Special operations forces are extracted from mountain pinnacle in Zabul Province, Afghanistan, after executing air-assault mission to disrupt insurgent communications (U.S. Army/Aubree Clute)
Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone
By Joseph L. Votel, Charles T. Cleveland, Charles T. Connett, and Will Irwin
n the months immediately following the illegitimate Taliban government in operatives working alongside an indig- the terrorist attacks on the World Afghanistan that had been providing enous force of some 15,000 Afghan I Trade Center and Pentagon in the sanctuary for al Qaeda. This strikingly irregulars.1 The Taliban regime fell autumn of 2001, a small special opera- successful unconventional warfare within a matter of weeks. Many factors tions forces (SOF) element and inter- (UW) operation was carried out with a contributed to this extraordinary agency team, supported by carrier- and U.S. “boots on the ground” presence of accomplishment, but its success clearly land-based airstrikes, brought down roughly 350 SOF and 110 interagency underscores the potential and viability of this form of warfare. What followed this remarkably effec- General Joseph L. Votel, USA, is the Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. Lieutenant tive operation was more than a decade of General Charles T. Cleveland, USA (Ret.), is a former Commander of U.S. Army Special Operations challenging and costly large-scale irregu- Command. Colonel Charles T. Connett, USA, is Director of the Commander’s Initiatives Group at Headquarters U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Lieutenant Colonel Will Irwin, USA (Ret.), is a lar warfare campaigns in Afghanistan and resident Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University. Iraq employing hundreds of thousands
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 101 While “Gray Zone” refers to a space in the peace-conflict continuum, the methods for engaging our adversar- ies in that environment have much in common with the political warfare that was predominant during the Cold War years. Political warfare is played out in that space between diplomacy and open warfare, where traditional statecraft is inadequate or ineffective and large-scale conventional military options are not suitable or are deemed inappropriate for a variety of reasons. Political warfare is a population-centric engagement that seeks to influence, to persuade, even to co-opt. One of its staunchest proponents, George Kennan, described it as “the employment of all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national U.S. Air Force CV-22 Osprey’s primary mission in 8th Special Operations Squadron is insertion, objectives,” including overt measures extraction, and resupply of unconventional warfare forces (U.S. Air Force/Jeremy T. Lock) such as white propaganda, political alli- ances, and economic programs, to “such of U.S. and coalition troops. Now, as constraints that made complete U.S. or covert operations as clandestine support Operations Enduring Freedom and allied victory virtually impossible for fear of ‘friendly’ foreign elements, ‘black’ Iraqi Freedom have come to an end, the of escalation. psychological warfare, and even encour- defense budget is shrinking, the Armed After more than a decade of intense agement of underground resistance in Forces are drawing down in strength, and large-scale counterinsurgency and hostile states.”5 support for further large-scale deploy- counterterrorism campaigning, the U.S. Organized political warfare served as ment of troops has ebbed. Our nation is capability to conduct Gray Zone op- the basis for U.S. foreign policy during entering a period where threats and our erations—small-footprint, low-visibility the early Cold War years and it was later response to those threats will take place in operations often of a covert or clandes- revived during the Reagan administra- a segment of the conflict continuum that tine nature—may have atrophied. In the tion. But, as Max Boot of the Council some are calling the “Gray Zone,”2 and words of one writer, the United States on Foreign Relations observed, it has SOF are the preeminent force of choice must recognize that “the space between become a lost art and one that he and in such conditions. war and peace is not an empty one”3 that others believe needs to be rediscovered The Gray Zone is characterized by we can afford to vacate. Because most of and mastered.6 SOF are optimized for intense political, economic, informa- our current adversaries choose to engage providing the preeminent military con- tional, and military competition more us in an asymmetrical manner, this repre- tribution to a national political warfare fervent in nature than normal steady-state sents an area where “America’s enemies capability because of their inherent pro- diplomacy, yet short of conventional war. and adversaries prefer to operate.”4 ficiency in low-visibility, small-footprint, It is hardly new, however. The Cold War Nations such as Russia, China, and and politically sensitive operations. SOF was a 45-year-long Gray Zone struggle Iran have demonstrated a finely tuned provide national decisionmakers “strate- in which the West succeeded in checking risk calculus. Russia belligerently works gic options for protecting and advancing the spread of communism and ultimately to expand its sphere of influence and U.S. national interests without com- witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet control into former Soviet or Warsaw Pact mitting major combat forces to costly, Union. To avoid superpower confron- territory to the greatest degree possible long-term contingency operations.”7 tations that might escalate to all-out without triggering a North Atlantic Treaty nuclear war, the Cold War was largely a Organization Article 5 response. China Human Domain-Centric proxy war, with the United States and knows that its assertive actions aimed at Core Tasks for SOF Soviet Union backing various state or expanding its sovereignty in the South SOF provide several options for operat- nonstate actors in small regional conflicts China Sea fall short of eliciting a bel- ing in the political warfare realm, espe- and executing discrete superpower inter- ligerent U.S. or allied response. Iran has cially those core tasks that are grouped vention and counter-intervention around displayed an impressive degree of sophis- under the term special warfare. Foreign the globe. Even the Korean and Vietnam tication in its ability to employ an array of internal defense (FID) operations are conflicts were fought under political proxies against U.S. and Western interests. conducted to support a friendly foreign
102 Features / Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 government in its efforts to defeat an Figure 1. internal threat. In terms of strategic application, UW represents the opposite Stabilizing Effects approach, where the U.S. Government supports a resistance movement or Foreign Internal insurgency against an occupying power Counterinsurgency Defense or adversary government. Both of these special warfare tasks U.S. rely heavily on SOF ability to build trust Special Warfare Campaigns Local Partner Main Effort Main Effort and confidence with our indigenous partners—host nation military and Major Combat paramilitary forces in the case of FID, Operations Unconventional Warfare irregular resistance elements in the case of UW—to generate mass through indig- enous forces, thus eliminating the need Destabilizing Effects for a large U.S. force presence (see figure 1). It is this indigenous mass that helps settlement. Similar successes against lower importance of interagency planning, co- minimize strategic risk during Gray Zone level insurgencies took place in neighbor- ordination, and collaboration; other U.S. operations: “Special Warfare campaigns ing Honduras and Guatemala. More Government departments and agencies stabilize or destabilize a regime by op- recently, U.S. SOF have played a central are not only frequently involved, but they erating ‘through and with’ local state or role in effective long-term FID efforts are also often in the lead. nonstate partners, rather than through conducted in support of the governments Unconventional warfare is funda- unilateral U.S. action.”8 As described in a of Colombia and the Philippines. mentally an indirect application of U.S. recent RAND study, discrete and usually Less well known and understood by power, one that leverages foreign popula- multi-year special warfare campaigns are those outside of SOF is the core task of tion groups to maintain or advance U.S. characterized by six central features: unconventional warfare. interests. It is a highly discretionary form of warfare that is most often conducted Their goal is stabilizing or destabiliz- •• Doctrine clandestinely, and because it is also typi- ing the targeted regime. This year marks the release of the first cally conducted covertly, at least initially, Local partners provide the main •• joint U.S. doctrine publication for the it nearly always has a strong interagency effort. planning, execution, and assessment of element. It can be subtle or it can be ag- U.S. forces maintain a small (or no) •• UW operations.10 The United States has gressive. The U.S.-indigenous irregular footprint in the country. been producing UW doctrine since the benefactor-proxy relationship, if success- They are typically of long duration •• first series of field manuals published ful, achieves mutually beneficial objectives and may require extensive prepara- from 1943 to 1944 by the wartime (although there can also be divergent tory work better measured in months Office of Strategic Services (OSS). interests between benefactor and proxy). (or years) than days. However, for the past seven decades, Advocates of UW first recognize that, They require intensive interagency •• that doctrine has been produced by the among a population of self-determination cooperation; Department of Defense U.S. Army. Despite the longstanding seekers, human interest in liberty trumps (DOD) elements may be subordinate recognition in Army doctrine that UW loyalty to a self-serving dictatorship, that to the Department of State or the is inherently joint and interagency in those who aspire to freedom can succeed Central Intelligence Agency. character, single-Service doctrine is at a in deposing corrupt or authoritarian They employ “political warfare” •• disadvantage in reaching joint and inter- rulers, and that unfortunate population methods to mobilize, neutralize, or agency audiences. Therefore, a joint groups can and often do seek alternatives integrate individuals or groups from UW publication was needed. to a life of fear, oppression, and injustice. the tactical to strategic levels.9 Army Special Forces remain the Second, advocates believe that there is Many examples exist of successful only element in the U.S. Armed Forces a valid role for the U.S. Government long-duration, low-visibility U.S. SOF- organized, trained, and equipped spe- in encouraging and empowering these centric FID operations in Latin America, cifically for UW. However, while Special freedom seekers when doing so helps to Asia, and Africa. From 1980 through Forces continue to play a central role in secure U.S. national security interests. 1991, U.S. support to the government the mission, Joint Publication 3-05.1, Historically, the U.S. military has of El Salvador fighting an insurgency in Unconventional Warfare, recognizes the conducted UW primarily in wartime to that country included an advisory force roles of other SOF, as well as important assist indigenous resistance movements that never exceeded 55 personnel. The supporting functions of conventional in defeating or causing the withdrawal of conflict ended with a favorable negotiated forces. It also provides insight into the a foreign occupation force. In peacetime,
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 103 UW can take the form of covert para- This was the case during the pro- forces will typically support three main military operations conducted by other longed U.S. UW campaign in support of elements of the resistance movement or agencies of the U.S. Government or Tibetan resistance fighters against Chinese insurgency—the underground, auxiliary, clandestine military operations. Through occupiers from 1957 to 1969, and again and guerrilla force. The underground is a diplomacy, development, and other with the UW operation in support of the cellular-based organization that operates means, other government departments Mujahideen in Afghanistan in their strug- in urban or other areas usually inacces- and agencies, such as the Department of gle against the Soviet 40th Army after its sible to the guerrilla force. Composed State and U.S. Agency for International invasion and occupation of that country. of part-time volunteers, the auxiliary Development (USAID), can help shape During the second Reagan administration, component clandestinely provides a wide the environment or provide support to however, the objective of the Afghanistan range of support to both the under- resistance in other ways. When Congress mission changed from a cost-imposing ground and guerrillas. Probably the most passed the Boland Amendment during strategy to forcing the withdrawal of familiar element is the guerrilla force, the 1980s, halting all but humanitarian Soviet forces from the country. The suc- an organization of irregular combatants U.S. aid to the Contras, USAID became cess of that mission had enormous political who comprise the armed or overt military the leading provider of support to the and historical ramifications, beginning a component of the resistance. Nicaraguan resistance. chain of events that eventually resulted in Often the resistance includes a If a resistance movement or insur- the collapse of the Soviet Union and an shadow government within the country gency exists within a country whose end to the Cold War. capable of performing government func- government threatens U.S. security in- In some cases, UW can be used as a tions on behalf of the movement. There terests, the movement asks for assistance regime change mechanism, enabling an might also be a government-in-exile from the United States, and the group’s indigenous resistance or insurgent group in another country—often as a result operational methods and behavior are to overthrow the existing government. of being displaced by an invading and deemed to be acceptable by the U.S. In a wartime supporting role, UW opera- occupying power—which remains the Government, the President of the United tions can be a shaping effort in support internationally recognized government States might approve initiation of UW of larger, conventional force operations, of the occupied state. Nearly all the operations. The target government could such as the very successful UW opera- countries of Western Europe overrun and be a state sponsor of terrorism or a pro- tions executed by U.S. SOF with Kurdish occupied by German forces in World War liferator of weapons of mass destruction Peshmerga forces in northern Iraq dur- II established governments-in-exile in technology. It might be a government ing the 2003 invasion of that country. London. engaged in ethnic cleansing or other Alternatively, it could be the main effort Methods used by the resistance in crimes against humanity, or a state in a military campaign, as was the UW meeting its objectives could include that willingly allows transit or provides operation that brought down the Afghan subversive activities such as mass protests, sanctuary or other forms of support to Taliban regime in 2001. work slowdowns or stoppages, boycotts, terrorists. Or it could be a state that ac- Unconventional warfare has often infiltration of government offices, and the tively and aggressively, even belligerently, been the option of choice in situations formation of front groups. These activi- takes action to expand its territorial sov- where the President (or a theater com- ties are primarily aimed at undermining ereignty with the result of undermining mander in wartime) wishes to initiate the military, economic, psychological, or regional stability. operations much sooner than could be political strength or morale of the gov- Under certain circumstances, the accomplished with the mobilization, ernment or occupation authority. prudent employment of coercive force, preparation, and deployment of conven- Sabotage can be a means of physically by empowering an indigenous opposition tional forces. Such was the case with the damaging the government’s military or element, can force a target government operation by the 5th Special Forces Group industrial production facilities, economic to do something it might not otherwise (Airborne) and Air Force Special Tactics resources, or other targets. During World be inclined to do. Under other condi- operators in Afghanistan in 2001. War II, sabotage targets for Allied SOF tions, the goal could be simply to disrupt A requirement might exist for op- included road and rail lines of communi- certain operations or activities of the erations in areas not easily accessible cation, hydroelectric power production hostile government, such as interfering to conventional forces or that lend and distribution facilities, telecommuni- with proliferation actions, safeguarding a themselves to UW in an economy of cations facilities, canal locks, radar sites, population group targeted for genocide force role in secondary theaters of war. port facilities, factories engaged in the by the incumbent regime, or imposing ex- Circumstances such as this resulted in manufacture of war materiel, and military traordinary and unexpected difficulties in several UW operations during World supply dumps or other targets. consolidating the occupation of a country War II, including those in Yugoslavia, Guerrilla warfare operations are car- that has been invaded, thus altering the Albania, Greece, northern Italy, Norway, ried out against military or other security adversary state’s cost and risk calculus. Burma, Thailand, Indochina, and China. forces to reduce their effectiveness and In conducting such operations, U.S. negatively impact the enemy’s morale.
104 Features / Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Jedburghs get instructions from briefing officer in London, 1944 (U.S. Office of Strategic Services)
Allied-supported World War II guerrilla Zone special warfare campaign could The complex nature of the future op- operations in occupied France, Belgium, include aspects of both missions, thus erating environment will often render and Holland, as well as those in the capitalizing on their synergistic effect. traditional applications of the diplomatic Philippines, were instrumental in facilitat- Among the U.S. objectives in initiating and economic instruments ineffective ing Allied ground campaigns. support to the Nicaraguan resistance in or inappropriate. Decisionmakers might Many types of information activities the early 1980s, for example, was to aid wish to avoid the political risks and are used to influence friendly, adversary, the U.S. FID program in El Salvador by consequences, including escalation and and neutral audiences. Resistance groups pressuring the Nicaraguan Sandinista mission creep, associated with direct craft narratives that best convey the government to halt its support to the military engagement. At such times, movement’s purpose and leverage key Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National UW might be the only viable option grievances of importance to the people. Liberation Front.11 through which the U.S. Government Another important purpose of informa- Today, “regional powers such as can indirectly achieve political objectives. tion operations could be to encourage Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, By supporting indigenous insurgencies, disparate resistance factions to work to- Nigeria, South Africa, Turkey, and Iran resistance movements, or other internal gether to achieve common objectives. assert growing power and influence. . . . opposition groups, the U.S. Government Because the FID and UW core tasks Sub-state actors (e.g., clans, tribes, ethnic can employ UW as a strategic tool of are so closely related, employing many and religious minorities) seek greater au- coercion, disruption, or to lead to the similar capabilities, a comprehensive Gray tonomy from the central government.”12 defeat of a hostile regime.
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 105 An Enigmatic History preventing the various resistance fac- The post–Cold War era brought two U.S. UW doctrine has evolved from tions—each with different postwar major UW successes for U.S. forces. First its World War II roots when the Allies political agendas and often violently op- came the operation to oust the Taliban conducted UW in at least 18 countries posed to one another—from fighting each regime in Afghanistan in late 2001, de- worldwide. Operations by U.S. forces other and keeping them focused on the scribed at the beginning of this article. The include a highly successful UW cam- common enemy, the German occupiers.14 second was the UW operation in northern paign in an “economy of force” role in One need look no further than Syria today Iraq that contributed to victory during the Burma and operations by stay-behind to imagine how much more difficult the 2003 U.S. invasion of that country. guerrilla leaders in the Philippines, Allied ground campaign to liberate France where UW proved invaluable to U.S. might have been had this internecine Civil Resistance land forces during the liberation of that rivalry not been held in check. With all of Today’s joint UW doctrine recognizes country. Probably the best prepared their tactical and operational successes, the variances of resistance that span the UW operations were conducted in the Jedburghs’ greatest strategic contribution breadth of organized opposition from European theater, where Allied SOF might have been in keeping the tenuous reform-oriented social movements17 benefited from an extensive and well- French Forces of the Interior coalition to social revolution,18 to insurgency, tested UW command and sustainment intact, making the Jeds truly warrior- and on to larger armed revolutionary infrastructure, to say nothing of state- diplomats. Eisenhower later wrote of the movements. of-the-art training and equipment. work of the Jedburghs and other SOE and Recently, there has been growing On May 25, 1940, when the German OSS special forces: “In no previous war, interest in UW operations that leverage defeat of France seemed all but inevitable, and in no other theater during this war, existing social movements and non- the British Chiefs of Staff met to consider have resistance forces been so closely har- violent, civil resistance–based social possible courses of action. Once France nessed to the main military effort.”15 revolution. Contributing to this inter- fell, they believed, Britain’s only hope Unconventional warfare continued est is the favorable track record of such lie in rescue by the as yet immobilized to play a significant role in U.S. foreign movements in comparison with armed United States. Until that time, “the best policy during the early Cold War years, resistance. Based on one recent study of hope would lie in subversion, to rot the often in the form of covert paramilitary 323 resistance movements whose objec- enemy-held countries from within.”13 operations led by the Central Intelligence tive was regime change or expulsion of a Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who Agency. Military UW conducted dur- foreign occupation force between 1900 saw great value in helping the people of ing the Korean War was only minimally and 2006, those movements following a occupied Europe to play an active part in effective, primarily because of a lack of strategy of “nonviolent resistance against their own liberation, signed the charter training and experience on the part of authoritarian regimes were twice as likely for the Special Operations Executive those charged with executing it. to succeed as violent movements.”19 (SOE) in July 1940. In April 1961, President John F. The main reason for this is that move- Four years later, Special Force Kennedy had to weather the politically ments choosing to follow a nonviolent Headquarters, an Allied UW com- embarrassing failure of the ill-advised Bay strategy attract a much larger domestic mand subordinate to General Dwight of Pigs affair in Cuba. Secretly working support base than armed and violent D. Eisenhower’s theater command and at a military base in Guatemala under the movements. While even the most success- staffed by the British SOE and the U.S. guise of a mission to train Guatemalan ful of the armed variety hope to attract OSS, along with Free French and other forces, U.S. Army Special Forces trained a support base numbering in the tens of Allied personnel, deployed several types of the rebel force of Cuban exiles in small thousands, supporters numbering in the special forces into denied territory in oc- unit guerrilla warfare operations.16 hundreds of thousands for nonviolent cupied Europe. Among the better known Unfortunately, those forces were then resistance campaigns are not unusual. units were the multinational Jedburgh employed in an inappropriate manner, Moreover, nonviolent movements find it teams. Deployed in support of the French attempting a conventional amphibious much easier to garner backing from the Resistance, “Jed” teams were primarily landing and beach assault against supe- international community, so important in assigned the dual mission of organizing, rior forces. building coalition UW support. equipping, training, and advising guerrilla Throughout the Cold War, many Figure 2 (created by the Naval forces; and serving as a communication hard lessons were learned in places as Postgraduate School’s Doowan Lee) link between the Resistance and the Allied wide-ranging as Eastern Europe, China, illustrates the relationship between so- high command in London. But they Indonesia, Tibet, North Vietnam, cial movements, social revolution, and served an additional purpose that was just Nicaragua, and elsewhere. One major unconventional warfare. An example of as important, though seldom mentioned success came during the 1980s with sup- the scenario depicted by sector G at the and largely unheralded. port provided to the Afghan Mujahideen center of the diagram can be seen in U.S. Many Jedburgh veterans later testi- that resulted in expulsion of Soviet occu- support provided to resistance elements fied that they spent much of their time pation forces from that country. during Serbia’s “Bulldozer Revolution”
106 Features / Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 that resulted in the overthrow of dictator Slobodan Milosevic, then president of Figure 2. what remained of Yugoslavia. When massive demonstrations in Social Unconventional September 1999 demanded Milosevic’s Movement Warfare resignation, he responded with a brutal D Indigenous crackdown by police and the army. One resistance movements B Externally sponsored opposition group, however, remained A Reform-oriented seeking to disrupt a guerilla forces to determined to oust Milosevic through social movements target regime harass, disrupt, or coerce a regime a campaign of nonviolent civil disobedi- ence. Otpor (Serbian for resistance), an G UW campaigns underground Serbian youth movement that mobilize indigenous social formed in 1998 by a dozen college stu- movements aiming dents, eventually grew to a nationwide for regime change grassroots popular movement claiming E Indigenous F Externally 20 movements sponsored a membership of more than 70,000. seeking to The Bill Clinton administration decided insurgency or coups overthrow a regime d tats for regime to support the movement and provided change much in the form of funding, computers, and political and military advice. The domestic anti-Milosevic cam- C Indigenous coups d tat paign culminated in October 2000 with a nationwide general strike and a march Social on the capital by hundreds of thousands Revolution of protesters from across the country. Milosevic finally announced his resigna- tion the following day, bringing to an end a brutal 13-year regime. can be armed or non-violent, but both consolidation or alliance of competing For several reasons, SOF are ideally must be planned for.”21 but compatible factions; or thwart or suited to contribute to U.S. support to Clearly, SOF have a traditional UW inhibit the development of competing such social revolutions. First and fore- role in providing the necessary organiz- factions or movements that are incompat- most, it must be remembered that just ing, equipping, training, and advising ible and adversarial. because a movement opts to follow a functions to support such an armed nonviolent strategy is no guarantee that resistance effort, but this role can have DOTMLPF Implications the revolution will remain nonviolent. a much greater chance of succeeding Much is already being done toward Several of the Arab Spring revolutions if SOF are involved as advisors early developing or upgrading joint and have shown that such movements must on, during the nonviolent resistance Service UW-related doctrine, and better be prepared in the event that severe campaign. Whether early U.S. support organizing and preparing our primary government repressive measures drive is covert or overt, if it reaches the point UW force. While some doctrine, them to abandon the nonviolent strategy where lead-agency responsibility transfers organization, training, materiel, leader and resort to an armed resistance cam- from the Department of State or another development, personnel, and facilities paign rather than forfeiting their cause. government agency to DOD, early in- (DOTMLPF) requirements have been In fact, in the case of Serbia’s Bulldozer volvement by SOF can ensure that such a identified and solutions determined, full Revolution, some elements of the resis- transfer is smooth and is executed at full implications should continue to emerge tance were prepared to do just that had it speed, much like the passing of a baton through a rigorous and disciplined become necessary. in a relay race, rather than a dangerous requirements assessment process. Participants at a recent UW/ and counterproductive stop-and-go affair. In recognizing a need for doctrine Resistance seminar (co-sponsored by SOF capabilities and expertise transcend updating, one Theater Special Operations U.S. Special Operations Command lead-agency boundaries. Command commander recently observed: Europe and Joint Special Operations An early decision to support a move- University) at the Baltic Defence College ment can also pay dividends, providing The conditions of 2014 are different than in Estonia observed that, based on the the opportunity for SOF or other U.S. those of 1944, and the tools with which experiences of some former Warsaw Pact Government departments or agen- unconventional warfare is waged today nations in their civil resistance–based cies to influence, shape, and steer the differ greatly. We must advance from the post–Cold War revolutions, “resistance movement; encourage and facilitate the nostalgic vision of remote guerrilla bases
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 107 in denied territory and adapt to a world To make a thorough assessment of a ical warfare has become a lost art which of split-second communications and data group and to be in a position to capitalize no department or agency of the U.S. transfer, non-violent resistance, cyber and on the advantages of early observation Government views as a core mission.25 economic warfare, and the manipula- and possible engagement, SOF should be tion of international law to undermine capable of recognizing the conditions and Conclusion national sovereignty. . . . In our era, uncon- early indicators of resistance. Unconventional warfare, whether con- ventional warfare is more likely to take the Materiel requirements are such that ducted by the United States or Russia form of a civil resistance movement, perhaps they apply to other SOF core tasks as well or any other state seeking to advance manipulated by foreign powers, that seeks as UW. Senior leaders have long recog- national interests through Gray Zone to provoke a violent government response nized that SOF require improvements proxy warfare, has a rich history but in order to destroy that government’s in denied area penetration and standoff continues to evolve to meet changing legitimacy in the eyes of the international capabilities and an ability to perform global conditions. One certainty in a community. Waging and countering this critical core tasks for extended periods in world of continuing disorder, a world new unconventional warfare demands high-risk situations.23 The requirement bereft of Cold War clarity and relative great sophistication and agility.22 for low-visibility and stealthy air platforms “stability,” where globalization has might not be limited to infiltration, exfil- enabled almost continuous change, is Implementation of emerging UW tration, and personnel recovery. Modified that the UW mission must continue to concepts and doctrine requires persistent, versions of these platforms could serve adapt and so must those responsible for low-visibility presence around the world as tankers or gunships, or platforms for executing it. and the development of a network of information operations, aerial resupply, U.S. forces can likely have the great- useful and influential contacts. Foreign precision strike, and terminal guidance. est chance for success in Gray Zone internal defense, security assistance, for- Materiel requirements might also UW operations when engaged early in eign officer exchange programs, foreign include a stealthy, long-endurance SOF a resistance movement’s development education and study opportunities, and drone with global surveillance and strike and continuously thereafter. As demon- special assignments are important means capability. Other payloads could provide strated in the U.S. operation to support of contributing to this. the capability to disseminate electronic Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance in 2001, To meet the challenges of UW messages via radio or television broadcast, however, it can also succeed with rela- support to social movements or social in standoff mode, to target audiences in tively mature and experienced resistance revolution, a deeper understanding of the denied areas. Unmanned aerial systems groups, when a benefactor state’s support dynamics of civil resistance and how UW might also have the ability to emplace re- might be just enough to tip the scales in can be conducted through such subver- mote unattended ground sensors capable favor of a movement that has been largely sive (and often nonviolent) movements of detecting, classifying, and determining stalemated. is required. Understanding conditions the direction of movement of personnel, One remaining requirement is that of where more violent methods might be wheeled vehicles, and tracked vehicles. determining what Gray Zone UW success problematic, if not counterproductive, looks like and establishing meaningful calls for an in-depth understanding of A Critical Policy Gap criteria for measuring the effectiveness the theories, concepts, and methods as- After a few early political warfare suc- of such operations. The very concept sociated with social movement influence, cesses in the 1950s, along with some of “winning” must be fundamentally mobilization, and activism. SOF must clear failures, President Eisenhower reexamined in the context of a future continually work to upgrade their train- once considered appointing a National environment where we will likely not ing regimen and education curriculum in Security Council (NSC)-level “direc- commit large military formations in deci- areas such as: tor of unconventional or non-military sive engagements against similarly armed warfare,” with responsibilities including foes. social movement theory •• such areas as “economic warfare, psy- A Gray Zone “win” is not a win in regional history, cultural studies, and •• chological warfare, political warfare, and the classic warfare sense. Winning is language proficiency foreign information.”24 In other words, perhaps better described as maintain- creation and preparation of an •• he saw the need for an NSC-level direc- ing the U.S. Government’s positional underground tor of political warfare, someone to advantage, namely the ability to influ- cyber UW tools and methods •• quarterback the habitually interagency ence partners, populations, and threats influence operations •• effort. This need still exists to achieve toward achievement of our regional or negotiation and mediation skills •• unity of effort across all aspects of strategic objectives. Specifically, this will popular mobilization dynamics •• national power (diplomatic, informa- mean retaining decision space, maximiz- subversion and political warfare •• tional, military, and economic) across ing desirable strategic options, or simply social network analysis and sociocul- •• the continuum of international compe- denying an adversary a decisive positional tural analysis. tition. As Max Boot has observed, polit- advantage.
108 Features / Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 In these human-centric struggles,
JFQ 80, 1st Quarter 2016 Votel et al. 109