Toward Perpetual Peace a Philosophical Sketch

Toward Perpetual Peace A Philosophical Sketch

Immanuel Kant

Copyright © Jonathan Bennett 2017. All rights reserved [Brackets] enclose editorial explanations. Small ·dots· enclose material that has been added, but can be read as though it were part of the original text. Occasional •bullets, and also indenting of passages that are not quotations, are meant as aids to grasping the structure of a sentence or a thought. Every four-point ellipsis . . . . indicates the omission of a brief passage that seems to present more difﬁculty than it is worth. Longer omissions are reported between brackets in normal-sized type. First launched: October 2010 Perpetual Peace Immanuel Kant

Contents

Introduction...... 1

Section I: Preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states1 1. ‘No peace treaty is valid if it was made with mental reservations that could lead to a future war.’...... 1 2: ‘No independent states, large or small, are to come under the dominion of another state by inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.’...... 2 3: ‘Standing armies are eventually to be abolished.’...... 2 4: ‘National debts are not to be incurred as an aid to the conduct of foreign policy.’...... 3 5: ‘No state is to interfere by force with the constitution or government of another state.’...... 3 6: ‘No state during a war is to permit acts of hostility that would make mutual conﬁdence impossible after the war is over—e.g. the use of assassins and poisoners, breach of capitulation, incitement to treason in the opposing state.’4

Section 2: Deﬁnitive articles for perpetual peace among states5 First article: ’The civil constitution of every state is to be republican.’...... 6 Second Article: ‘The law of nations is to be founded on a federation of free states.’...... 9 Third article: ‘The law of world citizenship is to be united to conditions of universal hospitality.’...... 11

Two additions 13 1: Nature as a guarantor of perpetual peace...... 13 2: The secret article...... 18

Two appendices 19 1: The friction between morality and politics with regarding perpetual peace...... 19 2: How the transcendental concept of public law harmonizes morality with politics...... 26 Perpetual Peace Immanuel Kant I: Preliminary articles

Introduction

A Dutch innkeeper’s sign had a burial ground painted on so the theorists are allowed to play their games without it, with the mocking inscription ‘Eternal Peace’. This could attracting the attention of statesmen, who know how the have been aimed world works! My condition is this: the practical politician •generally at mankind, or must maintain this attitude in times of trouble, and mustn’t •speciﬁcally at the war-hungry rulers of states, or suspect some danger to the state in things that the political •merely at the philosophers who dream this sweet theorist says openly and with no hidden purpose. With this dream ·of eternal peace·. saving clause the author regards himself as expressly and The author of the present essay wants to set one condition rigorously protected from any malicious interpretation of ·regarding relations between rulers and philosophers·. The his words. [‘saving clause’ translates Kant’s Latin clausula salvatoria. attitude of practical politicians to political theorists is at Though mainly a technical term in music theory, this has other meanings once condescending and offensive, complacently regarding too; ‘saving clause ’ is not one of them, but one suspects that Kant them as pedants whose empty ideas pose no threat to the thought it was. Anyway, whatever he meant by it, he clearly intended State. The State has to proceed on empirical principles; the phrase as pompous or mock-solemn, like the rest of the sentence.]

Section I: Preliminary articles for perpetual peace among states

1. ‘No peace treaty is valid if it was made with these are all, all, annihilated by the peace treaty. When one mental reservations that could lead to a future or both parties •sign a peace treaty only because they are war.’ too exhausted to continue the war, and in bad faith •enter into the treaty with a ·silent· mental reservation concerning Otherwise this would be only a truce, a suspension of hostil- issues that are to be confronted later on, that’s a bit of ities, not peace, which means the end of all hostilities—so Jesuit casuistry. [In that sentence, ‘that’ refers not to the treaty but that it’s really redundant to qualify ‘peace’ with the adjective to the mental reservation. Kant aims to head off any such plea as: ‘I’m ‘perpetual’. There may be existing states of affairs that could not morally bound by the treaty that I signed, because I signed it with a be causes of future wars—ones that the parties to the peace mental reservation that excluded clauses x and y from what I intended.” treaty don’t know about, and perhaps couldn’t know except Some Jesuit casuists—i.e. theoreticians of practical morality—have at- through clever forensic digging in dusty documents—but tributed that kind of moral force to ‘mental reservations’.]

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It’s beneath the dignity of a sovereign to make such a ‘mental 3: ‘Standing armies are eventually to be abolished.’ reservation’, and it’s beneath the dignity of a sovereign’s That’s because their constant appearance of war-readiness ministers to act upon it. is a continuing threat to other states, encouraging a never- But if ‘enlightened’ concepts of statecraft lead to the view ending ·arms-race, a· competition for which state can mobi- that glory of a state consists in its growing power, however it lize the largest army. This makes •peace eventually more of is achieved, then what I’m saying here will strike people as a burden than •a short war, so that a standing army is itself merely academic and pedantic. a cause of offensive war undertaken in order to relieve the state of this burden ·of peace·! And there’s another point: 2: ‘No independent states, large or small, are Paying men to kill or to be killed seems to be using them as to come under the dominion of another state by mere machines—as tools in the hand of someone else (the inheritance, exchange, purchase, or gift.’ state)—which doesn’t sit well with individual human rights. (As for periodic voluntary military exercises of citizens, to Unlike the ground that it occupies, a state isn’t a piece of secure themselves and their country against foreign aggres- property—·it isn’t owned·. It’s a society of men that can’t sion, that is entirely different.) The accumulation of treasure rightly be commanded or disposed of by anyone, except also has the effect that other states see it as preparation for ·of course·, by itself. A state is a tree with its own roots; war, because of these three— to incorporate it into another state—treating it ·as a mere the power of armies, branch· that can be grafted—is to destroy its existence the power of alliances, and as a moral •person. It’s to reduce it to a mere •thing, the power of money thus contradicting the idea of the original contract without —the third may well be the most dependable weapon. The which no right over a people is conceivable.1 It is common other states may ·think they are· compelled to make a knowledge what dangerous situations have arisen, even very pre-emptive attack against the wealthy state; though ·this recently, from this kind of thing. It is a European practice whole danger is lessened by the fact that· it’s hard to discover that is unknown in the rest of the world, namely: how wealthy a given state is. It is thought that states can marry one another, this being a new kind of industry for gaining power and territory by means of family alliances, with no expen- diture of resources. This principle also covers any state’s ﬁghting an enemy using soldiers hired from another state that has no quarrel with that enemy; because this practice uses and uses up subjects as though they were merely convenient commodities. 1 A hereditary monarchy isn’t a state that another state can inherit; though another physical person can inherit the right to govern it. If the ruler of x becomes through inheritance the ruler also of y, y acquires a ruler but x doesn’t acquire a state!

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4: ‘National debts are not to be incurred as an aid 5: ‘No state is to interfere by force with the consti- to the conduct of foreign policy.’ tution or government of another state.’

There’s nothing wrong with this way of seeking aid, within the state or from outside it, in support of the domestic economy— For what is there to authorize it to do so? [In the rest of the improvement of roads, new settlements, creating reserve this paragraph, ‘scandal’ (German Skandal) is being used in something stores of commodities as insurance against unfruitful years, like its theological sense (quoting the Shorter Oxford) of ‘moral perplexity etc. But as a tool for use in the struggle of ·national· caused by the conduct of a person looked up to as an example’. The Latin powers against each other, this credit system—the ingenious scandalum acceptum is a technical term from Thomist theology.] You invention of a commercial people in the present century—is might think that state x is authorized to interfere with state a dangerous kind of money-power. The debt it involves keeps y if y’s subjects behave in ways that create a scandal for x’s growing, unnoticed, and the debtor state isn’t pulled up subjects—·for example, the authorities in x see that y allows short by demands for repayment, because the creditors don’t its subjects to engage in polygamy and polyandry, and think all require payment at one time. ·And in time it grows to ‘We ought to do something about this or the infection will be· a war-chest bigger than those of all the other states spread·.’ But that’s not right. A better response to that kind combined. The only way it can get used up is through a loss of thing is to exhibit y ·not as a temptation but· as a warning of tax income [to pay the interest?]; that certainly will eventually of what can happen if a state lets its people behave lawlessly. happen, but it can be kept at bay for a long time because In such a scandalum acceptum—·i.e. letting that behaviour of the stimulus the credit system gives to industry and happen rather than stepping in and putting a stop to it·—the commerce ·and thus to tax revenues·. This ease in making leaders of x are perhaps setting a bad example to others, but war, together with rulers’ lust for power—something that they aren’t doing harm. seems inborn in human nature—is thus a great hindrance to perpetual peace. All the more reason why there should If a state undergoes internal dissension that splits it into be a preliminary article of perpetual peace forbidding this two parts, each claiming to be a separate state and laying credit system; and states that don’t use it are justiﬁed in claim to the whole, it may be all right for another state to combining against any state that does, because they will help one of the sides; this ·isn’t an infringement of article be harmed by their entanglement in that state’s inevitable 5 because doing this· doesn’t count as interfering with the bankruptcy. constitution of another state—it’s not a state, it’s an anarchy. But until the internal dissension reaches this critical point, such interference by foreign powers would infringe on the rights of an independent people struggling with its internal ills. It would itself be a scandal, and would render the autonomy of all states insecure.

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6: ‘No state during a war is to permit acts of hostil- **** ity that would make mutual confidence impossible after the war is over—e.g. the use of assassins and [The following paragraph and its long footnote are larded with Latin legal poisoners, breach of capitulation, incitement to terms, which seem not to be needed for the main thrusts of what Kant is treason in the opposing state.’ saying.] Although the laws—·my six ‘articles’·—are all stated as outright prohibitions, they differ in how strict ·or strictly These are dishonourable stratagems. Even in war there must immediate· they are. Articles 1, 5, and 6 are of the strict be some confidence in the enemy’s character; otherwise kind that hold regardless of circumstances, demanding to be no peace could be concluded, and the hostilities would acted on right away. On the other hand, Articles 2, 3, and 4, degenerate into a war of extermination. What is war? In the though also laws that are to be obeyed, allow some latitude state of nature ·that obtains between states·, where there is regarding when they are to be obeyed; with each of them, no higher court to settle disputes through law, war is the delay is permissible. But it’s not permissible to lose sight of sad recourse by which each state uses violence to assert the purpose of the article in question. Article 2, for instance: its right and in which neither party can be condemned as state x has been deprived of its freedom, which could be wrong, because that would presuppose a juridical decision. restored by state y; if immediate restoration might actually In the absence of such a decision, the question of which side harm x’s situation, then it is permissible for y to delay it—but is right is answered by the outcome of the conflict (as though not until hell freezes over! [Kant uses a different but equivalent this were a so-called ‘judgment of God’). There can be no colloquialism.] Postponement is allowed so that the restoration question of one state’s going to war to punish another state, of freedom isn’t rushed into, thus thwarting the very purpose because no state has authority over any other state. of the legal rule. [In the remainder of this paragraph, Kant It follows that a war of extermination, which can wipe out says: The rule forbids an action, the •creation of a certain •both parties and •all justice, can lead to ‘perpetual peace’ state of affairs; it doesn’t forbid the •existence of the state of only in the vast burial ground of the human race. Such a affairs. The action through which this state lost its freedom war, therefore, must be absolutely forbidden, as must any may have been universally regarded as lawful at the time it activities that lead to such a war. The examples that I cited happened; it wasn’t in fact lawful, and isn’t so now; but this ·in my statement of article 6 come under this ban, because doesn’t mean that any state has an immediate duty to move they· do inevitably lead to a war of extermination. Once these in and fix the situation by restoring the state’s freedom to it.] vile practices are employed, they’ll soon spread beyond the ·THERESTOFTHISSECTIONWASALARGEFOOTNOTE· confines of the war. The use of spies, for instance—·though The question has been raised, not unreasonably, as to it may seem morally innocent because it· only makes use whether pure reason can be a source not only of laws saying of the infamy of others (something that can’t be entirely ‘Do x’ and ‘Don’t do y’ but also of permissions i.e. laws exterminated ·even in a war of extermination·!)—will carry saying ‘It is all right for you to do z’. [Kant’s account of why this over into the state of peace and thereby cancel the spirit this is questionable is condensed and hard to follow. The of peace. core of it seems to be that ‘laws as such’ involve ’practical

4 Perpetual Peace Immanuel Kant 2: Deﬁnitive articles necessity’—they say ‘You must do x’ or ‘you mustn’t do as legal at that time. He continues:] If the acquisition of y’—while a permission is essentially a statement of non- the state had occurred in the civil state, it would be an necessity, saying ‘You don’t have to do x’. Kant sorts this out infringement that would have to cease as soon as its illegality by saying that there can be a ‘permissive law’ that says in was discovered. effect ‘You must do x, but you don’t have to do x yet’, or—this [Kant adds a further paragraph explaining why he has being his present concern—one that says in effect ‘You must wanted to linger on this matter. It is to replace not permanently have relation R to another state, but you permissions that are seen as exceptions to some law may have it for a while under certain circumstances’. He by applies this also to the case discussed above, of a state that lost its freedom through some state action that can now be permissions that are built into a law, seen to be illegal. There is a prohibition against one state’s because only the latter of these leaves intact the notion acquiring another in certain ways, and a permission to allow of a law as something absolutely strict and in some way a wrongly acquired state to stay acquired at least for a while. necessary. As Kant puts it:] Otherwise we shall have merely Kant is at pains to say, again, that the permission holds only general laws (which apply to a great number of cases), but if the wrong acquisition •occurred ‘in the transition from the no universal laws (which apply to all cases) as the concept of state of nature to a civil state’ and •was universally regarded law seems to require.

Section 2: Deﬁnitive articles for perpetual peace among states

The natural state of men is not •peaceful co-existence but ·STARTOFAFOOTNOTE· •war—not always open hostilities, but at least an unceasing threat of war. So a state in which there is no danger of We ordinarily assume that no-one may act in a hostile way hostilities needs to be established, and this will have to toward someone who hasn’t actively harmed him. And that involve more than merely the absence of hostilities. Real is quite correct if both men are under civil law, because by security against outbreaks of war is something that has to entering into a civil state they have given each other the be pledged to each person by his neighbour (a thing that can required security through the government that has power occur only in a civil state); without that pledge, each person over both of them. A man. . . .in the state of nature deprives may treat his neighbour as an enemy. me of this security; and if he is in my vicinity he harms me—even if he doesn’t do anything to me—by the mere fact that he isn’t subject to any law and is therefore a

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constant threat to me. So I can compel him either •to enter ·STARTOFAFOOTNOTE· with me into a state of civil law or •to get right out of my [Kant starts the footnote by stating and then trashing one neighbourhood. So the underlying postulate of all ·three of· suggested definition of ‘juridical [rechtliche] freedom’. He the following articles is: All men who can affect each other continues with a definition that he does accept:] My juridical must stand under some civil constitution. freedom is my ·right or· privilege of not having to obey any [In this next sentence, Kant uses Personen = ‘persons’ to cover France laws except those that I could have consented to. My juridical and Germany as well as you and me; we’ll see in a moment that he [rechtliche] equality with you in a state is the relationship counts nation-states as ‘citizens’ of the world-order and thus presumably between us such that if I am to constrain you by any law, it as ‘persons’.] Such constitutions are of three types, which differ must be one by which I am also bound (and vice versa). . . . in what range of persons falls under their laws: The validity of these inborn rights [Rechte], which are (1) Constitutions that embody the civil law governing inalienable and belong necessarily to humanity, is raised to inter-relations amongst men in a nation-state; an even higher level by the principle of the juridical [rechtliche] (2) The constitution that embodies international law relation of man to higher beings (if he believes in them), governing the inter-relations amongst the nation- because he regards himself by those principles as a citizen states of the world; of a supersensuous [= ‘supernatural’] world. [The switch from (3) The constitution that embodies the law of world ‘principle’ to ‘principles’ is Kant’s.] The situation about my freedom citizenship, governing the relations amongst men and is this: Divine laws that I know only through reason don’t nation-states considered as citizens of a universal put any obligation on me except to the extent that I could state of mankind. have given my consent to them; because the very concept of This isn’t an arbitrary classification; it goes to the heart of God’s will is one that I have only through the law of freedom the idea of perpetual peace. For if even one pair of these of my own reason. Take the most sublime being in the world items—·two men, two nation-states, or one man and one that I can think of (apart from God): when I do my duty nation-state·—were in a position to affect one another and in my post as he does in his, there’s no reason under the yet were in a state of nature, war would necessarily follow, law of equality why obedience to duty should fall only to me and freedom from war is the object of the present exercise. and the right to command only to him. The reason why this ·ENDOFTHEFOOTNOTE· principle of equality doesn’t apply to our relation to God (as the principle of freedom does) is that God is the only being First article: ’The civil constitution of every state at which the concept of duty stops. is to be republican.’ Regarding the right of equality of all citizens as subjects, the question arises: ‘Can a hereditary nobility be tolerated?’ The only constitution which derives from the idea of the The answer depends on how rank relates to merit: original compact, and on which all juridical legislation of a Is the pre-eminent rank granted by the state to citizen people must be based, is the republican. x over citizen y (1) a consequence of x’s having more merit than y, or is it (2) the other way around?

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Not (2): if rank is decided by birth then obviously there is no guarantee that merit (political skill and integrity) will •fight, accompany it; a nobleman is not necessarily a noble man! •pay the costs of the war out of their own pockets, Assigning rank on this basis would be on a par with giving •painfully repair the devastation war leaves behind, the command to a meritless favourite; and the general will and, of the people would never agree to this in ·drawing up· the •load themselves with a heavy national debt that would original contract that is the source of all law. ·So the answer embitter peace itself and could never be amortised to the original question is: No, hereditary nobility is not because of constant further wars. to be tolerated.· But (1) there’s a kind of nobility that ·is Faced with all that, it is utterly natural for them to be very allowable because it· follows from merit: this is the rank of cautious about getting into such a dangerous game. those who are high in the government, a position that has to On the other hand, in a non-republican political system be earned by merit. This rank doesn’t belong to the person in which the subjects are not citizens, it’s the easiest thing in as his property; it belongs to his governmental position, and the world to decide to declare war. The ruler isn’t a member it doesn’t infringe equality because when a man leaves his of the state—he’s its owner—and a war won’t cost him the governmental position he •gives up the rank it confers and least sacrifice of the pleasures of his table, his hunting, his •returns to the level of ordinary citizen. country houses, his court functions, and the like. So he ·ENDOFFOOTNOTE· can decide on war for the most trivial reasons, as though it This constitution—·the republican one that I introduced were a pleasure party, casually leaving it to his ever-ready before embarking on that long footnote·— is established diplomatic corps to come up with ‘reasons’ that will make firstly (a) by principles of the freedom of the members of the war seem respectable. a society (as human beings); secondly, (b) by principles of **** everyone’s dependence on a single common system of law (as subjects); and thirdly (c) by the law of their equality (as People usually confuse the •republican constitution with the citizens). On its legal side, then, the republican constitution •democratic constitution; let us now separate them. The is the one that is the original basis of every form of civil forms that a state can have can be classified either constitution. But that leaves open the question of how the (1) according to who has sovereign power in the state; or republican constitution relates to the prospects for perpetual (2) according to how the sovereign power is used, by peace. whoever has it, to administer the affairs of the state. I answer that its prospects for creating perpetual peace (1) The first classification is properly called ·a classification are favourable. Here is why. In a republican system it must of· forms of sovereignty, and there are only three of these: be the citizens, who are all legally on a par, who decide ‘War •autocracy, in which only one person, the monarch, or no war?’, and in answering that they have to contemplate has sovereign power; all calamities of war, in which they would have to •aristocracy, in which an associated group, the nobility, has sovereign power;

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•democracy, in which all those who constitute society, or any of its cognates occurs, except for one occurrence on page 24. Kant the people, have sovereign power. doesn’t explain it, but his view seems to be that a strictly representative (2) The second classification is ·a classification of· forms form of government is one in which no citizen of the state is ever thwarted of government, i.e. in terms of how states use their power by the law.] Every form of government that isn’t representative (this being based on the constitution, which is the act of the is really a shapeless monster, because a legislator (who general will through which the many persons become one chooses what laws there will be) can’t possibly also be an nation). In this classification ·there are only two items·: a executive (who implements those choices); any more than in government can be either a syllogism such as: •republican or (i) All men are mortal, and (ii) Hannibal is a man, •despotic therefore (iii) Hannibal is mortal Republicanism is the political principle of the separation of the work done by premise (ii) can be done by premise (i). the executive from the legislative power; despotism is the Autocracy and aristocracy are always defective in leaving principle of the state’s making the laws and administering room for this to the extent that they do leave room for them. In a despotic system, the public will is administered this mode of administration, but it is at least possible for by the ruler (or rulers) as his (or their) own private will. them to govern in a way that conforms to the spirit of a Of the three forms of the state, democracy—in the proper representative system (as when Frederick II at least said he 2 sense of that word—is necessarily despotism; because it was merely the first servant of the State). On the other hand, establishes an executive power in which ‘all’ settle things the democratic mode of government makes this impossible, for each individual, and may settle some things against an because everyone wants to be in charge. So we can say: individual who doesn’t agree ·with the policy in question·; the smaller the personnel of the government (the decisions are made by an ‘all’ that doesn’t include everyone! smaller the number of rulers), the greater is their rep- In this the general will contradicts •itself and •freedom. [You resentation and the closer •their constitution comes to may have noticed an oddity here. To show why democracy must be the possibility of republicanism; so that there’s room despotic, Kant should have contended that in democracy the legislative for hope that •it will through gradual reform finally to and executive powers are in the same hands. Perhaps that is buried rise to the level of outright republicanism. in what he does say; but it is hidden from view by his emphasis on For these reasons it is harder for an aristocracy than for a the matter of ‘all’ versus ’all but one’ and the supposed threat of this to monarchy to achieve the one perfectly legitimate constitution, peace.] and it is impossible for a democracy to do so except through [This paragraph and the next are the only ones where repräsentativ violent revolution. 2 High-flying epithets such as ‘the Lord’s anointed,’ ‘the executor of the divine will on earth’ and ‘the vicar of God’, which have been lavished on sovereigns, are often condemned as crude flattery. I think this is wrong. Far from filling a monarch with pride, they should rather make him humble. . . . They should make him reflect •that he has taken on a job that is too great for any man, a job that is the holiest God has ordained on earth, namely to be the trustee of the rights of men, and •that he must always stand in dread of having in some way harmed ·these rights·, this apple of God’s eye.

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How the governing is done, however, matters much more When we see how devoted savages are to their lawless free- to the people than does the form of sovereignty (though a lot dom, in which they prefer •being constantly at one anothers’ depends on how suitable the form of sovereignty is to the throats to •having the ·peaceful· rational freedom that they purpose of ·good· government).3 To conform to the concept could have if they submitted to a lawful constraint under of law, however, government must have a representative laws established by themselves, we regard this with profound form, which is the only one in which a republican mode contempt as crudeness, barbarity, and a brutish degradation of government is possible; without a representative form, of humanity. So you’d think that civilized peoples (each government is despotic and arbitrary, no matter what its united in a state) would be eager to escape—the sooner the constitution is. None of the ancient so-called ‘republics’ better—from such a depraved condition. But, instead, each knew this, and they all finally and inevitably degenerated state places its majesty. . . .in being subject to no external into despotism under the sovereignty of one, which is the lawful restraint; and the glory of its sovereign consists in the most bearable of all forms of despotism. fact that while he isn’t in the least danger many thousands of people are ready at his bidding to sacrifice themselves for something that really isn’t any of their business. European Second Article: ‘The law of nations is to be founded savages differ from American ones mainly in knowing how on a federation of free states.’ to make better use of their conquered enemies than to eat them! They use them to increase their subject population Peoples, as states, can be judged to harm one another and thus the quantity of cannon-fodder for ever bigger wars. merely by their coexistence in the state of nature (i.e. while The depravity of human nature appears nakedly in the independent of external laws), just as individuals can. Each unrestrained relations of nations to each other (it is pretty people can—and for its own security should—encourage the well hidden within law-governed civil states by the constraint other peoples to enter with it into a constitution like a civil of government). So it’s astonishing that the word ’law’ [German one; for under such a constitution each can be secure in its recht, which can also mean ‘right’] hasn’t yet been entirely ban- right. This would be a league of nations, but it couldn’t be an ished from the politics of war as an academic irrelevance. . . . international state, a state consisting of nations. [Kant gives ·But it certainly hasn’t. Such 17th and 18th century legal an obscure reason why it couldn’t be, and then says that theorists as· Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf and Emerich anyway that isn’t the point:] Our concern is with weighing Vattel are sincerely quoted to justify wars, although the rights of nations against each other, regarding them as distinct states and not amalgamated into one. 3 [Kant begins this note with a fierce put-down of a writer who seems to have thought] that the best-administered state also has the best mode of government, i.e. the best constitution. That is thoroughly wrong: examples of good governments prove nothing about the form of government. Who ever reigned better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius? Yet Titus was succeeded by Domitian and Marcus Aurelius by Commodus, though their unworthiness to be emperor was known early enough for them to have been excluded, and in each case the ruler had the power to make the exclusion. This could never have happened under a good constitution.

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is something that states have outgrown. This is true despite their legal codes—whether in their philosophical or the fact that reason from its throne of supreme morally their diplomatic versions—can’t have the slightest legislating authority absolutely condemns war as a legal legal force, because states as such are not under recourse and makes a state of peace a direct duty, although any common external authority; peace can’t be established or secured except by a compact and ·states presumably see this, because· among nations. So there must be a special sort of league there is no instance of a state having ever been moved that can be called a league of peace, aiming to make an to hold back from starting a war by an argument end to all wars forever, to be distinguished from a treaty of based on the views of such great men. peace which only ends one war. [In this work as Kant wrote it, this This lip-service that every state pays to the idea of law [recht] paragraph down to here is a single sentence.] This league doesn’t shows that there is to be found in man—asleep in him!—a encroach on the power of the state; its aim is just to maintain higher natural moral capacity that he can’t disown and that and secure the freedom of the state itself and of other states will eventually enable him to get the mastery over the source in league with it, with no need for them to be constrained by of evil in his nature, and to hope that others will do the same. civil laws as men in a state of nature must be. If that were not there in human nature, states wanting to This idea of federation that is gradually to spread to all wage war would never use the word ‘law’ except perhaps to states and thus lead to perpetual peace—is it practicable? sneer at it like the Gallic Prince who said that law is ‘the Yes, and this can be shown. If it so happens that a powerful privilege that nature gives the strong to force the weak to and enlightened people can make a republic for itself, which obey them’. by its nature must be inclined to perpetual peace, this States don’t plead their cause in a law-court; their only provides a centre from which other states can be drawn way of bringing a suit is by war. It may be clear who won the into the federal union, thus securing freedom in accordance war, but no question of law or right is settled; there’s no right with the law of nations. By more and more such associations, or wrong here, because on the international scene each state the federation can be gradually extended. is the judge of its own case. A peace-treaty may bring to an We can understand a people’s saying: end •this particular war, but it doesn’t end the •state of war, ‘There is to be no war among us, for we plan to make i.e. the state in which new ‘reasons’ for hostilities can always ourselves into a state; i.e. to establish a supreme be found. Individuals in a lawless condition are subject to legislative, executive, and judicial power that will a natural law that says ‘You should extract yourself from reconcile our differences peaceably.’ this condition’; but states aren’t subject to a law of nations But when this state says: telling them the same thing. That is because as states they ‘There is to be no war between myself and other states, have their own internal juridical constitution, so that although I don’t acknowledge any supreme legislative constraint by others, according to their ideas of right, power by which our rights are mutually guaranteed’, based on some juridical constitution that is broader we don’t at all understand what basis the state can have for ·than that of any individual state· conﬁdence in its own rights unless it is the free federation

10 Perpetual Peace Immanuel Kant 2: Deﬁnitive articles that reason necessarily ties to the concept of the law of lasts and spreads it will hold back the torrent of hostility nations if that has any real meaning left. [Kant builds into and lawlessness, but it will always be in danger of a new that sentence a clause calling this federation ‘a substitute bursting of the banks. [Kant decorates that thought with a for civil social order’; he means that the federation of nations brief quotation from Virgil].4 would keep them at peace in a manner analogous to that in which ordinary civil government keeps individual people at Third article: ‘The law of world citizenship is to be peace.] united to conditions of universal hospitality.’ The concept of a law of nations as a law about the making of war really doesn’t mean anything, because: This article like the preceding ones is not about •philanthropy such a war-law would be a law for deciding what is but about •right. Hospitality means the right of a visiting right •by unilateral maxims through force, not •by foreigner not to be treated as an enemy. universally valid public laws that put limits on the [In what follows, Kant distinguishes (1) what the foreigner has a right to from (2) what he doesn’t have a right to, and he isn’t utterly clear freedom of each one. about what line he is drawing. The best guess seems to be that he is The only conceivable meaning for a law like that would be: It distinguishing is right that men who choose to destroy each other should (1) being peacefully allowed to •set foot on the territory and to •ask ﬁnd perpetual peace in the vast grave that swallows both to be accepted into that society from the atrocities and their perpetrators. For relations among (2) being accepted into the society. states the only reasonable way out of the lawless condition The present version will track the German as closely as possible, occa- that promises only war is for them to behave like individual sionally using those numerals to help sort things out.] men, that is It is all right to refuse him (2) this ·acceptance into the give up their savage (lawless) freedom, get used to the society· if the refusal doesn’t have fatal consequences for him; constraints of public law, and in this way establish a but as long as he conducts himself peacefully and doesn’t continuously growing superstate to which, eventually, push forward, he is (1) not to be treated with hostility. It’s not all the nations of the world will belong. that he has a right to be (2) received as a guest (he couldn’t But their conception of the law of nations won’t let them do have that right unless a special friendship convention were this; they reject in practice what is correct in theory; so if in play), but just that he has a right to (1) visit, a right that anything is to be rescued from all this, and we can’t apply all men have to offer themselves as potential members of any the positive idea of a world-republic, we’ll have to settle for society. All men have this right by virtue of their common the negative idea of an alliance that averts war: while that possession of the surface of the earth, where (because it is a 4 A people that has just ended a war would do well to follow its day of •thanksgiving with a day of •repentance, in order to ask. . . .for heaven’s forgiveness for the constant wicked pride that leads the nations to •refuse to bring their relations with one another under the constraint of a system of laws and instead to •resort to the barbarity of war even though that never really settles anything. The war-time thanks for victories in battle, the hymns sung to the •God of Hosts. . . ., contrast sharply with the moral idea of the •Father of Men. For they not only show indifference to how nations seek their rights but also express joy at how many men’s lives they have taken or at least ruined.

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·finite· sphere) they can’t spread out for ever, and so must •spread famine, rebellion, treachery, and the whole litany of eventually tolerate each other’s presence. evils that afflict mankind. Originally no-one had more right than anyone else to any [Kant attaches to the first word of this paragraph a very long discus- particular part of the earth. This community ·of all men· sion of what name it is best for a European to use for ‘that wonderful is divided up by seas and deserts—uninhabitable parts of country’.] China and Japan, who have had experience with the earth—but ships and camels (ships of the desert) enable such ‘guests’, have wisely refused them entry: people to •approach each other across these ungoverned •China lets them come up to the border but not to regions and, using mankind’s common right to the face of cross it; the earth, to •create a possibility of ·peaceful· interaction. •Japan allows only the Dutch to land on its shores, The inhospitality of coastal people (e.g. those on the Barbary but it treats them like prisoners, not allowing them to coast) in robbing ships that come near or making slaves of interact in any way with the native Chinese. stranded travelers, and the inhospitality of desert people (e.g. The worst of this (or from the moral point of view, the the Bedouin Arabs) who see the approach of nomadic tribes best!) is that nothing was gained from all these outrages, as conferring the right to plunder them, is thus opposed because all these trading companies are on the verge of to the natural law. ·You get a measure of how bad this collapse. The Sugar Islands [in the Caribbean], that place of conduct is from seeing how weak, how unstrenuous, that the most refined and cruel slavery [where purchasers of slaves natural law is·: all it does is to lay it down that people paid for them with sugar], have produced no real revenue except arriving from foreign parts have (1) the right to try to interact indirectly and nastily by providing sailors for warships, thus with the locals. In this way distant parts of the world can contributing to the conduct of war in Europe. And these come to relate peaceably with one another, in ways that will atrocities are the work of powers that •make a great show eventually be covered by laws, moving the human race ever of their piety, and—drinking injustice like water—•regard closer to a constitution establishing world citizenship. themselves as being, in the matter of correct religious belief, Compare that ideal with the inhospitable conduct of the the chosen people! ‘civilised’ countries of Europe, especially the ones driven by The peoples of the earth have now gone a good distance commerce. Their wrong treatment of the lands and peoples in forming themselves into smaller or larger communities; they visit (here ‘visit’ = ‘conquer’!) is terrifying in its extremes. this has gone so far that a violation of rights in one place is When ·these Europeans·, these ‘civilised’ intruders, first now felt throughout the world. So the idea of a law of world came upon America, the Negro lands, the Spice Islands, the citizenship is not a legal flight of fancy; rather, it is necessary Cape etc., they regarded them as lands without owners, for to complete •the unwritten code of civil and international they counted the inhabitants as nothing. In India, under law and also •mankind’s written laws; and so it is needed the pretence of intending to establish trading posts, they for perpetual peace. Until we can establish a law of world •brought in foreign soldiers to oppress the natives, •started citizenship, we mustn’t congratulate ourselves on how close up widespread wars among the various Indian states, and we are coming to that.