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1993 Elections and Mass Politics in Sheila Carapico University of Richmond, [email protected]

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Recommended Citation Carapico, Sheila. "Elections and Mass Politics in Yemen." Middle East Report 185 26, no. 6 (1993): 2-6.

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m's PresidentialCouncil, May 25, 1990. Fromleft to right:Salim Sallh, Vice PresidentAH Salim al-Bayd, President All Abdallah Sallh, Abd al-Karlm al-Arashl and Abd ahAzizAbd al-Ghani.

Yemen's experiment in popular parliamentary elec? Elections and Mass tions has shaken things up in the Arabian Peninsula,

the last place on earth that the United States wants to Politics in Yemen see democracy flourish. But internal political differ?

ences, profound economic crisis and Saudi hostility

puts this achievement at risk.

Yemeni parliamentary election of April 27, 1993, The marks a watershed for the Arabian Peninsula. The multiparty contest for 301 constituency-based seats, and the period of unfettered public debate and discussion that preceded it, represents the advent of organized mass pol? itics in a region where political power has long remained a closely-held family affair. In the weeks after Yemenis

Sheila Carapico, an editor of this magazine, teaches international relationsat the Universityof Richmondin Virginia.She is currentlyin Yemenon a Fulbrightgrant, researchingpolitical developmentssince unification.

Middle East Report ? November-December 1993 went to the polls, the regime next door in Saudi Arabia es. The General People's Congress (GPC) was founded by sent armed police to raid a university campus in Riyadh Abdallah Salih in the 1980s as an Egyptian-style amal? and arrest a professor active in a banned human rights gam of all political tendencies within Salih's regime. Ali committee. These and other developments in the region Salim al-Bayd's Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), born during may compel the Clinton administration to weigh its democ? South Yemen's anti-colonial struggle and divided between ratization rhetoric a little more seriously. When a high- old-guard Leninists and a growing number of social democ? ranking State Department official visited Yemen in mid- rats, was better organized and had a more coherent ide? May, he followed his pro-forma congratulations with a ology than the GPC. cautionary note: "I don't think you should look on what you This rough two-party equilibrium created space for other do here as a model for anyone else to follow."1 political organizations. The Saudi-backed Isiah (Reform) Yemen's commitment to elections accompanied the uni? Party is a marriage of convenience between Shaikh fication agreement between Ali Abdallah Salih, president Abdallah al-Ahmar, the head of the powerful con? of the (North) Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and Ali Salim federation, and the urban-based Muslim Brotherhood. al-Bayd, leader of the ruling party in the (South) People's In 1991, the Isiah had led an unsuccessful boycott of the Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). Following for? 1991 constitutional referendum because the shari'a is stip? mal unification on May 22,1990, a five-member Presidential ulated simply as "the main" rather than "the only" source Council headed by Salih held executive power, and the two of legislation. The Iraqi-leaning Yemeni Ba'th is much former parliaments were combined in a unified Chamber smaller in numbers, but also wields some influence in trib? of Deputies. Under a constitution approved by national al and military circles through its charismatic leader, referendum in May 1991, political parties organized open? Mujahid Abu Shuarib.5 The most important among some ly and most restrictions on association, expression and 40 other parties are three Nasirist factions; a sayyid* group movement were lifted. The 1991 referendum specified that known as al-Haq (Right); Omar al-Jawi's progressive the elections be held within 30 months of unification, but Unionist Party; and the League of the Sons of Yemen led a combination of technical problems, procrastination and by Abd al-Rahman al-Jifri. Some smaller parties, unable conflicts between "Ali and Ali" (Salih and al-Bayd) post? to field a full slate and obtain state campaign financing, poned polling beyond the November 1992 deadline. ran candidates as "independents." In the months before April, a multiparty Supreme Despite instances of disorder and violence, and scores Elections Committee (SEC) drew up 301 districts and estab? of complaints, the outcome indicated a genuine contest. lished procedures for voter and candidate registration, a The GPC won 123 constituencies; Isiah came in second 10-day campaign period, write-in ballots, and counting with 62 seats, mostly from its tribal rather than its Islamist procedures.2 In early 1993, 2.7 million adults (including wing; the YSP took 57, mostly in the former PDRY; inde? 77 percent of eligible males and 15 percent of eligible pendents won 47; the Ba'th seven; three Nasirist parties females) registered to vote. Some 4,800 candidates regis? each gained one seat; al-Haq won two, and one district's tered, the majority of them independents.3 More than 3,600, election was postponed.6 The YSP claimed that in addition including 50 women, stayed in the campaign until the end. to 57 party members, 13 independent socialists won with its support, and an additional 17 genuinely independent deputies-elect share its vision of the future.7 Some spec? Political Space ulated that Isiah, which declined to estimate its unofficial How did it happen that two erstwhile dictators presided sympathizers, had 30 supporters who won under the GPC over relatively fair, peaceful multiparty elections? banner, plus three independents. By any count, the arith? The answer lies mainly in the conditions that led to uni? metic mandated a coalition government.8 fication. The end of the Cold War eliminated the Soviet assistance so essential to the PDRY's and reduced survival, Domestic Pressures Western and Gulf interests in sustaining inter-Yemeni tensions. Dissidents from each polity had sought refuge in Arab leaders have promised free elections in the past and the others' capital, and most independent political move? not delivered. What made Salih and al-Bayd?neither of ments, organizations and unions were committed to unity. whose personal histories indicates a commitment to polit? Planners looked to recent oil discoveries along their com? ical liberalism?follow through? The answer lies in soci? mon frontier to bring in foreign investment and exchange. etal pressures which took different forms: mass confer? In short, realizing that in order to maintain power they ences, strikes, demonstrations, political organizations, would have to share power, Ali and Ali agreed not only to press commentaries, academic symposia and maqiyal or merge their polities but to open up the process to wider "salons." participation.4 Prior to the elections, a series of mass conferences pro? The process had some unique facilitating features. vided outlets for articulate opposition elements. A nine- Unlike other "democratizing" systems, Yemen inherited day Talahum (Cohesion) Conference in December 1991, two ruling parties that shared power in a delicate, often gathered some 10,000 men; although its banner was the tense balance the transitional each retain? during period, *Sayyid (plural sadah) refers to persons claiming descent from , the prophet, ing control of its former military and security apparatus- whocomprised a ruling aristocracy inNorth Yemen prior to the 1962 revolution.

Middle East Report ? November-December 1993 Bakil tribal confederation, urban intellectuals were among integrity of the balloting process, they did perform a mod? the organizers and authors of a 33-point resolution calling est watchdog function and met again after the elections to forjudicial independence, strengthening of representative prepare for the next round. Syndicates, charities and inter? parliamentary and local bodies, fiscal restraint and man? est groups have been increasingly active. agement, revitalization of agricultural and services.coop- The press is also significant within the political arena. eratives, an independent media, environmental protec? More than 100 partisan and independent newspapers and tion, free elections within the mandated time-frame, magazines, mostly founded since 1990, covered these peaceful resolution of tribal conflicts, and other reforms.9 events. Although the government daily, Al-Thawra, and Some seven other tribe-based but civic-oriented mass con? state-run television and radio tend to dominate news cov? ferences in 1992 each issued written demands for the erage, a number of opposition weeklies have a strong read? rule of law, pluralism, economic development and local ership among the literate, urban, politically active popu? autonomy. The Saba' (Sheba) Conference of Bakil and lation: Sawt al-(Ummal (Voice of the Workers), based in Madhaj tribes elected a council of trustees, a council of Aden, has the largest circulation of any paper. Party organs, social reform, and follow-up committees to ensure insti? includingRaay, Al-Tashih, Al-Sahwa and others, provide tutional continuity. critical commentary and information about opposition con? This activity culminated with a national conference of ferences and independent organizations. There has emerged representatives of the smaller center and left parties and a press corps of scores of men and several dozen women political organizations, led by Omar al-Jawi. This time, who more and more approximate a fourth estate, conducting the two ruling parties strove to delay, discourage, coopt interviews, attending parliament, asking critical questions and eventually offset what promised to be a major event at press conferences, testing the limits of press law and by holding a simultaneous counter-conference and by defending one another against lawsuits.13 arranging the ouster of their opponents from the San'a Related to the mass conferences, political organizing Cultural Center to the local Sheraton. Well-publicized in and press activity was a trend toward academic symposia the opposition press but ignored by the official media, on topics such as the constitutional amendments, admin? the center-left conference criticized delayed preparations istrative decentralization, municipal services, and the cam? for the elections and the government's reckless printing of paign experience of women candidates. Typically invit? money, and proposed a code of political conduct for polit? ing members of each party and independent specialists, ical parties.10 The Ta'iz Conference in November 1992, such symposia, virtually unheard of in the old North or headed by al-Jifri, went even further in attracting facul? South Yemen, provided fora for discussion, debate and ty, journalists and professionals; challenging Ta'iz's gov? refinement of ideas which were then reported in the oppo? ernor; constituting steering and work councils; and artic? sition press. ulating explicit demands for civic and human rights, local More frequent and informal is an updated variation elections, and improved local services.11 Not to be outdone, on the male qat session, or maqiyal, which approximates the Isiah organized a 4,000-strong Unity and Peace the "salons" of 19th-century Europe.14 Nowadays these Conference in December under the slogan "The Quran and customarily informal social gatherings may elect a chair, the Sunna Supersede the Constitution and the Law."12 select a topic, establish rules of order, and hold organized These conferences, both tribal and urban-based, involv? political discussion on topics ranging from relations with ing tens of thousands of people, were among the transition the Gulf to women's rights to exchange rate policy. period's most important political developments. In response, Collectively, these civic activities applied consider? the regime felt compelled to adopt its own code of politi? able pressure on the regime to fulfill its promises, abide by cal conduct, dismiss the Ta'iz governor, accept the princi? a code of conduct, address its critics and respect political ple of local elections, and adopt a rhetoric of electoral rights. pluralism. Several Yemeni intellectuals have criticized There were also several outbursts of popular frustra? international observers and reporters for presenting an tion, most notably in December 1992. Outrage with the unduly positive picture of the electoral experience, and collapse of the value of the riyal, inadequate services, mount? many participants in the conferences and seminars are ing unemployment, government corruption and post? quite cynical about their own influence, insisting that they ponement of the elections erupted in mass demonstrations have been marginalized from the political process. By against both the state and private merchants in all major the same token, it is difficult to imagine the events of the cities. Along with strikes and threatened strikes by groups past year taking place had they been passive. ranging from garbage collectors to judges, the near-riots reminded the government of the power of popular wrath. External Involvement On a smaller scale but a more institutionalized basis, numerous independent political organizations emerged. Rumors in San'a had the US playing a major if covert The Committee for the Defense of Human Rights and role in organizing the elections and the post-electoral com? Liberties, established by liberal university professors, ini? promise. There is scant evidence, though, of Western pres? tiated the National Committee for Free Elections (NCFE), sure for political liberalization in Arabia. Although US- in turn spurring the formation of other electoral NGOs. Yemeni relations seemed poised to improve immediately Although they failed on their own terms to guarantee the after unification in May 1990, they deteriorated after Iraq's

Middle East Report ? November-December 1993 invasion of Kuwait because, in the words of US Ambassador Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), and Arthur Hughes, "San'a wanted to maintain normal rela? the International Republican Institute (IRI) to assist elec? tions with Baghdad."15 American aid, never monetarily tion officials and observers.19 Hastily arranged, these pro? significant, was slashed from $30 million to $3 million, and jects had minimal effect. IFES was still conducting train? Agency for International Development (AID) direct-hire ing on the eve of the elections, using a syllabus their own staff reduced from 19 to four or five. team leader considered inadequate. IRI's team of inter? Unity and electoral democracy have never been high national observers included few speakers. Even the on the US agenda for the Arabian Peninsula. Washington US Republicans could not overcome neighboring Arab habitually defers to Saudi perceptions. James Schelsinger, states' reluctance to have their citizens observe the process. former CIA director and secretary of defense and a man The IRI team included one person from the United Arab with some experience in setting the US strategic agenda in Emirates and a Bahraini who arrived on a tourist visa. the Middle East, asked recently "whether we seriously desire NDI's plan to organize volunteer Yemeni monitors for each or prescribe democracy as the proper form of government of the 7,000 polling stations was a fiasco, and illustrated for other societies. Perhaps the issue is most clearly posed the NDI's lack of familiarity with an Arab environment.20 in the Islamic world. Do we seriously want to change the US press coverage was favorable, as were the reports institutions of Saudi Arabia? The brief answer is no...."16 of these US and international observer groups. But Once elections were scheduled, though, Washington felt Washington's reaction was qualified by an obvious concern obliged to make a show of support. An embassy memo? that pluralism not spread to other parts of the Peninsula. randum in April 1993 claimed that "We have shaped near? The State Department's Mack emphasized that "one elec? ly every program to strengthen Yemen's emerging demo? tion does not make a democracy" and that US support is cratic institutions and to underline US support for this more likely to consist of corporate investments than restored development...."17 Deputy Assistant Secretary of State levels of aid. While holding that Yemen would have to take David Mack arrived in early May to say that he was further steps toward democracy before satisfying US stan? "instructed to congratulate the Yemeni people and gov? dards, and agreeing that countries have the right to choose ernment."18 the style of democracy that best suits their internal envi? Accordingly, with $480,000 (mostly for American staff ronments, Mack then cited Kuwait's more controlled, lim? and their travel expenses), AID funded the International ited-participation poll last August as a precedent for Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the National Yemen!21

Middle East Report ? November-December 1993 US and Gulf pressures may have been a factor in power in the hands of the chief executive. Critics, includ? Yemen's appointment of a new foreign minister, ing the newly-formed opposition coalition of five small par? Muhammad Salim Basindwa, who publicly disavowed ties, many Socialists, and independent intellectuals, con? Yemen's Gulf war stance and spent much of his time away tended that the current constitution has not yet been from the fray courting a rapprochement with the Gulf implemented, and that the continuing focus on the com? monarchies.22 Ambassador Hughes announced a modest position of government institutions only served to divert $1.7 million increase in US assistance, but made it clear attention away from a deepening economic crisis which that improved Yemeni relations with the Gulf are more promises to grow more acute as a World Bank-IMF struc? important to Washington than civil rights and political tural adjustment program is put into effect. Popular rat? pluralism.23 ification of the political establishment has not diminished profound disagreements over basic issues of governance and accountability, and more than a few thoughtful Post-Election Developments Yemenis fear that even the startling accomplishments of In the new parliament's first session, Shaikh Abdallah al- the last several years?unification and participatory pol? Ahmar, the Isiah leader, won the speakership with 223 itics?remain vulnerable to hostile forces in the country votes. Balloting for three deputy speakers returned one and in the region. ? each from GPC, Ba'th and YSP. A package of constitutional amendments put immediately to the Chamber proposed Footnotes Presidential tech? replacing the existing five-man Council, 1Financial Times, May 14,1993. nically selected by the Chamber, with a US-style two-term 2 SECTechnical Committee final report, al-Taqrir al-khatami I'lijnah al-faniah (San'a, n.d.). president and vice president; creating an upper house (a 3 SEC InformationCommittee, "Parliamentary Elections 27th April, 1993," San'a. The Consultative with for each lowregistration rates for women have been attributed tolack of separate registration Council) equal representation facilitiesinmany constituencies; therequirement ofphotographs forvoter registration; governorate; and mandating elections for the local coun? exceptionallyhigh rates of illiteracy among women; and, in some places, outright discour? agementofwomen from voting. The conservative Isiah, while discouraging women from cils, district administrators and governors.24 An Islah-pro- running,actively recruited female voters. posed amendment would require that all Yemeni laws 4 Conversationswith Muhammad Zabarah, Abd al-'Aziz Masaud, and Hamud al-'Udi, all ofSan'a University. Onthe economic aspects, see Sheila Carapico, "The Economic Dimension conform to shari'a. ofYemeni Unity," Middle East Report #184 (September-October 1993),pp. 9-14. Pending discussion of these amendments, parliament 5 Despiteantagonism between their backers, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, the leaders the Isiah sharelinks to extended the term of the transition Presidential Council, andthe Ba'th Yemen'stribal milieu. with three members and two QAl-Thawrah,May2,1993. After hearing appeals, the Supreme Court recommended recounts Congress Socialists, through insix districts and re-elections infour, including one Hodeida constituency where the assas? October. Prime Minister Abu Bakr al-Attas of the YSP, sinationofa GPCcandidate days before the election forced its suspension. YSP asked to form the new government, appointed 15 minis? 7 pressconference, April 30,1993; SEC press conference, May 1,1993. ters from the six from and Abu 8 Seatcounts did not accurately reflect the popular vote: 28 percent for the GPC, 18 per? GPC, eight Socialists, Isiah, centfor the Socialists, 17 percent for Isiah, 29 percent for independents, andthe remain? Shuarib of the Ba'th.25 Only a third of these 30 ministers derfor 10 smaller parties. Al-Quds, May 13,1993. The official government press put the GPCahead of independents. were new. 9 SeeAl-Mustaqbal, December 22, 1991; and the interview with Shaikh Abd al-Wahab A general eight-point government program, whose most MuhammadSinan, Yemen Times (YT), December 25,1991. sensitive proposal concerned the long-delayed merger of 10See the articles by Muhammad Abdul-Malik al-Mutawakkil inYT, August 12 and August 19,1992;and "National Conference's Political Communique," YT,November 25,1992. the two armies, was put to parliament for a vote of confi? 11Ahmad No'man al-Madhagi, "Assessing the Taiz Conference," YT,December 9,1992. dence in early July.26 But when bargaining and com? just 12Ahmad No'man al-Madhagi, "Yemen's Right Flexes its Muscles," YT, December 30,1992. seemed to a workable the promises produce coalition, 13Abd al-Aziz al-Saqqaf defeated a suit brought against him for criticizing thepresident deputies balked. For more than a week in late July and inYemen Times, giving hope to Muhammad Abd al-Rahman ofAl-Tashih and Sawt al- 'Ummal,accused of similar "crimes." early August, al-Ahmar pounded his gavel in a vain attempt 14Women also have qat sessions but have not been observed inthis new, political mode. to restore order as a raucous debate over the raged pro? 15Yemen-American Friendship Association () seminar onUS-Yemeni relations, San'a, gram, the constitutional amendments, the composition July22,1993. of the Presidential Council, and unification of the armed 16"The Quest for a Post-ColdWar Policy," Foreign Affairs 72,1, p. 20. unclassifiedcable. forces. After an alternative program drafted by parlia? 17USIA/San'a, committee was 260 demand? 18Interview with Ahmad No'man al-Madhagi, YT, May 16,1993; and group discussion with mentary presented, deputies Mack,May 9,1993. to on the debate ed to address the floor, threatening drag 19The NDI and the IRI are both affiliates ofthe quasi-official National Endowment for endlessly. Finally a vote of confidence on the program Democracy.These US fundswere granted to US institutions,andnot given as assistance tothe Yemeni government. on the that the substance of the passed implicit premise 20Ahmad Noman al-Madhagi, unpublished paper (on election observers), April 1993. debate would be deferred to deliberations on the consti? 21See footnote 18. tutional amendments package. As the Chamber went into 22SeeAl-Islah, August 3,1993, reporting Saudi acceptance ofYemeni democracy. recess in early August, the Isiah and the Socialists were 23Ambassador Hughes' remarks atYAFA Symposium. Inthe meantime, university pro? each to withdraw from the coalition unless fessorsand lawyers organizing a Saudi Organization forShari'a Rights were arrested for threatening crimesincluding smuggling tapes of Yemeni political campaigns and parliamentary debates. their respective demands for shari'a law and the vice pres? 24 Thefirst of several versions of the amendments proposed that the vice president, idency were met. ConsultativeCouncil and local officials upto and including governors would be elected; a laterversion called for election only of district officials. SeeAbu Bakr al-Saqqaf, "Malahuzat When parliament reconvened in September, a three- fial-Inqalab al-Disturi," part 2, Al-Mustaqbal, August 1,1993. party committee was formed to discuss the proposed con? 25Al-Thawra, May 31,1993. stitutional amendments, now revised to concentrate more 26Al-Raay, July 6,1993

Middle East Report ? November-December 1993