MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XX, NO. 3, FALL 2013 HAMAS AND THE ARAB SPRING INTRODUCTION Frode Løvlie and Are Knudsen Mr. Løvlie is a researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute and a PhD candidate at the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen. Dr. Knudsen is a senior researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute.1 he Arab Spring is a critical Since the outbreak of the Arab revolts in juncture for examining Hamas, a December 2010, the political landscape of movement created in the con- the Middle East has been recast, forcing text of a popular revolt (against Hamas to respond to a host of fundamental TIsraeli occupation) similar to those that challenges. And as Hamas is challenged, have reverberated throughout the Middle so is our received wisdom about the move- East. Palestinians have repeatedly protested ment. This special section is dedicated to domination and, like no other group, they complementing the extant knowledge on embody the image of the popular uprising, Hamas through analyses of the movement the intifada. The first (1987–93) and sec- and its responses to the Arab Spring on the ond (2000–05) intifadas established Hamas domestic, regional and internal levels. as the new Islamist contender for power. As the Oslo accords crumbled, Hamas THE REGIONAL DIMENSION progressed from movement, to party, to For the past decade, Hamas was a governing body. The 2006 parliamentary key member of the “Axis of Resistance,” elections sidelined Fatah and forced Hamas together with Hezbollah and its two main to form a government alone, only to be tar- sponsors, Syria and Iran.2 Although Hamas geted by a debilitating international boycott was never simply a proxy for either coun- that caused factional infighting and divided try, its relationships to these regimes have the Gaza Strip and the West Bank into two been crucial, and have influenced most political entities, governed by Hamas and analyses of the movement. But, after sid- Fatah respectively. This deepened divi- ing with the revolutionaries in the Syrian sions inside occupied Palestine and stalled civil war, Hamas abruptly left Damascus several attempts at reconciling the two, in- and quit the Axis of Resistance. By oppos- cluding the prospects for Hamas to join the ing Assad and leaving Syria, Hamas also Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). weakened its ties to Iran. The still-unfolding Arab Spring is test- Hamas left the axis in the hopes that ing Hamas’s tactical and strategic prowess. the newly elected Muslim Brotherhood © 2013, The Authors Middle East Policy © 2013, Middle East Policy Council 56 LØVLIE / KNUDSEN: HAMAS SPECIAL SECTION INTRODUCTION in Egypt would become its main backer. that future Palestinian elections should Notwithstanding the recent removal from be held not only for the presidency and office of the Brotherhood government, the the Palestinian Authority (PA) legisla- calculus behind this attempted switch of tive council but, significantly, also for the benefactor seemed sound. Hamas is the Palestinian National Council (PNC), the Palestinian offspring of the Muslim Broth- parliament and supreme political body of erhood, and they share a common history the PLO. and ideology. Intuitively, the movement By agreeing to hold elections to the could expect to benefit from the rise of the PNC, Hamas aims — for the first time — Brotherhood in Egypt. Added to this, it to join the PLO without preconditions. And can be argued that Hamas’s alliance with an eventual implementation of the 2011 Hezbollah, Syria and Iran was always one Cairo agreement promises to reshuffle rela- of tactical convenience, not ideological tionships among Hamas, Fatah and Israel conviction. The other members of the alli- and raises questions regarding Hamas’s ance are all Shiite Muslims (or members of strategy for the upcoming elections to the its offshoots), an increasingly salient factor PA and the PLO.3 given the rise of Sunni sectarianism and Salafism throughout the region. INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS However, Hamas’s hopes that the Officially, Hamas remains committed Brotherhood would become its new to its initial goals and demands. These in- benefactor were dashed when the Egyp- clude ending Israeli occupation, maintain- tian army deposed the newly-elected ing an armed resistance, insisting on the government. Having abandoned its former right of return for Palestinian refugees, and sponsors and without a new ally ready to establishing a Palestinian state “from the compensate for the shortfall of political river to the sea” (the Jordan River to the support, Hamas currently finds itself in a Mediterranean Sea) with Jerusalem as its difficult situation. The regional upheav- capital. These goals contradict the Quartet als most certainly will continue to affect Principles,4 which require Hamas to recog- Hamas, with the now uncertain future role nize Israel, adhere to previous agreements, of Islamist movements being particularly and renounce violence in exchange for crucial. international recognition. The changing regional environment, DOMESTIC POLITICS however, has forced Hamas to reevaluate On the national level, the main issue its long- and short-term strategies. Most facing Hamas is the stalled reconciliation important, Hamas has pondered its posi- process with Fatah. Here, also, the Arab tions on armed resistance, negotiations, the Spring had a direct bearing. The dem- 1967 borders, and an “interim” vs. “final” onstrations throughout the Arab region solution to the conflict. As such, it can be sparked protests within the Occupied Ter- argued that Hamas has come close to meet- ritories calling for national unity, forcing ing the Quartet’s demands, albeit indirectly Hamas and Fatah either to reconcile or risk or implicitly. being ousted from office. With Egyptian The movement has stopped short of mediation, the two movements signed the recognizing the state of Israel, but has Cairo agreement in April 2011. It stipulates repeatedly offered a temporary two-state 57 MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XX, NO. 3, FALL 2013 solution based on the 1967 borders. Israel decide on a new course of action. The has consistently either rejected or ignored movement has adopted a wait-and-see at- this offer. Although Hamas’s acceptance titude, hoping that the end of the region’s of a two-state solution is worded as a authoritarian regimes and the rise to power temporary measure, defended ideologi- of Islamist movements will usher in a more cally through the Islamic concept of hudna supportive geostrategic environment for (long-term truce), it implies an acknowl- Hamas. It is careful not to take any risks in edgment of Israel’s existence.5 a region still in flux. In light of the recent As for previous agreements between developments in Egypt, this wait-and-see Israel and the Palestinians, Hamas has said attitude has been prudent. While Hamas little, apart from its blatant condemna- did not foresee the deposing of President tion of the Oslo accords, which were all Morsi and the dismissal of the Brother- but declared dead with the outbreak of the hood government, a development which second intifada in the fall of 2000.6 How- has worsened the movement’s strategic ever, the movement’s willingness to join situation, its cautious approach to strategic the PLO through PNC elections implicitly change has so far proved wise. means that it is ready to adhere to previ- In many ways, this is the same Hamas ous agreements, at least until Hamas can we have observed before; a movement overturn them from within the PLO. This skillfully maneuvering in a volatile politi- would require the movement to secure suf- cal environment, but more reactive than ficient seats in the PNC. proactive, adapting to developments rather Finally, the movement has discussed than shaping them. This is only part of a change of strategy with regard to armed the picture, however. The debates within resistance, in effect inching ever closer to Hamas regarding alternative strategies fulfilling the Quartet’s demand to renounce indicate that the movement is prepared to violence.7 Of course, discussing a change change its modus operandi, if and when of strategy is not the same as changing it. the international, regional and domestic Nevertheless, the internal debate on the situations become more conducive. Sec- merits of armed resistance sends a pow- ond, Hamas has become more assertive erful signal that there are voices within than before, as demonstrated by its uncom- Hamas that would prefer a new mode of promising stance towards reconciliation operation. with Fatah. This newly won confidence is tightly linked to the hope that Islamist CONCLUDING REMARKS movements will continue to rise and rule Hamas is biding its time. Although throughout the region. Although such there are indications that the movement hopes have suffered setbacks in recent might be willing to change elements of months, Hamas stands on the verge of its strategy, it has so far remained content change. to discuss alternative avenues rather than 58 LØVLIE / KNUDSEN: HAMAS SPECIAL SECTION INTRODUCTION 1 This special section is based on a workshop organized jointly by the Chr. Michelsen Institute and the Pales- tinian Institute for the Study of Democracy (Muwatin) in Bergen, Norway, September 7, 2012. It was funded by the Research Council of Norway, grant no. 197027. 2 Erik Mohns and André Bank, “Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?” Middle East Policy 19, no. 3 (2012): 25–35. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4967.2012.00545.x. 3 The elections have been postponed several times. At the time of writing, no dates have been announced for PLC/PNC elections. 4 The Quartet is a diplomatic coalition made up of the United States, the United Nations, the European Union and Russia. 5 Beverley Milton-Edwards and Alastair Crooke, “Waving, Not Drowning: Strategic Dimensions of Ceasefires and Islamic Movements,”Security Dialogue 35, no.