RESEARCH BRIEF

C O R P O R A T I O N

The Growing Need to Focus on Modern Political Warfare

he United States faces a number of actors who use a Twide range of political, informational, military, and Key findings: economic measures to influence, coerce, intimidate, • Military commanders and the U.S. Department of State or undermine its interests or those of its friends and allies. (DoS) should identify critical information requirements for This brief summarizes a study that provided a clearer view of political warfare threats, and the intelligence community these adversarial measures short of conventional warfare and should increase collection and analysis capabilities that derived implications and recommendations for the U.S. gov- are dedicated to detecting incipient subversion, coercion, ernment and military. To this end, at the request of the spon- and other emerging threats short of conventional warfare. sor, RAND Corporation researchers examined the historical and current practices that fall into this realm of conflict short • Developing an integrated response to threats short of of conventional war. The starting point was the termpoliti- war includes (1) the need for strategy, (2) the need for a cal warfare, as defined in 1948 at the outset of the Cold War whole-of-government approach led by an appropriately by U.S. diplomat George Kennan: “Political warfare is the enabled DoS, and (3) the formulation and coordination of logical application of Clausewitz’s doctrine in time of peace. responses with and through other sovereign governments, In broadest definition, political warfare is the employment allies, and partners. of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to • This research highlighted significant gaps in DoS’s orga- achieve its national objectives. Such operations are both overt nizational and operational capabilities and practices that and covert. They range from such overt actions as political should be remedied to enable it to effectively plan, coor- alliances, economic measures (as . . . the Marshall Plan), and dinate, and execute interagency responses. ‘white’ propaganda to such covert operations as clandestine support of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ psychological • The U.S. Department of Defense and DoS should support warfare and even encouragement of underground resistance deployment of special operations forces in priority areas in hostile states.”1 deemed vulnerable to political warfare threats as an Political warfare is a historical term, but current ana- early and persistent presence to provide assessments and logues, such as gray zone, are also used to describe this realm develop timely and viable options for countering mea- of conflict. sures short of conventional war. • Numerous information capabilities and authorities gaps What Is Political Warfare? should be remedied. U.S. military information support In the Cold War, Russia routinely employed active measures operations are challenged by significant manpower and to subvert Western-allied governments, and in recent years it funding shortages and limited new media training. has pursued an array of destabilizing activities in the Baltics, including espionage, military pressure, and economic pres- sure. Iran, for its part, has used an array of proxies, as well as soft power (the use of economic, sociopolitical, and cultural influence), to gain influence in Iraq and Syria through reli- practices of statecraft (Figure 1). The boundaries are likely gious, cultural, and economic means and by supplying train- to remain fuzzy because views differ about what constitutes ing, equipment, and advisory services to a variety of partners. normal statecraft. To examine current practices systematically, the research Political warfare consists of the intentional use of one team scoped the definition of political warfare to clarify the or more of the implements of power—diplomatic/political, types of activities it comprises, as distinguished from normal information/cyber, military/intelligence, and economic—to affect the political composition or decisionmaking in a state.

1 George F. Kennan, Policy Planning Staff Memorandum 269, Washington, As an example, the political warfare tactic of economic sub- D.C.: U.S. State Department, May 4, 1948. As of May 20, 2019: version can be seen in the overlap of the diplomatic/political http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/johnson/65ciafounding3.htm – 2 –

Figure 1. Where Political Warfare Fits Within the Implements of influence over the Damascus government, and engaged in Power public diplomacy to endear Syrians to the Islamic Republic.

Diplomatic/political Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have sent fighters to Syria under Routine diplomacy the supervision of Iranian Quds Force advisers. Political warfare Synthesizing the case study characteristics in the table yielded a list of key attributes that broadly describe how this

Propaganda form of warfare is conducted today. Political warfare Economic Aid (not tied to subversion political a military parties effort) • employs diverse elements of power, including a prepon- Aid to Public Information/ Economic Trade resistance groups diplomacy cyber derance of nonmilitary means

Conditional • relies heavily on unattributed forces and means military aid Psychological to state warfare (as part of a • is increasingly waged in the information arena, where military effort) success can be determined by perception rather than outright victory Conventional military operations • uses information warfare, which works by amplifying, obfuscating, and, at times, persuading • is employed with cyber tools to accelerate and compound Military/intelligence effects NOTE: All activities are illustrative, rather than an exhaustive list of possible actions. • increasingly relies on economic leverage as the preferred tool of the strong • often exploits shared ethnic or religious bonds, as well as (routine diplomacy) and economic (trade) spheres. Political social divisions or other internal seams warfare is often—but not necessarily—carried out covertly, • extends, rather than replaces, traditional conflict and can but it must be undertaken outside the context of conven- achieve effects at lower cost tional war. • is also conducted by empowered nonstate or quasi-state actors What Are the Characteristics of Modern Political • requires heavy investment in intelligence resources to Warfare? detect it in its early stages. Researchers focused on three case studies—two state actors (Russia and Iran) and one nonstate actor (the Islamic State of Where Are the Gaps in U.S. Information Iraq and the Levant [ISIL])—to derive the common charac- Capabilities and Practices? teristics of modern political warfare (Table 1). Each country One of the key attributes of modern political warfare that employs its particular advantages or strong suits to gain emerges from the synthesis is the importance of the informa- leverage. In Estonia, Russia capitalized on the sentiments tion space and the ability to operate effectively within that of its Russian minority to fan protests over the decision by space. Because this area can profoundly affect all other lines the Estonian government to move a Soviet monument—the of effort, it must be considered and managed at the high- Bronze Soldier incident—which escalated into protests, a est levels of government. Moreover, the revolution in com- sustained cyberattack, and then sanctions and threats. In munications and information technology has transformed subsequent years, the Russian government has maintained its the information space, thus requiring new models and new hostile stance to destabilize Estonia and other Baltic states, capabilities to compete effectively in this arena. including contesting the legitimacy of their independence In this light, researchers identified several gaps in U.S. from the former Soviet Union. government information capabilities and practices: In terms of Iran, Tehran has engaged in political warfare in Syria as part of its efforts to extend its influence in the • Strategic-level communications are high-profile and region and ensure the survival of a pro-Iranian government bureaucratically risky—characteristics that militate in Damascus. To buttress its position, Iran has attempted against speed and initiative. to indoctrinate the National Defense Force militias with • Interagency coordination and National Security Council Islamic revolutionary ideology, appealed to foreign Shi’a guidance pertaining to message themes remain lacking. fighters’ desire to protect Syria’s holy shrines, taken advan- • The new Global Engagement Center, established by pres- tage of Syria’s economic dependency to increase Tehran’s idential executive order and located at the U.S. Depart- – 3 –

Table 1. Key Case Study Findings on Modern Political Warfare

Russiaa Iranb ISILc • Views its activities as defensive in reaction to • Heavily based soft power strategy on cultural, • Acquires or invents quasi-state tools, including the United States political, and religious influence versus governance, tax, economic resource control, • Sees democracy promotion and free press as differentiated approach to Shi’a, pan-Arab, and management threat and pan-Islamic audiences • Uses combined arms, innovated weaponry, • In Estonia, used opportunistic approach, • Uses a worldwide network of cultural, and tactics capitalizing on crises informational, and influence organizations, • Uses sophisticated information operations to • Used shaping operations (e.g., propaganda backed by material support, including religious recruit, inspire, plan, and execute directed at Russian speakers) to prepare the tactics, such as funding junior clerics and mass • Systematically indoctrinates new recruits to ground pilgrimages strip them of their old identities and prevent • Uses “New Generation Warfare” innovations • Offers political and economic support to them from straying in economic leverage, social proxies, and foreign political parties and leaders to install • Has powerful brand and is a unified and media penetration and influence governments sustained organization • Uses propaganda for obfuscation rather than • Uses Arab proxies in Syria (including • Has moved away from a broadcast model to a persuasion Iraqi militias and Lebanese Hezbollah dispersed and resilient form of communication paramilitaries) that become political actors and that relies on peer-to-peer sharing and spawn new proxies redundancy across platforms • Has well-developed financial and cyber tools • Targets different audiences with different messages—uses violence and emotive language liberally in Arabic-media productions to mobilize rank-and-file members, while English-language channels are more restrained and international in focus

a Focus on Estonian Bronze Soldier incident of 2007. b Focus on Iran’s development and use of militias in Iraq and Syria. c Focus on ISIL’s foundational documents and its suite of nonlethal tactics.

ment of State (DoS), focuses on third-party validators or may provide the United States with valuable tools to deter influencers from the bottom up, but it has encountered adversaries, prevent conflicts from escalating, or mitigate various limitations. their effects. In some cases, these approaches may effectively • U.S. military information support operations are chal- reduce or remove the incipient threats. lenged by significant manpower and funding shortages As for the need for a whole-of-government approach, and limited new media training. DoS is the designated lead for conducting U.S. foreign policy • U.S. Central Command is at the forefront of U.S. and represents such foreign policy interests abroad. Thus, it is Department of Defense (DoD) social media commu- the logical entity to lead a whole-of-government response in nications, but other combatant commands are lagging. this primarily political and diplomatic realm and to coordi- The U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military nate other agencies if given such policy guidance from the Information Support Operations Web Operations Center President. However, despite the deep country and regional is nascent. expertise at DoS, this research highlighted significant gaps • Unattributed communications may have counterproduc- in organizational and operational capabilities and practices tive effects that should be anticipated and mitigated. that should be remedied to enable DoS to effectively plan, coordinate, and execute interagency responses continuously, What Are Effective Measures to Confront Political if so directed by the President. Warfare? U.S. plans and activities must necessarily be coordi- Developing an integrated response to threats short of war nated with the governments of those countries where the includes (1) the need for strategy, (2) the need for a whole- aggression, subversion, coercion, or destabilization is occur- of-government approach to statecraft led by an appropriately ring, along with other partners or allies who are willing and enabled DoS, and (3) the formulation and coordination of able to contribute their resources and efforts in a common responses with and through other sovereign governments, effort. allies, and partners. The authors also include recommenda- Eight recommendations are relevant to improving the tions for improving military contributions to such an inte- practices and capabilities of the U.S. military—and special grated approach. operations forces (SOF) in particular—to work with state In terms of the need for strategy, the general require- and nonmilitary entities to combat nonconventional war- ment for a cost-effective approach to national defense sug- fare through expanded deterrence, enhanced resilience, and gests that early and effective nonmilitary responses—and preparations for national resistance, among other means. nonlethal uses of the military element of national power— – 4 –

• Recommendation 1: To improve whole-of-government • Recommendation 5: DoD should routinely seek to synergy, U.S. military commands—including deployed incorporate DoS knowledge and the current insights of headquarters—should routinely involve civilian depart- the U.S. country team into military plans to develop mental representatives to understand, coordinate with, effective responses to political-military threats. and support DoS and other civilian program execution. • Recommendation 6: The special operations community • Recommendation 2: DoD and SOF in particular should make it a high priority to improve and implement should incentivize and improve the selection and train- fully resourced, innovative, and collaborative informa- ing for military advisers serving at DoS headquarters, tion operations. U.S. embassies, and other diplomatic posts to increase • Recommendation 7: Military commanders and DoS their effectiveness. should identify critical information requirements for gray • Recommendation 3: DoD and SOF should offer mili- zone threats, and the intelligence community should tary planners to DoS as it builds its own cadre of plan- increase its collection and analysis capabilities dedicated ners and integrates regional and functional bureau plans; to detecting incipient subversion, coercion, and other doing so will enable DoS to play a lead role in responses emerging threats short of conventional warfare. to political warfare. • Recommendation 8: DoD and DoS should support the • Recommendation 4: Military commanders should deployment of SOF as an early and persistent presence develop and maintain collaborative relationships with to provide assessments and develop timely and viable their civilian counterparts through regular visits and fre- options for countering measures short of war. quent communications to develop common understand- ing of and approaches to political-military conflict.

This brief describes research conducted in the RAND Arroyo Center and documented in Modern Political Warfare: Current Practices and Possible Responses, by Linda Robinson, Todd C. Helmus, Raphael S. Cohen, Alireza Nader, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, and Katya Migacheva, RR-1772-A, 2018 (available at www.rand.org/t/RR1772). To view this brief online, visit www.rand.org/t/RB10071. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. R® is a registered trademark. © RAND 2019

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