DOCSLIB.ORG

Army Opens Way for Post-Bouteflika Era, Risky

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Army Opens Way for Post-Bouteflika Era, Risky UK £2 Issue 199, Year 4 March 31, 2019 EU €2.50 www.thearabweekly.com Interview Trump’s Tunisian Arab minister brain decision on of women drain the Golan Page 21 Page 20 Page 11 Army opens way for post-Bouteflika era, risky transition ahead in Algeria ► Despite their commitment to far-reaching change, many protest leaders are cautious about what next steps to take. Lamine Ghanmi insufficient to appease large crowds that demanded implementation of Article 7 of the constitution, which Tunis stipulates that “the Algerian peo- ple is the source of political power.” he prospect of Algerian “All that was offered by the re- President Abdelaziz Boutef- gime’s figures, including Gaid lika leaving office when Salah, is dust swept away by the T his term ends April 28 is a wind,” said parliament Member foregone conclusion. Experts said Khaled Tazaghart, from the oppo- Algerian Army Chief of Staff Gener- sition Socialist Forces Front, as he al Ahmed Gaid Salah sealed Boutef- marched in Algiers. “People want lika’s fate when he called on the the whole regime with all its sym- Constitutional Council to declare bols and personnel to go away.” the president unfit for office. There are many possible prob- This recalled previous military lems ahead, including a poten- interventions in Algerian politics tial power vacuum if the military since independence in 1962 that does not implement a transition entrenched a de facto military au- plan before Bouteflika’s term ends tocracy. April 28. There is also the risk of violent confrontations after weeks of The protests started to peaceful protests. “Imagine the show signs of division nightmare scenario that the mili- based on region and of tary would have to face if the im- antagonism between passe pushes millions of Algerians secularists and to clash in the streets with the se- Islamists. curity forces across the country,” said political writer Walid Ait Said. Military leaders used to decide Opposition figure Said Saadi, behind closed doors what course whose views have influenced the the country should take in major protest movement, warned that Closing a chapter. A 2012 file picture shows Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (L) and Army decisions, such as picking the pres- Gaid Salah’s move could “push the Chief of Staff General Ahmed Gaid Salah reviewing an honour guard near Algiers. (AP) ident. Now, however, the military army into the downward spiral of is negotiating a tight curve amid a facing off with the people.” powerful popular movement that The protests started to show be pushed into a new adventure to be adopted by parliament. Opponents are also wary of an keeps it under pressure. signs of division based on region with initiatives that threaten the If Gaid Salah’s proposal gains extended transition period once Gaid Salah sees Article 102 as the and of antagonism between secu- nation’s cohesion like the proposal traction and Bouteflika is found in- Bouteflika leaves office. way “out of the crisis.” larists and Islamists. In Tizi Ouzou, for the creation of a constituent as- capable of governing, the president “The logic says the people must However, some in the opposi- the stronghold of secularists in the sembly,” said constitutional law ex- would be replaced by Senate Presi- end the regime and, after that, the tion said that proposal has come Berber-speaking Kabylie region, pert Fatiha Ben Abbou, who backs dent Abdelkader Bensalah, who people decide what kind of regime too late. “Implementing this article protesters marched for the first the protests. would have 90 days to call presi- they want, with an election agenda has been overtaken by the events. time with signs in which pictures The army must demonstrate cre- dential elections. The vote would following later,” said leftist opposi- It should have been applied years of leading Islamists were combined ativity and imagination to remain occur under the watch of the gov- tion Workers’ Party leader Louisa ago,” said opposition Culture and with those of regime figures. credible with the populace. Only ernment of Prime Minister Noured- Hanoune. Democracy Rally party leader Despite their commitment to Bouteflika’s traditional backers fell dine Bedoui. She said she does not see a long Mohcine Belabbas, in reference to far-reaching change, many protest in line with Gaid Salah’s suggestion Some legal experts and protest transition under the current gov- Bouteflika’s ill health, including a leaders are cautious about what that the Constitutional Council figures say Bensalah cannot be ernment as “a good solution for stroke in 2013. next steps to take. invoke Article 102 of the Algerian interim president because he is a Algeria.” Protesters showed signs of radi- “Safeguarding the unity and Constitution to possibly declare dual Algerian-Moroccan national calisation March 29. Gaid Salah’s the stability of the country is the the president unfit. and the constitution stipulates the Lamine Ghanmi is an Arab Weekly call for the implementation of Ar- most important and crucial issue If approved by the Constitutional Algerian president must be only of correspondent in Tunis. ticle 102 a few days earlier seemed now. It is nonsense for Algeria to Council, the measure would have Algerian nationality. P4 Tunis gets a facelift and Tunisians a dose of optimism at Arab summit Stephen Quillen ing financial crisis and a fractured under the same roof and seeking Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud on tions, hundreds of Arab and inter- political scene, the influx of high- to strike compromises on divisive March 28. “We hope that the sum- national media representatives ranking officials and visitors came issues. mit will give an impetus for more travelled to Tunisia to report on Tunis as a welcome change and boon for solidarity and cooperation be- issues pertinent to their respective the economy. tween Arab states.” countries, including the Palestini- unisia’s capital received a Not only were hotels in Tunis The presence of King Salman, an issue, conflicts in Libya, Yemen welcome facelift ahead of and its suburbs at capacity but who arrived a few days before the and Syria and US President Donald the 30th Arab League sum- restaurants, shops and popular summit, reflected deepening ties Trump’s recognition of the Golan T mit, with the city’s roads, venues enjoyed a steady stream between Tunis and Riyadh since Heights as Israeli territory. public parks and main squares ti- of customers who brought in Caid Essebsi’s election in 2014. died up and freshly decorated for revenue for a recovering tour- The Tunisian presidency said the occasion. ism sector. King Salman’s visit was an op- For Tunisia, the influx of Welcome billboards and flags of The country’s hard currency portunity to develop “all areas high-ranking officials the visiting Arab League countries reserves — having steadily de- in the interest of the two broth- and visitors came as a greeted scores of high-level dig- clined for years — rose by three erly peoples.” welcome change and nitaries and thousands of visitors extra days during the week of At the top of Tunisia’s sum- boon for the economy. arriving in Tunis, while security the summit. mit agenda was the conflict in services were put on high alert by The event also offered Tuni- neighbouring Libya. Strife there The central media point was Tu- the Ministry of Interior. sians a respite from the country’s since 2011 has adversely affected nisia’s City of Culture, a 9-hectare Residents joked that Tunisia fractious politics, as local media trade and employment opportuni- downtown arts complex down the should host more summits to en- shifted focus from the domestic ties in Tunisia. road from the Palais des Congres, sure periodic renovation for its scene towards broader regional is- Former Tunisian Foreign Minis- where Arab heads of state con- public spaces, which are often sues. ter Ahmed Ounaies told the Asso- vened for the summit March 31. derided for having fallen into dis- Tunisian leaders said they ciated Press that the summit could array. The city’s upgraded appear- sought to maintain the country’s “Tunisia is renowned for its be a victory for Tunisia, “especial- Stephen Quillen is an Arab ance was not the only cause for traditional position of neutrality moderation and rationalism,” said ly if it manages to advance the po- Weekly correspondent in Tunis. optimism, however. in Arab affairs, taking pride in as- Tunisian President Beji Caid Es- litical process in Libya.” For Tunisia, beset by a linger- sembling so many Arab leaders sebsi as he welcomed Saudi King Apart from visiting state delega- P2-3,6 2 March 31, 2019 Cover Story Arab Summit Tunisia counts on ‘diplomatic rationalism’ to shore up Arab solidarity Lamine Ghanmi Tunis unisia hosted high-ranking officials from across the Arab world for a regional summit T March 31 it hoped would re- build Arab solidarity and strengthen its diplomatic role. Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, UN Secretary-General An- tonio Guterres and Arab League Sec- retary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit were among those arriving ahead of the 30th Arab League summit, which sought to address regional crises such as the conflicts in Libya and Yemen and the Palestinian issue Tunisian Foreign Minister Khe- maies Jhinaoui said the choice of Tunisia as the summit site was not “simply good luck” but reflected “Arab leaders’ deep and full convic- tion that Tunisia is a welcoming land that embraces all Arabs.” Strong attendance by Arab lead- ers, he said, was a “testament that Tunisia has regained its position on the Arab world stage. President Beji Caid Essebsi was eager to visit his brothers in various Arab capitals since he became president,” Jhi- naoui said.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • University Microfilms, a XEROX Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan
    MASTERS THESIS H-3321 KLETZIEN, Sharon Benge THE CHANGING STATUS OF TUNISIAN WOMEN. The American University» M.A., 1971 Sociology, general University Microfilms, A XEROX Company , Ann Arbor, Michigan © 1972 Sharon Benge Kletzlen ALL RIGHTS RESERVED THE CHANGING STATUS OF TUNISIAN WOMEN by Sharon Benge Kletzlen Submitted to the School of International Service of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Studies Signatures of Committee:' Chairman: . f ) Dean of' the School Date; f 1 I_____ Date: I ^ JHÈ /lyiftjCAN UNIVERSITY Th^merlcan University y , __p . Washington, D.C, rCD o Valù PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received. University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION .................................. 1 The purpose of Che study ........................... L Justification of the study ......................... 1 Organization of the thesis . 2 II. EARLY HISTORY ........... ' ............................ 7 The Phoenicians and Carthage ......................... 7 Rome ............................................... 9 The Vandals 9 / / / The Byzantines ........................................ 10 /' y Summary 11 / / / . Ill. ISLAMIZATION AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN .................. ;4.' / Historical background .............................. / 12 /'■ Women in traditional Islam ...................... r. 17 /' ' IV. THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE / . 25 ( / V. INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEW EMANCIPATION.................
    [Show full text]
  • Russia and Iran in Syria— a Random Partnership Or an Enduring Alliance? an Interim Report
    Atlantic Council RAFIK HARIRI CENTER FOR THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE BRIEF Russia and Iran in Syria— a Random Partnership or an Enduring Alliance? An interim report JUNE 2019 AMBASSADOR MICHEL DUCLOS Russia and Iran are allies in Syria not out of mutual sympathy, but for pragmatic reasons. According to many reports, Iranian leaders—nota- bly including Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Al-Quds force of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC)—were instrumental in convinc- ing Vladimir Putin to send his air force to Syria and save Bashar al-As- sad’s skin in September 2015.1 However, various episodes highlight the limits of what looks like a circumstantial alliance. On February 26, 2019, Assad was received in Tehran by Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Revolution, in a setting evidently designed to showcase the Syrian dictator’s per- sonal allegiance to the supreme leader and his debt of gratitude to the IRGC.2 On the very same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was once again in Moscow, where he met with President Putin.3 The asymmetric priorities in Tehran and Moscow could not seem clearer. A few months earlier, on May 9, 2018, Netanyahu attended the parade on Red Square, alongside Putin, on the anniversary of the end of World War Two ( the “Great Patriotic War” in Russian parlance).4 The follow- 1 Laila Bassam and Tom Perry, “‘Send Qassem Soleimani’: Here’s how Putin and Iran Plotted Out Their New Assault in Syria,” Reuters, October 6, 2015, https:// www.businessinsider.fr/us/r-how-iranian-general-plotted-out-syrian-assault-in- moscow-2015-10.
    [Show full text]
  • The Evolution of the Revolution
    The Evolution of the Revolution THE CHANGING NATURE OF IRAN’S AXIS OF RESISTANCE KENNETH M. POLLACK MARCH 2020 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary ince the earliest days after the 1979 Islamic Soleimani in January 2020 could significantly impede S Revolution, the Iranian regime has sought to build further progress. a coalition across the Middle East to help it achieve its As it stands currently, the Axis is comprised of ideological and geostrategic goals. Tehran understood both state and non-state actors. These groups include that its ability to secure the Islamic Republic in Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liber- overturn the regional status quo, drive out the United ation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC), States, and make Iran the regional hegemon was lim- Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and occasionally the ited if it acted on its own. It could only succeed with Kurdistan Workers’ Party. State and quasi-state actors the help of others. openly aligned with Tehran include Hamas in Gaza, However, for the next two decades, the Axis was Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Syria, and the Houthis little more than rhetoric, ascribing greater unity in Yemen. of effort to an amalgam of states,semi-states , and Ultimately, the new operating method of Iran’s non-state actors than was ever the reality. It was pri- Axis of Resistance is a strategy born of necessity. It marily a psychological ploy to frighten its adversaries is a strategy of the weak, unlikely to succeed against and make its members feel less isolated in the face the strong except when they are badly constrained of American hostility.
    [Show full text]
  • Re-Thinking Secularism in Post-Independence Tunisia
    The Journal of North African Studies ISSN: 1362-9387 (Print) 1743-9345 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fnas20 Re-thinking secularism in post-independence Tunisia Rory McCarthy To cite this article: Rory McCarthy (2014) Re-thinking secularism in post-independence Tunisia, The Journal of North African Studies, 19:5, 733-750, DOI: 10.1080/13629387.2014.917585 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014.917585 Published online: 12 May 2014. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 465 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fnas20 Download by: [Rory McCarthy] Date: 15 December 2015, At: 02:37 The Journal of North African Studies, 2014 Vol. 19, No. 5, 733–750, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2014.917585 Re-thinking secularism in post- independence Tunisia Rory McCarthy* St Antony’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK The victory of a Tunisian Islamist party in the elections of October 2011 seems a paradox for a country long considered the most secular in the Arab world and raises questions about the nature and limited reach of secularist policies imposed by the state since independence. Drawing on a definition of secularism as a process of defining, managing, and intervening in religious life by the state, this paper identifies how under Habib Bourguiba and Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali the state sought to subordinate religion and to claim the sole right to interpret Islam for the public in an effort to win the monopoly over religious symbolism and, with it, political control.
    [Show full text]
  • Deterrence and Realism
    The Evolution of Israeli Military Strategy: Asymmetry, Vulnerability, Pre-emption and Deterrence Gerald M. Steinberg We are a generation that settles the land and without the steel helmet and the cannon’s maw, we will not be able to plant a tree and build a home. Let us not be deterred from seeing the loathing that is inflaming and filling the lives of the hundreds of thousands of Arabs who live around us. Let us not avert our eyes lest our arms weaken. This is the fate of our generation. This is our life's choice - to be prepared and armed, strong and determined, lest the sword be stricken from our fist and our lives cut down. --Moshe Dayan's Eulogy for Roi Rutenberg (April 19, 1956)1 Overview When the nascent Israeli leadership met on May 14, 1948, in Tel Aviv to declare independence, the country was already being attacked by neighboring Arab armies. The clearly stated objective was to destroy the miniscule Jewish state, with its very vulnerable borders, before it could be established, using the apparently decisive Arab advantages in terms of territorial extent, armed forces, demography, and political influence. Israel overcame these hurdles in 1948 and in subsequent military confrontations, yet despite the development of formidable military capabilities, the inherent asymmetries and existential threats to the Jewish nation-state remain. Given this environment, Israel‟s survival has depended on the development of appropriate strategic and tactical responses. The period from 1948 to 1973 was characterized primarily by large scale confrontations with the armies of Egypt, Syria, 1 Iraq and Jordan in different combinations.
    [Show full text]
  • The Rise of Iran: an Identity Fight to Challenge the Existing Power Establishment Contesting US Hegemony, Israeli, and Sunni Powers in the Middle East
    International Journal of Liberal Arts and Social Science ISSN: 2307-924X www.ijlass.org The Rise of Iran: An Identity Fight to Challenge the Existing Power Establishment Contesting US Hegemony, Israeli, and Sunni Powers in the Middle East. Lina Haddad Kreidie, PhD University of Ca, Irvine faculty, is currently teaching at the American University of Beirut classes on Psychology of International conflict, Islamic political thought, and Iranian politics. Extensive work on identity politics and has presented at many academic conferences such International Society of Political Psychology, WAPSA, among others on “ fighting Identities: Sectarian Narrative in the Construction of Collective Identity in a Religiously Diverse Countries.” Some of her publications include a chapter on “Deciphering the Construals of Islamic Fundamentalists” in The Future of Identity, Edited by Ken Hoover; and on “The psychological dimensions of Ethnic conflict in the International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society. Vincent Bozonier Education: BA Political Science in International Affairs; BA in Sociology (both from UC Riverside); and a certificate degree in Middle Eastern Studies at UC Irvine. Abstract Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran is actively engaged in challenging the existing establishments to include the United States, Israel, and pro-American Sunni powers. The Iranian political maneuvering produced a ripple of waves over the years, specifically as Iraq became the first Arab-Shiite dominated state, the alliance and support of Hezbollah in its 2006 war with Israel, and its cunning management of its nuclear energy program. Amidst the current Middle East geopolitical restructuring; Iran continues to pose as a major regional player. This paper argues that Iran’s strategies has been based on three main identity narratives: (1) the global fight of the Oppressed against the Oppressor; (2) the regional discourse of Islamism; and (3) the particularistic dialogue that empowers the Shiites of the region following Khomeini’s contemporary Velayat-e faqih concept.
    [Show full text]
  • The Exodus of the Tunisian Jewish Population 1954-1967
    The American University in Cairo School of Global Affairs and Public Policy SEEKING A PLACE IN A NATION: THE EXODUS OF THE TUNISIAN JEWISH POPULATION 1954-1967 A Thesis Submitted to: The Center for Middle Eastern Studies in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts by Sean Haley Table of Contents 1) Introduction and Theoretical Framework………………………………..3 2) Tunisian Jewry and the Birth of a Nation-State: The Independence of Tunisia 1954- 1957……………………………………………………………………...21 3) The State Takes Shape: The Reordering of the Jewish Community and Tunisian Constitution 1958-1959………………………………………………….35 4) Casualties of Colonialism? Tunisian Jews, Identity and the 1961 Bizerte Crisis……………………………………………………………………..54 5) A Far Away War and Self-Imposed Exile: 1967, Identity and the Tunisian Jews………………………………………………………………………70 6) Conclusion………………………………………………………………..82 7) Bibliography……………………………………………………………...90 2 Introduction In the eleven years after the independence and creation of the Republic of Tunisia, the population of the Jewish community declined by approximately 88.7% because of emigration to France, Israel, and other countries. This period, as will be shown, was critical in shaping the ethno-religious arrangement of peoples in Tunisia today. This occurred because a centralizing newly-independent state created a nation through identity based upon citizenship. Tunisia is a particularly good case study of homogenizing post-colonial nation-states because the government never sought to exclude any part of the population through direct action. Instead, domestic and international events that shook the nation and had an impact on the Jewish minority, such as independence, the reorganization of the Jewish community of 1958, the 1961 Bizerte Crisis and the Six Day War, made a solution such as exile palatable for the Jews.
    [Show full text]
  • THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict Between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides Are Preparing for It
    ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford The Brookings Institution is a private non-profit organization. Its mission is to conduct high-quality, independent research and, based on that research, to provide innovative, practical recommendations for policymakers and the public. The conclusions and recommendations of any Brookings publication are solely those of its author(s), and do not reflect the views of the Institution, its management, or its other scholars. Copyright © 2011 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 www.brookings.edu ANALYSIS PAPER Number 24, August 2011 THE NEXT WAR: How Another Conflict between Hizballah and Israel Could Look and How Both Sides are Preparing for It Bilal Y. Saab Nicholas Blanford Table of Contents Executive Summary . iii Acknowledgements . vi The Authors . vii Introduction . 1 Potential Return to Arms . 3 Hizballah Prepares for War . 6 Israel Prepares for War . 14 Conclusion . 20 THE NEXT WAR The Saban Center at BROOKINGS ii Executive Summary ebanon and Israel have enjoyed a rare calm waged between them, and both sides have been in the five years since the August 14, 2006 feverishly preparing for the next war ever since the ceasefire that brought an end to that sum- last one ended. Lmer’s month-long war, the fiercest ever action waged between Hizballah and the Israel Defense Hizballah’s Posture Forces (IDF). Since the end of the 2006 war, Hizballah has under- Both sides drew sharp lessons from the 2006 conflict.
    [Show full text]
  • The Case of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry Pauline Crepy Edited by Cassandra Moschella and Madeleine Northfeld
    FLUX: International Relations Review Proxy Warfare’s Impact on Sectarianization: The Case of the Saudi-Iranian Rivalry Pauline Crepy edited by Cassandra Moschella and Madeleine Northfeld 22 23 FLUX: International Relations Review Cover art: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have committed a school the region or makes inroads with Western powers, it has to come at the expense bus bombing in Yemen in August 2018, killing 40 children. In response, an event of the other” (Robins-Early 2017). of blue backpacks was held in Chicago, IL, to remember the loss of these children. In order to attain such infuence in the region, one wonders what makes the Source: Charles Edward Miller. November 30, 2018, https://fic.kr/p/R9emBy. Middle East susceptible to the strategy of proxy warfare. Within the context of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry, the power of religious identity has occupied a central role Tis article was submitted to POLI 360: War and Peace. in the permeability of neighboring states to indirect warfare. In efect, the rivals recognize the possibility for political gain in the confict between the Sunnis Abstract and Shi’as and capitalize on pre-existing sectarian tensions to gain regional Te Saudi Arabian and Iranian rivalry has torn the Middle East apart, dominance. To better understand the prevalence of proxy warfare in the Middle aggravating the region’s struggles concerning persistent authoritarianism, East, one must turn to the sectarianization thesis; sectarianization is “an active militia violence, and sectarian tensions. Tis paper explores the impact of proxy process shaped by political actors operating within specifc contexts, pursuing warfare on sectarianization by studying the case of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in political goals that involve the mobilization of popular sentiments around both Syria and Yemen.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Israel Policy
    Iran’s Israel Policy Iran-Israel Conflict 1. Iran-Israel do not border each other and they’re well over a thousand miles from each other 2. Iran-Israel have no major bilateral claims toward one another 3. Historical memory of Persian-Judaic interactions is largely positive 4. Streets in Israel are named for Cyrus the Great, who allowed the Jews to return to Judea from their Babilonian exile in 538 BC. 5. Large Arab neighbors of Iran, like Iraq or Saudi Arabia, might be considered its natural competitors, Israel cannot. Israel and Iran dealt with an acute security challenge • A massive, largely hostile region unified by a common religion and a common antipathy. • All four of Israel immediate neighbors were Arab, backed by Arab & Muslim- majority states beyond them. • Israel’s natural posture was therefore to try and find fissures among its potential foes. • Prime Minister David Ben Gurion forged alliance with non-Arab countries in the Middle East as a counter-balance to the Arab states. • The Periphery Doctrine The Periphery Doctrine • The Periphery Doctrine (TPD): (Alliance with countries who had common orientation toward the West): 1. Pre-revolution Iran (A non-Arab but Muslim state) 2. Turkey (A non-Arab but Muslim state) 3. Ethiopia (A non-Arab Christian state) 4. Maronites in Lebanon 5. Kurds in Iraq • Israel was surrounded by radical Arab states and these Arab states sought the total destruction of Israel. • A way of offsetting the diplomatic/economic boycott of the Arab World • A traditional balance-of-power strategy aimed at countering pan-Arabism.
    [Show full text]
  • Continuity Despite Revolution: Iran's Support for Non-State Actors
    Crown Family Director Professor of the Practice in Politics Gary Samore Continuity Despite Revolution: Iran’s Director for Research Charles (Corky) Goodman Professor Support for Non-State Actors of Middle East History Naghmeh Sohrabi Associate Director Mohammad Ataie Kristina Cherniahivsky Associate Director for Research he Islamic Republic of Iran supports a number of David Siddhartha Patel Tnon-state actors throughout the Middle East, such as Myra and Robert Kraft Professor Hizbollah in Lebanon and elements of the Iraqi Popular of Arab Politics Eva Bellin Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha‘bi). Iranian leaders Founding Director describe their support for such groups in religious and Professor of Politics Shai Feldman revolutionary terms and as resistance against “global arrogance” (Istikbar-i Jahani), meaning imperialism. This aspect Henry J. Leir Professor of the Economics of the Middle East of Iran’s foreign policy, therefore, is widely understood to be a Nader Habibi product of the 1978–79 Iranian Revolution and as motivated, Renée and Lester Crown Professor in large part, by ideology. of Modern Middle East Studies Pascal Menoret In contrast, this Brief argues that Iran’s pattern of support for non-state Founding Senior Fellows entities after 1979, shaped around the so-called Axis of Resistance, is a Abdel Monem Said Aly Khalil Shikaki continuation of a regional policy that dates to the late 1950s and continued through the 1960s and 1970s. Both Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and the Goldman Faculty Leave Fellow Andrew March leaders of the Islamic Republic pursued a strategy of backing extraterritorial groups and invoking historical and religious ties to Shi‘i communities Harold Grinspoon Junior Research Fellow in the region to counter perceived threats and contain adversaries.
    [Show full text]
  • 11 BAB II DINAMIKA ORGANISASI LIGA ARAB Dalam Bab Ini Penulis
    BAB II DINAMIKA ORGANISASI LIGA ARAB Dalam bab ini penulis memaparkan deskripsi umum tentang Liga Arab dan bagaimana hubungan Liga Arab dengan Palestina terkait topik bahasan ini. selain itu penulis juga memaparkan tentang bagaimana tujuan serta prinsip Liga Arab, keanggotaan Liga Arab serta struktur organisasi yang dimiliki oleh Liga Arab. A. Sejarah Terbentuknya Liga Arab Ketika Perang Dunia II masih berlangsung, terdapat keinginan yang muncul diantara negara-negara Arab di Timur Tengah untuk mendirikan sebuah organisasi. Organisasi tersebut diharapkan dapat memberikan wadah dalam berbagai aspek dan dapat menjadi penengah atau mediator ketika terjadi perselisihan di antara sesama negara Arab ataupun dengan negara non-Arab. Keinginan ini kemudian didukung oleh Inggris pada tahun 1942 dikarenakan Inggris memiliki motif untuk negara-negara Arab agar bergabung dengan pihak Sekutu. Namun pada saat itu negara-negara Arab tidak memiliki ketertarikan untuk bergabung (Firman, 2019). Alasan negara-negara Arab enggan untuk bergabung dikarenakan pada saat itu juga turut berkembang semangat anti-kolonialisme di sebagian besar ngara-negara Arab. Pada saat itu dapat dikatakan Mesir masih menjadi negara boneka imperialis Protektorat Britania. Sedangkan Yordania, Bahrain, Irak, Qatar dan Uni Emirat Arab dijajah Inggris. Maroko, Tunisia, Suriah dan Aljazair dijajah Perancis. Menurut catatan Council of Foreign Relation Liga Arab, dukungan dari Inggris ini dinilai sebagai motivasi untuk segera membentuk sebuah kesatuan nasionalis Arab yang nantinya akan meningkatkan dukungan bagi orang-orang Arab Palestina. Puncak dari proses 11 ini ialah pada tanggal 7 Oktober tahun 1944 yang mana ditandatangani sebuah perjanjian yaitu Protokol Alexandria yang berlokasi di Alexandria. Perjanjian ini ditandatangani oleh lima negara Arab yang menjadi awal dari dibentuknya Liga Arab satu tahun setelahnya (Masters & Sergie, 2014).
    [Show full text]