Jihad of the Pen: a Practitioners Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency
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SMALL WARS JOURNAL smallwarsjournal.com Jihad of the Pen: A Practitioners Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency Special to the Small Wars Journal By Colonel G. L. Lamborn, USAR (Ret.) February 2010 Dedication This small work is dedicated to all those who use the power of their minds guided by courage, humility, resourcefulness and compassion to achieve a better world in which the forces of tyranny, hatred, fanaticism, and ignorance are defeated. Note to the Reader In reading this small work, the practitioner must keep in mind the following. In Islam, the concept of “jihad” (the Arabic word means “struggle”) consists of two aspects. The Lesser Jihad – with which the world is unfortunately somewhat familiar – is defined as “armed resistance in defense of the faith and the Believers,”—but only under prescribed conditions and under properly authorized leadership. What most non-Muslims do not know is that in Islam the Greater Jihad is the struggle that takes place inwardly – within each soul and person. It is a great struggle to conquer one’s own evil and base desires, and triumph over one’s own ignorance, barbarity and spiritual darkness. The Greater Jihad is Islam’s great challenge to build a better world, one Believer at a time. Unfortunately, thanks to the cruel deeds of a relatively small number of extremists, the newspaper version of “jihad” has imprinted only a warped definition of the Lesser Jihad as meaning torture, murder, fanaticism, hatred, and xenophobia. I chose the title “Jihad of the Pen” partly because the Prophet had once said: “The ink of the scholar is more sacred than the blood of the martyr.” In part, the title also derives from my fervent belief that the jihad of the pen is the battle all people must wage against ignorance everywhere. Each primary school student today, whether in America or Afghanistan, is carrying on his or her personal “Jihad of the Pen.” For it is only through education and a true spirituality that enlightenment – and peace on Earth – can someday be realized. And for those of us who must fight the forces of an evil new Dark Age on the battlefield of ideas, “Jihad of the Pen” is equally appropriate. Firepower cannot defeat an Idea; only a better and more compelling Idea can overcome its cruel adversary. When spurred to action by blind hatred and fanaticism, ignorance is mankind’s greatest enemy. Ours is truly a struggle of the pen. Page 2 of 122 smallwarsjournal.com © 2010, Small Wars Foundation Note of Thanks The author wishes to offer his grateful thanks to the following individuals for their help, expert advice, encouragement, and professional fellowship over the years. Several of the following individuals offered timely, insightful comments on this work while it was still in draft. All contributed over the years to the author’s understanding of political warfare and influence operations in support of counterinsurgency efforts. Dr. Arturo G. Munoz, RAND Corporation; Colonel Grant Newsham, USMC; Dr. John J. LeBeau, George C. Marshall Center; Dr. John Nagl, Center for a New American Security; Dr. David Kilcullen, The Crumpton Group; and Dr. Amin Tarzi, Marine Corps University. Special thanks go to Mr. Jack Shea, Department of Defense, Mr. Jason H. Campbell, RAND Corporation; and Captain David M. Lamborn, U.S. Army, for reviewing the manuscript on their own time and making valuable suggestions. Special thanks also are due to Ms. Cassandra Sheehan for her help with the text, especially with regard to the charts, footnotes and bibliography and to Mr. Tor Achekzai, The MASY Group, who reviewed the Pashto-language proposed military Code of Conduct found in section 23. Author also wishes to thank many others who, though not named, at various times in the author’s past have been of assistance. All are deeply appreciated. The observations and opinions in this work are solely those of the author and do not represent the views of any U.S. Government department or agency, nor any private corporation or group. The author takes full responsibility for any errors of fact. Page 3 of 122 smallwarsjournal.com © 2010, Small Wars Foundation ISAF Counterinsurgency Guidance Key Points Embrace the people Think before you act. Understand the consequences of your actions – how you drive, how you patrol, how you relate to people, how you help the community. View your actions through the eyes of the Afghans. If we harm Afghan civilians, we sow the seeds of our own defeat. Be an expert on the local situation. Build connections and hold routine jirgas. Afghan culture is founded on personal relationships. Listen to the population and adjust accordingly. Earn their trust. Develop their ownership in the solution. If they sweat for it, they will protect it. Be a positive force in the community; shield the people from harm; foster stability. Partner with the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Live, eat, and train together, plan and operate together, depend on one another, and hold each other accountable – at all echelons down to soldier level. Treat them as equal partners in success. Their success is our goal. Respect them; put them in the lead and coach them to excellence. Build governance Capacity and Accountability Facilitate and enable transparent and accountable governance from the national to community level. Insist government officials serve the people; support those who do. Confront corrupt officials. Protecting the people requires protection from physical harm, corruption and abuse of power. Get Better Everyday Learn and adapt to the environment. Keep your skills sharp. Improve daily. Learn how to shape the environment, and how to achieve greater effects with the people more quickly. Listen to and learn from our Afghan colleagues. Communicate and share ideas. Challenge the conventional wisdom if it no longer fits the environment. This is a battle of wits – learn and adapt more quickly than the insurgent. -- Guidance from GEN Stanley McChrystal Page 4 of 122 smallwarsjournal.com © 2010, Small Wars Foundation Table of Contents Part One: Looking over the Building Blocks 1. The Future of War 2. What is Influence? 3. Why Bother with Persuasion? 4. Tribes, Governments, and Politics 5. The Pain of Cultural Change 6. Leaders and Their Sources of Power 7. The Building Blocks of Nations 8. Of Target Audiences 9. Linkage, OR How We are Tied Together 10. When Target Audiences’ Interests Clash 11. Some Assembly Required 12. Does Control Equate with Support? Part Two: Applying Operational Thinking to the Blocks 13. Quo Vadis? 14. The Psyop Cycle 15. The Fine Art of Motivation 16. Rapport, Rapport, Rapport 17. The Conductor’s Score 18. Cinderella’s Slipper 19. Measuring Inputs or Outcomes? 20. The Game of Minds 21. The Voice of the Infantry 22. How Sick is the Patient? 23. Making a Silk Purse from a Sow’s Ear 24. So What Can I Do? Annexes A: Precepts for Discussion and Debate; Larry’s Laws B: Glossary C: Selected Propaganda Techniques D: “Just a Speech” E: Ideas for Strategic Influence Operations F: Ideas for Tactical Influence Operations Page 5 of 122 smallwarsjournal.com © 2010, Small Wars Foundation Jihad of the Pen A Practitioner’s Guide to Conducting Effective Influence Operations in an Insurgency Public sentiment is everything; with public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed. He who molds public opinion is greater than he who enacts laws. Abraham Lincoln Although no two insurgencies are exactly alike in all details, the inescapable fact is that at core all insurgencies are politically motivated. However primitive or bizarre the political vision of an insurgent group, the insurgent’s goal remains constant: to overthrow an existing government and replace it with one of the insurgent’s own choosing. Insurgency is “armed politics.” It is a violent form of political competition. Insurgents have historically employed a blend of two forces – persuasion and coercion (a negative form of persuasion) – to mobilize support for The Cause while undermining the government-in-being to the point at which it dissolves or is easily displaced. The more sophisticated (and usually successful) insurgent movements almost always employ a carefully balanced mix of blandishments and threats to achieve victory. Insurgent movements routinely use both “open” front groups and coalitions and truly clandestine groups in a political warfare campaign that the Sandinistas called poder de doble cara—power of two faces. Such an approach cannot be defeated by military power, but only by competent counterintelligence work combined with effective regime political warfare programs. It is a mistake to believe that insurgents merely shoot their way into power. That is a description of a palace coup, not an insurgency. Insurgents build power from the grass roots up; coup plotters start at the top and work their way downward. What many American military and civil officials frequently overlook or give short shrift to is the central importance of political warfare in insurgencies. It is usually the case that regimes and occupying forces rely more on weaponry and firepower than on persuasion and brainpower. In the vast majority of cases, the regime in power has a great advantage in weaponry over its opponents. But insurgents have time and again been able to offset that advantage by systematic – and often adroit – use of political warfare. Recognizing this difference in strategy, General Sir Frank Kitson observed that: “insurgents start with nothing but a cause and grow to strength, while the counter-insurgents start with everything but a cause and gradually decline in strength to the point of weakness.”1 The greatest challenge we face in the present war is for the Afghan government to formulate and communicate a cause that is more powerful and compelling than that of the insurgents.