MASTERS THESIS H-3321

KLETZIEN, Sharon Benge THE CHANGING STATUS OF TUNISIAN WOMEN.

The American University» M.A., 1971 Sociology, general

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Sharon Benge Kletzlen

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by Sharon Benge Kletzlen

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University Microfilms, A Xerox Education Company TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

The purpose of Che study ...... L

Justification of the study ...... 1

Organization of the thesis . 2

II. EARLY HISTORY ...... ' ...... 7

The Phoenicians and Carthage ...... 7

Rome ...... 9

The Vandals 9 / / / The Byzantines ...... 10 /' y

Summary 11 / /

/ . Ill. ISLAMIZATION AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN ...... ;4.' / Historical background ...... / 12 /'■ Women in traditional Islam ...... r. 17 /' ' IV. THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE / . . 25 ( / V. INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEW EMANCIPATION...... 40

Personal Status Code ...... 47

Union Nationale des Femmes de T u n i s i e ...... 55

Government . 58

Education ...... 60

Labor ...... 66

Family planning ...... 69

S u m m a r y ...... 72 ii

CHAPTER PAGE

VI. SUMMARY ...... 74

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 8L

Primary s o u r c e s ...... 81

Secondary sources ...... 83

APPENDIX ...... 91

Interview q u e s t i o n s ...... 91 LIST OF TABLES

TABLE PAGE

I. Foreigners in Tunisia ...... 26

II, Number Seeking Land Registration in French Courts .... 30

III, Frequency that Respondents Wear t!ie Veil ...... 46

IV, Choice of Husband for Married Respondents ...... 52

V. Age of Respondents at Time of M a r r i a g e ...... 53

VI. School Statistics 1956-57, 1970-71 . 62

VII, Respondents' Completed School Years ...... 65

VIII, Type of School Respondents Prefer for Daughters ...... 66 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the study. Since Independence in 1956, the

Tunisian government has enacted exceptional legislation affecting the status and emancipation of women. These reforms provide for;

--women to vote and hold office

--abolition of polygamy and unilateral repudiation

--a minimum age for marriage

--marriage as a contract between man and woman rather than between

families

--child support and maternal custody in divorce cases

--compulsory education to include girls as well as boys

--legalized abortion for women with five children even without

the husband's consent.

This new legal framework for women's emancipation has been instituted despite Tunisia's Islamic heritage and well-established tradition of subjugating women.

This study's purpose, then, is to determine how such recent and significant changes have been effected, including the enabling historical factors, and how a sample of Tunisian women have evaluated the Impact of these reforms on their lives.

Justification of the study. Tunisia's progress in forging new roles and rights for its women is a result of historical factors. 2 dedication of Ita leaders to women's emancipation, and their very skillful approach to the Tunisian populace. President Bourguiba declared in one of his many speeches regarding the role of the Tunisian woman that "a society cannot be healthy and balanced with half the social body--the feminine element--still subjugated, exploited, and humiliated."! In only the last few decades Tunisian women have left the seclusion of the harem to actively participate in their society.

From a human rights as well as a manpower viewpoint, this is profoundly important.

Although Tunisia's progress in effecting social change in general is mentioned in numerous books and articles, no substantial study since Henri de Montety's Femmes de Tunisie, published in 1958, has dealt exclusively with women. This study, then, will not only up-date de Montety's work, but will also trace the historical factors contri­ buting to this peaceful evolution.

Organisation of the thesis. The history of Tunisia^ will be

! Habib Bourguiba, "Women and Social Evolution." Speech given June 24, 1966. (Tunis; Secretariat of the State for Information and Orientation, 1966.) p. 3. 2 Tunisia's present geographical entity has been fairly consistent within the same borders. At times parts of today's Algeria and Libya have been Included. Various governments, ruling from Carthage, Kairouan, Msdhia, and Tunis, were able to extend on occasions, the southern boundary Into the Sahara, only to have it pushed back when the nomads' strength exceeded the government's. The French fixed the southern boundary on independence in 1956, but until agreement was reached between Algeria and Tunisia in 1970, this boundary was in dispute. The present eastern and western boundaries were fixed by the Ottoman rulers in the sixteenth century. 3 divided into four period8--pre-Islsmic, early Islamic, French controlled, and independent--in order to assess those factors affecting the status of women.

Chapter II includes a brief summary of political developments in pre-lslamic Tunisia from 1000 B.C. to A.D. 697. Tunisia's early history is important in any discussion of social change because it is responsible for the homogeneity and cosmopolitan nature of the society.

No attempt will be made to deduce the status of women in these early societies since this is not the main contribution of the pre-lslamic history. Sources of data for this period are books and pamphlets, especially those by Charles-Andre Julien,3 Cliarles Gallagher,4 and

Nevill Barbour.3

The Islamic era from 697 to 1881, has had the greatest effect on the Tunisian population. Thus, Chapter III will trace the development of the various dynasties which controlled the area, and it will also include an examination of the status of women according to the tenets of Islam. Works by Charles-Andre Julien,^ Roger le Tourneau,^

3Charles-Andre Julien, Histoire de l'Afrique Blanche (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966).

^Charles Gallagher, Field Staff Reports 1956-1968 (New York: American Universities Field Staff Reports, 1956-1968).

^Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

^Charles-Andre Julien, History of North Africa from the Arab Conquest to 1830 (London: Cass, 1968).

?Roger le Tourneau, The Almohad Movement in North Africa in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1969). 4

Leon Carl Brown,® and ibn Khaldun^ were particularly valuable In analyzing political factors. The section concerning women's role in

Islam was drawn largely from the Koran, Social Structure in Islam by

Reuben Levy, and Femmes de Tunisie by Henri de Montety.

Chapter IV reviews the changes occurring between 1881 and 1956, the period of the French Protectorate. One of the most important effects of this Western exposure was the breakdown of traditional authority which enabled the younger nationalist leaders to dominate the independence movement. Factors contributing to this breakdown and women's status during the occupation are discussed. Works by Clement Henry Moore,!®

Jacques Berque,!! Charles Gallagher,!^ Henri de Montety,!® g^d Charles

Micaud!4 were primary sources.

Far-reaching reforms accompanied independence in 1956. In Chapter V these reforms and the methods used by the government to insure their

®Leon Carl Brown, The Surest Path (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University Press, 1967). Q Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah; An Introduction to History Translated by Franz Rosenthal, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1958).

^^Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia Since Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965).

Jacques Berque, French North Africa: The Maghreb Between Two World Wars (New York; Praeger, 1967).

!^Gallagher, o£. cit.

!®Henri de Montety, Femmes de Tunisie (Paris; Mouton & Company, 1958).

Charles Micaud, Leon Carl Brown, and Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia The Politics of Modernization (New York; Praeger, 1964). 5 acceptance is discussed. The Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie and the Parti Socinliste Destourien are examined in view of their key roles in the women's rights movement. This chapter draws heavily upon the experience of the author who lived in Tunisia for the period 1964-

1966 and the spring of 1967. Many of the discussions which took place during this period of residence increased understanding and appreciation of the Tunisian women's position. Other sources drawn upon for this chapter are President Bourguiba's numerous speeches regarding the status of women and social change, Union Nationale des Femnes de Tunisie

(UNFT) tracts and reports, newspaper accounts, and Secretariat of State for Information and Orientation pamphlets and statistics. Further information was gained from interviews and discussions with Habib

Bourguiba, Jr., Chedli Klibi, Charles Micaud, Eqbal Ahmad, Hedi Khefacha, a psychologist with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Economique et

Sociales (CERES) and a UNFT official who prefer to remain anonymous, and the president of a women's social club in Tunis.

The results of interviews with selected women responding to questions on their reactions to government policy are also presented in Chapter V. Sixty women were chosen to reflect the dichotomy between urbanites and villagers with thirty women from Tunis and thirty from rural areas of Cap Bon.

The thirty Tunis women chosen were from the Dar Aziza Othmana, a woman's club created under the auspices of the Secretariat of State for

Cultural Affairs, rather than from the UNFT because the author wanted a sampling of the Tunis elite not directly involved in political activity. 6

They were Interviewed in French and then given questionnaires to complete.

The thirty rural women, who were interviewed through an Arabic interpreter, were selected at random from Hammamet, Dar Chaabane, and

Somaa. Various ages, backgrounds, and marital status were represented in both groups interviewed, All women were asked identical questions concerning their own backgrounds and their attitudes toward the

Personal Status Code, working outside the home, education for girls, and wearing the veil. Their answers provide a gauge to judge how far government's reforms have penetrated.

Chapter VI summarizes the study's essential findings. Conclusions are formulated concerning the extent of women's emancipation in Tunisia, and some projections for the future are made. CHAPTER II

EARLY HISTORY

"For most of recorded history, the Tunis region has been the cultural heartland of the North African littoral."! The coastal area, extending from Bizerte to Sfax, has been a settled strip of towns and cities for almost three thousand years. Known as the extended Sahel, this strip has felt the buffeting of centuries of foreign contact.

Even before Islam, the area which is now Tunisia was under the control of the Phoenicians or Carthagineans for 900 years, the Romans for

650 years, the Vandals and then the Byzantines each for 100 years.

Tunisia's geographical position at the crossroads of the

Mediterranean has made her highly vulnerable to foreign invasion.

Miles of gentle beaches backed by a wide fertile strip where food­ stuffs can be grown have made Tunisia far more accessible and desirable than either Libya whose desert stretches to the sea or

Algeria and Morocco whose coasts are mostly rough and forbidding.

The Phoenicians and Carthage. Berbers, the area's original

Inhabitants, were nomadic and pastoral. They were no match for the first invaders, the Phoenicians, c. 1000 B.C., and most were soon pushed into the interior. Here, many continued their old way of life, but occasionally sacked the Phoenician's coastal towns. Yet, some

!charles Gallagher, "Tunisia Modernizes" Africa Report, XIII (March, 1968), p. 14. 8 of the more passive Berber tribes stayed In the coastal areas, supplying food to the townspeople and trading ships. The Phoenicians had no interest in annexing the interior since their sole interest lay in coastal trading towns and shipping. For the Berbers remaining near the

Phoenician settlements the Punic language and civilization became the norm for educated men.

Because of the emphasis on trading, there was created an openness to foreign ideas and practices. Various languages, cultures, nation­ alities, and religions intermingled leaving the area with a relatively homogeneous population exposed to different ways of living.

An emphasis on mercantilism emerged since the Phoenicians were primarily traders themselves and, of necessity, encouraged local Berber tribes to produce goods for market. Thus, specialization was introduced early in Tunisia's history with settled agriculturalists and various artisans serving the needs of the traders. This ancient spirit of 9 cooperation and mercantile activity is still discernable today.

Carthage, founded near today's capital Tunis some 200 years after the initial Phoenician excursions, soon outstripped her mother city.

Tyre, as the center of Phoenician wealth, culture, and trade. It became a cosmopolitan city with inhabitants from all corners of the Mediter­ ranean. By 550 B.C., Carthage was the supreme naval power in the

Mediterranean with trading posts located as far away as Portugal.

The Empire reached its height in the fourth century B.C., but shortly afterwards fought ruinous wars with Rome over control of the sea. The

^Ibld. 9

Punic Wars, 264 B.C.-241 B.C., 218 B.C.-201 B.C., 149 B.C.-146 B.C., ended with Carthage's destruction and the incorporation of the

Tunisian area Into the Roman Empire.

Rome. Roman domination replaced Phoenician rule although the Punic language and civilization continued in Importance throughout North

Africa. During Rome's 650 years of rule, development of the interior areas was emphasized. Because agriculture flourished, Ifrlqlya, the

Roman name for the area, became "the breadbasket of Rome." Of all the

North African area under Roman control, the Tunisian coast and hinter­ land was the most prosperous, strongly influenced, and heavily populated.

While the Roman settlers ruled, the local Berber population did all the heavy work. The Berber inhabitants lost their land and were forced either to go south into the desert or to work land as sharecroppers.®

Materially Tunisia prospered, but the suffering Berber populace, worse I off than before, was face to face with the luxury and wealth of the

Roman settlers.^ "As Roman power waned in the early centuries of the

Christian era, the Berbers reasserted their control in much of the area and assisted in the destruction of the Empire."®

The Vandals. The Romans' defeat in A.D. 429 came from the Vandals

®J. S. Nickerson, Short History of North Africa (New York: Devin- Adair, 1961), p. 43.

^Ibid.

®Gallagher, o£. cit., p. 27. 10

from northern Europe who would control North Africa for the next 100 yeara.

Although the invaders met some opposition from the townspeople, the mass

of Berber inhabitants offered little resistance, and likely used the

opportunity in some cases to settle old scores with their Roman masters.®

Genseric, the first Vandal leader, maintained the Roman organizational

structure, but his successors failed to keep control, bringing a time

of decadence and Insecurity for Tunisia. There were Berber incursions

from the south, revolts in the Vandal army, a lessening of material

prosperity, a breakdown in control of townspeople and peasants, and a

dearth of new ideas and institutions. The agricultural infrastructures

from Roman times, such as Irrigation wells and ditches, were allowed to

fall into disrepair, as were the magnificent Roman aqueducts and many

Rosian buildings. Thus, the Byzantines coming from the east in the

sixth century, had little trouble routing out the Vandals.

The Byzantines. They reorganized all North African territories

under harsh military governors. Their armies were disloyal, the Berber

peasantry was heavily taxed, and the nomadic tribes in the south raided

towns and cities, all of which added to the uncertainty of this era.

According to Richard Brace, "Apart from blood mixture through marriage

with the Indigenous population and the influence of Byzantine architecture

on many a later mosque, the Vandal and Byzantine impact upon latter-day

civilization in Northwest Africa was relatively minor.

^Nickerson, op. cit.. p. 53.

^Richard Brace, Morocco. Algeria. Tunisia. The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Frentice-Hall, 1968), p. 21. 11

Summary. The 1000 yeara of Phoenician rule and influence practically ensured the ready acceptance eight hundred years later of another Semitic

language and religion.®

Also, even though the last two centuries before the coming of Islam were marked by disorganization and failure of the government to maintain order, the Tunisian coastal area still had a greater degree of security than other areas of North Africa.^ From the Sahel, for centuries a home to various conquerors, came a middle class of merchants, artisans, and later professional people with characteristics that Charles Gallagher has described as "a fiber of toughness and reliability. . . and a spirit of reasonableness and cooperativeness."!® Leon Carl Brown has described these same people as "frugal, hard-working, and holding knowledge in great esteem.Indeed, most of Independent Tunisia's leaders have their origins in the Sahel.

The importance of Tunisia's early history lies in the establishment of these societal values, and in the ability of the population to adapt itself to change.

®Ibid. , p. 24.

^Gallagher, o£. cit., p. 14.

!®Ibld.

ÜCharles Micaud, Leon Carl Brown, and Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia; The Politics of Modernization (New York; Praeger, 1964), p. 9. CHAPTER III

ISLAMIZATION AND THE STATUS OF WOMEN

Although Tunisia has felt the Influence of contact with many different cultures and religions, the Arabs and Islam have made the most profound impact. Richard Brace seeks to explain this by the similarity between the North African Berbers and the Arab tribesmen;

The Romans, and later the French, tried to assimilate the peoples of Northwest Africa; the Arabs came with kindred institutions and struck a receptive balance between the gifts they brought and those they accepted. An equity prevailed between Berber and Arab which Berber and Roman or European did not attain. Both came as conquerors. The one was rejected and turned away only to return centuries later. The other remained, intermarried, implanted its language, religion, architecture, and literature. Romans and Europeans felt them­ selves expatriate in Northwest Africa; the Arabs were at home.!

Historical background. The first Arab invasion in 647, ordered by Caliph Othman, was a military expedition from the East to proseletize and plunder. While the Byzantines and townspeople were soon defeated, the nomadic Berber tribes, led by a woman known as el Kahena, continued fighting for several decades.

Oqba ibn Nefaa, commander of the expedition, founded Kairouan first as a military camp in 670, but it later became the Holy City of

Tunisia and the base for expeditions further west.

!Richard Brace, Morocco. Algeria. Tunisia. The Modern Nations in Historical Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 22. 13

While Christianity was wide-spread during Roman and Byzantine rule, it was marked in North Africa by heresies and revolt against prevailing doctrine, and consequently, vulnerable to new forces. Islam quickly gained wide acceptance after the Arabs' military conquest, but then it, too, fell prey to heretical groups revolting from the caliph's authority.

Because of the great distance from Damascus, and later Baghdad, the caliphs maintained control only with great difficulty, and for some time Tunisia was the site of recurring political and religious revolts.

In 800, Ibrahim ibn Aghleb, appointed by Haroun el Rachld, an

Abbasid caliph, was able to unify the area and proclaimed independence.

The Aghlabite dynasty lasted for a century during which Tunisia experienced great cultural, military, and economic success.

Succeeding the Aghlabite dynasty were the Fatlmids who subsequently conquered Egypt and moved their capital there. They left Tunisia virtually unprotected and as punishment for their former capital's growing independence, unleashed the Beni Hillal and later the Beni

Suleim on the Maghreb. These were nomadic tribes from Arabia who

"swept across North Africa like a horde of locusts destroying everything in their path.Most of the agricultural progress made during Roman and early Arab rule was wiped out, and villages were destroyed.

Before the invasion only the towns and villages were "Arab" with the

2ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah; An Introduction to History Trans­ lated by Franz Rosenthal, (New York; Pantheon Books, 1958), p. 34. 14 country still profoundly Berber in language and custom. The penetrating wake of the nomadic invasions found the Arabic language and culture throughout Tunisia making it the only North African country so unified,®

The demise of the Berbers' previously superior position is today evidenced in the estimate that only 1% of the Tunisian population speaks Berber.4

Villagers and Bedouins of the southern area still trace their heritage and genealogy to these Arab nomads.^ According to Julien, "The Hilalian

Invasion is undoubtedly the most important event of the entire medieval period in the Maghrib."®

In 1236, the Hafsites, initially agents of the Moroccan Almohads who had managed to unify the area militarily, assumed power and controlled

Tunisia for three centuries. This highly prosperous period is sometimes called the "Golden Age" of Tunisian civilization.

With the Hafsites in Tunis, North Africa reached the apogee of its traditional civilization and compared favorably with the merchant states of Italy and Spain of the same period.7

®Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia Since Independence (Berkeley; University of California Press, 1965), p. 10.

^Nevill Barbour, A Survey of North West Africa (New York; Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 201.

^Jean Duvignaud, Change at Shebika (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970), p. 79.

®Charles-Andre Julien, History of North Africa from the Arab Conquest to 1830. (London: Cass, 1968), p. 73.

7Charles Gallagher, "A Note on North Africa" American Universities Field Staff Report. X (January, 1964), p. 6. 15

Architecture, music, and literature flourished, and remarkable writers

such as Ibn Khaldun were prominent. The Hafaite State knew military

and literary success and held its own against Christian Invasions and

Berber revolts. By the middle of the fifteenth century, though, the

Empire began crumbling due to internecine Hafsite family fighting over

succession rights. The last Hafsite ruler was weak and unable to repel

the Christians or Turks who both had imperialist designs on North

Africa.

In 1514, the Ottoman armies invaded. After a forty year struggle with the Christian king of Spain over Tunisia, the Turks established

control.

The Turkish army stationed in Tunisia was a polyglot mixture of

Turks, Greeks, Mamluks, and other eastern Mediterranean peoples. They mixed freely with the population thereby furthering the cosmopolitan make-up of the society. The rulers themselves were a small elitist

group of Turkish origin.

The early Turkish Beys ruled with the authority of the Ottoman

Porte, but by the eighteenth century, the Husseinite Beys had established

themselves as Tunisia's hereditary dynasty virtually independent of

Constantinople. The Bey had all the powers of an absolute monarch,

limited only by Shari'a law. Although there were attempts at reform,

notably during the reign of Ahmad Bey, 1837-1855, they were largely

excessively expensive military reforms which actually decreased the

state's fiscal viability. Lack of finance was the worst problem 16 confronting the Beys. While the army was sent to collect nomads' taxes in the South, the collection costs usually exceeded the taxes.® The townspeople were heavily taxed, and piracy, a source of income during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was no longer feasible given the international situation of the nineteenth century. Increasing financial pressure caused the Beys to begin borrowing from European powers, and by 1869, the Bey was so heavily Indebted that he capitulated to international financial control by France, Britain, and Italy.

Perhaps the most serious and important attempt at Instituting social change came between 1873 and 1877, during the reign of Kheireddine

Pasha. He acknowledged Western Europe's technological superiority and feared that Tunisia would fall prey to their colonial expansion. Since

France already controlled Algeria and seemed prepared to seize all

North Africa, Kheireddine thought that Tunisia's only self-defense lay in governmental and social reform.^ Thus, he implemented some changes directed toward returning to Islamic fundamentals while Incorporating the West's technical skills. For example, Sadiki College was established to instruct young men in Islamic principles, foreign languages, juridicial sciences, and pure science.

®Leon Carl Brown, The Surest Path (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Univer­ sity Press, 1967), p. 31.

9Charles Micaud, Leon Carl Brown, and Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia; The Politics of Modernization (New York; Praeger, 1964), p. 11. 17

Sadiki College educated most of Tunisia's present-day leaders, and

Kheireddine Pasha is now known as the Father of the Reawakening. The

reforms attempted were too late to prevent a French takeover, though,

and in 1881, the French forced the Bey to accept a French protectorate

over Tunisia.

Women in traditional Islam. "Men stand superior to women in that

God hath preferred the one over the other."!® The Koran and traditional

Islamic law has accordingly dealt with women's status by following this

precept. Although various legists have interpreted the Koran differently,

the Malikite school, predominant in all North Africa since the Aghlabid

rule beginning in 800, adheres closely to the letter of the Koran with

little room for interpretive maneuvrcs.

Today's Tunisian leaders interpret the lower status of women in

Islam as being a result of perversion of Mohamed's original intent.

As expressed in this quote from an official government publication,

"In the old Tunisia, women occupied a place inferior to that of men.

Although this was partly due to the status assigned to women by Islamic

laws, it was far more due to the traditions and customs which had grown

up around Muslim thought and life."!!

Islamic society changed as its center of gravity moved from Mecca

to Damascus and, finally, Baghdad. As Islam encompassed other societies.

^^the Koran 4®®

!!"Women of Tunisia" Tunisian Documents, (Tunis: Secretariat of State for Information and Tourism, 1961), p. 2. 18 their traditions became part of their religious practice. In countries such as Persia where seclusion of women had existed for centuries, hadiths (sayings of the Prophet) were traced or invented to condone this practice. Mohamed'a exhortation to Muslim women "net to expose their ornaments"!^ became the basis for veiling and a continuation of the harem system.

In the common Muslim view, women were creatures incapable of and unfitted for public duties.!® They were prevented from giving evidence in court, taking part in government councils, or exercising religious leadership. Decisions for the community were always made by men. A woman's life was circumscribed by the family and she could not aspire

to any position of influence in the society. She would not dare to speak to men strangers, and would be "ashamed"!^ to discuss any worldly matter with men in her own family.

In Tunisia, as in other Muslim countries, the major features of women's inferior position were the legality of polygamy, the seclusion and veiling of women, facility of divorce for men and its practical

non-existence for women, and unequal possibilities for education.!®

12 59 the Koran 33

!®Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 99.

!^The Arabic word is "hichma" which defies an exact translation, but Includes a feeling of shame and inferiority.

"Women of Tunisia" 0£, cit., p. 2. 19

The Koran allows a man to be married to as many as four wives at one time although It requires that he treat them equally. For women a plurality of marriages Is Impossible, and monogamy Is always the rule.!®

At the time of Tunisia's independence, only about 3% of the Muslim men were actual polygamists probably for economic reasons.!^

Men were also given discretion in the matter of divorce. If a man repeated the divorce formula three times, his wife had to leave his house and return to her family. Her children (unless very young) remained with their father. It seems to have been a fairly common occurrence in pre-independent Tunisia for a man to practice successive polygamy, particularly to take a younger wife, although another common cause for repudiation was inability to bear children.

The wife was granted no such easy means for divorce. Those few justifications for divorce given to a woman were difficult to prove and resulted in the humiliation of returning to her family even if she did obtain a divorce.

Islam fixes no age limit for marriage. Young children may be married although a girl is not given to her husband until she is physically mature. A girl's father or nearest male relative has the authority to give her away, and often the girl has never seen her prospec­

tive husband before the marriage ceremony.!® Young girls were taught to

stand in fear of their fathers and to obey them completely. Therefore

^^Micaud, Brown, and Moore, o£. cit.. p. 146. 18 Levy, o£. cit.. p. 108 20

there vas usually no thought of refusing the father's choice of husband.

If a girl were rebellious, defying her father and refusing to marry,

there was the threat of prison. There were two women's prisons in Tunis where girls who had committed such crimes as hitting their mothers-in- law or refusing marriage were sent.

According to the Koran, a man may marry a non-Muslim if she is

Christian, Jewish or Sabian, but a woman is forbidden to marry a

"non-believer.

In pre-independent Tunisia, marriage was the great day of a girl's

life. She entered the harem at about age seven and from that time planned only for marriage. The wedding affair was usually the most extravagant the families could afford, and gifts given to the bride by the prospective groom were evidence of his ability to support her.

This often resulted in very young girls' being married to much older men.^^

Although marriage is not a religious sacrament in Islam, the wedding ceremony is, by custom, presided over by an imam. The witnesses,

two men or one man and two women, who represented the two families

signed the marriage contract.

19 Henri de Montety, Femmes de Tunisie (Paris: Mouton & Company, 1958), p. 74; Levy, loc. cit.

ZOthe Koran 2^^®

21de Montety, o£. cit., p. 73. 21

Once married, the woman was entirely dominated by her husband although she kept as personal property her dowry. But, the Koran advises husbands to be kind: "Those whose perverseness ye fear, admonish them and remove them into bed-chambers and beat them;

but if they submit to you then do not seek a way against t h e m . "22

"If living together, both parents are responsible for the up­ bringing of the children--the father providing the material necessities, and the mother caring for their bodies and for their mental and religious training."23 if there is a divorce, the mother has a right to the custody of the children during their infancy. The Koran fails to specify how long a period this is, so the various schools of law interpret this passage differently. According to the Malikites, guardianship of a boy continues with his mother until his puberty, and of a girl until her marriage. Local custom seems to have changed

the rule in North Africa so that the Malikite interpretaion was ignored in favor of a more conseirvative one, whereby the child may remain with its mother only until the age of seven. "Mother of the

family, her children were not even hers; they belonged to her husband and his family; widowed or divorced, she had to abandon her progeny,"24

22the Koran 438

2^Levy, 0£. cit., p. 140.

24patma Haddad, "La Participation de la Fenme Tunisienne à la Vie Active" (Tunis; Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie, 1969), p. 1 (Mimeographed). Author's translation: "Mère de famille, ses enfants n'étaient même pas ) elle, ils appartenaient à son mari et â sa famille; veuve ou répudiée, elle devait abandonner sa progéniture." 22

Although the Koran gives good evidence that Mohamed Intended for women to carry out religious duties, in practice it became quite difficult for women to participate. Many places prohibit women from saying public prayers or seclude them in the mosque behind a grill.

In early Islam there were many women saints and many learned women authorities. There Is even a hadith making it incumbent upon every man and woman to seek l e a r n i n g . 23 when the practice of secluding women became common, it became disgraceful for a woman to do anything which attracted attention to her as a person. Therefore, education became non-existent for women and working outside the home was absolutely forbidden. Although "it is not possible to say when the harem system and the seclusion of women began to be general practice, by the time of Haroun el Rachid, the system was fully established."24

Since Bedouin society has had its own unique practices regarding women's status, also within a Muslim context, these are discussed separately. Although steadfastly religious. Bedouin religious training is a composite of tribal customs and Islamic hearsay.2? Their nomadic life necessarily dictates behavioral modes different from their city sisters. Bedouin women have always shared the burden of outdoor work which has precluded seclusion and have not been hampered by wearing the

23f evy, o£_. cit.. p. 132, (author's emphasis).

26lbid.. p. 127.

27de Montety, o£. cit.. p. 25. 23

long "aefserl" (veil) of the city women.

Despite these two factors contributing to the Bedouin woman's personal freedom, she has suffered from complete subjection to her husband who treats her like a beast of burden.28 Carrying water,

gathering firewood and food, cooking, childbearing and raising, and

sexual companionship for her husband are expected roles. Even the

little respect that most urban men grant their wives is absent, and

beatings are common.29 According to de Montety, it is the Bedouin woman who will have to make the biggest adjustment to the new society

in which women are the equals of men.30

In summary, Tunisian women lived strictly within Islam's constraints.

The prevailing attitude was that women were incapable of functioning in

society at large. Men did all marketing with women leaving the harem's

seclusion only to attend marriages or visit marabouts (religious shrines)

with other women. Men and women never mixed at functions such as

msrriages--they had separate celebrations in separate houses. When

guests visited the home, the women remained in back rooms without par­

ticipating in the conversation. They prepared meals, and only after the

men had finished eating, were they and the children allowed the left­

overs .

2®Ibjbd., p . 24.

29ibid.. p. 39.

30lbid,, p. 26. 24

Yet, the secluded and veiled urban woman, unlike her Bedouin sister, received a certain respect from her husband who interpreted seclusion as a form of benevolent "protection."^1

Since all these practices were in the name of Islam, it was clear that the population's attitude toward the religious aspect of their lives must change before women might emerge from seclusion. This attitudinal change came during the French occupation when many Tunisians withdrew loyalties from their traditional religious leaders and turned to Wes tern-educated Tunisians for leadership.

Although throughout the French occupation Shari'a law was retained for civil matters, subtle changes affected the social status of women.

31lbid., p. 39. CHAPTER IV

THE FRENCH PROTECTORATE

On May 12, 1881, the treaty of Kassar Said was signed giving France

external sovereignty of Tunisia for a "temporary but indefinite period,"

The ostensible, immediate cause for that treaty was the Bey's failure

to control tribes who had made forays into French-controlled Algeria.

Two years later, the La Marsa treaty gave the French Resident-General

the authority to supervise internal sovereignty and compelled the Bey

to introduce reforms in justice, finances, and general administration which did not directly affect the social fabric. The power of the Bey was broken, and the country was ruled, in effect, by the French

Resident-General.

The seventy-five years of French occupation opened the door to women's emancipation directly by laying the infrastructure of a modern

economy and through the educational system, and indirectly by undermining

traditional authorities and the mere presence of Europeans— with foreign

ideas and values--living and working in Tunisia. But the French did not

institute legal reforms affecting the status of women.

The first Resldent-Generals were Arabists anxious to preserve

existing Tunisian structures and customs, and in that pursuit Initially

discouraged French settlement in Tunisia. But Italian settlers out­

numbered the French, and to keep Tunisia firmly within France's sphere

of influence, French settlement was promoted. Table I illustrates this 26 point and indicates the dramatic increase in numbers of expatriates living in Tunisia, particularly during the Protectorate's early years.

TABLE

FOREIGNERS IN TUNISIA

Year French Italian Other

1881 700 11,200 7,000

1901 24,000 71,600

1911 46,000 88,000

1936 108,000 94,000 11,000

1956 180,000 66,000 9,000

Although the Arabist French Resldent-Generals maintained traditional

Muslim schools, Shari'a law, and qadi courts, they were only for Tunisians.

The foreign settlers demanded modern institutions for themselves and the

French Resldent-Generals were forced to respond by providing European schools, a French legal system, and legislation to facilitate land acquisition. These institutions, originally solely for the benefit of the Europeans, affected the Tunisians as well and contributed to lessening their reliance on equivalent traditional Muslim institutions.

^Nicola A. Ziadeh, Origins of Nationalism in Tunisia (Beirut; American University of Beirut, 1962), pp. 17-18; Andre Raymond, La Tunisie (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1961), p. 50. 27

The Tunisian educational system in 1881 was for males only and consisted of Zltouna University and about 1,400 kuttabs (Islamic primary schools). The university students were trained in the Koran and in Shari's law, and on graduation could become qadis (judges) or teachers. The kuttabs, usually very poor quality, often had teachers who could neither read nor write.2 Sadiki College vfhich was attended by the government elitist group was the only school to educate Tunisians for the modern world.

In response to European demands, a French educational system was created. Although these schools were open to Tunisians as well, several years passed before many of the Tunisian Muslims enrolled.

The Arab families' original hesitation in sending their sons to

"Christian" schools was overcome as they realized that a modern education was the key means of access to administrative positions and enhanced social statusBy the turn of the century, there were about 3,800

Tunisian Muslims in French primary schools and 10 in secondary schools.4

By 1899, the Tunisians were demanding instruction in Arabic, and the French had gained a prejudice against the Tunisians' attending

French schools. This resulted in establishing Franco-Arab schools

2Charles Micaud, Leon Carl Brown, and Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia The Politics of Modernization (New York; Praeger, 1964), p. 13.

^Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia Since Independence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 24.

^Micaud, Brown, and Moore, o£. cit., p. 14. 28 patterned after the French schools but with one-third of the instruction in Arabic. These schools, of which Sadiki College was a prototype, made it easier for Tunisian children to succeed by eliminating compe­ tition with native French-speakers, and the quality of education approached that given in the French schools. The number of Tunisian children in Franco-Arab schools Increased steadily during the occupation.

During the Protectorate's early years, the first steps toward women's emancipation were taken. In 1888 the first unofficial Arabic newspaper was founded and began publishing articles stressing the need to educate women.

The first Muslim girls' school was founded in 1900 by a French­ woman, and offered a French primary school syllabus with hygiene,

Arabic, and needlework. One of the school's main functions was to educate girls suitable to marry Sadiki College graduates.^ Because the girls received a basic foundation in French, they now had the key to a wealth of information in newspapers, magazines, and books.

The first year only ten girls were enrolled, recruited from among

Tunisian functionaries' daughters. These minor government officials reluctantly agreed to send their daughters only under pressure from the

Resident-General.^ The girls came to school veiled and accompanied by

^Henri de Montety, Femmes de Tunisie (Paris: Mouton & Company, 1958), p. 95.

*Ibid. 29 a trusted male family member. These concessions to tradition precluded any scandal, and since the girls who graduated were in demand as wives, the school was successful and attracted others.^ Girls were also admitted to Franco-Arab schools, but since these were co-educational, few girls attended until much later.

In addition to the French educational system, the Tunisians also participated, by necessity, in the formal French legal system. Under

Islamic law, land ownership in Tunisia was a confused situation. Much land was given over to "habous," a religious donation which prevented

Q the splitting of land among inheritors (particularly female) or confiscation by government. Privately owned land had ill-defined boundaries, and much land was used by nomads with no recognition of individual ownership _yhen the French started buying land and

settling in with crops and fences, a system of land registration was

needed. The Land Registration Act of 1885 allowed a man to register

claim on a piece of land, and if not challenged after a period of time,

to receive a title deed. Even though land registration with French

courts was not compulsory for Tunisians because it would take them

outside the Tunisian courts, many did register to prevent losing

their land to the French settlers. Table II Indicates how many

2Ibid.

^Fatma Haddad, "La Participation de la Femme Tunisienne à la Vie Active" (Tunis: Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie, 1969), p. 3. 30

Tunisians went outside the Jurisdiction of the Muslim qadis and the

Islamic courts on land ownership questions.

TABLE Il9

NUMBER SEEKING LAND REGISTRATION IN FRENCH COURTS

Year French Other Tunisian European

1907 3,331 2,824 3,985

1936 6,363 5,000 11,230

Tunisia's first political party, the Young Tunisians, was formed around 1900. It was patterned after the Young Turks and comprised of

the elite of Turkish origin who had ruled before the French takstover.

It aimed to provide a channel whereby Western ideas could be explained

to Tunisians and Tunisian customs explained to the ruling French.

However, it received neither support nor sympathy from most Tunisians and was never a large group. 10

In 1912 the Young Tunisian leaders were exiled, and for the next

few years Tunisia's main Western involvements were war-related with

100,000 Tunisians serving in the French armyThese Tunisian soldiers

^Micaud, Brown, and Moore, og^. cit., p. 17

^(^Moore, o£. cit., p. 26.

11 Ibid.. p. 27. 31 who had been Integrated into French routines and influenced by Wilsonian ideals quickly introduced rising expectations and ideas of individual freedom to Tunisia.

In 1920 the first broadly-based Tunisian political party came into existence. Called the Des tour (Constitution) Party, it was a loose coalition of many different traditional elements. Since it received support from the Tunisian traditional majority, its urban-centered and traditional leaders were the ulema, the muftis, the qadis, prominent merchants, and informal leaders of cities' various sections. In contrast with the Young Tunisians' origins in the Turkish governing elite, the

Destour leaders were Tunisian upper class.

Sheik Abdelaziz Taalbl, the Destourlan leader, wrote the book.

La Tunisie Martyre, which embodied the party's political ideas.

Although primarily a treatise extolling the pre-Protectorate society, it was also a call to reject Western influence and return to Islamic principles.

Although most Tunisians supported the Destour and its conservative ideas, already some Intellectuals in Tunis were ready to cease looking backwards to an allegedly perfect pre-French society and move forward

to modernization.

By the 1920's a few newspapers and magazines were cautiously discussing women's r i g h t s . ^2 Tahar Haddad, a teacher at Zltouna

12de Montety, 0£. cit.. p. 85, 32

University, wrote the book Our Women in the Shari's and Society as an attempt to prove that women's emancipation was consistent with the principles of Islam. The Council of Zltouna University attempted to have the book banned, but when the French government refused, the

Council stripped Haddad of his degree, forbade him to teach at Zitouna, and declared the book heretical.

It was clear at that time that traditional leaders still commanded the allegiance of most of the population, and the time for women's emancipation had not arrived. Yet, by the 1930's, Tunisia was on the threshold of a new modernization attempt which would be supported by the masses and led by the new middle class.

During the first fifty years of French rule--untll about 1930--a new class was being formed from young people of modest backgrounds with a French education and working either with the French administration or in private firms.

Like many of this new class, Habib Bourguiba was born in 1903 in

Monastir, an ancient city of the Sahel. He was the youngest child of a retired lieutenant in the Beylical Guard. His mother died while he was quite young, and he was raised in his older sister's family. After attending Sadiki College and the Lycee Carnot in Tunis, he finished his education at the University of Paris returning to Tunis in 1927 with a law degree, a French wife and infant son.

In the 1920's, other leaders of this new class. Mahmoud Materi,

Tahar Sfar, and Bahri Guiga--all active members of the Destour--also returned from universities in France. In 1932 they joined with Bourguiba 33 to establish their own nationalist newspaper, L'Action Tunisienne. In

May, 1933, they were all admitted to the Executive Conmnittee of the

Destour, but soon clashed with other Destour leaders over the party's traditional conservative ideology. Unlike older Destourlan leaders, the new leaders did not dwell on the Golden Age of Tunisia's past, but looked forward to modernization and independence. In contrast to the older Destour leaders who recognized themselves as being above the common people, this new class's elite came from the comnon people and emphasized this.

When the inevitable split came between Bourguiba and his friends and the Destour, it was ironic that the young leaders appeared to be greater defenders of Islam than the old guard.

Several years before, in 1923, the French had passed a law allowing

Muslims to become French citizens by submitting to the French legal system and removing themselves from Shari'a justice. Since most Muslims considered this a rejection of Islam, the few who accepted, called naturalise, were considered apostates. When a naturalise died in

Bizerte in 1932, the Muslims refused burial in the Muslim cemetery, and when the French administration Insisted, the leading ulema issued fatwas

(legal opinions) to support the French position. Still the Muslim populace was intractably opposed, and their fight--the first of many on this issue--was led by Habib Bourguiba through L'Action Tunisienne.

Each time a naturalise died, the newspaper provoked demonstrations in

Tunis. The older Destourlan leaders were not anxious to pursue this 34

Issue and even censured Bourguiba when he led a demonstration to the

Bey to protest a naturalise's burial in Monastir. Bourguiba resigned in protest, and his friends convened a Party Congress at which the

Destour split into two factions. Thus, the Neo-Destour emerged at

Ksar Hellal in the Sahel on March 2, 1934.

Finally, the Neo-Destour won the burial-issue battle against the

French and also against the traditional leaders when the French govern­ ment backed down and created special cemeteries for naturalises. The ulema and the Old Destour leaders had compromised themselves by siding with the French, and the young Neo-Destour leaders emerged as staunch defenders of Islam,

To provide a political and social education for the masses, the

Neo-Destour Party organized cells in most Tunisian communities.

Although the party was officially outlawed soon after inception its activities were tolerated until 1938 when most of its leaders were

Imprisoned. But by this time the Neo-Destour had more followers than the Old D e s t o u r . The party was allowed to reorganize during the

German occupation of 1942-1943 and functioned openly until 1952 when it was again outlawed and its leaders imprisoned. Even during the banned periods, the unimprisoned leaders and members were active in

spreading ideas of political change. The Union General des Travailleurs

Tunisiens (UGTT), the labor union, provided cover for Neo-Destour

13Moore, o£. cit.. p. 36. 35 leaders also active In the labor movement. When the party became legal again in 1954, at the time the decision to grant self-government was made, the estimated membership was over 100,000, and at independence there were more than 325,000 m e m b e r s . ^4

The Neo-Destourian leaders' French education had instilled in them the importance of human dignity and freedom and, consequently, they

'*. . . believed wholeheartedly in the emancipation of women, and sought the active participation of women in the national struggle, as a means to hastening that emancipation. "13 The publication Leila which began in 1936, was the mouthpiece for the young leaders' ideas of feminine equality. This weekly magazine, edited by Mahmoud Zarrouk, continued publication until the Second World War and aimed "to defend Tunisian women and to work for their social and intellectual revolution against the old traditions which render marriage difficult and terrible, and which torment our y o u t h . I t is significant that the magazine was in French as the Neo-Destour leaders were appealing to Western-educated

Tunisians who would likely be more receptive to these social Innovations.

In the 1930's a few educated Muslim women in Tunis dared break with the seclusion of the harem and participate in city life. The women who went out unveiled were indistinguishable from French or Italian women and, consequently, were treated the same. Yet the Muslim women

14Lars Rudebeck, Party and People (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 33,

15"Women of Tunisia" Tunisian Documents (Tunis: Secretariat of State for Information and Tourism, 1961), p. xx.

16Leila as cited by "Women of Tunisia" oj^. cit. , p. 14. 36 who left the house veiled were thus easily Identified as Muslims and were jeered and treated impolitely by Muslim men.^^ In spite of these initial difficulties, more women began going out, usually veiled, to market, to visit friends, and to attend family celebrations.

Soon the long white sefseri was a conraon sight on the streets of Tunis,

Women were recruited as party members beginning in the 1940's, and played an active role in the independence movement. Usually led by Sayda Bouzgarou Bourguiba's niece, they demonstrated against the

French government and were usually present at rallies for Neo-Destour leaders. Feminine Neo-Destourian cells were formed, particularly to promote civic education of women and to organize demonstrations while the Neo-Destour leaders were imprisoned or under close surveillance.

The sefseri provided women a natural anonymity unavailable to men so they were excellent messengers and organizers.

Educational opportunities for girls had progressed considerably from the establishment in 1900 of the first girls' school. By the

1950's Franco-Arab girls' schools were active in all the major Tunisian communities. At independence approximately 70,000 girls were enrolled;

64,000 in primary schools, 3,500 in technical training schools, 2,500 18 in secondary schools, and about 30 at the university.

Although by the 1950's Muslim women were attending schools, participating actively in the drive for independence, and taking a more prominent role in society, few were prepared for the dramatic

l?de Montety, 0£. cit.. p. 86. 18 Ibid.. p. 97; Fatma Haddad, o£. cit., p. 9. 37 legal changes which were to take place immediately after independence,^^

While the French occupation lasted only seventy-five years, during that time a traditionally-oriented conservative society was

Jarred out of its complacency and started on the road to modernization under dynamic leadership. Throughout the French occupation, a steady discernible shift in prestige and influence took place. Dependence on new institutions undercut the kuttab teachers, the qadis, and the ulema, and they lost much of the people’s allegiance. Replacing them in influence were the French-educated teachers in the Franco-Arab schools, the French-trained lawyers, and the new party and labor union leaders.

On the eve of independence came the final blow to the tradition- oriented leaders. At issue was the advisability of compromising with the French on full or partial independence. Bourguiba had struggled to obtain an agreement with the French giving Tunisia home rule but not independence. The opposing group, led by Salah Ben Youssef, criticized the agreement, the Franco-Tunlsian Conventions, because they felt that there should be no compromise on the question of complete independence.

Bourguiba argued that by accepting the compromise of the Conventions, the government would be in a better position to negotiate for full

Independence.

Salah Ben Youssef had joined the party in 1937 and became Bourguiba's

l^charles Gallagher, "Tunisia Modernizes," Africa Report. XIII (March, 1968), p. 10. 38 right-hand man as party general secretary. During Bourguiba's exile years, 1945-1949, Ben Youssef held together party organization. In contrast to most of Neo-Destourian leaders, he was not of Sahelian origin, but from the South, historically a conservative and traditional area. From 1952 to 1955 Ben Youssef himself was in exile in Cairo where he was subject to the extremist climate of the Arab Maghreb

Liberation Committee which believed in no compromise or cooperation with France. On return to Tunisia in 1955, although still considered the party's general secretary, he began criticizing it for compromising with the French.

Significantly, Ben Youssef's opening attack on Bourguiba was from the Zltouna Mosque in a sermon criticizing Bourguiba and the Conventions.

His approach was pan-Arab and religious, appealing to Tunisians to reject Western influences. His greatest support, outside of his friends in the Neo-Destour, came from Southerners who saw him as their represen­ tative in the party, the small group of Old Destour loyalists who objected to the Conventions' unification of French and Tunisian courts, large land owners who feared a coalition of Bourguiba and the UGTT, and politicized urban youth who responded to the pro-Nasser pan-Arab r h e t o r i c , 20

The party regulars, unable to tolerate their general secretary's public criticism of the party, voted to strip him of his position and expel him. After expulsion Ben Youssef went to the South and began

20Moore, 0 £. c i t . , p. 63. 39 organizing an opposition army. After some guerrilla warfare, the

Tunisian-French government cracked down on the Yousseflsts arresting one hundred twenty dissidents, although Ben Youssef escaped to Cairo.

In the fall of 1955, France promised Morocco full Independence the following year. This put additional pressure on Bourguiba to demand

Tunisia's immediate independence. Although Bourguiba was possibly embarrassed by the Moroccan independence agreement, he successfully negotiated Tunisia's independence soon after. Although the Indepen­ dence Protocol of March 20, 1956, destroyed any rationale the Youssef rebellion may have had, the last guerrilla fighters did not surrender until mid-June, three months later after a large-scale military operation in the South.

The ability to eradicate Youssefism while keeping the party intact resulted in Increased prestige for the Neo-Destour leaders. Bourguiba,

Taieb Mehiri, Bahi Ladgham, and for the dynamic young UGTT leader, Ahmad

Ben Salah. Whether or not the Conventions had accelerated independence was no longer important; independence was a reality and Bourguiba had negotiated it.

According to Gallagher, "The party's dethronement of the traditional bourgeoisie in the bloodless revolution begun in the 1920's and ending

only in 1955 was the crucial turning point in recent Tunisian political history."21 The younger Western-educated modernist-oriented leaders

controlled the independence movement and were in a position to lead the

populace to a new society through a new government.

21Gallagher, o£. cit.. p. 14. CHAPTER V

INDEPENDENCE AND THE NEW EMANCIPATION

The Independence Protocol was signed March 20, 1956. A feeling of exhilaration engulfed Tunisia now that she was once again in the hands of Tunisians. The long fight for independence had been won, and

in celebration many younger women in Tunis discarded their veils,

symbolic of their country’s independence and their own freedom.^

The prestige of the Neo-Destour leaders, pre-eminently Habib

Bourguiba, was great, and the battle for independence which had demanded all their energies for the last several years had been won. Now,

Ben Youssef's threat to stability had been eliminated, and the Bey was a mere figurehead. Real power lay with Bourguiba, then Prime Minister,

and within the first year of Independence, the Neo-Destour could claim

A an estimated membership of 600,000. "Conditions were ripe to turn the

political revolution into a social revolution."^

The Neo-Destour, a well-organized mass party, has played a critical

role in transmitting policy to a local level. Party cells, located

1 Charles A. Micaud, Leon Carl Brown, and Clement Henry Moore, Tunisia; the Politics of Modernization (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 148

^Lars Rudebeck, Party and People (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 33,

^Micaud, Brown, and Moore, o£. cit., p. 145. 41 throughout the country, are in contact with virtually all the populace.

Party centers, equipped for radio or television reception, are vital to propagating party policies and priorities. Broadcast speeches by

President Bourguiba or other government officials are usually followed by discussion and further explanation--repetition!--by local party officials. Public meetings are frequent, usually including discussion of important governmental policy. Local party officials are quite faithful to party line, and often seem to be using the President's exact words.

The local branch of the party, according to the Neo-Destour charter,

"executes the programs and decisions of the party, and works in its district to awaken the national conscience to arouse the enthusiasm of the masses of the people, to train party militants, and to diffuse the principles of Destourlan socialism."^

Repetition and explanation are the keys to the party's success.

As Gallagher has pointed out:

A number of Tunisian intellectuals have complained over the years about the tendency of the Neo-Destour to repeat the same message ad-nauseum, but the fruits of exhortation and indoctrin­ ation are now becoming apparent in the quality of comprehending ^ participancy which is being brought to the task of nation-building.

^Neo-Destour Charter, Article 6, as cited by Rudebeck, 0£. cit., p. 160.

^Charles Gallagher, "Tunisia Modernizes," Africa Report, XIII (March, 1968), p. 10. 42

Tunisia's approach to and success in social reform has greatly depended on the personality and adroit statesmanship of Bourguiba who has been "... chief architect of the political and social transfor­ mation of Tunisia. . . Indeed, in giving women equal rights, there is no question that President Bourguiba has been the moving force.^ For example, the Personal Status Code, providing comprehensive civil reforms, was enacted by Bourguiba soon after independence and took almost everyone--including the women--by surprise.®

Almost all government programs in Tunisia reflect Bourguiba's own personal approach to his countrymen;

One often feels that Habib Bourguiba is dealing with Tunisia by alternately prodding, scolding, envisioning, crying, and decrying as a Pygmalion with four million Galateas. It is an enormous unending personal effort to remake the character, thoughts, and habits of his countrymen to the image of his inner eye. In this there is much paternalism, more than a shade of vanity, and a whisper of the obsession of the true fanatic, without whom men would probably still be eating nuts and berries.®

"Bourguibism" has come to mean a method of attaining a goal by pragmatic tacking and is the key to Tunisia's success. Bourguiba has made revolutionary decrees, such as the Personal Status Code, but has

4lbid.. p. 19.

2Interview with a UNFT official, April, 1967; Interview with the president of Dar Aziza Othmana, May, 1967.

®Ibid.

®Charles Gallagher, "Building a New Tunisia: Comments on an Address by Habib Bourguiba" (New York: American Universities Field Staff Reports Service, 1961), p. 6. 43 tempered potential divisiveness by calling on Islamic principles in

Justification and support. Rather than making Tunisia a secular state and offending the religious population, the 1959 Constitution affirms that; "The Tunisian State is free, independent, and sovereign. Islam is its religion, Arabic its language and the republican system is its regime.

The President of the Republic is head of state and Islam is his religion.

Even while retaining its essential Muslim character, Tunisia is going through a process described by Jacques Berque as "desacralization,"

It is not a secularization, but rather a removal of religious taboos from certain areas of behavior.Many Tunisians themselves describe it as a return to Islam's true intent and a rejection of centuries of out­ moded customs that have developed around many facets of life and have come to be associated with Islam.

As Dr. Lorna Hahn explains;

Citing the Koran and the life of the prophet Mohamed, they [the Neo-Destour leaders} took the approach that the Moslem religion was not really one of asceticism and renunciation, but one which upheld the dignity of man, held him alone responsible for his actions, and made it a sacred duty to try to improve his life on earth.12

l^Constitution of the Tunisian Republic, Articles 1 and 38. (Tunis; Publication of the Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Infor­ mation, 1962), pp. 7 and 20.

llcf. Jacques Berque, Les Arabes d'Hier à Demain (Paris; Editions du Seuil, 1960).

12Lorna Hahn, North Africa. Nationalism to Nationhood (Washington; Puolic Affairs Press, i960), p. 19. 44

Bourguiba has tried to reopen the possibility of 1.1 tihad (indi­ vidual Judgment) which was closed by religious leaders during Islam's

fourth century. Until that time, Shari'a law had been allowed to develop according to society's needs, but the then leading ulema

reasoned that ijtihad had explored all the possibilities so nothing

remained but Imitation of already existing doctrine, taqlid. Bourguiba has tried to convince Tunisians to look beyond customs which have evolved

around Islam, reject the idea of taqlid, and find the true meaning of

the Koran. Once the true Intent is understood, ijtihad must be used within a contemporary context.

This concept is exemplified in Bourguiba* s approach to the veil

issue when women were encouraged to discard this symbol of their

retreat from the world. No legislation was passed or even requested,

but female government employees and wives of government employees were

asked to set an example by no longer wearing them.

The key factor in this approach to the populace is separating the

tenets of Islam from custom. As Bourguiba explained;

While we understand the reluctance of middle-aged women to give up an old habit, we can only regret the obstinacy of parents who still force their children and young daughters to wear the veil to school. We even see government officials going to their work encumbered with this unbearable rag. I do not cease from repeating that it has been abandoned by other Moslem countries and has nothing

^3personal interviews with selected women of Tunis, many of whom were government employees' wives. 45

to do with religion. Though Islam recommends that women should cover their hair, their arms, and their legs, it does not mention the veil. The veil, as stated before, was adopted by the Moslem countries from foreign empires.

The Koran's true intent in advising women "not to expose their ornaments"^5 is to prevent them from drawing sexual attention to them­ selves, not withdrawal from society, and the modern interpretation calls for modest dress and proper conduct. Thus, veils are discouraged, but miniskirts as well are discouraged.^^

The author's field research evaluated the reception which Tunisian women have accorded Bourguiba*s request that they discard the "unbearable rag." Their responses varied from complete compliance to rejection.

Of the thirty urban women interviewed (see Table XXX, page 46), seven­ teen said that they had never worn the veil. But among the remaining thirteen who have worn it in the past, nine said that they never wear it now, and four said that they wear it only rarely. Xn contrast, it was found tnat five of the village women nad never worn the veil.

Significantly, these five were tne youngest village respondents and were unmarried. Of the remaining twenty-five, fifteen wore it every

time they went out; four wore it most of the time; five wore it only rarely; and six said that they had quit wearing it completely.

^^Bourguiba, Speech given December 5, 1957. Cited in Women of Tunisia Tunisian Documents, (Tunis: Secretariat of State for Infor­ mation and Tourism, 1961), p. 14.

l^the Koran 33^9

^^Bourguiba, "Birth Control as a Factor of Development," Speech given August 12, 1966, (Tunis: Secretariat of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, 1966), p. 25, 46

The women offered several reasons for the continued use of the veil.

Older women often said that they would feel undressed without it, and

some said that it was useful In covering old clothes. Concern over what other villagers would say was often expressed, and concomitantly

and not unexpectedly, some said they wore veils in the village where

everyone knew them, but took them off when in Nabeul or Tunis.

TABLE III

FREQUENCY THAT RESPONDENTS WEAR THE VEIL

Frequency Urban Rural

Have never worn it 17 5

Have worn it in the past but never wear 9 6 it now

Rarely wear it 4 5

Usually wear it 0 4

Always wear it 0 15

No urban women respondents wanted their daughters veiled and only

three village women felt that their daughters should be veiled. In all

three cases, the daughters were uneducated and already married indicating

that even though some village women hesitate discarding the veil for

themselves, most are anxious that their daughters do so. And, likely

within another generation or two, the veil will have disappeared 47 entirely in this area.

Among the Bedouin, it Is interesting to note--however numerically

insignificant— a trend opposite that described above. When Bedouin women, traditionally unveiled, move to a town, they usually adopt the

veil because they associate it with the increased social status of the

non-rural life.l?

Personal Status Code. Without any public warning, the revolutionary

Personal Status Code was announced a scant five months after independence,

It rejected Shari'a law, making all Tunisians— Muslim, Jew, male, female--

subject to the same civil code and-its essential features would allow

reform of basic Tunisian family structure.

After introducing the Code on August 13, 1956, Bourguiba made

several radio speeches to explain it and encourage acceptance. This

effort exemplified the new government's tactical approach to social

reforms.

In considering the Personal Status Code, it is important to note

that the Koran provides for five categories of actions; mandatory,

recommended, tolerated, discouraged, and absolutely forbidden. Signifi­

cantly, the Personal Status Code rejects nothing considered mandatory

practice by the Koran.

These laws do not presume to reform the Koran. On the contrary they obey its moral precepts. Their aim, however, is to clarify the status and rights of both husband and wife and to adapt the marriage relationship to the demands of modern life. This means that many outdated customs, which are not based on the teachings

Personal interview with Eqbal Ahmad, June, 1966. 48 of the Koran, have been swept away. The new code does not legalize anything forbidden by religious law--it merely forbids certain practices tolerated hitherto, but unsuited to the twentieth century. Monogamy in no way prevents the Tunisian from being a good M o s l e m . 18

Among the Personal Status Code's major provisions are making marriage

an agreement between two individuals— not two families, setting the marriage age at eighteen for men and fifteen for women.Also unilateral

repudiation is abolished and divorce obtainable only through court action with either spouse able to initiate divorce proceedings. If a divorce is

granted, the new law provides for child support to be paid to the mother

who in most cases would be allowed to retain custody of the children.

In another more controversial provision, men and women are allowed to

marry outside their r e l i g i o n . ^0 This is the only section of the Personal

Status Code which condones an "absolutely forbidden" action, by allowing

a woman to marry a non-Muslim. However, Bourguiba, the UNFT and the

PSD have given this scant attention and some women do not recognize this

provision as law.

Finally, although the Koran tolerates polygamy, it is estimated that

only about 3% of the Tunisian population practiced it at independence.22

^8Women of Tunisia, op. cit.. p. 23.

l^The minimum age was changed in 1964, to twenty and seventeen for men and women respectively.

^®Contrast Islamic law pages 18-22.

^^Interviews with selected village women, April and May, 1967.

2%Micaud, Brown, and Moore, 0£. cit., p. 146. 49

Thus, Bourguiba carefully introduced the feature of the Personal Status

Code prohibiting polygamy calling upon Mohamed Abduh's interpretation in declaring that although the Koran allowed a maximum of four wives, it also was mandatory for a husband to treat them equally. And since no one but the Prophet himself could treat four women exactly alike,

Mohamed was really forbidding polygamy. While appearing to be a far-flung apologetic analysis to some, it was fully consistent with

Bourguiba's policy of keeping reforms within a nominal, at least,

Muslim context.23

Numerous government and party officials travelled the countryside echoing the President's words. Party meetings were held and the

Personal Status Code carefully explained again and again. Because of the careful groundwork laid, and because party cadres were thoroughly indoctrinated, Bourguiba was able to institute this Code with little overt criticism.

Since the Code brought about the abolishment of Shari*a courts, many religious judges were "retired;" the most important of these leaders were given positions either in the Ministry of Justice or at the Zitouna before the Code was announced. Thus potential criticism from the most important religious authorities was moderated.

Although several of the Muslim judges who had been made part of the

Ministry of Justice felt compelled to resign in protest, there was no

23Mohamed Abduh, Islamic reformer, 1849-1905. Cited by Reuben Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 101. 50 large-scale rejection of the Code.

De Montety points out that general acceptance of the Code was a natural extension of a trend already in evidence: "After the short waves of modernism from 1925 to 1950, a groundswell silently formed under the crust of tradition which could break, open with the national revolution. With the passionate elan of triumphant nationalism, the revolution of customs could be accomplished with good conscience and with

the support of l e g a l i t y . "24 And, Gallagher has asserted that, "It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this bold step, with which

Bourguiba took the country and most of the traditional elements by surprise,"23

Of course all these legal changes would merely remain on the books and unimplemented unless a massive and concerted effort to convince people of women's equality were made. As deftly put by Asma in an article in the woman's magazine Faiza, "where this private domain is concerned, it is not enough to promulgate laws. It is also necessary to persuade, convince, euligaten . . . and wait! "26

2^Henri de Montety, "Mutation des moeurs familiales en Tunisie," Cahiers Nord Africains ESNA, no. 77, pp. 25-26. Cited by Moore, ££. cit. , p. 51.

23Gallagher, "Tunisia Modernizes," o£. cit., p. 10.

2&Asma, "La famille maghrébine," Faiza, LVI, (mars-avril, 1967), p. 60. Author's translation; ". . . des qu*on touche a ce 'domaine réservé' il ne suffit pas de promulguer des lois. Il faut aussi persuader, convaincre, éclairer. . . et attendre!" 51 The author's interviewing of city and village women dealt at length with the women's reaction to the Personal Status Code. The respondents, who were generally favorable in their reactions, were asked the year of their marriage and their age at marriage, and who chose their husband. Then, whether they would choose their daughter's husband and the ideal age for marriage were asked. Finally, the question of whether a Muslim girl could marry a non-believer was asked.

As shown in Table IV, page 52, eighteen of the city women were married before 1956, and of these, three chose their husbands themselves, five said that they and their parents jointly made the choice, and the remaining ten said it was a parental choice. Tlie ten^/ city women married after 1956 showed an opposite trend; five chose themselves, three said they chose with the help of their parents; and only two said that their parents chose for them. These answers indicate that this group of women had already begun exercising some freedom in choosing husbands even before independence, but the Personal Status Code accelerated the trend.

The answers of the village women reflect a more abrupt change in attitudes before and after independence. Eleven had married before 1956, and all said their parents had chosen their husbands. Fourteen^Q village women married after 1956, and of those, ten said they chose themselves with the help of their parents while only four said their parents chose

for them.

27t w o were unmarried.

28pive were unmarried. 52

All of the women interviewed, both urban and rural, believed that it is better for the daughter to select her own husband although about half of all the women expressed the importance of the parents helping the daughter in her choice.

TABLE IV

CHOICE OF HUSBAND FOR MARRIED RESPONDENTS

Chose Chose herself Parents chose with parents

Before 1956

City women 3 5 10

Village women 0 0 11

After 1956

City women 5 3 2

Village women 0 10 4

The median age for the city women married before 1956 was twenty.

It was the same for those married after 1956--still twenty. The village women showed a greater variation. Before 1956, the median age was six­ teen; after 1956, the median age was twenty. See Table V, page 53.

When asked to specify the ideal age of marriage for a man and a woman, the median age specified by the city women was twenty-five for the man and twenty-two for the woman, whereas the villagers specified the median ages of twenty-eight for the man and twenty for the woman. This 53 reflects the traditional orientation of the villagers since customarily the man is older. Still, both groups gave ages well above the legal twenty and seventeen for men and women respectively.

Not one of the women interviewed approved the idea of a Muslim girl marrying a non-Muslim. However, reactions varied from the villagers' insistence that it would be illegal and impossible to the urbanites' explanation that they objected because of the difficulties involved with the families. Many of the respondents Indicated that it was perfectly acceptable for a man to marry a European. The difference between the villagers and the urbanites on this question was one of sophistication in the response--not one of basic belief.

TABLE V

AGE OF RESPONDENTS AT TIME OF MARRIAGE

15 or under 16-17 18-19 20-21 22 or older

Before 1956

City women 1 - 6 5 3

Village women 5 1 4 - 1

After 1956

City women - - 5 4 3

Village women - 2 4 3 4 54

Questions concerning the divorce provisions of the Personal Status

Code were asked in the author's interviewing. Specifically, the women's reaction to the divorce reforms and their ideas on the child custody section were solicited.

All the villagers expressed approval of the new divorce law,29 but the city women were not unanimous in their enthusiasm. Nine of

the thirty city respondents expressed fear that women might "take advantage" of the law. Only one of the respondents was a divorcee, an older village woman whose inability to bear children had caused her husband to repudiate her in 1948.

Eighteen of the city women felt that the mother should have full custody of the children in case of divorce while twelve suggested

some type of combined responsibility, either with the mother while they are young and then with the father,30 or an arrangement allowing six months with one and then six months with the other.

Seventeen of the village women felt that the mother should have

custody. One village woman felt a male child should be with the father

after the age of seven, and two women felt that the richer parent should have the responsibility of the children. Evidently the child-support

provisions of the law were unknown to them, or they considered them

impracticable.

29xhis unanimous approval may have been due to tlie interpreter's phrasing of the Arabic.

30This, of course, reflects the system that existed before the Personal Status Code. 55

Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie. In addition to the Neo-

Destour (the name was changed to the Parti Socialiste Destourien in

1964), the UNFT has been very active in disseminating information to women, providing educational programs for women, lobbying for laws insuring equality of women, and making women aware of their rights and responsibilities. Created in 1956, with the personal encouragement of President Bourguiba, the UNFT's objectives are essentially social and political, as its charter states:

We, women of Tunisia, militants in the creation of the Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie, proclaim our conviction that our Union is a national organization which works for the evolution of woman and the development of her civic responsibility, and which works in relationship with all national organizations under the guide of the Neo-Destour Party and the President, the Supreme Combatant, Habib Bourguiba, liberator of the country and of w o m e n . 31

After a slow start in building membership,32 fhe UNFT now has about 40,000 women organized into 250 sections throughout the country.33

^^UNFT Charter. Cited by Fatma Haddad, "La Participation de la Femme Tunisienne â la Vie Active," (Tunis: Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie, 1969), p. 1. Author's translation: Nous, femmes de Tunisie, militant au sein de 1'Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie, proclamons notre conviction que notre Union est une organisation nationale qui oeuvre pour 1'évolution de la femme, et le développement de son sens civique, et qui travaille en relation avec toutes les organisations nationales sous l'éguide du Parti du Néo-Destour et de son Président le Combattant Suprême, Habib Bourguiba, libérateur de la Patrie et de la femme.

32Moore, 0£. cit., p. 164.

33pudebeck, 0£. c i t ., p. 40. 56

Wtiile greatest strength is among the educated urban women, there is an

active interest in the special position of rural and village women.

According to Gallagher, the UNFT has become the prime force in mobilizing

and modernizing the country's w o m e n . 35

The UNFT's founders were women active in the Independence movement with many of them Bourguiba*s relatives or wives of his lieutenants.3&

The UNFT was founded not so much as an expression of Tunisian women's

desire for a voice in national affairs, but as a means for the national

leaders to mobilize w o m e n . 37 Because of this, the UNFT has never been

in a position of opposing the party or the government. Indeed, it

functions as the feminine arm of the PSD, albeit separate organizationally

Radhia Haddad, President of the UNFT since its creation, favors an

organizational integration with the PSD. 38 There is no ideological

difference, and as long as Rudebeck's observation that "most politically

interested women join the UNFT rather than the party, although there are

exceptions,is true, women will not be involved in "real" politics.40

34patma Haddad, "Les Ressources Humaines pour le Développement" (Tunis: UNFT, 1970), p. 2.

^^Gallagher, "Tunisia Modernizes" 0£. cit., p. 11.

3GMoore, loc. cit.

32Personal interview with the president of Dar Aziza Othmana, May, 1967.

3®lntervicw with Radhia Haddad, October 19, 1965, cited by Rudebeck, op. cit., p . 40.

39Rudebeck, o£. cit., p. 141.

4^Radhia Haddad, cited by Rudebeck, loc. cit. 57

Bourguiba has pointed out that women are naturally more effective in carrying the message of women's emancipation to other women than men could be,41 but once women are aware of their rights and responsibilities, they must be encouraged to participate equally with men in politics42 and not to remain segregated in the UNFT.

Among the UNFT's main tasks are increasing women's awareness of their voting rights and getting competent women elected to office.

Women first voted in May, 1959, with 101,000 balloters^^ in municipal elections. Ten women were elected to municipal councils. In 1959, following the Constitution's promulgation and the declaration of the republic, Radhia Haddad was elected Parliament's first woman deputy.

By 1966, there were 212,606 women voting in municipal elections which represented 37.6% of the nation's eligible women voters.44

Forty-four women were elected to municipal councils. By the 1969 elections, 38.3% of the eligible women exercised their ballot, and eighty-two were elected to municipal c o u n c i l s . 45 t w o other women

41-Habib Bourguiba, Speech delivered to the Second Congress of the UNFT, Monastir, August 13, 1960, (Tunis: 1960), p. 19.

42personal interview with UNFT official, April, 1967; personal interview with president of Dar Aziza Othmana, May, 1967.

43"Women of Tunisia," 0£. cit., p. 19.

44naddad, "Les Ressources Humaines pour le Développement" o£. cit.. p. 3. 45ibid. 58 were also elected to Join Mrs. Haddad in Parliament. In 1969, 61.7% of the eligible men voted,48 making the women's 38.3% seem low, but as

Rudebeck points out, "Arousing the women of Tunisia from their age-long habits of non-participation in public life is a process that demands time."42

Besides political activities, the UNFT is active in welfare work.

"El Hidya," a center for young unmarried mothers and mothers-to-be, teaches child-care, math, sewing, cooking, reading, and writing to facilitate their return to a society which traditionally would probably have condemned them to death for their transgression. Efforts are made to return the girls and their babies to their families or to find suitable husbands and fathers for them.

The UNFT has also assisted abandoned children by creating orphanages and pushing in 1958 for the Arab world's first adoption law.

Government. As Gallagher states, "Most ministers are active party members who spend their free time in junketing to the countryside for campaigns of 'explanation' and indoctrination."48 Working closely with

President Bourguiba, and following his lead, these ministers and govern­ ment officials play an active role in disseminating ideas and civic education.

48"Rapport Triennal," (Tunis: UNFT, n.d,), p. 3,

42Rudebeck, o£. cit.. p. 212,

48Gallagher, "Tunisia Modernizes," o£. cit.. p. 10. 59

Unfortunately, most real discussion and criticism in thrashing out policy is kept closely within the party circles. Only several times since Independence have party leaders openly criticized Bourguiba or party policy, and they have been severely reprimanded and deprived of their positions. Consequently, no open discussion among party or government leaders concerning women's emancipation has been aired, although it is quite likely that party leadership embraces Bourguiba's lead in this field.

Most campaigns aimed at women are introduced by Bourguiba and implemented by the appropriate ministry together with the PSD and the

UNFT. All government officials, party officials, and UNFT leaders interviewed by the author reiterated virtually the same ideas, arguments, and predictions regarding women's emancipation. "Observers [^have] noted, not without cynicism, that all Tunisian politicians sounded like Bourguiba.

Not only did they utter the same ideas, they even unconsciously imitated his staccato style delivered in the familiar Tunisian dialect."49

The Ministries of Education, Labor, Justice, and Health are those most directly concerned with women, and each has made efforts to improve the position of women.

Hedi Khefacha, former Minister of Justice, expressed in an interview the necessity for the courts to strongly enforce the legal reforms affecting women which will act to instruct and guide Tunisians in

49%,eon Carl Brown, "The Age of Bourguiba Comes to an End: What Will Follow It?" The Sunday Star, Washington, D.C., June 20, 1971, p. 10. 60 developing proper responsibility and morality.50

Punishment for abusing the new freedoms accorded women are harsh.

For example, conviction of elopement nets two years in prison.51 Also,

if a man has sexual relations with a girl less than twenty years old, he must marry her and not divorce her for any cause for at least two years.52

Verdicts often include moral lectures from the bench, and to heighten

the "social pressure" in trials involving more serious offences, cases are tried publicly. President Bourguiba does not hesitate to use cases as examples in his public speeches.53

Education. Girls have benefitted enormously from changes in the

educational system under the leadership of the former Ministers of

Education Mohamed Masmoudi and Ahmad Ben Salah. Greatly increased

numbers of schools make it possible for girls to attend nearer their

homes. Government now provides free classroom materials for many students,

thus enabling a family to send more of their children to school. This

Increases the number of girls in school since most families have

50personal interview with Hedi Khefacha, March, 1966.

5lMicaud, Brown, and Moore, o£. cit. , p. 149.

52”Rapport Triennal," 0£. cit., p. 2.

53cf. Habib Bourguiba, "Women Have Rights and Duties too," Speech, (Tunis; Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, 1968); Bourguiba, "Eliminating Libertinism," Speech, (Tunis: Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs and Information, 1966). 61 considered their education less important than their brothers'.54 Girls are no longer required to spend time learning sewing and hotnemaking, and now follow the same courses as the boys creating the opportunity to do equally well on examinations and thus be able to continue their education.

Certain fields, formerly reserved for boys, have been opened to girls.

As shown in Table VI, page 62, Tunisia's school girls have increased their numbers dramatically although they are still far behind the number of boys. Primary school enrollment of girls in 1955-56 was 77,225, but by 1970-71, the figure had jumped to 359,730. That stands in contrast

to the 1970-71 figure of 563,131 boys. Statistics for girls in secondary school in the same years went from 6,816 to 50,016 which is still considerably lower than the boys' 130,506. Similarly, the number of women in higher education leaped from 363 at Independence to 2,136 by

1970-71. This compares with 7,993 men in higher education,

To reach the goal of 100% primary-school attendance for girls,

families must be convinced that their education is important. Of course,

the government must also provide adequate facilities to accommodate all

the girls whose parents are willing to enroll them.

In addition to governmental educational programs, the UNFT has

created a broad network of educational and social services. Numerous

literacy courses have been organized within UNFT sections under the

54%nterviews with selected village and city women. May, 1967.

55"Evolution des effectifs des élèves par sexe et par degré d'enseigne­ ment depuis 1'Indépendance," La Presse, Tunis, October 1, 1971. 62

TABLE Vl58

SCHOOL STATISTICS 1956-57, 1970-71

1956-57 1970-71

Primary School;

Boys 149,664 563,131

Girls 77,225 359,730

Secondary School;

Boys 26,108 130,506

Girls 6,816 50,016

Higher Education;

Men 1,777 7,993

Women 363 2,136

56Ibid. 63 auspices of the Service de 1'Education Sociale, a subdivision of the

Secretariat d'Etat aux Affaires Culturelles. By May, 1965, forty-seven centers had enrolled a total of 3448 women in literacy courses. As expected, the greatest number of women attend in the northern part of

the country. Although impressive, the number of women attending literacy courses is far behind the 7245 men a t t e n d i n g . 52

Girls completing primary school but failing the secondary school entrance examination can now attend a special secondary school created oy the UNFT. Tiiis Centre Professionnel d'Ez-Zouhour offers two years or terminal training in domestic and clerical skills. About 600 girls per year receive domestic science training and professional courses.^8

Other less formal educational programs in UNFT sections offer cooking, sewing, hygiene, child care, and basic mathematics courses.

Rural girls with no formal education are recruited for residential courses with the UNFT paying transportation, room and b o a r d . 59

Day child-care centers for working mothers or those attending UNFT courses have been established. Also the UNFT has established klndergardens

52"La lutte contre 1'analphabétisme en Tunisie," Rapport présenté à 1'UNESCO, (Tunis; Secretariat d'Etat aux Affaires Culturelles, 1965), p. 13.

58"Aspects Particuliers du Problème de l’Accès Des Femmes Tunisiennes à l'Education," (Tunis: UNFT, 1969), p. 4.

59ibid. 64 with programs and instructors provided by the government.80

Another effort to facilitate higher education for girls was insti­ gated by Wassila Bourguiba,81 the President's wife and a strong feminist, and involved building a university dormitory for girls. It was felt that families would be more receptive to sending their daughters to Tunis and university if they were assured of proper and supervised living conditions.

Finally, the UNFT officials visit families of girls who have the opportunity to study overseas to convince the families of their safety and propriety in going a b r o a d . 83

In the author's interviews the city and village respondents were asked about their own and their daughters' educational background. Ques­ tions also regarding whether they preferred an all-female or coeducational school for their daughters, whether they considered a university education necessary for girls, and whether they would want their daughters to go abroad to study were asked.

Among the city women interviewed, three had only three years of school, eight had six years, nine had nine years and ten had twelve years

80lbid.

81presldent Bourguiba divorced his French-born wife and remarried after Independence. His present wife, Wassila Bourguiba, is Tunisian and was active in the Independence movement. Since 1956, she has shown a great deal of interest in women's emancipation.

82ibid. p. 3.

^^Ibid. 65 as shown In Table VII. Ten village women had no education, five had only one year, five had three years, four had six years, four had nine years, and two had twelve years. Significantly, the younger women in both groups had more education.

■ ' TABLE VII

RESPONDENTS' COMPLETED SCHOOL YEARS

None 1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 years years years years

City women 0 3 8 9 10

Village women 10 10 4 4 2

All the women interviewed wanted their daughters educated. Of the

urban women, twenty-two specified coeducational institutions stressing

the need for girls to overcome "complexes" with boys, while eight said

either coeducational or girls' schools were acceptable. The village women were divided: six wanted their daughters in girls' schools, twelve

preferred coeducational, and twelve said that it made no difference. See

Table VIII, page 66.

All the women said they would like their daughters to continue to

university, but, significantly, about half of the village and urban women

mentioned the greater importance of sons to attend university.

The question of girls' studying abroad won unanimous approval among

the city women, but many village women expressed doubts, and five simply 66 said they would not allow it.

It is a positive trend that most of the women believe in coeducational schools, and even though their sons' education is still most important, the villagers' acceptance of the need for their daughters' education has the greatest ramifications for the future of women's status.

TABLE VIII

TYPE OF SCHOOL RESPONDENTS PREFER FOR DAUGHTERS

All Girls Coeducational Ei ther

City women 0 22 8

Village women 6 12 12

Labor. "A woman, or young girl, who by her own labour assures her

existence, becomes conscious of her dignity. She no longer waits, as an

animal, for man to provide for her. Her standards are immediately r a i s e d ."84

Generally, Increased educational opportunities precipitate increased

employment opportunities. Yet, unfortunately for Tunisia with more

educated women than ever, the overall unemployment or underemployment

situation now makes it doubly hard for women to find jobs. This present

84gourguiba, Speech, August 13, 1960. p. 20, 67 hardship has many ramifications since according to Dorra Bouzld, former editor of Faiza, employment is the key to the future of women's emancipation. 85 And Tunisia's 1966 census reported a 15% unemployment rate among both men and w o m e n . 88 As long as men are preferred for jobs where women are equally qualified, women can not be economically indepen­ dent. This, of course, is the same problem women face in the techno­ logically developed countries, which in Itself, is a measure of how far

Tunisian women have progressed in the last fifteen years.

In 1964, the labor force was 20% female with 30,000 women in industry, commerce and administrative services, 60,000 in agriculture and 30,000 in domestic w o r k . ^2

Legislation governing working women is predicated on United Nations' recommendations with the major features being:

the right of the Secretary of State for Public Health and Social Affairs to define various kinds of employment detrimental to the health or morals or beyond the strength of women; the right to twelve consecutive hours of sleep; the prohibition of work for a period of twelve consecutive weeks preceding and following child­ birth, and the prohibition of employment of women in the four weeks following childbirth; the right of nursing mothers to a period of one hour, divisible in two, during working hours In order to feed their babies; the provision of chairs and restrooms; and the absolute prohibition of employment of women and girls in mines and q u a r r i e s . 88

^^interview, September, 1971, with Aaron Segal.

88u. S. Bureau of the Census, Population of Tunisia. Estimates and Projections: 1967 to 2000 (Washington: U, S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 18.

82naddad, "La Participation de la Femme Tunisienne à la Vie Active," op. cit., p. 5.

68Women of Tunisia, op. cit., p. 24. 68

In April, 1956, a law was passed controlling wages and conditions of work for women in agriculture, and in May, 1968, this was further extended to provide for equal salaries for men and women in agriculture. Tlie wage earned by a woman belongs to her by law--she can dispose of it freely, but must contribute to the household expenses. Legally "women have

access to all jobs, without any discrimination, "89

In interviewing the city and village sample, the women were asked whether they worked, and, if so, what kind of work, whether they believed a woman should stay at home, and how they felt about women supervising men.

Among the city women, nine said they were employed outside the home, five were active in social work, and sixteen did no work other than their home duties. Among the village women, six were employed outside the home in UNFT related jobs, three specified that they worked in the fields, eight did handicrafts at home for profit, and thirteen did only house­ work.

There was a certain ambivalence among both groups of women concerning wliether or not women should stay at home. Only six women (three urban, three village) stated categorically that women’s place was in the home.

Most of the other women felt that a mother of young children should stay at home, but that a single woman or those without children should work.

Four of the village women felt that a woman should work only in occupations where they would not have to have contact with men.

^^Ibid. 69

Most of the city women felt that a "woman of ability" should not feel compelled to reject a position of authority over men. Some stressed that the woman would have to be very careful not to offend and not to relinquish her power lest she become only a figurehead. The villagers were not so confident; nine said that a woman should not be put in a position of giving orders to men; the remaining twenty-one approved it, but usually with conditions attached.

It is interesting to note that in responding to these questions, the city women emphasized the altruistic patriotic aspects of working whereas the village women stressed the practical economic factors. It might also be assumed that the economic motives are more compelling since more village women did work in addition to home duties than city women.

Family Planning. Closely related to the unemployment problem is population growth. Tunisia's current population is estimated at five million, and government planning is based on an estimated 3.0% growth rate.20 The Tunisian government's concern about the growth rate was manifested in 1960 when the Family Allowance Decree stopped the granting of supplemental allowances for more than four children. Following this in lybl was legalizing tne import and use oi contraceptive devices. And in 1965, a very advanced law providing for legal abortion in the first three months of pregnancy for women aged over thirty with five or more living children was enacted. The woman may obtain an abortion even without

7 0Population of Tunisia, op. cit., p. 10. 70 her husband's consent. Voluntary sterilization as well has been legal­

ized

In 1964 a Family Planning Program emphasizing interi. iine devices

(IUD's ) was launched with the cooperation of the Ford Foundation and the

Population Council, The program started slowly, and then in an apparent

about-face in August 1966, President Bourguiba gave a speech urging

families to have at least four children.There was speculation at the

time as to the reasons for Bourguiba's apparent capitulation, but no

specific explanation was ever advanced by the government. Whatever the

reason, the original program failed to recover from this loss of momentum

and had reached only half Its original goal by May 1968.

Yet, with Bourguiba'8 backing a new program had been launched in

January, 1968, headed by Mrs. Taouhida Ben Cheikh, Tunisia's first

woman doctor. Working through 300 centers throughout the country, the

program provides information and mechanical and chemical contraceptives

free of charge.

Without family planning, the population would jump to over seven

million by 1981, and 14.5 million by the year 2000. Yet, even with a

continuation of the present efforts, the population will be just seven

million in 1981, and 12.5 million by the year 2000. If the stated goals

of the program are achieved the population in 1981 and 2000 would be 6.5

and 10,5 million respectively.

^^Gallagher, "Tunisia Modernizes," o£, cit., p. 11.

^^Bourguiba, "Birth Control as a Factor of Development," o£. clt., p, 14. 71 Population of Tunisia, op. cit., p. 5. 71

According to Dr. Amor Daly, wno helped develop family planning services in Tunisia, sluggish progress in family planning, apart from political seLuacks, is due to, "a decline in concern about population growth, the lack of a good family planning educational program, a shortage of medical and paramedical personnel, and the Inadequate integration of

family planning into the public health services. Added to these problems is the massive psychological job of convincing families that

fewer children are desirable which can only be mounted with total co­ operation of all interested parties.

The women respondents were asked how many children they had and the

size of an ideal family.

Their answers indicated that they generally believe that fewer

children are preferable. The city group of respondents had a median

number of two children which corresponds with the most often mentioned

number in connection with the ideal family size. Three women called four

children the ideal number, but none indicated more than that.

The median for the actual number of children for the village women was three. They mentioned three and four most often as the ideal family

size. Only one woman said more than four (a dozen!), but on closer

questioning it was discovered that she was an only child and an orphan.

These answers indicate that not only the educated elite, but also

^^Amor Daly, "Tunisia, the Liberation of Women," cited by Population of Tunisia, op. cit.. p. 10. 72

the villagers are aware of the economic advantage of having fewer children.

At the time of the interviews (May, 1967), most village women were uninformed of birth control methods although they were interested in obtaining advice. This reflects a substantial change from traditional acceptance of birth and death as the will of Allah.

Sunroarv. The years since Independence have seen profound cnanges

in women's status. These changes have found a ready reception among the urban elite and to some extent among village women of Cap Bon. Jean

Duvignaud shows in his study of Shebika, in Tunisia's Southwest, that women's life there has not changed, and this is probably true for most of the South.The impact of education is just beginning to be felt

in this area, and in all likelihood, it will be some time before these women enjoy their new legal and social status.

President Bourguiba deftly summed up the official attitude toward

the reasons for favoring women's emancipation, the method of encouraging

it, and the progress made in achieving it in a speech delivered April 3,

1968:

We have achieved in Tunisia a progress which is, I dare not say spectacular, but definite and appreciable, and one can only judge its extent if one is aware of our starting-point. At the outset, only thirteen years ago, when Tunisia achieved her independence, we were dragging behind us the weight of several centuries of decrepitude and of decay that brought, among other evils, the abasement of women; and that is an unmistakable sign of decay: when woman does not have her rightful place in society, it is proof that

^^Jean Duyignaud, Change at Shebika; Report from a North African Village. (New York: Pantheon, 1969). 73 such a society is far behind the times. We do not claim to have made It up completely, but we have gone a long way in that direction, not merely in terms of legislation, but in actual fact. That Is why we consider that the National Union of Tunisian Women has an outstanding part to play. Its president . . . leads with tireless determination a campaign In depth whose object Is to enable women to enjoy the rights guaranteed to them by law and to make them aware of the duties which law thus Imposes on them; for the enjoyment of rights is Inseparable from respect for duties. These two concepts involve some kind of a break with the status quo that was based on very ancient traditions. It was not easy to get them accepted by social classes and communities iu which, from time immemorial, religious ueliefs have entrenched a certain view of woman's place in society. There is nothing worse than decadence buttressed by religion. We have done our best to emerge from it without offending religious feeling or breaking with religion itself, without making a new break, but interpreting religion in a more intelligent and humane way. We have thus been able to take a giant stride forward without breaking with the past, or with our national identity of which religion is an important part.76

^^Bourguiba, "Women Have Rights and Duties too," o£. cit., pp. 6-7. CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY

Since 1956, Tunisia's independent government has boldly legislated to change women's status. Supporting this legislation have been active broadly-based campaigns to eliminate traditional and Islamic objections to women's emancipation. Tunisia has succeeded in freeing women from many constraints of seclusion because of many factors: the historical cosmopolitan nature of the Tunisian people, the Tunisians' great respect for President Bourguiba, the government's approach in implementing reforms, and the country's leaders' exceptional dedication toward social change.

Hie Tunisian people are relatively homogeneous. Centuries of village and city life under many foreign conquerors as well as indigenous rulers, have produced a fairly large middle class and a history of outward-looking attitudes, unique in the Maghreb, As summed up by Charles Gallagher:

The existence of a solid middle class and a bulwarking village hinterland of quality, plus Tunisia's position at the crossroads of the Mediterranean, combine to give a unique flavor to this country which has been and remains relatively homogeneous, tranquil, and open to fruitful outside influences.1

Islam has played the greatest role in setting the constraints of

Tunisia's social structure. The strict Malikite school of jurisprudence, dominant throughout North Africa, encourages a rather narrow interpretation of ShaM ' a' law. Women in pre-independent Tunisia were secluded thus ruling

^Charles Gallagher, "North African Problems and Prospects, Part 3, Language and Identity" Vol. X, no. 4. (January, 1964), p. 9. 75 out the possibility for education or working outside the home. Polygamy was legal bringing great disadvantage to many women. Unilateral repudiation which often forced a mother to leave her children with her

ex-husband at great emotional hardship was common practice. Finally, women in Tunisia were generally Created as persons unable, indeed,

incapable, of controlling their own destiny.

Beginning with the French occupation in 1881, came disintegration of

traditional customs. An educational system, originally set up for the

benefit of the European settlers, attracted Tunisians as well, and the

government soon relented to pressures, creating a Franco-Tunisian system.

Tunisians educated in these schools found positions in government or

private firms and achieved greater job and social mobility than traditionally

educated Tunisians. This resulted in more Tunisians seeking modern

educations within the French system, and the decline in the Koranic schools

and Muslim teachers' losing prestige.

The French Land Registration Act in 1885 led--often out of necessity--

to Tunisians registering their land. It was through French courts with

French-trained lawyers that Tunisians learned they could protect their

land, and, consequently, the qadis and Shari'a courts lost influence and

prestige to the Western-educated lawyers.

By the 1930's the new Western-educated middle class had grown suf­

ficiently large and prestigious to break with the traditionalists' party,

the Destour, to found their own political party, the Neo-Destour.

The next twenty years the Neo-Destourians consolidated power and

supplanted in large measure the traditional, religious authorities. 76

During the fight for independence women had taken increasingly active roles. They had entered schools in increasing numbers. Some had already discarded the veil; others retaining the veil, at least broke from the absolute seclusion of the house. Some women, especially relatives of

Neo-Destour leaders, actively demonstrated against the French.

Five months after independence, in August, 1956, the Personal

Status Code was announced. Shari*a law was now rejected in favor of a civil code which applied to all Tunisians. Unilateral repudiation was abolished; divorce was obtainable only through court action and wives could bring suit as well as husbands. Child support was provided for in case of divorce where the mother kept the children. Polygamy was henceforth forbidden. Marriage became a contract between individuals, not between families and minimum marriage ages were set at 18 and 15 for men and women respectively. ^ Women, as well as men, could marry outside the Muslim religion.

This revolutionary Code was followed with a law allowing women to voce and hold office--thus making them the legal equals of men.

Government was able to institute these reforms without a great resistance because President Bourguiba's popularity and prestige were great and the Neo-Destour which had just led the country to independence had in the process discredited largely the traditional religious leaders.

Another factor responsible for Tunisians' acceptance of the bold

2 This was changed in 1964 to twenty and seventeen for men and women respectively. 77 reforms was that Bourguiba and the Neo-Destour used a pragmatic and effective approach to the populace. Instead of trying to secularize

Tunisia (as was attempted in Turkey), Tunisian leaders have used new interpretations of Islam to support social reforms. They made clear distinctions between customs that have grown up around Islam and the

Koran's true intent. This process of desacralization of Tunisian society has been deftly managed by the leaders.

Organizations carrying out the psychological or attitudinal change approach to the population are of utmost importance. The Parti

Socialiste Destourien (the Neo-Destour changed its name in 1964) is well-organized in most parts of the country with local branches mandated to explain party and government policy to the populace.

The Union Nationale des Femmes de Tunisie, organized with the keen personal involvement of President Bourguiba, fulfills educational functions as well as welfare services. The UNFT challenges women to develop a sense of civic participation and responsibility and offers in its centers literacy training and homemaking courses. It also takes an active role in helping unwed mothers or abandoned children, or assisting young mothers interested in working or pursuing an education. The UNFT is also a main force behind the Family Planning Program,

Education for girls has progressed rapidly since Independence, but much remains to be done before the goal of universal primary school attendance becomes a reality. In 1970-71, only 409,746 school-age girls were in school as compared to 589,239 boys. The greatest stumbling block 78 to girls* education is that most families still do not consider girls' education as important as they do boys'.

Women have entered the labor market in increasing numbers and now are guaranteed equal wages by law. In 1965, every fifth Tunisian worker was a woman. While mostly in agriculture, domestic services, and clerical or administrative services, more women are being trained as professionals and there are now several women doctors, lawyers and professors.

Tunisia's worst difficulty is an unemployment problem, and specifically women suffer from the favoritism given men when being hired for positions

that both sexes qualify for equally.

Closely related to Tunisia's unemployment problem is a population

increasing at about 3.0% a year. Tunisia's present five million people,

if the population growth rate remains the same, will swell to 14.5 million

by the year 2000. The government recognizes this danger and has Instituted

a Family Planning program. Contraceptive devices are distributed free

of charge, and abortions for women with five children or more are legal

now even without the husband's consent. Family allowance payments are

cut off after the fourth child. If the program succeeds, the population

in the year 2000 will be only 10.5 million.

The effectiveness of Tunisia's reforms vary. Tlie village and city

women in the North and the Sahel are aware of the social reforms, and if

they can not whole-heartedly embrace all of them for themselves, they

appear to want them for their daughters. The Southerners and the nomadic 79

Bedouins are least affected by government reforms. In isolated oases in

the South, women's lives continue much as they always have. While the

radio brings news of things happening In Tunis, it is far away and not

relevant to their lives. Their one hope for change is education. Even

in isolated areas, primary schools usually have some girls among the boys attending. They learn what is going on in other parts of Tunisia, and their knowledge will extend to the other members of the village.

It may take several generations though before the women of the South

reach the status government is trying to promote.

However, among the educated urban elite, the government programs

are accepted willingly and Bourguiba is praised as being the women's

liberator. Yet, some of these urban women are criticized by certain

political leaders as being not actively Interested in their continuing

civic responsibility — not willing to participate in politics or other

professions— but being content to use their increased freedom for per­

sonal enjoyment. Even though this criticism is partially Justified,

Tunisia's urban women are irrevocably committed to modernization, and

once initial changes in their status are sufficiently internalized,

they will likely participate fully in political and public roles. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

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______, "Les Ressources Humaines pour le Développement." Tunis: UNFT, 1970. Mimeographed. 83

"Rapport Général du Conseil National de l'UNFT, 20-21 juillet, 1965." Tunis: UNFT, 1965. Mimeographed.

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French North Africa: the Maghreb Between Two World Wars. New York: Praeger, 1967.

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Brown, Leon Carl (ed.). State and Society in Independent North Africa. Washington: Middle East Institute, 1968.

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Charles-Plcard, Gilbert. Carthage. Translation Miriam and Lionel Kochan. London; Elek Books, 1964.

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Gautier, E.-F. Le Passé de l'Afrique du nord. Les Siècles obscurs. Paris: Petit Bibliothèque Payot, 1952,

Gordon, David C. North Africa's French Legacy. 1954-1962. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969.

Women of Algeria: an Essay on Change. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1968.

Hahn, Lorna. North Africa. Nationalism to Nationhood, Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960.

Halpern, Manfred. The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

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Khaldun, ibn-. The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History. Translation Franz Rosenthal. New York: Pantheon Books, 1958.

Lammens, Henri. Islam: Beliefs and Institutions. Translation E. Denison Ross. London: Cass, 1968, 85

Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Illinois; Free Press, 1958.

Levy, Reuben. The Social Structure of Islam. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

Micaud, Charles A., Leon Carl Brown, and Clement Henry Moore. Tunisia: the Politics of Modernization. New York: Praeger, 1964.

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INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Are you married?

2. What year were you married?

3. Who chose your husband, you or your parents?

4. How old were you when you were married?

5. Is is preferable for parents to choose the spouse for their children?

6. Are you going to choose the husband for your daughter?

7. Do you believe that a Muslim girl should marry a non-Muslim?

8. How old should a girl be to get married?

9. How old should a man be to get married?

10. Before 1956, a man could repudiate his wife easily, now it is much

more difficult to obtain a divorce. What, in your opinion, is the

effect of this law?

11. In case of divorce, and the couple has children, who should keep the

children, and why?

12. How many years of school have you completed?

13. Do you prefer a co-educational school or an all girls' school for

your daughter?

14. Would you like for your daughter to complete school?

15. Do you believe that it is important for her to go to university?

16. If your daughter had the chance to study abroad, what decision would

you make about letting her go? 91

17. Do you wear the veil? Every time you go out or only sometimes?

Why?

18. (If the previous answer was no), have you ever worn it? When did

you stop wearing it?

19. Do your daughters wear the veil? Does this please you?

20. How many children do you have?

21. How many children do you consider an ideal family?

22. Do you do work other than household duties?

23. \7liat type of work do you do?

24. Do you believe that women should stay at home and not take outside

jobs ?

25. Do you think that a woman should accept a position where she would

be supervising men?