s translations; see Jaroslav Ko²í, „Moje ìešení duchovního problému” [My Solution of the Spiritual Problem] in Cesta za pravdou: Dílo Jaroslava Ko²ího, ed. Jiìí Vacek (Praha: ORFEUS, 1993), 18 and Ko²í, „Dopis inženýrovi” [A letter to the engineer], in Ibidem, 133. 16 Karel Funk ed., Mystik a u²itel František Drtikol (Praha: Fontána, 2001), 83. 17 Ibidem, 83–85. 18 Jaroslav Ko²í, „Moje ìešení duchovního problému”, 21. Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 89

to walk along the path towards Him and suddenly I happened to stay on His position. This was a complete disaster. The whole world, all my knowledge had broken down – complete crush, earthquake. And at the moment I realized that it is so simple to get to Him. Just, to throw away one’s own self, whole soul along with the body, with everything: thoughts, will, desire, plans, with all the virtues and vices, sins and good deeds. Which means to change one’s mind, to leave the human mind, mind of separate- ness, duality, and to put His Mind on the throne instead.19 An important aspect of this issue was that, while teaching this to Ko²í in 1936, Ko²í interpreted it retrospectively as an expression of Maharishi’s ¬tmavic¬ra since Drtikol told him to leave all the mystic visions and search nothing but his own self, or not to search anything: Jarka, what are you searching for? What you are looking for is already yours, it is your natural “Substance” which you own – it is your “nature” which you do not have to search, just turn your attention to it.20 Thus, Drtikol’s Mah¬y¬na Buddhism intermingled with the Maharishian Adaviata Ved¬nta in the Czechoslovak Yoga-Ved¬nta tradition as it is expressed by both of its most influential proponents Jiìí Vacek21 and Eduard Tomáš22. Tomáš and Vacek form the chains connecting traditions of pre- socialist past with the present time. Tomáš was one of the Bruntonians during the years before the Communist seizure of power. Not only did he follow the practice according to Brunton’s books (especially The Secret Path and The Quest for the Overself)23, but he also learned from the account of Maharishi’s life in Josef Hoznourek’s book, from the translation of the vedantic text Drg-drïya Viveka by Arnošt +apek, and from the booklet of Asht¬vakragÎt¬ translated by Drtikol. He was engaged in the company of Brunton’s disciples (to the slight displeasure of his second wife Míla whom he considered his teacher and more advanced in mysticism than himself) and met Brunton personally during his second visit in Prague in 1947.24 He was, however, largely influenced by Drtikol whom he used to visit with his wife. His final method was the Maharishian ¬tmavic¬ra. In his interpretation, as much as in the interpretation of Ko²í, this was a path taught personally by Drtikol. The ultimate identity of sans¬ra and

19 Karel Funk ed., Mystik a u²itel František Drtikol, 51–52. 20 Jaroslav Ko²í, „Moje ìešení duchovního problému”, 27. 21 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl první [How I Searched God and Found Myself, vol I] (Praha: Jiìí Vacek, 2000), 181. 22 Eduard Tomáš, Pam»ti mystika, 50f. 23 Tomáš provides us, for example, with an account of his first sam¬dhi which followed a morning meditation after reading The Secret Path in the night (Ibidem, 29). 24 Ibidem, 35. 90 Milan Fujda nirv¬na thought by Drtikol, the ultimately free nature of man was viewed as an equivalent to the idea of the unity of ¬tman and brahman, and the illusive character of m¬y¬. Thus, Ved¬nta was interpreted through some basic concepts provided by Mah¬y¬na Buddhism, and there seemed to be no difference between them. Tomáš and Vacek wrote works both on Buddhist and on Ved¬nta topics, the Sayings of Ramana Maharishi were read (in samizdat editions) alongside the biography of Milaräpa.25 While Tomáš was bound to Brunton and the Maharishian tradition enriched by the Buddhism taught by Drtikol, Jiìí Vacek was very active in his personal search and contacted as many Indian teachers as possible. While Tomáš was a convinced Christian, however far from being orthodox, for Vacek Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular was rather a synonym of spiritual blindness and hypocrisy. The Tomáš couple and Vacek knew each other and used to meet up, nevertheless they started to have conflicts in 1969 and splitted26. The legacy of this situation might be seen in contemporary quarrels between Tomáš’s followers (and his publisher and son Miloš Tomáš) and the followers of Jiìí Vacek as well as Jiìí Vacek himself.27 Both Vacek and Tomáš used to hold intellectual professions but were persecuted by the Communist regime and subsequently became manual workers. While the house and the cottage of the Tomáš family

25 In this context, we should look at the case of Kv»toslav Minaìík. Minaìík was a formally almost uneducated person with a very difficult childhood and adult life. He was impressed by some of Weinfurter’s books on Yoga, but possibly also by the accounts of Tibet and Tibetan Buddhism by Alexander David-Neel. On the basis of his readings and personal experiences, which he described vividly in his autobiography (Kv»toslav Minaìík, Ké²ara: Autobiografie Mystika [Praha: Canopus, 1997]), he developed a very particular teaching which he interpreted as a realization of the teaching of the Kagyu-pa tradition. He conceived himself to be the next chain in the passing of this tradition after Milaräpa and believed the spread of this tradition in Czechoslovakia to be the mission of his life (Minaìík, Ké²ara, 327). He also used to be a member of the Psyche Club in Pardubice, but was expelled in 1936 for being “a dangerous magician” (Josef Sanitrák, D»jiny ²eské mystiky 2. Legenda Karel Weinfurter [Praha: Eminent, 2006], 318). However particular teachings he developed and however closed the group of followers was that he gathered around him [being frequently under the control of the secret police (Minaìík, Ké²ara, 248, 263, 265, 323)], his works became a part of the whole network-tradition of Yoga-Ved¬nta after 1989, when published officially for the first time. 26 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl druhý (Praha: Jiìí Vacek, 2001), 253f. 27 These quarrels can be found in Vacek’s continually published books (especially in the newest volumes of his autobiography Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe [How I Searched for God and Have Found Myself] and on the websites www.jirivacek- satguru.cz as well as at www.kauza-vacek.blogspot.com. For further information on this issue see Michaela Ondrašinová, „The Negotiation of Borders between ‘Religi- on’ and ‘Spirituality’: The Case of the Czech Spiritual Milieu” in this volume. Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 91 used to be one of the centers of spiritual meetings and meditations, younger Vacek was changing places of meetings as the possibilities came and went, and his memoirs thus resemble the “who is who” in the Czechoslovak Yoga-Ved¬nta milieu of that time. While Tomáš became famous through his successful lectures in the Unitarian Church (or Unitaria) in Prague in the 1960s and, after 1989, became a celebrity through public lectures28 and documentaries on Czech TV and radio, Jiìí Vacek influenced the tradition by some books published first in samizdat and officially after 1990s. Furthermore, he became a leader of a mediation group and an organizer of longer-term (two weeks) meditation sessions attended by a few dozens of regular visitors. Because of this, his opponents frequently call him „a sectarian leader”. Tomáš’s success in the public media after 1989 was exceptional and could hardly be repeated by anybody today. Czech Radio 3 – Vltava broadcasted a series of Tomáš’s spiritual lectures, Cestami sebepoznání (Along the Paths of Self-Realization), from September 1996 until January 1997. In 1992, Czech TV broadcasted for the first time a series of nine lectures, Cesta uskute²n»ní (A Path to Realisation). This series was quite an incredible phenomenon from the contemporary point of view, as the seemingly atheist Czech public was watching lectures on the search for freedom and the inner God. The staging was extremely simple: Tomáš sitting at the table in his cottage, following the text of his lectures on Asparïayoga, a picture of Ramana Maharishi on the wall behind him, and the camera shooting him either from closer or further distance, the overall image being very static. In 1993, Czech TV broadcasted a documentary on Tomáš (produced by the director Viliam Poltikovi²) as a part of the series GEN: 100 +echþ dneška (GEN: A Hundred of Czechs of Today). The same director continued by preparing a fifteen-part series Pam»ti mystika (Memoirs of the Mystic), which was broadcast for the first time in 1998 (the last broadcasting took place in 2007).29 Vacek became popular through his illegal translations of less known Advaita Ved¬nta works like R¬magÎt¬, RibhugÎt¬, parts of Yogavasishtha, again the Sayings of Maharishi, and some works of KaïmÎr

28 Audiences of these lectures grew so large that during the second half of the 1990s, they were regularly organized in the Lucerna Palace with a capacity of 2500 places (usually it was completey filled with people, some of which were sitting on the ground). 29 Josef Platz (director), Cesta uskute²n»ní I [DVD] (Praha: Avatar [contains a series Cesta uskute²n»ní part 1–4 and a bonus GEN: Eduard Tomáš pohledem Viliama Poltikovi²e]); Josef Platz (director), Cesta uskute²n»ní II [DVD] (Praha: Avatar [contains a series Cesta uskute²n»ní part 5–9]); Viliam Poltikovi² (director), Pam»ti mystika [DVD] (Centrum ²eského videa 2000). 92 Milan Fujda gaivism. His work in this respect followed his spiritual development. He had learned much from older Czech mystics (including Míla Tomášová) and in the context of various illegal house meetings – the first took place in 1949 in the house of Mr. Šimandl, a practitioner of Weinfurterian mysticism.30 Vacek regarded Jaroslav Ko²í as his guru and visited him frequently in his house in Ostrava from 1961.31 He searched very intensively for his guru as well as for books and mainly used the means of correspondence to achieve his goals. He regularly communicated with Raman¬ïram in Tiruvannamalai. The Sayings of Maharishi as well as Yogavasishtha and others were presented to him by the ¬ïram.32 He also communicated much with people from the Indian embassy in Prague. Later on, his correspondence with a former employee of the embassy (to whom he introduced Ramana Maharishi), B. N. givpuri, was published by the ¬ïram in its journal Mountain Path.33 Moreover, through his correspondence he also became a Hatha- Yoga practitioner and a disciple of Sw¬mÎ giv¬nanda,34 was in contact with Sw¬mÎ Nikhil¬nanda of the Ramakrishna Mission35 and with Sw¬mÎ Mukt¬nanda (of the tradition of the KaïmÎr gaivism).36 He published some of the works of the KaïmÎr gaivism in samizdat, he went through the lecture courses which had been sent to him, again free of charge, by the American Divine Life Society37 founded by Paramhansa Yog¬nanda, and he became a member of an illegal Czechoslovak branch of Subud.38 As much as many others (and the Tomáš couple), he used to meet Indian sanny¬sins who happened to visit Czechoslovakia. Thus, he met Sw¬mÎ Prem¬nanda (1961 and 1962)39, then Sw¬mÎ Jan¬rdana40 of Mathura, who was on his way to the USA and Canada. These meetings usually took place in the Unitaria in Prague which was, at the time, the only place where such events could be organized officially. Unitaria was also one of places where Hatha-Yoga could be practiced on a limited

30 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl první, 127–132. 31 Jiìí Vacek, „+lov»k Jaroslav Ko²í” [Jaroslav Ko²í, a Man] in Cesta za pravdou: Dílo Jaroslava Ko²ího, Jiìí Vacek ed. (Praha: ORFEUS, 1993), 8. 32 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl první, 136. 33 A Czech Devotee [Jiìí Vacek], „Letter to a friend,” Mountain Path 24 (1987)/3: 160– 162; Mountain Path 26 (1989)/1&2: 64–65; Mountain Path 26 (1989b)/3&4: 120–122. 34 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl první, 146. 35 He received a Gospel of Sri R¬makrishna form him (Ibidem, 147). 36 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl tìetí (Praha: Jiìí Vacek, 2001), 110. 37 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl druhý, 79–80. 38 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl tìetí, 29–34. 39 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl první, 167. 40 He was invited to the country by Ctibor Dostálek, an important person in popularizing Hatha-Yoga in Czechoslovakia (Tomáš, Pam»ti mystika, 85). Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 93 scale. Even Unitaria, however, got into trouble after 1970, when it was infiltrated by agents of the intelligence service. During the period of “normalization” (1970s–1980s) only private and secret meetings were possible. This total oppression of unchurched spiritual life and the total control over officially recognized churches (Unitaria among them) was one of reasons for the immense popularity of Eduard Tomáš and his wife, of Jiìí Vacek, and of alternative healers such as Tomáš Pfeifer (a disciple of Josef Zezulka) in the 1990s. Classical works of Western New Age like Ferguson’s Aquarian Conspiracy or Capra’s Turning Point have never had anywhere near the popularity of Tomáš and his popular lectures, radio and TV series, and the numerous books published by Avatar publishing house. Today he is, however, almost unknown to the younger generation. One can still find tapes with his lectures, CDs, and DVDs with the documentaries created in the 1990s, and his books are still being published. On the other hand, market pressures force his son-publisher to also publish other books – mostly his father’s and Míla’s favorite authors, thus making his father less visible on the overcrowded book market. Since the 1990s, the range of books, courses, lectures, seminars, healing sessions, etc., offered and sold to the public has grown significantly. In this environment, lectures of Tomáš’s son reach a much smaller public than Tomáš’s lectures did in the 1990s, when the market just started to evolve and when he was one of very few spiritual teachers.

Hatha-Yoga in the Context of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

Eduard Tomáš and Jiìí Vacek represented a particular tradition of Yoga-Ved¬nta which could prove a certain continuity, however problematic, with the occult milieu of the pre-Communist era. Another tradition, which can be labelled as the tradition of Hatha-Yoga, developed during the years of communism. I do not intend to present a complete history of Hatha-Yoga in Czechoslovakia here. Nevertheless, it is useful to make few remarks on the forms of Hatha-Yoga which developed in Communist Czechoslovakia, the organizational forms it took, and its influence on the later development of Yoga after 1989. I have mentioned that a certain form of Hatha-Yoga practice was exercised by Jiìí Vacek and that this practice was formed by Sw¬mÎ giv¬nanda. Indeed, this tradition, in spite of the fact that Hatha-Yoga really only spread from the 1970s, has deeper roots. At the beginning of this movement, a member of the Society for Mystic Studies, Miloslav 94 Milan Fujda

Lži²ka, played an important role. According to archive materials, giv¬nanda was a frequent lecture topic at the Society for Mystic Studies in the year 1949.41 According to notes of Jiìí Vacek, Miloslav Lži²ka stayed for a year at the headquarters of the Theosophical Society in Adyar (Chennai) and also spent some time in giv¬nanda’s ¬ïram where he studied giv¬nanda’s Hatha-Yoga system.42 In the 1970s, the role of Yoga in Czechoslovakia can be illustrated by the fact that a prestigious (and the only) medical publishing house, Avicenum, could publish an original and very complex Czech work on the topic, Jóga: Od staré Indie k dnešku (Yoga: From Ancient India up to Nowadays). Its authors Milada BartoÜová, Zden»k Bašný, Boris Merhaut, and Rudolf Skarnitzl are still active today in practicing, popularizing, and teaching Yoga. The book provided detailed descriptions of a number of ¬sanas together with instructive photographs and information about its medical effects. Furthermore, it comprised detailed sections on the history of Yoga as well as on the relation of Yoga to certain contemporary techniques of psychological training, hypnotism and suggestion, psychoanalysis, biofeedback, zen, and psychotherapy. It introduced the reader to the cultural conditions of the origins of Yoga, explained in detail its branches like Karma-, Bhakti-, and Jn¬na-Yoga, and analyzed the Patanali’s R¬ja-Yoga system. Apart from ¬sanas, it also introduced purification techniques, pr¬n¬y¬ma, bandhas, and a limited number of mental exercises. It described physiological and psychological effects of various exercises and provided a list of ¬ïrams and Yoga centers in India. During the Communist era, there was no other book comparable in its range, although the regime permitted a publication of two volumes (excluding the third volume on Pr¬n¬yama) of van Lysebeth’s famous Yoga trilogy43 and of a book by a Czech Indologist, later emigrant to Great Britain, Karel Werner44. Yoga was a suspicious affair for the regime, based on the ideology of scientific atheism. Yoga, however, provided certain opportunities for being interpreted purely in the language of sport, stretching activities, and health care, and thus, one could argue in favor of practicing Yoga even from the point of view of the leading political ideology, without

41 “Teosofická spole²nost”, location mark IX/0103, Carton No. S2-02.06, Department of Domestic Affairs, Associations’ register, Prague City Archives (Archiv hlavního m»sta Prahy). 42 Jiìí Vacek, Jak jsem hledal Boha a nalezl Sebe. Díl druhý, 89–91. 43 André van Lysebeth, Jóga [trans. of J’apprends le Yoga. Flammarion 1968] (Praha: Olympia, 1972), here I work with the 3rd impression from 1984; Cvi²íme jógu [trans. of Je perfectionne mon Yoga. Flammarion 1973] (Praha: Olympia, 1988). 44 Karel Werner, Hathajóga. Základy t»lesných cvi²ení jógických [Hatha-Yoga: The Principles of Yogic Physical Exercises] (Praha: Olympia, 1969). Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 95 necessarily contradicting oneself. Due to this fact, Hatha-Yoga could be not only practiced, but also studied scientifically45, and it was thus looked at with certain respect. According to a famous Yoga teacher from the region of Brno, Vladimír Zeman, it was a scientist engaged in physiological studies of Yoga, Ctibor Dostálek, who recommended to propagate Yoga in the era of „normalization” as a form of preventing civilization diseases and focusing on the physically weak and handicapped.46 Possibilities for this were opened partly thanks to activities of an Indologist and a graduate of the Bihar School of Yoga in Munger (Bihar)47, Milada BartoÜová, in the Central Department for Physical Culture (Ústìední ústav t»lesné kultury).48 She developed a popular way of Yoga practice and trained a number of later Yoga teachers. The advantage of the Central Department for Physical Culture was that it had branches in all regions of the country and thus the activities could easily be spread. In a number of regions, cycles of practitioners were established as part of the Federation of Health and Physical Education (Svaz zdravotní t»lesné výchovy), an official body through which sport and physical education was organized and supported financially in Communist Czechoslovakia. Today, this practice is sometimes criticized as a degradation of Yoga which left its mark on its contemporary understanding because it „veiled all the spiritual content of Yoga”49. At the time, however, there were not many alternative possibilities. Furthermore, as Vladimír Zeman points out, this way of practice changed frequently into „practicing philosophy in a gym”, and for many, it served as „a source of moral coherence” in a period where one never knew if and by whom he was being spied on,

45 In the Czech context, this was provided at the Department of Physiological Regulations at the Academy of Sciences and the Faculty of Physical Education and Sports at the Charles University. Much was done in this field by Ctibor Dostálek who is personally interested in Yoga and at the same time a member of the Friends of India Association. 46 Vladimír Zeman, „Zavzpomínání, které nemá obecnou platnost (subjektivní poznámky k vývoji jógy u nás),” [Commemorating without General Relevance (Subjective Comments on the Development of Yoga in our Country)] in Jóga v minulosti a pìítomnosti (Praha: Sdružení pìátel Indie a +eský svaz Jógy, 2000), 16. 47 Following the system of Sw¬mÎ giv¬nanda as developed by his disciple Sw¬mÎ Saty¬nanda. 48 Boris Merhaut, „Doslov k ²eskému vydání van Lysebethovy Hathajógy” [Afterword to the Czech Edition of van Lysebeth’s Hatha Yoga], in André van Lysebeth, Jóga (Praha: Olympia, 1984), 259. 49 Miroslav Rotrekl, Jan Jandus, „Stru²ný pohled na vývoj ²eské jógy za posledních 25 let” [A Short Overview of the Development of the Czech Yoga in last 25 Years], Dotek. Nezávislý m»sí²ník pro duchovní kulturu 13 (2004)/2: 13. 96 Milan Fujda and where, consequently, „an adherence to fundamental moral norms was seen as a problematic issue”.50 A sport activity of this kind could be used to cover a number of activities which did not have much in common with physical education. The sport division of Geophysics in Brno, in cooperation with the Masaryk University51, published a textbook of Sanskrit compiled by Dušan Zbavitel according to which, those who were interested could learn the source language of Yoga. The same sport division lead by Vladimír Zeman published – with relevant ideological explication – Zbavitel’s translation of Rabindranath Tagore’s GÎt¬njali and presented it as „methodical material for teachers of health and physical education”52. Finally, the organization was even able to coordinate courses for officials of the Communist Party where Yoga was taught as a form of anti-stress prevention. As Zeman notes, with this Yoga a number of volunteer workers became proponents of ideas of an improvement of general morality through non-violence [ahins¬], non-lying [satya], non-stealing [asteya], non-storage [aparigraha], and non-attached acting [br¬hmacarya] – or through Patanjali’s first fold of R¬ja-Yoga, yama. By doing exercises, we also proposed the correction of living in a direction towards the chastity of conduct [ïauca], contentment [santosha], search for knowledge [swadhy¬ya], self control [tapas] – and a search for the higher principles of existence [Îïvarapranidh¬na] – or the ancient but actual niyama.53 After the fall of Communism, this strategy had several consequences. First of all, Hatha-Yoga was well-established and the practice could continue. There was a number of Yoga teachers, there was a training institution for teachers, there was a state funding of Yoga activities since the number of “Yoga clubs” continued to be organized in the framework of the Federation of Physical Education and Sports (Svaz t»lesné výchovy a sportu). In a limited measure, Yoga could be used in the healthcare service as some research was done, and also because there was a tradition of Yoga work with handicapped people. Karel Nešpor, a psychiatrist and a yogi in the tradition of the Bihar School of Yoga, used Yoga techniques for his work with drug addicts. Even though a number of “sects” were portrayed very negatively in the media during the 1990s and members of these “sects” were boycotted,

50 Vladimír Zeman, „Zavzpomínání, které nemá obecnou platnost”, 15. 51 University of Jan Evangelista Purkyn» at the time. 52 Vladimír Zeman, „Edi²ní poznámka k metodice užití veršþ R. Thákura ve zdravotní t»lovýchov»” [Editor’s Comment on the Method of the Use of the Verses of R. Ta- gore in Health Physial Education”, in Dušan Zbavitel, Rabíndranáth Thákur a jeho GítáÜdžali (Brno: TJ Geofyzika, 1986), 3–6. 53 Vladimír Zeman, „Zavzpomínání, které nemá obecnou platnost”, 15. Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 97 the actual practicing of Yoga was not jeopardized by such negative campaigns. On the other hand, “guru” became a threatening word in the public discourse, and Yoga practice was not excluded from this (however, Eduard Tomáš was not viewed as “a guru” in a negative sense of the word). So while sport-like Yoga was spread easily, more spiritual or meditative practices remained suspicious. This was an obstacle which had to be overcome by disciples of Sri Chinmoy as well as, for example, the Yoga in Daily Life Association, which was active in Czechoslovakia since 1973. The spiritual (as opposed to physical) aspects of Yoga remained more under surface. As a Yoga teacher of the Yoga in Daily Life Association told me, today not even 5% of the 2500 practitioners of Yoga in Yoga in Daily Life (in Prague and Brno) follow aspects of Yoga other than physical exercising and call themselves followers of Sw¬mÎ Maheïwar¬nanda. Even the practice of meditation was removed from the Yoga courses of the association because it was regarded as useless for the wider cycle of practitioners.54 I have found it significant that the notion of “guru” and the relationship between guru and disciple was a dominant theme he chose for his presentation of Yoga in Daily Life to my students.55 Up to now it is a sensitive issue in the public sphere and something that practitioners want the public to understand „correctly”.

Yoga under Communism: A Comparative Perspective

A comparative work in this area of study is complicated. In the countries of former Western Europe, studies of contemporary Western Yoga and its social contexts are not much developed. At the moment, there is not much more than studies of Maya Burger56 and the relatively recently published work by Elizabeth De Michelis57. Studies of the topic in the countries of former Eastern European are even scarcer. The study of Yoga (and of religion in general) from the viewpoint of the Study of Religions was as difficult as its practicing up to 1989. For that reason, not

54 An interview with a Yoga teacher of Yoga in Daily Life Association in Brno, Yoga in Daily Life Association establishment, Domikánské nám. 6/7, Brno, 6th October 2008. 55 The presentation took place during the course “Hinduism in the West” at the De- partment for the Study of Religions, Masaryk University, Jaselská 10, Brno, 4th Novem- ber 2008. 56 Maya Burger, „What Price Salvation? The Exchange of Salvation Goods between India and the West,” Social Compass 53 (2006)/1: 81–95. 57 Elizabeth De Michelis, A History of Modern Yoga (London – New York: Continuum, 2004). 98 Milan Fujda much information is available on the situation in Eastern and Central European countries before the fall of Communism. It is not clear whether a Maharishian Yoga-Ved¬nta tradition developed in other CEE countries to the same extent as in Czecho- slovakia. It seems that it did not. Instead, it is likely that domestic occult movements like The Universal White Brotherhood in Bulgaria somehow continued their activities during the Communist era in spite of state oppression in a similar manner as the Yoga-Ved¬nta tradition did in Czechoslovakia. A rather different case was the Agni-Yoga of Nicholas and Helena Roerichs in Russia. The movement grew from the Theosophical Movement in 1920 and it developed (probably due to the presence of Tibetan Buddhism in a number of Asian states of Russia) both Advaita-Ved¬ntic and Mah¬y¬na Buddhist aspects of theosophical teachings. According to Karel Funk, this movement might have had a certain influence on František Drtikol58, but this is not well documented. Like the Czech Yoga-Ved¬nta tradition or the Universal White Brotherhood in Bulgaria, the Agni-Yoga movement in Russia could also only live underground until the 1980s, though it prospered in the USA. An interesting issue for further discussion might be an organizational form of the movements, somehow analogical to the Czech Yoga-Ved¬nta tradition. Though it might be seen as a certain tradition, it cannot be viewed as a particular movement. It has some shared fundamentals, it was (and continues to be) transmitted – apart from the media – through personal ties, but it is not a united organization and did not use to be one even when it worked underground. It resembles more a composite network with several centers that is subjected to a continuous reorganization of multivalent relations among its units (groups as well as individuals). In this respect, it might be described more in terms of SPIN structures like New Age in the works of Michael York59. A certain difference, however, is noteworthy: there were very limited possibilities of the flow of people and information in this network during the years of Communism and no possibility of open public work, no “spiritual marketplace”. Hatha-Yoga is a different case. Its structure is given by the structure in which sport activities were organized. On the other hand, this structure was further complicated by the half-illegal or illegal character of some activities of the Yoga sport divisions which resulted in something like the outer and inner cycles. Members of these inner cycles could become, for example, devotees of Sw¬mÎ Maheïwar¬-

58 Karel Funk ed., Mystik a u²itel František Drtikol, 84. 59 Michael York, Emerging Network. A Sociology of the New Age and Neo-Pagan Movements (Boston – London: Rowman & Littlefield, 1995). Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 99 nanda when he turned his attention towards Czechoslovakia in 1973. Special meetings or satsangs with him were organized, and participation was possible only upon personal invitation. During these meetings, Sw¬mÎ did not teach many ¬sanas, but mainly meditation, reciting mantras and singing kÎrtans, the importance of a guru and his duties, the duties of his devotees towards him, as well as the “suspicious” Sanskrit language.60 However illegal some activities connected with the practicing of Yoga might have been, I do not know of anybody who was put in jail for this practice in Czechoslovakia. With regard to this, the case of Gregorian Bivolaru and his Yoga school in Romania might be an Eastern and Central European exception, just like an explicit official ban on Oriental practices in Romania and the continuous control and several imprisonments of Bivolaru’s yogins. Furthermore, an interesting issue in Bivolaru’s case is the fact that when the political situation changed in the countries of Eastern Europe and the new freedom was followed by a new growth of the religious/spiritual market, he again fell into disfavor with the political power and was imprisoned again. Unfortunately, there are so many unknown aspects of this case that the real intention of the state activities against Bivolaru are not clear.61 Was there something criminal in Bivolaru’s practices or is his an extreme case of anti-cult activities in Central and Eastern Europe of the 1990s? The development of the religious market after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe with reference to the earlier development of individualized and detraditionalized forms of religion during the Communist era would be an extremely interesting field of comparative research, also in comparison to the development of New Age practices in Western Europe. A problem here is posed by the lack of studies in CEE countries, but also by a general lack of historical studies of New Age in Western Europe. The studies of Hanegraaff62, Bochinger63 or Sutcliffe64

60 Milena Lisá, „Paramhans svámí Mahéšvaránanda – 30 let Jógy v denním život» v naší zemi” [Paramhans Swámí Maheïwar¬nanda – 30 Years of the Yoga in Daily Life in our Country], Dotek. Nezávislý m»sí²ník pro duchovní kulturu 12 (2003)/3: 18. 61 The ambiguous situation of Gregorian Bivolaru and the Movement for Spiritual Integration into the Absolute (MISA), founded in 1989, was described and analyzed in Sara Møldrup Theils’ presentation „Esoteric Yoga: The Case of Gregorian Bivolaru and MISA” during the 2008 EASR conference in Brno (10th Sept 2008). Her presentation makes it clear that not much can be said about the case until a deep study of the documents has been carried out. 62 Wouter J. Hanegraaff, New Age Religion and Western Culture. Esotericism in the Mirror of Secular Thought (New York: State University Press, 21998). 63 Christoph Bochinger, ‘New Age’ und moderne Religion. Religionswissenschaftliche Analysen (Gütersloh: Chr. Keiser, Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 1994). 100 Milan Fujda are rather exceptions than illustrations of the rule. However, in order to understand the role and significance of detraditionalized and individualized religiosity in modern society, its history has to be written.

Conclusions

Although detraditionalized and individualized religious activities were hindered and sometimes interrupted by the seizure of power by the Communist Party, the disruption was not absolute. Continuity was difficult to maintain but was not completely lost. The Communist regime, nevertheless, left its mark on the organization as well as on teachings and practices, and this consequently formed the Czech religious field in the years after the Velvet Revolution as well. Issues concerning the organizational structure of the Czech traditions of Hatha-Yoga and Yoga-Ved¬nta were dealt with above. Communist control and oppression might have had an interesting influence on personal interpretations of teachings and practices followed by Czechoslovak yogins, and this issue can be elaborated here in more detail. In the works of Eduard Tomáš as well as in works of Jiìí Vacek, one can encounter an extreme emphasis on the personal experience of the state of unity with God, alongside long descriptions of this state of unity, written at a time when there was no established interpretation framework for these questions. In my opinion these passages clearly show that sam¬dhi and the realization of the unity with God or the proper character of one’s own self is nothing that can be achieved without proper training in interpretation. Authors described them as spiritual experiences but stated frankly that such description is retrospective and that these experiences were not understood as such at the time when they occurred. Ordinary experiences like gazing into nowhere65 were described in terms of mystic experiences with retrospect assurance.66 On the other hand, a religion based exclusively on personal experience – a religion which in another paper67 I call a product of printed media – was the only possibility in an environment

64 Steven Sutcliffe, Children of the New Age. A History of Alternative Spirituality (London: Routledge, 2003). 65 The Czech expression “koukání do blba” is usually used to describe this state of mind. 66 Eduard Tomáš, Pam»ti mystika, 53–56. 67 Milan Fujda, „Modernizace, nová religiozita a akulturace hinduismu v ²eském okultismu” [Modernization, New Religiozity, and Acculturation of Hinduism in Czech Occultism], Sociální studia 5 (2008)/3–4: 141f. Acculturation of Hinduism and the Czech Traditions of Yoga 101 where the public expression of religious faith was prohibited, and where there was a lack of literature and the possibility to communicate and share one’s ideas. Thus, the Yoga masters of the Communist era exemplified a type of religious genius (Weberian sense) and this fact was very much in their favor after the fall of Communism. Intensive personal experience was the source of their authority. For them personal experience or rather guides towards its achievement have been lacking in a Christian tradition. For this reason indeed, Weinfurter searched for and worked with Indian sources. Europeans believed Sw¬mÎ Vivek¬nanda that Hinduism is first of all an elaborate „scientific” path to personal religious experience, the authority of Indian teachings among them was significantly dependent on this believe. Belief in personal experience as the essence of Hinduism (and Yoga) and an emphasis on personal experience as achieved through Indian practices (namely ¬tmavic¬ra) created an environment in which not only Brunton in the 1930s, but also his Czech successors during the Communist era could claim religious authority with relative ease. In a country with a strong anti-clerical tradition like Czechoslovakia or the Czech Republic, this created a good ground for the popularity of Indian teachings – whether proposed by Czech or foreign teachers. Since Czech ‘masters’ could not have any competitors from abroad, since they were ‘heroes’ who carried on their missions during the years of oppression, and since the Communist regime – by prohibiting their teaching – created a large public for them, eager to hear what they had to say and offer, their success in the years after the fall of Communism was secured. As the conditions have changed since then and the “spiritual marketplace” is as open as the financial one, the days of Czech Yoga masters with a rank of general public celebrities seem to be gone for good.

The Interaction between Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia Identifying the Borders of Political Development

DUMITRU MINZARARI

The very controversial thesis of an ongoing „clash of civilizations”1 generated heated debates about the role of culture, history, but most important of all, religion, on the political development of countries. Huntington’s ideas were perceived as suggesting that only specific religious faiths were favoring liberal-democratic development. This claim is backed by the evidence of the so-called waves of democratization,2 during which Protestant countries led the way in embracing liberal democracy, later to be followed on this path by some Christian Catholic countries. Provided the rather widespread acceptance, in the academic community, of religion as an important social institution, able to influence the political development of people and countries,3 there has been insufficient attention devoted to the influence of religion on the post-Soviet development of ex-USSR countries. If we agree that the church-state relations in the Western Christianity had a significant impact on democratic development in the West, then we could advance our understanding of the political development in Eastern Orthodoxy, looking at the relations between the same two actors. This chapter will analyze the historical interaction between state and church on the example of the largest representative case of Orthodoxy, Russia. It will examine the differences of this interaction compared to the case of Western Europe, and how they determined the role that the Orthodox (Eastern) Church had and continues to have on the post-Soviet transition of Russia. Through this, the analysis will also aim to contribute to the larger debate on the correlation between the type of

1 Samuel Huntington, „The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, 72:3 (1993). 2 S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Nor- man, OK, and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 15. 3 Among most influential see Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the „Spirit” of Capi- talism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2003), 320. 104 Dumitru Minzarari religious faith and the efficiency of democratic development in a given society. The study will distance itself from the popular debate that a religious faith may be intrinsically more or less favorable to the emergence of specific political systems. In principle, this approach is value-judging the philosophical core of religious faiths, ignoring how this core is exploited for the purpose of generating influence. The current chapter will instead look at how religion is capable of affecting the social fabric of societies, and specifically it will analyze the Church4 taking a functionalist perspective. Religion, as a community of faith, is able to forge boundaries of selective inclusion and of exclusion. In the examined case of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), this was reflected in the Church’s efforts to discredit Western spiritual values and its way of life as „immoral”. In the context of Russia one has to also underline, in addition to its inherited Eastern Church’s hostility to Rome and the West, the consequences of Russia’s isolation from Renaissance and Reformation.5 Thus, on the top of the modernization barriers separating Russia from the West, it may also be necessary to consider the historical borders. A unique characteristic of Russian Orthodoxy is that after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia its theological, sacramental, and ecclesiastical development was frozen,6 resulting in a long spiritual and intellectual hibernation. While the religious denominations in the West were embracing the ideas of individual liberty and human rights, and while Catholicism was absorbing the consequences of the Second Vatican Council, the Moscow Metropolitanate was working hand in hand with the Soviet Politburo and KGB, both domestically and internationally.7 These are not the only identifiable distinctions between how religion affected the society in Russia or in the West. An important separation line can be traced to the individualism-collectivism

4 „Church” will be used while talking generally about the Christian Church, either Western or Eastern. Similarly, the term Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) will be used further in the text when referring to the Moscow Patriarchate. 5 Paul Anderson, „The Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia,” Foreign Affairs, 39:2 (1961), 299. 6 Alexander Agadjanian and Victor Roudometof, introduction to Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-first Century eds. Victor Roudometof, Alexander Agadjanian, and Jerry Pankhurst (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2005), 12. 7 John Garrard and Carol Garrard, Russian Orthodoxy Resurgent: Faith and Power in the New Russia (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2008), 326. The Interaction between Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia 105 dichotomy, which is based on the autonomous character of the individual versus this individual’s analytic indistinctiveness from the human mass of the society.8 It’s also worth considering the legal and political traditions, as in Russia the State was historically above the law, with virtually no checks existing to balance the ruler’s power.9 The next section will further analyze the impact of religion on political development, considering the Church’s functions and historical evolution, and employing a number of analytical tools from comparative politics, game theory, sociology and anthropology.

Refocusing the Debate

The key argument of this chapter is that the whole debate around whether some religious faiths are more favorable to democratization than others is somewhat misplaced. Since it is rather vague, this argument needs to be reframed, and it will definitely gain in logical rigor if its underlying assumptions could be broken down. Therefore, the current study claims that in judging the role of religion in political (democratic) transition the logical accents should be placed differently. Instead, one should ask what are the structural features of a society (ideology, values, authority perception, citizen-state relations, etc.) that a religion has contributed to create or consolidate, either through its actions or inactions? In fact, long before Huntington hinted towards specific „democratic” political culture that Protestant and Catholic religions helped to form, de Tocqueville in its analysis of American democracy emphasized the key importance of the customs and manners of the people in preserving the democratic republic in the United States.10 This would suggest that there exists a specific set of cultural characteristics, which are necessary in order to build a Western-style democracy.

8 Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in Anthropological Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 25. 9 Andreas Buss, „The Individual in the Eastern Orthodox Tradition,” Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 91 (July-September 1995): 52. 10 Alex de Tocqueville, „Democracy in America,” Vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1945), 298–342 quoted in Sullivan J.L. and J.E. Transue, „The Psychological Underpin- nings of Democracy: A Selective Review of Research on Political Tolerance, Interper- sonal Trust, and Social Capital,” Annual Review of Psychology 50 (1999): 626–627. 106 Dumitru Minzarari

Based on the existing research on democratization,11 it is necessary then to identify which of these societal features are more effective in and critical for bringing genuine democratic development. This will allow us to assess how the Church has historically influenced the „customs and manners of the people” in relation to authority and to each other, both in-group and outside it. This study will examine the Church as a political institution in the society, rather than a religious practice. Examining the Church as a political actor allows the employment of a more divers set of analytic tools. This approach avoids the unproductive assessment of religion as an abstract process, while undertaking a more dynamic examination of it, and generating better explanations. The new analytical avenues opened by such an approach have proved to carry a number of advantages,12 as research emerging from various fields of social sciences increasingly indicates.13 The paper will address the institutional interests of the Church, as reflected in its behavior and the declarations of key stakeholders. Also, it is critical to consider the roles the religious leaders select for the ROC, how they react to various external constraints and opportunities, and the social effects their choices had on the people and society at large. In doing so, this chapter will employ the strategic analysis perspective based on variables such as power, preferences and perceptions of involved actors.14 Another analytic tool considered in this research includes the concepts of historical context and path dependence. Despite the criticism this approach was subject to,15 there is convincing evidence and research confirming that history matters. The seminal work of Robert Putnam on how historically differing civic traditions in Northern and Southern Italy resulted in different models of political development in these areas is one excellent example.16

11 For a good overview see Barbara Geddes, „What Causes Democratization?” in Ox- ford Handbook of Comparative Politics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 2009), 317–39. 12 Kenneth Westhues, „The Church in Opposition,” Sociological Analysis 37:4 (Winter 1976), 299–314. 13 Mart Bax, „Religious Regimes and State Formation: Towards a Research Perspec- tive,” Anthropological Quarterly 60:1 (January 1987), 1–11. 14 Bruse Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics (Washington DC: CQ Press, 4th ed., 2010), 14–21. 15 Kathleen Thelen, „How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 208–40. 16 Robert Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 280. The Interaction between Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia 107

In our comparison between different historical paths of development of ROC and Western religious traditions, historical legacy has a key importance. In Fig.1 it is shown that the West experienced multiple processes of separations between power holders. This separation between religious and state authorities, when people lived in an environment where existed two competing poles of power – the king and the priest –, was contributing to the creation of a culture of political pluralism. Gradually, over centuries, people learned to doubt the existence of absolute truth, developed multiple loyalties, and gained the possibility to chose the side that better reflected their interests. These effects amplified after the initial separation between the State and Church was followed by another one, inside the Catholic Church itself, when Protestantism emerged and spread in Western Europe. In addition to contributing to the growth of political and religious pluralism, building diffused loyalties towards authority, the historical development of Western Christianity offered support for the emergence of civil society tradition in the West,17 and even of political parties. Research using agent-based modeling techniques confirmed this intuition, suggesting that a higher plurality of information results in maintaining a larger diversity of opinions and worldviews.18 In our case this means that given a few independent power centers, one unintentional byproduct of their interaction will be the emergence and consolidation of the number of loyalties and worldviews at least equal to the number of actors. In other words, for the pluralism to emerge, there had to be created conditions where no single actor or group of actors could completely dominate the polity, while they maintained distinct single-peaked preferences. (Figure 1) Following a similar logic in the case of Russia, the result of Church being subordinate to the state was that their preferences merged, which led to the enforcement of a dominating worldview and a single loyalty. For the pluralism to come into existence, there had to more than one competitive worldview, able to recruit followers. Since this was only possible when this worldview was sponsored by a powerful actor in the society, the pluralism, either political or religious, did not find a fertile environment in Russia. It is this particular difference in historical development between West and Russia that serves as a critical juncture period, which in turn generates a „historical lock-in”, namely a process

17 R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 127–142 in Oleg Kharkhordin, „Civil Society and Orthodox Christianity,” Europe-Asia Studies 50:6 (1998), 953–954. 18 Y. Shibanai, S. Yasuno and I. Ishiguro, „Effects of global information feedback on diversity: Extensions to Axelrod’s cultural adaptive model,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001): 80–96. 108 Dumitru Minzarari which increasingly forces units on a path of development from which they cannot escape.19

Figure 1: The Church-State interaction and its influence on political development

Religion in Russia, in addition to its traditional function of providing the spiritual harbor and a value-based existential justification for the masses, also started to combine these functions with that of becoming a political ideology. This assertion is based on the interpretation of ideology as a meaning in the service of power.20 Thus the Church’s function in Russia was of either social cement, which served to bind the society around the State-set goals, or social control,21 reflecting a more coercive effect such as for instance, identifying the collective „enemies” or proselyting unquestionable and unconditional loyalty to authorities.

19 J. Mahoney and D. Schensul, „Historical Context and Path Dependence,” in Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis, eds. Robert Goodin and Charles Tilly (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 454–71. 20 John Thompson, Ideology and Modern Culture: Critical Social Theory in the Era of Mass Communication (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 7 21 Mike Cormack, Ideology (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 20–21 The Interaction between Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia 109

While operating with a similar role, the Church in the modern time is not only able to weaken the popular support for the opposition parties, but also consolidates the positions of the incumbent political forces. Studies on ideology and beliefs from sociology, psychology and anthropology show very strong correlations between schema-driven interpretations of reality created through cultural socialization and the activation of certain motivational goals.22 Having built a powerful socialization mechanism, and basing its activity on frames creation23 and promotion, the Church has a powerful ability to influence motivations. As a next step, following the model presented in Fig.1 we shall describe the emergence of civic culture in the West, which according to Almond and Verba is an evolutionary trade-off between traditionalism and modernity. They defined it as a „pluralistic culture based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change but moderated it”.24 It generally echoes rather well with Weber, Tocqueville, and Putnam, despite of the considerable skepticism among scholars regarding this kind of analysis.25 Notwithstanding the criticism, it won’t be an overstatement suggesting that civic culture analytic approach seems to have the strongest explanatory power among competing theories. Besides, what many critics fail to consider, is that the cultural phenomena fits well into the existing game theoretic explanations of cooperation, which appear to be very robust. Because of their individual autonomy and a higher number of available options (centers of authority) compared to the „Russia” side of the schema, the actors in the „West” side of the schema are able to better realize their needs. Since they can switch sides, being able to credibly threaten with defection to a more benign center of authority, they are more likely to engage in actions that further their interests and are able to do this collectively. Given these starting points, there are few theoretical frameworks that one can

22 John Duckitt, „A Dual-Process Cognitive-Motivational Theory of Ideology and Prejudice,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 33 (2001): 50 23 For a good introduction to framing see D. Chong and J. Druckman, „A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments,” Journal of Communication 57 (2007), 99–118. 24 G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (First Sage Printing, 1989), 6. 25 For a good overview see Felippo Sabetti, „Democracy and Civic Culture,” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (Oxford: Ox- ford University Press, 2009), 340–62. 110 Dumitru Minzarari explore – for instance the collective action theory,26 or cooperation under uncertainty.27 However, provided that prevailing individualism and political pluralism will eventually generate conditions for improving the rule of law, economic welfare, and will result in a qualitative increase in security and self-expression values,28 this will open new perspectives. For instance, a decrease in insecurity or a shift in emphasis from survival to self-expression values will have a positive impact on interpersonal trust,29 which is crucial to overcome the problems of collective action theory and cooperation game. As Putnam has shown, the higher the trust between the actors, the easier and more unconditionally they will cooperate, building social structures upon which liberal democracy depends. It is then of no surprise that according to the World Value Survey (WVS) traditionally Protestant countries and most of the West European Catholic countries score higher on interpersonal trust indices than post-communist (Orthodox) countries.30 This civic culture evolution played out differently in Russia, where historically there was no alternative pole of authority, except for that of the tsar, the emperor, the Communist Party, or the president, since the Church has always served whomever was in power. The loop in the scheme is depicted to show this, as ROC was forced to serve the political authority during the USSR, and it chose to do so again, this time by its own volition, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This section was aimed to respond to the „what” question, depicting the differences in political development between the West and Russia, and showing how the Church influenced their emergence. At this point it is important to stress that the study did imply the emergent and stochastic nature of the Church actions, until the collapse of the Soviet Union, since it responded to external pressure and aimed to survive. The next section will attempt to answer to the „why” question, examining the reasons behind Church’s decision to subordinate itself to the State in the post-Soviet period.

26 Elinor Ostrom, „Collective Action Theory,” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Poli- tics, eds. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 186– 208 27 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books, 2006), 241. 28 R. Inglehart and D. Oyserman, „Individualism, Autonomy and Self-Expression: The Human Development Syndrome,” in Comparing Cultures, Dimensions of Cultures in a Comparative Perspective, eds. H. Vinken, J. Soeters, and P. Ester (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 29 R. Inglehart and C. Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Hu- man Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 52–63. 30 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, 71–72 The Interaction between Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia 111

Explaining the Conservation of Development Borders

On 29 April 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, held in Kremlin with the leaders of the ROC what the New York Times called “a highly unusual meeting”. That was the first formal meeting of a USSR leader with ROC top clergy, since Joseph Stalin summoned church leaders in 1943 to ask for their support in the war against the Nazi Germany. Talking to ROC top clergymen Gorbachev expressed the idea that he envisaged a special role for the Church in helping his program of reforms, aiming at restructuring the Soviet society. He explained his current move by the necessity of strengthening the national unity when his country faced great challenges.31 This had marked the beginning of a new era for ROC, as Kremlin replaced the Soviet-style coercive strategies towards the Church by extending economical and political favors. For instance, the Russian government provided in 1990s the External Relations Department of ROC with the privilege of duty-free import of alcohol and cigarettes,32 for “humanitarian” purposes. ROC has reportedly been involved, with tacit approval of the State, in other commercial activities such as oil and fishery exports, imports of wine, construction material, selling of jewelry and others businesses.33 Continuing the political tradition of his predecessors, Vladimir Putin stressed that religion played a unique role in Russia. In 2001 the then-president Vladimir Putin said during a visit to Solovki monastery that Russia had a special role as a keeper of Christianity, assumed voluntarily, and that “without Christianity Russia would have hardly become an accomplished state”. He went on saying that it was the Russian Orthodox Church and the “truths” it promoted that “permitted the creation of a powerful, centralized and multinational state”.34 During his visit to Tatarstan, in August 2002, Putin declared he had “became increasingly convinced that now since we have no work collectives or party organizations, such as those of the Communist

31 “Gorbachev Sees Church Leaders, Vows Tolerance,” New York Times, April 30, 1988 32 Nikolay Mitrokhin, “Ekonomika russkoy pravoslavnoy tserkvi,” [The Economics of the Russian Orthodox Church] Otechestvennye Zapiski 1:1 (2001), accessed July 15, 2009, http://www.strana-oz.ru/?numid=1&article=104. 33 Zoe Knox, “The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow’s Patriarchate’s Post-Soviet Leadership,” Europe-Asia Studies 55:4 (June 2003), 588. 34 Quoted in Mark A. Smith, “The Russian Orthodox Church,” Conflict Studies Re- search Center, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, C-109 (October 2002), www.csrc.ac.uk. 112 Dumitru Minzarari

Party of the USSR, or educators at places of work, nothing but religion can make human values known to people”.35 These cases offer sufficient evidence for claiming that the Russian political leadership sought to fill in the ideological vacuum created after the communist ideas were discredited, and decided to outsource this task to the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church apparently accepted the job, and is supporting the Russian government both domestically and internationally. It did so not only for the economic benefits and the return of the Church properties expropriated by the Soviet regime. As it will be clear from the further reading, ROC reverted to its role as the arm of the Russian government, because its institutional goals coincided largely with those of the State. And the Orthodox top clergy believed these goals were quicker to achieve in tandem with the State. In fact, the post-Soviet period witnessed a transformation of the symphonia36 into a political symbiosis between the State and Church. Employing the strategic perspective in assessing ROC’s actions after the collapse of URSS, we should look at its power, preferences and perceptions. The power of religion resides in its ability to project influence and attract masses. Because in the Soviet period the dominant function of religion was social control, and due to the aggressive official policy of atheism, the Church did not have a large capital to start with. Available statistical data suggest that while the majority of Russian citizens identify themselves with the Orthodox Christian religion (73%),37 only a very small minority of them actually are really religious and go to Church regularly. About 3% of Russian population is believed to go regularly to church (at least once a month), of which no more than 1.5% attend ROC churches.38 Other sources provide slightly different figures (1–2%) of regular church attendees.39 Now, a political party with such a low political support of the population is not

35 Russian radio Ekho Moskvy, quoted in Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment, eds. A. Evans, L. Henry, and L. Sundstrom (New York: M.E. Sharpe, October 2005), 112– 113. 36 For a theological meaning of „symphonia” see Nina Sinitzina, “Simfonia sveashenstva i tzarstva,” Istoricheski Vestnik 9–10 (2000), accessed August 20, 2009, http://www.intercon.ru/~vle/public/istor_vest/2000/9–10/1_11.htm. 37 VTsIOM, “Religia v zhizni rossijan,” December 10, 2008, accessed September 2, 2009, http://wciom.ru/arkhiv/tematicheskii-arkhiv/item/single/11099.html?no_cache=1&c- Hash=b84c4f423a. 38 Evans, Henri and Sundstrom, Russian Civil Society, 115. 39 Scott Peterson quoted in Religion and Identity in Modern Russia: The Revival of Orthodox and Islam eds. B. Forest, J. Johnson, and M. Tigranovna Stepaniants (Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005), 16. See also Levada-Tsentr, “Obshestvennoe Mnenije-2008,” 116. The Interaction between Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia 113 influential. In fact, in the post-Soviet Russia, the Church authority and legitimization is less based on the support of its flock, than on its character of being incorporated into the state body.40 By returning under the state control ROC was able to benefit from its administrative resources, national media coverage, and the State’s power aura, which has been always appealing to people in the authoritarian Russia. The State interest in Church is explained by the fact that while not many Russians are churchgoers, the symbol and messages of the ROC serve as a perfect nationalistic platform, which allows to consolidate the society around the authorities and against the West. This quality became very valuable to the Russian leadership after the wave of „color” revolutions swept across the post-Soviet area.41 Another element of Church’s power included its ability to maintain a canonical control over the national Orthodox churches in the ex- Soviet republics, as long as USSR existed. In modern days Church exploits the Kremlin’s political and economic influence over the ex- Soviet republics to consolidate its canonical influence, which then mutually reinforce each other. This approach reflects the “imperial” character of the Church, which is encouraged by the Russian government to project its economic and political power into social and ideological influence. Thus, Church is used as a source and channel for ideological influence over these countries, promoting the Kremlin’s authoritarian ideology of „stability” that competes with the Western liberal-democracy. ROC enlisted the support of the State to limit the proselyting of other faiths on what it sees as its canonical territory. However, this was not sufficient, as due to the popularity of liberal-democratic values, ROC generally perceives the West as an ideological competitor. As it is futile to try convincing people that things like freedom or welfare are bad things, ROC appealed through framing to the deep conservatism dominant in the post-Soviet area, and to the ignorance and the resistance to change entrenched in the post-Soviet people. The Church began describing in exaggerated ways the Western concept of liberty as all-permissiveness and violation of traditional local values. It harshly attacked the Western standards of human rights and liberal-democratic values as unsuitable to Russia. In its

40 Igor Yakovenko, “Solominka ili girja,” Ezhednevnyi Zhurnal, July 27, 2009, accessed August 2, 2009, http://www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=9310. 41 The „Rose Revolution” in Georgia in 2003, the „Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2005, and the „Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 worried Russia, as its leadership viewed the changes of power in these countries being inspired by the West, and specifically by US. 114 Dumitru Minzarari

“Declaration on Human Rights and Dignity” ROC opposed the Western human rights principles to the “traditional morality and all historically established religions”.42 Patriarch Kirill also decried them as immoral, „dictatorial”, and claimed they represented the tool used by the West to impose its interests in Russia.43 ROC claimed it promoted the “old morality” as a civilizational alternative to the West. This approach is weak, as Church did not spell out clearly what the “old morality” would mean in real terms. The critics justly pointed out that what was moral hundreds of years ago may be irrelevant today, and that in the modern world morality is often supported by the practical need to follow the rule of law.44 Attacking the „immorality” of the West also brings benefits for Church’s popularity at home. Since Orthodox religion does not seem to be spiritually attractive to the large masses of Russians, the Church decided to market ROC as a national and patriotic church, embedded into Russia‘s national culture and heritage, promoting the idea of “Russian civilization”.45 This was viewed very positively in Kremlin, both because it supported official efforts to build a new national identity in Russia and it enforced the claims over historically privileged interests in ex-Soviet area. The State exploited ROC as an ideological and political brand in support of the Russia’s claim for derzhavnost, a phenomenon of “affectation of great power standing – that is, to asserting their [Russians] natural right to the role and influence of a great power whether they have the wherewithal or not”.46 Like Kremlin, the top clergy seemed to view religion less than a spiritual refuge but rather, in more materialistic terms, as a control system linking meaning and motivation, as a mechanism for integrating the society and establishing incentives for its actions47 as wished by the State.

42 ROC Declaration, in Russian, accessed September 2, 2009, http://www.mirros.ru/ politics/185. 43 Patriarch Kirill speech, in Russian, accessed September 10, 2009, http://www.mirros. ru/politics/186. 44 Sabrina P. Ramet, foreword to Eastern Orthodoxy in a Global Age: Tradition Faces the Twenty-first Century eds. Victor Roudometof, Alexander Agadjanian, and Jerry Pankhurst (Walnut Creek: AltaMira Press, 2005), vii–xii. 45 Sergey Filatov, “Russkaya pravoslavnaya tserkov v poiskah kulturno-esteticheskogo natsionalnogo ideala,” Keston Institute Russian Review 13 (October 2006). 46 Robert Legvold, Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty First Century and the Shadow of the Past (Columbia University Press, 2007), 114 47 Robert N. Bellab, Beyond Belief (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1970), 12 The Interaction between Orthodox Church and State in Post-Soviet Russia 115

Conclusions

This chapter argues that Orthodox Church had and continues to have a key influence on the nature of political development in Russia. It contradicts the volume of research claiming that Eastern Orthodoxy is favoring democratic development,48 pointing out to its failure to examine the Church as a social rational actor, instead of a philosophical concept. Cherry-picking specific points or events in time and claiming they prove the democratic character of ROC is a sure recipe for analytic errors. This static method is replaced in the current study by a dynamic approach, which examines the historical interaction between state and church over time, the effects it generated, and the interests behind the actions of the two actors in post-Soviet Russia. Using the concept of path-dependence it explored the causal effects of church-state historical separation in the case of the West, and the subordinate relationship of the Church to State in Russia. It suggests that this initial separation in the West, followed by later separations inside Catholic Church itself, created a number of powerful actors, who through competition generated profound social transformations. Building on the literature on democratization and agent based modeling research on cultural diffusion it claimed that independent and competing actors are able to generate and sustain multiple loyalties and pluralism. This was not the case in Russia, where Church and State merged into a single power center, failing to generate social transformations in the society similar the West. The historical legacy of the Orthodox Church affected its institutional structure, its modus operandi, and most importantly, the worldviews of its top prelates. Formal modeling research of cultural behavior seems to confirm the claim that cognitive constraints and institutional precedents are a better explanation of community behavior, be it cultural-religious or political.49 It shows that institutions will often follow a sub-optimal behavior, choosing strategies that performed well in the past, even though they occurred under differing conditions. Thus, after the collapse of USSR, ROC did not choose a path of independence from the State, as it did not possess an institutional memory and knowledge of such a choice having been successful in the past.

48 For instance, see Christopher Marsh, „Orthodox Christianity, Civil Society, and Russian Democracy,” Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 13: 3 (Summer 2005), 449–462 49 Bednar, Jenna and Scott Page, “Can Game(s) Theory Explain Culture? The Emergence of Cultural Behavior within Multiple Games,” Rationality and Society 19:1 (2007), 65–97 116 Dumitru Minzarari

Employing various analytic concepts such as civic culture and modernization, the research conceptualizes the effects of church-state separation on the population, and how they determined the particularities of political development in the West. In a society where people faced more informational diversity, a civic culture based on individual autonomy emerged and consolidated. Gradually in time, this led to a more successful political organization and participation of the population, creating better conditions for defending their political and economic rights. As another consequence it generated a shift from survival to self-expression values, which has been registered by WVS. Analyzing Russia in comparative perspective, it notes that since its human material was and is different, this led to the emergence of a different political system. The research suggests further that in modern days the church-state separation is very important for democratic development, as besides generating political and religious pluralism, it may also compensate for the lack of opposition and balance an authoritarian government. ROC has historically failed to follow this path, and considering its post-Soviet development, there is no sign hinting that Church will strive to attain independence from State in the future. Due to the nature of its relationship with the political authorities, Church becomes an obstacle to Russia‘s modernization, opposing the liberalization of its political system. Continuing building a political symbiosis with the State, Church may eventually become more influential in society and thus increasingly powerful. Even at that point ROC is unlikely to challenge the state and nurture a civic culture of individual autonomy, as Bednar and Page suggested, because it does not have institutional interests different from those of the state, and lacks experience of successful confrontation with political authorities. Church instead contributes further to the consolidation of collectivist patterns of behavior in the Russian society, which creates conditions necessary for the survival of an authoritarian system of government. It was neither the purpose nor the ability of this chapter to cover in its limited space the question of why church-state and church-church separation occurred in the West and not in Russia. In fact, this is irrelevant to the scope of the study, which looked only at how the emergent and evolutionary consequences of these separations not occurring determined the current democratic deficit in Russia.

Clericalization of Nationalism Interpreting the Religious Rivalry between Serbian and Montenegrin Orthodox Churches, 1989–2009

FRANTIŠEK ŠÍSTEK

Introduction

In the early 1990s, Montenegro (then one of the two remaining republics of Miloševi°´s rump Yugoslavia, since 2006 an independent state) joined the group of several predominantly Orthodox countries of Eastern Europe affected by religious schism. In October 1993, several hundred Montenegrins gathered in the historical capital of Cetinje to proclaim the (re)establishment of an independent, autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church. Since then, Montenegro´s Orthodox majority has been polarized by bitter religious rivalry between two churches: the Serbian Orthodox Church (Srpska pravoslavna crkva, SPC) and the cannonically unrecognized Montenegrin Orthodox Church (Crnogorska pravoslavna crkva, CPC), both competing for legitimacy, influence, political support and property. The roots of the ongoing conflict are inseparable from questions of national identity and politics in this corner of Southeastern Europe. While SPC maintains that Montenegrins represent a mere regional branch of the Serb nation and Montenegro one of the traditionally Serb lands, CPC has promoted the idea of separate Montenegrin national identity and has consistently voiced its support for Montenegro´s independence from Serbia. The following paper attempts to outline and explain the process of crystalization of a long-term division between the two rival Orthodox churches in the course of the last two decades. It will first briefly summarize the competing historical narratives that help to legitimize their respective stands. Our attention will then shift to the initial phase of the conflict in the beginning of the 1990s and, progressively, to present, which is characterized by a permanent, currently unbridgeable division of the country´s Christian Orthodox believers into two rival camps. These developments on the religious scene have coincided with the break-up of the Yugoslav federation and the ensuing re- 118 František Šístek arrangement and delimitation of the post-Yugoslav space, including its multiple successor identities. Prior to the referendum on Montenegro´s independence from Serbia in 2006, the dispute over autocephaly was closely tied to the question of Montenegro´s political borders, as each of the churches actively promoted their respective, mutually exclusive stand on the issue. However, this paper puts more emphasis on two phenomena that can be somewhat metaphorically but quite usefully conceptualized as borders. Firstly, it is the melting, uncertain boundary between religious institutions and the secular state and, secondly, the increasingly overlapping border between nationalism and religion, as a result of a process that has been summed up as clericalization of nationalism.

Methodology

Sources concerning the rivalry between Serbian and Montenegrin churches in other than South Slavic languages have been limited, fragmental and rather imprecise even when it comes to basic facts, dates or figures. Sources originating in the region have been burdened by partiality as most of them have been produced by either supporters or opponents of one or the other church, with a notable exception of some matter-of-fact journalistic accounts which tend to concentrate on particular events such as clashes between followers of the respective churches during religious festivals. This paper is based on discoursive analysis of sources produced by both rival churches, their ideologues and laic supporters, complemented with data from the relatively more independent press sources and the few scholarly works that shed some relevant light on particular aspects of the topic such as historical narratives. The most important part of the research was undertaken during two visits to Montenegro in 2009, especially in the National Library of Montenegro in Cetinje. Further research was conducted in the Slavic Library of Prague. A growing number of sources has also been available on the internet. Most of them are used as ammunition in the great virtual war of claims and counterclaims waged between both rival factions in cyberspace.

Clericalization of Nationalism 119

Results

Old Wine, New Bottles: Competing Historical and Identity Narratives

Both SPC and CPC have put special emphasis on corresponding historical arguments in order to support their respective claims to legitimacy. As a result, two mutually exclusive narratives have crystallized since the beginning of the 1990s. Both churches attempt to prove that their religious organization is deeply rooted in Montenegrin history and can therefore rightly lay claim to the entire Christian Orthodox heritage of the country. Consequently, both churches construct such narratives that legitimize their respective raison d´être and justify their present goals from the same historical material, but with a different “national color” and emphasis. The most serious disagreements evolve around the question of autocephaly. In 1766, the Serbian patriarchate of Pe°, encompassing a large area of western Balkans including Montenegro, was abolished by Ottoman authorities. Eparchies of the dismantled patriarchate were taken over by Greek (Phanariote) clergy loyal to Constantinople except for the territory under ecclesiastical and secular jurisdiction of the vladikas of Cetinje which effectively remained out of Ottoman control. Montenegro became a de facto sovereign territory with all secular and ecclesiastical powers fully in the hands of the vladika of Cetinje. The country was ruled by hereditary prince-bishops1 since 1697 until 1852, when it became a secular principality. Political power remained in the hands of the Petrovi° – Njegoš family until the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918. The Orthodox Church of Montenegro was defined as autocephalous in various state acts from the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.2 CPC and SPC provide radically divergent interpretations of the status of the Christian Orthodox Church in Montenegro since the abolishment of the patriarchate of Pe° until the end of Montenegro´s existence as an independent state following the First World War. The SPC version of Montenegro´s history stresses the non-canonical, unlawful nature of the abolishment of the Serbian patriarchate by the

1 This term (as well as its French equivalent prince-êveque) fittingly captures the unity of secular and ecclesiastical powers enjoyed by the vladikas of Cetinje from the Pet- rovi°-Njegoš dynasty. 2 Some of these documents from the archives of the Montenegrin royal government were recently made available by Živko Andrijaševi°, Crnogorska crkva 1852–1918: Studija sa zbirkom dokumenata o Pravoslavnoj crkvi u Knjaževini/Kraljevini Crnoj Gori (Nikši°: Filozofski fakultet, 2008). 120 František Šístek

Turks.3 The de facto independence of the eparchy of Montenegro is not entirely denied in mainstream SPC discourse, nevertheless, its proponents rather try to highlight the Serb identity and consciousness of the Montenegrins and their church. In the more rigid interpretations, based on the presumption that the patriarchate of Pe° canonically never ceased to exist, all subsequent developments are presented as ephemeral aberrations of history.4 The establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Church as the sole Orthodox Church on the territory of the newly-formed Yugoslavia in 1920 represents a revival of the ancient patriarchate that was – spiritually as well as canonically – invisible rather than non-existent for several centuries. The CPC historical narrative, on the other hand, stresses those elements that underline the specific development of the Montenegrin church and state. In the more resolute views of some CPC ideologists, the Orthodox Church in Montenegro became autocephalous already in 1766. “After the abolishment of the Patriarchate of Pe°, the Monte- negrin Orthodox Church, which had de facto enjoyed independence even before that, fulfilled the canonical conditions for autocephaly,“5 as Novak Adži° claims. Other writers rather focus on latter periods, documents and testimonies instead of situating the origin of autocephaly to the very year 1766. Both CPC and SPC agree that the autonomous history of the Christian Orthodox Church in Montenegro ended with the creation of Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the First World War. In 1920, all Christian Orthodox ecclesiastical structures on Yugoslav territory were fused into a single church – SPC. In contemoprary SPC interpretations, this unification represented a return to the previous order of things that in fact never ceased to exist from the canonical point of view. For CPC, on the other hand, the loss of church independence represents an integral part of a violent, unlawful suppression of Montenegro´s independence by Serbia.6 The same event which is interpreted as “the reestablishment of the Patriarchate of Pe°“ by SPC tends to be described as “the violent abolishment of the autocephalous Monte- negrin Orthodox Church“ by their rival brethren. In the eyes of pro-

3 See especially Ljubomir Durkovi°-Jakši°, Mitropolija crnogorska nikada nije bila autoke- falna (Beograd – Cetinje: Sveti arhijerejski sinod Srpske pravoslavne crkve, Mitropolija crnogorsko-primorska, 1991). 4 See, for example, Aleksandar Stamatovi°, Kratka istorija Mitropolije crnogorsko- primorske (1219–1999) (Cetinje: Svetigora, 1999). 5 Novak Adži°, Kratka istorija crnogorske pravoslavne crkve (Cetinje: Dignitas, 2000), 71. 6 See Sreten Zekovi°, ed., Poïetnik o Crnoj Gori i Crnogorstvu (Cetinje: Dignitas, 1996) as a representative example of Montenegrin nationalist elaboration of church history. Clericalization of Nationalism 121 independence authors, the unification of Montenegro with Serbia by the proclamation of the Podgorica assembly in November 1918 was illegal and invalid. In the more rigid line of interpretation, the autocephalous church of Montenegro never truly ceased to exist. Such reasoning is curiously similar to the arguments of the rival SPC concerning the non-canonical decision of the Ottoman authorities to abolish the Patriarchate of Pe° in 1766.

Blueprint for Divisions: Political and Ethnic Polarization of Anti- Regime Opposition

When Amfilohije (Risto) Radovi° replaced the aged metropolitan of Montenegro and the Littoral Danilo Dajkovi° in December 1990, his arrival at the throne of the vladika of Cetinje was jubilantly greeted by many in Montenegro, from Serb nationalists to top-ranking representatives of the political establishment.7 At the time when Montenegro firmly allied itself with Serbia as Yugoslavia slided towards the brink of the abyss, Amfilohije possessed the right pedigree and nationalist credentials for the moment: he was of Montenegrin origin, but a professed Serb nationalist at the same time. Amfilohije´s ascension to the highest ecclesiastical position in the Christian Orthodox hierarchy of his native land coincided with the recent rise of a new generation of politicians in Serbia and Montenegro such as Slobodan Miloševi°, Momir Bulatovi° and Milo Djukanovi°.8 At the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, Amfilohije surfed on the same wave of Serb nationalism and populism that engulfed Serbia and Montenegro as the above mentioned Communist cadres increasingly opted for the politics of ethnic nationalism and violent confrontation with the northwestern republics of Slovenia and Croatia.9 His arrival to Montenegro after years spent in Serbia and abroad was hailed as a sing of rejuvenation of the Serbian Orthodox Church, previously suppressed by the Titoist regime, and overall regeneration of the Serbian nation, including its contested Montenegrin offshoot. Moreover, Amfilohije´s

7 Novak Kilibarda: Ja i Amfilohije, available at: http://www.montenegrina.net/pages/ pages1/istorija/cg_od_1990/ja_i_amfilohije_n_kilibarda.htm 8 For overview of political developments in Montenegro since the break-up of Yugosla- via until 2003, see Florian Bieber, ed., Montenegro in Transition: Problems of Identity and Statehood, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), also available at: http://www.policy.hu/ bieber/Publications/Montenegro. For a similar overview of political developments in Serbia, see for example Robert Thomas, Serbia under Miloševi° (London: Hurst, 1999). 9 Vjekoslav Perica: Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 143. 122 František Šístek appointment as new vladika of Montenegro followed just a few days after the Holy Synod of SPC selected a new Patriarch.10 The establishment of an autocephalous, autochtonous and “truly national” Montenegrin Orthodox Church (CPC) and the following eruption of religious rivalry cannot be fully grasped without some understanding of the long-term division of society into two opposing camps over key questions of national identity, political future of Montenegro within or without Yugoslavia and contesting interpretations of the nature of the ensuing military conflict that destroyed the federation. The break-up of Yugoslavia did not only result in fragmentation of its territory into several new nation states, but was also reflected in a deep political and ideological polarization that occurred practically within each (post)Yugoslav republic and nation (narod). In the better known case of Serbia, this division has been often conceptualized as a discourse of two Serbias (dve Srbije): one traditionalist, nationalist and backward-looking, the other progressive, liberal and future-oriented.11 Similar tendencies could be observed in Montenegro. Due to its relative proximity to Serbia throughout most of the last two decades and other structural similarities with that republic, the long-term polarization of society over major political and cultural issues has in many ways resembled the Serbian case. However, there was a very important difference in one respect. Opposition to the rise of Serb nationalism, undemocratic practices of the ruling regime and fratricidal war tended to assume a national(ist) dimension in Monte- negro. As the post-1989 regime in Montenegro assumed a strongly pro- Serb position, it correspondingly eliminated and downplayed notions of Montenegrin sovereignty and national identity, stressing instead the common origins and destiny of the Serbs and Montenegrins. Political and cultural institutions were purged of potential opponents who were often labelled as presumed Montenegrin nationalists. Many Montenegrins, technically members of the republic´s dominant national group, therefore experienced an increasing sense of marginalization and suppression by the ruling pro-Miloševi° regime, whose visions of Montenegrin identity and political future were quite incompatible with

10 Amfilohije was one of the candidates for a new patriarch, but failed to gather enough votes. Few days later, Montenegrin vladika Dajkovi° was sent to retirement, opening a new position for the unsuccessful candidate, see Milorad Tomani°: Srpska crkva u ratu i ratovi u njoj (Beograd: Medijska knjižara Krug, 2001), 28–32. 11 See Slobodan Naumovi°, “On “Us“ and “Them“: Understanding the Historical Bases and Political Uses of Popular Narratives on Serbian Disunity,“ in: Sofia Academic NEXUS – How to Think about the Balkans: Culture, Region, Identity; CAS Working Papers Series (Sofia: Centre for Advanced Studies, 2007), available at: http://www.cas.bg/ uploads/files/Sofia-Academic-Nexus-WP/Slobodan%20Naumovic.pdf. Clericalization of Nationalism 123 theirs.12 As the question of political independence was not on the order of the day during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the pro- independence drive was more apparent in various attempts to promote a distinct Montenegrin ethnic, historical and cultural identity that was perceived as being seriously threatened by the rising tide of Serb nationalism. The establishment of an autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church as a counterweight to an increasingly nationalist course of the SPC, personified by vladika Amfilohije and as an attempt to stress the separate ethnic identity of the Montenegrins who as a nation in their own right should be entitled to their own Orthodox church, represents a radical, if somewhat paradoxical reaction of Montenegrin anti-establishment forces and intellectual discontents to perceived threat from contesting nationalism. In response to rapid rise and clericalization of the rival Serb nationalism, the Montenegrin nationalist response was that of a corresponding clericalization of its own nationalist agenda.

From Christmas Fires to Tribal Gatherings: Trajectory of Religious Conflict

In December 1990, as a reaction to the anointment of Amfilohije as new vladika, first public protests against this decision erupted in Cetinje, largely caused by Amfilohije´s previous reputation as a hardline Serb nationalist and as a reaction to his persistent refusal to acknowledge the existence of a distinct Montenegrin national identity. Indeed, Amfilohije repeatedly claimed in the media that “Montenegrin nation has never existed” and “the Montenegrin nation is a product of Tito´s and Djilas´ laboratory.”13 References to Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito and Milovan Djilas, chief ideologue of the Communist regime in the initial postwar era, reflected the official thesis of Serb nationalist circles that the Montenegrin nation was nothing but an artificial creation of the essentially anti-Serb Communist regime, invented with the aim of weakening Serbia and the Serb nation in general. In Amfilohije´s mind, there was no doubt that Montenegro was an ethnically Serb land. In January 1991, at the occasion of Christian Orthodox Christmas, two separate badnjak ceremonies (burning of Christmas yule log) took

12 Sabrina P. Ramet, The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918 – 2005, (Washington – Bloomingtom: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Indiana University Press, 2006), 317. 13 Veseljko Koprivica, “Seja² mržnje,“ in: e-novine.com, January 17, 2009, available at: http://www.naslovi.net/2009-01-17/e-novine/sejac-mrznje/1001172 124 František Šístek place for the first time in Cetinje. One was celebrated by Amfilohije and SPC on the traditional spot in front of the monastery, while supporters of the “autocephalist” cause gathered on the main square in front of the nearby palace of King Nikola. Such division has remained a permanent feature of Montenegrin Christmas celebrations to this day. This was the first occasion when a portion of believers entered into open conflict with the official structure of the church. The separate autocephalist celebration was organized by the Committee for the Renewal of the Montenegrin Autocephalous Orthodox Church, founded in the aftermath of Amfilohije´s installment as vladika, on January 27th, 1990 in the offices of the opposition Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG).14 The project was not completely new: following the foundation of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church in the 1960s (sanctioned by the Communist regime on both republican and federal levels), some Communist leaders from Montenegro toyed with the idea of establishing an autocephalous Orthodox Church in their republic as well in order to stress its separate ethnic and historical identity. However, no further steps in the direction of potential autocephaly had been taken before the dissolution of Titoist Yugoslavia by the increasingly passive Communist leadership of the smallest federal republic.15 Two separate Christmas celebrations raised tensions, but it took another half a year before the polarization erupted in an open conflict. It broke out on July 12, 1991 at the occasion of Petrovdan, the feast of St Peter of Cetinje,16 whose relics are displayed in the Cetinje monastery. Just two weeks before, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia and the fratricidal war was already well under way in the neighborhood. The inhabitants of Cetinje who wanted to enter the monastery to pay homage to their patron saint were prevented from doing so by armed militia. Over the previous night, the monastery turned into a fortress, adorned with Serb flags. Vladika Amfilohije invited special guests for the festival: members of the most radical paramilitary organization from Serbia, the Serbian Volunteer Guard, soon to be known as Arkan´s Tigers. Their commander, Željko

14 Branko Nika², Vojislav Rašovi°, Antonije I – arhiepiskop cetinjski i mitropolit crnogorski, 1919 – 1996 (Cetinje: CPC, 2000), 181. 15 Blažo Kilibarda, ed., Lov°en, Njegoš, Meštrovi°: projekt Njegoševa mauzoleja na Lov°enu i njegova realizacija (1952. – 1974.) (Zagreb – Podgorica: Nacionalna zajednica Crnogoraca Hrvatske, Matica crnogorska, 2004), 73–94. 16 Vladika Petar Ist Petrovi° Njegoš (ruled 1784 – 1830), canonized in the 19th century largely for his efforts to eradicate blood revenge among the Montenegrin tribes as part of his drive against internal disunity. Clericalization of Nationalism 125

Ražnatovi° Arkan, professional criminal wanted by the Interpol who soon became one of the most notorious ex-Yugoslav war criminals, was personally present in the monastery.17 Just like Amfilohije, Arkan was a hard-line Serb nationalist of Montenegrin origin who never lived in the land of his ancestors during his adult life. As emotions and verbal exchanges intensified, Arkan´s gunmen opened fire at the crowd. Some Montenegrins retaliated, while most fled in panick. There were several wounded in the end but no casualties. Official police reports confirmed that first shots were fired from the monastery, but regime media still blamed the “separatists” for the incident.18 The sounds of gunfire and stains of blood spilled on St Peter´s day of 1991 marked the point of no return for those who had already been troubled by Amfilohije´s radical Serb nationalism. Over the following two years, many alienated believers came to regard SPC as a foreign, essentially political organization whose aim is to eliminate the specific national, cultural and historical identity of the Montenegrins. There was no hope for a Macedonian type of scenario since the ruling regimes of Montenegro and Serbia (united in the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since April 1992) overwhelmingly supported the unity of SPC as a powerful symbol and agent of the unity of the Serb nation. There could also be no talk of schism in the real sense, more precisely – separating the eparchy or its part from the mother church. SPC was quite impenetrable in this sense, last but not least because much of its cadres did not come from Montenegro but from other “Serb lands” and felt no sympathy for a distinctly Montenegrin cause of any sort. Eventually, the autocephalists managed to gather several priests of Montenegrin origin who for various reasons left SPC or other Orthodox churches to perform rites of passage and other ceremonies, since most of the population of Cetinje and vicinity, along with other anti-war, pro-independence groups in different parts of the republic boycotted the official church after the Petrovdan shooting as illegitimate. In cooperation with several organizations of Montenegrin diaspora, especially from North America, a new vladika was finally found in Canada in the personality of Antonije Abramovi° (1919 – 1996), cleric of the Russian Orthodox Church in Toronto and native of Montenegro who agreed to accept the position of the first head of the nascent, unrecognized church.

17 For a biography of Arkan, see Christopher S. Stewart, Hunting the Tiger: the Fast Life and Violent Death of the Balkans´ Most Dangerous Man (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2008). 18 Živko Andrijaševi°, Nacrt za ideologiju jedne vlasti (Bar: Conteco, 1999), 212 – 213. 126 František Šístek

On October 31, 1993, on Lu²indan (St Luke Day – anniversary of the death of St Peter of Cetinje in 1830), a large crowd gathered on the main square of the old royal capital of Cetinje to proclaim the (re)establishment of an independent, autocephalous Montenegrin Orthodox Church. Imitating the ancient tradition of tribal gatherings which used to be practiced before Montenegro became a secular state in the middle of the 19th century, the participants chose Antonije Abramovi° by acclamation as head of the alternative church.19 In this way, the crowd followed the ancient, non-canonical Montenegrin tradition of electing vladikas by the acclamation of popular tribal assemblies as it had been practiced for centuries before the abolishment of theocracy by Prince Danilo in 1852. The subsequent one and a half century long history of the secular state was thus effectively suspended as the autocephalists reverted to the replay of the ancient ritual. Autocephalists had no hopes that SPC or other Orthodox Churches could recognize the existence of CPC. Consequently, its new vladika was quickly anathemized by SPC and soon also by the Patriarchate of Constantinople.

Risto the Satan and Miraš the Impostor: Perpetually Frozen Conflict

Discourse that attempted to legitimize the establishment of CPC strongly stressed the notion of its continuity with the autocephalous Orthodox Church of the pre-1918 Montenegrin monarchy. The notion of continuity represented a basis for CPC claims over church property. According to CPC views, church property in Montenegro was illegally seized by SPC after the non-canonical abolition of the Montenegrin Church in 1920. Not surprisingly, SPC has resolutely rejected all such claims. Instead, it has anathemized the rival Church as an apolitical sect and has consistently tried to curb its influence. The escalation of conflict among Montenegro´s Orthodox believers further deepened the long-term polarization and division of society into two opposing camps whose members differed in their political preferences, views on nationhood and the question of autocephaly.

19 In the last two decades, both Montenegrin and Serb nationalists have made attempts to revive ancient tribal structures and traditions for new political purposes. However, tribes as political and social units ceased to exist already in the 19th century. It is therefore utterly absurd to speak or act in the name of a traditional tribe, despite the fact that one´s tribal origins are still much a part of family heritage and memory in present day Montenegro. Clericalization of Nationalism 127

Until the end of the 1990s, CPC remained unrecognized not just by SPC, but also by the ruling regime and state administration. Despite that, CPC managed to establish its presence in the historical capital of Cetinje and its vicinity, usually conducting services in the open air or in a villa (Vladi²anski dom) acquired by its followers as a “provisional seat“ before an envisaged “return“ to the Cetinje Monastery. After the death of vladika Antonije Abramovi° on November 19, 1996, the new head of the church Mihailo (Miraš) Dedei°, until then a cleric of the Greek Orthodox Church in Rome, was again elected by popular acclamation on January 7, 1997 and ordained, in 1998, in Sofia by Patriarch Pimen, head of the Bulgarian Alternative Synod. Similarly to his predecessor, Mihailo was formally excommunicated and anathemized by SPC and the Greek Orthodox Church. As the Montenegrin leadership, led and personified by President Milo Djukanovi°, gradually turned away from the regime of Slobodan Miloševi° in favor of an increasingly pro-independence agenda, the fortunes of CPC turned for the better. The first symbolical step towards acknowledgment of CPC´s existence was heralded by official greetings regularly sent since 2000 by President Djukanovi° to vladika Mihailo as head of CPC at the occasion of important holidays such as Easter and Christmas along with similar greetings addressed to Amfilohije as head of SPC in Montenegro.20 In 2000, CPC was officially registered as a religious organization which greatly eased its further activities, but did not amount to full recognition as national church that would replace the SPC. After 2000, CPC has managed to build several new ecclesiastical structures, usually on land donated by its followers. In the struggle for control of historical heritage, CPC has largely relied on ancient traditions of tribal and clan property and has primarily focused on village churches. According to traditional law and customs, such churches belong to a particular clan, tribe or village whose inhabitants originally built the church. This form of collective ownership, dating from the patriarchal age of tribal society, has been reflected in the contemporary legal system as well. In several counties in the south of Montenegro, such village churches are officially registered as property of the respective village communes. Unlike the monasteries, these churches do not constitute a property of the Orthodox Church or its territorial units such as eparchies. The inhabitants of each area, CPC

20 Dragoljub Vukovi°, “Spor oko uskršnje ²estitke: Djukanovi°ev zaokret prema crkvenom pitanju,“ in: AIM Press, May 8, 2000, available at:: http://www.aimpress. ch/dyn/pubs/archive/data/200005/00508-002-pubs-pod.htm

128 František Šístek representatives have argued, can therefore freely choose which church or priest will be in charge of religious services and rites of passage such as weddings and funerals. In the so-called Old Montenegro, which consists of the historical heartland of Montenegro around Cetinje where CPC positions remain strongest, gatherings of local citizens have often been organized and keys to the village churches ceremoniously presented to CPC clergy since the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. This policy has led to numerous clashes and heated debates with SPC, often with different levels of involvement of the police. Meanwhile, transfer of all historical heritage built before 1918 to CPC (“restitution of illegaly seized property”) represents an ultimate, if admittedly distant goal of CPC. The ongoing conflict over jurisdiction, competing historical narratives and struggle for souls, territory and places of worship between the two churches, followed by periodic incidents and outbursts of violence between supporters and opponents of the two camps, have remained a permanent feature of Montenegro´s life. The hopes of CPC that its positions will significantly improve after the proclamation of independence have been disappointed. Different factions of the ruling regime have publicly displayed preferences for either CPC or SPC, however, the pro-independence state administration has not intervened in favor of CPC claims to property and historical legitimity over SPC even after 2006. Both churches represent an important symbol of national identity for their respective followers and anathema to their adversaries. Both have been largely personified with their leaders in public consciousness: vladika Amfilohije, or Risto Sotona – Risto the Satan, as he is often referred to by his adversaries and vladika Mihailo, or Miraš the Impostor, as his opponents typically label him. CPC has already survived the death of its first head, vladika Antonije in 1996 and the dissolution of its most important political ally, the Liberal Alliance after 2001 without any visible impact on its current activities and long-term fortunes. More than a decade later, CPC has experienced stable growth of influence under vladika Mihailo, though certainly too slow and modest in the eyes of its most ardent followers and miniscule clergy (around 20, as opposed to around 200 clerics serving within the Montenegrin eparchy of SPC). CPC activities have been motivated by unsatisfied nationalism rather than individual charisma of religious and political leaders.

Clericalization of Nationalism 129

Conclusions

In this paper, we have observed how new political divisions that appeared at a volatile time of the break-up of Yugoslavia acquired features of an ethnic conflict between Serbs and Montenegrins. Serb nationalist discourse and strategies, closely tied to radical segments of SPC personified by vladika Amfilohije have been closely mirrored by rival Montenegrin nationalism, which was newly clericalized along similar lines in an attempt to undermine the superior position of its adversary in the sphere of religious life. Thus, the previous political division within Montenegrin society was relatively quickly transformed into a permanent frontline between two bitterly opposed religious and national identities. In the last two decades, leaders of the two camps have been competing for attention, recognition, and influence. Apart from the ongoing struggle for souls, property and historical legitimacy, both churches have tried to gain support of the state as a possible favorable arbiter of the dispute. The staunch support of the Montenegrin administration for SPC throughout the 1990s as well as a partial shift of the same political establishment towards CPC positions in the last decade have signalled that borders between secular state and church (or churches) are not very rigid but rather porous and changeable according to political circumstances of a particular moment. Nationalism has often been called a “secular religion.” This catchy phrase summed up the prevalent belief, largely based upon the 19th and 20th century secularization paradigm, that nationalism represents a secular heir to religion, filling the role previously played by religion in various aspects of social, political and cultural life. However, such notion has clearly lost much of its metaphorical validity and practical usefulness when it comes to post-communist Southeastern Europe. Here, religion has demonstrated a remarkable ability to make a comeback through nationalism. Eventually, the religious component comes to increasingly dominate the overall nationalist discourse as religious organizations, along with corresponding laic circles, privatize or hijack particular nationalisms for their own purposes. Such scenario is facilitated by the fact that religion, just like nationalism, can claim historical origins that are more often than not presented as indistinguishable from those of the nation itself.21 The prevalent stress on historical precedents and notions of continuity are essential in legitimizing the self-imposed role of a particular church as chief

21 See Anthony D. Smith, Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 130 František Šístek guardian of the nation and national interests. Balkan nationalisms that have been at the centre of our attention are not only ethnocentric by definition as before, but increasingly “church centric” at the same time.

Religion and Politics

Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis

MILDA ALIŠAUSKIEN7

This article analyses freedom of religion in the three Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – from legal and sociological perspectives. Its main aim is to research how freedom of religion was implemented in these countries after the 1990s; for this an analysis of legal documents and sociological surveys was applied. It appears that the best way to analyse freedom of religion is to research how it is implemented at the macro, meso and micro levels and focuses on the situation of minority religions, particularly new religious movements. Although the Baltic States had common historical experiences within the Soviet Union, where religion was removed from public life, different models of implementation of the freedom of religion were chosen and applied. From a macro perspective freedom of religion was implemented in the 1990s, but at the institutional level it was supported only after the countries entered the European Union. The issue of freedom of religion challenges these societies at the individual level, especially Lithuania. The analysis of the implementation of freedom of religion in the Baltic States reveals differences between these societies, existing borders between majority and minority religions.

Introduction

Freedom of religion, which we can define as a set of human rights to believe, to confess, to practise one’s religion, and favourable socio- political conditions for implementation of these rights, is one of the basic values of democratic countries. The aim to become a democratic country and a member of the European Union was raised by the re- founded states of Lithuania (1990), Estonia1 and Latvia (1991).

1 Special gratitude shoul be expressed to Ringo Ringvee – Adviser of Religious Affairs Department at the Ministry of the Interiors of the Republic of Estonia for his help in gathering the material for this publication. 134 Milda Ališauskien½

The unfavourable conditions that were created for religious life during the Soviet occupation in these countries made freedom of religion a special and very important issue in the lives of particular individual, religious communities and the development of the young state towards democracy and civil society. For this reason it is very important to analyse how the freedom of religion was implemented in these countries, what the current outcomes of this implementation are and what the forecast is. The main factor that indicates the level of freedom of religion is the situation of minority religions, which is a leitmotif of this analysis. Freedom of religion in the Baltic States was analysed from different perspectives. We should mention here papers written by Balodis, Kiviorg and Glodenis and Žiliukait½ that discussed the Church and State relations in the Baltic countries2. Krumina-Konkova analyzed the situation of new religious movements in the Baltic States3. Ringvee analysed the legislation of the religious communities in Estonia and made a comparison of the legal acts in the three Baltic States4. All of these publications provide a worthy contribution to the topic of this publication. They do not cover in particular, however, the subject of this publication – the situation of freedom of religion, religious minorities and religious tolerance.

The Framework of the Research

The research on the freedom of religion in the Baltic States was conducted by seeking to analyse its three levels – macro, meso and micro. The macro level was understood as consisting of the policy of the given state in the field of religion. The state policy is reflected in the main laws of the country – constitution and laws following it and implementing its main regulations. The main actors of the macro level

2 Žiliukait½, RĀta, Glodenis, Donatas, “Church and State in Lithuania”, State and Church in Baltic States, Ed. R. Balodis, (Riga: Religijas Brivibas Association, 2001), 67– 94. Balodis, R. “State and Church in Latvia”, State and Church in Baltic States, Ed. R.Balodis, (Riga: Religijas Brivibas Association, 2001), 13–42. 3 Krumina-Konkova, Solveiga, “New Religious Minorities in the Baltic States”, New Religious Movement in the 21st Century. Legal, Political, and Social Challenges in Global Perspective, Ed. Phillip Charles Lucas, Thomas Robbins (New York, London: Routledge, 2004), 117–128. 4 Ringvee, Ringo, “State, Religion and the Legal Framework in Estonia”, Religion, State and Society.36(2) 2008, 181–196. Ringvee, Ringo, “Mainstreaming and Marginalization in the Legal Context – Legislation on the Religious Associations in the Baltic States”. A paper presented at 2009 CESNUR international conference. http://www.cesnur.org/2009/ slc_ringvee.htm. Accessed 05 09 2009. Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis 135 are politicians and representatives of religious communities. In the analysis of freedom of religion at the macro level special attention should be paid to Church and State relations and their model, as this is the direct consequence of the interactions of the above mentioned politicians and representatives of religious communities. According to Massimo Introvigne, there are three models of Church and State relations5. Firstly, there is a model of State religion which means that one religion is accepted differently, with special respect in comparison to others. This kind of Church and State relations is adopted in Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom. Secondly, there is a model of Church and State separation which is implemented in France, the United States and the Netherlands. Thirdly, there is a model of different recognition, whereby the State approaches religious communities existing in the society in different ways. Some religious communities might be considered to be more special, receive some or more privileges than others and named as “traditional“. Meanwhile other religious communities might be treated as “non-traditional“ and for this also might be treated differently. Such a model of Church and State relations is implemented in Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain. The meso level of freedom of religion is the organisational level where the issues of freedom of religion are covered and supported by different governmental and non-governmental organisations and religious communities. At this level the organisational activities that promote freedom of religion and work against discrimination based on religion or beliefs are analysed. The micro level of freedom of religion is the level of individuals and their interactions. The nearest environment which helps or enables individuals to experience the freedom of religion, i.e. possibility to believe, to confess and to practise one’s religion. In the following subsections freedom of religion will be analysed at the macro, meso and micro levels from sociological and legal perspectives. For instance at the macro level the analysis provides insights into how the laws in the countries in question were created, what the social circumstances were when they were created, etc. For this a historical approach was also applied. At the meso level of the analysis the main actors of the organisational level are identified, their roles are discussed, etc. The micro level of the analysis discusses how individuals experience freedom of religion, religious tolerance or

5 Introvigne, Massimo, „Religijos ir tik½jimo laisv½ krikš²ioniškame Vakarā pasaulyje“ http://www.religija.lt/content/view/41/45/. Accessed 08 04 2009. 136 Milda Ališauskien½ discrimination on the grounds of religion and beliefs. No surveys have been conducted recently in Latvia and Estonia on religious tolerance, but the one conducted in 2007 in Lithuania reveals the situation in this country.

Religious Landscapes of the Baltic States

Usually perceived as one entity, the Baltic States in reality have different socio-historical peculiarities. Latvia and Estonia are Protestant countries, while Lithuania is Roman Catholic. Historical sources reveal that Christianity arrived in Latvia in the 10th and 11th centuries, and in 1071 the first Christian church was built6. The religious landscapes of the Baltic States illustrated in Table 1 reveal Lithuania to be a homogenous Roman Catholic society, while Latvia and Estonia are more religiously plural societies with visible Evangelical Lutheran and Russian Orthodox communities. In Latvia there is also a large community of Roman Catholics. The 2002 census in Lithuania revealed the situation of religious minorities in its society: it appeared that so called new religions7 have around 1 percent of followers. The religious landscapes of the Baltic States have also influenced the legal and sociological position of religious communities in the discussed societies. Special attention should be paid to the non-believing part of the discussed societies. It appears that in Estonia and Latvia every fourth citizen claims to be a non-believer. Meanwhile in Lithuania the equivalent part of society does not form even 1 percent of the population. Such data reveals differences of the place and the role of religion in the discussed societies, and Lithuania in comparison with the other three Baltic States looks different, i.e. more religious.

Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States. The Macro Level

After their re-founding, the newly independent states in the Baltic region implemented basic human rights in their Constitutions. In

6 Krumina-Konkova, Solveiga, Gills, Nikandrs, “Latvia” Religions of the World. A Com- prehensive Encyclopedia of Beliefs and Practices, Eds. Gordon J. Melton, Martin Baumann, (Vol. 1, ABC Clio, 2002), 82–83. 7 New religions – religious groups that were founded after the 19th century, they also include widely known new religious movements that were founded in Western world after the IIWW in the context of societal changes, rise of egalitarism, utilita- rism, etc. Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis 137

Estonia and Lithuania constitutions were adopted in 1992, and in Latvia in 1998. The constitutions declare the rights of individuals to believe, to confess and to practise one’s religion. Almost all of the wording is similar to that found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and regulates the field of religious freedom.

Table 1. Religious landscapes of the Baltic States.

Religious community Lithuania Latvia Estonia (2002) (2000, 2002) (2000) Roman Catholics 79 20.8 0.5 Greek Catholics 0.01 – – Russian Orthodox 4 23.6 16.5 Old Believers 0.78 2.69 Protestants 0.76 23.8 17.2 Karaites 0.1 – – Sunni Muslims 0.8 0.4 0.3 Jews 0.01 0.6 0.2 Jehovah’s Witnesses 0.1 no data no data Mormons 0.01 no data no data ISKCON 0.01 no data no data Non-believers 0.01 26.0 25.1

Together with the statements on basic human rights, Church and State relations were also discussed in the constitutions of the Baltic States. In the Constitution of Republic of Estonia (CRE) Art. 40 declares that “there shall be no state church”8. Art. 99 of the Constitution of Republic of Latvia (CRLA) states that “the church shall be separate from the State”9. Meanwhile, Art. 43 of the Constitution of Republic of Lithuania (CRLI) presents the Church and State relations in a broader way. It asserts that the state recognises traditional religions and that “there is

8 Constitution of the Republic of Estonia: http://www.president.ee/en/estonia/constitution.php. Accessed 04 09 2009. 9 Constitution of the Republic of Latvia: http://www.saeima.lv/LapasEnglish/Consti- tution_Visa.htm. Accessed 08 09 2009. 138 Milda Ališauskien½ no state religion”10. Thus the differences between Lithuania and the other Baltic States arises in analysis of the Constitutions, especially the articles regulating Church and State relations. The state recognition of religions type of Church and State relations according to Introvigne’s model was implemented in Lithuania. In the Constitution there is a division between traditional and other religious communities, that are recognised after they provide information about society‘s support and when their teaching and practices are not in conflict with the law and public morals. The Lithuanian case is special in the sense that the model of different recognition is already existing in the Constitution. There were unsuccessful attempts to mention traditional religions in the CRLI, because the authors of its text believed that “the list of traditional religions was final and would not be reviewed”11. Following the CRLI different recognition of religious communities was also implemented and broadened in the Law on Religious Communities and Associations (LRCA), issued in 199512. Another important proposition in the CRLI is regarding Church and State relations. It states that churches and other religious organisations shall be established by agreement or by law. However, the main ideas about Church and State relations were implemented in the 1995 LRCA. After the ratification of three international treaties in 2002 between the Holy See and the Republic of Lithuania discussions began about the implementation of their regulations in the laws and in the relations of the State with other religious communities. Such discussions were also raised in 2005–2008, mostly inspired by other traditional religious communities which sought to ensure their special status in the society of Lithuania by strengthening it with agreement with the State. Though discussions did not end with a successful result, they actually attracted attention to the problem of the distinctive situation of the Roman Catholic Church in Lithuania. Meanwhile in neighbouring countries such as Latvia, Estonia and Poland the notions of international treaties between the Holy See and the state were also applied for other so-called “traditional” religious

10 Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania: http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/ Constitution.htm. Accessed 07 09 2009. 11 Aliulis, Vaclovas, “Vieno žsiaganio istorija” (Vilnius: Aidai, 2007). 12 There are nine traditional religions, according to the 1995 LRCA, in Lithuania – Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, Russian Orthodox, Old Believers, Evangelical Lu- therans, Evangelical Reformed, Jews, Sunni Muslims (Tatars) and Karaites. Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis 139 communities13. For instance, in 2007 the Latvian Parliament adopted laws for the Latvian Old Believer Pomora Church, Seventh Day Adventist Union, Union of Latvian Baptist, United Methodist Church, Riga Jewish Community, and in 2008 for the Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church and Latvian Orthodox Church. In general, an analysis of the constitutions of the three Baltic States leads to the conclusion that they all implemented the liberal attitude towards basic human rights and freedom of religion. Regarding the main principles of Church and State relations in the discussed legal acts, there is a common notion that „there is no state religion”. But it should be stated that the Lithuanian case differs from others in the sense that the division between traditional and other religious communities appears in the main document of the state. Thus it should be researched and discussed further how the theoretical and practical division between traditional and other religious communities is implemented, and what impact this has for freedom of religion in general, and especially in the organisational (meso) and individual (micro) levels. The other legal acts that regulate religious life in the Baltic States are laws on religious communities. Usually they adopted the main notions found in the Constitutions and discussed the practical issues of Church and State relations, for instance, the registration of religious communities as legal entities. Firstly, in Lithuania the LRCA of 1995 regulated the differences of recognition of traditional, state-recognised and other religious communities, which actually ended in the presentation of three kinds of religious communities. The status of state-recognised religion requires a legal registration of at least 25 years, to have support in society and teaching and practices that are not in conflict with the law and public morals. In such cases the Lithuanian Parliament may grant the status of state recognition according to the conclusion of the Ministry of Justice. In 2002 this status was awarded to the Association of Evangelical Baptist Churches, and in 2008 to the Seventh Day Adventist Church. The granting of state-recognised status was denied, however, for the United Methodist Church in 2001, and for

13 Krumina-Konkova, Solveiga, “New Religious Minorities in the Baltic States”, New Religious Movement in the 21st Century. Legal, Political, and Social Challenges in Global Per- spective, Ed. Phillip Charles Lucas, Thomas Robbins (New York, London: Routledge, 2004), 117–128. Zielinska, Katarzyna, „Freedom of Religion and Beliefs in Poland – Ideologies and Reality“, Religions, Churches and Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe, Ed. Irena Borowik, (Krakow: Nomos, 2006), 209–220. Ringvee, Ringo, “Mainstreaming and Marginalization in the Legal Context – Legislation on the Religious Associations in the Baltic States”. A paper presented at 2009 CESNUR international conference. http://www.cesnur.org/2009/slc_ringvee.htm Accessed 04 09 2009. 140 Milda Ališauskien½ the pagan community “Romuva”. There are also applications of the Pentecostals and New Apostolic Church for this status that were met with favourable conclusions by the Ministry of Justice but ended in waiting at Lithuanian Parliament. The discussions about corrections to the 1995 LRCA also include new requirements for the status of state recognition: it was raised from 25 years to 50 years based upon the decision of the Constitutional Court, which explained that tradition should be kept for more than one generation14. Legal registration is required if religious communities want to have their own property, have a bank account, etc. In such cases the requirements for legal registration differ in the three Baltic States. In Estonia, according to the 1993 Churches and Congregations Act (CCA), 12 members are required for a newly founded religious community to be registered. It should also provide the statute with a doctrinal base, religious rites, membership processes, status of the clergy, etc. In 2002 a new CCA was adopted where a shift in the registering institution appeared, from the Ministry of Interior to the courts15. A refusal to register may occur if the activities of a religious community damage public health, morality or the rights and freedoms of others. The Law on Religious Organisations and Associations (LROA) of Republic of Latvia of 1995 replaced the 1992 LROA and adopted the principle – “one confession, one church”. This principle denies the possibility to register more than one association for the same tradition as for so-called traditional religions16. The list of such traditional religions appears in the legal regulation of the education sphere: only Evangelical Lutherans, Roman Catholics, Russian Orthodox, Old Believers, Baptists and Jews are allowed to give classes of religion in the public schools. The principle “one confession, one church” has resulted in the denial of registration for the Independent Old Believers Association, as well as the Latvian Free Orthodox Church and Confessional Lutheran Church. According to Balodis, this principle does not comply with the principle of religious freedom and contradicts the CRLA17. In general the requirements for registration of a religious community in Latvia are 20

14 Glodenis, Donatas, “Administrative and Financial Matters in the Area of Religious Freedom and Religious Communities: Case of Lithuania”, Legal Aspects of Religious Freedom, Ed. Drago Cepar, (Ljubljana: Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious Communities, 2008), 392–408. 15 Ringvee, Ringo, “Mainstreaming and Marginalization in the Legal Context – Legislation on the Religious Associations in the Baltic States”. A paper presented at 2009 CESNUR international conference. http://www.cesnur.org/2009/slc_ringvee.htm 16 Ibid. 17 Balodis, R. “State and Church in Latvia”, State and Church in Baltic States, Ed. R.Balodis, (Riga: Religijas Brivibas Association, 2001), 13–42. Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis 141 members, and the community should provide its statute with a doctrinal base, information about the structure, leadership, membership, etc. According to the LROA, ten communities may form an association; if not they should reregister every year for ten years18. The LRCA of Republic of Lithuania of 1995 states that a religious community may be registered if it has 15 members, and it should also provide a statute with the doctrinal base, information about the structure, leadership, membership, rules of property ownership, etc. The registering institution is the State Centre for Registers, where the application for registration documents should be presented by the Ministry of Justice. Refusals to register are analysed in court. There have been few refusals, later analysed in court, one of which is the case of the Osho religious community, which was refused registration because of the requirement for its members to provide the information whether they have AIDS and the conclusion of the experts about non religious essence of community. The court decision was favourable for the Osho community, and it was registered in 2005. According to the legal position based on the legal acts regulating the situation of certain religious communities in the Baltic States, religious communities might be divided into five categories in Lithuania, and in Latvia and in Estonia into four (see Table 2). In all three cases special position is held by the RCC, which usually signs a bilateral agreement – an international treaty between the Holy See and the state. This is not possible for other religious communities because of the absence of a subject from their side for such a treaty. But the situation may be improved if the state applies the same notions that are discussed in such a treaty to other religious communities. In the Latvian and Estonian cases this has been done, while in Lithuania this possibility has been discussed since 2002. It should also be stated that such a division into different categories of religious communities existing in the discussed countries, but especially Lithuania, at a macro level creates a non-tolerant atmosphere at an individual level. In general, analysis of constitutions and laws regulating freedom of religion and Church and State relations allows to conclude that Estonia has chosen a liberal separation model. Latvia has a mixed model between the liberal notions which appear in its Constitution and a different recognition model, where special conditions appear for some religious communities. Meanwhile, the Lithuanian case is a different recognition model with special conditions for some religious communities, especially the RCC.

18 Ibid. 142 Milda Ališauskien½

Table 2. The hierarchy of legal positions of religious communities

Legal act Lithuania Latvia Estonia International Roman Catholic Roman Catholic Roman Catholic treaty Church (RCC) Church Church Agreements or 8 traditional religious 8 religious Estonian Council laws for communities (Russian communities of Churches special Orthodox, Greek (Old Believers, religious Catholics, Old Baptists, Jewish, communities Believers, Evangelical Methodist, of their Lutherans, Evangelical Adventist, Jewish associations Reformed, Jews, Evangelical Karaites, Sunni Lutherans, Muslims (Tatars) – Orthodox) drafted State 2 religious – – recognition communities (Baptists (but not & Seventh Day “traditional” Adventists) yet) Registration in 180 religious 244 religious 70 congregations the communities (in total congregations governmental 27 religious traditions) institution Nonregistered ? Scientology, AoLF, ? Scientology, ? religious SSB, Brahma Kumaris SSB, Brahma communities Kumaris, or registered Moonies, as NGOs Christian Science

Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States. The Meso Level

The implementation of the notions of freedom of religion is usually related to the particular governmental and non-governmental organisations working in this field. As discussed above, freedom of religion at the macro level has been adopted in all three Baltic States. Some of the issues from the Church and State relations that contradict the main principles of freedom of religion might be discussed, but it should be Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis 143 very useful to analyse the institutional level and to indicate the main actors creating or not creating an atmosphere which is favourable or not favourable for the main principles of freedom of religion to be implemented (see Table 3).

Table 3. The main actors of freedom of religion at the meso level

Institution Estonia Latvia Lithuania Governmental The Gender New Religions Interministerial organisation Equality Consultative Commission to Coordinate Commissioner Council Activities of Governmental (2005) Institutions which Deal with Issues of Religious, Spiritual and Esoteric Groups (2000 – present) Governmental Chancellor of Ombudsman Office for Equal organisation Justice Office (former Opportunities National Ombudsman (2005) Human Rights (before – Office for Equal Office) Opportunities for Men and Women Ombudsman (1999) Non- – – Spiritual Support Home governmental (1999–2001), Office for organisation Cult Observation (2004) Non- – – New Religions Research governmental and Information Centre organisation (2001)

The main phenomenon creating an unfavourable atmosphere for freedom of religion from the perspective of new religions is the anti- cult movement. The first wave of anti-cult movements, according to Ringvee, reached the Baltic States in the mid-1990s, and the second wave around the new millennium19. This has received special attention in Lithuania, but in Latvia and Estonia it has passed by almost unobserved.

19 Ringvee, Ringo, “State, Religion and the Legal Framework in Estonia”, Religion, State and Society.36(2) 2008, 181–196. 144 Milda Ališauskien½

In Lithuania the first signs of an anti-cult movement showed up in the early 1990s as a reaction to the emergence of freedom of religion with the activities of new, unknown religious communities. Around the new millennium, the sectophobian atmosphere was strengthened by different actors, non-governmental organisations and politicians who followed France and proposed to accept a law which would „ban the activities of sects“. The social circumstances that became very favourable for discussions on the possibility of banning sects were mostly created by the mass media and the non-governmental organisation Spiritual Support Home, which was later changed by another NGO – Office for Cult Observation. Although both organisations sought official support from the RCC they did not succeed and the dominant religious tradition was not involved officially in the cult wars. Although the draft on banning the sects was not accepted in 2000, the Inter-ministerial Commission to Co-ordinate Activities of Governmental Institutions which Deal with Issues of Religious, Spiritu- al and Esoteric Groups was created. This institution is responsible for Co-operation between various governmental institutions concerning the activities of religious, spiritual and esoteric groups. Although it was expected that this institution would be an important actor in the battle with sects, it appeared that in reality there were not so many enemies to fight with. Thus the existence of this institution in theory and in practice does not provide for any changes in religious life, only showing the attitude of the government towards new religions as something that carries a threat, and that is why it should be looked at carefully. Around the same time, the New Religions Consultative Council was created in Latvia, with no decision-making authority. It consists of doctors, academics and independent human rights ombudsmen. The activities of this institution are almost unobservable. In 2001 the non-governmental organisation New Religions Research and Information Centre was created as a reaction to the sectophobic atmosphere in Lithuanian society, which lacked an objective and scientific approach towards the activities of new religions. This institution became one of the most authoritative actors in the field of freedom of religion and providing objective information about new religions. The ambition of the three Baltic States to become part of the European Union was followed by changes in the field of freedom of religion, too. Starting with the problems of equal opportunities for men and women, new laws and new institutions observing the situation Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis 145 were created. For instance, in 1999 in Lithuania the Office for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women was created, in 2005 becoming the Office for Equal Opportunities Ombudsman (OEOO). Similarly, in Estonia and Latvia institutions observing the field of equal opportunities for all were created, and contributed to the strengthening of freedom of religion in these societies. In general the meso level of freedom of religion in the Baltic States was mostly covered by governmental organisations which were created under two conditions. The first one is related to the sectophobic atmosphere in the societies that arose around the new millennium. The second condition is related to the processes of integration to the European Union that determined the adoption of new laws regulating the field of equal opportunities for everybody and the creation of institutions observing the field. In Latvia and Estonia there were no non-governmental institutions working in the field. Meanwhile, in Lithuania the activities of non-governmental organisations which were not officially related to the dominant traditional churches might be orbserved.

Freedom of Religion in Lithuania. The Micro Level

The micro level of implementation of freedom of religion may be well illustrated by surveys of public opinion and qualitative research. In 2007 a survey and subsequent qualitative research – semi-structured interviews with 17 members of different religious communities in Lithuania – were conducted. The research had the aim of researching discrimination on the grounds of religion or beliefs20. In the same year further research was conducted – a public inquiry which aimed to study society‘s attitude towards new religious movements21. The research on discrimination on the grounds of religion or beliefs looked for “equal opportunities for people or groups of different

20 The research was conducted by the New Religions Research and Information Centre together with the market research company Vilmorus; it was ordered by the Office for Equal Opportunities by the programme “2007 – a year of Equal Opportunities for Everybody”. The research was conducted by dr. A. SprindžiĀnas (head), M. Ališauskien½ et al. Internet: http://www.lygybe.lt/?pageid=10&id=66. Accessed 01.09.2008. 21 The report of the interrogatory of Lithuanian inhabitants about religious movements. 2007. It was conducted by Baltijos Tyrimai Ltd. according to the request of Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania. (The author of this paper worked in the Ministry and contributed to the creation of the questionnaire and to the analysis of the data). Internet: http://www.tm.lt/?item=relig. Accessed 10.08.2008. 146 Milda Ališauskien½ religions, abolishing discrimination on the grounds of religion and realising the principles of freedom of conscience“22. This research consisted of two parts – quantitative and qualitative – and was conducted in summer 2007. The survey revealed that respondents would grant civil rights most readily to Traditional Christians (85%), atheists (46.6%) and Pagans (39.2%). Spiritual self-development communities were in fourth position – 37% of Lithuanians would grant them civil rights. The group of Traditional Christians included the Roman Catholic Church, Orthodox, Evangelical Lutherans, Old Believers, i.e. religious communities that survived the Communist period and remained the main bearers of tradition. The favourable evaluation of Atheists is related to the sentiments society express for the Soviet period when scientific atheism was the only legitimate world outlook system. It is still popular to consider atheism as “scientific” which approves the conviction that “religion is illusion”23. Meanwhile, the favour for Pagans may be explained by the society‘s interest in ancient Baltic religion and customs that remain a part of Lithuanian cultural identity. The groups of Spiritual self-development consisted of the Art of Living Foundation, Scientology Church, the Academy of Para- psychology24 and Transcendental Meditation. The public favour for the Spiritual self-development group was unexpected as usually they do not present themselves as religions, and this is maybe also one of the reasons why Lithuanian society does not see them as a threat to other religions and their followers. A negative attitude was expressed by the respondents towards Satanists (68%), Muslims (40%) and Christian origin groups (37%). Similar results were expected by the researchers as the listed groups are usually opposed to Traditional Christians and are understood by the majority of society as a threat to their own religious status quo. The resistance to grant some civil rights to certain societal groups may be understood as a presupposition for non-tolerance and discrimination on the grounds of religion or beliefs. From this per-

22 The report of the research “Discrimination on the grounds of religion or beliefs in Lithuania”. Internet: http://www.lygybe.lt/?pageid=10&id=66. Accessed 01.09.2008. 23 Ališauskien½, Milda, “The Peculiarities of Lithuanian Satanism: between Crime and Atheism in the Cyberspace”, Contemporary Religious Satanism. A Critical Anthology, Ed. Jesper Aagard Petersen. (Ashgate, 2009), 121–128. 24 Ališauskien½, Milda, “New Age Milieu in Lithuania: the Case of the Academy of Parapsy- chology”, paper presented at CESNUR conference, Baylor University, Waco, Texas, 17–20 June, 2004. Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis 147 spective respondents would not tolerate or would discriminate Satanists, Muslims and Christian origin groups and their members. The qualitative part of this research was aimed at the analysis of the stories of individuals who had experienced discrimination on the grounds of their religion or beliefs. It revealed that discrimination was faced by members of different religious communities, so-called traditional as well. They were discriminated against in different social contexts – in the family, work, educational institution, informants felt themselves discriminated against by representatives of governmental institutions and mass media. The most common reason for discrimination was the knowledge about the informant’s religion and his or her non-provocative action. Also research revealed that the consequences of the discrimination that informants faced had an impact on their religious and everyday activities. In general, analysis of the data from the quantitative and qualitative research about discrimination on the grounds of religion and beliefs in Lithuania allows us to conclude that the potential subject of discrimination may become a more religious person. According to the authors of the research: ...one should state that in general the majority of Lithuania society is xenophobic in the field of religion and beliefs. It was observed that almost half of the respondents are inclined to discriminate believers of other faiths, to not grant them certain civil rights. At the same time the majority of respondents would discriminate against the people of their own faith. Thisleads to the conclusion that in general publicly declared religion or beliefs in Lithuania may become grounds for non-tolerance and discrimination25. The second survey related to the subject of this paper – the freedom of religion – is the representative survey on Lithuanian society public opinion about new religious movements. This was also conducted in November 2007 on the orders of the Ministry of Justice26. Its aim was to research the knowledge of society about new religious movements and its attitudes towards these groups. As the survey revealed, Lithuanians have more knowledge about such groups as Jehovah’s Witnesses, Word of Faith, Baptists and ISCKON. But it should also be mentioned that one third of the respondents did not have an answer or answered negatively to the question whether they had heard anything about

25 Ibid. 26 The report of the interrogatory of Lithuanian inhabitants about religious movements. 2007. It was conducted by Baltijos Tyrimai Ltd. according to the request of Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania. (The author of this paper worked in the Ministry and contributed to the creation of the questionnaire and to the analysis of the data). Internet: http://www.tm.lt/?item=relig. Accessed 10.08.2008. 148 Milda Ališauskien½ these groups. Thus it was revealed that the problem of new religions is not significant to one third of the population. 13 percents of respondents evaluated favourably the ancient Balt faith group “Romuva”. Charismatic church “Word of Faith” (32.4%) and Jehovah’s Witnesses (37.6%) were evaluated unfavourable. Although it is difficult to compare the two surveys, because of their different aims and questionnaires, some similarities are obvious. For instance in both surveys respondents revealed favourable attitudes towards Pagans and unfavourable attitudes towards New Christians (“Word of Faith“) and Christian origin groups (“Jehovah’s Witnesses“). In the first survey respondents expressed their tolerance towards Spiritual self-development groups, while in the second survey they did not express their attitudes towards these groups. Two thirds of respondents did not evaluate the listed groups at all. The survey revealed that one third of respondents had not heard of these groups, and another third were not inclined to give an evaluation. In general the analysis of the surveys conducted in 2007 in Lithuania revealed the population’s attitudes towards different religious groups, showed the non-favourable conditions for some aspects of freedom of religion, i.e. expression of one’s religion of beliefs publicly, xenophobic attitudes towards such expression. At the same time they revealed the lack of public knowledge about new religions and indifference towards them. The qualitative research revealed the social circumstances of discrimination on the grounds of religion and beliefs and also the gaps of implementation of freedom of religion at the macro and meso levels and what impact this has for the individual level in Lithuania. Unfortunately there is no possibility to compare similar data of surveys with Latvia and Estonia, as nothing similar has been done there. But this fact may also interpret the societal differences in the three Baltic States, as Lithuania is more religious than Latvia and Estonia, where religious affairs are not so important and do not raise so many questions.

Conclusions

The analysis of implementation of freedom of religion in the Baltic States revealed differences between societies of the discussed countries – Lithuania is more religious than Latvia and Estonia. This analysis also revealed existence of the boundaries between majority and minority religions in Lithuania and Latvia. Such boundaries are observable in macro as well as individual (micro) levels of implementation of Freedom of Religion in the Baltic States: Sociological and Legal Analysis 149 freedom of religion in these societies. The existence of such boundaries suggests that the macro and micro levels of implementation of freedom of religion are interdependent and should be analysed inseparable from each other.

What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations in Central and Eastern Europe

BRANKO AN+I)

Introduction

Theories and theoreticians who deal with the position of religion in a society can be roughly (and unjustly) divided into two groups. There are those emphasizing the decline of the influence and position of religions in a society, and those who still accentuate the significance of religions, with reference to the recorded increase in religiosity (new and traditional) in some countries on the one hand and to current debates in the public sphere that are closely connected to religion on the other hand. Based on this distinction, we can analyze the development of sociology of religion and its focus on the position of religion in the public sphere. The first tradition, starting with Max Weber, and continued by the early Peter Berger, Jürgen Habermas, Karl Dobbelaere, and Steve Bruce, focuses on the privatizational development of religion, while the second tradition, whose main advocates are, among others, Robert N. Bellah, Jose Casanova, Grace Davie, and Daniel Hervieu-Léger, considers religion to have an important role in modern societies and not on a merely individual level. During the secularization debate in the 1980s, the comparison of the religious landscape in different societies and cultures revealed an important difference between the Western world and the rest of the world, as well as noticeable differences within the West1. If one wants to criticize secularization theories, one could underline the very obvious fact that religion has various aspects and that is has the power to exert influence and bring change (whether slowly or faster). Maybe it is better to speak of religious evolution, forreligion has not disappeared as modernization-secularization theories have tried to

1 Peter Berger, Grace Davie, and Effie Fokas, Religious America, Secular Europe? A Theme and Variations. (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008). 152 Branko An²i° predict2. We can even say that the processes of modernization revi- talized religion and promoted its growth so that we should speak of sacralization rather than secularization. Norris and Ingelhart showed that religion declines only when there is security in an existential sense; while, in fact, religiosity in the world is increasing due to a lack of this kind of security3. Yves Lambert claims that religions in modern times react differently – (a) decline, adapt, and open to new interpretations; (b) react conservatively; (c) make innovations4. Secularization theories also vary and do not always advocate the same ideas and theoretical framework. A very useful fourfold typology was introduced by Woodhead and Heelas – (a) the disappearance thesis which states that religion in the sense of giving meaning to the world will disappear in the West; (b) the differentiation thesis whose main idea is that religion will retreat to the private sphere and will therefore become socially insignificant; (c) the de-intensification theory, is a ‘pale’ version of the differentiation thesis, which, rather than predicting the insignificance of religion, speaks of a weakening role of religion in the public sphere, (d) the co-existence theory which claims that religion under specific circumstances does experience secularization, while in other social situations, it undergoes revitalization and growth5. These differences show that diverse theoretical considerations and empirical studies are needed to fully grasp the complex role and changes that religion is facing in various societies in Europe. When it comes to ex-socialist societies, on the one hand, it seems most instructive to analyze the church-state relationship within the above-mentioned second theoretical tradition, though one will have to be careful not to reject the theories which favor secularization. The reason for why it is not wise to limit oneself to one side of the secularization debate is that the religious situation in the different countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is characterized by both aspects which will equally need to be considered. The main goal of this paper is to research public expectations about the role of religion in nine different societies of CEE. The general

2 Jonathan Fox, A World Survey of Religion and the State (Series: Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion and Politics – Bar-Ilan University, Israel, 2008). 3 Pippa Norris and Ronald Ingelhart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 4 Yves Lambert, Religion in Modernity as a New Axial Age: Secularization or New Religions Paradigms? Sociological Analysis, 60 (3) 1999: 303–33. 5 Linda Woodhead and Paul Heelas (eds.), Religion in Modern Times: An Interpretative Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations... 153 hypothesis would be that the perception (expectation) of religion in the public sphere differs considerably in different social contexts.

Methodology

In this paper, we will take a look at nine countries which participated in the REVECERN project: Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Ukraine. The data presented were collected as part of the ‘Aufbruch’ research project. The main focus of this study was the position of religions / Churches in the transitional countries during the years of Communism and after the fall of the Berlin wall. ‘Aufbruch’ is a cross-sectional and longitudinal study employing quantitative and qualitative methods. In 1997, ten ex- communist countries were involved: Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, the Czech Reoublic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia, and East Germany. In 2007, Moldavia, Belarus, Serbia, and Bulgaria joined the project. The questionnaire survey was a quantitative part of the project with the clear research goal to investigate the value system and religious orientation in these countries. In both waves, the same questionnaire survey was conducted, but some new questions were added in 2007 (Tomka and Zulehner6 2008). A sampling was made in each of the countries in the attempt to proportionally represent the different population groups. Some data presented in this paper stem from the European Values Study (EVS) which is a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey of moral, religious, political, and social values. The survey was designed to investigate the nature and the inter-relationship of value systems, their degree of homogeneity, and the extent to which they are subject to change across time. To date, there have been three survey waves, the first carried out in 1981, the second in 1990, and the third in 1999/2000. The data are analyzed by dint of univariate (percentages of frequencies) and multivariate (factorial analysis, analysis of variance) statistics. The factorial analysis of all nine countries (due to space limitation, the results of the factorial analysis of all nine countries cannot all be presented here, but are available on request) was carried out with the extraction of factors using a principal components method. The factors gained were subjected to the orthogonal rotation under the varimax criterion. Following these analysis, two observations occurred.

6 ‘Aufbruch’ was conducted at the Pastoral Forum in Vienna and the project manager was Paul Zulehner. 154 Branko An²i°

Two identical factors were extracted from the dat of seven countries7, while Slovenia and the Czech Republic showed totally different factors. Therefore, I have conducted a factorial analysis for these seven countries as one sample. The analysis of variance was done on average factor scores considering religious self-identification, age, sex, education, and country.

Results

The religious situation in Central and Eastern Europe

Tomka8 notes that in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, two trends have shaped the religious situation. The first one is the direct influence of communism which generated a social group that has no connection with European Christian tradition and which promoted the creation of a non-religious and secularized educated stratum. The second trend consists in religious revival and religious growth. In that sense, it is obvious that Central and Eastern Europe differ from the Western European religious trends of disengaging religion from the political society, processes of individualization, detraditionalization, and decollectivization9 (see Table 1). The communist past is definitely a common characteristic for these countries, but experiences of communism are not the same and not even similar in different places. The position of religion during the years of communism was also considerably different in the single countries. The transition process following the fall of communism in these countries did not always have the same directions and the same intensity, and it did not produce the same problems. Keeping in mind the sociopolitical and socioeconomic differences in the structural sense, we must not ignore the socio-cultural distinctions. Of the nine countries which will be analyzed, Romania, Bulgaria, and Ukraine are Orthodox countries while the rest of

7 In the first factorial analysis, the statement that the role of religion is to alleviate social needs was placed under the first factor and in some countries under the second factor. After removing this variable, two factors occurred in seven countries. 8 Miklos Tomka, The Changing Social Role of Religion in Eastern and Central Europe: Religious Revival and its Contradictions, Social Compass, 42, 1(1995): 17–26. Miklos Tomka, Religion, Church, State and Civil Society in East-Central Europe; in Irena Borowik (eds.), Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (Nomos: Krakow, 1999). 9 Ankica Marinovi° Bobinac and Dinka Marinovi° Jerolimov, Religious education in Croatia, in Zorica Kuburi° and Christian Moe (eds.), Religion and Pluralism in Educa- tion: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2006). What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations... 155 them are mainly Catholic (the majority of believers being Catholics). Borowik10 states how historians have shown clear differences between Orthodoxy and Catholicism that have produced various forms of political identification, state organization, implementation of law, everyday life, and so on. If we speak about religious affiliation (see table 1.), we see that Poland and Croatia as Catholic countries and Romania and Bulgaria as countries characterized by Orthodoxy have a monoconfessional situation with only small religious minorities, while the religious situation in Slovenia11, Hungary, and Slovakia is pretty much mixed. The Czech Republic has a dominance of those who report to have no religion at all and a low percentage of Catholics. Looking at the religious belonging as one of the indicators of religiosity, we can say that the Czech society is the most secularized in comparison with the societies of the other eight countries. Interestingly, in Ukraine, 30.7% of respondents report to not be religious at all, and in that sense we can say that Ukraine ranks somewhere between the second group of countries and the Czech Republic.

Table 1. Confessional affiliation (according to the last national census in each country – %)

2001/2002 Roman Catholic Orthodox Protestant Greek Catholic Other Christian Muslim No religion Other or unspecified

Poland 89.8 1.3 0.3 / / / 8.3 0.3 Croatia 87.8 4.4 / 0.4 1.3 5.2 0.9 Slovakia 68.9 / 10.8 4.1 / / 13 3.2 Slovenia 57.8 2.3 / / 0.9 2.4 13.6 23 Hungary 51.9 / 18.9 2.6 1 / 14.5 11.1 Romania 4.7 86.8 7.5 / / / 0.1 0.9 Czech 26.8 / / / / / 59 12.2 Republic Bulgaria / 82.6 / / 1.2 12.2 / 4 Ukraine / 43.7 / 6.4 / / 30.7 19.2

10 Irena Borowik, The Religious Landscape of Central and Eastern Europe after Com- munism; in James Beckford and Jay N. Demerath (eds.), The SAGE Handbook of the Sociology of Religion (London: SAGE Publication, 2007). 11 In Slovenia, 15% out of 23% which are in the category ‘Other or unspecified’ did not want to answer this question at all. 156 Branko An²i°

The second table shows the data for some typical indicators of religiosity12 – believing in God, religious self-identification, religious belonging, church attendance, and frequency of prayer. At first view, the situation seems to be particularly interesting and dynamic in Romania, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic, when looking at the interval of 10 years between the two waves of research. In Romania, we see that of 5 indicators shown there, the following 3 show a significant increase: believing in God, religious self-identification, and the frequency of prayer. In Ukraine, within the 10 years under survey, a significant increase has occurred for all 5 indicators. In the Czech Republic, on the other hand, there is a decrease of religiosity in all indicators except the indicator ‘frequency of prayer’. If we look at the other six countries, we also notice certain changes. Poland experiences a slight, but significant increase of religiosity in the indicators ‘believing in God’, ‘religious self- identification’, and ‘frequency of prayer’, while Croatia sees a slight, but significant increase in the indicators ‘believing in God’ and ‘frequency of prayer’. Both these countries report a significant decrease in the indicator ‘religious belonging’13. In Slovakia, the only noticeable change which occurred regards the question of church attendance where we can see a significant decrease. Growth of religious self-identification is reported in Slovenia, however a slight decline is recorded in the frequency of church attendance. Hungary records a slight decrease in the religious practice (church attendance and frequency of prayer). A general conclusion that we can deduce from this data is that religious growth is still occurring, but alongside this process we can observe certain tendencies of secularization. If we look at the present religious situation (the data from 2007), the variables ‘religious belonging’, ‘religious self-identification,’ and ‘believing in God’ show the highest scores. Lower scores are recorded for indicators concerning religious practice (church attendance and frequency of prayer). If we look at the answers concerning religious belonging, Romania, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, and Croatia, with the

12 The data for Bulgaria is missing for the year 1997 since it did not participate in the ‘Aufbruch’ project at that time. 13 With this indicator one must be careful. The question for this indicator is: “Do you belong to church or a religious community?” The compound ‘religious community’ often misleads the interviewees. Happened similar problem occurerd within the project ISSP (International Social Survey Program) which is carried out at the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb (project manager: Dinka Marinovi° Jerolimov), within the research module Role of Government. Respondents are often not sure if they are being asked about religious belonging since this compound can have different connotations (reference to sects). See also Miklos Tomka, Is Conventional Sociology of Religion Able to Deal with Differences between Eastern and Western European Developments? Social Compass, 53(2) 2005: pp. 251–265. ȱ What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations... 157 highest levels of religious belonging, seem to form a clear group. On the other hand, it is the Czech Republic that has the lowest score, while Ukraine, Slovenia, and Hungary rank somewhere in the middle. As for religious self-identification, Romania, Poland, and Croatia show the highest percentages, while the figures for the Czech Republic are at the other end of the spectrum. The situation in Bulgaria is particularly interesting, because even though 84.8% declare to have some kind of religious belonging, only 65.9% declare themselves religious (concerning religious self- identification), and only 28.5% are sure about God’s existence. (82.6% of Bulgarians are Orthodox). Croatia has a similar situation. One of preliminary conclusions from these results is that religiosity in these countries is primarily traditional religiosity as a factor of cultural, ethnic, or national identification. We can conclude for sure that the highest level of religiosity is to be found in Romania, Poland, and Croatia (on 4 indicators out of 5 they have the highest results), while the Czech Republic is the least religious country, or, rather, has the most secular society (from an individual perspective) (see Table 2). Peter Beyer14 predicted that the development of religion in Central and Eastern Europe will unfold in two directions – privatization of religion on a personal level and politicization of religion in a wider contest over identity and character of nation and culture. From the data presented so far, we cannot determine a clear tendency towards privatization of religion. A possible explanation is that Beyer’s prediction was set for a longer period of time. Other possible explanations, however, are that this process will not occur at all or that, in this very moment, privatization of religion is indeed happening, but that there is a lack of empirical indicators or research designs to detect such a process. Despite all apparent differences, it is definitely true that the communist past is a common characteristic and that religion still has a significant role in the societies under scrutiny. The new democratic process following the fall of communism gave religion and churches a new possibility of acting publicly, but contradictory and sometimes painful social processes, which include very contrary ideological views15, can be

14 Peter Beyer, Privatization and Politicization of Religion in Global Society. Implications for Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe; in Irena Borowik (ed.), Church-State Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (Nomos: Krakow, 1999). 15 Siniša Zrinš²ak, Anonymous Believers as a Sociological Challenge: Religions and Religious Changes in Post-Yugoslav States, in Irena Borowik (ed.), Religions, Churches and Religiosity in Post-Communist Europe (Nomos: Krakow, 2006): pp. 68–80. 158 Branko An²i° a hindrance. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that heated public debates about the role of traditional religions, the position of minorities and new religions, human rights, religious education, the historical role of churches, etc., still occur in these societies.

Table 2. Indicators of religiosity – %

I know that God exists and exists and God I know that it doubt about I have no Religious self-identification (very religious and to some extent religious) (yes Religious belonging answers) (every Church attendance more times) or week once Praying (every day once or more times) 1997 Croatia 51.6 75.4 85.1 24.6 30.2 Czech 9 Republic 15.1 26.8 27.4 8.7 Hungary 27.5 53.7 60.6 13.1 21 Poland 55.1 73.1 94.1 52.1 37.3 Romania 63.7 63 97.8 24.4 54 Slovakia 36.5 53.4 74.9 31.2 29.8 Slovenia 22.3 48.7 67 20.3 14.4 Ukraine 23.1 36 33.3 7.4 19.4 2007 Bulgaria 28.5 65.9 84.8 21.9 16 Croatia 56.4 74 76.7 22.4 35.7 Czech Republic 10.5 23 19.3 6.2 9.5 Hungary 25.7 52.4 52.1 9.6 18.7 Poland 63.7 76.5 90.9 51 42.3 Romania 74.9 83 97.7 26.5 65.5 Slovakia 38.9 52.2 97.5 21 32.3 Slovenia 23.7 65.9 64.8 15.5 13.6 Ukraine 41.2 64 47.4 13 29.3 What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations... 159

What do People expect from Religion?

In the twentieth century, numerous and rapid socio-cultural and socio- political changes occurred. After the fall of the Berlin wall, the transformation and democratization of societies greatly changed the social and legal position of religions. These changes brought with them social controversies about the relations between religion and state, refocusing attention on questions of freedom of religion and religious equality. If we look at the relationship between religion and state from an ideological standpoint, we can say that in the West, many theoreticians speak in favor of a separation of religion from the state, with complete freedom for individuals to privately practice their religion. It is even stressed that religion and democracy are incompatible. Other authors claim that religion can function in democratic societies. We have several examples of state churches in Western European countries. Fox16, based on his international survey on church-state relations, claims that there is a possibility of coexistence between religion and democracy, but it largely depends on the nature of religion. Some religious traditions are not compatible with democracy and the changes it brings. Since religious communities often act in the social field and thus fulfill important social functions (education, social security, psychological assistance, preservation of peace, welfare, etc.), a legislative framework for it is required and provided by the state. It is often hard to define the impact that religions can have on the state and vice-versa, due to contemporary changes which shift relations and expectations. Therefore, it can be instructive to look atthe social expectations and the dynamics of the continuing process of defining and redefining relations between religion and state (see Table 3). The table above shows the data from EVS and ‘Aufbruch’ surveys. The first part of the table shows the results to the question of adequacy of the church/religious community in response to the moral and social problems of a particular society. Respondents in Romania and Ukraine are the most satisfied when it comes to the reaction of the churches to moral problems in their societies. In Slovakia, Poland, and Croatia, more than half of the respondents also express satisfaction, while in Bulgaria, Slovenia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, more than half of the respondents are not satisfied. Considering how churches react to social problems, only in Romania slightly more than half of the respondents are content with the churches’ response to social problems. In other

16 Jonathan Fox, A World Survey of Religion and the State (Series: Cambridge Studies in Social Theory, Religion and Politics – Bar-Ilan University, Israel, 2008). 160 Branko An²i° countries, people are not satisfied as much, especially so in Bulgaria and the Czech Republic where the numbers of unsatisfied respondents are the highest. The results shown in the second part of the table concern the question “Do you believe that in general the xxxx17 Church can respond to the…?” from ‘Aufbruch’. The difference between the first and the second question lies in the attitude towards the general possibility of churches/religious communities to respond to moral and social problems, and in the possibility of a specific church/religious community to react to actual moral problems and individual needs in a specific country. Even though these questions are not the same, they are quite similar in the way of detecting people’s perception and different feelings towards the social role of religion. The answers collected in the ‘Aufbruch’ survey draw quite similar picture when it comes to the role of religion. People in Romania have the greatest belief in the churches’ (Orthodox) role to give answers to moral problems, followed by Ukraine, Bulgaria (Orthodox), and Poland (Catholic). Hungary and the Czech Republic have the lowest belief in the churches’ (Catholic) potential to solve social problems in their countries.

Table 3. To assess potential of churches/religious communities to give answer/respond to… (yes answers – %; *Orthodox Church, **Catholic Church)

1999 EVS Bulgaria Croatia Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Czech Rep. Ukraine Hungary moral problems 44.5 56.5 65.6 80.7 68.2 44.9 36.8 80.9 44.8 social problems 13.9 41.1 40.5 52.2 29.7 33.8 16.7 31.7 23.3

2007 ‘Aufbruch’ Bulgaria * Croatia ** Poland ** Romania * Slovakia ** Slovenia ** Czech Rep.** Ukraine * Hungary * moral problems and 68.3 56.3 65.3 81 47.9 45.6 40.5 67.2 49.1 needs of individuals actual social problems of 48.3 37.2 43.4 65.1 35.4 31 26.5 55 21.5 your country

17 In each country, interviewees were asked about the church/churches that is/are dominant in their respective countries. What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations... 161

Although these questions are a bit vague and we have to critical of what they really grasp, we can derive two general conclusions. Firstly, there are differences between the perception of the general potential of religions to give answers to moral and social problems and the perception of the potential of specific churches concerning the same issues. Secondly, respondents differentiate between the religions’ potentials to solve moral problems, on the one hand, and social problems on the other. To put it differently, it is obvious that the public perception recognizes the different role of religion in those two matters.

Graph 1. Social expectations – Aufbruch 2007 (only agree and fully agree answers)

In the above chart we can see the distribution of answers concerning attitudes about the purpose of churches and religious communities, or, in other words, expectations of the role of churches within the society. At first glance, we notice that Romania is on one end of the scale while Slovenia is on the other. To make a harsh division: the first group of countries with the highest level of social expectations from religion is formed by Romania and Poland; the second group comprises Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Ukraine, and Croatia; while the third group is represented by the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The acceptance of the role of religions in strengthening the national spirit, taking a firm stand concerning important social issues and participating in the public life is 162 Branko An²i° the lowest in all nine countries with the exception of Slovenia (regarding the participation in the public life) where only Romania and Hungary have higher levels of acceptance. The results of the factorial analysis are presented in the following table. The first factor was named ‘socio-cultural role of religion‘ and the second ‘socio-political role of religion’. Factor 1 (F1) comprises seven variables which relate to interpersonal relations and values and which, generally speaking, reveal a humanistic approach to what religion is expected to provide in a society. The second factor (F2) concerns the political role of religion (in the sense of public participation in society) and comprises three variables.

Table 4. Factor scores of social expectations considering the role of religion

SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS F 1 F 2 Give spiritual comfort 0.833 – Teach people to be more attentive to each other 0.805 – Reconcile people with each other 0.793 – Support morality 0.788 – Educate/ bring up people in the faith 0.769 – Teach people to help the needy 0.768 – Support /foster relations between people 0.757 – Participate in the public life – 0.853 Take official position in important social issues – 0.829 Strengthen the national spirit – 0.782

Eigenvalue 5.860 1.226 % of Variance 58.599 12.258 Cumulative % 58.599 70.856

The factorial analysis for Slovenia and the Czech Republic will not be provided since it would require some additional exploration. One of the possible reasons for why in these countries the two factors were not saturated in the same way as in others is maybe due to the lowest results concerning these variables compared to other countries. Nevertheless it would be interesting to follow up on these results in some other piece of research. What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations... 163

Table 5. Analysis of variance and t-test on average factor scores

F 1 –Socio- F 2 – Socio- cultural role of political role of religion religion RELIGIOUS SELF-IDENTIFICATION Very religious ,329 ,334 To some extent religious ,149 ,106 Neither religious nor non religious –,243 –,236 To some extent non-religious –,539 –,409 Absolutely non-religious –,659 –,558 F 233,576 169,443 Sig. 0,000 0,000 AGE 18 – 29 –,163 –,115 30 – 39 –,028 –,063 40 – 49 ,014 –,037 50 – 59 ,043 ,026 60 + ,132 ,162 F 24,460 23,812 Sig. 0,000 0,000 EDUCATION Elementary school“ (approximately 8 or 9 school years previously-and perhaps still ,173 ,184 now-considered to be obligatory) or less „Elementary school“ (like 1.) plus a professional or other qualification which is ,067 ,054 insufficient for entrance into a higher education High school graduation (Abitura, Matura or other qualification sufficient for entrance –,059 –,071 into higher education) College or University degree, Master or Magister (plus a further professional or –,118 –,080 other qualifications) F 30,182 29,501 Sig. 0,000 0,000 SEX Male –0,057 –0,042 Female 0,511 0,037 F 15,280 9,496 Sig. 0,000 0,002 COUNTRY Bulgaria –,190 –,029 Croatia –,146 –,181 Poland ,241 –,163 Romania ,233 ,348 Slovakia –,010 –,219 Ukraine –,183 ,012 Hungary ,005 –,140 F 49,966 64,016 Sig. 0,000 0,002 164 Branko An²i°

Table 5 presents the results of the analysis of variance and t-test which have detected significant differences on average factor scores considering religious self-identification, age, sex, education, and country. As for religious self-identification, those who are very religious or to some extent religious are in favor of a strong socio- cultural and socio-political role of religion, while religiously uncertain interviewees and those who are not religious do not approve of these dimensions18. Looking at the different age groups, it is clear that with age, the tendency towards these two factors generally increases. Younger interviewees (18–29 and 30–29 years of age) do not speak in favor of a socio-cultural role of religion. Older respondents, and especially those over 60, show a greater inclination to such a role of religion. The results concerning the socio-political role of religion are rather similar, with a difference among the 18 to 49year-olds which are not in favor of it. Differences in social expectations depending on differenteducational backgrounds are noticeable for both factors. Those who have a higher level of education (high school and more) are not fond of a strong socio-cultural and socio-political role of religion. Male and female respondents differ inasmuch as women are usually more inclined to supporting an influential position of religion in the society. The differences between the seven countries are interesting, too. Interviewees from Romania and Poland are more in favor of a socio- cultural role of religion while respondents from Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Croatia have a lower tendency towards this factor. Concerning the socio-political role of religions, Romania has the greatest affection for the “political” factor. Slovakia, Croatia, Poland, and Hungary could be grouped together since they report the lowest acceptance of a socio- political role of religion. Bulgaria and Ukraine are grouped together, ranking somewhere in between.

Conclusions

The picture of the role of religion(s) in the nine countries of Central and Eastern Europe which we have looked at is shaping and reshaping. The situation varies in every country, which is why it would be more accurate to say that concerning religion, more differences than similarities could be detected. The comparisons made in this paper are useful for finding some similar trends, but also for emphasizing the need for a more complex research of every society per se. Trends show

18 See paper of Bogdan Radu in this volume. What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations... 165 us common patterns and tendencies, but they do not allow us to draw conclusions about causes. Research surveys and the data they provide challenge us to think and rethink beyond usual transitional or ex- socialist discourse19. The analysis presented in this paper indicates the need to investigate the forms of social action of churches. Differences in the public role of religions could be detected through the research of social expectations (though, of course, this is not the only way). The analyses have shown that people have different attitudes towards and perceptions of the role of religion, but that they, nonetheless, have similar expectations. One could say that the socio-cultural role of religion is a natural role that results fromthe social teaching of Christianity in the sense of providing spiritual comfort and encouraging peaceful relations. The socio-political role of religion heats up the debate. To give but one example, in the presidential elections in Croatia (2010) we could observe the public perception of the Catholic Church being on the side of one of the presidential candidates, who was religious, while the other candidate (now President) was agnostic. Although Church did not distance itself from this view (which might indicate that they really supported the Catholic candidate), the Croatian people elected the agnostic one. We see that the socio-political role of religion is not as broadly accepted and not as important as might think, given that majority of people in Croatia are Catholic. From the data presented, we can deduce that the social expectations of the socio-cultural role of religion are higher than those of its socio- political role. In table 6, we can see that the general attitude towards the influence of religion on politics is not in favor of religion. With the exception of Romania (on the first and third variable) and Ukraine (on the third variable), the majority of respondents in all nine countries do not agree that religion should exert influence on politics. Bearing in mind the results presented before, we can say that people perceive the different ways of religious engagement in society in different ways and that they do not support all public roles of religion in the same way. In that way, the preliminary hypothesis is confirmed.

19 After deriving two factors (socio-cultural and socio-political role of religion), I wanted to test certain socio-demographic differences in the seven countries (in which these factors occurred) as one sample with the goal of tracing possible future research directions. The discrepancies reported for Slovenia and the Czech Republic challenge us to go beyond transitional discourses. 166 Branko An²i°

Table 6. Religion and politics (agree and strongly agree answers – %)

1999 EVS Bulgaria Croatia Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia Czech Republic Ukraine Hungary

Politicians who do not believe in God are 25.7 24.8 15.9 52 22 10.8 6.3 34 12.5 unfit for public office Religious leaders should not influence 84.1 86.1 85.4 77.9 74.1 77.7 79.8 82.6 78.1 how people vote Better if more people with strong religious 28.9 45.5 29.3 64.7 36.9 12.3 9.5 57.2 23.1 beliefs in public office Religious leaders should not 80.9 79.4 81.4 77.5 70.6 73.3 74.4 72 71.1 influence government

Keeping in mind the results of the survey on social expectations, we know that Croatia and Poland are the societies with the highest level of religiosity in Eastern Europe, but with a lower acceptance of the socio- political role of religion when compared to Bulgaria or Ukraine. In the Czech Republic, the number of interviewees who express to have certain expectations from religion is higher than the number of people who actually say that they are religious. This can indicate a need of reconsidering the classic religious indicators, especially when we use them to support or confute theories of secularization. We see that the discrepancy between reported religiosity and social expectations of the different social/public functions of religion is, in some countries, significant. Therefore, future research should try to focus more on questions concerning the public role of religion in order to improve the understanding of the social processes that model social relations and social structures. Within these possible future analyses, we must try to What Do We Want from Religion? Religiosity and Social Expectations... 167 contextualize the religious situation in every society, taking into consideration historical differences, doctrinaire specificities of each specific Christian confession, specificities of the position of religions in communism, relations between religion20 and other subsystems of society, etc. Sociology of religion is definitely one of the protagonists of this scientific quest, but, the advantages of an interdisciplinary approach must not be ignored.

20 See paper of Cosima Rughinis in this volume.

Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence from Eastern and Western Europe

VICTOR CEBOTARI

Introduction

Perhaps the most prominent issues of interest in social studies of the recent decades have been ethnicity, religion and nationalism. Particularly in Europe, they have been for centuries the traditional pillars of the modern nation-states1. Solid national identities have been formed upon these values which shaped the borders of Europe in many ways during the last century. The biggest challenge to the secular Europe however, was posed by the communist ideology which dominated the Central and Eastern Europe for more than half a century. During that time, some of the traditional supports of the old state-societies have been removed or changed radically making the entire set of values to weaken consistently. The most affected pillar was religion which has been officially banned in most of the communist regimes. On these grounds, willingly or reluctantly, artificial identities were forced upon nations in order to represent clusters of ethnies and populations as it was the case of the Soviet, Yugoslavian, Czechoslovakian and other socialistic entities. After 1989, new national feelings have emerged in a mass effort to build a consistent post-communist identity, free of the past ideological heritage. At the same time, the former atheist way of perceiving the inter-societal relations has disappeared and the resurgence of the traditional religious practises has been very active in many of the former communist countries. In such context, numerous ethnic groups started being faced with serious national identity problems, many of them along religious lines which sometime escalated to violence.

1 Mattei Dogan, “The Decline of Traditional Values in Western Europe. Religion, Nationalism, Authority .“International Journal of Comparative Sociology 40 (1999): 77–90, at 77. 170 Victor Cebotari

Arguable, religion is usually seen as a value in itself and the interrelation between the process of identity formation and religious consciousness has produced new nationalist feelings. Tilley and Heath have found that religion plays a significant role in the decline of national identity.2 The connection between religion and patriotism is important at both individual and group levels. Individuals who are more religious tend to be highly involved in their local or regional community and thus, their civic feelings are more tighten with the nation.3 This causality becomes more complex when considering members of ethnic minority groups in relation with members of the majority populations. Those who have the same religious denomination as the majority group may feel more tighten to the society and thus their pride attitudes should be as similar as the ones of the dominant group. Throughout the history, religion has served as an important criterion for the in-group demarcation among members of the same nation. Thus religion can be seen as an important cultural marker which may underline feelings of pride among members and non-members of an ethnic community. Therefore, it is argued in this paper that a strong feeling of national pride is a relevant measure for the idea of interethnic and interreligious cohesion. The investment in the people’s attachment with the nation proves to have rational consequences for the development of an affective nationhood. This was the main target of any state aspiring to last for long. Previous research has clearly shown that strong sentiments of national pride have a positive effect on the state stability by making their citizens to be more involved in the nation.4 Therefore, we imply that states are actively involved in creating cohesive socializing policies for bridging national loyalty across different ethnicities in order to obtain this diffuse support from its citizens. Following this reasoning, we would like to capture in our study different degrees of national pride among both minority and majority groups. Religious denomination was set up to play an extensive explanatory role in measuring the level of patriotism among different European nations. This is a relatively new area of research in social

2 James Tilley, Anthony Heath, „The Decline of British National Pride.” The British Journal of Sociology 58/4(2007): at 668. 3 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York, Simon and Schuter, 2000). 4 M.D.R. Evans, Jonathan Kelley, „National Pride in the Developed World: Survey Data From 24 Nations.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 14/3 (2002): 1–36. Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 171 sciences and limited scholar work has included religion and pride as measures or controls. Several questions will serve as our primary focus and will be therefore employed in this analysis: Is national pride perceived the same across different religious communities in Eastern Europe? Do both ethnic minority and majority groups, with different or similar religious denomination, share common pride values within a state? Does the discrimination status of a religious minority group matter when it comes to national loyalty? All these questions will be measured descriptively and empirically. In doing so, a set of explanatory indicators will be employed in measuring the causality between various socio-demographic factors and different pride dimensions. A comparative perspective will be further employed at two levels: across minority and majority groups and along religious lines. This comparative angle is chosen in order to better reflect the direction of causality of the dependent variable but also to maximum explore the utility of the analysed data. In the first section a brief introduction of the data and the sampling procedures are described. The dependent and independent indicators are further presented in the second section. The empirical method is further presented in a third place. The forth section proceeds with the descriptive and empirical analysis itself. The main conclusions stemming from the analysis complete this study.

Data and the Sampled Population

In order to consider the feelings of national pride in relation to religious denomination, we use data from the European Values Survey (EVS) by pooling the last two extensive waves, from 1990 to 2004. This period captures the main ideological transformation which Europe undertook after the end of the Cold war era. The data is configured as an individual level, cross-sectional survey which encloses information about political values, social attitudes and beliefs. There will be analyzed 20 European countries5 which for the purpose of comparison will be divided in three main clusters: Western European democracies, Former Soviet European countries and ex- communist South Eastern/Balkan states.

5 A number of sub-state entities are also included in EVS. We will use in our analysis two such sub-national territorial entities: Northern Ireland (The United Kingdom) and Republica Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina). 172 Victor Cebotari

The sampled population is separated into two main categories, ethnic minority and majority groups. Since the EVS data is structured at the individual level, we made use of several sorting variables to cluster all respondents in distinct ethnicities. The following delimi- tating criteria were applied: Country of the respondent (s003), declared ethnicity (x051), language spoken at home (g016) 6 and the region where the interview was conducted (x048). Further, we chose to split the sampled minority groups into two categories: ethnies “at risk” of being discriminated and minority groups “not at risk” for being disadvantaged. The classification of minority groups in one of these two groups follows the guidelines of the “Minorities at Risk” (MAR) project developed by Tedd Gurr at Maryland University. The status “at risk” for discrimination is considered since many European minorities are traditionally the target of substantial discrimination in the societies they are living in. This status is assigned following two main documented rules: A minority group should “collectively suffers, or benefits from, systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a society” and the group “is the basis for political mobilization and collective action in defence or promotion of its self-defined interests.”7 Based on the EVS sample, we identified a total number of 62 ethnicities, from which 20 majority groups and 42 ethnic minorities. Following MAR classification, there are 27 minority groups classified “at risk” for discrimination. The reason behind splitting our sample into minority–majority groups is straightforward: Previous studies have found that minority groups are very reluctant to develop strong ties at the state level and rely more on the group-level communities.8 Among others, this reality is reinforced by religious beliefs which are seen as powerful incentives to tighten the bounds with local communities and less with national state. Such reality strongly advocates considering group-level attitudes instead of individual beliefs.

6 There were an insignificant number of respondents having more than one language spoken at home. We excluded them from the analysis. 7 Taken from the Minority at Risk IV Dataset: Users Manual 030703”, version 2003, 117, at 5, Accessed January 2009, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/home.htm. 8 Tom Smith, Lars Jarkko, National Pride: A Cross National Analysis (Chicago, IL, Na- tional Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1998). Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 173

Measurements and Expectations

National pride can be considered as part of the state collective identity. It can be understood as the positive link of an ethnic community with its nation. When correlated with ethnic diversity, the national pride might serve as a relevant indicator to measure the standards of patriotism and national cohesion among different ethnic groups in the country. What we need to capture is therefore the intensity to which individuals of both minority and majority groups are attached to their nationality. The level of national pride is an excellent measure for our study since it captures the substance of primordialist feelings among ethnic communities. As a value, ethnic identity has proved to be more important to ethnic minorities than to the majority groups.9 Ethnic minorities seem to attach more weight to their ethnogenesis and to feel more in terms of group identity. However, this devotion for the intra-group feelings do not allow much room for sensing positively about the supra-group, national identity. We might expect therefore that national pride should be stronger among majority groups than among ethnic minorities. The dominating communities are regarded also to be both the main actors and the main beneficiaries of the nation-state projects. Individuals, members of an ethnic minority group, will report being proud of their nationality only if they sense that their ethnic values have been assimilated or accommodated into the national scheme. Higher pride values will thus signal closer emotional connection with the hosting state. Since the accommodation and assimilation practices widely vary across different ideological regimes, we expect different trends in pride values in each of the group of countries under analysis. Western democracies are more experienced in nation-building and integrating ethnic minorities and thus, it is expected that in such environments minority groups will have practically similar pride values as the majority groups. On opposition, former communist countries had applied more aggressive policies of assimilation and uniformisation which forced many minority communities to feel discriminated. Since discrimination is supposed to be negatively correlated with national pride, we believe that ethnic minorities in former communist countries will have lower pride values than the majority populations.

9 Maykel Verkuyten, „Life Satisfaction Among Ethnic Minorities: The Role of Discrim- ination and Group Identification,” Social Indicators Research 89/3 (2008): 391–404. 174 Victor Cebotari

The indicator measuring the level of national pride in EVS is represented by the following question: “How proud are you to be [country nationality]?” It offers four options for an answer: 1 = not at all proud, 2 = not very proud, 3 = quite proud, and 4 = very proud. Individuals are assigned also a religious denomination with which the majority of members in a group identify themselves. In doing so, we use a direct question surveyed in EVS asking the respondents whether they identify themselves as a Muslim, Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox Christians. From the existing literature, a correlation can be observed between a strong sense of national pride and the feeling of too much diversity in the country. Furthermore, the feeling of too many “others” is directly linked with the advancing age, lower education levels, a tendency towards ‘materialism’ and right wing political preferences.10 Individuals have more other criteria, based on which they evaluate their attachment with the group-ethnicity and their loyalty to the larger nation. Drawing from identity, ethnocentrism11 and trust studies, we try to identify which particular variables are suitable for strong effects on pride attitudes. Prior studies have shown relatively weak and inconsistent differences that gender has on national pride, with men usually expressing stronger national pride values than women do.12 The literature reveals however that women are more trusting and less ethnocentric then men are.13 Based on the generational replacement theories, older people have proved to be more proud of their nationality than younger individuals, although this aspect widely varies, depending of the particular national domain targeted.14 Age also has proved to have a positive effect on trust and ethnocentrism values.15 Education is also one of the factors which are expected to have a direct effect on how people think of their national resemblance. In his post-modernization theory, Ronald Inglehart stipulates that highly educated individuals tend to be more

10 Shamit Saggar and Joanne Drean Saggar, British Public Attitudes and Ethnic Minorities (London, Performance and Innovation Unit, Cabinet Office 2001), at 9. 11 Ethnocentrism is closely related to identity and inter-ethnic studies. It relates to thinking that a group cultural heritage is superior to others and all the judgments related to other groups‘ values are viewed from these stereotypical lenses. 12 Smith and Kim, op.cit. note 25, at 3. 13 Peer Scheepers, Albert Felling, Jan Peters, „Anomie, Authoritarianism and Ethno- centrism: Update of a Classic Theme and an Empirical Test,” Politics and the Indi- vidual 2/1 (1992): 43–60. 14 Evans and Kelley, op.cit. note 7, at 323–324. 15 Dietlind Stolle, “Clubs and Congregations: The benefits of Joining an Association” in Trust in Society,.ed. K. Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 202–44. Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 175 cosmopolitan in thinking and thus less attached to their nations.16 Research done by Tilley and Heath,17 but also by Evans and Kelley18 has found similar correlation patterns. Higher levels of education provide people with more mobility and international openness. They will be hence less tempted to connect with a particular national environment and are expected to report lower levels of national pride. Researchers have also found that national pride is very much affected by the way people are attached with religion.19 The intertwined connection between national beliefs and religious denomination is expected to hold a strong causality in our study as well. Particularly, in former communist countries, the absence of a strong democratic leadership, made religious institutions to be the intermediate link through which national identity is formed and disseminated. For Western Europe there is also evidence that the decline in religious and cultural traditions goes in parallel with the decline in national pride.20 Given the extended research on civic values done by John Brehm and Wendy Rahn,21 we also know that income-secured people are more prone to trust and oriented toward accepting ethnic diversity. This can be widely accepted because a strong sense of community is given by the idea of equality of the membership within the nation. This equality promotes solidarity across rich and poor and between left and right on the political scale.22 Stephen Shulman23 has found that, in many countries, low income people have greater levels of national pride than the rich, upper class individuals. Ronald Inglehart also has observed that satisfaction with the national pride is inversely linked with the level of economic development of the country.24 At the individual level however, rich people are expected in general to be more proud of their nationality by virtue of the country allowing them to acquire more wealth. Even though the literature has mixed findings regarding this

16 Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Politi- cal Change in 43 Societies. (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1997). 17 Tilley and Heath, op.cit. 18 Evans and Kelley, op.cit. 19 Inglehart, op.cit. 20 Tilley and Heath, op.cit. 21 John Brehm and Wendy Rahn, „Individual-Level Evidence for the Causes and Con- sequences of Social Capital,” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 999– 1023. 22 Thomas Hylland-Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (London, UK: Pluto Press, 2002). 23 Shulman, op.cit. 24 Inglehart, op.cit. 176 Victor Cebotari correlation,25 we believe that poor people tie their status with feelings of social injustice and thus they tend to be more unsatisfied with their nationhood. Economic performance and life satisfaction are usually strong positive predictors for any pride values. People satisfied with their quality of life proved to attach higher weight for nationalistic support.26 The existing research has found lower life satisfaction among ethnic minorities than within majority population.27 Hence, it can be expected that ethnic minorities, being less satisfied with their life in the country will be also tempted to adopt weaker pride values within the same society. This study also acknowledge for the shifting attitudes toward authority resulting from both postmodernism and globalization or by ideological regime change (mainly in Eastern Europe). Once these changes occur, the observations show that individuals seek the security of strong leaders and powerful institutions.28 Further evidence indicates that respect for authority is declining in the advanced democracies with possible negative consequences for national pride. Research has also revealed that desire for strong authority breeds intolerance for cultural change and adversity for different ethnic groups.29 Finally, an indicator measuring the degree of discrimination among ethnic minorities will be taken into consideration. Discrimination proved to be a drawback factor which leads ethnic minorities toward within-group inclusiveness and less devotion to the nation.30 Many groups perceive discrimination as an act of political injustice31 and therefore, they are reluctant to be part in the process of consolidating national identity. By default, discrimination is often associated with weak incentives toward national cohesion which makes higher levels of national pride very unlikely. The discriminatory practices further limit the general access of minority groups to resources which restrict their ability to integrate as full members in the nation. It also emphasized the idea of “otherness” among people and significantly reduces their attachment

25 See Shulman, op.cit. 26 Peter Lewis and Michael Bratton, „Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Nigeria,” MSU Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa 56 (2000): 1–56, at 9. 27 Frank M. Andrews and Stephen. B. Withey, Social Indicators of Well-Being: America’s Perception of Life Quality (New York: Plenum Press, 1976). 28 Inglehart, op.cit. note 38, at 10. 29 Ibid., at 5. 30 Verkuyten, op.cit. note 22, at 401. 31 Tedd Gurr, „Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945,” International Political Science review 14/2 (1993): 161–201. Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 177 to the nation.32 For that reasons, minorities considered to be “at risk” for discrimination are expected to reject more intensely the national pride values.

Method

The method used to analyze our empirical model is a discrete choice technique in the form of ordinal probit. The reason behind this choice is well-grounded in the nature of our dependent variable. We use a hierarchical ordinal scale indicator to measure the level and the intensity of national pride. A typical measurement in such context is through discrete choice modeling techniques. This approach avoids treating the differences between pride levels as uniform, as it is in the case of a least-squares regression. It allows us to assess the magnitude of national pride at each level of the scale while controlling for potentially relevant indicators. Since this study uses a pooled data, some problems might arise in terms of individual heterogeneity. In order to control for this limitation, we consider a procedure to “de-mean” the data in accordance to a technique established by Yair Mundlack in 1978. This technique controls for the fixed effects in the model by considering the within means of the regressors.33 The equation of our model can be visualized as follows:

Pit = E1 kit +E2 xit +΅i + Ήit (i=1, .. N) (1)

Where Pi is the intensity of the national pride coded as 0—for negative pride, 1—for moderate pride and 3—for strong national pride; ki stands for a handful of socio-demographic variables at the individual level i; xi relates to some control variables quantifying values and believes which are measured at the individual level i; ΅i is a group specific and time- invariant component which controls for the systematic fixed effects associated to our data. Accordingly, ei is equal to the individual specific error term that is presumed to be normally distributed and uncorrelated with the control variables. However, the general probit model shows only an ambiguous causality and do not clearly identify the causal effects on each level of

32 Miael Hjerm, „National Identities, National Pride, and Xenophobia; A Comparison of Four Western Countries,” Arta Sociologica 41 (1998): 335–347. 33 Yair Mundlack, „On the Pooling of Time Series and Cross-Section Data,” Econometrica 81/1 (1978): 69–85. 178 Victor Cebotari the ordinal scale of the dependent variable. The raw results are considered to be irrelevant in drawing any conclusions since the literature is widely unclear when it comes to the interpretation of the coefficients of a raw ordinal probit model.34 To circumvent this limitation we will estimate the marginal effects of the probit model which will assess the impact that every particular variable has on each hierarchical value of the dependent variable. The analysis is conducted in STATA which calculates the marginal effects at the means of the independent variables by using the prediction associated with the previous ordinal probit estimation command. The final results and also the interpretation of the obtained model will be presented in terms of marginal effects.

Results

This section describes the general trends in pride values across minority and majority groups in three distinct regions in Europe. Figure 1 presents the mean pride values, distributed both among ethnic and religious denominations. The picture comprises Balkan countries and includes the discrimination status of the measured groups. There can be observed that almost all ethnic minorities in the region are perceived of being “at risk” for discrimination. There is also an amalgam of religious diversity among both majority and minority groups. On average, dominant communities share higher pride feelings as compared to ethnic minorities. Almost all majority groups, irrespective of their religion denomination, have on average ‘quite proud’ attitudes or higher. Generally, the correlation between the main religion of the country and being member of the majority community provide higher values for national pride. It is the case of Muslim Albanians and Bosniaks, orthodox Romanians, Macedonians and Serbians: all sharing strong feelings of patriotism in their native countries. Ethnic minorities having the same religious denomination as the majority groups have also higher feelings of national belonging. Minority communities sharing different religious denominations, have on opposite, lower pride feelings in the country. Notably, the two ethnic minorities classified as being ‘not at risk’ for discrimination,

34 William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2000), at 876. Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 179

Turkish and Vlah communities in FYROM, have higher pride attitudes, closer to those of the majority groups.

Albania ALBANIANS Greeks Croats MUSLIMS Bosnia Serbs BULGARIANS Bulgaria Gypsy Turkish Hungarians Romania ROMANIANS Albanians Gypsy MACEDONIANS FYROM Serbs Turkish Vlahs Albanians Serbia SERBS Hungarians SERBS Srpska Muslims

Not at all proud Not very proud Quite proud Very proud

Muslim Ortodox Protestant Catholic

Source: European Values Survey. Note: The names of the majority groups are written in capital letters. Minorities “at risk” are marked with a “+”.

Figure 1: National Pride among Minority and Majority Groups in Former Balkans: Denominated by Minority-Majority Group and Religion

Figure 2 further presents the average pride values in the former Soviet, East European states. The fall of the USSR has lead to the formation of new group identities which unlike the Balkan case, have been less influenced by violent religious nationalism. The Soviet epoch has been characterized by a widespread atheist environment which to a certain extend succeeded to neutralize the religious power across ethnic lines. As result, when transition to democracy started the religious beliefs did not have sufficient boosting power to influence major inter-group tensions. Besides, all Eastern European states are relatively homo- genised in terms of religious denomination, where both minority and majority groups are traditionally part of one or another sect of Christianity. Jonathan Fox has stated that violent religious nationalism has developed mainly in those former Soviet republics with a 180 Victor Cebotari significant Muslim population.35 In these countries, strong feelings have been placed around Muslim practices which were acting as cultural differentials to the former Soviet and, later on, Russian Orthodox dominance.

BELORUSSIANS +Polish Belarus Russians Ukrainians Estonia Russians ESTONIANS Belarusians LATVIANS Latvia Lithuanians Polish Russians Ukrainians Bulgarians Gagauz MOLDOVANS Moldova Russians Ukrainians UKRAINIANS Ukraine Crimean Russians Russians

Not at all proud Not very proud Quite proud Very proud

Orthodox Protestant Catholic

Source: European Values Survey Note: The names of the majority groups are written in capital letters. Minorities “at risk” are marked with a “+”.

Figure 2: National Pride among Minority and Majority Groups in Former USSR States: Denominated by Minority-Majority Group and Religion

On average, the pride attitudes in Eastern Europe are relatively weak in intensity. The evidences shown in Figure 2 reveal that stronger values of pride can be seen mainly among majority groups. Ethnic minorities, in general, have significantly lower levels of national pride. Unlike in Balkans, ethnic minorities having similar religion denomination as the majority groups do not share the same levels of patriotism. There is also no evidence which can link the discrimination status with lesser feelings of patriotism. This can be explained from the

35 Jonathan Fox, “The Future of Religion and Domestic Conflict,” in Religion, Interna- tional Relations, and Development Cooperation, ed. B. K. Goldewijk (Wageningen: Wageningen Academic Publishers, 2007), 129–152, at 129. Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 181 perspective of the transition process undertaken by these countries. In the time of regime change, the baseline for loyalty is weakening within the society. This process equally affects pride feelings of all ethno- religious groups in the country. Almond and Verba describe these attitudes as „system affected” feelings which temporarily may bias the true national beliefs of a certain population.36 In an extensive study on the declining of traditional values in Western European democracies, Mattei Dogan has found that many people are still proud of their nationality but in a very ‘narcissistic’ way, which mainly reflects the high standard of living, democracy performance or country’s economic achievements.37 However, the author concluded that despite of high levels of patriotism there are an increasing number of individuals which start declaring negative pride values in all Western European countries.

FLEMISH Belgium Wallons FINISH Finland Russians Tyrolians Italy ITALIANS Sardinians Basques Catalans Spain SPANISH Gallegans SWEDISH Sweden Finnish Italian Swiss Switzerland French Swiss GERMAN Swiss Scotish Great Britain Welsh ENGLISH PROTESTANTS Northern Ireland Catholics

Not at all proud Not very proud Quite proud Very proud

Protestant Catholic

Source: European Values Survey. Note: The names of the majority groups are written in capital letters. Minorities “at risk” are marked with a “+”.

Figure 3: National Pride among Minority and Majority Groups in Western Europe: Denominated by Minority-Majority Group and Religion

In our study, we took over these results and tried to identify pride beliefs among different ethnies in Western Europe. According to findings presented in Figure 3, we see that indeed, on average, pride intensity stays on a fairly “quite proud” level. With a few exceptions,

36 Gabriel Abraham Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (London: Sage Publications, 1989). 37 Dogan, op.cit. note 1, at 82. 182 Victor Cebotari the pride feelings are not significantly different between ethnic minority and majority groups. In a number of countries, ethnic minorities have even higher pride feelings than the majority population. It is the case of Switzerland, Belgium, Sweden and to a certain extend the United Kingdom. This situation is unique yet not surprisingly if compared with the findings from other regions in Europe. The high standards of democratization guarantee extensive rights for many Western European minorities which in turn elevate their national feelings. The religious landscape in Western Europe is also characterized by a high degree of religious homogeneity. The traditional ethnic minorities embrace, in many cases, the same religious denomination as the majority group in the country. Similarly, there are only few minority groups prone for discrimination. Their pride feelings stay relatively close to the national average which also can be linked with the way democracy deals with ethnic diversity in Western European countries.

Empirical Evidence

The second part of our analysis is disclosing the empirical evidence of an ordinal probit regression. One objective of this study is set to observe the impact and influence which different socio-economic characteristics have on the positive levels of national pride. Therefore, the presented results in Table 1 show the causality only for the ‘quite proud’ and ‘very proud’ levels of our dependent variable. The results are presented in terms of marginal effects and comparatively for both minority and majority groups. Generally, the model underlines several interesting results. The first examination confirms our initial suppositions that the impact of the employed indicators is significantly different when comparing the two hierarchical levels of pride. The second general observation reveals important differences in the pride values between majority and minority groups. The obtained results are further described in detail. In the literature, discrimination proved to be a very powerful explanatory factor linked with the minority status. When controlling for this aspect, the results are in line with our expectation, minorities considered to be ‘at risk’ for discrimination have higher probability to feel less proud of the nationality of their host country. The influence of gender on national pride proved to be not significant for minority groups but highly significant for majority populations. Moreover, this indicator has different causality patterns Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 183 for each of the two analyzed pride scales, with women proving to be more ‘relatively proud’ of their identity while men have higher probability to be ‘very proud’ of their nationality. The relationship between different age-cohorts and national pride is more diverse: older cohorts are considerable more proud of their nationality across both minority and majority groups. Within the majority population, the younger cohort has still a relative value of national pride which widely confirms the stipulations from past research – that there is an outgoing declining trend in national pride among younger generations.38 These results can be regarded as cohort effects39 with younger generations feeling less proud than older generations. Within former communist societies, the low values of pride amongst younger generations could be triggered by the transition process and by feelings of seeing themselves as being a disadvantaged generation. In the process of nationhood awareness, many states are developing special policies for building links of national socialization among its citizens. One of the mechanisms used to promote such policies are through education systems where historical, national, religious and linguistic symbols are learned and further promoted in a continuous process described as a ‘banal nationalism‘.40 The relationship between education and national pride provides some compelling results: within both minority and majority groups, highly educated people are less proud of their nationality. Highly educated individuals show only a relative degree of proudness within the majority population. These results confirms the proposed association of Inglehart’s post-modernization theory – that less educated citizens have higher probability to be more proud of their nationality. Generally, some scholars have also argued that the positive relationship between low education and stronger pride is due to lower levels of schooling of earlier generations.41 We believe however that more educated individuals tend to be more cosmopolitan and internationalized in their behaviour which by definition weakens the identification with national values. Given the same causality pattern among both minority a majority groups we tend to believe that this could be indeed the case. Wealth is another important factor which was expected to significantly influence the pride attitudes in Europe. Our empirical results reveal that less wealthy people have stronger pride feelings all

38 Tilley and Heath, op.cit. note 5. 39 Smith and Jarkko, op.cit. note 21. 40 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995). 41 Smith and Kim, op.cit. note 25, at 5. 184 Victor Cebotari over Europe. In an extensive study on ethnicity and nationalism, Hylland-Eriksen has concluded that strong identity beliefs promote solidarity amongst rich and poor42 (see Table 1). Stephen Shulman’s work43 has also shown that a strong national identity is perceived as being an equalizer factor across different segments of the society, where poorer individuals proved to be more attached to their nationality than the richer segments of the population. Especially in the transition countries where prosperity is not prevailing among large masses of populations, poor individuals might have additional psychological incentives to invest more in a positive national pride. The data further shows that ethnic minorities in former USSR countries are very unlikely to be proud of their nation while minority groups in Western Democracies have higher probability to be highly patriotic. The results for majority groups hold insignificant causality.

Table 1: Marginal Effects of the Ordinal Probit with Fixed Effects (Mundlack Terms)

Relatively Proud Minority Groups Majority Groups

‘At risk’ for discrimination (ref. ‘Not at risk’) –0.00307 (0.00317) Gender (ref. Male) –0.00130 (0.00146) 0.00999** (0.00427) Adults (30–49) (ref. young 19–29) 0.00162 (0.00162) –0.0210*** (0.00542) Seniors (50>) (ref. young 19–29) 0.00412** (0.00185) –0.0553*** (0.00640) Middle level education (ref. low) –0.00202 (0.00191) 0.0286*** (0.00578) High level education (ref. low) –0.00674 (0.00488) 0.0387*** (0.00610) Medium income (ref. low) –0.00244 (0.00220) 0.0116** (0.00504) High income (ref. low) –0.00667* (0.00364) 0.0208*** (0.00562) Former USSR (ref. other communist) –0.0310*** (0.00983) –0.00481 (0.0212) Western Democracies (ref. other communist) 0.00283 (0.00455) –0.0419 (0.0314) Orthodox (ref. Muslims) –0.0267* (0.0162) 0.102*** (0.00965) Protestant (ref. Muslims) –0.0436 (0.0330) 0.00658 (0.0182) Roman catholic (ref. Muslims) –0.0212* (0.0118) 0.0522*** (0.0159) Respect for authority – neutral (ref. positive) –0.0109*** (0.00358) 0.0548*** (0.00433) Respect for authority – negative (ref. positive) –0.0249** (0.0118) 0.0620*** (0.00530) Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with 0.00358** (0.00167) –0.0576*** (0.00550) the life) Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the 0.00276 (0.00234) –0.109*** (0.00763) life)

42 Hylland-Eriksen, op.cit. note 44. 43 Shulman, op.cit. note 23, at 45. Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 185

Very Proud Minority Groups Majority Groups ‘At risk’ for discrimination (ref. ‘Not at risk’) –0.117*** (0.0220)

Gender (ref. Male) –0.0132 (0.0142) –0.0185** (0.00790) Adults (30–49) (ref. young 19–29) 0.0180 (0.0190) 0.0387*** (0.00986) Seniors (50>) (ref. young 19–29) 0.0551*** (0.0210) 0.0990*** (0.0110)

Middle level education (ref. low) –0.0201 (0.0179) –0.0529*** (0.0106) Very Proud Minority Groups Majority Groups High level education (ref. low) –0.0427** (0.0216) –0.0770*** (0.0130)

Medium income (ref. low) –0.0218 (0.0171) –0.0217** (0.00947) High income (ref. low) –0.0479*** (0.0186) –0.0396*** (0.0109) Former USSR (ref. other communist) –0.166*** (0.0338) 0.00891 (0.0390)

Western Democracies (ref. other communist) 0.149*** (0.0451) 0.0756 (0.0553) Orthodox (ref. Muslims) –0.120*** (0.0443) –0.200*** (0.0202) Protestant (ref. Muslims) –0.121** (0.0476) –0.0123 (0.0346)

Roman catholic (ref. Muslims) –0.165** (0.0701) –0.106*** (0.0357) Respect for authority – neutral (ref. positive) –0.0775*** (0.0154) –0.106*** (0.00862) Respect for authority – negative (ref. positive) –0.0878*** (0.0226) –0.136*** (0.0143) Moderate life satisfaction (ref. dissatisfied with 0.0463** (0.0187) 0.104*** (0.00964) the life) Satisfied with the life (ref. dissatisfied with the 0.0839*** (0.0234) 0.186*** (0.0119) life) N 2911 N 14609

adj. R-sq 0,07 adj. R-sq 0,06 Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

In the case of regime change there is a transition period where institutional settings are redefined and readapted to correspond to the new expectations of the citizens in the country. This process however has a certain impact on the individuals’ feelings toward the nation, being regarded as a tendency from the state authorities to monopolize patriotism and “revise’ the official version of the nationhood.”44 In fact, the main objective of political authorities is to maintain the constitutional structures of the nation by mobilizing all individuals around patriotic feelings and trying avoiding radical change.45 This is a complex process and may be not completely well understood or

44 Jordi Muñoz, „From National-Catholicism to Democratic Patriotism? Democratization and Reconstruction of National Pride: The Case of Spain (1981 2000), ” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32/4 (2009): 616–639, at 618. 45 David Easton, „A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” British Jour- nal of Political Science 5 (1975): 435–457, at 437. 186 Victor Cebotari accepted by the entire population, a reality which our data tend to confirm as well. There is a growing literature which focuses extensively on the specific relation between religion and national identity. The importance of religion for national values is usually negotiated within society,46 especially when a multiethnic and multi-religious environment is involved. Being part of a religious majority or on the contrary, having a religious minority denomination act as a form of in-group demarcation which in turn shapes the attitudes of the adopted identity. The data presented in Table 1 show that Orthodox, Protestant and Catholic minorities have lower probability to be proud with their nations. Comparatively, the results on majority groups are more diverse. The dominant Orthodox and Catholic populations show only a relative confidence with their national pride, yet a negative correlation with stronger standards of patriotism. Generally, powerful religious beliefs are found in the European periphery, where church still has retained its influence on some traditional functions in the society, such as schools, social welfare, culture etc.47 The results however, seem pessimistic about the role and impact of religion on national pride in the future. Several scholars pointed out on the continuous decreasing role of religious practices and beliefs, especially in the Western and Central Europe.48 One can think of the weakening of the traditional religious values in a post-modernist society to which Europe is driving nowadays. This reasoning is supported by the fact that there is a significant negative correlation between religion denomination and high levels of national pride across both minority and majority groups all around Europe. Closely linked with religion, the belief in authority is one of the main traditional pillars of the European state-societies.49 Some scholar work however has documented that there is a continuous decreasing trend in the authority trust worldwide.50 The data employed in our study shows a strong and significant causality between negative attitudes toward authority and lower pride values across both minority

46 Robert M. Kunovich, “Relative Group Size and Religious Nationalism in Europe,” Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association (Atlanta Hilton Hotel, At- lanta, GA (2003): 1–21, at 2. 47 Dogan, op.cit. note 1, at 81. 48 Ibid.; Sabato Acquaviva, The Decline of the Sacred in Industrial Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979). 49 Dogan, op.cit. note 1, at 77. 50 Ronald Inglehart, “Postmodernization, Authority and Democracy,” in Critical Citi- zens: Global Support for Democratic Government, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 1. Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 187 and majority groups. Once again this denotes the close interrelation between positive attitudes toward authority and high pride standards. The empirical evidence obliges us to make a clear separation between national pride and the legitimacy of the authority. Many former communist East European countries are more challenged in terms of having weak institutions or irregular rates of trust in political leadership. On the other hand, many western European countries have traditionally lower rates of confidence in the institutional and political authority. However, the legitimacy of the regime is not challenged since the virtue of democracy is to provide a reasonable framework for peaceful change of the political game.51 The strong correlation between attitudes towards authority and national pride prompts us to give a consistent credit to leadership values. Drawing from the literature, our results rely on the existing idea that in the nowadays Europe, individuals still need to anchor their pride values to a strong sense of authority. Finally, in line with our initial expectations, we found a positive causal link between life satisfaction and strong national pride across all ethnic groups. There always has been a constant support for the argument that the satisfaction with the general life-being is an important predicting factor for positive pride values. Commonly, the correlation between life satisfaction and pride feelings goes beyond the ethnicity factor and proved to be a significant indicator for national cohesion.

Conclusions

The purpose of this analysis was set to explore the substance of national pride by applying a comparative perspective at two levels: among ethnic lines and across religious denominations. We started this study by considering the fact that people usually build cultural barriers around their beliefs and tend to see the reality around them through these particular lenses. Thus, when someone is guided by faith and is about to make a choice at the level of personal values and beliefs, there can be seen little space for compromise or negotiation. The rigidity of people’s values can be widely seen all the way across pride feelings and ethnic lines while further presenting the obtained outcomes. We have observed a constant tendency among majority groups to feel more pride with the nation in all European countries. The exception is provided by some west European democracies where minority groups seem to be well integrated in their host societies by

51 Dogan, op.cit. note 1, at 87. 188 Victor Cebotari showing greater than average feelings of national pride. We might carefully stipulate that higher feelings of pride among these minority groups could be the direct results of the alternative nation building processes set up by the local autonomous governments in many European developed democracies. Similarly, a homogenous religious denomination within one country, which is cross-bordering ethnic lines, seems to increase the average national pride feelings. The exception to this trend is made by the former Soviet East European countries where ethnicities with similar religious denomination denote negative trends in terms of average pride feelings. One possible explanation for these findings can go as far as the state of transition undertaken by many East European states. The change in the political realm correlated with the hardship and uncertainties of the everyday life may consistently weaken people’s moral comfort in the nationhood. In our analysis we have found also that the status of perceived discrimination at the group level seems to lower the feelings of patriotism. All over Europe, the common feature of the disadvantaged groups is to have weaker feelings of national pride than the average standards in their countries. The constant negative relationship between being “at risk” for discrimination and frail pride feelings, prompts us to think that further tensions at the level of interethnic relations are still possible in Europe. Despite decades of democracy and efforts toward tolerance, discrimination has nonetheless profound roots in many European societies. In order to improve the idea of national cohesion, additional research is recommended to deeply analyse the way the attachment to the nation could be mediated along discrimination lines. Overall this study has also shown the importance of targeting national pride in connection with other socio-economic characteristics. The results of the analysis have roughly confirmed our initial expectations. The existing literature constantly considers national pride in its general conception. However, we have analysed the degree of pride as several hierarchic values and tested the impact of the employed characteristics on each of them. Thus we have found that individuals perceive differently the two positive national pride feelings: being “relatively proud” and “very proud”. Many independent indicators show different causality patterns as we go up on the pride scale. Once more, these results prove the volatility of the people’s beliefs in nationhood. The surprising configuration of the obtained outcomes gives additional incentives for considering further research on patriotism feelings all along the pride scale. Confronting Religion with National Pride Values: Comparative Evidence ... 189

As such, attachment with the nation proves to have strong primordial links by involving strong causality between cultural values and beliefs. It proves also to be a social construction, given the influence which many socio-economic factors have on individuals’ pride feelings. Unfortunately, we could not analyse the developments of pride attitudes in a temporal perspective. The way people change their national feelings across time would be by far the biggest academic challenge but also an impressive achievement for identity studies.

Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam Alterization of Islam: Borders between Islam and Other Faiths, defined by Media

DAVOR MARKO

Following, mainly, the so-called “Western point of view,” Islam has often been perceived as backward, violent and regressive. Widespread is the tendency of reducing it to fundamentalism and to religious extremism – and this became a global issue after September 11, 2001. Revivalism, fundamentalism, and Islamism1 are usually connected with the radical minority, while the huge majority of Muslims who belong to the moderate mainstream of society are ignored.2 The focus in this paper will be on Bosnia and Herzegovina, where Islam is one of the largest religions, and where Bosniaks, as constituent people3, have practiced it for more than 500 years, living together with their Catholic and Orthodox neighbors. As the Bosniaks are of Slavic origins, and used to be Christians before the Ottoman Empire conquered the Balkan states, their choice to accept Islam in the Middle Ages was not perceived as something positive by their co-citizens and neigbours of Serbian and Catholic origins. Religious belonging has beeing considered as on of the most imporant marker of contemporary relations of three constituent people’s of Bosnia and Herzegovina4,

1 Islamism refers to the political dimension of Islam, when Islamic principles and ideas have been transformed into a political ideology. See further: Kulenovi°, Tarik. Politi²ki islam. Sarajevo: VBZ, 2008. 2 This was the exact motive for John L. Esposito and Dalia Mogahed for their book Who Speaks for Islam, that was published in 2007, and which is factually based on the Gallup Research. 3 According to the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina today consists of two entities: The Republic of Srpska, which is dominated by the Serbs, and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, dominated by the Bosniaks and Croats. “Others” as a constituent category includes national minorities and all those citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who declare themselves not in an exclusively nationalistic way, but rather as Bosnian, Herzegovinians, or both. 4 According to the Bosnian intellectual, Ugo Vlaisavljei°, religion “fulfills the ideological gap that appeared with the crash of communism, and gives politics what it lacks most: 192 Davor Marko since its society has been characterized with a high level of division among etnhic, religious and national lines. As well as, leading media that are affiliated to specific ethno-political elite(s) are reporting according to their narrowed political interests. Therefore, media also perceive religion or religious belonging as an important element of ethno-national identities and the interests of the political elite.5 Following this discussion, this paper will test the thesis that mainstream media of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which are divided, report through stereotyped and prejudiced images of religious “others”. In this way, those stereotypes and prejudices are re-affirmed according to the dominant ethno-national political agenda and the polarization of the three dominant religious communities (Orthodox, Catholic and Islamic) is further being developed.

Ethno-Politics and Borders in Bosnia and Herzegovina

During the socialist Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only Yugoslav republic, among six, whose name did not reflect the majority of the population. This Republic was a mix of Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, and this configuration offered a lot of opportunities for cooperation among these three ethnic and religious groups. In those times Muslims were, in most cases, considered as a “powerless pawn in the Croat and Serb battle for dominance in Bosnia”.6 But problems appeared in the last decade of the 20th Century, when Bosnian Muslims became “the players”. Croats and, especially, Serbs found themselves losing control not only over this group, “but of the political and social resources of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself”.7 In spite of the fact that the Bosnian war was not a religious one, the instrumentalization of religion and employment of ethnopolitics played a more than important role

a concrete ground and substantial good”. Therefore, he claims, ethnicity has been “derived from religious social forms”. See further in: Vlaisavljevi°, Ugo, Ethno-politics and the Divine Good, (Religions in Politics, no 23). 92–95 5 In his book “We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis”, a Bosnian scholar Asim Mujki° considers religion as the most important element of the group constitution in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Referring to John Dewy, he concludes that “religion is… indeed “our” tribal ancestor or founder of “our” community key element of “our” group identity”. In: Mujki°, Asim, We, the Citizens of Ethnopolis, (Sarajevo: Center for Human Rights, 2009). 20 – 24 6 Friedman, Francine, The Muslim Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina (with Reference to the Sandzak of Novi Pazar): Islam as National Identity, (Nationalities Paper, vol. 28. Taylor and Francis, 2000). 171 7 Ibid. 174 Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam 193 within it. Today, political life has been strongly intertwined with religion. Therefore, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, religious intolerance in the country directly reflects ethnic intolerance because the identification of ethnicity with religious background is so close as to be virtually indistinguishable. Frederik Barth explains the boundaries of ethnic groups as relational and therefore as social boundaries, rather than as territorial (although that can be the case as well). According to his theory of interactionism, the basis of one’s group identity is the relation to the “other” groups which are considered to be “different”. Barth stresses the social organization of differences, claiming that those differences, seen as important, are actually chosen or agreed upon. Barth sees the contact between groups as constitutive for both identification and maintenance of boundaries.8 In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, religion has been considered to be the main divisive marker of its three constituent people’s. The role of religion in a public sphere has been elaborated by Ugo Vlaisavljevi°, who wrote that besides modern politics being predominantly secular, that fact “does not assume that religion should be deprived of any meaningful influence on society”, and new politics, based on ethnicity, “profited from the growing influence of religion over the past years of communist regime”.9

Media in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The media landscape of Bosnia-Herzegovina is determined by the country’s complex political structures and its divisions, the deliberate post-war peace process and devastated economy. Understanding these divisions is very important in order to understand the way that the media market in Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided and functioning. Public RTV service in Bosnia and Herzegovina has a specific structure that follows territorial and ethnic divisions. It consists of three public broadcasters – the „umbrella“ broadcaster Radio-Television of Bosnia-Herzegovina (BHRT), and two entity broadcasters – Radio- Television of the Federation of B-H and Radio-Television of Republika Srpska. Because of the circumstances of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s ethnic and political divisions, the „umbrella“ broadcaster is also weak

8 Barth, Frederik, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries : The Social Organization of Culture Difference, (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 1998). 15 9 Vlaisavljevi°, Ugo, Ethno-politics and the Divine Good, (Religions in Politics, no 23). 92–93 194 Davor Marko and its audience ratings are low.10 Despite numerous financial and staffing problems and frequent (in)direct political pressures on its editorial policy (direct, from politicians of Republika Srpska, and indirect from political representatives of the Croat people), Public Service on the state level is trying to preserve its declared primary goal – professional, timely, balanced and politically-correct reporting on issues of public interest to all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.11 As much research and many analyses of the media in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows, print media reach a far smaller audience than radio and TV, but print media are really indicative for the research of the ethnic affiliation of certain media and specific ethno-national groups. Print media usually report in favour of specific ethnic groups and the content that they publish matches the interests of these groups. Out of 168 different print media,12 there are 12 daily newspapers. The majority of them are affiliated with a specific ethno-national group. For example, there is the pro-Bosniak (or pro-Muslim) oriented “Dnevni Avaz” (which is as well the daily with the highest circulation and influence in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina); then, the explicitly pro-Serbian oriented “Glas Srpske” and “Fokus” from Banja Luka; and the pro-Croat “Dnevni List” and “Ve²ernji List”. The left-oriented daily “Oslobo¶enje” is the oldest newspaper in the country (founded in 1943). For a very long period, the daily “Nezavisne Novine” from Banja Luka was the only opposition daily paper in Republika Srpska. Today, its owner Željko Kopanja is strongly connected with the regime of the RS and Milorad Dodik personally, but considering its content, this daily is the only one from the RS that covers events from the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Very influential are the dailies from the neighbouring countries – Croatia (“Ve²ernji List”, “Jutarnji List” and “Slobodna Dalmacija”) and Serbia (“Blic”, “Ve²ernje Novosti” and “Politika”). This is the reason for including these media in this analysis.

10 Baši°-Hrvatin, Sandra, Mark Thompson and Tarik Jusi°, Razjedinjeni propadaju: Javni radio-televizijski servisi u multietni²kim državama, (Sarajevo: Mediacentar, 2008). 11 Marko, Davor, Significant Consistency in Content of Prime-time News Programs on Public and Commercial TV station, in Udovi²i°, Radenko, ed., Indicator of Public Interests. (Sa- rajevo: Media plan institute, 2007). 47–48 12 That is the number of officially registered media in the country by Press Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, http://www.vzs.ba Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam 195

Methodology Description

Analysis of media content of leading daily and weekly newspapers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia, has been conducted in order to investigate how these media report on religions – with special attention to religions that are not major in specific countries (for example, how Serbian media report on Islam). Three daily newspapers and two magazines per country are analyzed in Serbia and Croatia, and five dailies and four magazines in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, as a new value to this research, it was investigated how Islamic media in Bosnia-Herzegovina report on religions other than Islam. Research took place during the April, 2009, when the contents of 22 selected print media from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia were analyzed, in order to explore how (in quantity and quality) these media present Islam and, according to their editorial policy, setting the borders between different ethnic/religious communities. In this period, 19 (out of 22) media reported on Islam – 13 dailies and 6 periodicals, or by country – 11 from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 6 from Serbia and 2 from Croatia. During the intensive, daily-based, one-month analysis of media content, 313 media announcements / articles were identified to report on Islam. It is interesting that the total paper-space dedicated to Islam in all selected media was 116 pages, but by average, it is less than 1 percent of total space in these media.13 The method applied was the content analysis. The basic unit of analysis was the media announcement / article. Variables, according to which articles were deeply analyzed, are the following: name of the media, date and place of the announcement, space in the media, journalistic genre / form, territorial distribution, author / source, subject/object of reporting, photographs / illustrations, context of reporting (theological, political or societal), value of the content and orientation towards the subject of the reporting. In order to better understand the outcomes of the research, especially the qualitative component, it is necessary to explain the last three variables – context, orientation towards the subject / object of reporting and the value of the content of reporting. Context means the thematic unit that dominates the journalistic article and defines its character. Three contexts14 have been determined

13 If we count that dailies are published with cca. 60 pages and periodicals with 80 pages, the total amount of pages for one month is cca. 28,000, so in relation to this, 116 pages is 0,4 percent. 14 Several media theorists considered the importance of context for understanding media messages. For Bignel “each individual move in chess is selected from the 196 Davor Marko to be in the focus of research interest – a) theological, b) political, and c) social. Orientation towards the subject / object / topic means the dominant attitudes or biases of journalist / author / source of the announcement, or of the analyzed media, towards Islam. Orientation can be positive, neutral or negative, and this depends on various factors – already mentioned attitude(s), connotation, evaluations, etc. Content of reporting has being evaluated separately and this variable also has its three variations – positive, neutral and negative.

Media and Islam: Setting the Borders Dominant Trends of Reporting on Islam

According to the analysis, the characteristics of media reporting on Islam are sensationalism, reductionism, personalization and ignoring. Sensationalism in media reporting is more generally characteristic of today’s media activities, which aim to attract a new public / audience much more than to (mis)represent its object of reporting. Anyway, the main rule of how it operates is the mechanism of news selection, where only those that are unusual, even bizarre, have a chance to be published.15 That was the case when a Bosnian court found a local Islamic priest from Gluha Bukovica guilty of sexually abusing an underaged girl and sentenced him to 18 months in prison. That case shocked the country and stirred up tensions between local media organizations and the country’s influential Islamic Community. Several TV stations, newspapers and magazines investigated the case further, and found another four cases of girls who supposedly were abused by the same Imam in the past four years. These reports and journalists, mostly from the Federal Television magazine “60 Minutes” and the magazine “Dani”, triggered widespread criticism from Bosnia‘s Islamic Community.

whole system of possible chess moves”. In: Laughey, Dan, Key Themes in Media Theo- ry, (Open University Press, 2007). 15 In this context, it is always interesting how non-Muslim media report on Shia Mus- lim holy day, the Day of Ashura, which presents the commemoration of the martyr- dom of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad at the Bat- tle of Karbala on October 10th, in 680. As an act of devotion to the sacred figure of Husayn, many believers congregate together in public processions for ceremonial chest beating (matham/latmiya). It is quite usual to see on the front pages or as an illustration for this day, the pictures of believers in the blood as result of this procession. Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam 197

Reductionism, in terms of media work, could be translated as the mechanism of information selection, according to the dominant editorial policy of certain media. This research has proved that there are media with an “apologetic“ orientation towards Islam (in which editors and journalists select only news with a positive or affirmative content or news that adopts a positive tone towards Islam and its representatives). On the other side, there are certain, specific media that report on Islam with a tendentious negative attitide, reducing the events from the Muslim world on extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism. Besides this, we can claim, based on the analyzed articles, that strong personalization occurs in media presentation of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This means that Islam is usually (mis)represented, including in the representation of important figures / persons, such as the reis Mustafa Ceri° and other imams of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All media, in spite of their national orientation, consider him “an important political figure” and contribute to the creation of the myth of “reis”. The daily “Dnevni Avaz”, often referred to as “Ceri°’s bulettin”, gives him unquestionable support, as it publishes,, at least once per week, his religious speech (which can be considered as an open political message to Bosniaks). On the other side, there are so-called “independent or opposition media”, such as the daily “Oslobo¶enje” and the magazines “Dani” and “Slobodna Bosna” that criticize reis Ceri° for misuse of his position and criminal activities. In response, Ceri° accuses them of “Islamophobia” (an example is the article titled: “Islamopbhobia Made Us Stronger”, published in “Avaz” on the 16th of April). There is an obvious tendency in Serbian media to blame the reis for a lack of political will from the Bosniak side (example – “Reis is dividing Bosnia”, published in “Fokus” on the 21st of April). There are some media that report on Islam in only a very small amount, usually concerning either the topics of protocol news (religious leaders’ meetings, celebrations of religious holidays, statements, inter-religious dialogue…), and events in the Middle East. Those events are those that are the most attention-grabbing, such as suicide bombings, and the activities of radical Islamist organizations.16

16 Research conducted by Media Plan Institute in 2007, has showed that such media are those located in the areas settled by a Croatian majority. Such examples are Herzegovinian TV Mostar (out of 24 packages broadcasted on different religions, only 3 or 13 percent were on Islam) and the daily “Ve²ernji List“ (out of 91 articles, 13 or 14 percent were about Islam). During the analysis that I did for this paper in April 2009, the Croatian daily “Jutarnji Llist“ and the magazine “Globus“ (if we do not consider articles about the events from the Middle East) did not publish any article that treated Islam in the context of the Western Balkans. 198 Davor Marko

That (in)action of ignoring and marginalizing “others” does not necessarily directly influence the creation of prejudices. Instead, it legitimizes the “status quo” that dominates the overall environment where Muslims are the minority and therefore are discriminated against because they are not affiliated with the dominant system of values that is dominantly Christian.

Dominant Attitudes and Topics of Reporting on Islam

The perception of Islam offered by the analyzed media varied, from “apologetic” and affirmative, towards the tendentious negative. That is the direct result of diverse media / editorial politics and of strict political influence on their editorial policy. The daily “Dnevni Avaz”, which represents the interests of the Bosniaks, reports mostly on Islam and promotes this religion, as well as the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its religious leader Mustafa Ceri°. Other media reported on Islam in smaller amounts, with exception of “Oslobo¶enje” which reports on Islam and its leaders with a much higher critical and professional engagement of its journalists. The daily newspaper from Banja Luka, “Fokus”, mostly reported on Islam in negative terms, tendentiously warning its public about Islamic extremism and terrorism that is located in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Journalists of the weekly magazine “Dani”, also, were very critically oriented towards the representative of Islamic Community, focusing their reporting mostly on criminal activities, corruption within it, but were often accused for “islamophobia” for that. The religious leader Mustafa Ceri° was the main target of the criticism. The vast majority of the articles on Islam (74 %) were published in the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by representation in Serbian print media (16 %) and finally, in Croatian media (10 %). Reasons for this could be found in the fact that in Bosnia and Herzegovina the majority of the populations are Muslims / Bosniaks, who have their own media. In Serbia, there is a Bosniak minority that is settled in Sandžak, an area on the Serbian south, and in Croatia an even smaller number of Muslim minority lives there.17

17 According to some estimates (UNHCR, 1996), in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina there are 46,7 % Bosniaks (who are attached to Islam), 37,9 % Serbs (linked with Orthodoxy) and 14,6 % Croats (considered to be Catholics); In a 2002 census on Serbian population, there are 1,82 % Bosniaks and 0,2 % Muslims who are living in this country; a census from 2001 shows that in Croatia, Bosniaks constitute 0,47 % of the entire population. Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam 199

What is common for the media of all three countries is the high percentage of articles that report on negative issues (declared as articles with “negative content“). Fifty-eight percent of all articles published in the Croatian media are of such content, 57 % of those in the Serbian media and 50,6 % in the media of Bosnia and Herzegovina. While the situation in Serbia and Croatia is more simply explained (Bosniaks or Muslims are a minority, and as such they are not „political players“, they do not have influence on the mainstream media in those countries and they are marginalized), in Bosnia and Herzegovina we have a more complex internal situation. The media of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as they reflect these complex inter-community relations, are following the logic of blaming, misrepresenting and “satanizing” the „others“ for the sake of the „vital national interests“ of the „self group“ (actually, for the sake of the narrow interests of national political elites). Assuming this, we can understand why pro-Bosniak media, mainly “Dnevni Avaz”, are reporting generally positively and apologetically on Islam. Out of 63 articles published in this daily, 16 (25 %) contained an obvious positive attitude towards Islam, and 8 (13 %) were with positive content. On the other side, 32 (50%) articles had neutral content and 18 (28,6 %) had negative meaning. But it became very indicative of how the media of “others” threaten Islam, when we include the media from Republika Srpska in this analysis. Of the 81 articles analyzed in three dailies published in this part of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Nezavisne Novine”, “Glas Srpske” and “Fokus”) 54 (67 %) were with negative content, there were no articles with positive attitudes or tone towards Islam and in 14 articles (17 %) a negative tone was indicated. For example, in an article published on the 23rd of April in “Nezavisne Novine”, self-proclaimed expert on anti-terrorism, Dževad Galijaševi°, claims that “mujahedeen’s in Bosnia and Herzegovina are protected and secured”. This same expert was cited in another Serbian medium, “Fokus”, where he stated that the “khatib”18 of King Fahd’s mosque in Sarajevo, Muderris Halilovi°, wants “Bosnia and Herzegovina based, not on the Dayton peace agreement, but on Shari’a law” (“Fokus”, 6th April 2009, page 5). There are several elements important for analysis of these two articles. First is the fact that Islam is being perceived as the religion of “others”. Second, Islam is reduced to its negative aspects and personalized, either through radical Muslim speakers (such as Muderris) or groups (such as “holy warriors” mujahedeen’s). And third, the position and negative influence of these speakers and groups has been interpreted by

18 A “khatib” is a person who delivers a sermon on Friday 200 Davor Marko someone who belongs to Islam (let’s say nominally, by his name and surname), who is considered to be an expert on anti-terrorism. The most frequent topics in media were terrorism and security measures (21 %), the role or position of Islam and Islamic countries in international politics (16 %), Islam / state relations (13 %), political instrumentalization and misuse of Islam (11 %), society and Islamic values, and economy, both 7 percent. In the 81 articles published on terrorism, 36 (44 %) had a neutral attitude of the journalist(s), and negative content; and in 13 cases (16 %) both attitude and content, were negative. The daily from Republika Srpska, “Glas Srpske”, reported regularly on the issue of terrorism, connecting it with the affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In this daily during the month of April, 23 articles on this issue were published (28 % of all articles published on terrorism). The dominant context of reporting on terrorism was political (95 %). Considering territorial distribution, the majority of the articles were related to the events in the Middle East (27 %), the European Union (25 %) and Bosnia and Herzegovinia (21 %). Usually, articles on terrorism were published (in descending order of frequency) without illustrations (in 39 % cases), then articles that contained photos of terrorists (17 %), massacres (12 %) and politicians (10 %). On the opposite side, topics that are generally neglected in all analyzed media are inter-religious dialogue and the status of women in Islam.

How Islamic Print Media in B-H perceived “Others”

As a sample, three media have been selected for this part of analysis – one daily newspaper with a pro-Bosniak orientation (“Dnevni Avaz”), the official journal of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Preporod”), and an Islamic monthly edited by Muslim youth, characterized by a radical or conservative interpretation of Islam (“SAFF”). “Others” in daily “Dnevni Avaz” – This daily reports favorably on Bosniak official politics / politicians and on the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Based on research of its content, and 30 articles on religious „Others“ that have been identified during July 2009, the following can be concluded: • There is a lack of articles on religious “Others” on the pages of “Dnevni Avaz”. During the monitored period the average was one article published per day, which is a good basis for the claim that Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam 201

this daily ignores and marginalizes religious “others” (primarily, Orthodox and Catholics, then Jews and “small religious communities”). • There are almost no articles on inter-religious dialogue, which is considered, within the context of a divided society such as that in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be of the utmost importance. • Relations / attitudes (or tone of reporting) towards “Others” are, in general, neutral. • The most frequent specific topics are related to the ownership and the question of de-nationalization of churches‘ property (3 articles), the Conference of Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina19 (3 articles), and criminal activities (2 articles), etc. • “Dnevni Avaz” mostly reported on the Catholic Church (15 articles or 50 %), then on Orthodoxy (4 articles or 13 %), on Judaism (3 articles or 10 %), and on other religious traditions or on themes related to all religious communities (8 articles or 26,7 %). • In comparison, “Avaz” reported on Islam twice as much as on other religions (63 articles in April compared to 30 articles on religious “Others” in July).20 Results of the analysis of the treatment and perception of Islam in “Dnevni Avaz” showed that one of the dominant topics was on the (re)building of religious places of worship (mostly mosques) and on de- nationalization of the Islamic Community’s property. In spite of the fact that all religious communities shared the same faith, reporting on this issue is not balanced. During July, two articles appeared on this issue related to the Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church (one article each). On July 10th it was reported that the Parliament of Sarajevo‘s Canton would give a license to a Catholic Church to build a place of worship in Dobrinja, which is on the periphery of Sarajevo. This article was placed on page 16 as small news story, without illustration. Almost the same treatment occurred with the news on a representative of the Orthodox Church who met the prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and who was promised that the building in the centre of the town would be given back to them as soon as possible. This news was illustrated with their common picture and the source was the

19 The Catholic Bishops Conference is the national body of the Bishops of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 20 That Islam is dominantly presented on the pages of this daily has been shown, as well, in research conducted in 2007. Among the four traditional religions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Islam was targeted in 59 % of the articles, the Orthodox Church in 21 %, the Catholic Church in 15 % and the Jewish Community in 5 %. Contained in: Taji°, Lea, ed., Media and Religion, (Konrad Adenauer Foundation: Sarajevo, 2007). 202 Davor Marko

Information Service of the Orthodox Church. In comparison to the number of articles on the same topic, related to the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with more than evident political reasons and motivations of journalists to report on, these two presented news articles were purely based on the facts. Very indicative for the treatment of religious “Others” in “Dnevni Avaz” is the case of Fata Orlovi°, an elderly Muslim woman who lives in small village in Republika Srpska, and who became famous in Bosnia when she insisted that an illegally built Orthodox Christian Church should be removed from her property. In the process, she also refused to take enormous sums of money from Serbian authorities in exchange for her land. Actually, her personal accident was (mis)used by Bosniak politicians and their media to illustrate their position as victim(s) and the struggle for justice in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian context.21 On July 22nd, an article appeared on the front page with the title, “Fata’s Church is moving to the Serbian village“. The starting construction is very interesting (“Fata’s Church“) because the story, thanks to the media (especially to „Dnevni Avaz“), became well-known, as well as destiny of this woman, and her relation to the illegal building in her garden. The fact is that before Orlovi° stated that she would act similarly if a mosque were built, instead of a church, is generally neglected by the media. For them, it is important to build the relation with the „Other“ (in this case, with the Orthodox Church) throughout the dichotomy of victim and perpetrator, justice and usurpation. “Others” in the magazine of Islamic community “Preporod” – “Preporod”, as an informative newsletter of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, is published twice per month in Sarajevo. According to the web site of Riyasat, this magazine “plays an important role among the Muslim population as a whole which consider it as their religious magazine, and subscribe to and read it regularly”.22 Analysis showed that the religious “Others” are generally ignored. This magazine, in the vast majority of its articles, is reporting on the activities of Islamic Community and on the issues related to Islam. The way of reporting is protocolar, without positive or negative attitudes towards religious “Others“, it reflects generally the efforts of the Islamic Community and its leader to establish functional inter- religious dialogue within the Bosnian framework. The good example is the reporting on activities of The Inter-religious Council in BiH, which

21 According to the anonymous survey of “Dnevni Avaz” readers, the Person of the Year for 2007 in Bosnia was Fata Orlovic, while foreign Person of the Year for 2007 is the International Community’s High Representative in Bosnia Miroslav Laj²ak. 22 The official web page of the Riyasat is on the following link www.rijaset.ba Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam 203 was in established in 1997 through joint commitments by Reisu-l-ulema Mustafa ef. Ceric, the Islamic Community in BiH, Metropolitan Nikolaj of Dabar-Bosna, the Serbian Orthodox Church, Vinko Cardinal Puljic, Archbishop of Vrhbosna-Sarajevo, the Roman Catholic Church and Mr. Jakob Finci, Jewish Community of Bosnia-Heregovina (BiH).23 An example of their “apologetic” attitude towards the Islamic Community and its leader, reis Ceri°, can be elaborated upon within the commentary written by Muhamed Veli° on the 1st of September, 2009. As he states, reis Ceri° is the one who combats Islamophobia all the time. However, it is not only that one Islamophobia, which is promoted within the Serbian discourse (and accepted by Westerners), according to which Bosnian Muslims are linked with the cells of “white al-Quaida“, but also with the Islamopbobia promoted within the media in Sarajevo. In this course, he mentioned two publicists – Andrej Nikolaidis from Montenegro and Željko Ivanovi°, of Croat origin, from Bosnia and Herzegovina, whom he claims constantly targets Islam with his negative tone. In comparision to the content and attitudes analyzed within the following magazine “SAFF“, the language used by Veli° is far away from one of blaming and mispresenting the religious “Others“. It is rather self-defending and apologetic towards the Islamic Community and its leader. “Others” in the magazine of Islamic radicals “SAFF” – As supporters of this magazine claim, it was established in 1996 to contribute to “an ongoing dialogue with instances of united Europe, in order to shape and clarify a constructive role for European Muslims”. 24 On the other side, there are many who blame this magazine for spreading stereotypes and prejudices of people who do not belong to Islam, even to those Bosniaks who are not believers or who share different ideologies than that of the editorial position of the magazine, and which is the “wahh¬bÎsm”.25 Commenting on the ongoing debate on the principles in the newly- constructed BBI Centre, publicist Fatmir Alispahi° wrote on the 17th of

23 More on the Interreligious Council is available online http://www.mrv.ba/site/ 24 In Alishapi°, Fatmir, European Way to Islam, (Sarajevo: Magazine SAFF, number 144, 13th of May, 2005). Available online: http://www.alispahic.net/index.php?option= com_content&view=article&id=51:euislamenglish&catid=37:eubosniaks&Itemid=63 25 Wahh¬bÎsm or salafism is a conservative reformist movement in Saudi Arabia whose aim is to strengthen Islam and that neglects all other beliefs without roots deep in Islamic history. It is focused on absolute monotheism and this leads to its followers being referred to as muwahiddun, or unitarians. The term salaf refers to the first three generations of Muslims who were the most devoted believers in the history of Islam. Salafi ideas were adopted by wahh¬bÎsm, which was created on the Arabian Peninsula in the 18th century. 204 Davor Marko

April an article full of negative sentiments towards the “Others”. The title – “Human rights of the pork” – is very indicative and highlights his main idea off showing how “pork meat” is misused by Croats and Serbs (Catholics and Orthodox), in order to show how they are endangered in Sarajevo (which is settled by Bosniak or Muslim majority). Explaining that the right of choice of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina is endangered because of the pork meat presented in big stores like “Merkator”, and some other places, he says that the same rules are not imposed on Catholics and Orthodox and when it does happen, it is a problem. In this article, Alispahi° took a clear position describing a “Self-group” as endangered and victimized, and “Others” as those who should take into account this position and be much more tolerant.

Conclusions

If we follow the main postulates of the “interactionist” theory of Frederik Barth, according to which belonging to a certain group and the cohesion of the same are becoming stronger as result of the relation to the “Other“ groups from the nearby, surrounding areas, we can note that it is applicable to the media situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and supported by the the media from the neigbouring Serbia and Croatia, that were analyzed in this paper. Interpreting the results of the analysis presented in this paper, we can conclude that several different media discourses on Islam presentation confront each other in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. At least three we can mention here: (a) “Apologetic discourse” that is created within the media linked with the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina that creates an image of society which is dominantly Islamic; (b) Discourse that is focused on the “clash between the secular and religious” orders of society, and that is promoted by media with obvious pro-secular (or, in this case, pro- citizen) orientation; and (c) “Islamophobic discourse” that is result of the reporting of the Serbian media from Republika Srpska and that applies different techniques (reductionism, selection, sensationalism…) in order to connect Islam exclusively with fundamentalism and terrorism (in this case, elements of the secular / religious clash are not important; it is rather to highlight the clash between “Us” and “Them”). According to the analysis, characteristics of media reporting on Islam are (a) sensationalism, (b) reductionism, (c) personalization and (d) ignoring. While sensationalism in media reporting has been Stereotypes and Prejudices in Media on Religious “Others”: The Case of Islam 205 considered as a more general characteristic of today’s media that aims mainly to attract new public than to (mis)represent its object of reporting, on the other hand reductionism could be linked to the process of the selection of information, according to the dominant editorial policy of the specific media. Two dominant poles of media orientation can be identified, according to this: those who select mainly positive information on Islam and the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina (so called, “apologetic“) and, on the other side, those media that report on Islam with a tendentious negative attitude, reducing the events from the Muslim world to those on extremism, fundamentalism and terrorism. There are, also, media that generally ignore the presence of Islam in the nearby environment, and report usually only on events from the Middle East and not on their neigbouring Muslims. Besides this, it can be concluded that media presentation of Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is strongly personalized, which means that Islam is usually (mis)represented via important figures / persons such as the reis Mustafa Ceri°, and other imams of Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Attitudes towards National Identity and National Values among Polish Catholic Youth

DOROTA HALL

Introduction

This chapter addresses the issue of a border between the Poles’ religious and national identities. This border, and more specifically, its vagueness, has attracted many sociologists of religion trying to explain Poland‘s 20th-century religious vitality.1 This chapter does not aim to challenge previous academic considerations. Instead, if focuses on the importance of national identity and national values to today’s Catholic youth. Additionally, it examines attitudes towards the traditional cluster of Polish and Catholic identities, and seeks to cull meanings ascribed to nation-related self-perceptions by deeply engaged young believers. The strong interrelation between the area of religion and the nation in Poland, which has been widely commented by sociologists, is considered a historical legacy. It coalesced during the 19th century when Poles were deprived of their own state and was reinforced during communism. During the latter period, the Catholic Church served as the primary institution of political resistance to domination by the state and presented itself as a representative of the nation. Recent sociological surveys show the level of religiosity remains high in

1 Sociological interest in the “Polish case” has stimulated development of new sociological theories and revision of existing ones. José Casanova presented the idea of deprivatization of religion, and Rodney Stark and Roger Finke enriched the supply- side theory with the concept of ethno-religious conflict. See: José Casanova, Public Re- ligions in the Modern World (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, “Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies: Religious Mobi- lization in American Cities, 1906,“ American Sociological Review 1 (1988): 41–49. On the issue of relations between the religious and the national identity in Poland see also: Patrick Michel, Politique et religion: La grande mutation (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994); Genevieve Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz: nationalism and religion in post- communist Poland (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006); SÙawomir Mandes and MirosÙawa Marody, “On Functions of Religion in Molding the National Identity of Poles,“ International Journal of Sociology 4 (2005–06), 49–68; Krzysztof KoseÙa, Polak i katolik: spltana toČsamoï° (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2003). 208 Dorota Hall

Poland, and so does the level of national pride. Furthermore, according to data from Aufbruch and EVS/WVS, there is a positive correlation between collective manifestations of religiosity (church attendance) and positively valued national identity.2 The actual importance of religious and national values for Poles is verified by surveys measuring collective identities, where respondents are asked to choose characteristics from a set of several dozen attributes that, in their mind, are most apt.3 The peculiarity of Poles’ self- characteristic is acutely visible when compared to the self-characteristic of another population. A survey performed on a random sample of individuals aged 15–24 in Poland and Germany shows that both populations willingly acknowledge identities related to gender, family and nation.4 However, there are significant differences as regards the importance of such characteristics for surveyed samples. The “Polish” identity is deemed important by 89% of surveyed Poles, which situates it at the top of the Polish ranking of the most prevalent characteristics. In turn, only 42% of German respondents selected the “German” category, placing it sixth in order of importance in the German ranking. The German list is topped by, in order, the identity of a “person with a future”, followed by gender and family characteristics. The most significant disparity refers to religion: while 77% of Polish youth chose the “religious person” attribute, only 18% of their German counterparts did so. Considering the entire layout of self-descriptions, Germans selected the identities of “a person with a future”, “a person pursuing an

2 Tadeusz Doktór, “Religion and National Identity in Eastern Europe“ (paper presented at the 2006 ISORECEA conference); see also the chapter by Victor Cebotari in this volume. In the EVS/WVS survey, the level of national pride was measured by the question “How proud are you to be Polish?”. In the Aubruch survey, the question was more complex, and measured the sense of being proud with respect to the following national issues: present political system, human rights, social justice, economic achievements, qualities of people, history, cultural, artistic and scientific achievements, beauty of nature, and achievements in sport. 3 More on the issue of collective/social identities see: Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Francesca Poletta and James Jasper, “Collective Identity in Social Movements,” Annual Review of So- ciology 27 (2001), 283–305. In Poland, country-wide surveys using the mentioned methodology were carried out by K. KoseÙa. See: Krzysztof KoseÙa, Polak i katolik: spltana toČsamoï° (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2003); Krzysztof KoseÙa, “Zbiorowe identyfikacje mÙodych Niemców i Polaków,“ in MÙodzi Polacy i mÙodzi Niemcy w nowej Eu- ropie, ed. Krzysztof KoseÙa and Bernadette Jonda (Warszawa: IFiS PAN, 2005), 47–82; Krzysztof KoseÙa, “SpoÙeczne identyfikacje Polaków,“ in Wartoïci Polaków a dziedzictwo Jana PawÙa II, ed. Tomasz ukowski (Warszawa: Centrum Myïli Jana PawÙa II, 2008), 39–61. 4 The survey was realized in 2001/2002. Krzysztof KoseÙa, “Zbiorowe… op.cit. note 3. Attitudes towards National Identity and National Values 209 occupation/profession”, “a member of societies/associations”, “a person critical of the Church”, “a non-believer”, and “an affluent person” more frequently than Poles, which suggests German youth are more attached to individualistic and secular values. Polish youth, meanwhile, present themselves as more emotionally involved in family, religion and the nation. This chapter continues the discussion on the collective identities of young Poles with special reference to religious and national components. It draws on the research among those who decidedly subscribe to religion and seeks to discern possible peculiarities in the layout of their self-descriptions as set against the background of the self-characteristics of the general Polish population. It also provides an insight into subjective interpretations of those researched related to national constituents of their identity.

Methodology

The research was performed on participants aged 19–33 of university and post-university chaplaincies run at churches administered by the Dominican order in Warsaw, Gdansk, Krakow, Poznan, Wroclaw and Lublin. The choice of respondents guaranteed they unambiguously subscribed to religion. Obviously, the researched group was not representative either of Polish Catholics or Polish youth. However, the aim of the research was not to discover regularities applicable to any larger or overarching part of Polish society, but to find patterns of self- descriptions which could inspire further research on religious and national identities of Poles. The two-stage research was carried out in early 2008. Firstly, an email questionnaire was distributed. Respondents were asked to select up to sixteen identities apt to themselves and to place them in order of importance. The set of characteristics was the same as in the survey Values of Poles and the Legacy of John Paul II realized on the random sample of Poles in autumn 2007,5 which enabled comparisons. Ninety

5 Krzysztof KoseÙa, “SpoÙeczne… op.cit. note 3. At the same time, the set of characteristics slightly differed from the set used in the Polish-German survey quoted in the in- troductory part of this chapter. The international survey contained the “member of my family” category, willingly chosen by young Poles. In the Values of Poles and the Legacy of John Paul II survey, there were only two attributes addressing the family, “a wife/husband” and “a mother/father”, irrelevant to a large part of young Poles. Thus, little might be said about the importance of the family identity for members of the researched group. However, this does not seem to influence the considerations relevant to religious and national identities that this chapter focuses on. 210 Dorota Hall questionnaires were gathered. Said questionnaires showed the prevalence of particular identities. That is, the research measured the percentage of those who selected the identities as apt self-characteristics. A salience index was calculated, by multiplying weights indicating the ranking in an individual sorting by the percentage of respondents who attributed a particular ranking to a given characteristic.6 Secondly, the research included eleven in-depth interviews with respondents from Warsaw. Interviewees responded to questions about the personal importance of selected identities, the order in which they placed them, and the reasons why they did not select the other characteristics. Each conversation placed much emphasis on the issue of national identity.

Results

Quantitative part of the research

Results from the survey among participants of (post)university chaplaincies have been set against results extracted from the country- wide survey, which refer to a population of the same age and education level. Both are displayed in the tables. The juxtaposition of identities chosen by the two groups (Table 1) reveals certain disparities. Some are related to inherent features of the discussed samples, which is the case of “religious person” or “person attached to Catholic values” identities – although it should be noted that chaplaincy participants chose the “member of the JP2 Generation [John Paul II]” category less willingly than their Polish counterparts of like age and education level. Discussion regarding a few other identities, for example, “the master of my own destiny”, would fall outside the scope of this paper. The layout of attributes related to national and civic issues brings interesting conclusions.

6 The higher the value of the index, the more central the identity for the researched population. The shift from individual ranking to a group index consisted of assign- ing 16 points to the identity indicated as the most important, 15 points to the second most important, and so on, down to the lowest one, i.e. the sixteenth identity in every person’s individual order. The lowest-ranked identity in the sixteen-element sequence is assigned one point. Points for ranking first, second and lower in individual rankings are multiplied by the frequency (expressed in per cent) of a given identity appearing on the first, second, third and following positions. The total of the weighted scoring of a given identity for being ranked first, second, etc. in the sorting, divided by 16, is the salience index value of a given identity. Attitudes towards National Identity and National Values 211

Table 1: Social identities arranged in order of prevalence among participants of (post)university chaplaincies aged 19–33 [U.Ch.]. A comparison with students and highly educated individuals aged 19–33 in Poland [PL] (prevalence in percent)

I am: U.Ch. PL A religious person 100 71 A man/woman 99 85 Polish 95 93 A person guided by my own conscience 86 84 A person attached to Catholic values 80 39 A young person 80 98 A person guided by principles 79 78 A pupil/university student 68 72 European 67 85 A democrat/supporter of democracy 63 62 A resident of a region/city/locality 62 68 A person attached to the Polish national tradition 52 63 A member of the intelligentsia 51 57 A citizen of Poland 47 87 The master of my own destiny 46 82 A member of the JP2 Generation 41 53 A member of societies/associations 37 20 Slavonic 31 41 An anti-communist 30 24 A person pursuing an occupation/profession 24 37 A person who has benefited from the post-1989 transformations 24 21 A person of limited means 23 27 A person driven by the need of the moment 22 37 An anti-fascist 22 27 A person who endures life’s adversities patiently 21 58 A typical person 19 67 A citizen of a country that matters in the world 18 35 A supporter of a politician or a party 12 14 A wife/husband 9 35 An employee of an enterprise, factory, institution 7 33 I am: U.Ch. PL A supporter of strong-arm government 6 17 A Solidarity person 6 18 An affluent person 4 19 A citizen of a country without any significance in the world 2 18 Unemployed 2 10 212 Dorota Hall

A private entrepreneur 2 17 A mother/father 1 38 A victim of the post-1989 transformations 1 15 A person without a future 1 7 An old age or disability pensioner 0 12 An elderly person 0 11 A person identifying with the Polish People’s Republic 0 9 A worker 0 15 A farmer 0 12 A non-believer 0 15

Source: Own survey 2008 set together against Values of Poles and the Legacy of John Paul II 2007

The “Polish” self-description is deemed equally important by both groups. It is striking, however, that participants of (post)university chaplaincies less frequently feel attached to the Polish national tradition than their age and education level counterparts (52% as compared to 63%). Also, they do not seem to be much interested in the significance of Poland as a country, since they less commonly subscribe to both characteristics referring to the issue: “a citizen of a country that matters in the world” (18% as compared to 35%) and “a citizen of a country without any significance in the world” (2% as compared to 18%). Furthermore, participants of (post)university chaplaincies are less likely to identify themselves with the “European” characteristic (67% as compared to 85%), and tend to discard the “citizen of Poland” self- description (47% as compared to 87%). The latter might suggest they have little interest in civic issues. But on the other hand, they perceive themselves democrats as commonly as their age and education level counterparts and they are more likely to participate in societies/ associations. The higher support for grass-roots initiatives might be underpinned by their social feature as unmarried and childless individuals.7 The remaining disparities need to be addressed with reference to the qualitative component of the research. Prior to addressing those, there are additional observations to be gleaned with reference to the personal salience of selected identities (Table 2).

7 Catholics who are married with children, interested in deepening their piety choose other religious groups, for example, family chaplaincies which have not been em- braced by the research. Attitudes towards National Identity and National Values 213

Table 2: Fifteen most important social identities arranged in order of personal salience among participants of (post)university chaplaincies aged 19–33 [U.Ch.]. A comparison with students and highly educated individuals aged 19–33 in Poland [PL].

I am: Salience index U.Ch. PL A religious person 93.82 40.85 A man/woman 83.13 54.40 Polish 68.19 67.97 A person guided by my own conscience 58.33 41.56 A person attached to Catholic values 55.49 14.47 A person guided by principles 52.97 44.03 A young person 47.15 61.49 A pupil/university student 36.60 37.46 A resident of a region/city/locality 32.36 26.44 European 27.85 40.96 The master of my own destiny 26.80 46.32 A person attached to the Polish national tradition 26.74 19.27 A citizen of Poland 24.93 52.56 A member of the intelligentsia 24.03 24.25 A democrat/supporter of democracy 22.22 23.35

Source: Own survey 2008 set together with Values of Poles and the Legacy of John Paul II 2007

The majority of disparities commented above holds relevance when taking into account the salience index for discussed identities. There is, however, one exception; the index for the “person attached to the Polish national tradition” category is higher for participants of (post)university chaplaincies than for their age and education level counterparts (26.7 as compared to 19.3). It means those participants of chaplaincies who subscribe to the “person attached to the Polish national tradition” characteristic consider it very important to their core identity as they place it near the top of the list of identities selected.

Qualitative Part of the Research

The common feature of the interviewees from (post)university chaplaincies is that they critically assess the religiosity widely shared by their compatriots. They deem it shallow, superficial and having little to do with morality and actual behaviours of Poles. They are not patronizing towards others on account of their own more developed religiosity, they merely note facts recognized by sociologists of religion, 214 Dorota Hall i.e. the preponderance of the traditional dimension of Catholicism in Poland, and the overwhelming prevalence of ritual factors over the moral and intellectual ones as opposed to the personal and individualistic.8 The majority of people treat religion just as tradition, they don’t really live with it. Many people hold a cash register in their shops, but they don’t include all articles sold. Or a couple says they believe in God but they don’t aspire to marriage while living together. […] There are a lot of contradictions.9 I do like rituals very much and I do appreciate them. But I think matters can’t just stop there. I’ve got a friend who, quite ironically, says how Poles understand the Holy Triduum: a little bit of ash, a small palm, and an egg. So, I’m in favour of signs; the signs which reinforce the belief. But they [should] reinforce it, rather than being its substitute.10 Consequently, interviewees question the firmness of linkage between the Polish nation and the Catholic religion, and find it outdated. Although they consider their being both Polish and Catholic of great importance to themselves, they clearly separate the two identities from each other. As for me, patriotism, fatherland, an attachment to the country, to its symbolism, to the whole set of meanings standing behind that – this is one thing. And being a Catholic is totally another thing. For me, such a Polish- Catholic figure is, unfortunately, a resultant of the history. Derived from some determined factors: since the period of Partitions, through the War, to the PPR [Polish People’s Republic – DH]. For me, Christianity, Catholicism – this is a community of people closest to me. They are believers and Catholics, no matter in which country they dwell, whether it’s in Europe or in other parts of the world. I don’t identify the nation and Catholicism as one value.11 This attitude is reinforced by many participants of (post)university chaplaincies taking part in international religious networks and activities, for example, those organized by the Ecumenical Community of Taizé. They therefore place much higher value on pan-national links established by the common interest in religion than their national bonds. An interviewee explains: There are international meetings; there are people from various countries there. And I feel closer to people from China there than to Poles I meet in other places. I just feel I have much more in common with them, I don’t know, maybe it’s a question of a kind of shared spiritual perspective… […]

8 Cf. Irena Borowik and Tadeusz Doktór, Pluralizm religijny i moralny w Polsce (Kra- kow: Nomos, 2001). 9 Female interviewee, aged 28 (26 March 2008). 10 Female interviewee, aged 33 (27 March 2008). 11 Male interviewee, aged 26 (02 April 2008). Attitudes towards National Identity and National Values 215

I’m linked to them by something crucial, fundamental, the most important things. And with other Poles… This something which links me to another Pole is less important than this thing [bond] linking me to a Chinese, or a person from elsewhere.12 Still, participants of (post)university chaplaincies willingly portray themselves as “Polish”. While explaining this, they tend to underline the personal dimension of their involvement with the nation. I’m aware of not drifting in a vacuum, I know I have the roots. For me, events such as the Warsaw Uprising or the Solidarity movement in which my parents participated… These are very important things, which drive my perception of the world.13 Such a privatization of the national identity implies they do not consider it to be given top-down, nor do they take it for granted, but understand it in a reflexive mode, as a value personally constructed. The approach is acutely visible in the following statement: Being Polish is something I’ve built within myself. […] I’ve simply looked for it since I began to realize my surroundings, the place I live, was important to me, and also… One of my grandfathers was an Oflag prisoner, the other grandfather was somewhere else, and my family told me much about it. And the whole history of my family is deeply enrooted in Polish things. So, I began to look for it, to think what is Polish, what is mine, what derives from what… and so it was.14 The focus on the personal dimension of being Polish also informs interviewees’ relative lack of interest in the significance of Poland in the world. A “person attached to the Polish national tradition” self- characteristic is understood in private terms as well, but this category is more ambiguous. All interviewees highlight their disapproval of the possible xenophobic component inscribed in attitudes which esteem both religion and nation. Since they are aware they themselves are extremely attached to their religious as well as national identity, they, so to say, feel obliged to declare they are far from any intolerant views. A “person attached to the Polish national tradition” self-description is perceived as explicitly alluding to language used by right-wing politicians. A person attached to the national tradition – I’ve thrown it away with disgust. Because I associate it with the League of Polish Families [a xenophobic right-wing political party – DH].15 I don’t know what your was intention by putting the “person attached to the Polish national tradition” into the set of characteristics to be chosen.

12 Female interviewee, aged 28 (25 March 2008). 13 Female interviewee, aged 25 (04 April 2008). 14 Female interviewee, aged 33 (25 March 2008). 15 Female interviewee, aged 33 (25 March 2008). 216 Dorota Hall

Do you consider the national worldview xenophobic? Or do you just perceive it as respect? Because I perceive it as a respectful attitude, far from any xenophobic connotations… […] My first impulse was to choose this description, but then I realized it might be considered an attitude I’m very far from.16 The strategy commented by interviewees explains what the statistics reveal: that participants of (post)university chaplaincies are less likely to choose the “person attached to the Polish national tradition” description than the rest of Polish highly educated youth. And if they choose it – they locate it high in the ranking of personally important characteristics, since in fact, they are quite approving of the Polish tradition so long as it is not understood in the terms offered by right- wing participants of public discourse. It is noteworthy that the lack of approval for the “supporter of strong-arm government” identity among members of the researched group might also be understood as evidence of their aversion to right-wing political discourse. Uncertainties over the sense of attachment to national tradition mirror the lack of serious discussion of national identity in the Polish public sphere. Various political forces play with the category of “nation” and use it to promote their particular interests. A neutral and uncharged language for conveying national values has not been worked out. This seems to strengthen the observed tendency to privatize ideas related to the concept of nation. Ambiguities are also inscribed in the “European” category. Some interviewees keenly endorse such: “I am a declared enthusiast of the European Union and European integration”.17 The pro-European attitude is supported by an observation that EU membership is very advantageous for Poles, and especially for youth: Many of my friends benefit from our membership in the European Union. They travel and so on, and this is related just to the European Union. Or some – those who begin working – can make use of grants from the Union. Or, when my friends organize various events, they also get funds from the Union.18 Additionally, some have a strong sense of belonging to the Judeo- Christian tradition, viewed as formative for Europe. However, simultaneously, they decidedly distance themselves from secular orientations seen as typical for Europeans. I feel outraged with some European nations, and especially with the French people. And why? Because I just can’t understand how it’s happened that

16 Female interviewee, aged 31 (26 March 2008). 17 Female interviewee, aged 25 (04 April 2008). 18 Male interviewee, aged 26 (02 April 2008). Attitudes towards National Identity and National Values 217

the country proud of Chlodwig and Saint Gertrude has suddenly forgotten its roots. I’m just irritated with it. I am not saying they should all attend church. I do understand that they don’t need to find the Church attractive. But the way they treat it… As if they had never, throughout their whole history, had anything to do with it. And I just can’t understand it. And I must admit, I’m personally irritated with it – as a believer, and as a European. It makes me sick. Because this is our shared culture. And they would have damn all instead of tourists if they didn’t have their cathedrals or so many sacred objects. Wouldn’t they? […] Christianity is a base for Europe, it’s its main source, its root.19 Such conclusions drive many to reject the “European” self-description. Interviewees disapprove of Europe in particular for the promotion of secular values and excessive permissiveness in the realm of morality, leading to undesired legal solutions which “just don’t make any sense”,20 such as the acceptance of abortion or homosexual marriages: “Homosexual marriages are a curiosity. I just don’t understand why a bicycle should be called a car from today on”.21 It needs to be stressed, that if participants of (post)university chaplaincies refuse the European identity, it is not because of prejudices towards other European nations, and by no means for the lack of will to subscribe to pan-national communities, but because of a reserve towards European legal solutions. Thus, the refusal is far from being informed by the tendency to perceive Europe as a threat to what is Catholic and Polish (an inclination quite visible among supporters of Polish right-wing parties), but it is driven by political orientation, and more precisely, the conviction that state legislation and policy should be influenced by Christian values. The split between those interviewees who endorse the European identity and those who reject it overlaps with two separate visions as to the function of religion. Some of the researched group perceive religion as a phenomenon belonging to the private realm, one proposing different kinds of standards than those exercised in the domain of state policy. For me, religion is very personal thing. And it’s very important in my life, and it informs my life choices, it determines how I perceive the world, how I interpret it, and so on. But it has nothing to do with my choices in the area of state or policy. This is even more so, since I think free choice is the essence of democracy. […] And it can’t be combined with religious commandments, because in the area of religion, there is no place for compromises. Here, you are hot or cold, and being in between doesn’t

19 Female interviewee, aged 33 (27 March 2008). 20 Female interviewee, aged 33 (25 March 2008). 21 Female interviewee, aged 31 (26 March 2008). 218 Dorota Hall

make any sense. So, religion shouldn’t be mixed with politics. Politics should be just a domain for compromises and free choice.22 Interviewees who subscribe to such a view consider the belief and related morality as values to be proselytized, but are far from supporting the idea that the state should take part in this process. Other interviewees, however, think differently. What is striking, each time they express the expectation that Church teachings will be respected by the law, they condemn public manifestations of the attachment to the Catholic religion. Just briefly speaking: abortion – no, euthanasia – no, and marriage is a sacrament between a woman and a man. This is what I think. [And do you think this should protected by legislation?] Definitely yes. But to achieve this, it’s not necessary that politicians make a display of images of the Mother of God. Especially since such manifestations often drift towards xenophobia in our country, towards attempts to exclude some from society. I can’t find any reasons for excluding anyone.23 Indeed, Polish politicians who strive to incorporate Christian values into state policy willingly draw on religious symbolism. This was much visible at the time the interviews were conducted. Participants of (post)university chaplaincies find such predilections outdated. They do not feel close to the model of publicly manifested belief elaborated under the communist regime, exercised either by politicians or other members of society. For this reason, they also disavow the “member of JP2 Generation” self-characteristic. They consider the identity as created by the media and linked to the massive admiration for John Paul II that arose after the pope died. Participants of (post)university chaplaincies distance themselves from traditionalism as exercised by Polish politicians. At the same time, they do not seem to place importance on the model of civic identification with the state. Statistics show there is a huge disparity between the approval for the “citizen of Poland” self-description among members of the studied group and their Polish age and education level counterparts. Interviewees say they do feel attached to this self-characteristic, but other identities disproportionally better convey the ways they perceive themselves. This drives them to withdraw the “citizen of Poland” attribute from the set of categories. More research on civic identifications of declared believers is needed to find whether such an explanation might be considered satisfactory.

22 Female interviewee, aged 25 (04 April 2008). 23 Female interviewee, aged 33 (27 March 2008). Attitudes towards National Identity and National Values 219

Conclusions

Twenty years after the fall of communism, the traditional fuzziness of a border between areas of religion and nation is questioned by Poles. It is still intentionally maintained by some political groupings, however, radical parties building their identity on the Polish-Catholic figure are losing social support – in 2007, the League of Polish Families lost parliamentary elections. Participants of university and post-university chaplaincies covered by the research have a strong sense of being both Polish and Catholic, and they represent a cohort that clearly separates the two identities from each other. Still, they do not seem to replace the traditional pattern of Polish-Catholic identity which opposed authorities, with civic identification with the state. National and religious values do appeal to them, but national and religious symbolism used by politicians does not. Such a situation stimulates privatization of their national and – to a lesser degree – religious identity. Particularly the process of shifting national identity to the private realm might inspire further research among broader populations of Poland, and perhaps also those of Central and Eastern Europe. It is likely such is typical not only for members of the researched group, but also for larger segments of societies. If so, factors influencing the trend, related to both individualization and local relations between areas of religion, nation and state, should be identified.

Religious Determinants of Democratic Values

BOGDAN MIHAI RADU

The main goal of this research is to explore the ways in which religion influences the formation of political values and attitudes in 5 Christian countries of East Central Europe. Democratic transition and consolidation bring about unprecedented change in East Central Europe, not least in the realm of religion. I evaluate the relationship between religious determinants and political values in four eastern European Orthodox countries: Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Moldova and one predominantly Catholic country, Poland. The data is part of the World Values Survey’s last wave of surveys1. The choice of cases has several reasons. First, all the Orthodox countries in the analyzed set are former communist countries, in which religion was marginalized. Second, Orthodoxy is the dominant denomination. While these first two reasons offer grounds for similarity, there are also differences between these countries. For example, Moldova is a former Soviet republic Romania and Serbia are former communist nationalist regimes, with Bulgaria standing in the middle. Additionally, all 4 countries represent different levels of democratization and democratic consolidation. While Romania and Bulgaria are the only members of the European Union that have a predominant Orthodox population, Serbia is left outside its confines, and Moldova has a debated position both in terms of democracy and of “full” political independence.

Introduction and Relevant Literature

The debate on the compatibility between religion and democracy is a multi-faceted issue. Its most controversial facet is the so-called “natural” symbiosis between western Christianity and liberal demo-

1 I am deeply grateful to the REVACERN project for generously supporting my research, and to the GESIS Eurolab for providing access to data, infrastructure and support. I am also thankful to my colleagues from the REVACERN project that offered valuable comments on previous drafts of this paper. 222 Bogdan Mihai Radu cracy. Starting off with Max Weber’s Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism the marriage between Protestantism and capitalism, was gradually extended to include liberal democracy and Catholicism, into what became a deterministic argument – the values embedded within Western Christianity create fertile soil for the flourishing of democracy. Although the Catholic Church was a force of conservatism for centuries, the Vatican II Council and the Aggiornamento, signaled its formal recognition of religious freedom and pluralism, an its commitment to change. During the process of democratization, countries have two institutional options: either to choose a model already employed in consolidated democracies, or to design their own institutions. Once institutions are in place, public acceptance and participation are both necessary for democracy to consolidate. Beyond this institutional change and its acceptance by society, democratic regimes are also subject to external approval. There is growing literature on the external influences on democratizing countries2. The international pressure on democratic transitions also has an effect on the status that religion has in new democracies. From this perspective, the West exhibits high rates of secularization (with the exception of United States), religious privatization, pluralism and constitutionally sanctioned freedom of religion. Nevertheless, Jose Casanova advocates the complex structure of secularization and argues that public religion can mobilize resources in defense of traditional values, against the increasing penetration of states and markets3. In his famous Clash of Civilizations, Huntington considered that democracy will be more welcome in western Christian religions, rather than in Eastern Orthodoxy, Asian religions or Islam4. The argument centers upon the compatibility between protestant and democratic values, and the almost opposite situation for Islam and democracy. His thesis of civilizational clashes was criticized on many counts, the most important ones focusing on his monolithic and static understanding of religion.

2 Frank Schimmelfennig, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, International Socialization in Europe. European Organizations, Political Conditionality and Democratic Change (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power. Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Palg- rave, Macmillan, 2006). 3 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994). 4 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

Religious Determinants of Democratic Values 223

Thus, subsequent research showed that the Catholic Church underwent a process of democratization and that religions are multi- vocal and can adjust to new contexts in many different ways5. Additionally, research offers examples of non-Christian societies/ communities that implemented democratic measures with a reassuring measure of success6. Positive attitudes are a measure of satisfaction with one’s political system. Post-communist systems are different than both consolidated democracies and other new democracies, because of their communist past and the incredible range of changes brought about by democratization. Therefore, the functioning of attitude formation mechanisms needs to be harmonized to the post-communist context.

Religious Determinants of Political Attitudes

According to Mishler and Rose, disappointments caused by democratic transition create political malaise, observable in decreasing rates of turnout, among other things. The church and the army are trusted societal actors, and, accordingly, people participate in religious activities more than any other political or social events7. Conceptualizing the effect of religion on the formation of attitudes is not among the most researched topics. The Civic Volunteerism Model (CVM), developed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady accounts for the mobilizing role of the civil society. The CVM asserts that tangible resources are not the only predictors of political participation. Political engagement, recruitment and civic skills also increase political participation. Civic skills are practices and experiences that familiarize individuals with the political game, and its rules of play. The authors show that participation in non-political organizations, such as unions, voluntary organizations, churches and the workplace, creates a famil-

5 Alfred C. Stepan, “Religion, Democracy and the ‘Twin Tolerations’.” Journal of Democracy, 11 (2000): 37–57. See also Anthony J. Gill, “Rendering Unto Caesar? Religious Competition and Catholic Political Strategy in Latin America.”. American Journal of Political Science 38 (1995): 403–425. 6 Mark Juergensmeyer, “The New Religious State.”Comparative Politics 27 (1995): 379–391. See also Robert Hefner, “Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization.” Sociology of Religion, 62 (2001): 491–514. 7 William Mishler and Richard Rose, “Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evalua- tions of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies”. The Journal of Politics, 59 (1997): 418–451.

224 Bogdan Mihai Radu iarity with the ways organizations function and give the individual a feeling of efficacy8. Although the organizational structure of the church as an institution is mentioned in the CVM, the weakness of the model resides in its inability to deal with the limitations of the model imposed by the internal culture of the church. Richard Wood asserts the causal autonomy of culture and states that the internal political culture of the church is formed from its cultural strategy and its cultural base9.

Modernization

Modernization theses relate democracy and development. As economic development takes place, levels of education increase, and the social stratification of the society changes, making space for the middle-class – the main promoter of democracy – that needs to become more educated because of their occupational status, and, through this process, they develop pro-democratic attitudes. These attitudes spread into the larger society because of the increasing size of the middle class “the middle class emerges as the main pro-democratic force.”10 Societal values, persisting since communist times, also affect and condition the formation of attitudes towards the new political and economic system. In fact, McIntosh et al.’s findings suggest such an effect, when they find that the people that show the least amount of support for both democracy and market economy tend to be older, less educated, and overall less politically connected11. Most scholars of Central and Eastern European democratization however, find support for the modernization theory12. The simultaneous occurrence of democracy and market economy in Central and Eastern Europe causes favorable attitudes to be developed more by citizens that stood to gain

8 Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality, Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995). 9 Richard L. Wood, “Religious Culture and Political Action.”. Sociological Theory 17 (1999): 307–332. 10 Dieter Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist development and democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 11 Mary E. McIntosh, Martha Abele Mac Iver, Daniel G. Abele and Dina Smeltz, “Publics Meet Market Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 1991–1993.”. Slavic Review, 53 (1994): 483–512. 12 Frederic J. Fleron Jr. and Richard Ahl, “Does the Public Matter? What We Have Learned from “Third Wave” Transitions and Public Opinion Surveys,” in Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia?, ed. Harry Eckstein, William M. Reisinger and Frederic J. Fleron Jr. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1998, 187–327). Religious Determinants of Democratic Values 225 from the process. In other words, the supporters of democracy are those that benefited from an economic opportunity structure that allowed them to convert previous skills in abilities necessary for succeeding in the new economic and political context13. The applicability of the modernization hypotheses is also limited in Central and Eastern Europe through the presence of the communist legacy. For instance, Finifter and Mickiewicz found that in the former USSR, highly educated people were more inclined to support political change, but also less inclined to support individual responsibility for the welfare of the citizenry14.

National Identity and Support for Democracy

Throughout the transition process, nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe has been blamed for such bloodshed as Bosnia, Kosovo, and Eastern European national identity formation is often portrayed as dangerous and leading to wars and genocide15. Most of the time, the discussion between nationalism and democracy takes place within a continuum limited by civic nationalism, at the “good” end, and ethnic nationalism, at the “bad” end16. Kuzio argues that there has not yet been a sustained effort at theorizing the relationship between democracy and nationalism. He analyzes Ukrainian survey data, and concludes that support for nationhood is actually positively correlated with support for democracy: “strong national identity is promoting democratization, while weak national identities are more prone to be victims of sultanistic regimes.”17 Increasingly, authors speak about the potential constructive/benefic effect of national identity in the construction of democratic systems – a political system cannot exist without a state, and a state performs on

13 Judith S. Kullberg and William Zimmermann, „Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses, and Problems of Russian Democracy.” World Politics, 51 (1999): 323–358. 14 Ada W. Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, „Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change.” The American Political Science Review, 86 (1992): 857–874. 15 Adam Burgess, Divided Europe. The New Domination of the East (London: Pluto Press, 1997). 16 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationalism and The National Question in The New Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). See also Leah Greenfield, Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 17 Taras Kuzio, “‘Nationalising States’ or Nation Building? A Critical Review of The Theoretical Literature and Empirical Evidence.”. Nations and Nationalism, 7 (2001): 135–154. 226 Bogdan Mihai Radu shaky grounds without a nation to back it up. Nodia argues that nationhood provides the necessary level of social cohesion for democracy to work. Movements for nationhood, understood as political autonomy, are often times movements for democracy18. Rustow believes that national unity is the sole background condition for democratization, since in order to undertake such a broad regime change as transition from communism to democracy, citizens need to be very clear as to what political community they belong to19. Kuzio also finds a connection between being Western Ukrainian, a speaker of Ukrainian, and also a supporter of democracy and market, as opposed to being from Eastern or Southern Ukraine, and a speaker of Russian, or being a Russian in Ukraine, and supporting socialism. The author finally concludes that democracy and capitalism will be successful if they are perceived as strengthening national identity – whatever national identity may mean at one point in time.

Methodology

The aim of this paper is to assess the influence of religion values and participation on political attitudes. Nevertheless, political attitudes are not a unified block, but rather different according to the object for support. Hence, I split political values into three different measures. The World Values Survey contains many different measures of political attitudes, but in this paper I selected those that relate more directly with support for democratic forms of government. Exploratory investigation employing factor analysis revealed that at least three measures of democratic support could be identified. The first is democratic liberalism, and groups answers to questions aiming at recording people’s attitudes towards a set of values at the core of liberal democracy. These measures include people’s acceptance of homosexuality, abortion, family violence, euthanasia, suicide, or claiming government benefits, all associated with a democratic elector in the United States, and most of them measuring post-material developments in Central and Eastern Europe. Although the echoes of such measures in post-communist Europe are definitely not identical

18 Ghia Nodia, “How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?” in Democracy after Communism, ed. Larry Diamond and Mark F. Plattner (Baltimore: The Johns Hop- kins University Press, 2002, 3–17. 19 Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model” Comparative Politics, 2 (1970): 337–363.

Religious Determinants of Democratic Values 227 with their Western counterparts, the internalization of liberal values is part and parcel of the process of rooting democracy. Additionally, liberal values are shown to be the problematic issue for the institutionalization of democracy in the Middle East too20. The second variable that measures support for democracy represents an economic definition of democracy, and is represented by 3 questions that group together people that believe that economic safety is the most important feature of a democracy. Finally, the last indicator represents a more “political” definition of democracy, and it groups together variables principally constructing procedural democracy, a political system where leaders are elected in free and fair election, and people’s individual freedoms are guaranteed. As discussed in the literature review, religious measures are different and range from pure and simple denomination, to the degree of involvement in the doctrine of that specific religion, and to becoming integrated in the affairs of one’s church. In this analysis, I use 3 different and yet related measures of religious involvement. The first is religious denomination, a simple measure that separates people that are at least minimally involved with religion from non-religious people. I also use the subjective appreciation of being a religious person. Describing oneself as a religious person or a non-religious person shows the actual involvement in religion in comparison to the declarative belonging to a denomination. The third measure is church attendance, traditionally used for taking into account religious participation, involvement in the mundane organization of other- worldly religions. All these three measures are introduced in regression models, and their separate effect on political attitudes is investigated. The models also include two categories of control variables. The first one is the pride one takes in one’s nationhood, as a measure of national identity. Expressions of national identity are usually associated with being anti-democratic, as the literature reviewed above suggested. Therefore, including this measure is a way of simply testing those anti-nationalistic hypotheses. Second, in Orthodox countries, because of the autocephaly of the church, national identity and especially extremist or more conservative expressions of nationalism can be constructed along religious lines. The rest of the control variables are consistent with the modernization theses of democratization. Thus, sex, age, income, education and place of residence

20 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

228 Bogdan Mihai Radu can be illustrative independent variables in explaining political attitudes.

Data Analysis

In the process of analyzing data, multiple linear regressions were used21. Table 1 summarizes the findings for all three dependent variables including all the cases in the datasets, but also including dummy variables for each country (the excluded, contrast category is Poland). This table allows for comparisons between the three objects of support, while presenting the influence of independent variables. The influence of the socioeconomic status control variables confirms the validity of modernization models; educated people are more supportive of liberal values and of procedural democracy, while being against the safety economic principle, showing understanding of the necessary economic and political reforms required by democratization. The variable measuring age also confirms the validity of the models, since older people are less inclined to accept liberal values, and more supportive of a safety economic system. The same is confirmed by the effect of income on economic democracy, with people having higher incomes being more against the safety of a socialist system, and also by the positive effect of living in a bigger city over acceptance over tolerance of liberalism. Interestingly, there is no direct effect of the Orthodox denomination on political values of any of the three types included in the analysis. Orthodox believers are no more or less inclined to support democracy. Nevertheless, non-religious respondents are more supportive of liberal values, a finding that offers support for theories that claim that religion can be a conservative force against further opening of the political spectrum. Religious people tend to be more resistant to liberal ideas, but this belief driven effect is not consistent across all three dependent variables. Christian believers do not oppose market economy or procedural democracy. The effect is stronger in the case of church attendance, with religiously participatory people being more conservative and also against procedural democracy. The finding according to which church-goers are less accepting of liberal values and of democracy as a system may be a socialization effect, while also representing the possibility that “losers” of the transition game tend to

21 For all tables the beta coefficients are presented in the tables. For tables 2, 3 and 4, the coefficients in bold are significant at .05 level. Religious Determinants of Democratic Values 229 turn towards the church more. The results in Table 4 also suggest then that Romania is less liberal than any of the other countries in the analysis, while also being more supportive of an economic definition of democracy, that puts state offered financial safety before anything else, and especially individual freedoms. All Orthodox countries rank lower than Poland with respect to procedural democracy. The effect played by national identity is also different according to the object of support. While strong national pride makes one less prone to internalize liberal values, it is also correlated with support for procedural democracy and also with a preference for financial state- driven safety. The results in table 1 confirm that the three types of political attitudes are the result of different mechanisms of formation. Liberal values seem to be the most problematic and the most difficult to internalize, while a preference for safe “economic” democracy is present only in some countries. The effect of the country is perhaps the most important result from table 1, suggesting that the ways in which religion, belief and participation influence political values can differ greatly from country to country. Therefore, in the next 3 tables, I compare models of attitude formation in each country. Table 2 summarizes the performance of the same model of attitude formation in each of the 5 countries included in the analysis, having as dependent variable the index of liberal values. The data shows that the effect of age is important and significant in predicting the acceptance of liberal values in most countries (except for Serbia). Older people are less tolerant of liberal ideas, while the younger post-communist generation is more tolerant of self-expression values. Nevertheless, the positive effect of education is significant only in case of Romania, where more educated people accept liberal ideas more. In 4 out of the 5 countries under study (again Serbia makes a distinctive note) non- religious people are more tolerant and more willing to accept liberal values. This result is interesting for this paper at least on two counts. First, it seems that in the case of Eastern Europe, religiousness is associated with more conservative views of the world, perhaps with more traditional lifestyles. Second, this relationship between religion and conservatism is not a feature of only Orthodox systems. Church attendance is negatively correlated with tolerance of liberal values in Poland and Serbia, confirming that in Poland the Catholic Church, with both religious identity and participation both playing against liberalism. In Romania, Moldova and Bulgaria the effect of national identity is negatively correlated with the acceptance of liberal values, suggesting that liberal views are threats to traditional lifestyles. 230 Bogdan Mihai Radu

Interestingly, only in Orthodox countries is nationalism constructed along religious lines, lending some support to the thesis according to which Orthodox churches are successful vehicles for preserving and promoting the nation. Table 3 depicts the results of the same regressions on the economic democracy variable. This is the one dependent variable that caused the most amount of variation between the functioning of the predictive models in the 5 countries. This is not puzzling, since each of the 5 countries had very different economic transitions. Therefore, in Romania less educated poorer people are more supportive of materialistic definitions of democracy. In Moldova, the situation is different, with older people and poorer people offering economic definitions of democracy, but also with more nationalistic people and people living in larger cities joining the same beliefs. Perhaps the unfortunate economic situation in Moldova, associated to some extent with non-lucrative Soviet style economic policies led to the correlation between national identity, larger cities and a preference for safe economies. In Poland, older people are still regretful of the socialist safety, while in Serbia men are more inclined to prefer socialist policies than women. Finally, the religious variables do not influence in any way people’s preference towards this economic democracy. Table 4 repeats the regression results on procedural democracy. Again, there is significant difference between countries. Poland serves as the best example for confirmation of modernization theories, since older, more educated, and richer people are supporters of procedural democracy, while national identity is negatively correlated with it. In Moldova, richer people, those living in smaller towns and people having strong feeling towards national identity support procedural democracy, a finding that suggests that Moldovan democratic identity is constructed along nationalistic lines, in contradiction to Russian forceful control. In Serbia, only education is a significant predictor of support for procedural democracy. In Bulgaria inhabitants of smaller towns and more nationalistic people are similar in their support for democracy. Interestingly, Romania and Bulgaria are the only two countries in the set in which denomination is an important predictor of support. While Orthodox people in Romania are more supportive of procedural democracy, in both Romania and Moldova, church attendance is negatively correlated with support for democracy. The conclusion of this quantitative analysis is that the role played by religion in the formation of support for democracy can vary greatly from country to country, and, probably, if data was available, would vary even within country. At a more general level, it seems that Religious Determinants of Democratic Values 231 throughout the 5 cases, non-religious people tend to be more liberal, more acceptant of what liberal values entail. The effect of religion, seems to diminish in the case of economic or even political democracy, making one ask him or herself whether the religious revival hypothesis is actually taking place, or it is just a an illicit generalization. The two cases in which religious identification and participation are the strongest, Romania and Poland, are also the cases in which religion is the most significant in predicting support for democracy. This data also suggest that people have very different understandings of democracy, and further research should probably try and figure out how those meanings are constructed and why.

Conclusion

This paper is clearly a response to research over-generalizing the effect of Orthodox faith as necessarily conservative and anti democratic, because of its autocephaly and known collaboration with the communist regimes. Therefore, my main objective was to try and understand in which ways religion can influence political values in Central and Eastern Europe. The brief literature review showed that new post-communist democracies sometimes find themselves in a tensed position, in which western understanding of privatized religion and secular societies are applied in contexts that saw in the end of communism the possibility for re- embracing religion. In this context I criticized approaches that perceive religions as monolithic and static, and aimed to show how the ways in which religion can influence support for democracy can vary according to social, cultural, historical context. The analysis I conducted on the last wave of the World Values Surveys data shows that denomination itself is not a clear predictor of political values, in any of the three types under study here: liberal values, “economic” democracy and “political” democracy. Non-religious people are generally more liberal and tolerant, but in what economic or procedural democracy is concerned, the effect of religious identification and religious participation is at best mixed. Additionally, citizens across the five countries seem to have fairly different understandings of democracy, another argument in favor of contextualized research. The most important conclusion of this research is the fact that the Orthodox denomination does not have a transnational clear direct effect on the formation of political attitudes. Rather, it seems that in each country church and religion found a niche and popular support 232 Bogdan Mihai Radu according to some specific contextual factors impossible to detail through quantitative analysis. At the end of this research I can speculate on some possible features of context that may affect the formation of attitudes. First, the historical evolution of religion and the traditional role of church in the recent history is an important feature of context. The studying of these state church features can be analyzed through comparatively analyzing the roles played by churches in different systems. Second, the presence of any compromising event, a lustration process in the history of the church may also be important. Analyzing the ways in which churches interacted with the communist regimes, and how much of their collaborative acts was made public can explain some of the different levels of religious revival. Third, if the constructions of national identity are directly and strongly correlated with national identity, especially one pertaining to ethnic nationalism, then the effect of Orthodox denomination on political attitudes may be negative. Finally, the degree, nature and constructions of secularization are also critically important in deciphering the effect of religion on support for democracy, with different citizenries understanding the place and roles of religion and churches in a democratic, globalized Europe. Religious Determinants of Democratic Values 233

Appendix

Table 1. Mechanisms of political attitude formation in 5 countries

Liberal values “ Economic” “Political” N= 4371, Rsq. = .231 democracy democracy N= 4974, Rsq.= .104 N= 4825, Rsq. = .066 Beta sig. Beta sig. Beta sig. (Constant) .000 .000 .000 Sex –.007 .622 .020 .141 .013 .373 Age –.076 .000 .033 .023 .024 .124 Highest educational .042 .008 –.033 .038 .053 .001 level attained Scale of incomes .002 .912 –.040 .013 .026 .123 Size of town .057 .000 .009 .527 –.030 .049 nation –.076 .000 .033 .019 .044 .003 nonreligious .047 .002 .009 .547 .022 .167 orthodox .026 .177 –.028 .158 –.002 .929 churchatten –.082 .000 .002 .876 –.042 .008 romania –.133 .000 .297 .000 .114 .000 bulgaria .062 .005 –.098 .000 –.118 .000 moldova –.030 .227 .038 .130 –.145 .000 serbia .325 .000 .072 .003 –.103 .000

Table 2. Liberal values formation in 5 countries

Model Romania Bulgaria Moldova Serbia Poland N= 1251, N = 644, N= 857, N=900, N= 715, Rsq.= .132 Rsq. = .105 Rsq. = .068 Rsq.= .048 Rsq. = .243 Sex –.017 –.039 .019 –.003 .010 Age –.086 –.180 –.112 .041 –.224 Highest educational .142 .051 .062 .025 .052 level attained Scale of incomes .041 .077 .047 –.156 .045 Size of town .090 .003 .057 –.042 .198 Nation –.165 –.150 –.096 .019 –.054 Nonreligious .087 .142 .110 –.048 .169 Orthodox/Catholic –.026 .071 .034 –.008 –.046 (Poland) Church attendance –.045 .030 –.041 –.127 –.129 234 Bogdan Mihai Radu

Table 3. „Economic“ democracy in 5 countries

Model Romania Bulgaria Moldova Serbia Poland N=1393, N = 783, N= 962, N=1010, N= 822, Rsq.= .040 Rsq. = .005 Rsq. = .031 Rsq.= .011 Rsq. = .027 Sex .023 –.029 .020 .072 .005 Age –.012 –.014 .091 .032 .120 Highest educational –.105 .007 –.010 .005 –.050 level attained Scale of incomes –.086 .022 –.067 –.035 .033 Size of town –.048 .016 .087 .016 –.009 Nation –.007 .049 .083 .010 .059 Nonreligious –.023 .009 .027 –.015 .020 Orthodox/Catholic .011 –.027 –.014 –.051 –.024 (Poland) Church attendance .006 .002 –.011 –.038 .061

Table 4. “Political” democracy in 5 countries

Model Romania Bulgaria Moldova Serbia Poland N= 1287, N = 766, N= 942, N=985, N= 841, Rsq.= .010 Rsq. = .028 Rsq. = .038 Rsq.= .015 Rsq. = .040 Sex .024 –.064 .000 .052 .014 Age .033 –.029 –.021 .043 .133 Highest educational level attained .018 .045 .005 .088 .095 Scale of incomes .000 .043 .072 –.014 .073 Size of town –.005 –.091 –.091 .039 –.016 Nation –.031 .117 .098 .037 –.074 Nonreligious .014 .030 –.058 .047 .044 Orthodox/Catholic (Poland) .056 –.013 –.056 .011 –.068 Church attendance –.065 .012 –.105 –.015 .007

Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries

COSIMA RUGHINIk

Introduction

In this paper I explore the variation in normative opinions on political secularity across European countries, and I will search for influences at macro and micro level on the level of secularity among religious people. In order to measure secular orientations, I use two indicators available in the World Value Survey: agreement with the assertion that “Politicians who don’t believe in God are unfit for public office”, and agreement with the assertion that it is “Better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office”1. The indicators of political secularity included in the World Value Survey have been used in multiple analyses. A considerable body of research has developed around the specificity of secular opinions for Muslim persons or in Muslim societies (see for example Tanwir2, Tessler3, Yilmaz4, Carlson and Listhaug5, and Toros6). A second strand

1 This article is the result of research work conducted with the support of the REVA- CERN project, March – August 2009; part of this work was carried out at the Euro- pean Data Laboratory for Comparative Social Research (EUROLAB) - GESIS. Access to the EUROLAB was supported by the European Community under the “Structur- ing the European Research Area” specific programme Research Infrastructures Ac- tion in the 6th Framework Programme. 2 Farooq Tanwir, “Religious Parties and Politics in Pakistan”. International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 43 (2002): 250–268. Also available on January 14, 2010 at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 3 Mark Tessler, “Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? – Evidence from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria” (Research paper, World Value Survey, 2002, available on January 14, 2010 at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) 4 Esmer Yilmaz, “Is there an Islamic civilization?” (Research paper, World Value Survey, 2002, available on January 14, 2010 at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) 5 Matthew Carlson and Ola Listhaug, “Public Opinion on the Role of Religion in Political Leadership: A Multi-level Analysis of Sixty-three Countries”. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 7(2006): 251–271. 236 Cosima Rughinió of research focuses on factors that influence political secularity, especially on explanations for cross-country variations. Authors such as Voicu7, Pettersson8, Halman and Pettersson9, and Müller10 analyze political secularity at micro and macro level, across entire national samples. For example, Petterson11 finds that, at individual level, traditional values, including attachment to religious identities, family values and national identities, are positively associated with approval of involvement of religious people in politics, while at macro level, a secular culture has a negative influence on the country level of endorsement of the opinion that religious people should be active in politics. Müller also finds a significant negative influence of religiosity on normative beliefs about secularity at individual level, while at macro level he identifies a positive influence of the number of religious laws, as indicator of societal secularization, on approval of the involvement of religious people in politics12. In this volume, Branko An²i° uses the same indicators on secularity, as measured in the European Values Study 1999, to explore the diversity in public expectations from religion. Therefore, multiple analyses confirm a relationship between individual religiosity and individual normative opinions towards the political involvement of religious persons, both at micro and macro levels. In what follows I have decided to focus only on religious people, in order to see to what extent the influence of religiosity still holds. The WVS 2005 includes the following indicator which I have used to differentiate religious from non-religious and atheistic people: “Inde- pendently on whether you go to church or not, would you say you

6 Emre Toros, “The Relationship Between Islam and Democracy in Turkey: Employing Political Culture as an Indicator”. Social Indicators Research 95 (2010): 253–265 7 M©lina Voicu, “Modernitate religioas© în societatea româneasc©”. Sociologie Româneasc©, 1–4(2001): 70–96. 8 Thorleif Pettersson, “The relations between religion and politics in the contemporary Western world: The impact of secularization, postmodernization and peoples’ basic value orientations”, (Research paper, World Value Survey, 2003, available on January 14, 2010 at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/) 9 Loek Halman and Thorleif Pettersson, “Normative orientations towards the differentiation between religion and politics”, in European Values at the Turn of the Millen- nium, ed. Will Arts, Loek Halman (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2004), 317–339 10 Tim Müller, “Religiosity and Attitudes towards the Involvement of Religious Leaders in Politics” (World Values Research Papers 2 (1): 1–30, 2009, available on January 14, 2010 at http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) 11 Thorleif Petterson, op.cit., p. 15 12 Tim Müller, op. cit., p. 16 Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries 237 are…1. A religious person, 2. Not a religious person, 3. A convinced atheist, 4. Don’t know”. Of course, it is to be expected that non-religious or atheistic people would reject the claim that politicians who don’t believe in God are unfit for public office, or that strong religious convictions are better for public servants. Still, it is less clear how these opinions vary among religious people themselves. If non-religious persons share secular opinions concerning the relationship of religion and politics, it is still possible that a significant relationship exists in the general population between religiosity and secular opinions, without a significant covariation within the category of religious respondents. In the following analysis I will explore this relationship, and other influences on secular opinions of religious people. In all countries except Romania, political secularity is supported by a majority of religious respondents (see Table 1).

Table 1. Political secularity for religious and non-religious people in ten EU countries / regions

Politicians who don’t believe Better if more people with strong in God are unfit for public religious beliefs office (% agree) (% agree) Non- Religious Non-religious Religious religious or or atheist atheist Bulgaria 9 39 8 38 East Germany 4 15 5 49 Finland 4 13 5 17 Italy 5 14 3 21 Poland 4 19 2 32 Romania 16 52 31 64 Slovenia 2 15 2 15 Spain 7 17 7 21 Sweden 1 8 3 11 West Germany 5 23 6 38

Data source: WVS 2005 Data is weighted by country sampling weights.

There is considerable variation within and between countries. What are the sources of these differences? My analysis is exploratory, using indicators available in the WVS 2005 dataset. In order to identify sources of variation among political secularity opinions within the population of religious people, I have 238 Cosima Rughinió started from two general assumptions. The first is that the degree of religiosity is an important predictor for endorsing religion within the public and political sphere: Religiosity hypothesis: strongly religious people would favor more often religious politicians and public servants than people who are still religious, but to a lesser extent. This hypothesis is derived from previous research that indicates a connection between religiosity and political secularity opinions among the general population. Since religiosity is more a matter of nuance and degree than a dichotomous yes / no phenomenon, it is to be expected that the omission from analysis of people who consider themselves non-religious or atheistic would not eliminate this covariation. At the same time, as qualitative interviews have indicated in Romania, people who support the idea of religious politicians and public servants may do so not necessarily out of religious conviction, but because they believe that religiosity is a guarantee of morality13. Politicians who don’t believe in God are considered more susceptible to corruption and other self-serving or immoral conducts. In a worldview structured by the traditional moral values, religion may be synony- mous with honest, principled behavior. Therefore: Traditional morality hypothesis: After controlling for religiosity, the personal relevance of observing traditional moral values should have a positive influence on support for religiosity of politicians and public servants. Along the same line of reasoning, we can expect that people who are less satisfied with current politicians and public servants will be more prone to support the necessity of religious values in the political sphere (the disenchantment hypothesis). Last but not least, the belief that religious people hold, in general, stronger moral principles than non-religious people is expected to be stronger in more religious societies. The representation of atheistic and non-religious people as “godless” persons, who fear nothing and therefore have no scruples, loses credibility in societies where higher proportions of people are non-religious. Therefore, we can expect that: The context hypothesis: The degree of support for religion in the public sphere, after controlling for personal religiosity, is influenced by the proportion of non-religious people in the society.

13 Cosima Rughinió and Iulia R©uöu, “Of priests and politics. Measuring separation of Church and State in present-day Romania”. Studia Sociologia 2 (2009): 57–77. Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries 239

Methodology

In order to test the first three hypotheses, I have modeled a linear regression equation in which I have explained the indicator of political secularity, combining items A and C, as a function of religiosity indicators, relevance of traditional moral values, political disenchantment and several control variables: sex, age, education and locality size. The fourth hypothesis was tested by a two-level regression model which included, at the individual, “within” level, indicators of personal religiosity, and at the social, “between” level, the proportion of non-religious respondents. I have used the WVS 2005 dataset. The multilevel model was estimated with MPlus v. 5, while the regression model was estimated with SPSS v. 16.0. The indicators for all variables included in regression models are presented in Appendix – Table 3. In order to combine the two items in a single measure of political secularity, I have computed a factor score, using Principal Axis Factoring (PAF). Explained variance for each of the ten EU countries / regions included in WVS2005 is presented in Appendix – Table 4. It is important to notice that this variable actually indicates the rejection of political secularity and the support for religious influence in the political arena. I have also computed factor scores for two variables indicating relevance of moral values in the civic area, on one hand, and in intimate relations, on the other hand, using available indicators in the WVS 2005 dataset. Exploratory factor analyses have indicated a single factor for each of the two dimensions, in all countries/ regions; explained variance is also presented in Appendix – Table 4.

Results

In the following sections I will first discuss several influences on political secularity at individual level. I will then investigate whether the proportion of secular people in a country has any influence on the level of political secularity among religious people from the respective country.

Political secularity, religiosity, morality and disenchantment

The linear regression model indicates that religiosity is a significant predictor for normative opinions on political secularity, not only in the 240 Cosima Rughinió general population, but also within the category of religious people. Higher religiosity is usually associated with higher probabilities of accepting the involvement of religious people in politics. The importance of God has statistically significant influences in all countries/regions, while perceived adequacy of church is significant in eight out of ten cases. Church attendance retains a significant influence in the model in four out of ten countries/regions. The two indicators for political disenchantment are not associated with rejection of political secularity, when controlling for the other variables in the model – and this is why I have not included them in the final model. Satisfaction with democracy in one’s country has a significant (p=0.01) negative influence in the model in Spain and Finland, while satisfaction with respect of human rights has a significant negative influence only in Spain. The disenchantment hypothesis seems to be refuted by data. Sexual morality relativism has, as expected, a significant negative influence on rejection of political secularity, after controlling for all other indicators. This may reflect the influence of traditional moral values but, given the religious relevance of this topic, it may also reflect the influence of other dimensions of religiosity which were not controlled in the model (residual confounding). The positive influence in Slovenia is most likely due to an error in the direction of the answer scales, which applies to all items included in the moral relativity factor scores; such an error would explain the symmetry of distributions for each item, in Slovenia compared to the other European countries. Contrary to my expectations, civic morality relativism has a significant negative influence on the rejection of political secularity, after controlling for the other variables (with the exception of Slovenia, where, again, the reversed sign is probably due to a coding error in the dataset). It seems that people who approve more of cheating the state are more likely to ask for religious politicians and public servants. This surprising result contradicts the morality hypothesis – insofar support for strict observance of traditional moral values has divergent influences on political secularity. Sexual morality relativism is positively associated with secularity, while civic morality secularism is negatively associated. At the same time, this finding offers renewed support for the disenchantment hypothesis: the disposition to cheat the state may be a reaction to the perception that the state apparatus itself is cheating on people. Perceived honesty of politicians may be a common influence on the disposition to cheat the state and the option for religiosity as a safeguard for politicians’ honesty. Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries 241

The regression models14 are presented in Appendix, Tables 5–8.

Influence of Social Context

In order to test the context hypothesis, I have first plotted the affirmative answers to the two items among religious people, as a function of the proportion of non-religious people in the country sample, in all countries/regions included in the WVS 2005 dataset. Figure 1 and Figure 2 indicate a negative association (with Thailand as an outlier). The relationship still holds when only the ten EU countries/regions are included in analysis, supporting the hypothesis of a negative relationship in Europe (charts not shown).

Figure 1. Affirmative answers to “It would be better for... (your country) if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office” among religious people, by proportion of non-religious people in the respective country

Data source: WVS2005, all countries/regions (see Appendix – Table 9) Data is weighted by country sampling weights. In order to test whether this relationship persists after controlling for the religiosity indicators available in the dataset, I have estimated a two-level regression model.

14 The model was estimated separately for Spain and Finland because in these national surveys the variable for locality size was measured with different answer categories. Also, West Germany and East Germany were estimated as distinct models, since data were available at region level. 242 Cosima Rughinió

Results indicate that indeed there is a significant negative influence of the proportion of non-religious people on the intercept in the regression of secularity items on religiosity indicators (see Table 2). Therefore, independent of the influence of personal religiosity on secularity among religious people, there is a significant influence of the societal context: the higher the proportion of nonreligious people, the

higher the level of secularity among religious people in a society.

Figure 2. Affirmative answers to “Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office” among religious people, by proportion of non-religious people in the respective country Data source: WVS 2005, all countries/regions (see Appendix – Table 9) Data is weighted by country sampling weights.

Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries 243

Table 2. Multilevel model for the influence of social-level secularity on individual level rejection of political secularity

Dependent Atheist politicians Strongly religious variable: are unfit for office people in office Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Within level Dependent variable (variation on… among Adequacy of 0.099 0.000 0.145 0.000 individuals) church Church attendance 0.052 0.000 0.071 0.000 Importance of God 0.077 0.000 0.073 0.000 Residual variance 1.329 0.000 1.038 0.000 Between level Within-intercept on –0.009 0.006 –0.007 0.009 (variation proportion of non- among religious and countries) atheistic people „Between” 2.205 0.000 2.140 0.000 intercept Residual variance 0.182 0.000 0.120 0.000

Number of clusters: 40; average cluster size: 808; data source: WVS 2005. Data is weighted by country sampling weights.

Conclusions

A multivariate exploratory analysis of political secularity, measured with two of the WVS 2005 items, leads to several interesting conclusions. As expected, religiosity is a significant predictor for rejection of political secularity: in particular, importance of God in one’s life seems to be the strongest influence, significant in all ten countries / regions included in the model. Evaluation of the adequacy of church answers is also a systematic influence, while church attendance has a significant influence only in four societies. People with more traditional views of sexual morality are more likely to reject political secularity, while, surprisingly, people with stricter views on civic morality are more likely to accept it. It seems that the disposition to cheat on the state is significantly associated with the opinion that religiosity is necessary for politicians and public servants. This may reflect the fact that people who perceive politicians to be corrupt may be simultaneously more tolerant towards cheating the state, and more willing to find a solution, such as religiosity, to perceived immorality in the political sphere. Additional research could 244 Cosima Rughinió provide valuable insights in the relationship between tolerance for cheating the state and political secularity. As expected, societies with higher proportions of non-religious people have higher levels of political secularity among their religious residents, worldwide, even after controlling for individual religiosity. This may indicate that, in more secular societies, religious people think less of religion as a necessary or sufficient guarantee of morality in the public sphere. Overall, it seems that the rejection of political secularity among religious people in Europe is influenced by the religious structure of individual worldviews, but also by disenchantment with public officials and a search for guarantees of public morality. Available data cannot properly differentiate between the influence of a religious agenda, and the influence of the desire to curb self-serving behavior in public office. Additional quantitative research could better specify the paths towards political secularity opinions, by measuring the two relevant variables: public perceptions of politicians and public servants, on one hand, and representations of the honesty of non-religious people, on the other hand. Qualitative research should direct the investigation on a meaningful track, indicating the lines of reasoning that support or discourage political secularity.

Appendix Table 3. Indicators for variables included in regression models

Variables Items Rejection of Factor score (Principal axis factoring) with the political following items: secularity “How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following...” (Item A.) “Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office”; (Item C.) “It would be better for... (your country) if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office” (1. Strongly disagree to 5. Strongly agree) Education Respondent schooling with four categories: primary or less, vocational secondary, high-school secondary, university Locality size Locality size measured with 8 categories, from 1. 2000 or less to 8. 500,000 and more; categories are different for Spain and Finland

Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries 245

Religiosity: Church Apart from weddings and funerals, about how attendance often do you attend religious services these days? 1. More than once a week 2. Once a week 3. Once a month 4. Only on special holy days 5. Once a year 6. Less often 7. Never, practically never (recoded on 4 levels) Adequacy of Generally speaking, do you think that the churches church for in your country are giving adequate answers to various issues - The moral problems and needs of the individual (number of - The problems of family life affirmative - People’s spiritual needs answers) -The socialproblems facing our society Importance of How important is God in your life? Please use this God scale to indicate. 10 means “very important” and 1 means “not at all important”. Political Satisfaction How democratically is this country being governed disenchant- with today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 ment democracy in means that it is “not at all democratic” and 10 one’s own means that it is “completely democratic”, what country position would you choose? Satisfaction How much respect is there for individual human with human rights nowadays in this country? Do you feel there rights in one’s is… own country 1. A great deal of respect for individual human rights 2. Fairly much respect 3. Not much respect 4. No respect at all Relevance of Civic morality Please indicate for each of the following statements traditional relativism whether you think it can always be justified, never moral be justified, or something in between. (1=Never values: justifiable, 10=Always justifiable) - Claiming government benefits to which you are Factor not entitled scores - Avoiding a fare on public transport - Cheating on taxes if you have a chance - Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties Traditional Factor score sexual morality Please indicate for each of the following statements relativism whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between. (1=Never justifiable, 10=Always justifiable) - Homosexuality - Prostitution - Abortion -Divorce

Data source: WVS 2005

246 Cosima Rughinió

Table 4. Variance explained by factors for political secularity, civic disenchantment and sexual morality relativism

Political secularity Civic morality Sexual morality (%) relativism (%) relativism (%) West Germany 58.7 49.5 55.0 Italy 56.9 41.6 49.3 Spain 70.6 56.1 58.9 Sweden 41.1 36.7 43.2 Finland 42.5 41.0 46.9 Poland 57.8 34.2 53.0 East Germany 52.9 49.5 53.3 Slovenia 56.4 49.1 56.4 Bulgaria 53.6 51.8 49.8 Romania 60.3 53.8 55.4 Extraction method: Principal axis factoring. Score computation method: Regression Data source: WVS 2005 Table 5. Regression model for rejection of political secularity among religious people (Spain and Finland)

Spain Finland

Adjusted R square .35 .27

Beta Sig. Beta Sig.

Sexual morality relativism –0.33 0.00 –0.28 0.00

Civic disenchantment 0.33 0.00 0.11 0.01

Adequacy of church for various issues 0.24 0.00 0.20 0.00

Church attendance 0.04 0.49 0.18 0.00

How important is God in your life 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.00

Sex –0.05 0.23 0.01 0.81

Age 0.03 0.51 0.00 0.93

Education 0.00 0.95 –0.12 0.01

Size of locality (Spain and Finland) –0.03 0.44 0.02 0.67

Data source: WVS 2005; only religious respondents are included in analysis.

Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries 247

Table 6. Regression models for rejection of political secularity among religious people (Italy, Sweden and Poland)

Italy Sweden Poland

Adjusted R square. .33 .30 .23

Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.

Sexual morality relativism –0.33 0.00 –0.25 0.00 –0.20 0.00

Civic disenchantment 0.17 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.00

Adequacy of church for various 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.18 0.00 issues

Church attendance 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.00

How important is God in your life 0.11 0.01 0.21 0.00 0.13 0.00

Sex 0.03 0.32 –0.01 0.88 0.07 0.08

Age 0.04 0.28 0.23 0.00 –0.02 0.59

Education –0.05 0.24 0.01 0.89 –0.06 0.12

Size of town 0.00 0.93 –0.04 0.51 –0.02 0.54

Data source: WVS 2005; only religious respondents are included in analysis. Table 7. Regression models for rejection of political secularity among religious people (Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania)

Slovenia Bulgaria Romania

Adjusted R square .33 .35 .24

Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig.

Sexual morality relativism 0.28 0.00 –0.11 0.03 –0.19 0.00

Civic disenchantment –0.14 0.00 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.00

Adequacy of church for various 0.15 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.00 issues

Church attendance 0.02 0.68 0.15 0.00 0.04 0.20

How important is God in your 0.25 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.21 0.00 life

Sex –0.05 0.19 0.06 0.23 –0.04 0.18

Age 0.07 0.15 0.01 0.89 0.03 0.34

Education –0.02 0.68 –0.14 0.01 –0.09 0.00

Size of town –0.02 0.71 0.04 0.43 –0.07 0.02

Data source: WVS 2005; only religious respondents are included in analysis. 248 Cosima Rughinió

Table 8. Regression models for rejection of political secularity among religious people (West Germany and East Germany)

West Germany East Germany

Adjusted R square .44 .42

Beta Sig. Beta Sig.

Sexual morality relativism –0.32 0.00 –0.15 0.02

Civic disenchantment 0.17 0.00 0.01 0.81

Adequacy of church for various issues 0.16 0.00 0.13 0.05

Church attendance 0.20 0.00 0.09 0.18

How important is God in your life 0.14 0.00 0.33 0.00

Sex –0.01 0.84 0.04 0.43

Age 0.01 0.88 0.02 0.78

Education –0.05 0.26 –0.10 0.13

Size of town 0.06 0.12 –0.04 0.47

Data source: WVS 2005; only religious respondents are included in analysis.

Table 9. Proportion of non-religious respondents and affirmative answers to items C and A across WVS2005 countries

Non-religious or atheist More people with strong Atheist politicians are unfit Country: respond. (%) religious belief … (% agree) for office (% agree) Andorra 52 8 4 Argentina 19 34 36 Australia 48 24 21 Brazil 12 50 50 Bulgaria 37 38 39 Burkina Faso 8 62 51 Chile 35 49 36 Cyprus 38 24 48 East Germany 72 49 15 Ethiopia 19 52 52 Finland 40 17 13 Ghana 9 81 73 India 22 41 50 Indonesia 15 86 90 Italy 12 21 14 Japan 76 16 18 Jordan 8 65 68 Malaysia 11 61 66 Mali 2 74 59 Mexico 25 40 28 Moldova 16 50 47 Political Secularity of Religious People in European Countries 249

Non-religious or atheist More people with strong Atheist politicians are unfit Country: respond. (%) religious belief … (% agree) for office (% agree) Morocco 8 64 53 Peru 18 64 40 Poland 5 32 19 Romania 7 64 52 Rwanda 6 63 45 South Africa 19 62 52 South Korea 70 38 25 Serbia 15 40 46 Slovenia 27 15 15 Spain 55 21 17 Sweden 67 11 8 Taiwan 60 33 14 Thailand 65 72 74 Trinidad and 16 67 70 Tobago Turkey 17 54 62 Ukraine 19 50 53 USA 28 51 40 Vietnam 61 34 20 West Germany 40 38 23 Zambia 11 63 59

EU countries/regions included in Figures 3 and 4 above are marked with bold characters. Data source: WVS 2005 Data is weighted by country sampling weights.

Quasi-Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing Radical Ideology An International Comparison

TAMÁS SZILÁGYI

This article examines the structure of the correlation between Hungarian and Central and Eastern European radical right-wing ideology and the field of religion. It briefly presents the relations of radical right wing groups and Christian churches, and tries to reveal the background and role of the explicit religious elements of the ideologies.

Introduction

If we examine the relationship between the Hungarian radical right and the religious field in general, we have to see that they do not have official relations with mainstream religious groups – the historical churches1. Hungarian historical churches sharply distance themselves from the activities conducted by radical right-wing groups and they do not share the ideologies of these groups. In general, we can state: the radical right-wing is seeking the connection points with Christian “historical” churches, they define themselves as Christians and Christian value orientation is also emphasized on ideological level, regarding the relation with historic Christian churches, we can see that churches strongly distance themselves from – and in many cases, clearly oppose – radicals. Radicals have tried to break this status quo in the past years, but apart from isolated cases, church circles and radical groups have not come closer officially. In this regard, the situation in Hungary is special in Eastern Europe, since there are several examples in this region that national churches support radical groups

1 Historical churches include the Catholic, Reformed, and Lutheran Churches and the Alliance of Jewish Communities 252 Tamás Szilágyi

Quasi Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing

We can state that the ideological “mainstream” of the radical right- wing, which consists of heterogeneous political, religious and cultural elements, can be less and less considered a marginal factor, and its dynamic expansion can be perceived in the political and cultural field. From the point of view of the study of religion, a syncretistic (neopagan/Christian) religious orientation is more emphasized among the followers and supporters of Hungarian right-wing radical movements, than the factor of traditional Christian commitment and church religiosity. In some cases, we can state that the undertaking of the (usually Christian) religious identity is only present as a secondary factor, as an element providing a kind of external background identity, and serves as a spiritual base of anti-Semitism. The motive of considering religion as a counter-culture is also important. Christianity (and certain indigenous pagan religions) appear as the representatives of eternity, and eternal values against the currently dominant global political-cultural line, which usually appear in radical right-wing narratives as historical constructions which are doomed to fail. Due to the pre-modern components (traditionalism, conservatism, auto- cratism), many view religions as the most authentic symbols of opposing the “prescribed” modern lifestyle, political view, and social value system. This way, religiosity itself works as a counter-culture, or in our case, as a defining element of a counter-culture in a wider sense. Though radical right-wing ideology places itself in the political field, it uses a syncretistic religious narrative to legitimate its programme, the central elements of which are the sacralisation of the Hungarian nation, the idea of a chosen people, the designation of the national territory as a sacral space, and the inclusion of religious moral elements into political rhetoric. The Hungarian radical right-wing does not only designate religious doctrines as the source of ideals and values that underpin its political actions, but the orientation towards the transcendental also appears specifically in its ideological direction. The elements of Christianity and the ancient Hungarian pagan faith are mixed in the religious narratives of the radical right-wing ideology. However, it cannot be proven that either the Christian or the pagan elements mean a unified point of reference for everyone. In the Hungarian radical right-wing, the groups using Christian rhetoric seem to enjoy the most popularity, but the currently marginal paganism- oriented group plays a more and more increasing role. The sacralisation of the nation is an organic element of radical right- wing ideologies, however, Hungarian specialities should be looked for Quasi-Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing Radical Ideology 253 in the prominently religious dimensions of this process. On the ideological level, Hungarian right-wing radicalism does not only designate religious doctrines as the source of ideals and values underpinning its political action, but orientation towards the transcendental also appears specifically in its ideological direction. The integrative power of radical right-wing ideology helps the forming of the group, it provides practical answers to the questions of the community and designates the direction of political action. These right- wing groups form their own structure of plausibility, which is analogous to the similar structures of religious communities. When we mention that the situation in Hungary is special, we also have to emphasize another characteristic of the religious and the political field, which are different from other Eastern European countries. These characteristics, when compared to known international processes and phenomena, outline the quasi-religious character of the Hungarian radical right-wing ideology.

Radical Right-Wing in Central and Eastern Europe

For the sake of the comparability of the situation in Hungary and in Eastern Europe in general, it is worth examining the relation system of radical right-wing groups and the religious field in other countries of the region as well. Romania is the first to be reviewed. The situation in Romania is different from other Eastern European countries in many aspects, due to historical events. Until the beginning of the 19th century, when national consciousness in the modern sense started to evolve, the ethnic identity of Romanians in connected to the Orthodox religious identity and it is primarily present as a religious identity. The Romanian Greek Catholic church was the first to start combining religious and national identity2, and pointed out – especially in Transylvania – that the collective identity of Romanians is not exclusively denominational, but it is also based on ethnic and lingual identity. Greek Catholics were the first to turn to history, as they recognized the power of history in strengthening national identity, and they started to talk about the Roman origin of Romanians, the ethnic and cultural continuity in Transylvania, which was then dominated by Hungarians. The Romanian revolutionary movements of 1848–49 bore the characteristics of a religious nationalism; religion appeared in the

2 Tamási, Zsolt. 2003. Istenkép, vallásos nacionalizmus a román politikai diskurzu- sokban (19–20. század). Korunk (June). 254 Tamás Szilágyi formulas of revolutionary nationalism. The “political liturgies” of the political assemblies of the era were almost always accompanied by religious liturgies, which provided the religious legitimacy of political action, thus increasing the faith of the community in political actions. “In 1848, the revolutionary Messiah is the nation itself, a force which has its value in itself. The romanticised impersonation of the nation symbolised mythical virtues. This way, a new religion is “created”, a new political religion”, points out Tamási. In the last decades of the 19th century, and especially in the early 20th century, the unifying Romanian national ideology used an anti- urban, xenophobe narrative in order to promote national unity. At that time, more than two-thirds of Romanians were peasants, who lived outside of cities, in villages. This mass had one meeting point with the elite, and this was religion, orthodoxy. Cultural and political nationalism is forced to redefine itself with going back to orthodox traditions.3 With the creation of the unified nation state, the common national identity is also more and more emphasized, and it tries to strengthen itself with the mythicization of common memory, the historical past. Similarly to Hungarian, and other Eastern European mythologies, special mythological constructions appear, in the creation of which, the Orthodox Church played an important role. Romanian historical figures – Stefan cel Mare or Vlad Tepes – appear as liberating national heroes chosen by destiny; their actions are clearly placed in a religious dimension. Among national historical events, ethnic history writing emphasizes the western orientation of Romanians, and their loyalty to Latin culture. The most influential ideological movement, which primarily defines the contemporary Romanian radical right wing ideology, is the Iron Guard movement, which started in the 1930s. Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the founder and main ideologist of the Legion of the Archangel Michael (Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail) and the Iron Guard, tried to address the widest range of people – especially the high number of peasants – so he included a special, mystical version of orthodoxy in his programme: The Legionary movement willingly inserted strong elements of the Orthodox Christianity into its political doctrine. Thus the Legionary movement is one of the rare modern European political movements with a religious structure. Legionary mysticism did not set itself up as an Orthodox mysticism. On the contrary, the latter underwent alterations owing to the attempts to canonise certain saints chosen from among the

3 Bakk, Miklós. 1998. Románia és Közép-Európa – két kiegyezés. Magyar Kisebbség 4(1). Quasi-Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing Radical Ideology 255

‘Legionary martyrs’, to the intense cult of death, of instinct, of the providential leader, along the lines established by the myth of youth and of old warriors.4 The Iron Guard’s programme is burdened with social and national chauvinist demagogy, its basic elements are mysticism, anti- democratic, anti-liberal notions and xenophobia. Anti-Semitism and anti-communism are especially strongly emphasized and they are interweaving in his thoughts. With a few exceptions, the Romanian intelligence shared the idea of the Iron Guard revolution between the two world wars.5 For example, Eliade saw a religious movement, a mystic sect in the Iron Guard, and in one of his declarations, he states that “It is a Christian revolution, a spiritual, ascetic and manly revolution, which is unprecedented in European history” (quoted by Oisteanu). The appearance of neopagan elements and their inclusion in national and political mythologies is an interesting similarity between Romanian ultranationalist ideology and the contemporary Hungarian ideology. In the Romanian case, this meant the inclusion of pre- Christian religious traditions, especially certain elements of the mystical tradition. The certain elements of cult of Zalmoxis god of Getae origin6, like the belief in the immortality of the soul, initiation and heroic-ritual self-sacrifice are popular elements in right wing ideology. Similarly to Hungarian ideologists, they tried to explain the legitimacy of the acceptance of the pre-Christian ancient religion by its monotheistic nature, and by the emphasis of the identical elements of the two religions. Naturally, the Iron Guard primarily emphasized its Christian orthodox commitment and the Zalmoxis cult did not become the general belief among its followers. When we examine the relation between contemporary Romanian right-wing radicalism and religion, the most significant group we have to deal with is Noua Dreapta (“New right-wing”), which can be considered the intellectual successor of the above described ideological line. Noua Dreapta steps up as the legitimate successor of the Iron Guard, and tries to keep the cult of Cordenau – they commemorate him every year. The organisation fights against liberalism, communism, sexual minorities, abortion, non-Christian religious movements and new religious movements and the autonomy of national minorities.

4 Ioanid, Radu. (2004). The sacralised politics of the Romanian Iron Guard. Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions 5(3): 419–453. 5 Oisteanu, Andrei. 2002. Mircea Eliade, intre ortodoxism si zalmoxism. Istoria Re- ligiilor (July). 6 Eliade, Mircea. 1986. Zalmoxis, the vanishing God : comparative studies in the religions and folklore of Dacia and Eastern Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 256 Tamás Szilágyi

Since 2002, the “International Religious Freedom Report”7, which is made every year upon the commission of the government of the United States, mentions the atrocities committed by the members of the organisation almost every year. The victims of these actions are religious groups like Mormons and Jehova’s Wittnesses. Noua Dreapta declaredly protects orthodox faith, the teachings of the Orthodox Church and religious traditions. In their ideology, orthodoxy is inseparable from Romanian national identity; it is an integrated and determining part of national identity. Every attempt to weaken the position of the church – like the appearance of new religious movements – counts as an attack against the unity, against the nation and the “national spirit”, against which people have to step up using violence. Though we found several indications that the Romanian Orthodox church supports Noua Dreapta, there is no official declaration for this from the church. Even if there are connection points, similarly to the relation between Hungarian right-wing radical groups and churches, these are individual, isolated actions of church officials in the Romanian case, these do not reflect the official opinion of the church. The most well known event was the counter-demonstration organised against the gay march in Bucharest in 2006, where the members of Noua Dreapta, together with representatives of the Romanian Orthodox Church and politicians, marched in the protection of orthodox families against sexual minorities. There was another event which gained publicity from the same year, in which Noua Dreapta and the Romanian Orthodox Church were on the same platform. This was a collection of signatures against the legalisation of the marriage of homosexuals, was supported by both organisations. It can be seen, that in certain questions – especially in the issue of homosexuality – the official church opinion and the views of Noua Dreapta are in harmony, but it can be stated that the organisation does not have the official support of the church. However, the church did not openly distance itself from Noua Dreapta. This is remarkable, since the “orthodox Christian spirituality”, which the organisation so often mentions, is dishonouring for the Romanian Orthodox church on international level, in view of the actions of the organisation. In Serbia, the other country of the Eastern European region with orthodox dominance, the relation between radical right-wing groups and orthodox religious fundamentalism appears in a more articulated way than in the neighbouring Romania. This is due to the special role the Serbian Orthodox Church played in the political events of the past

7 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/ [downloaded on 21. 09. 2008.] Quasi-Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing Radical Ideology 257 decades. With the gradual erosion of the theory of “Yugoslavism”, and with the decomposition of old values, the value-conserving role of the church was appreciated in the seventies. In the eighties, nationalistic views gained strength within the Serbian Orthodox Church, which manifested in keeping the issue of Kosovo Serbs continuously on the agenda. Kosovo has also played a special role in Serbian national mythology. The battle of Kosovo Polje, where the best of Serb aristocracy – together with Prince Lazar Hrebeljanovi – lost their lives in the battle against the armies of the Ottoman Turkish Empire, is a determining element of the collective Serbian national narrative. According to the legend, Prince Lazar was visited by an angel the night before the battle and offered him two options. The angel offered the prince victory over the Turkish and thus kingdom on earth, or the failure in battle and winning the kingdom of heaven. The martyr death of the prince is the symbol of the destruction of the Serbian state, it is not a coincidence that in the period of national awakening in the 19th century, the figure of Lazar is portrayed in analogy with Christ, and the passion of the Christ appears in the history of the Serbian nation. Kosovo’s accentuated role in mythical national geography is further strengthened by several places of historical and religious importance, which provide the actual sacral role of the territory, most importantly, the Pec patriarchate, symbolizing the heart of the Serbian Orthodox Church.8 Vjekoslav Perica emphasized the importance of the territory: “Kosovo is the central myth and symbol of Serbian Orthodoxy. It is also a sacred center, the nation’s rallying point and its lost paradise. Kosovo is often referred to as «Serbian Zion» or «Serbian Jerusalem».”9 The bishops of the Serbian Orthodox Church issued a declaration in 1988, in which they accused the Albanians of destroying Serbian cultural memorial places, and of attempting to destroy the indigenous Serbian nation. Their declaration helped to fan the flames of nationalistic feelings, which contributed to the cessation of the autonomy of Kosovo. The Serbian Orthodox Church played an ambivalent role in the Southern Slav conflicts of the nineties. On the one hand, in several proclamations, the church officially condemns civil war and violence and calls for peace10, on the other hand, for the sake of the creation of

8 Ilic, Angela. 2004. Church And State Relations In Present-Day Serbia. Religion in Eastern Europe 25(1): 8–33. 9 Perica, Vjekoslav. 2002. Balkan idols : religion and nationalism in Yugoslav states. Ox- ford; New York: Oxford University Press. 10 Vukomanovi°, Milan. 1999. The Role Of The Serbian Orthodox Church In The Pro- tection Of Minorities And ‘Minor’ Religious Communities In The Fr Yugoslavia. Facta Universitatis – Philosophy and Sociology 2.(6): 15–22. 258 Tamás Szilágyi the unified Serbian state, the representatives of the church call for the unconditional support of Radovan Karadzic in Bosnia. A unique figure of the church, Artemije Bishop of Rashka-Prizren and Kosovo-Metohija has actively participated in the political interest representation of Kosovo Serbs since the South Slav war, and he rejects any cooperation with Kosovo Albanians and foreigners present in the province. Artemije was caught in international limelight in February 2008, when he called on the Serbian government to take arms and – with Russian help – prevent the province from declaring its independence. In his dramatic-toned declaration he stated that We must first convince ourselves and then explain to our friends from other countries, who understand and support us, that Kosovo for us Serbs is not simply GEOGRAPHY, but much more than that. Kosovo is an ideology and an ideal. It was the ideal which was given to the Serbs as a people and to each Serb individually on the day of VIDOVDAN11 in that distant year 1389 as something to strive for. It was on that day that Kosovo and Vidovdan became our “spiritual vertical” and our cornerstone on which we have built all our history, our culture and our statehood from the Battle of Kosovo to this day12 The viewpoint of the Serbian Orthodox church regarding radical right- wing groups is not unified. However, these organisations enjoy the unofficial support of the church. On the level of official narrative, the church basically rejects any form of anti-Semitism, as a thought, believing it to be alien from orthodoxy. However in 2003, the church sainted bishop Nikolaj Velimirovi°, whose writings contained antisemitic thoughts. The intellectuality of Velimirovic is followed by several groups. One of the most significant streams is Obraz, which is a clerical-fascist movement established in 1993. The theocratisation of the Serbian state is a declared aim of the organisation, the creation of a state which is based exclusively on Serbian national traditions and which follows religious values. The ideology of Obraz is a mixture of political conservatism and clerical nationalism, anti-Semitism and homophobia.13 The organisation has stepped up against ethnic and sexual minorities several times, and launched attacks on non-orthodox religious groups, and the activists of the organisation are proven to have been behind numerous other hate crimes. The Dveri movement, which initially consisted of university students, and which is

11 One of the biggest feast of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the memorial day of the battle of Kosovo Polje 12 http://www.eparhija-prizren.com/defaultE.asp?s=vesti&idvestep=2464 [downloaded on 10. 09. 2008.] 13 Byford, Jovan. 2003. Antisemitism and the Christian Right in Post-Milosevic Serbia: From Conspiracy Theory to Hate Crime. Internet Journal of Criminology 1: 1–27. Quasi-Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing Radical Ideology 259 committed to orthodox Christian values can also be considered an influential group. Anti-globalism, xenophobia and religious fundamentalism appear in the ideology of the movement. Their aim is to create a Serbian national and religious unity. Dveri has good relations with the Serbian Orthodox Church; church officials regularly participate in their events. Similarly to Noua Dreapta, these organisations have not become a party either, they are rather considered civil organisations, however, in contrast with the Romanian movement, the connection to the church is much more emphasized in their case. In the case of Slovakia, the third examined country, we find only a few references for the relation between radical right-wing groups and religion. A Christian commitment similar to the already described groups cannot be found within Slovakian radical groups. Romantic 19th century nationalism is more accentuated in their ideology. Slovaks, similarly to other peoples of Eastern Europe, created their own national mythology, one of the central elements of which is the motive thousand-year battle for the autonomous Slovakian nation state (Ková² 1995). According to the myth, with the conquest and destruction of the Moravian state in the 9th century, Hungarians tore apart the unifying block of Slavs and the 900-year “oppression” of Slovaks started. The national awakening of the 19th century ends the “900-year dream”. In contrast with several national mythologies in Eastern Europe, Slovakian historical narrative contains only a few religious elements, which may be because in Slovakia, religion counts only moderately as the pillar of ethnic identity, since the divisions of denominations are not the same as ethnic divisions.14 Religion as an ethnic integrating force is only important for maintaining the nation if the given ethnicity has a different religion than its surroundings. Beside this, it can be said about the leading strata of 20th century Slovakian nationalism that it was tightly connected to the Slovakian Catholic Church. Catholic priest and politician Andrej Hlinka can be mentioned as an example, whose work had a great impact on Slovakian radical right wing thinking. In Hlinka’s concept, Slovakian ambitions for autonomy, clericalism, anti- communism and anti-hungarianism got along well. The acceptance of Lex Hlinka in 2007 by the Slovakian parliament can be considered symbolic, as it also means the rehabilitation of Hlinka’s political legacy. Jozef Tiso, a catholic priest, is another emblematic figure who often appears in Slovakian radical right wing ideologies as a point of reference. He was the president of the fascist Slovakian Republic in

14 Tátrai, Patrik. 2007. Az etnikai és vallási identitás földrajzi vetületei Szlovákiában. Kisebbségkutatás (2). 260 Tamás Szilágyi

World War II, and he was executed for war crimes in 1947.15 The idealization of Tiso’s state is an emphasized part of Slovakian radical right wing narrative and Tiso’s politics have supporters in high Catholic circles. For example, Ján Sokol Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Trnava called Tiso’s Republic a “welfare state” in an interview16, and expressed his personal gratitude to the former president. In April 2008, Sokol held a holy mass for the 61st anniversary of Tiso’s execution and for the redemption of his soul. Later, the spokesman for the Slovakian Catholic Church proclaimed the declaration a private opinion and the holy mass the individual action of Sokol, which the church did not support officially. Slovenská Pospolitosõ, is the best-known Slovakian radical right wing movement, which was originally registered as a party (Slovenská pospolitosõ – Národná strana, SPNS) in 2005, and banned in 2006, since the programme of the party violated the Slovakian constitution and several international standards. SP openly undertakes the legacy of the Slovakian Republic of World War II, and holds regular comme- morations with its activists wearing a uniform similar to the uniform of the so called Hlinka Guard. In the ideology of Slovenská Pospolitosõ, religious elements can be considered the legacy of Tiso’s state ideology and it can be stated that there is no connection between the movement and the church. The references of the movement to Christianity are usually born to strengthen the “We/They” dichotomy and clearly serve the purpose of strengthening and legitimizing the vulgar anti-Semitism of the group. Jednota slovenskej mládeže, can also be considered an important group. The movement was organised on the ideological basis of Slovenská Národná Jednota, and it promotes the “political doctrine of national-christian realism”. It is a declared aim of the organisation to strengthen Slovakian national consciousness. Several other organisations (Nové Slobodné Slovensko, Slovenské Hnutie Obrody etc.) with only a small number of supporters exist in Slovakia which can be categorized as radical right wing, due to their ideology, however these organisations – similarly to the above two movements – have very little importance in the official political field.

15 G. Kovács László.1997. Jozef Tiso. Dunaszerdahely: Nap Kiadó. Hoppenbrouwers, Frans. 1998. Nationalistic Tendencies In The Slovak Roman Catholic Church Religion in Eastern Europe XVIII(6). 16 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6231163.stm [downloaded on 10. 09. 2008.] Quasi-Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing Radical Ideology 261

Comparison of Radical Right Wing Ideologies in Eastern Europe

In comparison with the Hungarian radical right wing ideologies, it can be clearly seen, that radical groups in the examined countries have mono-religious profile. This is especially obvious in the case of Romania and Serbia, where within the groups of these countries, Orthodoxy and spiritual contents connected to Orthodoxy are the main value defining forces of the ideological lines represented by the organisations. Our main problem arises when we wish to categorize the ideologies of the above groups into a system of categories which is relevant from the aspect of the study of religions. Hungarian radical right-wing ideology, despite its heterogeneity, contains the seeds of a “political religion”, and its dimensions can be articulated and analyzed. In the Serbian and Romanian case, we can only mark the visible and determining elements of the ideology, such as religious fundamentalism, nationalism and xenophobia. These ideologies aim to create a totalitarian system, a totalitarian (nation) state, while unifying political and religious power. The religious dimensions of the ideology are clear, since in the case of Noua Dreapta, but especially in the case of Obraz, national and religious identities overlap, and their boundaries are also the same. The two are together the integrating components of the “we consciousness”. In the mentioned countries, the religious and ethnic divisions are the same, which further strengthens the merging of the notion of orthodoxy into the notion of national consciousness. The categories along which we defined the orientation of the Hungarian radical ideological “mainstream” (“sacred land”, “chosen nation”, “ancient past” etc.) are only parts of the nationalistic narrative in the case of the orthodox countries, and the religious contents of the certain ideologies appear separately, in a clean church-like form. In summary: Serbian and Romanian right wing radicalism is organised as a clerico- fascist ideology. Orthodoxy provides the spiritual background of this ideology, and the nationalist political line gives its secular programme. The religious and political dimensions are inseparable, so unlike the “civil religion” or “surrogate religion” character of Eastern European nationalisms, the nationalism of orthodox countries results from religious affiliation and it is not a substitute for it. In the following tables, we try to capture the relation of the radical right wing groups and churches of the examined countries on the level of generalization (see Table 1). In the case of religious orientation, it is visible that Hungary is the only example where we can mention the appearance of traditions that 262 Tamás Szilágyi are different from Christianity. The neopagan orientation is an accentuated element of Hungarian radical thinking and there are more and more followers of indigenous religious traditions beside the primarily Christian majority. Regarding Slovakia and Hungary the nationalism is more determining. Regarding relations to religious minorities, a strongly excluding tendency can be perceived in the case of orthodox countries, while we find an ambivalent approach in the case of the other two countries. We have mentioned above regarding all the examined countries how the given national churches are related to radical right-wing groups.

Table 1: Comparison of the Eastern European radical right-wing movements – orientation

Relation to Religious Religious Orientation Worldview Minorities Christian (Roman Catholic – Hungary Nationalistic Ambivalent Protestant) / Neopagan Romania Orthodox Christian/Nationalistic Exclusionist Serbia Orthodox Christian/Nationalistic Exclusionist Slovakia Roman Catholic/ Lutheran Nationalistic Ambivalent

Table 2: Comparison of the Eastern European radical right-wing movements – background

Support of Churches Support of Society Anti-Semitism

Hungary Low Low Yes Romania Moderate Low Yes Serbia Moderate Moderate Yes Slovakia Low Low Yes

In the cases of the right-wing radical ideologies of the two Orthodox countries that were examined within the framework of the research, it is clear that the dominant political narrative has an explicit religious orientation. In their cases, the commitment to the church excludes the possibility that the ideologies take up the form of a surrogate religion.

Conclusions

In the case of Romania and Serbia, the support of churches appears as moderate because they are connected to the church in many levels and they are relatively embedded in the life of orthodoxy. In the cases of Slovakia and Hungary, there is clearly low church support and in Quasi-Religious Character of the Hungarian Right-Wing Radical Ideology 263 several cases, open rejection. The way these groups appear in the wider social consciousness is primarily determined by their public appearance. Radical groups have basically low support from the society in every country. Their excluding views and their violence is rejected by almost all social strata. Due to the uniqueness of the Serbian political situation, radicals receive a certain amount of support from the society, due to the general nationalistic emotions and the disappointment in moderate political forces. Finally, the factor of anti-Semitism should be mentioned, which appears in all four of the examined countries, though with different emphasi.17 In this case, national movements are on the same platform, though Jewry appears in many cases as the synonym of communist or liberal, however with the usual topos. In the Slovakian example, the religious dimension seems negligible. Being a member of national churches does not mean such a factor of identification, which could further increase nationalistic feelings. The nostalgia of radical groups towards the clerical fascist state of the World War II, and the almost compulsory Christian value orientation does not seem to be enough to attribute religious character to Slovakian radical ideology. The ideology, which in their case serves as a foundation for political action, is a primarily a kind of romantic nationalism and it bears the mark of the ideologies of 20th century totalitarian systems. All these strengthen the uniqueness of the Hungarian radical right wing in the Eastern European political and religious field. The official distancing of historic churches is expected to further increase the syncretistic tendencies (the inclusion of neopagan elements in Christian/national narrative), which have been mentioned in relation to radical movements. This will further distance Hungarian radicalism from Christianity-oriented national radicalisms. If the heterogeneous ideological elements are unified, an aggregation of political ideas and opinions aiming for action garnished in religion will be formed. This aims at fulfilling the messianistic role of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. The new ideology places the individual in a social context; it is able to induce the feeling of community affiliation overwriting the inflation of the idea of the nation) and due to its quasi-religious nature it also offers inner worldly salvation.

17 Shafir, Michael. 2004. Varieties of Antisemitism in Post-Communist East Central Europe. Jewish Studies at the Central European University III. 2002–2003 edited by Kovács András, Andor Eszter. 175–210. Budapest: CEU. Pana, Georgetta. 2006. Reli- gious Anti-Semitism In Romanian Fascist Propaganda. Religion in Eastern Europe 26(2): 1–9.,

List of Contributors

Milda Ališauskien½ is a post-doctoral fellow at the Center for Oriental Studies at Vilnius University. She is also lecturer at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, where teaches courses on the sociology of deviance and contemporary processes of religious group formation. Her 2009 dissertation was entitled “Manifestation and Peculiarities of New Religions in Lithuania: the Case of the Art of Living Foundation”. She has published several articles on contemporary religiosity in Lithuania, focusing on New Age, the Art of Living Foundation, and Satanism, which are based on the material collected during her fieldwork. Her research interests include secularization, religious pluralism, religious fundamentalism, new religious movements, New Age, and Neo-Hinduism.

Branko An²i° is a research assistant at the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb, Croatia. He is engaged at Postgraduate Doctoral Study of Sociology at University of Zagreb. His dissertation will be on topic on religion and health connection with the title „Religious Community as Social Resource: Research on Relationship between Religion and Health”. His scientific focus is on religion in public sphere, social expectations from religion, religiosity and social capital, new religious movements, alternative religiosity, popular and folk religiosity, religion and health connection, non-religiosity, religious education. His also an executive editor of an interdisciplinary journal “Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe” (published by International Study of Religion in East- ern and Central Europe Association).

Victor Cebotari is currently a post-doctoral researcher at Faculty of Arts and Social Science at Maastricht University. Cebotari’s general expertise lies in the field of ethnicity, identity, European politics, pover- ty measurements; mix-methods research designs, migration and remit- tances. Apart from his main research activities, Cebotari is also actively involved in coordinating, lecturing, and tutoring various courses at Maastricht University, and the University College Maastricht. In addition, he is part of various research and training projects commissioned by UNICEF, NUFFIC, NWO, and the European Commission. He has published his research in a number of international peer-reviewed journals and book volumes. 266 List of Contributors

Önder Çetin is a Ph.D. fellow at Leiden University Institute for Area Studies. His doctoral dissertation focuses on the role of Bosnian ulama in the rebuilding of trust and coexistence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Çetin also teaches at the Department of Sociology of Fatih University (Istanbul) on the history of sociological thought, and ethnicity and multicultural society. He has published several articles on the role of religious establishments and the ulama in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Balkans on ethno-religious conflicts as well as peacebuilding. His research interests include social-psychology of inter-group relations and the use/misuse of cultural memory in religious peacebuilding.

Gábor Attila Feleky is a researcher and project manager at the South- ern Great Plains Region Social Research Association (Szeged, Hun- gary). He has been a lecturer at the University of Szeged, teaching courses on the relation between economy and religion, and on new approaches in the sociology of religion. He has published several articles on contemporary religious phenomena – focusing mainly on civil religion and New Age. From 2009 he has been engaged in the study on the situation of migrants in Hungary. In 2010, he became the leader of a research group, which aimed at finding the keys of successful integration of third-country nationals living in Hungary in order to supply policy makers with reliable information.

Milan Fujda is assistant professor at the Department for the Study of Religions, Masaryk University, Brno. His main field of study is the circulation of symbolic resources with reference to (re)forming of order and social relations. He is also concerned with attempts to overcome numerous well established misconceptions in the Study of Religions, including the concept of religion itself. He is an author of some studies (mostly in Czech) and the books Akulturace hinduismu a formování mod- erní religiozity: K sociálním d»jinám ²eského okultismu 1891–1941 [Accultu- ration of Hinduism and Forming of Modern Religiosity: Social History of the Czech Occultism 1891–1941] Oddaní Kršny. Hnutí Haré Kršna v pohledu sociálních v»d [The Krishna Bhaktas. Hare Krishna Movement in the Perspective of Social Sciences; withDušan Lužný].

Dorota Hall, PhD is a cultural anthropologist and sociologist, an assistant professor in the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences. In 2007, she published a book New Age in Poland: the Local Dimension of the Global Phenomenon (in Polish). She has also published papers in academic journals, e.g. Anthropological Journal of European Cultures. Currently, she is starting her research project on the List of Contributors 267 religiosity of Polish LGBTQ people. She is a general secretary of the International Study of Religion in Eastern and Central Europe Associa- tion (ISORECEA) and a member of the network of socio-economic experts in the anti-discrimination field reporting to the European Com- mission.

Tomáš Hrusti² is a post-doctoral researcher at the Institute of Ethnol- ogy at Slovak Academy of Sciences in Bratislava. He received PhD degree in 2008 for his dissertation in comparative studies of religions on Religious Conversions among Roma in Eastern Slovakia, which was based on long-term field research in a Romani community in Eastern Slova- kia. During his academic career, Tomáš has focused on research subjects related to folk religiosity, transmission of religious and supersti- tion concepts and various topics of Romani studies, including religious conversions, political and civic participation and economic strategies of Roma in Slovakia. Together with Tatiana Podolinská he coordinated a comprehensive research on religious missions among Roma in Slovakia and their impacts on social inclusion of Roma. He is also active in NGO sector and works for National Democratic Institute for Interna- tional Affairs on their program dedicated to political participation of Roma in Central and Eastern Europe.

Davor Marko holds MA in Democracy and Human Rights, joint-degree awarded by the University of Sarajevo (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and Bologna (Italia). He completed his BA studies in journalism at the Fa- culty of Political Sciences in Belgrade, Serbia. Last eight years he works in Sarajevo as journalist, media analyst and project coordinator. His field of expertise was media reporting on diversities. He was the leader of regional project Dialogue of diversities, that was implemented during 2007 and 2008, and that was consisted of educational, research and production activities. He is editor in chief of academic magazine Novi pogledi [New perspectives], and he collaborated with various magazine / journals from the region of SEE. In 2009 he published a book Zar na Zapadu postoji drugi Bog? [Does another God exists on the West?], where he analyzed dominant stereotypes and prejudices on Islam in media of Western Balkans. Also, he is co-editor of a book State or Nation? Chal- lenges for Political Transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2011).

Dumitru Minzarari is a PhD student with the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, United States. His interests, among others, include topics such as church-state relations in transition countries, the influence of religion on political development 268 List of Contributors and modernization, and the evolution of Orthodox (Eastern) Church in post-Soviet area as a political institution. He also works on investigating the effect of beliefs on radicalization in Western Europe and the mechanisms of religious diffusion.

Michaela Ondrašinová is a Ph.D. student at the Department for the Study of Religions at Masaryk University in Brno. Her research interests include detraditionalization of religion, diverse forms of “spiritual seekership” in the Czech context and methodology of qualitative research. Within her dissertation project she focuses on the role of tradition(s) in creation of individual and collective identities of Czech spiritual seekers. She published a study on the “Ethnography of the Expected” of a local holistic milieu (with E. Hamar and G. Oláh) and a study on limitations of widely used academic conceptualizations of detraditionalized religion/spirituality.

Bogdan Mihai Radu is assistant professor of Political Science at Babes- Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Irvine, and his MA in European Politics and Policy from the University of Manchester. His research interests revolve around political culture and its dimensions, limits and measurements in the context of democratic transition and consolidation in East Central Europe. In his doctoral dissertation entitled “Traditional believers and democratic citizens. A contextualized analysis of the effects of religion on support for democracy in East Central Europe”, Bogdan analyzed the interplay between religious and political variables in post- communist countries of East Central Europe. He also conducted and published research focusing on the relationship between church and state in former communist countries, the impact of religious values on political participation, and social constructions of national and religious identities.

Cosima Rughiniò is Associate Professor at the Department of Sociology and Social Work, University of Bucharest, where she teaches courses on sociological explanation and on marginal communities. Her recent publications discuss conceptual and methodological issues of measuring scientific literacy and ethnicity in sociological surveys. Her research interests include public understanding of science and social science, secularity, gender and social theory, and sociological research methodology. She is also the Editor-in-chief of Compaso - The Journal of Com- parative Research in Anthropology and Sociology. List of Contributors 269

František Šístek, Ph. D. is a research fellow at the Institute of History – Czech Academy of Sciences. He also teaches modern history of the Balkans at the Faculty of Social Sciences – Charles University, Prague. His research interests have evolved around national identities, images and stereotypes of the other and competing interpretations of the past in Southeastern and Central Europe. He has published several mono- graphs and co-edited volumes, most recently Junáci, horalé a lenoši (He- roes, Highlanders and Idlers), (Prague 2011) which focuses on Czech representations of Montenegro in the 19th and 20th centuries.

RafaÙ SmoczyÚski is an assistant professor at Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. His current research interests revolve around questions of social control studies, sociology of religion and discourse theory. He enhanced his knowledge in the field during research projects, scholarships and grants most notably at the University of Sheffield, London School of Economics, University of Portland, University of Bergen. Recently he has co-edited with Dorota Hall New Religious Movements and Conflict in Central Europe, Warszawa: IFiS PAN Publishers, 2010

Tamás Szilágyi studied Study of Religions and Ethics at University of Szeged. He is PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Pécs. He is assistant research fellow in Bálint Sándor Institute for the Study of Religions and assistant lecturer of Department for the Scientif- ic Study of Religions at University of Szeged. His teaching and research interests include topics in the religion and politics, contemporary paganism, western esotericism and comparative mythology.

Index of Objects anti-cult 49, 50, 53, 54, 55, 56, Buddhism 39, 41, 53, 59, 88, 89, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 99, 143, 90, 98 144 Bulgaria 98, 153, 154, 155, 156, atheism 88, 94, 112, 146 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, authority 35, 70, 72, 74, 82, 84, 164, 166, 221, 229, 230, 233, 86, 101, 105, 106, 107, 109, 234, 237, 246, 247, 248 110, 113, 144, 176, 184, 185, catholic 184, 185, 259 186, 187 Catholicism 9, 23, 37, 38, 40, 41, Balkan 75, 76, 77, 121, 130, 171, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 50, 90, 104, 178, 179, 191, 257 155, 185, 214, 222 Baltic 133, 134, 136, 137, 139, census 71, 136, 155, 198 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, Christian 9, 23, 38, 39, 40, 41, 146, 148 69, 86, 88, 90, 101, 103, 104, belief 10, 13, 19, 20, 24, 27, 33, 112, 117, 119, 120, 121, 124, 36, 129, 160, 186, 214, 218, 136, 142, 146, 147, 148, 154, 228, 229, 238, 248, 255 155, 167, 198, 202, 216, 217, beliefs 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 218, 221, 222, 223, 228, 251, 20, 21, 37, 39, 46, 109, 135, 252, 255, 258, 259, 262, 263 136, 145, 146, 147, 148, 166, church 18, 20, 23, 26, 33, 38, 39, 171, 172, 175, 179, 181, 184, 41, 45, 47, 58, 68, 103, 111, 186, 187, 188, 189, 203, 230, 112, 114, 115, 116, 118, 120, 235, 236, 237, 241, 244 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, Bosnia 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 136, 137, 140, 148, 152, 156, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 79, 123, 159, 160, 186, 202, 208, 217, 171, 178, 191, 192, 193, 194, 223, 224, 227, 228, 230, 231, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 232, 236, 240, 243, 245, 246, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 225, 247, 248, 251, 252, 253, 256, 258 257, 258, 260, 261, 262 Bosnia-Herzegovina 191, 193, churches 23, 25, 27, 33, 34, 36, 194, 195 37, 38, 39, 41, 46, 93, 112, Bosniak 65, 66, 67, 71, 76, 77, 113, 117, 118, 119, 125, 127, 78, 194, 197, 198, 199, 200, 128, 129, 138, 145, 157, 159, 202, 204 160, 161, 165, 201, 209, 223, 230, 232, 245, 251, 256, 261, Bosnian 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 262, 263 78, 191, 192, 196, 202, 203 church-state 103, 115, 116, 152, British 51, 52, 170, 174, 185 159 272 Index of Objects clergy 111, 112, 114, 119, 128, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 140 159, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166 clericalization 118, 123 Czechoslovak 86, 87, 89, 91, 92, communism 93, 154, 157, 167, 93, 100 191, 207, 219, 226, 231, 255, Czechoslovakia 81, 83, 84, 85, 259 86, 87, 90, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, communist 55, 112, 153, 154, 98, 99, 101 157, 169, 171, 173, 175, 183, democracies 171, 173, 176, 181, 184, 185, 187, 193, 211, 218, 187, 222, 223, 231 221, 223, 224, 225, 231, 232, democracy 81, 103, 105, 110, 263 113, 134, 159, 179, 181, 182, communities 25, 30, 54, 55, 71, 187, 188, 211, 213, 217, 221, 74, 75, 77, 78, 82, 87, 134, 222, 224, 225, 226, 228, 229, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 240, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 159, 245 160, 161, 171, 172, 173, 178, democratic 45, 82, 103, 105, 192, 195, 201, 217, 223, 253 106, 113, 115, 116, 133, 157, community 65, 69, 70, 71, 72, 159, 175, 221, 222, 223, 224, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 86, 103, 225, 226, 227, 230, 231, 232, 104, 115, 136, 137, 140, 141, 245, 255 156, 159, 170, 173, 175, 178, democratization 70, 103, 105, 192, 199, 202, 214, 226, 253, 106, 115, 159, 182, 221, 222, 254, 263 223, 224, 225, 227, 228 consciousness 14, 50, 120, 128, denomination 33, 44, 61, 170, 170, 253, 260, 261, 263 171, 174, 175, 178, 179, 180, conservatism 113, 222, 229, 182, 186, 188, 221, 227, 228, 252, 258 230, 231, 232 conservative 200, 203, 227, 228, detraditionalized 33, 34, 35, 36, 229, 231 37, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 83, Croatia 53, 54, 55, 58, 61, 71, 85, 99, 100 121, 123, 124, 153, 154, 155, development 14, 17, 19, 37, 38, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 39, 42, 46, 51, 73, 81, 83, 87, 163, 164, 165, 166, 194, 195, 92, 93, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 198, 199, 204 107, 108, 110, 115, 116, 120, cult 50, 53, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 134, 146, 148, 151, 157, 170, 143, 144, 255 175, 207, 224 culture 10, 41, 44, 52, 61, 103, discourse 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 105, 107, 109, 110, 114, 116, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 53, 55, 65, 157, 186, 217, 224, 236, 252, 66, 97, 120, 122, 129, 165, 254, 258 203, 204, 216 Czech 33, 35, 36, 37, 42, 43, 44, discrimination 135, 136, 145, 45, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 90, 146, 147, 148, 171, 172, 173, 91, 92, 94, 95, 98, 100, 101, 176, 178, 180, 182, 184, 185, 188 Index of Objects 273 eastern 221 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, education 10, 95, 96, 140, 154, 148, 159, 222 158, 159, 163, 164, 174, 175, future 10, 18, 19, 20, 21, 47, 78, 183, 184, 185, 210, 212, 213, 116, 122, 165, 166, 186, 208, 218, 224, 227, 229, 230, 239 212 elite 45, 192, 254 Germany 9, 111, 135, 153, 208, esoterika 37, 38, 39 237, 241, 246, 248, 249 Estonia 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, god 255 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 148 government 78, 111, 112, 113, ethnic 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 116, 119, 144, 166, 188, 211, 30, 75, 121, 123, 124, 129, 216, 226, 245, 256, 258 157, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, Greek 23, 119, 127, 137, 138, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 142, 155, 253 182, 184, 187, 188, 192, 193, groups 14, 18, 24, 26, 28, 52, 53, 194, 195, 225, 232, 253, 254, 54, 56, 58, 60, 68, 69, 78, 85, 258, 259, 261 87, 98, 125, 136, 144, 145, ethnicity 23, 26, 27, 28, 30, 169, 146, 147, 148, 151, 153, 164, 172, 174, 184, 187, 192, 193, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 259 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, Europe 1, 7, 18, 44, 49, 54, 55, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 192, 60, 65, 70, 71, 81, 97, 99, 103, 193, 194, 199, 204, 210, 212, 107, 111, 117, 129, 139, 151, 226, 251, 252, 253, 256, 258, 152, 154, 155, 157, 164, 166, 259, 261, 262, 263 169, 171, 175, 176, 178, 180, Herzegovina 69, 71, 73, 75, 78, 181, 182, 183, 186, 187, 188, 79, 171, 191, 192, 193, 194, 203, 208, 214, 216, 217, 219, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 229, 202, 203, 204, 205 231, 232, 241, 244, 251, 253, historical 35, 38, 44, 45, 53, 66, 255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 263 74, 78, 81, 87, 99, 103, 104, European 8, 9, 44, 55, 57, 69, 97, 105, 106, 107, 115, 117, 118, 99, 101, 110, 133, 144, 145, 119, 120, 123, 124, 125, 127, 153, 154, 156, 159, 170, 171, 128, 129, 133, 135, 136, 158, 172, 179, 180, 181, 182, 186, 167, 183, 207, 231, 232, 251, 187, 188, 200, 203, 211, 212, 252, 253, 254, 257, 259 213, 216, 217, 221, 222, 224, history 41, 47, 66, 93, 94, 100, 225, 235, 236, 240, 251, 253, 103, 106, 119, 120, 126, 170, 254, 255, 256, 261, 262, 263 203, 208, 214, 215, 217, 232, faith 18, 23, 26, 27, 38, 41, 101, 253, 254, 255, 257, 258 104, 147, 148, 162, 187, 201, Hungarian 23, 251, 252, 253, 231, 252, 254, 256 254, 255, 256, 261, 262, 263 Finland 12, 237, 240, 241, 244, Hungary 10, 12, 153, 155, 156, 246, 248 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, freedom 54, 91, 99, 113, 133, 166, 251, 253, 261, 262 134, 135, 137, 139, 140, 141, 274 Index of Objects identities 49, 51, 53, 55, 60, 62, minorities 134, 136, 155, 158, 65, 66, 88, 118, 129, 169, 179, 172, 173, 176, 177, 178, 180, 192, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 182, 184, 186, 191, 255, 258, 212, 213, 214, 218, 219, 225, 262 236, 261 minority 50, 112, 133, 134, 148, ideological 50, 51, 52, 53, 55, 170, 171, 172, 173, 176, 178, 56, 68, 96, 112, 113, 114, 122, 179, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 157, 159, 169, 171, 173, 176, 191, 198, 199 191, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, modern 10, 38, 45, 65, 87, 100, 260, 261, 263 109, 113, 114, 116, 151, 152, ideology 20, 56, 59, 66, 86, 94, 169, 193, 252, 253, 254 105, 108, 109, 113, 169, 191, modernization 51, 104, 116, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 151, 174, 183, 224, 225, 227, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263 228, 230 ISKCON 49, 50, 53, 57, 58, 59, Moldova 221, 229, 230, 233, 60, 61, 137 234, 248 Islam 65, 74, 78, 112, 191, 192, monastery 111, 124 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, Montenegro 71, 73, 117, 118, 201, 202, 203, 204, 222, 223, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 236 125, 126, 127, 128, 203 Jehovah´s 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, moral 24, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 30 55, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62, 95, 114, Jesus 19, 30, 38, 39 153, 159, 160, 161, 188, 214, Jewish 30, 139, 142, 201, 203, 238, 239, 240, 245, 252 251, 263 morality 96, 114, 140, 162, 213, Kosovo 71, 74, 225, 257, 258 217, 218, 238, 239, 240, 243, Krishna 50, 53, 58, 61 244, 245, 246, 247, 248 Latvia 133, 134, 136, 137, 138, movement 7, 9, 24, 30, 33, 45, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 58, 59, 69, 81, 87, 93, 98, 143, 148 144, 203, 215, 254, 255, 258, liberal 103, 110, 113, 122, 139, 260 141, 221, 226, 228, 229, 231, movements 23, 49, 50, 53, 54, 255, 263 56, 58, 59, 81, 82, 98, 133, Lithuania 133, 134, 136, 137, 134, 136, 143, 145, 147, 226, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 252, 253, 254, 255, 260, 262, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153 263 Lutheran 136, 139, 140, 251, mystic 39, 85, 89, 100, 255 262 narratives 26, 27, 28, 30, 40, market 23, 83, 87, 93, 99, 114, 117, 118, 119, 128, 252 145, 193, 224, 226, 228 nation 29, 30, 45, 54, 65, 117, meditation 11, 13, 20, 37, 42, 121, 122, 123, 125, 129, 157, 85, 89, 91, 97, 99 169, 170, 173, 174, 175, 176, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 207, 208, 209, 214, 215, 216, 219, Index of Objects 275

226, 230, 233, 252, 254, 256, 230, 231, 233, 234, 237, 246, 257, 259, 261, 263 247, 249 national 25, 50, 65, 66, 68, 69, political 42, 43, 55, 66, 68, 70, 79, 81, 86, 111, 113, 114, 117, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 94, 99, 119, 122, 123, 125, 127, 128, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 129, 130, 153, 155, 157, 161, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 162, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 115, 116, 117, 118, 121, 122, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 153, 154, 155, 159, 162, 163, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 197, 164, 165, 166, 171, 172, 174, 199, 201, 207, 208, 209, 210, 175, 176, 185, 187, 188, 191, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 217, 219, 225, 227, 229, 230, 199, 200, 202, 207, 208, 215, 232, 236, 241, 251, 252, 253, 216, 217, 219, 221, 223, 224, 254, 255, 257, 258, 259, 260, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 261, 262, 263 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, nationalism 118, 121, 122, 125, 239, 240, 243, 244, 246, 247, 128, 129, 169, 179, 183, 184, 248, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 207, 225, 227, 230, 232, 253, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263 254, 257, 258, 259, 261, 262, politics 45, 47, 57, 67, 79, 105, 263 114, 117, 121, 165, 166, 191, NRMs 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 192, 193, 198, 200, 218, 236, 56, 57, 59, 60 237, 238, 240, 255, 260 occult 7, 9, 13, 19, 81, 82, 83, 86, post-communist 55, 62, 110, 87, 88, 93, 98 129, 169, 207, 223, 226, 229, occultism 13, 14, 82 231 orthodox 90, 178, 233, 254, 255, power 19, 36, 38, 39, 43, 52, 65, 256, 258, 261, 262 66, 77, 81, 82, 89, 99, 100, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, orthodoxy 254, 256, 258, 261, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 151, 262 179, 253, 261 pagan 7, 18, 140, 252 protestant 20, 222 panic 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, regime 76, 82, 87, 90, 94, 100, 56, 57, 59, 60, 62 101, 112, 121, 122, 123, 124, past 87, 89, 115, 154, 157, 169, 125, 127, 128, 176, 181, 185, 183, 193, 196, 223, 251, 254, 187, 193, 194, 218, 226 256, 261 region 9, 12, 18, 23, 41, 44, 47, pluralism 107, 110, 115, 116, 65, 78, 95, 118, 136, 172, 178, 222 211, 213, 241, 251, 253, 256 Poland 35, 44, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, reincarnation 14, 17, 19, 20, 37 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 138, religion 7, 9, 12, 14, 19, 20, 21, 139, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 166, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 43, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 215, 218, 219, 221, 228, 229, 54, 56, 61, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 276 Index of Objects

71, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 231, 233, 234, 237, 238, 246, 81, 82, 85, 97, 99, 100, 101, 247, 249, 253, 256, 261, 262 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 111, Romanian 253, 254, 255, 259, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 261, 263 119, 122, 127, 128, 129, 133, Russia 98, 103, 104, 107, 108, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 115, 116, 224 146, 147, 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, Russian 27, 65, 104, 111, 112, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 113, 114, 115, 116, 125, 136, 166, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 137, 138, 140, 142, 180, 225, 175, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 226, 230, 258 183, 186, 187, 188, 191, 192, samizdat 82, 85, 87, 90, 91, 92 193, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, Sandžak 65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73, 201, 202, 203, 204, 207, 208, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 198 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, Sarajevo 65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73, 215, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 74, 75, 77, 191, 192, 194, 199, 223, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 201, 202, 203, 204 231, 232, 235, 236, 237, 238, secular 54, 74, 118, 119, 126, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 129, 157, 169, 193, 204, 209, 245, 246, 247, 248, 251, 252, 216, 217, 231, 235, 237, 239, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 244, 261 259, 260, 261, 262, 263 secularity 235, 236, 237, 238, religions 7, 19, 20, 34, 67, 74, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 246, 105, 114, 133, 134, 136, 137, 247, 248 138, 140, 143, 144, 146, 148, secularization 34, 129, 151, 152, 151, 152, 153, 158, 159, 161, 156, 166, 222, 232, 236 164, 165, 167, 191, 195, 197, 201, 222, 223, 227, 231, 252, Serb 117, 120, 121, 122, 123, 255, 261 124, 125, 126, 129, 192, 257, 258 religiosity 9, 10, 23, 33, 34, 45, 46, 81, 83, 85, 100, 151, 152, Serbia 66, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 155, 156, 157, 158, 166, 207, 76, 77, 78, 79, 117, 118, 120, 213, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 121, 122, 123, 125, 153, 194, 241, 242, 243, 244, 252 195, 198, 199, 204, 221, 229, 230, 233, 234, 249, 256, 257, representation 25, 28, 45, 67, 258, 261, 262 197, 198, 238, 258 Serbian 65, 72, 75, 77, 78, 117, republic 105, 122, 124, 125, 192, 118, 119, 121, 122, 125, 191, 221 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 202, revolution 19, 104, 255 203, 204, 256, 257, 258, 261, roman 254 263 Romania 99, 153, 154, 155, 156, Slovakia 23, 24, 25, 26, 54, 55, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 164, 165, 166, 221, 229, 230, 161, 163, 164, 166, 259, 260, 262 ȱ Index of Objects 277

Slovenia 8, 9, 53, 58, 61, 71, 121, spirituality 7, 8, 11, 18, 19, 33, 124, 140, 153, 154, 155, 156, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 165, 44, 45, 46, 47, 256 166, 237, 240, 246, 247, 249 state 18, 19, 26, 42, 49, 51, 54, social 9, 10, 12, 25, 28, 30, 34, 55, 56, 71, 75, 77, 88, 96, 98, 35, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 111, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 67, 81, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 97, 103, 104, 106, 108, 110, 120, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134, 112, 113, 115, 126, 129, 135, 137, 138, 139, 141, 147, 155, 144, 147, 148, 152, 153, 154, 159, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 157, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 185, 186, 188, 194, 200, 207, 165, 166, 169, 170, 171, 176, 217, 218, 219, 225, 229, 232, 186, 189, 192, 193, 196, 208, 240, 243, 251, 252, 254, 256, 212, 213, 219, 223, 224, 226, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263 231, 239, 241, 243, 245, 252, states 98, 122, 133, 136, 137, 255, 263 138, 141, 152, 155, 169, 170, socialism 9, 24, 226 171, 179, 183, 188, 191, 203, socialization 109, 183, 228 222, 224, 255, 257 societies 104, 133, 136, 145, 148, Sweden 182, 237, 246, 247, 249 151, 152, 155, 157, 159, 166, telepathy 10, 11, 13, 14, 17 169, 172, 183, 186, 187, 188, terrorism 76, 197, 198, 199, 200, 209, 211, 212, 219, 223, 231, 204, 205 235, 238, 243, 244 theory 35, 47, 51, 55, 105, 110, society 26, 30, 34, 44, 45, 47, 50, 144, 152, 174, 183, 193, 204, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 67, 83, 207, 224, 257 87, 100, 104, 105, 106, 107, therapy 18 108, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 122, 126, 127, 129, 134, 135, tradition 9, 25, 39, 40, 41, 50, 136, 138, 139, 144, 145, 146, 68, 69, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 147, 151, 154, 155, 157, 159, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 98, 161, 162, 164, 165, 167, 170, 101, 107, 111, 126, 140, 144, 172, 176, 181, 184, 186, 191, 146, 151, 152, 154, 211, 212, 192, 193, 200, 201, 204, 209, 213, 214, 215, 216, 255 218, 222, 223, 224, 238, 242, traditional 24, 30, 45, 54, 55, 56, 245, 263 66, 69, 72, 74, 82, 108, 113, solidarity 66, 175, 184 124, 126, 127, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 145, 147, 151, spiritual 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 157, 158, 169, 181, 182, 186, 19, 20, 21, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 201, 207, 214, 219, 222, 229, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 232, 236, 238, 239, 240, 243, 45, 46, 47, 61, 75, 81, 82, 84, 245, 252 85, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 108, traditions 19, 24, 33, 36, 68, 78, 114, 144, 162, 165, 214, 245, 82, 84, 87, 89, 100, 105, 106, 252, 255, 258, 261 107, 126, 127, 142, 159, 175, 201, 254, 255, 256, 258, 261 278 Index of Objects transition 81, 103, 105, 154, 179, 183, 186, 187, 188, 189, 198, 181, 183, 184, 185, 188, 221, 200, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 223, 225, 226, 228 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, Ukraine 113, 153, 154, 155, 156, 222, 224, 226, 228, 229, 231, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 233, 236, 238, 239, 240, 245, 165, 166, 226, 249 252, 253, 257, 258 USSR 103, 110, 111, 112, 113, west 187 115, 179, 180, 184, 185, 225 western 119, 187, 221, 222, 231, value 30, 42, 51, 53, 104, 108, 254 153, 170, 173, 178, 183, 195, witnesses 24, 25, 26, 27 210, 214, 215, 236, 251, 252, xenophobia 218, 255, 259, 261 254, 257, 261, 263 yoga 18, 19, 20, 37, 61 values 23, 24, 30, 34, 39, 40, 41, Yugoslavia 68, 70, 72, 74, 117, 46, 47, 49, 52, 104, 105, 110, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 112, 113, 116, 133, 153, 162, 129, 192, 257 169, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182,