Issue 70, 3rd Quarter 2013
On the Edges of War
Beyond Sequester Awaiting Cyber 9/11
Joint Force Quarterly Inside Issue 70, 3rd Quarter 2013
Editor Col William T. Eliason, USAF (Ret.), Ph.D. JFQ Dialogue Executive Editor Jeffrey D. Smotherman, Ph.D. Supervisory Editor George C. Maerz 2 From the Chairman Production Supervisor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Have You Renewed Your Commitment Yet? By Bryan B. Battaglia Senior Copy Editor Calvin B. Kelley 4 Copy Editor/Office Manager John J. Church, D.M.A Forum Internet Publications Editor Joanna E. Seich Executive Assistant Ryan Heggs, J.D. Executive Summary Design Amanda Drake, Maureen Nugent, Guy Tom, 6 and Jessica Reynolds 8 A Western Insurgency in Afghanistan By Robert Egnell U.S. Government Printing Office Printed in St. Louis, Missouri 15 Forward-deployed Medical Assets and the COIN Offensive by By David S. Kauvar and Tucker A. Drury 21 The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams By Christopher J. Lamb, James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, and Theodore T. Pikulsky NDU Press is the National Defense University’s cross-component, professional military and 30 Environmental Planning While Deployed: Mission Hindrance academic publishing house. It publishes books, or Enhancement? By LeeAnn Racz, Peter A. Baker, Kelsey L. Duckworth, journals, policy briefs, occasional papers, Tiffany R. Heline, and Brian D. Woodall monographs, and special reports on national security strategy, defense policy, interagency 34 Air Advising: A Critical Component of Joint Engagement cooperation, national military strategy, regional By Nicole S. Finch and Peter A. Garretson security affairs, and global strategic problems. Commentary This is the official U.S. Department of Defense edition of JFQ. Any copyrighted portions of this Tora Bora Reconsidered: Lessons from 125 Years of Strategic Manhunts journal may not be reproduced or extracted without 40 permission of the copyright proprietors. Joint By Benjamin Runkle Force Quarterly should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content. 47 Beyond Sequester: Improving National Defense in an Age of Austerity By Richard H. Kohn
COMMUNICATIONS 55 Insights from the Women in Combat Symposium By Ellen L. Haring Please visit NDU Press and Joint Force Quarterly online at ndupress.ndu.edu for more 59 Enhancing the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia: Elevating Allies on upcoming issues, an electronic archive of By James M. Keagle, Richard D. Fisher, Jr., and Brian Johnson JFQ articles, and access to many other useful NDU Press publications. Constructive com- 66 Thucydides, Benghazi, and Honor By Alan Greeley Misenheimer ments and contributions are important to us. Please direct editorial communications to the link on the NDU Press Web site or write to: Editor, Joint Force Quarterly National Defense University Press 260 Fifth Avenue, S.W. (Building 64, Room 2504) Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319
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3rd Quarter, July 2013 ISSN 1070-0692 PUBLISHER Features GEN Martin E. Dempsey, USA Unpacking Cyberwar: The Sufficiency of the Law of Armed Conflict in the President, NDU 70 MG Gregg F. Martin, USA Cyber Domain By Kyle Genaro Phillips Advisory Committee Awaiting Cyber 9/11 By Clifford S. Magee RADM John N. Christenson, USN Naval War College 76 Brig Gen Thomas H. Deale, USAF Air Command and Staff College On Military Creativity By Milan Vego Col Mark Desens, USMC Marine Corps Command 83 and Staff College The New Operational Paradigm: Operation Odyssey Dawn and the Maritime Ambassador James B. Foley National War College 91 BGen Thomas A. Gorry, USMC Dwight D. Eisenhower Operations Center By James G. Foggo III and Michael Beer School for National Security and Resource Strategy Maj Gen Scott M. Hanson, USAF Air War College 94 Energy Diversity and Development in Kenya By Albert Kiprop Kendagor and Col Jay L. Hatton, USMC Marine Corps War College Richard J. Prevost LTG David G. Perkins, USA U.S. Army Command and General Staff College LTG Curtis M. Scaparrotti, USA The Joint Staff Recall RDML John W. Smith, Jr., USN Joint Forces Staff College Second Fronts: Factors in Success and Failure and Implications for the Future 100 Editorial Board By Phillip S. Meilinger Richard K. Betts Columbia University Stephen D. Chiabotti School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Eliot A. Cohen The Johns Hopkins University Book Reviews COL Joseph J. Collins, USA (Ret.) National War College Mark J. Conversino Air War College 108 Bleeding Talent Reviewed by Lindsay L. Rodman Aaron L. Friedberg Princeton University Col Thomas C. Greenwood, USMC (Ret.) Office of the Secretary of Bleeding Talent Reviewed by Gregory E. Schwab Defense 109 Douglas N. Hime Naval War College Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century Reviewed by F.G. Hoffman Mark H. Jacobsen Marine Corps Command and Staff College 110 Daniel T. Kuehl Information Resources Management College Col Jerome M. Lynes, USMC (Ret.) The Joint Staff Allied Master Strategists Reviewed by Francis P. Sempa 111 Kathleen Mahoney-Norris Air Command and Staff College Thomas L. McNaugher Georgetown University Joint Doctrine Col Mark Pizzo, USMC (Ret.) National War College James A. Schear Office of the Secretary of Defense 113 From National to Theater: Developing Strategy By Derek S. Reveron and LtGen Bernard E. Trainor, USMC (Ret.) James L. Cook CONTRIBUTIONS Joint Force Quarterly welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from members of the Armed Forces, security policymakers and shapers, defense analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration About the covers to the address on the opposite page or by email to [email protected] “Attention A&R Editor” in the subject line. For further information, see the guidelines on the NDU Press Web site at ndupress.ndu.edu. Front cover: Soldier provides security from Black Hawk during mission over Kandahar Province, Afghanistan Joint Force Quarterly is published by the National Defense University Press for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. JFQ is the (U.S. Army/Brendan Mackie). Table of contents shows Chairman’s flagship joint military and security studies journal (left to right) Soldier observes security during ceremony designed to inform members of the U.S. Armed Forces, allies, and to open new soccer field in Kandahar City (U.S. Army/ other partners on joint and integrated operations; national security Breanne Pye); Seaman monitors surface contacts aboard policy and strategy; efforts to combat terrorism; homeland security; USS Kearsarge, deployed in support of maritime security and developments in training and joint professional military education to transform America’s military and security apparatus to operations (U.S. Navy/Corbin J. Shea); MV-22B Osprey meet tomorrow’s challenges better while protecting freedom today. lands during operations at sea (U.S. Marine Corps/Kyle N. Runnels); and F-35 Lightening II, assigned to 442nd Test The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations and Evaluation Squadron, moves into position at Nellis Air expressed or implied within are those of the Force Base, Nevada (U.S. Air Force/Lawrence Crespo). contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.
ndupress.ndu.edu DOD (D. Myles Cullen)
Chairman meets Marines stationed at U.S. Embassy, London
me, this means making choices that uphold From the Chairman the reasons why we serve. An Uncommon Life Our choices must preserve the unique Why We Serve ethos of our profession of arms. Deployed in Afghanistan, Army Staff Sergeant Rachel Baranek put it this way: “I believe that being part of a bigger organization than myself and here are as many reasons to Like any family, we understand the representing something bigger than myself is serve the Nation as there are importance of making tough decisions to my way of earning my freedom and my way Servicemembers. Some join for balance competing challenges. General of life, and that of my family.” T honor, some for a challenge, and George Marshall famously stated, “Don’t Generations before Rachel have some for more concrete reasons. I once knew fight the problem, decide it.” He knew that answered a similar call to live an uncom- a Soldier who signed up on a dare. simply railing against our challenges was mon life—a call embodied by the inscription Regardless of why we join, most Sol- choosing not to choose. at the base of “Old Simon” in Antietam diers, Sailors, Marines, Airmen, and Coast- Our family has some tough choices National Cemetery: “Not for themselves, but guardsmen continue to serve because of the ahead as we deal with rising risks and declin- for their country.” This spirit must continue camaraderie we forge with our brothers and ing dollars. I cannot predict all the choices to be our guide. sisters in arms. These bonds of trust extend or their consequences. But I can share with Our officers and enlisted personnel from those in uniform to the loved ones who you how I will approach them. In every have to remain more than simply competent support us, and they connect today’s force case, I will be guided by my commitment to practitioners of the art of war. They must with those who have already served and with ensure that we have the best trained and best continue to be men and women of character, those who will. This trust makes us who we equipped military on the planet and that we worthy of standing alongside past generations are—it makes us a military family. keep our nation immune from coercion. To and leading this generation into the future.
2 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu The Mission worry about providing for the military family or unsustainable compensation. We cannot Our choices must ensure we are in the decades to come. That means meeting compromise tomorrow for today. We have always ready and always the best. Genera- our commitments, but resetting expectations an obligation to the Nation to be ready for tions past and present have been driven developed over a dozen years of expanding an uncertain and dangerous future. Along by a desire to make a difference in the budgets. It means working together to set the way, our character and competence must world. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Victor up a system where pay remains competitive, remain unblemished. Vazquez enlisted at the age of 34 and cel- health care becomes sustainable, and retire- In the end, we cannot fight the hard ebrated his 35th birthday at boot camp. He ment stays solvent. choices that will keep our force in balance. remarked, “I wanted the opportunity to We must decide them. JFQ give back what I have learned as a civilian.” Bonds of Trust When asked why he serves, his answer was Our choices must safeguard the bonds MARTIN E. DEMPSEY simple: “the mission.” of trust we have with one another and the General, U.S. Army Petty Officer Vazquez’s story is Nation. As Army 1st Lieutenant Ian O’Neill Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unusual, but his motivations are familiar. put it, “They do it for each other and I People join the military because they want to don’t think there’s any other organization defend our nation and its interests. At a more where there’s that much selflessness and personal level, they want to do meaningful brotherhood.” work that produces results and to be a part of We cannot afford to mortgage this trust the most potent military force the world has or our people for ever-expanding capabilities ever known. We honor this drive by remaining com- mitted to the effectiveness of our peerless Joint Force, both today and tomorrow. That starts with our people. We will ensure those in harm’s way have the training and resources required to achieve the mission in Afghani- stan and around the world. As they return home, we must give U.S. Army (Anna Rutherford) them the autonomy to excel and make sure that their work continues to have meaning. And we must work not only to keep them ready with reduced resources, but also to guarantee that we remain the best trained and equipped force in the world.
Our Families Our choices must contribute to the well-being of our families. Army Specialist Patrick Serna explained, “I knew that if I could join, I could pay bills, go to college, and I’ll be able to support [my son] in the long run.” Pay, benefits, retirement—these are powerful motivators for many who choose to serve. In the end, the well-being of our Servicemembers and their families is the foundation of strength for our whole military family. To keep this foundation solid, we must preserve our ability to care for military families in the past, present, and future. Our compensation system strives to reflect the unique sacrifices our families make—the birthdays missed, friends left behind, and loved ones lost. But just as Patrick worries about caring for his family in the long run, we have to Army 1st Lt. Ian O’Neill, security force platoon leader for Provincial Reconstruction Team Paktika ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 3 Have you Renewed your Commitment yet?
By Bryan B. Battaglia
he Chairman’s letter to the uniform, the membership and passion different and our purposes for joining the joint force has been published within the profession remains unbroken. military vary. But regardless of whether for some time now, and in that I was recently asked by a Soldier in you have been serving four months or four letter he addresses four priori- Afghanistan, “SEAC, I get the re-swearing of decades, it is never too early or too late to T renew your commitment. ties. Since these are his priorities, they are my oath piece to renew my commitment. But also our priorities. At this point, we should be is there anything else I can do? What sort of In our line of work, accompanied with familiar with them, but just in case, we are to questions am I asking myself as I renew my risk and danger, there are two fundamental “Achieve Our National Objectives in Current obligation and commitment? I’ve never done questions that I recommend you ask yourself: Conflict, Develop Joint Force 2020, Renew this before and I want to do it right.” These Why do I serve? Why is it worth the sacrifice? Our Commitment to the Profession of Arms, very questions may be on the minds of many Now to help you answer those questions, let and Keep Faith with Our Military Family.” others, too. me offer a recent personal experience. It may As I circulate around the force, I enjoy Allow me to offer some suggestions, cost you a few out-of-pocket pennies to get talking about all four of these priorities. along with a personal experience to help in there, but again, I believe it will be money But for the purpose of this article, I want to your renewal. It worked for me and I am well spent and enable you to find additional expound on one of them: renewing our com- confident it can work for you. We are all answers to help with your reflection. mitment to the profession of arms. To begin, I do not want you to think that because renewing our commitment is listed third, it is of lesser importance. In fact, that could not be farther from the truth. The way I see it, the last three priorities blend to achieve the first. In Joint Force Quarterly 64 (1st Quarter
2012), I mention a favorite “how to renew” U.S. Army (A.M. LaVey) method: reaffirming our oath of enlistment or office, an oath that has literally been around since the late 1700s. It is a powerful paragraph of soldierly verbiage and expresses the lifelong investment to a purpose that is greater than ourselves. “Service in our Armed Forces is more than a job; it is our profession. A job is something assigned within the profession. And jobs come and go, but the commitment and passion to the profession in which we serve lasts forever.” There comes a time when we honorably discharge or retire. Though no longer in
Sergeant Major Bryan B. Battaglia, USMC, is the Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Senior Noncommissioned Officer in the U.S. Armed Forces. Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen prepare for mass joint reenlistment ceremony, Al Asad Air Base, Iraq
4 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. Air Force (Christopher Meares) U.S. Air Force
Airman carries flag during 10th anniversary of 2-mile remembrance march at Sather Air Base, Iraq, to honor victims of 9/11
In February, I found myself in New countrymen we are sworn to support and was literally a stone’s throw away, responded York City. It was my first visit to this power- defend—perished. to the World Trade Center alarm. As she ful metropolis. I had seen Ground Zero only After the events of September 11, there finished speaking of how her husband was on television and in pictures. Where the was never any question from our foxholes as such a proud and committed firefighter, she Twin Towers once stood, only holes in the to why the following month we as a robust directed our attention to a memorial name- ground remain. Ground Zero has since been fighting force deployed overseas, taking the plate that contained the inscription “Fire- converted into an almost surreal memorial fight to our enemy. That is what our President fighter Jeffrey Olsen, Engine #10.” It made me surrounded with nameplates of those who directed, and we as American fighting men reflect that, along with our military fallen, lost their lives on 9/11. You cannot help but and women were going to exhaust every there are other groups of brave men and get caught up in the moment, and for us who effort to defend our nation by eliminating women who we also promise never to forget. wear the cloth of this nation, that moment the threat so this would never happen again. They, too, have sacrificed much. Escorted is quite long. (Suggesting New York City Many if not all of you were raising your hand, throughout the sites and hearing their stories as a place to reflect and renew your service saying, “Put me in, Coach!” From that time reminded me of the questions that I ask here. commitment brings no intent to slight the on, you have been putting it all on the line, Though it comes with great sacrifice, this is other two terrorist-struck sites, the Pentagon and that in itself lives up to the oath, obliga- why we continue to serve. and Shanksville, Pennsylvania.) New York tion, and commitment to which you all raise Visiting such a location can help you City was where 9/11 started. Think about your hand. find your own answers and reaffirm your it: hundreds of thousands throughout the We hold our fallen with great respect commitment. While in spirit only, our fallen city woke up that morning having no idea and honor. When we bury one of our com- comrades have left an indelible legacy at what was in store—other than just another rades, we vow ourselves to them, their family, Ground Zero, heavily felt throughout those day at the office, and carrying on with life and each other that we will never forget. I hallowed grounds. in a free democratic society for which our intently listened to one of our guides talk How have you renewed your commit- country was founded. Only hours later, thou- about that morning, and how her husband, ment to the profession of arms? I am inter- sands of men, women, and children—our firefighter Jeffrey Olsen, whose fire station ested in hearing your feedback. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 5 Executive Summary
ne of the enduring images learn how close we really are and what we women in combat, the rebalancing of U.S. from World War II is a 1939 mean to each other in such times. We do military forces to the Pacific, and how the public awareness campaign indeed keep calm and carry on. diplomatic corps views the aftermath of poster developed by the British This edition’s Forum offers five valu- the first loss of an Ambassador in several O able perspectives from the experiences of the decades. Benjamin Runkle first takes us Ministry of Information in anticipation of inevitable German bombing raids. It boldly last decade-plus of combat and supporting through more than a century of efforts to stated, “Keep Calm and Carry On.” More operations. In an article that should enliven find, fix, and target those individuals who than two million of these posters were the ongoing debate on insurgencies and how seek to affect the strategic level of interna- printed and made ready for use, but they were militaries deal with them, Robert Egnell tional relations through the lens of the battle never publicly distributed. Why? After the provides another important view of the last of Tora Bora. Internationally recognized Ministry of Information showed the poster to 12 years of coalition efforts in Afghanistan historian Richard Kohn discusses the “so a number of test groups, it learned something with a different critique of counterinsurgency what?” and “now what?” questions as we quite interesting: the British public did not operations and their implications for future look to where the military will be after think that they needed reminding of their conflicts and military force structure. As the sequester ends. Ellen Haring reports need to be resilient. Even after the German combat-experienced doctors who have seen on an important symposium held at the raids came some 10 months after the posters the results of these conflicts on both our own height of the recent debate on removing the were made, they were still not used. In 2000, troops and local populations, David Kauvar remaining combat exclusions in the Ser- a shopkeeper found one in a box, and eventu- and Tucker Drury next offer their views on vices barring women from specific combat ally a company placed them in the public how best to position and take advantage of specialties. Adding to Admiral Samuel consciousness worldwide. Today, they seem medical units in counterinsurgency opera- Locklear’s comments on his area of opera- to be everywhere, even in parody on various tions. Human Terrain Teams deployed to tions in U.S. Pacific Command (see JFQ 69), Web sites. But the message has some weight combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan have James Keagle, Richard Fisher, and Brian in these seemingly difficult times. been both praised and assailed for a range Johnson wrestle with the twin problems of As we all know, life is a gift that we of reasons in the media. But the question a lack of a North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- frequently take for granted. When tragedy remains as how best to fill the gap between tion–style alliance in the region and the strikes, we are always caught off guard and the military instrument’s limitations and desire to manage China’s behavior. A career left to wonder why. As this edition goes to the local social problems it faces in a conflict diplomat with service as a teaching faculty press, we are learning of the loss of life and area. A team of research fellows from the member at National Defense University, property in Moore, Oklahoma, from a dev- Institute for National Strategic Studies here Alan Greeley Misenheimer offers important astating tornado. Having begun my career at NDU, led by Christopher Lamb, provides thoughts from a Foreign Service Officer’s as a member of the Air Force’s Airborne us a summary of his team’s detailed study point of view on the tragic events that took Warning and Control System aircraft crew of this program. Another significant issue the lives of four Americans in Benghazi, force based nearby at Tinker Air Force Base, facing deployed forces and the host nation is Libya, including Ambassador Christopher my family and I have lasting memories of the how well the joint force concerns itself with Stevens, who was a graduate of the National power of tornadoes and their accompanying the environmental impacts of operations. War College in 2010. thunderstorms. As devastating as the losses LeeAnn Racz and her graduate students Cyber, military creativity, maritime were, it seems at this early time many were from the Air Force Institute of Technol- operations, and energy provide a great deal to as prepared as they could have been and the ogy describe the important considerations consider in our Features section. Kyle Genaro responses to the disaster were well organized for both military planners and deployed Phillips helps us understand the relationship and effective. commanders on how to include being good between the Law of Armed Conflict and At the National Defense University, we stewards of the area they operate in. Finally, cyber warfare. Many have predicted a cata- are just beginning to accept the loss of a pair Nicole Finch and Peter Garretson describe a strophic cyber event just over the horizon. of leaders, mentors, friends, and truly great growing (and actually traditional) means of Clifford Magee strongly advocates for the people, Major General Joe and Sue Brown. helping nations build air arms in their secu- Department of Defense to take responsibility Their stars shone brightly here at NDU rity forces through the use of air advisors. for defending the Nation from this threat, to as they led the Eisenhower School team. This issue’s Commentary continues include defending all aspects of our computer In a manner that Joe and Sue would have several discussions that have been ongoing infrastructure. JFQ readers and many profes- expected, the faculty, staff, and students at in JFQ, and in the wider media, to include sional military education students among the Eisenhower School and all of the NDU how the United States and other nations them have been the benefactors of the many community paused and then continued the hunt for their enemies, the effects of reduced significant contributions of Milan Vego to mission toward graduation this spring. We national budgets on defense, the role of this journal and beyond. Professor Vego
6 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu returns with a thoughtful article on military creativity that should be required reading as we all seek to find new ways to do more with what we have. Next, focusing on the operational level of war, Rear Admiral James Foggo III, USN, and Lieutenant Michael Beer, USN, offer an important look into how the maritime forces of the coalition operated effectively during the 2011 Libyan cam- paign. Adding to our frequent discussions on Africa and its strategic implications for the joint force in the future, Albert Kendagor IN MEMORIAM and Richard Prevost offer an important review of the energy situation in Kenya, a key he Joint Force and the National Defense University community lost a truly state in the U.S. Africa Command area of Texceptional pair of leaders on April 19, 2013, in a tragic plane crash that responsibility. took their lives: Major General Joseph Daniel Brown IV, USAF, and his wife, In Recall, Phillip Meilinger, another Sue Stanger Brown. longtime contributor to JFQ, offers a sig- General Brown was born February 8, 1959, in Charlottesville, Virginia. Sue nificant case study with modern implica- was born September 14, 1960, in Washington, DC. The couple met while Joe was tions to consider—the problem of opening a cadet at the Virginia Military Institute, and Sue was a student at the College of operations on two simultaneous fronts in William and Mary. They were married June 26, 1982, at Fort Myer Post Chapel in combat. Our Book Reviews section once Arlington, Virginia. again brings the reader three important General Brown was Commandant of the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for books and four reviews, each with an National Security and Resource Strategy at NDU. After being commissioned in insightful look. In Joint Doctrine, Naval 1980 as a distinguished graduate of the ROTC program at VMI with a Bachelor War College professors Derek Reveron and of Arts degree in history, he went on to earn a Master of Science degree in busi- James Cook offer an excellent discussion of ness administration from Central Michigan University. General Brown was also theater strategy that will be useful in joint a distinguished graduate of the National War College, class of 1997. Sue Stanger professional military education classrooms Brown was President of the Air Force Officers’ Wives’ Club of Washington, DC. and for those on the geographic combatant Sue graduated with honors from the College of William and Mary in 1982 with a command staffs. Bachelor’s degree in business administration. She also earned a Master of Science On May 16–17, 2013, NDU Press degree in administration from Central Michigan University. hosted the 7th Secretary of Defense and Beyond leadership and academic accolades, both were accomplished in a 32nd Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff variety of ways. General Brown was a 32-year Air Force veteran and decorated Essay Competitions here at NDU. As a first, aviator. A command pilot with more than 4,300 hours primarily in bombers, he many of our judges, unable to travel due to flew sorties over Iraq and Afghanistan for which he was decorated with the Distin- fiscal constrains, participated online. The guished Flying Cross with “V” device. His other medals and decorations include event was a success, and the winners of the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal, and Air Medal. Sue was a gifted musician these important contests will be formally and the principal cellist for the William and Mary Symphony Orchestra, and she announced in the next edition of JFQ. My played in various symphonies and string quartets, including the Fairfax Symphony, thanks to all who entered the contests, to the throughout her life. judges who reviewed the dozens of entries Together, Joe and Sue led and cared for all under his command at the 28th and selected the winners, and most of all to Bomb Squadron at Dyess Air Force Base and the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air our NDU Press team led by Joey Seich who Force Base, and continued to do so for the students, staff, and faculty at the Indus- most impressively organized and executed a trial College of the Armed Forces, which was renamed the Eisenhower School world-class event on a shoestring budget and during their tour. computer. Even in these difficult times, we In all, the Browns touched thousands of lives during their 18 military assign- carry on to bring you the best ideas from the ments. Survivors include their son, Daniel Craig Brown, and daughter, Emily joint force. JFQ Allison Brown. The NDU Foundation has organized a memorial fund in their honor. —William T. Eliason, Editor ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 7 Marine conducts patrol during battlefield U.S. Marine Corps (Colby Brown) circulation in Helmand Province
A Western Insurgency in
Afghanistan By Robert Egnell
he wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya have each had many names, reflecting the political and strategic ambitions of coalition forces, the antagonism of those unsupportive of these wars, and the latest conceptual trends within the military profession as well as in academia. T For a number of years, counterinsurgency was the dominant conceptual trend, and opera- tional plans were adjusted to reflect the contested lessons gleaned from America’s experience in the Vietnam War as well as Britain’s and France’s imperial experiences in Malaya, Algeria, Kenya, and else- where. While there were clear benefits of the counterinsurgency narrative as a tool for reform of armed Dr. Robert Egnell is a Visiting forces too narrowly focused on conventional warfare, the theories of colonial policing have also evinced Professor and Director of Teaching clear limits in their applicability to the contemporary context. in the Security Studies Program at This article engages the heated counterinsurgency debate by arguing that not only were previous Georgetown University. His most recent book is Counterinsurgency counterinsurgency lessons misunderstood, misapplied, and under-resourced in Afghanistan, but also in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges that, more fundamentally, the counterinsurgency narrative failed to provide an accurate analysis of the of Modern War (Columbia University nature of the problem in Afghanistan, or a link between the tactical level of operations and the coalition’s Press, forthcoming), coauthored frequently changing political aims. In short, the Western application of counterinsurgency approaches in with David H. Ucko. Afghanistan never “got it right,” and an alternative interpretation of and approach to the conflict would therefore have been necessary to achieve success.
8 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Egnell
With the withdrawal date from The Campaign in Afghanistan as In Iraq, the switch to population-centric Afghanistan drawing closer, one can reason- Counterinsurgency approaches, together with the troop surge ably question the merits of reconsidering the Part of the problem with the coalition’s and the Anbar Awakening, was instrumental coalition’s strategy for the country. Afghani- campaign in Afghanistan was the lack of in turning an ever-worsening civil war into a stan increasingly looks like a lost cause, and certainty and consensus regarding the aims more manageable situation.3 In Afghanistan, the main lesson from it is seemingly set in of the international community as a whole, however, the switch to counterinsurgency has stone: avoid large-scale social engineering which has over time led to three separate not proven as useful. Whatever the metric, projects on the other side of the globe unless yet increasingly related operations with dif- assessments of post-2014 Afghanistan con- one has almost infinite will, resources, and ferent missions occurring simultaneously: ducted in 2013 are generally bleak.4 Not only time. However, limiting ourselves to that conclusion would be a serious mistake. The lessons emerging from the insurgency/coun- in addition to never quite being defined in a coordinated way, terinsurgency nexus in Afghanistan and Iraq the international community’s aims changed over time will likely prove important in an environ- ment of continued global urbanization, with operations that will most likely be conducted the American-led counterterrorist effort to have the democratic ideals that once justified “amongst the people.”1 This environment will hunt down al Qaeda and its fellow travelers, the operation been more or less abandoned, also be characterized by the continued attrac- then the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- but there are also signs that the Western tiveness of asymmetric tactics to militarily tion (NATO)–led International Security military withdrawal will lead to an escalated inferior adversaries, continued Western polit- Assistance Force operation with a mandate civil war in the country, compromising ical ambitions to democratize and liberalize to provide security and enable the third NATO’s achievements, however defined.5 As the Global South, the securitization of “state mission, and finally the third mission itself, a consequence, the idea of counterinsurgency failure,” and operations with the objective of which is the United Nations–led effort to in the contemporary context is increasingly building government capacity. Nonetheless, pursue political and economic development. criticized within the U.S. context and may in exploring alternative ways—defined as In addition to never quite being defined in already be a nonstarter. being less costly in lives, money, and political a coordinated way, the international com- Regardless, the branding of the cam- capital—of dealing with state failure, regional munity’s aims changed over time. What was paign in Afghanistan as counterinsurgency instability, and international terrorism, the initially a spontaneous reaction aimed at the meant that a number of assumptions were conceptual toolbox from the British and perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks morphed, in made regarding the nature of the enemy, A Western Insurgency in French colonial histories should be replaced the relatively calm years following the fall Afghan society, “the problems at hand,” and or at least amended by reference to the writ- of the Taliban regime, into a state-building the appropriate resources and strategies ings of revolutionaries and guerrilla leaders effort both to prevent al Qaeda’s return and required to deal with those issues. Since the such as Mao Zedong and Che Guevara. to create a democratic Afghanistan. concepts we use to define a conflict also This article turns the international NATO Allies disagreed over whether create the intellectual framework within coalition’s approach in Afghanistan on its counterterrorism or state-building ought which we approach the problem, the follow- head by advocating an insurgency approach to be the driving motivation for the overall ing section highlights and problematizes a to operations; that is, a strategy for fostering mission, and these tensions only grew as the number of key assumptions that follow from revolutionary political change by a steadily security situation deteriorated from 2004 the interpretation of the conflict in Afghani- growing local movement, supported by onward and the Taliban regained its strength. stan as counterinsurgency. Western political and military advisors and As the frequency of attacks on government materiel. Surely the reader will also recognize and international targets increased, the Relevance of Counterinsurgency weaknesses in the insurgency approach, but language of development and state-building Lessons Over Time and Space the purpose of this article, beyond illustrating shifted in favor of counterinsurgency, Most seriously, major counterinsur- the flaws in the counterinsurgency approach culminating in a formal change in strategy gency operations have historically achieved to operations in Afghanistan and the need to announced by President Barack Obama in few successes. While it is indeed possible to draw the appropriate lessons for future cam- 2009. At that time, with 8 years on the war learn from these few successes and numerous paigns, is to demonstrate the strategically and clock, the counterinsurgency campaign only failures, counterinsurgency principles of the intellectually formative nature of concepts, had so much time to succeed, so by 2011 past are accepted outright a bit too easily in and the utility of using or at least contem- the focus again shifted to “transition” and the 21st century. Applying often-failed histori- plating completely different perspectives. withdrawal as NATO troop contributors cal approaches in today’s context should at To achieve that, this article challenges the sought a way out. To enable some degree of least require a substantive reinterpretation application of counterinsurgency approaches success in this more than 11-year endeavor, and reorientation of past approaches and in the contemporary context of Afghanistan the ambitious language of state-building and principles. A challenge recently stressed by and demonstrates how the idea of a Western even of counterinsurgency gave way to the numerous scholars is that past theorists, insurgency in Afghanistan and elsewhere can more limited aspirations of counterterror- and especially contemporary interpreters improve the way we interpret conflicts and ism—completing a full circle regarding inter- of those theorists, have generally exagger- conduct operations. national intervention in Afghanistan.2 ated the “hearts and minds” aspects while
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 9 Forum | A Western Insurgency in Afghanistan downplaying the often equally and perhaps a government whose interests at times ran problem must be an insurgency—commonly more important coercive tactical approaches counter to those of the intervening coali- defined as “an organized movement aimed at of historical counterinsurgency operations.6 tion. In Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency the overthrow of a constituted government Massive use of force, executions, and forced campaign confronts a deeply dysfunctional through the use of subversion and armed population movement are but a few examples state bureaucracy and a NATO headquarters conflict.”12 Consequently, counterinsurgency of past tactics that were employed even in the that lacks the competence and resources is defined as “the military, paramilitary, most revered counterinsurgency campaign to run anything but the security aspects of political, economic, psychological, and civic of all, the British response to the Malayan operations. In both campaigns, difficul- actions taken by a government to defeat Emergency from 1948 to 1960. ties with the host nation government were insurgency.”13 If we take a closer look at Beyond the selective interpretations of compounded by differences among coalition the identity of the “enemy” and ourselves past campaigns, the context within which partners regarding approach, commitment, in Afghanistan, is this really an accurate counterinsurgency operations take place has and contributions. description of the nature of the problem and changed significantly. Invading or interven- Although it is easy to overstate differ- the actors involved? I would argue that the ing in a foreign country to assist an insur- ences between the past and now, the nature of counterinsurgency conceptualization of the gency-threatened ally or to impose a new insurgency has also changed. It is easier today conflict in Afghanistan is so off the mark that regime, as in Iraq or Afghanistan, represents for movements of different persuasions and it risks creating significant confusion regard- a different endeavor than achieving an orga- types to communicate and cooperate across ing the situation on the ground. There is not nized and politically acceptable withdrawal borders. John Mackinlay introduces the idea room in this article for what would necessar- from a colony (such as Malaya) and from of the “insurgent archipelago” to highlight ily be a long and complex discussion about suppressing uprisings for national liberation horizontally ordered, informal patterns of the actual nature of the problem in Afghani- against the established governments (as in insurgents disbursed transnationally, with stan, but a useful test would be to ask our- Kenya and Algeria). Contemporary interven- no formal command structures or territorial selves if the defeat of the insurgency would tion by fighting one’s way in and asserting basis, making them difficult to reach through lead to the achievement of our strategic aims control brings a broader set of challenges a nationally based military campaign.9 The there. If we cannot answer affirmatively, it is including domestic commitment, theater information technology revolution has also definitely time to rethink both the concept familiarity, and the necessarily limited provided insurgents with entirely new and and strategy. timelines of operations. Winning the hearts vastly more efficient means of resistance in Counterinsurgency Is Inherently and minds of the local population in order the struggle for hearts and minds. Whereas Conservative. We—the United States, the to remove support for an insurgent group the British authorities in Malaya managed to international coalition, NATO, or however preaching change is also different from inter- clamp down on newspapers and other media, we is defined—overthrew the Taliban gov- vening to impose such change and fomenting today’s insurgents are difficult to silence or ernment, we are imposing revolutionary local support for it. isolate from their target audience. Indeed, the societal changes in the image of Western A second difference in the nature of counterinsurgency today is the fact that past counterinsurgency operations took place as contemporary intervention by fighting one’s way in and “internal” challenges within the realms of asserting control brings a broader set of challenges the empire; today, operations are typically conducted by coalitions and in support of a legally sovereign state.7 In the place of the expansion in the ways and means of commu- liberal ideals of governance, and we are leverage that comes with colonial control, we nication has increased the returns on what fighting the Taliban despite the constant are left with weak yet entirely independent the anarchists of the early 20th century called reminder that we are only supporting the host nation governments that are either “propaganda of the deed.”10 Social media and Afghan government in its counterinsur- unable or unwilling to lead such campaigns the ability to find an audience have allowed gency campaign and in its struggle for or even to follow our lead.8 Despite these some groups to complement whatever they democracy, equality, and a liberal market obstacles, contemporary counterinsurgency are lacking in capability with a powerful economy preferably not based largely upon doctrine still presumes a sufficient harmony narrative.11 opium revenues. In fact, part of the problem of interest between intervening and host is that counterinsurgency, by definition, is nation governments, and the ability of inter- Problematic Assumptions of a conservative endeavor that seeks to pre- vening states to deploy a civilian presence Counterinsurgency serve the existing political order. Although large and capable enough to compensate Beyond historical and contextual chal- the quest for control may often involve a for whatever weaknesses are found in-state. lenges, there are also a number of problematic number of minor adjustments to address the Actual practice provides a more sobering assumptions involved in choosing to frame popular grievances that fuel the insurgency, perspective. In Iraq, the institutions either operations as counterinsurgency. counterinsurgency is not about change. collapsed through war or were dismantled Is the Nature of the Problem Really In Afghanistan, the international through coalition decree, leading to the an Insurgency? Defining the campaign campaign can be described as conservative infiltration of various sectarian elements in Afghanistan with the terminology of only through a tremendous stretch of imagi- into positions of central political power and counterinsurgency means the core of the nation. Such a view treats the history of the
10 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Egnell U.S. Army (Thomas Duval)
Female Engagement Team Soldier talks with Afghan children on their way to school in Kandahar Province
conflict as starting after the overthrow of the as being in any way conservative. Instead, described as an agent of revolutionary Taliban government in 2001 and is therefore the coalition has been an actor in support of change also forces the coalition and the completely ahistorical. Moreover, such an revolutionary societal change. Afghan government to acknowledge that interpretation fails to help us understand The Assumption of Legitimate Coun- there is nothing natural or inherently legiti- the current challenges of the campaign. terinsurgency. The ahistorical counterin- mate in their activities, aims, or existence. First, it fails to acknowledge the overthrow surgency narrative in Afghanistan also fails They have to convince the population of the of the Taliban regime and the far-reaching to acknowledge the limited legitimacy of the benefits of the change they purport to offer, international aims of state-building. While current Afghan government. This legitimacy and thereby establish legitimate authority. the initial aims of the campaign were limited deficit, on the one hand, is a traditional In the liberal international state-building to countering threats of terrorism emanating problem due to the limited experience of context, democratic and liberal ideals, as from Afghanistan, the aim of overthrowing central governance. At the risk of oversim- well as the superiority of a view of legitimacy the Taliban regime arose within a broader plifying Afghan politics, I would simply based on legal and rational factors, are too international context that was flirting with note that there is a built-in suspicion toward often accepted outright as inherently useful. grand social engineering projects, which centralized rule in Afghan society, which What is forgotten is Max Weber’s important meant that the intervening coalition natu- has been characterized by decentralized lesson that legitimacy and authority are rally inherited the state-building campaign. tribal-based rule and informal patrimonial based only on the subjective perception of Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn rule,” that is, structures for centuries. Popular suspicion of the population and not on quasi-objective “you break it, you buy it”—albeit in relation the central government in Kabul also stems factors such as liberal democracy or rule to Iraq—highlights the dominant sentiment from the widely held perception that it is of law. If a citizen of Marjah perceives the of the time. The subsequent state-building thoroughly corrupt and incapable of deliver- brutal but effective Taliban justice system rhetoric of democratization, reconstruction, ing the bare necessities—even though these as more legitimate than the corrupt and economic liberalization, and equality can be demands in Afghanistan seldom go beyond dysfunctional official justice system of the described as nothing short of revolutionary security, justice, or simply being left alone. Karzai government, it is more legitimate, in the context of Afghanistan. The Western However, acknowledging that the regardless of ideological grievances. The intervention cannot accurately be described Western coalition is more accurately “inherently” desirable and beneficial nature ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 11 Forum | A Western Insurgency in Afghanistan of democracy and liberalism is obviously not convincing enough, and the Western revolu- tionary coalition must work much harder to change the perceptions and political behavior of the population in order to achieve success.
I will return to the most appropriate means U.S. Army (Tia Sokimson) of doing so. The final point in the litany of assump- tions involved in defining the contemporary campaign in Afghanistan as counterin- surgency is that it involves clearly taking sides. In the context of Afghanistan, the international coalition—including its civil- ian and military elements—is supposed to be a resource for the Afghan government in its struggle against the insurgency. It is nevertheless increasingly acknowledged that Hamid Karzai and his entourage are part of the problem rather than the solution. More- over, in terms of Afghan popular perceptions, Afghan soldiers rehearse security procedures during simulated road halt as part of training with U.S. are we really sure that Karzai’s government forces at Forward Operating Base Shank, Logar Province is categorically seen as good and that the Taliban and other fighters are viewed as bad? Of course not, and we should therefore not means needed to address it. Given that the by external actors. Instead, local actors must have been so willing to place all our bets on international coalition’s aim is not merely take charge of these processes. The question Karzai and his version of Afghan democracy. counterterrorism but also broader societal then is whether the Afghans would be willing In sum, defining the campaign in transformation, the main hurdle is not the to fight for Western ideals and aims. As Mao Afghanistan as a counterinsurgency has existence of Taliban fighters, the Haqqani and other revolutionary guerrilla theorists proven unfortunate as the concept has Network, or other groups currently catego- have reminded us, the most important failed to help us understand the true nature rized as insurgents; they are simply actors quality in officers and soldiers is a strong of the problem there. Consequently, it that cause tactical friction in the struggle to belief in the cause. has failed to help us determine the most transform Afghan society. The challenge is In fact, Mao, George Washington, and appropriate methods and resources needed to transform not only the political system Vladimir Lenin were all absolutely certain to deal with that problem. Therefore, let us that, in part, is an unfortunate post-invasion about the moral righteousness of their revo- turn the approach to the conflict upside- creation of the West, but also societal ideals at lutionary struggles and aims, and so are we down and consider the idea of a Western large. Rather than assuming that the West is today as liberal interventionists in Afghani- insurgency or other narratives of conflict the protector of the existing Afghan political stan. While there are still some disgruntled that have the aim of revolutionary societal order, as the counterinsurgency approach socialists and moral relativists out there, transformation in Afghanistan. does, an insurgency approach would general support for market-based liberal acknowledge that Afghan society is in fact far democracy is almost unchallenged within the A Western Insurgency in Afghanistan from permeated by Western notions of gov- broader Western populace. However, the key The counterinsurgency narrative ernance, justice, and economic management, to success is to nurture this conviction among in Afghanistan is clearly problematic. and that the international coalition is instead not only the local troops but also the entire However, all concepts that seek to capture the agent of change. The aims of operations population. Just as the populations in China the complex conflict in Afghanistan are in Afghanistan thereby take a much more and Imperial Russia were far from communist likely to be imperfect, so a constructive ambitious turn, and the tactics that must at the time of their revolutions, the Afghan critique requires presenting a more useful be used to achieve the more ambitious aims population is far from liberal, and a key aspect alternative. A key argument of this article is change from defense to offense—not least of operations would be to create the support of that any definitions or terms used to brand along the civilian lines of operations, includ- the local population. The challenge then is to conflicts must help us understand their true ing governance and development. make substantial positive changes in the lives nature and the best approaches to achieving Second, a more ambitious transforma- of ordinary Afghans in regions that could some form of success. Turning the tables by tional aim coupled with offensive civilian function as bases of support and recruitment considering an insurgency strategy is helpful tactics places the local population at the fore- against the existing political order—that is, in a number of respects. front of operations. A societal transformation both the corrupt central government and First, an insurgency strategy provides on the scale that was envisaged during the patrimonial clan system. This would involve a more accurate description of the nature of state-building phase of the campaign in raising not only military units (either through the problem in Afghanistan, as well as the Afghanistan is inherently difficult to achieve recruitment or indoctrination) with a strong
12 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Egnell belief in the cause, but also a substantive of hope, but also a base for recruitment and this from the onset when adopting the civilian effort to establish new systems of military training for the struggle to trans- insurgency approach. In the end, however, governance, justice, and economic manage- form the entire social fabric of Afghan society given the fact that the insurgency approach ment within the havens of support, which in the rural areas. to operations manages to tickle our intellects would include the training and recruitment The insurgency approach to regime by asking new questions and pointing out of local civil servants for these systems. change abroad is not in any way new. new possibilities, it is certainly worth further Indeed, counterinsurgency also highlights Western special operations forces have inquiry and consideration. the importance of local support and popula- long operated in support of guerrilla move- tion-centric operations. The difference is that ments around the world. The U.S. Special Toward a Multiconceptual in an insurgency approach, the international Operations Command–approved definition Identification of Conflicts community would use the people as a proxy of unconventional warfare is “activities Proposing an insurgency approach for change rather than the government. The conducted to enable a resistance movement to operations in Afghanistan serves two local population would be involved as the key or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or over- purposes. First, it provides an attempt at a actor in the process of change rather than as throw a government or occupying power by broad outline of a more useful approach to a third party or a prize to be won through operating through or with an underground, the interventions and societal transforma- hearts and minds activities. auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied tion projects of today. Afghanistan may Third, the insurgency perspective area.”15 It is further described as the core already be a lost cause, and it may be too stresses the importance of bottom-up mission and organizing principle for Army late to implement the insurgency approach approaches to achieving order and security. Special Forces. The novelty of an insurgency there. However, in a strategic context where A common problem of current attempts approach to international interventions the problems of failed states, rogue regimes, at state-building and societal transforma- would be the directive to act more com- and crimes against humanity will persist, tion is the focus on the state and its central prehensively—that is, to provide essential coupled with an “Iraq syndrome” character- institutions with top-down approaches that civilian and ideological support for these ized by a reluctance to become engaged in fail to engage the broader population.14 As efforts. The insurgency approach actually large-scale military interventions and state- already noted, societal transformations fits well with current activities of economic building projects, the insurgency approach of this magnitude should ideally emanate development assistance in many parts of the provides a thought-provoking policy alterna- from the people, and a better approach is to world. The aim of development aid, beyond tive not unlike the idea of “limited interven- engage, educate, and mobilize the masses the more acute goal of poverty alleviation, tion,” but with the ambitious aims of societal to initiate the deep rumblings of the early is to transform societies in our self-image transformations remaining. stages of a popular outpouring that can lead through positive and negative sanctions— Second, the insurgency approach to societal transformation. the old carrot and stick—and provide some highlights how changing the way we concep- tualize a conflict can also completely change the way we view the problem at hand and the the insurgency approach fits well with current activities of methods we choose to deal with it. Not only economic development assistance in many parts of the world does the choice of concept mean working within certain legal frameworks or dusting off a particular doctrine or field manual. A fourth strength of the insurgency degree of leverage or influence over foreign The concepts we use to define conflicts also approach is that it has the potential to provide governments. Although obviously contro- change the way we approach the conflict, a better congruence of the strategic concepts versial, development aid can thereby be the way we interpret it, and the resources of ends, ways, interests, and means. The described as a semi-overt insurgency strat- and means we employ to deal with it. The current strategy has failed in this regard and egy employing both sticks and carrots. An problem is that concepts defining wars are requires more resources than the interna- insurgency approach to military activities seldom the product of strategic analysis or tional community has been either willing would provide the civilian insurgency effort an objective process of matching the analysis or able to commit and sustain. An insur- with a matching military operation. of a conflict with the most accurate concepts gency approach would retain the strategy’s The above is clearly only the first that characterize it. Instead, they are often ambitious aim of societal transformation broad strokes in an outline of an insurgency the product of political and bureaucratic but would produce a much more limited approach to operations, and much work processes and interests that have more to do footprint and type of intervention. It could on this subject remains to be done. There with “selling” than conceptual effectiveness be argued that this is exactly what took place are also a number of obvious caveats to the for operational effectiveness. during the early years of the campaign. insurgency strategy. Most importantly, it Challenges arise when our constructed However, the problem in Afghanistan during is not the quick-fix solution that political “reality” or definition of the conflict fails those years was that the light footprint was leaders are looking for; it will require time to match the conflict’s true nature—that defensive rather than offensive. To spread and patience to achieve substantial politi- is, when the political narratives and con- the idea of change, the coalition should have cal change. This does not really clash with cepts depart from the reality in the field. sought to completely transform Kabul and current approaches, but the difference is As an example, the conceptualization of thereby create not only a functioning beacon that politicians would have to acknowledge the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 13 Forum | A Western Insurgency in Afghanistan
3 Stephen Biddle, Jeffrey A. Friedman, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012), 7–40. 4 International Committee of the Red Cross, U.S. Army (Kap Kim) “Afghanistan: Outlook Remains Bleak Despite Progress in Some Areas,” operational update, January 16, 2012; Dexter Filkins, “After America: Will Civil War Hit Afghanistan When the U.S. Leaves?” The New Yorker, July 9, 2012; Scott Bates and Ryan Evans, NATO Strategy in Afghanistan: A New Way Forward (Washington, DC: Center for National Policy, May 2012). 5 This civil war is arguably already decades old, but the fear is that it will enter a new and more violent phase following the Alliance’s with- drawal. See Ryan Evans, “The Once and Future Civil War in Afghanistan,” AfPak Channel, July 26, 2012, available at
14 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. Army (Zackary Root) Soldiers load patient onto UH-60 Black Hawk at Forward Operating Base Shank, Afghanistan
Forward-deployed
Historically, deployed medical units Medical Assets have employed mission profiles reflect- ing the U.S. Army Medical Department motto, “to conserve the fighting strength.” AND the COIN Offensive While a necessary primary mission, caring only for friendly force casualties, injuries, and illness vastly underutilizes deployed By David S. Kauvar eployed U.S. military medical medical resources.1 This situation is espe- assets are primarily structured cially true at the forward-deployed levels and Tucker A. Drury to support combat operations of care, where battalion-level medical D on the conventional battle- companies and brigade-level forward sur- field, but they are increasingly deployed in gical teams (FSTs) are scattered over the support of expeditionary counterinsurgency battlefield and generally care for a young, fit (COIN) operations. The development of force operating on the relatively nonkinetic doctrine to guide medical support in a COIN COIN battlefield.2 Larger deployed medical environment has not kept up with the brisk units such as combat support hospitals are Major David S. Kauvar, MD, Medical Corps, USA, pace of operations, resulting in significant more fully utilized; they act as clearing- is a Vascular Surgeon stationed at San Antonio gaps in the capabilities necessary to meet houses in the evacuation chain for friendly Military Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, Texas. needs. With the publication of Field Manual He is also an Assistant Professor of Surgery at force sick and wounded from many smaller the Uniformed Services University of the Health 3-24, Counterinsurgency, in 2006, the U.S. units. Given the civil-military emphasis Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland. Major Tucker A. Army and Marine Corps jointly developed a of COIN operations, integrating the activi- Drury, MD, Medical Corps, USAF, is an Orthopedic strategic framework to guide COIN opera- ties of small, forward-deployed medical Surgeon stationed at Joint Base Elmendorf- tional planning, but medical and health assets into the broader COIN “offensive” Richardson, Alaska. support activities are not mentioned. is a clear step toward achieving mastery of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 15 Forum | Medical Assets and the COIN Offensive the comprehensive set of capabilities that Such areas are primarily served by smaller, point that real improvements are possible modern COIN warfare embodies.3 forward-deployed military medical units, in the indigenous health sector. Even in U.S. special operations forces (SOF) such as medical companies and FSTs. Not reconstruction-focused operations such as medical units have consistently demonstrated coincidentally, these areas tend to be havens medical projects, the inability to maintain the feasibility of targeted medical operations for insurgents because the government has security in the inherently unpredictable in COIN. The medical seminar and medical limited presence. The relationship between COIN security environment can easily mentorship approaches have achieved insurgency and underserved populations impede progress.8 To maintain the support tangible goals in SOF COIN engagements. multiplies the positive effect of health of the indigenous population, civil health These techniques should be transitioned engagements in the broader context of reconstruction must begin simultaneously to conventional medical assets in COIN the COIN campaign, resulting in medical with security operations, establishing a theaters of operations. Our hypothesis is that operations that are inherently high in value. “feedback relationship” between access to conventional, forward-deployed military This is evident in the unique perspec- health services and freedom of movement medical assets can and should be used in tive and information gained through the of the populace.9 Military medical assets expeditionary COIN operations as low-cost, conduct of medical operations in Afghani- are designed to support combat opera- high-value force multipliers. We address this stan and Iraq.6 tions in an unstable security environment by first answering the question, “Why should In addition to being high-value, and are well suited to direct participation conventional medical assets play a role in the forward-deployed medical assets can in COIN engagements, especially during COIN offensive?” After presenting the ration- participate in direct COIN engagements initial stages when the security situation is ale for the involvement of deployed medical with ready availability and low cost. Con- particularly volatile. assets in COIN operations, we answer the ventional medical companies and FSTs Provincial Reconstruction Teams question, “How do we do this?” will always be deployed to support combat (PRTs) are hybrid military-civilian units developed to support COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are charged operations to legitimize the indigenous health sector would with facilitating reconstruction efforts and be most effective in underserved rural areas focus primarily on infrastructure develop- ment. PRTs have historically been lacking in medical assets and have no inherent medical Why Do This? forces in forward areas. These units deploy care capacity. This limits their usefulness in In expeditionary COIN, the territory with supplies, facilities, and expertise that direct medical actions as part of a broader contested is the support of the populace can be leveraged at low cost to accomplish COIN offensive. Coordination between for the legitimate host nation government. specific COIN missions. Leveraging assets expeditionary military medical assets and Rather than the typical approach of “winning can be accomplished with minimal impact NGOs, PRTs, and other governmental agen- hearts and minds,” the goal of COIN has on the primary mission of caring for cies is vital to the strategic success of medical been recast as providing the population with friendly battle casualties because COIN COIN operations. Synchronization between “a sense of order and predictability to their operations tend to be relatively nonkinetic, all groups involved in medical civic actions lives.”4 Expeditionary COIN operations resulting in far fewer serious casualties than is necessary to avoid duplication of effort, strive to assist the host nation government in conventional operations. Once established, present a united position of support for the achieving legitimacy as a source of stability most of the costs of running these facilities legitimate government, and prepare for tran- for the governed. For a government to achieve are fixed—remaining the same regardless of sition to nonmilitary agencies when military legitimacy, it must demonstrate a capacity the volume of care occurring at the facility assets leave the COIN theater. to provide four essential types of security: and whether the patients are friendly forces Civil-military operations performed physical, economic, ideological, and—the or local nationals. by small, forward-deployed conventional subject of this article, health. A government Nongovernmental organizations medical units at the battalion and brigade must be able to answer the question, “Who (NGOs) such as the International Com- levels should be an integral part of COIN tac- will care for me and my family when we are mittee of the Red Cross and nonmilitary tical planning and execution. Engagements sick or injured?” Increasing the capacity of governmental agencies such as the U.S. should be focused on increasing indigenous the indigenous health sector is the most effec- Agency for International Development health-sector capacity in the name of the tive use of deployed medical assets in COIN.5 are already involved in health support and legitimate government. Employed in this way, Expeditionary medical units in a reconstruction operations in many areas medical units can move from the sidelines COIN environment should develop opera- beset with insurgencies. Despite their to the frontlines of a COIN campaign and tions to stake an underserved host nation expertise in development, civilian agencies contribute to its success. population’s need for health care to the should not be the only “key enablers of a legitimate host nation government’s ability successful COIN strategy.”7 The level of How Do We Do This? to provide it. Operations to legitimize the civilian participation in these operations Insurgencies embody unique char- indigenous health sector would be most is directly related to the security situation. acteristics of the societies they arise from. effective in underserved rural areas where Only as security is established can civil- Strategies and tactics to counter them must the need for basic health care is most acute. ian participation safely increase to the be tailored to exploit the specific avenues
16 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KAUVAR and DRURY U.S. Army (Nazly Confesor)
Combat medic dresses wounded hand of Afghan National Army soldier after IED attack
to increase legitimacy presented by each care to host nation civilians, a reliance on a reasonable goal would be a tenfold increase situation.10 While it is impossible to fully these assets is established. The reliance in sophistication, bringing the score to 1. characterize the particular tactics that will be on foreign care marginalizes the local This can be done relatively cheaply and successful in a medical COIN operation, the health sector in the eyes of the population, is certainly within the capabilities of a general principles for medical engagements directly countering the strategic objec- deployed military medical company or FST. can be elucidated. These principles create a tive of increasing indigenous legitimacy.11 A further tenfold increase would require framework that should be used for planning Limited MEDCAP-type operations may bringing healthcare sophistication to the and executing such operations. be valuable during the initial phases of an level of a modern Western hospital, which Medical operations in COIN must expeditionary COIN operation in order would cost millions of dollars and is com- always strive to increase the capacity of the to accustom the population to working pletely unfeasible. indigenous healthcare sector to care for the with military medical personnel, but these Placing indigenous personnel and host nation’s population. Simply having should be performed in concert with indig- assets in the lead is essential to the success expeditionary medical assets provide care enous healthcare providers and rapidly of any COIN operation. Personnel from to local civilians in the manner of the transitioned to more sustainable practices. forward-deployed medical units must traditional medical civic action program Medical COIN efforts should be frequently engage leaders of the indigenous (MEDCAP) does not meet this goal and focused where the need for health sector healthcare sector and build durable relation- is not advisable for several reasons. The improvement is most acute. Healthcare ships. These interactions and relationships inherently transient nature of MEDCAP sophistication spans a continuum from no will become the core of medical programs engagements risks alienation of the popula- available care (0) to the best care available in and maximize sustainability. Local stake- tion when military assets are no longer the developed world (10). The people of an holders should be required to provide a present and disaffection when frequently area such as Uruzgan Province, Afghanistan, realistic and truthful view of their specific encountered complex medical needs for instance—where we have planned and needs in consultation with expeditionary cannot be met during a short humanitar- participated in such activities—have limited forces prior to planning any health opera- ian mission. Additionally, when foreign access to fairly primitive care. If this area tion. This assessment process should con- military medical assets provide direct rates 0.1 on the aforementioned continuum, tinue for the duration of intervention, and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 17 Forum | Medical Assets and the COIN Offensive U.S. Army (Seth Barham)
Medic reviews lesson plan for combat lifesaver refresher class in Farah Province, Afghanistan
programs should be flexible enough to adapt Forward-deployed medical assets Programs in Tarin Kowt to changing needs over time. Setting realistic employ highly trained but frequently An example of a successful COIN goals is another key aspect of program plan- underutilized medical personnel. Leverag- medical training program is the Afghan ning. It must be feasible to meet the goals of ing their knowledge and skills to train Medical Training Partnership and Valida- a program within operational constraints members of the indigenous health sector tion (AMTPV) program, which we have including resource availability and security. costs nothing and represents the most participated in at the Special Operations The expectations of local stakeholders powerful and sustainable type of medical Forward Surgical Element (FSE) in Tarin should be reasonable as well. In COIN, it is COIN operation. Training programs should Kowt, Afghanistan. Tarin Kowt is the capital often worse to break a promise than not to follow a “train-the-trainer” regimen in of Uruzgan Province, one of the most rural make one at all.12 which individuals trained by the deployed and poor in Afghanistan. An assessment by COIN medical programs should be military unit are utilized as trainers for district health officials and special operations designed to meet the goal of decreasing other indigenous healthcare personnel. Use physicians in 2010 revealed that the Tarin reliance on expeditionary military medical of this technique exponentially increases the Kowt Provincial Hospital had essentially assets. Indigenous resources should be used capacity-building impact of COIN medical no personnel trained to care for victims of to the maximum possible extent in any programs. In underserved areas, training by significant injury, and almost all injured medical COIN engagement. Local stakehold- expeditionary forces should be accompanied local nationals were being cared for at U.S. ers have insight as to what resources are by a commitment on the part of the trained facilities. The medical capabilities available at available locally and should provide the labor, providers to remain in the underserved the hospital (that is, basic operative, labora- expertise, and materiel for programs in which areas following the completion of training. tory, X-ray, and ultrasound) were similar to expeditionary forces participate. Health- Programs should be tailored to impart the those of the forward-deployed U.S. FSE, but a sector leaders should be heavily involved skills and knowledge most relevant to indig- significant deficit was noted in the knowledge in programs directing the distribution of enous needs and capabilities. Teaching rural and skills of the hospital providers. Building humanitarian aid such as medical supplies, medical providers to read diagnostic X-rays trauma care capacity at the hospital would durable equipment, and medical devices does not improve their ability to serve in a greatly improve the care provided to Afghans coming from foreign sources. clinic with no X-ray machine. in the ongoing insurgency.
18 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KAUVAR and DRURY
A 3-year training program was initi- ress toward independence from expeditionary schedule for local and partner force pro- ated with 12 participants from the provincial medical support. Additionally, wounded viders or zero missed appointments from hospital. Four groups, each consisting of a host nation military casualties cared for by scheduled clinics for local nationals. Medical physician, anesthetist, and nurse, spend one deployed units should be transferred to host programs should allow for increasing 3-month period per year living and working nation military medical facilities as soon as indigenous sector participation in care and alongside FSE personnel at the U.S. facility. feasible. U.S. personnel from the FSE in Tarin should adapt as local capabilities expand These individuals participate in all aspects of care under the supervision of U.S. military medical programs should allow for increasing providers. The remainder of the year is spent indigenous sector participation and should working at the hospital and training other providers. The trainees are modestly paid adapt as local capabilities expand through the local U.S. commander’s dis- cretionary funds and, in exchange for their Kowt engage in weekly trauma care education over time. The successful “clear-hold- participation, have committed to practice and simulation with the Afghan National expand” framework in use for civil-military at the hospital following completion of the Army (ANA) 8th Commando Kandak (Pashto operations in COIN should be applied to program. The AMTPV program costs little, for camp) and ANA 4th Brigade medics and medical engagements. The process begins is entirely sustainable, and has resulted physicians. When partner force casualties are with the clear phase, an initial needs assess- in dramatic improvements in the care of treated at the FSE, their care is transitioned to ment and program planning. Following injured patients at the hospital and a reduc- ANA facilities as soon as possible. This rela- this, program implementation represents tion in reliance on U.S. and coalition care in tionship has resulted in meaningful advances the hold phase. As improvements are made Uruzgan and surrounding provinces. in these ANA units’ abilities to care for their or situations change, a continual needs To fully engage the indigenous health own casualties. assessment process results in modifications sector, expeditionary medical units should to existing programs or new engagements pursue integration with host nation health- Other Considerations in the expand phase. Utilizing this frame- care facilities. The resources available at even The nature of the COIN environ- work results in dynamic programs respon- smaller deployed military units may exceed ment is one of fluctuating security and civil sive to the changing needs of the indigenous those routinely available at indigenous facili- considerations. Accordingly, medical COIN population and suits the variable COIN ties, so patient transfer agreements can facili- operations should be flexibly designed operational environment. tate the best available care for local patients. and executed. Giving host nation medical Assessing the effectiveness of medical When local providers training at military providers and patients access to a medical engagements in COIN is crucial to ensur- facilities participate in the care of host nation facility on a base in a combat environment ing ongoing success. Planning for such patients, capacity-building still occurs even is the prerogative of the local combatant assessments should take place prior to though care is being provided at military commander. Establishing buy-in from this the implementation of programs and the facilities. The medical director of Tarin Kowt individual and his staff is crucial. Keeping assessment process must be continual. Provincial Hospital has the authority to local authority over the activities of forward- Because the goal of engagement is to request the transfer of patients with complex deployed medical units with the combatant increase indigenous healthcare capacity, injuries to U.S. FSE for surgical care cur- commander (rather than with higher level progress should be evaluated from the rently unavailable at his facility. At the earli- medical commands in the theater) maxi- perspectives of host nation stakeholders est opportunity following surgery, patients mizes operational flexibility at the tactical rather than those of expeditionary forces. are transferred back to the care of providers level. This relationship allows operational This ensures that what is being measured at the provincial hospital. Because AMTPV flexibility for medical COIN activities and are the health-related outcomes of engage- participants care for these patients at the facilitates synchronization with other civil- ments and not just the outputs of provided FSE, at no point is a patient’s care solely military COIN activities in the battlespace. care. An example is measuring changes in being provided by U.S. personnel. Command The local SOF task force commander the monthly percentage of occupied beds at support of the medical COIN mission is vital oversees the Tarin Kowt FSE day-to-day Tarin Kowt Provincial Hospital rather than due to the security implications for local operations while administrative authority the number of host nation civilians treated patient and provider movement on and off rests with the theater-level special operations at the FSE. The former is an outcome of an forward-deployed military installations. medical command. This structure allows the intervention and the latter is the interven- The indigenous military will likely be FSE to easily respond to the specific needs of tion’s output. If the FSE is seeing more fighting the insurgency long after the rede- Uruzgan Province’s health sector while main- patients while the hospital’s bed census is ployment of expeditionary assets. Medical taining materiel and administrative support unchanged, no progress is being made in units contribute to the hastening of turnover from higher levels of medical command. increasing its capacity, and any relevant ini- of security operations by developing training Changes in the local security situation tiatives should be reexamined. and patient care relationships with partner will affect the movement of patients and force medical elements. Performing realistic providers between indigenous and military Concluding Thoughts combat casualty care training with indige- facilities. It is unreasonable to expect 100 There are three critical enablers of nous military personnel facilitates their prog- percent compliance with a rigid training COIN medical engagements by forward- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 19 Forum | Medical Assets and the COIN Offensive U.S. Army (Michael J. MacLeod)
Army medics unload mock casualty from UH-60 Black Hawk during training exercise at Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk
deployed medical units. The first is motivated and mitigate the security risk that comes with 4 Sebastian L.v. Gorka and David Kilcullen, expeditionary personnel who are willing such engagements. “An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understand- to think beyond the doctrinal mission of Small, forward-deployed medical units ing the Difference Between COIN and Counter- insurgency,” Joint Force Quarterly 60 (1st Quarter conserving the fighting strength. These indi- are ideally suited to perform civil medical 2011), 17. viduals will be culturally open-minded and engagements in counterinsurgency. These 5 Donald F. Thompson, The Role of Medical willing to treat all patients equally. They will units’ capabilities can be leveraged at low Diplomacy in Stabilizing Afghanistan, Defense feel they have a stake in improving the indig- cost and with high value, making them force Horizons 63 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, May enous healthcare sector. Not all personnel multipliers. Though programs will differ 2008), 2. deployed with a unit will have these charac- depending on specific theater and local char- 6 Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghan- teristics, but those who do should be sought acteristics, increasing the capacity of the host istan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 100. out and challenged with this mission. Dedi- nation indigenous healthcare sector is the 7 Joshua W. Welle, “Civil-Military Integra- cated interpreters are crucial. Their expertise desired endstate. Programs should be focused tion in Afghanistan,” Joint Force Quarterly 56 (1st in language is obviously essential, but they through collaborative needs assessments and Quarter 2010), 55. 8 also provide vital links with the local health designed to leverage skills and knowledge Jones, 130–131. 9 Jennifer Caci, “Counterinsurgency, authorities and valuable cultural insights toward sustainable health goals. JFQ Healthcare, and Human Nature: Tapping into the on health and disease. Having interpreters Hierarchy of Needs,” Journal of Special Operations embedded with units allows them to become Medicine 11, no. 1 (Winter 2011), 9. Notes medically savvy, and this understanding 10 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency greatly facilitates integration with host nation 1 Albert R. Bryan, “Field Hospital Support (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 42. facilities and personnel. Finally, the support 11 for Civilians in Counterinsurgency Operations,” Matthew S. Rice and Omar J. Jones, of both medical and combatant command- Military Review 89, no. 4 (July 2009), 121. “Medical Operations in Counterinsurgency ers is absolutely essential to mission success. 2 Richard W. Thomas, Ensuring Good Medi- Warfare: Desired Effects and Unintended Con- Medical commanders have to think outside cine in Bad Places: Utilization of Forward Surgical sequences,” Military Review 90, no. 3 (May–June of the doctrinal box to allow the leveraging Teams in the Battlefield (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army 2010), 49. 12 of their assets to perform COIN missions. War College, 2006), 18. Kilcullen, 47. Combatant commanders must be willing to 3 T.X. Hammes, “Counterinsurgency: Not a synchronize their civil-military COIN activi- Strategy, But a Necessary Capability,” Joint Force nd ties with medical engagements and to accept Quarterly 65 (2 Quarter 2012), 49.
20 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Member of Human Terrain Team talks with LAMB et al. village residents during patrol in Sher’Ali Kariz, Maiwand District, Kandahar Province
U.S. Army (Jason Nolte)
The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams
By Christopher J. Lamb, James Douglas Orton, Michael C. Davies, and Theodore T. Pikulsky
eneral Raymond T. Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, learned from his Dr. Christopher J. Lamb is a Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Strategic three combat tours in Iraq that the U.S. military needs to better understand Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, local populations and their social, political, and cultural attributes. He at the National Defense University (NDU). Dr. James concluded that the more we understand the human domain, the less combat G 1 Douglas Orton is an Adjunct Senior Research force it takes to prevail in counterinsurgency. Similarly, during his confirmation hearing Fellow at NDU. Michael C. Davies is a Contributing before taking command of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Editor in the Center for Technology and National Afghanistan in June 2010, General David Petraeus told Congress that the decisive terrain Security Policy at NDU. Theodore T. Pikulsky is an in counterinsurgency was “the human terrain.”2 These leaders understand that effective Adjunct Research Fellow at NDU. counterinsurgency requires protecting and eliciting cooperation from the population—the human terrain—which, in turn, requires a keen understanding of the population’s social and cultural characteristics. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 21 Forum | The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams
The Army created Human Terrain glowing endorsement that captured the atten- we first developed a detailed chronology of Teams (HTTs) to provide combat forces in tion of Congress.3 Later, it became apparent HTS history and management issues. Afghanistan and Iraq with knowledge of the that while HTTs often did good work and human terrain, or put differently, “sociocul- were widely appreciated by commanders, Historical Overview of HTS tural knowledge.” HTTs are small, cross- they were slow to provide value, inconsistent A former HTS director acknowledged functional teams of specially trained military in performance, and insufficient in number. some of the controversy surrounding officers, research managers, and civilian Ultimately, the HTTs failed to ameliorate the program when she observed that the social scientists that are typically appended growing cross-cultural tensions between “HTS story is one of challenges, rewards, to brigade-sized units. If HTTs do their job U.S. forces and Afghans and were unable to stumbles, and successes.”7 The hundreds well, they can advise commanders on how to make a major contribution to the counter- of articles written about HTS are polarized win popular support and isolate insurgents. If insurgency effort.4 Eventually, performance around advocates who focus too much on HTTs perform poorly, or are used unwisely or concerns precipitated a number of internal the program’s rewards and successes and ignored by commanders, military operations and external reviews of HTS and HTTs. critics who emphasize its challenges and are more likely to alienate populations and Commanders viewed HTT per- stumbles. To conduct a rigorous study of make success unattainable. The performance formance differently than others. Most HTS, it was first necessary to generate a of HTTs is therefore intrinsically important commanders, when asked, state that their thorough and balanced history that rec- both now in Afghanistan and in any future HTTs are quite useful, while HTT members ognizes program achievements without military operations against irregular forces. themselves—those who have studied them ignoring shortcomings. That history can be In the past, the U.S. military has been and those charged with their oversight—are summarized as a set of sometimes overlap- slow to recognize the need for sociocultural more likely to state that HTT performance is ping developmental periods. knowledge, much less to institutionalize the variable. The new study from NDU explains The first period, gestation, began fol- capability to provide it. Now, however, with the origins of the performance variation, lowing the terror attacks on September 11, 2001, when the need to understand human terrain in order “to help narrow the search while HTTs often did good work, they were slow to provide space for terrorists and terror groups”8 value, inconsistent in performance, and insufficient in number became evident. The momentum for more investigation in sociocultural knowledge increased after the intervention in Iraq when senior officers believing that the military why the large majority of commanders found experts pointedly told Congress the United must retain the means to generate sociocul- HTTs useful, and why HTTs collectively were States did not have sufficient knowledge of tural knowledge to be well prepared for the unable to make a major contribution to the the human terrain to conduct a counterinsur- future security environment, the key issue counterinsurgency effort. It also explains the gency operation.9 However, it was not until is how to do it well and efficiently. The place tremendous challenges the HTS program 2005 that a new organization supporting to begin answering that question is with faced in starting and rapidly expanding a warfighters funded an effort to produce a a rigorous, balanced, and evidence-based nontraditional military program and why device that would store information about evaluation of past HTT performance. If some challenges were met successfully while the human terrain of a defined area including leaders understand this performance over others were not. This article identifies HTS the social networks involved in the produc- the past decade, it is much more likely they management challenges with an in-depth tion and placement of improvised explosive will be able to provide ready and reliable history of the program and provides an inter- devices (IEDs). Several HTS progenitors knowledge of human terrain to U.S. forces nal assessment of HTT performance based on convinced the Joint IED Defeat Organiza- in the future. Toward that end, this article 10 key small-team performance factors.5 tion (JIEDDO) that the solution required a summarizes a major study conducted at Any study of HTTs must address the nontechnological component with human National Defense University (NDU) that criteria for evaluating their performance. experts, a shift in perspective that advanced offers an explanation for past HTT perfor- Previous studies agree that HTT perfor- further when 10th Mountain Division submit- mance and makes recommendations on mance should be judged by how well a team ted an operational needs statement in late how to build on that experience. provides sociocultural knowledge to improve 2005 requesting such a capability.10 a commander’s decisionmaking. They also The second HTS phase began with its Evaluating Performance agree that feedback from commanders is the actual birth in June 2006 when JIEDDO offi- The Human Terrain System (HTS), primary means of making that assessment.6 cially agreed to fund five test teams.11 Getting which deploys HTTs, was formed in Our study used this criterion and these data, the HTS program off the ground proved dif- 2006 under the supervision of the U.S. but also considered performance evaluations ficult and time-consuming. HTS leaders had Army Training and Doctrine Command from other sources. The study relied on inter- to quickly recruit a management team and (TRADOC). HTS deployed its first team to views with more than 100 team members, find a way to field teams to test the concept. Khost, Afghanistan, in early 2007. Although former HTS managers, commanders, and Rapidly hiring 25 people to populate the first it took time for the team to establish its rel- other experts to assess the factors that best experimental teams was not possible, so by evance, it eventually won over the brigade’s explain variations in team performance. September the number was scaled down to a commanding officer, who gave the team a Before analyzing team performance, however, single team to be fielded in early 2007.
22 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB et al. U.S. Army (Charles M. Willingham)
Human Terrain Team social scientist with interpreter inspect conditions at U.S. Department of Defense–funded Al-Arshad Desert School Agricultural Research Center, Najaf Province, Iraq
The third developmental stage of the sudden increase in demand. Previously, was healthy and was “having a very real program was its proof of concept. The 82nd HTS management focused on the need impact.”14 A few months later, after negative Airborne Division agreed to test the first to create, field, and test the experimental depictions emerged, Gates continued to back experimental HTT with one of its brigades team in Afghanistan.12 Now there was little the program, characterizing any missteps as deploying to Afghanistan in early 2007. The time to analyze the AF1 experience criti- “attendant growing pains”15 common in new HTT, designated AF1, arrived in Afghani- cally. Instead, the replacement team for programs. With U.S. Central Command, stan in February 2007 to join 4th Brigade, AF1 and five new teams that were quickly General Petraeus, and Secretary Gates all sup- 82nd Airborne, in Khost. Initially the brigade being trained and deployed to Iraq became porting HTS, the nascent effort was safe for had no idea how to use the team. The team the proof-of-concept effort for the HTS the time being and its budget was expanded to members tested a variety of activities to program. The performance of the five Iraq cover the costs of deploying more teams. demonstrate their utility, but it was not until teams, IZ1 through IZ5, was mixed. For HTS then entered a period of rapid Operation Maiwand in June 2007 that the example, the level of interpersonal conflict expansion that its leaders would later brigade realized how useful the HTT could on IZ1 was so “untenable” that individual describe as a “catastrophic success.”16 HTS be. The brigade commander and his staff members left the team to work directly with managers quickly had to recruit, select, concluded that the HTT’s work with the battalions, and IZ5 “fractured” and had to train, and retain qualified personnel to field population in advance of operations helped be withdrawn.13 26 teams. For one thing, securing quality reduce kinetic activity and therefore lowered Given developments at the theater level, recruits was a challenge. To attract and brigade casualties. the emphasis on building operational HTT select personnel, HTS was obliged to use the Meanwhile, multiple requests from capacity was understandable. The Pentagon existing omnibus contract TRADOC had in other field commanders coalesced into a was firmly backing new capabilities for irreg- place, a contract that was later described by Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement ular warfare. In November 2007, Secretary the HTS program manager as “totally and issued by U.S. Central Command in April of Defense Robert Gates cited the program completely inadequate” for this purpose.17 2007 that requested 26 HTTs across two as an example of necessary adaptation for Consequently, questionable personnel were theaters of war. The original HTS model irregular warfare. He noted that bringing in being screened into the program. Even so, for developing HTTs changed with the “professional anthropologists as advisors” HTS struggled to fully staff the growing ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 23 Forum | The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams
U.S. Army (Crystal Davis)
Human Terrain System Soldiers and civilians speak with Afghans during key leader engagement in southern Kandahar Province
24 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB et al. number of teams. In 2008, the program had counter negative publicity, improve HTT new policies and procedures for HTS that it a 30 percent attrition rate during training performance, and find a way to prevent HTT hoped would improve performance.25 that effectively cost $7 million18 and meant disasters that alienated commanders and In retrospect, it seems clear that a training cycle had to be about 50 percent hurt the program’s reputation even while support from field commanders saved an larger than absolute demand. overseeing the drawdown of HTTs from HTS program under pressure and undergo- The overwhelming number of trainees Iraq and increasing the number of teams ing wholesale management changes. The who left the program simply quit. Much of in Afghanistan from 6 to 22. Afghanistan’s report to Congress helpfully noted that their dissatisfaction was attributed to the human terrain was the centerpiece of combat forces appreciated their HTTs, and inadequacy of the training program, and in General Stanley McChrystal’s new campaign when a journalist asked General Petraeus particular, the poor relationship between the plan for Afghanistan, and there was great about HTS, he responded by email from training and the tasks performed in the field. pressure to field capable HTTs there quickly. Afghanistan: “It is working. I hope it’s here The factors that produced high-quality team Congress increased funding to meet the new to stay.”26 In December 2010, HTS was given performance were unknown, so training requirements in Afghanistan, but it also a green light from U.S. Central Command to involved an element of trial and error. HTS signaled reservations about the program grow the HTT program from 22 to 31 teams management did not systematically collect by requiring a study of the management by summer 2011. feedback from field experience, but adjusted and organization of HTS to be delivered Several important observations can be the training curriculum based on its impres- by March 1, 2010.21 In a March 31 meeting made based on this brief history: sions of what worked well in the field. The with reporters, Secretary of the Army John training was also complicated by variation McHugh also implied the program was on ■■ The Pentagon was slow to stand in class composition. It was not uncommon a probationary status by refusing to endorse up a program for providing ground force to have an incoming class with many more it, stating instead that he was “neither happy commanders with sociocultural knowl- team leaders and research managers than nor unhappy”22 with HTS. edge,27 deploying the first HTT more than social scientists or human terrain analysts. While HTS took on these challenges, 5 years after Operation Enduring Freedom An uneven distribution made it difficult to TRADOC moved to exert more control over commenced. assemble teams and have them train with the program. TRADOC leaders approved ■■ HTS only stood up because another brigades prior to deployment. a new contract with the company that HTS new organization—JIEDDO—had the flex- ibility to push resources at promising new ideas, and defined its mission broadly to under the new management team, the launch a personnel-intensive program in a program entered a period of more intense Army system primarily focused on new technology. institutionalization at a precarious time for HTS ■■ TRADOC, an organization that does not normally field units, had trouble meeting the high demand for HTTs from commanders Recruitment, training, and other thought was the root cause of its recruitment in the field. management challenges were exacerbated by problems and agreed to job descriptions for ■■ HTS never had a theory of perfor- increasing public criticism. In October 2007, HTT positions that were not accurate and mance, validated by field experience, that the American Anthropological Association that complicated recruitment and retention it could use to inform its training program cited perceived ethical shortcomings,19 and in of quality personnel, all without HTS input.23 or explain the optimum role for HTTs May 2008, the Society of Applied Anthropol- TRADOC also initiated two internal inves- to commanders. ogy similarly expressed “grave concerns” tigations of HTS,24 and finally, in June 2010, ■■ HTS survived because commanders about the program. Some well-publicized HTT replaced the HTS program manager with valued HTTs. failures in the field worsened the perception a trusted insider from the TRADOC staff. that the program was struggling, and it seemed Other members of the original HTS team left HTS’s tenuous existence is unlikely to like the tide of informed opinion was turning as well, and soon there was a completely new change. Major cuts in the defense budget are against it. For example, a July 10, 2008, edito- management team in place that was firmly forcing a careful reexamination of all defense rial in Nature stated that the program could be under TRADOC control. programs, especially those perceived as niche a win-win effort for local populations and the Under the new management team, the capabilities created for recent operations in U.S. military. Five months later, the influential program entered a period of more intense Afghanistan and Iraq. In this environment, magazine reversed its position and called for Army institutionalization at a precari- sociocultural programs must convince senior the “swift close” of the program, concluding, ous time for HTS. A month after the new leaders that they meet enduring requirements “In theory, it is a good idea. . . . In practice, program manager assumed her duties, the efficiently. In the case of HTS, this requires however, it has been a disaster.”20 study demanded by Congress was delivered a compelling explanation for past HTT per- In fall 2009, HTS entered a critical to Capitol Hill. The report identified prob- formance variation. Without understanding yearlong period marked by the need to lems regarding TRADOC’s management the origins of past performance variation, it expand HTTs in the field while management practices. To assuage critics, TRADOC and will be hard for HTS to convince skeptics that conflicts were on the rise. HTS leaders had the new HTS leaders let a new contract with it can manage the program to better, more to resolve training and retention problems, a new company. TRADOC also established consistent performance in the future. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 25 Forum | The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams
HTT Performance: An Explanation pation of popular behavior. The ability to ■■ improved information operations by To explain HTT performance, it is anticipate reactions can shape theater-level helping tailor message content and style to first necessary to explain why commanders decisionmaking. reach Afghan audiences better typically rated HTTs more highly than the ■■ better “damage limitation” when people who managed or studied them did, Brigade commanders were not predis- untoward events occurred that had to be and second, to identify the optimum role posed to believe HTTs would make contribu- explained and compensated for with the HTTs could play in an integrated cultural tions at one level of cultural knowledge or Afghan populace. intelligence architecture. It is clear that the another. They generally had a “wait and see large majority of commanders thought their attitude” about HTT performance. However, Rarely did brigade commanders assess HTTs were useful (see table28). However, it is the majority of those commanders who pro- HTT performance in ways that suggest they not immediately apparent why commanders vided more specific reasoning for why HTTs were capable of the third level of cultural valued HTTs (or not). were helpful underscored their contributions knowledge, which provides deep insights To determine levels of commander at the first level, noting they provided conti- on the origins and implications of Afghan expectations for HTT performance, we cat- nuity of situational awareness across multiple behaviors and decisionmaking. The best egorized commander praise and criticisms brigade deployments and faster situational explanation for why U.S. forces need all three of HTTs according to three levels of cultural awareness than was possible without an levels of cultural knowledge is a 2010 paper knowledge previously postulated by some HTT. They also noted that the teams could by Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, subject matter experts.29 The levels roughly help spread this basic situational awareness and other military officers entitled Fixing equate to the social science objectives of accu- through their forces by providing training on Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Rel- rate description, explanation, and prediction: basic Afghan customs (dos and don’ts) and evant in Afghanistan. The paper articulates a instruction on how to collect information on cultural intelligence architecture that makes ■■ First level: Cultural awareness. Basic human terrain effectively. it possible to identify the ideal role for HTTs familiarity with language and religion and an Fewer commanders, typically those and to better interpret commander reactions understanding and observance of local norms who worked with the handful of widely to HTTs in practice. and boundaries. This roughly equates to good acknowledged superlative HTTs, testified Fixing Intel notes that in counterin- description of human terrain. It was often that the HTTs contributed at the second level surgency, “the most salient problems are observed by commanders that such descrip- of cultural knowledge. These teams not only attitudinal, cultural, and human,” and that tion is needed at the tactical level, down to helped describe the human terrain, but they theater commanders need to keep abreast of battalion and company levels if not below. also explained the behaviors in ways that these concerns on a daily basis. In a coun- ■■ Second level: Cultural understanding. helped commanders tailor their brigade oper- terinsurgency, small units supply key intel- The “why” of behavior embodied in percep- ations. In this vein, commanders stated that ligence to higher commands rather than tions, mindsets, attitudes, and customs. This with HTT help, they could better understand the other way around. For this reason, all roughly equates to explanation of human the consequences of their decisions, which soldiers must be intelligence collectors who behaviors. Perhaps because brigade com- facilitated course of action analysis and other enable higher level analysts to create “com- manders were the focus of interviews, it is not benefits, such as: prehensive narratives” for each district that surprising that this level of understanding, “describe changes in the economy, atmo- which presumably is important at all levels, ■■ reduced friction with the population spherics, development, corruption, gover- was emphasized at the brigade level. (which in turn reduced casualties) nance, and enemy activity” and “provide ■■Third level: Cultural intelligence. ■■ support for political reconciliation the kind of context that is invaluable up the The implications of these behaviors and by identifying who had power, trust, and chain of command.”30 However, General their drivers. This roughly equates to antici- resources, and what their motives were Flynn argues that brigade-level commanders
Comparison of Studies Sampling Commander HTT Assessments Successful Partial Success No Impact or Ineffective West Point Study Highly valued 4 Center for Naval Analyses Very useful Varied usefulness Not useful Study 5 8 3 Institute for Defense Analyses Success: the Brigade Combat Partial Success: No impact Study Team could not have been suc- on balance, the HTT did (regardless of reason) cessful without the HTT efforts more good than harm 26 9 1 National Defense University Effective Mixed effectiveness Not effective Study 8 4 1
26 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB et al. must authorize a select group of analysts to retrieve information from the ground level and make it available to a broader audience, similar to the way journalists work. These
analysts must leave their chairs and visit the U.S. Army (Raul Elliott) people who operate at the grassroots level— civil affairs officers, [Provincial Reconstruc- tion Teams], atmospherics teams, Afghan liaison officers, female engagement teams, willing [nongovernmental organizations] and development organizations, United Nations officials, psychological operations teams, human terrain teams, and staff officers with infantry battalions—to name a few.31
In short, primary collection is done at the small unit level where there are “many sensors,” and analysis of the diverse descrip- tive inputs is done at the brigade level, where Human Terrain System leader and PRT members listen to briefing during meeting at Contingency there are more resources, and then the Operating Base Speicher, Tikrit, Iraq information is passed along to the regional (or division) level to create a comprehensive ■■ HTTs had to be appended to a brigade that forced teams to repeatedly adjust to composite understanding of the situation. commander and staff that were committed to a new commanders. In such circumstances, it The Flynn explanation for how the population-centric counterinsurgency approach. was important to field cohesive teams that entire force, aided by “select teams of civilian ■■ HTTs had to prove to typically skep- could be immediately productive. Ideally, analysts,” should produce cultural intel- tical commanders that they could make a HTTs should have been given more general ligence helps make sense of the diverse com- contribution. expertise on Afghanistan and greater access mander assessments of HTT performance. ■■ HTTs had to overcome the many to specific information about the areas they The few, small, and costly HTTs best served intrinsic constraints on productivity that would operate in as early as possible. They brigade commanders at the second level of characterized the HTS program at the organi- should have been well-functioning teams cultural knowledge rather than being used at zational, team, and individual levels. composed of individuals with diverse exper- the first level as small-unit data collectors. If tise that trained together, bonded, and found the teams were used as data collectors, they These preconditions for success their place on brigade staffs prior to deploy- perhaps pleased commanders but ultimately underscore several points. First, there are ment. They should have relieved predecessor were too few in number to make a difference. limits to what any sociocultural program teams in the field with a period of overlap As one brigade commander commented, can do without a consensus among brigade with the outgoing teams, not as individual using HTTs as collectors was like using commanders on the critical importance of replacements. They should have had longer a squirt gun to fight a forest fire. HTTs human terrain, the role their own troops periods of deployment to deepen their cannot serve as a substitute for a larger, more play in collecting human terrain data, and expertise on local conditions and to permit comprehensive effort to collect and analyze the analytic capability HTTs are supposed the desired overlap with relieving HTTs and cultural intelligence. Instead, the optimum to provide to the brigade staffs as part of a brigades (see the larger study for a detailed role for HTTs is to perform at the second level larger, theater-wide human terrain–centric explanation of small cross-functional team of cultural knowledge where they can help intelligence architecture. Absent a “whole performance factors). explain local human terrain to the command force” approach to developing and using For a variety of reasons, none of these staff and facilitate decisionmaking. HTTs sociocultural knowledge such as General conditions applied. Instead, HTTs were that did so improved brigade command deci- Flynn envisioned, the ability of HTS or any conceptualized, created, and managed in a sionmaking and received the most effusive other small sociocultural teams to make a way that made it hard for them to serve as commander praise. difference is quite limited. cultural knowledge integrators for brigade With the nuances of commander Moreover, even if brigade command- commanders. Among other things, quickly assessments and the optimal role for HTTs ers were open to the population-centric winning commanders’ confidence was clarified, it is easier to make sense of other approach to counterinsurgency that theater difficult given the way HTTs were raised factors that determined the teams’ perfor- commanders were emphasizing—and this and trained. Since HTT members were mance. There were several broad precondi- has never uniformly been the case32—they individually assigned to teams after arriv- tions for HTT productivity, the first of still took time for HTTs to prove themselves. ing in country, they did not typically have which was beyond the control of HTS and This reduced efficiency, especially given a chance to get to know the other members, the HTTs: the yearlong brigade tours for Afghanistan much less the brigade commanders and ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 27 Forum | The Way Ahead for Human Terrain Teams staffs. Without predeployment training by repeatedly integrating newly arriving than the HTTs but can expand quickly to as a team, HTTs could not work out team members who deployed individually in generate a HTT-like capability when U.S. dynamics in a less stressful environment or staggered timeframes rather than as teams. forces go to war. To execute this transition, establish team decisionmaking processes This was a difficult proposition, and unfor- HTS will have to overcome a great deal of until they reached the field where each new tunately, HTT leader performance was as organizational inertia. The U.S. military has team member’s arrival potentially disrupted variable as HTT performance. Autocratic a strong cultural aversion to irregular warfare established productive team practices. team leaders were particularly out of place and to devoting resources to sociocultural Deploying members singly inadvertently given the composition of the teams and their knowledge.33 This aversion is demonstrated signaled that they were valued as individual mission. They were a major factor in notable repeatedly as the military abandons sociocul- assets rather than as teams. In a stressful team failures. Those leaders who were able tural knowledge and the means to acquire it combat environment, the failure to bond as to overcome the many impediments to HTT once conflicts are over. Despite expressions teams was sometimes crippling. effectiveness were indispensable and heroic of senior leader support, the HTS program is now being curtailed to save resources, and many believe it is an open question whether leaders had to get their teams operating smoothly the knowledge painfully acquired by the and prove themselves to commanders quickly since their program will be retained. standard length of deployment was only 9 months One way to make the future of HTS more secure would be to house it in an organization that is predisposed to value Moreover, the training the teams catalysts who were much admired by their sociocultural knowledge. The U.S. Army received was not based on a theory of HTT team members. The HTS selection process Special Operations Command (USASOC) performance that was tested by feedback did not screen team leader candidates for the meets the requirement for an organization from actual in-country experience. Thus, attributes that correlated with such high per- that is familiar with what it takes to field the HTS program had no way to improve formance; their presence was largely a matter small, high-performing, cross-functional HTT learning and prepare teams for the of happenstance. teams such as HTTs. USASOC commands significant challenges they would face. Some With performance constrained by so Special Forces, which already use a female teams overcame their interpersonal conflicts many external and internal factors, it is not version of Human Terrain Teams as well and learned how to channel conflict into surprising that it was variable. Even so, most as civil affairs and military information productive avenues that improved team commanders valued HTTs, which is a testi- support operations units that would benefit performance, but many did not. If teams mony to the people who populated high-per- from better sociocultural knowledge. could not resolve conflicts productively, they forming HTTs, but also to the general lack USASOC is part of U.S. Special Operations stood little chance of developing a cohesive of sociocultural knowledge in U.S. military Command, which is often assigned the lead team culture or trust. In addition, the quality forces that made even limited HTT contribu- for irregular warfare and has other units of HTT recruits was highly variable. Many tions so necessary and conspicuous. (for example, Navy SEALs) that use Human recruits were alienated during training Terrain Teams of one sort or another. For or joined for the wrong reasons and were Future of HTS these and other reasons, USASOC might be unproductive after they deployed. In many The HTT experience demonstrates that a good fit for HTS. cases, team members were not mentally or it is difficult to develop sociocultural knowl- Whether or not HTS is housed in physically conditioned to operate in hostile or edge quickly; difficult to retain, update, and USASOC, the need for a standing program austere environments. In the rush to institute transfer that knowledge between units; and to provide sociocultural knowledge should the program, HTS relied on high individual almost impossible to do these things without be well recognized after a decade of difficult member remuneration, and even so it was a well-developed concept for HTT perfor- military operations. Some Army observers, hard to find and attract individuals with deep mance that is based on empirical feedback for example, believe the need for cultural regional and linguistic expertise. Job satisfac- from actual experience in-theater. Thus, the understanding is one of the “top 5” lessons tion on high-performing small teams is more U.S. military needs a standing capability to learned from the post-9/11 wars.34 If this a function of team bonding and productiv- provide a baseline of sociocultural knowledge lesson is acted upon and HTS survives, ity than individual remuneration, but the that can be rapidly expanded in wartime. those who lead it into the future hopefully program was structured to make the former HTS and the many similar programs that will benefit from a thorough understand- difficult and to rely on the latter. stood up and proliferated during the wars in ing of how and why HTTs performed as With so many impediments to high Afghanistan and Iraq could have been run they did over the past decade. In that case, performance, HTTs were critically depen- much more efficiently if they emerged from it should be possible to improve both HTT dent on stellar and versatile leadership. a standing sociocultural knowledge program performance and chances for success in Leaders had to get their teams operating designed for that purpose. future irregular warfare operations. If, smoothly and prove themselves to com- Looking to the future, HTS now faces however, the program cannot learn from manders quickly since their standard length the challenge of transitioning to a stand- the past, or fades away for lack of support of deployment was only 9 months and ing peacetime sociocultural knowledge or other reasons, it is quite likely that the they had to ensure productivity over time capacity that provides a different capability future of sociocultural knowledge in the
28 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu LAMB et al.
U.S. military will be much like its past—a Capabilities: Analysis of Human Terrain Teams in 22 John McHugh, “Transcript: Defense Writers story of too little knowledge, obtained and Afghanistan—Draft Final Report, December 2011; Group,” A Project of the Center for Media and disseminated at great cost, often arriving Jack A. Jackson et al., Contingency Capabilities: Security, New York and Washington, DC, March Analysis of Human Terrain Teams in Afghanistan, 31, 2010, 10. too late to ensure success. JFQ Draft Final Report, IDA Paper P-4-4809 (Alexan- 23 “Appendix F: Position Descriptions for dria, VA: IDA, December 2011). Human Terrain Teams,” documents include a 7 Sharon Hamilton, “HTS Director’s February 2, 2010, job classification date; attached This article is based on the Message,” Military Intelligence Professional Bul- as appendix G to Clinton et al., 221–236. authors’ book entitled Human Terrain letin 37, no. 4 (October–December 2011). 24 Ironically, what is publically known about Teams: An Organizational Innovation 8 U.S. National Research Council, Experi- these investigations substantiated HTS manage- for Sociocultural Knowledge in Irregu- mentation and Rapid Prototyping in Support of ment’s view that elements of TRADOC responsible lar Warfare (Institute for World Politics Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: National for contracting and personnel hiring performed Press, forthcoming). Academies Press, 2009), 22. poorly. See Clinton et al., 42, 135, appendix G. 9 Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Army Transformation: 25 HTS established new “policies and proce- Implications for the Future,” testimony before the dures in areas as diverse as ethical certification, House Armed Services Committee, Washington, human resources, peer product review, civilian Notes DC, July 15, 2004. evaluations, team product quality control, and 10 Montgomery McFate and Steve Fondacaro, individual position qualification.” See Hamilton. 1 Doyle McManus, “McManus: A smaller, “Reflections on the Human Terrain System 26 Joanne Kimberlin, “Part 4: In the Enemy’s smarter military: The best-equipped army in the During the First 4 Years,” PRISM 2, no. 4 (Septem- Lair, Fighting for Afghanistan’s Future,” The Vir- world can still lose a war if it doesn’t understand ber 2011), 67. ginian Pilot, September 29, 2010. the people it’s fighting,” Los Angeles Times, April 11 “Authorization to Release Joint IED Defeat 27 U.S. Special Operations Command had 22, 2012. Organization [JIEDDO] Funds for Human Terrain some classified programs related to human terrain 2 Leo Shane III and Kevin Baron, “Petraeus System,” memorandum for record, signed by under way earlier. Confirmation Hearing, Live,” Stars and Stripes, JIEDDO Director Montgomery C. Meigs, June 12, 28 Jebb, Hummel, Chacho, 3; Clinton et al., 153; June 29, 2010. 2006. data obtained from S.K. Numrich, IDA, email on 3 Colonel Martin P. Schweitzer, USA, Com- 12 The Human Terrain System Yearly Report April 18, 2012. mander, 4th Brigade Combat Team/82nd Airborne, 2007–2008, 5–7. Document in authors’ possession. 29 Arthur Speyer and Job Henning, “MCIA’s Statement Before the House Armed Services Com- 13 Ibid., 155, 236–237. Cultural Intelligence Methodology and Lessons mittee, Terrorism and Unconventional Threats 14 Robert M. Gates, “Landon Lecture,” Kansas Learned,” in Socio-Cultural Perspectives: A New Subcommittee and Research and Education Sub- State University, Manhattan, Kansas, November Intelligence Paradigm, Report on the Conference committee of the Science and Technology Commit- 26, 2007. at the MITRE Corporation, McLean, Virginia, tee, U.S. House of Representatives, 110th Cong., 2nd 15 American Anthropological Association September 12, 2006, ed. LeeEllen Friedland, Gary sess., Hearings on Role of the Social and Behavioral (AAA), “American Anthropological Associa- W. Shaeff, and Jessica Glicken Turnley, Document Sciences in National Security, April 24, 2008. tion’s Executive Board Statement on the Human Number 07-1220, Technical Report MTR070244 4 See Jeffrey Bordin, A Crisis of Trust and Cul- Terrain System Project,” October 31, 2007; Sharon (McLean, VA: MITRE, 2007). tural Incompatibility: A Red Team Study of Mutual Weinberger, “Gates: Human Terrain Teams Going 30 Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul Perceptions of Afghan National Security Force Through ‘Growing Pains,’” Wired, April 15, 2008. Batchelor, Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intel- Personnel and U.S. Soldiers in Understanding and 16 TRADOC, Office of Internal Review and ligence Relevant in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Mitigating the Phenomena of ANSF-Committed Audit Compliance, results briefing, May 12, 2010, Center for a New American Security, 2010), 9, 12. Fratricide-Murders, May 12, 2011, available at attached as appendix G to Clinton et al., 237–250. 31 Ibid., 17.
DOD
Environmental Planning While Deployed Mission Hindrance or Enhancement?
By LeeAnn Racz, Peter A. Baker, Kelsey L. Duckworth,Tiffany R. Heline, and Brian D. Woodall
Major LeeAnn Racz, USAF, is Director of the Graduate Environmental Engineering and Science Program at the Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Major Peter A. Baker, USMC, is Deputy Head of the Natural Resources and Environmental Affairs Branch at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. Captain Kelsey L. Duckworth, USMC, and Captain Tiffany R. Heline, USAF, are graduate students in the Department of Systems Engineering and Management at the Air Force Institute of Technology. Captain Brian D. Woodall, USMC, is Deputy Director of the Environmental Management Division at Marine Corps Installations East–Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, Jacksonville, North Carolina.
30 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu RACZ et al.
here is abundant doctrine sores, uncontrollable diarrhea, and extreme from soil, water, and air.11 Over 40 cases requiring planners and opera- fever among Athenians jammed together in from 1991 to 2006 were reported in which tors to consider environmental unsanitary conditions.5 In fact, World War I contingency-related incidents with negative T protection in deployment marked the first time combat-related deaths environmental consequences actually or operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-34, outnumbered deaths from DNBI. Even potentially affected the health of U.S. troops Joint Engineer Operations, for instance, then, a noted bacteriologist observed during or others. These instances had a profound outlines environmental considerations for preparations for World War I that “war effect on the military mission. For example, both domestic and foreign training and is . . . 75% an engineering and sanitary a base camp that was poorly sited had to operations.1 Many commands have also problem, and less than 25% a military one. be dismantled and relocated, which dis- included an annex L in operation plans, The wise general will do what the engineers tracted the unit from its primary mission. which describes the overall environmental and sanitary officers let him.”6 Nevertheless, In another case, a 300-gallon fuel tanker mission. However, these plans seldom these lessons have not been learned to the overturned at a U.S. camp, but the spill was include specific instruction or goals on the necessary extent. During the Soviet-Afghan not officially reported or properly marked. tactical level. In fact, although many lessons war in the 1980s, 67 percent of Soviets who Base planners had begun to construct sleep- from the Balkans and other contingency served in Afghanistan required hospitaliza- ing areas at the site until officials learned of operations have been documented and tion for a serious illness such as hepatitis, the spill. Construction had to be halted and studied, lessons are now being relearned in typhoid fever, plague, malaria, or cholera.7 started over at a new location. the Iraq and Afghanistan operations.2 In During Operations Iraqi Freedom and Base camps generate large streams of addition, despite requirements to conduct Enduring Freedom from 2001 to 2006, evacu- waste. It is critical that this waste is managed environmental health site assessments prior ations for DNBI accounted for 35 percent properly to prevent contamination. Until to establishing base camps, they were not and 36 percent, respectively, of all medical recently, military bases in Iraq and Afghani- always completed during Operations Iraqi evacuation cases and were the largest single stan routinely used burn pits to dispose of Freedom and Enduring Freedom because category of evacuations for both operations.8 their solid waste. It is unclear exactly how commanders did not advise preventive medicine personnel where camps were being set up.3 This may be, at least in part, World War I marked the first time combat-related attributed to field commanders not being deaths outnumbered deaths from disease aware of the function of their preventive medicine assets.4 It should be noted that Final Governing Standards (FGS), or the In addition to communicable diseases, many burn pits were operated and for how Overseas Environmental Baseline Guid- other environmental conditions can lead long. Notwithstanding the lack of clear epi- ance Document (OEBGD) where FGS are to debilitating injuries. At least 25 percent demiological evidence linking burn pits with not available, currently do not apply to of the 697,000 who served in the 1991 Gulf respiratory and pulmonary diseases, these contingency military operations. However, War are afflicted with an enduring, chronic operations have been eyed as a potential policy is being drafted to extend the FGS or multisymptom illness commonly known cause for these types of illnesses. As a result, OEBGD to contingency bases. as “Gulf War Syndrome.” Suggested causes Department of Defense Instruction 4715.19, There is a difference between an include exposures to potential neurotoxins “Use of Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency environmental baseline study and an envi- (pyridostigmine bromide pills, pesticides, Operations,” now prohibits long-term use ronmental health site assessment, though and nerve agents), close proximity to oil of burn pits for certain kinds of waste and they are inextricably related. While an well fires, and receipt of multiple vaccines.9 authorizes their short-term use only when no environmental baseline study evaluates the Even more recently, a jury ordered a military alternative disposal method is feasible. status of the environment, an environmental contractor to pay 12 U.S. Soldiers $85 million health site assessment evaluates the impact in damages after failing to protect them from Combat Effectiveness and Mission of the environment on the warfighter. In this exposure to hexavalent chromium, a known Success article, we discuss both studies as they are human carcinogen, that contaminated a Besides degradation of troop health key to successful military operations. water treatment facility in Iraq.10 It is conceiv- and safety, failing to account for environ- able that had some of these environmental mental factors can have a detrimental effect Troop Health and Safety conditions been assessed more carefully, they on meeting mission objectives. Forward History is rife with examples of disease could have been mitigated. operating bases (FOBs) generate hazardous non-battle-related injuries (DNBI) being the JP 3-34 stresses the link between the wastes such as fuel, oil, other chemicals, and dominating causes of casualties in military physical health of military members and batteries. The 1989 Basel Convention on operations. Diseases associated with unsani- mission readiness by noting that “failure to the Control of Transboundary Movements tary conditions and close quarters such as recognize environmental threats can result of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal dysentery, typhoid fever, pneumonia, and in significant health risks to the JTF [joint prevents the United States from moving influenza were responsible for DNBI. As task force], adversely impacting readiness.” hazardous wastes out of a country in a timely early as the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides These threats include endemic insect- or manner. As a result, they tend to accumulate documented vomiting, convulsions, painful rodent-borne disease as well as pollution at these sites and, if not sited or managed ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 31 Forum | Environmental Planning While Deployed
mental practices. Due to strict environ- mental regulations in the United States, U.S. Navy units conducting field training exercises are often required to bivouac in areas that have permanent lavatory facilities and water distribution and waste disposal systems. To make appropriate environmental practices part of a unit’s culture, training facilities would better serve unit needs if personnel were allowed to construct and manage all aspects of an FOB including waste manage- ment. Such predeployment training would prepare military personnel better for deploy- ment operations.
Making the Case for Sustainability Sustainability has become something of a buzzword, but it has real implications for enhancing military mission effective- ness. In this context, sustainability may be defined as “using processes that are non-polluting, conserving of energy and natural resources, economically efficient, 16 Naval medical personnel examine positive malaria blood smear at Naval Medical Research Unit, Callao, Peru [and] safe and healthful for workers.” FOBs have become an important feature in the U.S. expeditionary warfighting strategy. Contingency bases in deployed properly, could hinder mission effectiveness. and trash is key to gaining support of the environments vary in size, mission, and For example, in Afghanistan, improperly population. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, duration, but all require significant logis- stored lithium batteries resulted in two fires attacks on soldiers were reduced in sections tics to supply water, fuel, and food, as well that released hazardous fumes, immediately of Baghdad where U.S. forces had provided at as to remove waste. For example, a 600- putting the health of nearby personnel at least some of these services.14 soldier FOB requires a convoy of 22 trucks risk. In Iraq, hazardous waste accumulation Failure to manage waste is counter- per day just to supply fuel and water and points were located near the base perimeter, productive to meeting both strategic and haul away wastewater and solid waste.17 making an attractive target for attack by tactical objectives. U.S. actions that are The costs to supply the FOBs are not only insurgents. Also in Iraq, American units used perceived as harmful to the environment dollars and manpower, but also the risk heavy construction equipment that damaged can cause friction between Americans and of attack against convoy personnel. There the fragile topsoil (called desert pavement) nationals, which may promote instability remains an urgent need to improve FOB that created dust storms, leading to vis- and keep the United States from obtaining sustainability to reduce the need to convoy ibility, breathing, and vehicle-maintenance its political objectives. Therefore, diligent supplies in and the waste out. problems. An appropriate environmental planning minimizing environmental Although official military doctrine assessment factoring the local soil and envi- impact must be conducted throughout all specifies that bottled drinking water be used ronmental conditions might have prevented operational phases. However, the military as a last resort, it is in reality the primary these problems.12 is frequently inadequately staffed, trained, source of drinking water at many FOBs. There Although there may be trash in the and equipped to deal with waste manage- is a perception that bottled water is safer, easier streets and polluted water in a country where ment. The Area of Responsibility Environ- to pack and carry on missions, and more easily deployed operations take place, locals still mental Component Plan discusses the U.S. distributed during humanitarian missions. care about their environment. In fact, public military’s challenges in effectively manag- However, delivering bottled water is expen- opinion data in Iraq from 2003 to 2005 indi- ing waste streams, often relying on open sive, dangerous, and creates a major source cated that environmental issues should be an burning of all forms of solid waste and non- of solid waste. An estimated half of the water important piece of reconstruction efforts.13 ideal discharge lagoons for wastewater.15 bottles are discarded even before they are People care deeply whether their water will While contractors may manage the waste used because of torn shrink-wrap packaging make their children sick, and they will be generated at larger FOBs, smaller bases may or expired shelf lives.18 If not hauled out of the more likely to support forces that provide assign the responsibility as an additional FOB, the waste must be disposed of on-site. their basic needs. Field Manual 3-24, Coun- duty to military personnel. Many times, on-site solid waste disposal is terinsurgency, notes that providing essential In addition, tactical units often lack accomplished via burn pits. As mentioned, services such as sewage, water, electricity, training in the use of appropriate environ- burn pits are not viable long-term alternatives
32 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu RACZ et al. to waste treatment. However, there are alterna- Command locations. Power production at 6 Hans Zinsser, Rats, Lice, and History (New tives to relying on bottled drinking water. As these deployed sites often exceeds demand, York: Little, Brown, 1935). 7 long as local water sources meet purity and wasting a significant amount of fuel. For Lester W. Grau and William A. Jorgensen, “Beaten by the Bugs: The Soviet-Afghan War quantity requirements, military units may use instance, Camp Leatherneck only required Experience,” Military Review 77, no. 6 (1997). reverse osmosis water purification units, tacti- 5 megawatts of power but was generating 19 8 Keith G. Hauret et al., “Frequency and cal water purification systems, or lightweight megawatts with 196 generators running at 30 Causes of Nonbattle Injuries Air Evacuated from purifiers. These technologies are proven to percent capacity and consuming over 15,000 Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, 23 produce safe, potable drinking water and, if gallons of fuel per day. More judicious use of U.S. Army 2001–2006,” American Journal of Pre- used more regularly, would reduce the need for generators could reduce the consumption of ventive Medicine 38, no. 1 (2010). bottled drinking water. precious fuel. 9 Donald W. Riegle, Jr., and Alfonse M. Fuel is another important commodity D’Amato, “U.S. Chemical and Biological Warfare- required at FOBs. In 2006, Major General Conclusions Related Dual Use Exports to Iraq and their Pos- Richard Zilmer, USMC, requested alternative Regulations intended to protect the sible Impact on the Health Consequences of the rd nd energy sources such as solar panels and wind environment have implications beyond just Gulf War,” United States Senate, 103 Cong., 2 sess., May 25, 1994. turbines for battlefield operations in Iraq. complying with written mandates. Indeed, 10 Glenn Hess, “Chemical Hazards: Jury General Zilmer’s memo noted that without planning for environmental conditions and awards $85 million to US soldiers exposed to renewable power, U.S. forces “will remain protection at the beginning of a deployment hexavalent chromium in Iraq,” Chemical & Engi- unnecessarily exposed” and will “continue benefits troop health and safety. Employing neering News, November 12, 2012, 8. to accrue preventable . . . serious and grave sustainable practices in deployed operations 11 Rosaline Cardarelli, Maintaining a Trained and Ready Army from an Environmental Perspec- tive (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Camp Leatherneck only required 5 megawatts of power 2002). but was generating 19 megawatts and consuming 12 David E. Mosher and Beth Lachman, “Green over 15,000 gallons of fuel per day Warriors: Environmental Opportunities in Con- tingency Operations,” Army, August 2009, 30–36. 13 Mosher et al. 14 Mosher and Lachman. casualties.”19 Ashton Carter, Under Secretary helps reduce waste and costs both in funds 15 CH2M Hill, “AOR Environmental Compo- of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and and lives. Including environmental factors nent Plan,” prepared for U.S. Army Central, March Logistics, testified to Congress in 2009 that in planning and operations directly helps to 2009. “protecting large fuel convoys imposes a huge ensure strategic and tactical mission success. 16 See Lowell Center for Sustainable Produc- burden on combat forces” and “reducing the Nevertheless, environmental considerations tion, available at
U.S. Air Force (Christopher Meares)
AIR ADVISING A Critical Component of Joint Engagement
By Nicole S. Finch and Peter A. Garretson
ver the past few years, the U.S. gencies. Iraqi pilots attend the international operational environment, first and foremost Air Force has developed a scal- F-16 schoolhouse in Tucson, Arizona. to reduce U.S. employments abroad and share able capability for air advising U.S. Airmen in mobility support advisory the burden of necessary international action that is designed to enhance squadrons (MSAS) spend a month with their with partner nations, and also to provide O global access to the U.S. joint force. access, build relationships, and create partner compatriots in Honduras, exchanging infor- capabilities that enable and create synergies mation on everything from survival training for the joint force. This article discusses air to logistics to air traffic control. Each of these Air Advising Defined advising, the future joint environment and diverse activities includes a central strategic Air advising is “the act of com- the impetus for the creation of an air advisor feature: long-term relationship-building for municating professional knowledge and capability, benefits of air advising for the the purpose of advancing U.S. national inter- skills to partner nation personnel in order joint force, standing air advising units, avia- ests. These partner nation security forces now to improve their airpower capabilities. tion enterprise development, the future of have U.S. military contacts and affiliations Air advising includes five basic activities: air advising in the joint force, and how the to last them throughout their careers as they assessing, training, advising, assisting, and members of the joint community can engage advance to positions of leadership. In turn, equipping.”1 The Air Force assists partner and leverage the air advising capability. Airmen have done their best to prepare the nations by helping them develop, enhance, Air advising is happening around the world. Kyrgyz firefighters learn coalition Nicole S. Finch is a Senior Analyst at Scitor Corporation. Lieutenant Colonel Peter A. Garretson, USAF, is techniques for responding to airfield emer- Division Chief of Irregular Strategy, Plans, and Policy.
34 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu FINCH and GARRETSON and sustain their aviation enterprises, cal endstates without placing U.S. surface to withstand internal threats and external defined as “the sum total of all air domain forces at risk, thus providing a wider range aggression. However, advancing a partner resources, processes, and culture, including of options. Therefore, both airpower and nation’s aviation enterprise also typically personnel, equipment, infrastructure, oper- surface operations benefit from more capable advances that partner’s dual-use aviation ations, sustainment, and airmindedness.”2 partners. Successful deployment and employ- capabilities, serving larger U.S. development Air advising is a critical component ment require the cooperation of partners who goals. While air advising could span the full of the Air Force response to direction in can provide APODs in various regions of spectrum of partner air forces, the capabil- Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction the world, who can provide aviation support ity that the Air Force is expanding is aimed 5000.58, “Security Force Assistance” (SFA), in mobility and intelligence, surveillance, principally at developing nations with under- which instructs the military Services, among and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and who developed aviation enterprises. Therefore, other things, to: are capable of operating with U.S. forces. the Service anticipates that it will be part Air advising provides our partners with the of a team with other government agencies, ■■ support DOD efforts to organize, capability and professionalism to perform such as the Federal Aviation Administration, train, equip, and advise foreign military forces such missions as ISR and moving land forces, U.S. Agency for International Development, ■■ provide scalable capabilities to meet whether working alone, with regional part- Department of Commerce, and Department the requirements of SFA activities ners, or in concert with U.S. joint forces and of State, which will handle other aspects of ■■ develop military department Service- interagency organizations. civilian and military aviation development specific strategy for SFA capabilities.
Future Joint Environment and the Air Force vision is developing and enhancing Impetus for Air Advising partner nations’ aviation enterprises via air advising as U.S. leaders have directed the military part of targeted security force assistance to focus on more efficient means to achieve security and stability, teaching that we can get the most “bang for the buck” by prevent- Air advising benefits the joint force as part of a larger, whole-of-government– ing the types of conflicts overseas that can in four specific ways: prevention, burden- planned effort. The Air Force will also affect us within our borders or require U.S. sharing, legitimacy, and access. Air advising cooperate with international organizations intervention abroad. To achieve the endstates has the potential to reduce U.S. employments such as the International Civil Aviation in this national-level guidance, DOD and abroad while increasing compatibility and Organization, International Air Transport the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff interoperability for coalition and allied Association, and various financing organiza- have issued directives and instructions for operations, leading to more opportuni- tions such as, for example, the World Bank, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, ties for burden-sharing with other nations International Monetary Fund, Millennium stability operations, and irregular warfare. when future conflicts arise. A rising tide Challenge Corporation, and Asian Develop- The Air Force vision is to employ a strat- lifts all boats, so to speak, when it comes ment Bank.3 Such civil-military relationships egy of developing and enhancing partner to aviation enterprise development: what may be established through the U.S. Embassy nations’ respective aviation enterprises via helps our partner nations helps us. Building Country Team in each partner nation as well air advising as part of targeted security force professionalism in partner air forces, as well as through interagency organizations within assistance. Over the past few years, the Air as improving their overall infrastructures, the national capital region and elsewhere.4 Force has developed a scalable capability helps lead to the legitimacy of partner nation for air advising designed to enhance access, governments within their own borders. Air Standing Units in Special Operations build relationships, and create partner capa- advising also opens the door for access to and and General Purpose Forces bilities to enable and create synergies for the shaping of nonpartner nations, either holding Air advising takes a variety of forms. joint force. up our partner nations as examples for others Current examples include Airmen deployed to emulate, or via our partners advising other to Iraq and Afghanistan who advise on a full- Benefits for the Joint Force neighbors who may not be as anxious for a time basis. Some Airmen assigned in partner The dynamics of the international U.S. presence on their soil or our involvement nations as part of security cooperation orga- environment mean we cannot plan the spe- in their affairs. nizations within U.S. Embassies may perform cifics of future joint force employment with Air advising assists the joint force and air advising on a part-time basis. Some base- certainty, but we do know that whenever U.S. the Nation in reaching desired defense and level maintenance personnel and aircrew may forces are employed abroad, they will need security goals in multiple ways. From the perform air advising activities routinely, as appropriate support elements and force mul- beginning, Airmen consider joint and inter- members of mobile training teams, to partner tipliers. For American forces to be timely and agency needs and synergies. Air Force air nations or during exercises and personnel effective, they often need to be air mobile, advising is executed in concert with the other exchanges with partner nation personnel.5 arriving via an aerial port of debarkation military Services and other governmental The standing units of execution, education, (APOD). The joint force has the option of organizations. For example, military engage- and training for air advising in the Air Force using airpower combined with indigenous ments will necessarily be focused on building are 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS), forces to achieve certain military and politi- the capacity and capability of partner nations two mobility support aviation squadrons in ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 35 Forum | Air Advising the general purpose forces (GPF) that provide Although only established in 2011, advisory capability for steady-state protracted an expeditionary capability, and the Air the squadrons have already been successful IW requirements to complement existing Advisor Academy (AAA), which provides in their first engagements. In April 2012, special operations force advisory capabili- education and training for air advisors 571 MSAS participated in an information ties.” The strategy directed the creation of assigned to the MSAS as well as predeploy- exchange with the Honduran air force, “an aviation advisor schoolhouse, which will ment training. which was described by participants as “a preserve the hard-won experience gleaned 6th Special Operations Squadron. success from every aspect.” During this from current efforts to stand up the Iraqi Air While air advising and aviation enterprise engagement, 15 members of the 571 MSAS Force and the Afghan Air Force.”9 development are becoming more prominent demonstrated a capability to conduct The AAA mission, as described in its in Air Force strategy, the Service has per- seminars in airbase defense, aircraft main- April 2010 charter, is “to provide a rigorous, formed these roles since its inception. The tenance, aircrew safety, aircrew survival, air relevant, and flexible continuum of educa- tion and training to Airmen so they are a partner nation cannot have aviation operations capable of applying their aviation expertise to assess, train/educate, advise, assist, and until it has developed an aviation infrastructure equip partner nations in the development and application of their aviation resources oldest organization dedicated to air advising traffic control, communications, generator to meet their national needs in support is Air Force Special Operations Command 6 maintenance, and fuels assessment. Com- of all security cooperation activities.” It SOS, which was established as a squadron in mensurate with the Air Force commitment combines the core air advisor skills with 1994 but with lineage dating back to 1944.6 to increase language and culture skills, the language, region, and culture instruction, These combat aviation advisors (CAAs) ability of many members of this unique as well as fieldcraft skills to Airmen of all do not conduct initial qualification train- squadron to speak Spanish improved the ranks.10 Depending on mission require- ing. Moreover, their core mission is not to engagement, and the after-action report ments, courses, which start almost every develop a partner nation’s broader aviation recommended more language training for all week, can range between 1 and 4 weeks in enterprise. Instead, CAAs specialize in train- squadron members. The 818 MSAS has par- duration. Longer courses meet U.S. Central ing foreign forces in advanced or tactical ticipated in engagements in Africa including Command theater-entry requirements, employment of aviation resources operated the March 2012 African Partnership Flight, counterinsurgency training standards, by the partner nation—often equipment a 2-week military-to-military multilateral and security force assistance training and aircraft produced by the former Soviet and regional engagement event in Ghana. In standards. The AAA was initially focused Union.7 Combat aviation advisors from 6 this multilateral engagement, the 818 MSAS on training personnel deploying to Iraq SOS have been working over the past decade demonstrated its capability to conduct class- and Afghanistan but has now expanded its to increase the aviation counterinsurgency room instruction including such courses as scope to support global requirements for air capability and capacity in both Iraq and cargo preparation, search and rescue, airfield advisors. It reached its initial operational Afghanistan. Their efforts have been so suc- security, public affairs, flight and ground capability in July 2012, and will eventually cessful that Congress mandated that 6 SOS safety, aerospace physiology, and fixed-wing have a throughput of up to 1,500 students double in size in 2006 and again in 2010. aircraft maintenance. In addition to impart- per year. Meanwhile, DOD asserted the importance ing knowledge, these activities opened the of institutionalizing similar capabilities in door for truly lasting partnerships. Aviation Enterprise Development the GPF so special operations forces can Air Advisor Academy. An air advisor Many in the joint force understand- remain “special” while the GPF responds to a is not entirely born or made. Air advising ably care about partner air capabilities to broader mission set. begins with a certain type of individual—not support land forces and combined air-land Mobility Support Aviation Squad- everyone is cut out for the job. Just as a good operations. But aviation does not begin rons. Since 2008, the Air Force has been aviator does not necessarily make a good and end at close air support, and a partner working to achieve a capability similar to instructor, a good instructor does not neces- nation cannot have aviation operations until that of 6 SOS within the GPF. Toward this sarily make a good advisor. The successful it has developed an aviation infrastructure. end, and drawing on lessons learned by air advisor empathizes with the partner’s Aviation enterprise development is an Air Air Force Special Operations Command situation, feelings, and motives and has Force–led initiative to engage with less combat aviation advisors, the Air Force enough patience to adapt to the slow process capable partner nations to build aviation established 571 and 818 MSAS. While the of partner nation improvement.8 Once identi- capabilities, capacities, and institutions and MSAS are trained and able to support any fied, the air advisor, preferably with these to strengthen the U.S. global defense posture. country, the Air Force has chosen to create basic personality traits, attends training at The aviation enterprise development initia- each squadron as a regionally aligned force: the Air Advisor Academy to learn the tools of tive begins with guidance from the President, 571 MSAS is aligned to support U.S. South- the air advising trade. Secretary of Defense, and Joint Staff to make ern Command and 818 MSAS is aligned to The AAA was officially established in thoughtful choices supporting partnership- support U.S. Africa Command, allowing May 2012 to fulfill the 2009 Air Force Irregu- building to achieve desirable foreign policy these commands to build long-term rela- lar Warfare (IW) Strategy’s goal of establish- effects in peacetime. Airpower capabilities tionships with partner nations. ing “a permanent general purpose force . . . include “all air, space, and cyberspace capa-
36 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu FINCH and GARRETSON U.S. Air Force (Lesley Waters) U.S. Air Force
Air traffic controller and air advisor review arrival-runway separation procedures with Honduran military air traffic controllers
bilities germane to a given engagement with and safe havens beyond state reach that approach, from initial assessment of a partner a partner nation.”11 For some partner nations, provide the freedom of action sought by nation to planning, execution, and lessons air advising must begin with the development insurgents, extremists, criminals, and ter- learned, with the end goal of empowering of the aviation enterprise—that is, having the rorists. The same light aircraft initially used the partner nation to extend its state reach ability to consistently get even the simplest for mobility operations can then be modi- through aerospace-enabled governance. aircraft into the sky—before it can move on fied to perform ISR and strike operations. to the major capabilities typically associated The overall goal of aviation enterprise Development Planning with Air Force operations. development is for a nation’s airpower capa- The Air Force has an exceptional system To meet that challenge, 571 and 818 bilities to be “employed, supported, and inte- to service the needs of near-peers who can MSAS assess, train, and advise partner grated into the larger context of the partner afford the type of advanced aircraft that nation air forces in those critical agile nation’s national security strategy” and the provide the United States with air superiority. combat support activities (command and geographic combatant command’s theater These near-peers already have a well-devel- control, communications, air operations, campaign plan.12 An important part of a oped aviation enterprise and a history of avia- aerial port, aircraft maintenance, aeromedi- functional aviation enterprise is aerospace- tion professionalism, and they are interoper- cal evacuation, and support functions) that enabled governance. Mobility, ISR, and strike able with U.S. capabilities. The Air Force is assist in aviation enterprise development capabilities are critical to a nation’s internal increasing its emphasis on GPF air advisors, and open the door to economic develop- stability and legitimacy and are interactive who fill a vital niche and service critical ment and future aviation operations. A and mutually supportive of the less visible security cooperation partners with nascent or nation with little or no aviation enterprise comprehensive, whole-of-government, and even nonexistent aviation enterprises. These would then move on to developing mobility military-civil interaction and interoperability advisors assess the partner nation’s ability to capabilities, providing more operational that likewise allows the functioning area of meet its goals, along with U.S. desired security reach over wide expanses of ungoverned or a state to expand. The Air Force incorpo- endstates, and formulate a plan to help the undergoverned territory, reducing the space rates the whole-of-aviation enterprise in its nation reach those goals and endstates. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 37 Forum | Air Advising
Air advising absorbs critical lessons learned from previous attempts to partner with nations with less-developed aviation enterprises. Failure to fully develop the “back-end” of aviation through advising efforts has many times resulted in delivering inappropriate equipment to partner nations, (Nadine Barclay) U.S. Air Force and sometimes even in airframes “rotting on the ramp”: expensive aircraft sitting unused because they lack operators, maintainers, and spare parts. These failed partnership efforts yield no increased partner capabil- ity for self-defense, diminish the treasuries of both nations, and are outcomes that the Air Force seeks to avoid in its shaping of the operational environment. To do the job right, the Air Force is in the process of developing a deliberate planning system intent on build- ing long-term partnerships and coming to an understanding of what the partner nation U.S. Air Force advisor shows Afghan airmen proper way to take temperature reading of fuel sample actually needs, not just what may bring pres- tige or sales to the United States. Country Team, joint force, and partner total force including Active-duty, Reserve, Guidance nation government and military,” and that it and Air National Guard Airmen, as well Although Air Force personnel have cannot consist simply of selling or giving a as Department of the Air Force civilians. been involved in air advising activities for partner nation equipment and then leaving. A current example of joint air advising is many years, there has been a lack of an The goal of improving a partner nation’s Air Force–Army rotary-wing advising. An “overarching framework that guides and aviation enterprise starts long before any example of total force air advising is Air integrates all of these efforts towards the equipment is procured or delivered and con- National Guard participation in the National common goal of meeting geographic combat- tinues after any equipment is fielded. Guard Bureau’s State Partnership Program. ant commander . . . requirements.”13 Until Members of the joint force who want Joint special operations and Air Force GPF recently, air advisors relied on common sense to learn more about air advising can refer- also work together in air advising. and the experience of predecessors to get the ence AFTTP 3-4.5, Air Advising, published Joint advocacy is vital to air advising. It job done, and they have done a commend- in July 2012. The publication takes an even is important for surface components to artic- able job. But to truly institutionalize the air more detailed look at how to perform air ulate their air advising requirements through advising mission, the Air Force has developed advising including the principles and skills their geographic combatant commands and guidance that preserves the lessons learned of air advisors, the role of culture in air the integrated priority list process to help the over the past 10 years in Iraq and Afghani- advising, logistical support for air advisors, Air Force better support those needs. While stan, as well as those from the decades before and step-by-step mission execution. The some Air Force parties believe their Service the 9/11 era. Air advising is now addressed AFTTP is an invaluable handbook for air could more effectively partner and train with through the following: advisors, capturing lessons learned that pre- developing partner nations if it maintained viously did not exist. The Irregular Warfare smaller, more affordable aircraft in its own ■■ Air Advising Operating Concept and Operations Roadmap provides the blueprint inventory, the demand signal was not clear associated Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and for integrating GPF and special operations enough to support the requirement in the Procedures (AFTTP) 3-4.5, Air Advising forces and seeks to create the systems that current fiscal climate. For example, light ■■ Irregular Warfare Operations support coherent air advising capability. The mobility and light attack/armed reconnais- Roadmap Air Component Campaign Support Plan is sance aircraft were programmed to diversify ■■ Air Component Campaign Support the document in which air components of the Air Force’s air advising capability beyond Plan. the geographic combatant commands will agile combat support. These light aircraft lay out how air advising activities support were designed to be transferrable, affordable, The Air Advising Operating Concept command endstates and the theater security modular, and interoperable. The program was published in February 2012 and lays out cooperation plan. was a victim of defense budget cuts, but the the capabilities for performing air advising, Air Force is still within a time period where as well as the sequenced steps for air advising Future of Air Advising in the it could easily restart the program office activities. The concept proclaims that “air Joint Force with a simple and relatively small infusion advising is a long-term activity undertaken Air advising can be pursued both of resources—if the strategic case could be in partnership with the U.S. Government jointly with other Services and through the made for how it sets conditions favorable to
38 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu FINCH and GARRETSON
U.S. interests and the Department decided it traveling to this country regularly for the capabilities as part of a coherent national should be an area of investment. past 2 years and has built personal relation- effort supporting the enterprise. ships. Although the bilateral relationship Airmen are already engaged in air How the Joint Force Can Engage was tentative at first, this Airman and advising around the world every day and are The key entry point for engaging Air other members of his squadron have built helping partner nations develop their avia- Force air advising capabilities is through trust through a process of working within tion enterprises and improve their political, the geographic combatant command air the partner nation’s needs and budget and military, and economic stability and security. component staff planning organizations. providing appropriate, affordable solutions However, the Air Force can deliver even more These bodies develop the individual Air rather than following a one-size-fits-all positive foreign policy outcomes and further Force country plans for partner nations in checklist developed with a Western point support the national security goals articu- their respective areas of responsibility and the of view. Over time, the partner nation has lated in the Guidance for Employment of the overall Air Component Campaign Support made sustainable progress, developing both Force, the Strategic Defense Guidance, and Plan, which details all planned security military and civilian resources and follow- the National Security Strategy. The Service cooperation engagements for the theater. All ing international best practices for aviation. will lead in preventing, shaping, and gaining of these plans are in direct support of the It has gained control of its undergoverned access through the air advising function it is command’s theater campaign plans. The joint areas, won legitimacy in the eyes of the developing for the joint force. JFQ force has a number of tools to help get even population, and made positive economic better leverage from air advisors. Through the strides. The United States has gained an ally Global Force Management process, combat- in the region with the infrastructure and Notes ant commands can request scalable, tailorable inclination to allow U.S. joint access and 1 U.S. Department of the Air Force, “Air air advising units for their planned security basing in the event of a future contingency. Advising Operating Concept,” Department of the cooperation activities. Commands also Such are the outcomes that air advising Air Force, February 10, 2012, 6. produce annual integrated priority lists that seeks to advance. 2 Ibid., 8. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., 9. combatant commands can request scalable, tailorable air 5 Ibid., 10. advising units for their planned security cooperation activities 6 U.S. Air Force, 1st Special Operations Wing, 6th Special Operations Squadron Fact Sheet, Febru- ary 24, 2011, available at
Coalition forces offload from U.S. Army
Chinook during Operation Torii Lock) T. (Jeremy U.S. Air Force Tora Bora Reconsidered LESSONS FROM 125 YEARS OF STRATEGIC MANHUNTS
By Benjamin Runkle
rior to the raid on Abbottabad, appeared alive on a videotape on December Pakistan, in May 2011, the 27. Unfortunately, much of the debate on this seminal event in the 13-year operation has been marked by partisan fin- P hunt for Osama bin Laden ger-pointing and bureaucratic score-settling, was the operation to capture or kill the generating more heat than light and doing Saudi terrorist at Tora Bora in December future U.S. commanders and policymakers a 2001. Although the operation started with grave disservice. great anticipation due to reports that bin But the killing of bin Laden allows for Laden and al Qaeda’s senior leadership were more measured analysis of what went wrong Dr. Benjamin Runkle is a Veteran of Operation surrounded in a remote mountain fortress, in the hunt for the al Qaeda leader than was Iraqi Freedom, former Department of Defense and anticipation turned to frustration as bin possible while he remained on the run. This National Security Council Official, and author of Laden’s fate remained uncertain after 2 analysis is important, as the operational Wanted Dead or Alive: Manhunts from Geronimo to weeks of intense bombing, and frustration problems posed by strategic manhunts Bin Laden (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). turned to recriminations when bin Laden remain relevant given the continued pursuit
40 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Runkle
of Ayman al-Zawahiri and other al Qaeda Jawbreaker established a command center On December 16, numerous reports leaders, as well as the ongoing hunt for Lord’s in a schoolhouse in the foothills near Tora of genuine surrenders came into the school- Resistance Army commander Joseph Kony Bora. Satellite imagery and photographs house, and by the next day, the battle of Tora by U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and from reconnaissance planes showed deep Bora was over. Estimates of al Qaeda fighters our Ugandan allies. snow stacking up in the valleys and passes, killed ranged from 220 to 500, although the This article analyzes the failure to leading the team to conclude that bin Laden real number was likely higher as the bombing capture or kill bin Laden at Tora Bora in the would not be able to leave the mountains any literally obliterated or buried the bodies of context of the broader history of strategic time soon. Consequently, the plan for Tora large groups of fighters. Fifty-two fighters, manhunts. Starting with the 16-month Bora closely resembled the operations that mostly Arabs, were captured by the Afghans, Geronimo Campaign in 1885–1886, the had broken the Taliban lines north of Kabul: and another hundred were captured crossing United States has deployed forces abroad a CIA paramilitary operatives and U.S. SOF the border into Pakistan. Yet there was no dozen times with the operational objective would infiltrate the area to identify targets sign of the campaign’s target. Bin Laden’s fate of apprehending—dead or alive—one man. for bombing, which would clear the way for remained unknown until December 27, when The lessons learned from these historical Afghan militias to advance. However, the he appeared on videotape. Despite being campaigns offer a fuller perspective of the Northern Alliance had neither the capac- left-handed and typically gesturing with challenges posed by such operations, and ity nor the desire to push as far south as both hands while speaking, a visibly aged bin especially the hunt for bin Laden in Decem- Jalalabad. Consequently, team leader Gary Laden did not move his entire left side in the ber 2001. In particular, history suggests that Berntsen was forced to rely on local warlords. 34-minute video, suggesting he had sustained the number of troops deployed has little One was Hazaret Ali, a Pashai tribal leader a serious injury during the battle. effect on whether an individual is success- who had distinguished himself as a field “I am a poor slave of God,” he said fully targeted, and that the conventional commander in the war against the Soviets, resignedly. “If I live or die the war will con- wisdom that bin Laden escaped from Tora and the other was Haji Zaman, a recently tinue.”1 The hunt for bin Laden would last Bora because there were too few U.S. troops returned exile whose base of operations for almost another decade until it reached its present is a canard contradicted by 125 years during the anti-Soviet jihad had been Tora climax on a cloudless night in a quiet neigh- of strategic manhunts. Bora but who was a fierce rival of Ali’s. borhood in Abbottabad.
U.S. Air Force (Jeremy T. Lock) T. (Jeremy U.S. Air Force By December 4, the first observation The Tora Bora Operation post was established on a mountaintop Not Enough Boots on the Ground? After the Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan overlooking the Milewa Valley, and over The most persistent criticism of the began to disintegrate in the face of the U.S. the next 3 days about 700,000 pounds of bin Laden manhunt as executed at Tora Bora air campaign and the Northern Alliance’s ordnance were dropped on al Qaeda posi- is that the Bush administration failed to ground assault in mid-November 2001, bin tions. On December 9, a 40-man detachment deploy enough U.S. troops and thereby let Laden and al Qaeda’s fighters fled southeast arrived at the base of Tora Bora. Under the bin Laden escape certain capture or death. from Jalalabad toward the Pakistan border. command of a major who would later publish On December 3, 2001, CIA team leader Their destination was Tora Bora (Pashto for a memoir under the pseudonym “Dalton Gary Berntsen sent a request to the agency’s “black dust”), a series of cave-filled valleys LESSONS FROM 125 YEARS OF in the White Mountains where ridgelines rose from wooded foothills to jagged, snow- history suggests that the number of troops deployed has little covered peaks separated by deep ravines. The effect on whether an individual is successfully targeted STRATEGIC MANHUNTS Tora Bora complex covered an area roughly 6 miles wide and 6 miles long and had withstood numerous Soviet offensives in the Fury,” the operators were supplemented headquarters asking to assault the cave com- By Benjamin Runkle 1980s. Moreover, bin Laden was intimately by 14 Green Berets, 6 operatives, a few Air plexes at Tora Bora and block escape routes. familiar with the terrain. In 1987, he used Force specialists, and a dozen British com- He also appealed directly to the head of U.S. bulldozers from his family’s construction mandos. The bombardment—which included Central Command (USCENTCOM) SOF company to build a road through the moun- over 1,000 precision-guided munitions and during a meeting in Kabul on December 15. tains and later fought his first battle against a 15,000-pound BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter” Similarly, Brigadier General James Mattis, the Soviets at the nearby village of Jaji. bomb—continued for another week, and on commander of the Marines in Afghanistan, During the years before September 11, bin at least two occasions directly targeted bin reportedly asked to send the 1,200 Marines Laden kept a house in a settlement near Tora Laden. Although SOF could hear the frantic, stationed near Kandahar into Tora Bora. But Bora and routinely led his children on hikes anguished cries of the al Qaeda operatives USCENTCOM denied all requests for more from Tora Bora into the Parachinar region via a captured radio, the Afghan militias troops. Consequently, as Peter Bergen con- of Pakistan that juts into Afghanistan on the withdrew each night from the ground cluded, “there were more American journal- southern slope of Tora Bora. Thus, Tora Bora gained during the day in order to break their ists at the battle of Tora Bora than there were afforded bin Laden the option of fighting Ramadan fast. Haji Zaman further compli- U.S. soldiers.”2 or fleeing. cated the siege by opening surrender negotia- USCENTCOM commanders cited Elements of the Central Intelligence tions with al Qaeda that were likely a stalling three broad arguments for why troop levels Agency (CIA) paramilitary team codenamed tactic for the terrorists to escape. were kept so low during the operation. First,
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 41 COMMENTARY | Tora Bora Reconsidered former Deputy Commander of USCENT- was kept on the sidelines,” while “bin Laden insurgent leader Augusto Sandino noted, COM Lieutenant General Mike DeLong and an entourage of bodyguards walked “Large bodies of troops had not the mobil- argued, “The simple fact is, we couldn’t put unmolested out of Tora Bora and disappeared ity necessary to overtake bandit groups and a large number of our troops on the ground into Pakistan’s unregulated tribal area.”6 force them to decisive action.”10 The initial [at Tora Bora].”3 The roads from Jalalabad Bergen similarly concluded, “The Pentagon’s plan to capture Mohammad Farah Aideed to Tora Bora were horrible and ran through reluctance to commit more American boots in June 1993, codenamed Caustic Brimstone, villages loyal to the Taliban and al Qaeda, on the ground is a decision that historians called for a small force of 50 operators to be making the stealthy or efficient deployment are not likely to judge kindly.”7 Even former deployed to Mogadishu to capture the clan of large numbers of U.S. troops improb- Bush administration defense official Joseph leader. And a raiding force was eschewed able. Moreover, the weather conditions at Collins noted, “It was the lack of expert altogether on June 7, 2006, for fear it would Tora Bora’s high altitudes and the lack of infantry that allowed Osama bin Laden to tip off Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s lookouts, potential landing or drop zones for air inser- escape at Tora Bora.”8 leading to the F-16 strike that killed the al tion and resupply would have made such Yet even where USCENTCOM’s logic Qaeda in Iraq leader. a mission dangerously unpredictable and is questionable, the history of strategic Beyond historical considerations, the logistically unprecedented. manhunts suggests that a larger U.S. ground specific conditions at Tora Bora undermine Second, USCENTCOM Commander force would not have significantly increased the conventional wisdom regarding inad- General Tommy Franks later explained: “I the chances of capturing bin Laden at Tora equate troop strength. In an early December was very mindful of the Soviet experience Bora, as additional troops have never been a meeting at the White House, President of more than ten years, having introduced guarantor of success in similar campaigns. George W. Bush asked Hank Crumpton, the CIA official heading the agency’s Afghan campaign, whether the Pakistanis could seal it would have taken 9,000 to 15,000 U.S. troops to their side of the border during the Tora Bora completely cordon off the 100 to 150 potential escape operations. “No sir,” Crumpton said. “No one routes out of Tora Bora has enough troops to prevent any possibility of escape in a region like that.”11 Indeed, if we apply the planners of March 2002’s Operation 620,000 troops into Afghanistan.”4 USCENT- For example, the 1916 Punitive Expedition Anaconda assumption that between 90 and COM believed that the deployment of large- to apprehend Pancho Villa deployed twice 100 troops were required to block each pass scale U.S. forces would inevitably lead to con- as many troops as the 1885–1886 Geronimo out of comparable terrain in the Shah-i-Kot flict with Afghan villagers and alienate our Campaign used operating over the same Valley, then it would have taken 9,000 to Afghan allies. Both Ali and Zaman had made terrain in northern Mexico—11,000 versus 15,000 U.S. troops to completely cordon off it clear that eastern Afghans would not fight 5,000. Yet it was the earlier, smaller cam- the 100 to 150 potential escape routes out of alongside the American infidels, and Major paign that was successful. Similarly, both Tora Bora, a number that was logistically Fury was “convinced that many of Ali’s Operation Just Cause to arrest Panamanian impossible to deploy there in December fighters, as well as those of his subordinate strongman Manuel Noriega and the United 2001. Moreover, Major Fury noted that “We commanders such as Zaman and Haji Zahir, Nations operation in Somalia targeting had to operate in virtual invisibility to keep would have resisted the marines’ presence warlord Mohammad Farah Aideed involved Ali on top of the Afghan forces,” and that and possibly even have turned their weapons approximately 20,000 troops pursuing “It would have been a major slap in Ali’s on the larger American force.”5 individuals in urban environments. Yet the face” had thousands of Rangers and Marines Finally, General Franks firmly believed former succeeded in capturing Noriega while shown up. If the Afghan militias “didn’t turn that the light-footprint approach—U.S. the latter failed to capture Aideed. And in on [U.S. forces] then they definitely would airpower supporting indigenous ground 1967, 16 American Green Berets trained the have gone home.”12 forces—had already succeeded in overthrow- 200 Bolivian rangers who captured (and Two historical operations conducted ing the Taliban and would succeed in Tora later executed) Che Guevara. Thus, it is clear over the same terrain provide counterfactu- Bora too. Franks was concerned that taking that some variable other than troop strength als that refute this conventional wisdom. the time to introduce significant numbers explains the difference between success and In March 2002, 3 months after bin Laden of U.S. ground forces would disrupt the failure in past manhunting campaigns. escaped from Tora Bora, roughly 2,000 U.S. momentum of the coalition-Afghan offen- In reality, because of the need for troops from 10th Mountain and 101st Infan- sive, thereby giving bin Laden a chance to operational surprise, smaller is often better in try divisions, in addition to SOF and U.S.- slip away. strategic manhunts. In 1886, when General trained Afghan allies, were deployed to the In the ensuing decade, a conventional Nelson A. Miles ordered Lieutenant Charles Shah-i-Kot Valley in eastern Afghanistan wisdom regarding the operation has formed. Gatewood not to go near the hostile Chir- to trap several hundred al Qaeda fighters The Democratic staff of the Senate Foreign icahua Apaches with fewer than 25 soldiers, and a suspected senior leader. But as Sean Relations Committee argued in a 2009 report Gatewood disobeyed, later recalling: “Hell, I Naylor notes in Not a Good Day to Die, “At that “The vast array of American military couldn’t get anywhere near Geronimo with least as many al-Qaeda fighters escaped the power, from sniper teams to the most mobile twenty-five soldiers.”9 One Marine officer Shahikot as died there,” despite the reli- divisions of the Marine Corps and the Army, serving in the 1927–1932 hunt for Nicaraguan ance upon thousands of U.S. conventional
42 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Runkle U.S. Air Force (Francisco V. Govea II) (Francisco V. U.S. Air Force
Soldiers fire at targets on Tora Ghar mountains from Luy Kariz, Afghanistan troops.13 And whereas the Bush administra- to capture or kill bin Laden to the “rugged Laden. Five hundred al Qaeda fighters were tion has been faulted for not deploying an and inaccessible” terrain of the border area.16 killed by U.S. forces at Tora Bora, and the additional 800 to 3,000 troops, in the 1930s Physical terrain is obviously a factor terrain apparently did not save bin Laden and 1940s the British hunted the Faqir of in every military operation, whether a tank from being wounded. During the first 3 years Ipi with 40,000 troops over similar terrain battle or SOF raid. Hence, it is true that of the manhunt, 1998–2001, bin Laden was in Waziristan but never caught their prey. terrain can play a role in any individual stra- not hidden among mountains and caves, but Thus, it appears troop strength was not the tegic manhunt. Marine officers in Nicaragua, rather lived openly in the plains around Kan- determining variable of success in the bin for example, attributed Sandino’s ability to dahar. Moreover, since the 2007 advent of the Laden manhunt. elude his pursuers to the unique difficulties of “drone war” against al Qaeda in Pakistan’s fighting in the inhospitable terrain of Nicara- tribal areas, more than half of al Qaeda’s top The Role of Physical Terrain gua’s jungles. Similarly, then-USCENTCOM 20 senior leaders have been killed despite A better argument for the failure to Commander General Joseph Hoar believed the forbidding terrain. Thus, the problem capture or kill bin Laden at Tora Bora lies the odds were against capturing Aideed due was not merely one of terrain masking bin in the terrain over which the operation was to the warlord’s ability to simply disappear Laden’s movements, but rather of pinpointing waged. Describing the difficult terrain, Major into the narrow alleyways of Mogadishu. Yet his fixed location. Fury told 60 Minutes concerning attacking despite these examples, U.S. forces have cap- bin Laden’s position there that on a scale of 1 tured their quarry in mountains (Geronimo, The Centrality of Human Terrain to 10, “in my experience, it’s a ten.”14 Colonel Che), jungles (Emilio Aguinaldo, Char- More important than physical terrain John Mulholland, commander of 5th Special lemagne Peralt), and urban environments is the human terrain over which a manhunt Forces Group in Afghanistan during Opera- (Noriega, Pablo Escobar). Thus, it would is conducted, which refers to the attitudes of tion Enduring Freedom, noted, “there was no be incorrect to say that any single type of the local population among which the target shortage of ways for [al Qaeda], especially for terrain determines success or failure in a operates. These attitudes determine the people who knew that area like the back of strategic manhunt. availability of the three variables that histori- their hands, to continue to infiltrate or exfil- Although the terrain of Tora Bora cally have proven decisive to the outcomes trate.”15 Consequently, in 2008 CIA Director was undeniably a hindrance, it was not the of strategic manhunts: human intelligence, General Michael Hayden ascribed the failure decisive variable in the broader hunt for bin indigenous forces, and a border across which ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 43 COMMENTARY | Tora Bora Reconsidered U.S. Air Force (D. Myles Cullen) U.S. Air Force
U.S. and Canadian soldiers prepare to depart Bagram Air Base to Tora Bora, Operation Mountain Lion
the target can seek sanctuary. In the case of based on intelligence gained from captured Since moving back to the region, he had dis- Tora Bora, each of these variables was slanted members of their networks. tributed money to practically every family in against U.S. forces, and it was the inhospi- The hunt for bin Laden reinforces these Nangarhar Province. Noted Milton Bearden, table human terrain around Tora Bora that lessons. Although the CIA was working eight former CIA station chief in Islamabad, bin led to the failure to apprehend bin Laden in separate Afghan tribal networks, and by the Laden “put a lot of money in a lot of the right December 2001. time of the September 11 attacks had more places in Afghanistan.”19 Human Intelligence. Perhaps the clear- than 100 recruited sources inside Afghani- This practice continued after U.S. forces est dividing line between successful strategic stan, these assets could rarely predict where arrived in Afghanistan. At a November 10, manhunts and failed campaigns is the ability bin Laden would be on a given day. Despite 2001, banquet at the Islamic Studies Insti- to obtain actionable intelligence on the target several years of effort, the CIA was unable tute in Jalalabad, nearly 1,000 Afghan and either from the local population or sources to recruit a single asset with access to bin Pakistani tribal leaders rose and shouted within the target’s network. Conversely, in Laden’s inner circle. As a former senior U.S. “Zindibad, Osama!” (Long live Osama!) every failed strategic manhunt, there has counterterror official told Peter Bergen, an al without prompting. The tribal elders each been a distinct inability to obtain intel- Qaeda operative betraying bin Laden would received a white envelope full of Pakistani ligence on the targeted individual’s move- be like “a Catholic giving up the Pope.”18 The rupees, its thickness proportionate to the ments or location from the local population. territory around Tora Bora was controlled chief’s importance, with leaders of larger Whereas Mexican farmers tipped off the U.S. by tribes hostile to the United States and clans receiving up to $10,000. In exchange, cavalry to Geronimo’s location in August sympathetic to al Qaeda. Villagers turned the tribesmen promised to help smuggle 1886, 30 years later General John J. Persh- the places where al Qaeda fighters were Afghan and Arab leaders to freedom in ing complained, “If this campaign should buried into shrines honoring holy warriors Pakistan if escape became necessary. One eventually prove successful it will be without fighting against the infidels. In the wake of leader later claimed his village escorted 600 the real assistance of any natives this side the Taliban’s collapse, the “Eastern Shura” people out of Tora Bora and into Pakistan, of” the border. Unfortunately for Pershing, became the principal political structure in receiving between 500 and 5,000 rupees per historian Herbert Mason notes, “Going into the region, and its most influential leader fighter and family for the use of mules and Chihuahua to lay hands on Villa was like the was an aging warlord who had welcomed bin Afghan guides. Sheriff of Nottingham entering Sherwood Laden at the airport in 1996 upon his return Indigenous Forces. One way in which Forest expecting the peasants to help him to Afghanistan from the Sudan. Bin Laden U.S. forces are able to develop human intelli- land Robin Hood.”17 Alternatively, Saddam had been providing jobs and funding for resi- gence is through the use of indigenous forces. Hussein, al-Zarqawi, and more recently dents since 1985 through the construction of Apache and Filipino Macabebe scouts were Anwar al-Awlaki were successfully targeted the trenches, bunkers, and caves in the area. critical to tracking down Geronimo and
44 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Runkle capturing Aguinaldo, respectively. Similarly, commander named Ilyas Khel to guard the the ISI paid lip service to U.S. counterterror- it was the U.S.-trained and advised Bolivian Pakistani border, but instead Khel acted as ism goals, it simultaneously used bin Laden’s Second Ranger Battalion and the Colombian an escort for al Qaeda. “Our problem was training camps in Afghanistan to prepare police’s “Search Bloc” who apprehended and that the Arabs had paid him more,” one of its own allied extremist groups for attacks killed Che and Pablo Escobar. Conversely, Ali’s top commanders later said. “So Ilyas in Kashmir. CIA Director George Tenet U.S. forces were unable to rely on indigenous Khel just showed the Arabs the way out of the concluded years later that “The Pakistanis forces in the unsuccessful hunts for Villa country into Pakistan.”23 Zaman’s men were always knew more than they were telling us, and Aideed. from the local Khungani tribe, and many and they had been singularly uncooperative After 9/11, it appeared the United States had been on bin Laden’s payroll in recent in helping us run these guys down. . . . That would be able to draw upon indigenous months, hired to dig caves. “We might as well meant not cooperating with us in hunting forces in its pursuit of bin Laden. Multiple have been asking them to fight the Almighty down bin Laden and his organization.”25 sources suggested the majority of the Taliban Prophet Mohammed himself,” Major Fury In the wake of 9/11, the Bush adminis- opposed him and could possibly be recruited later concluded. “I am convinced that not a tration delivered a set of ultimatums warning as allies in the manhunt. A Taliban official single one of our muhj fighters wanted to be Pakistan that it was either an ally or enemy told a U.S. diplomat in Pakistan that “Taliban recognized in their mosque as the man who in the coming fight. Despite internal opposi- leader Mullah Omar is the key supporter of killed Sheikh bin Laden.”24 tion, Pervez Musharraf agreed to the U.S. his continued presence in the country, while Bilateral Assistance. There are two demands and, on his own initiative, even 80 percent of Taliban officials oppose it.” Al exceptions to the correlation between the replaced the religiously conservative head of Qaeda insider Abu Walid al-Masri later wrote use of indigenous forces and success in stra- the ISI and his cronies on October 8. Part of that a “nucleus of opposition” developed tegic manhunts. During the 5-year hunt for Pakistan’s responsibility was to intercept al among senior leaders of the Taliban who had Sandino in Nicaragua, U.S. Marines trained Qaeda and Taliban fighters fleeing into Paki- urged that the Saudi be expelled prior to the and officered the Guardia Nacional, which stan. This request from Washington came September 11 attacks.20 Immediately after spoke the language and understood Nica- with little advanced warning, and Pakistan’s September 11, an ulema of 1,000 Taliban ragua’s culture. Although the Guardia kept tribal areas on the Afghan order had been mullahs formally petitioned Mullah Omar Sandino’s insurgency in check through two off limits to the Pakistani army since inde- to have bin Laden expelled from Afghani- elections, they and the Marines could never pendence. Consequently, the best Musharraf stan to a Muslim country. As one analyst suggested prior to the start of Operation Enduring Freedom, “Informants might mate- in every failed strategic manhunt, there has been a distinct rialize in faction-ridden Afghanistan, where inability to obtain intelligence from the local population the extremist Taliban and its outside Arab allies such as bin Laden are much hated in some quarters.”21 capture Sandino, who was able to slip across could manage was to deploy 4,000 “Frontier Thus, the United States was not obvi- the border into Honduras whenever things Forces” to the border, although due to poor ously foolish in its choice of allies in the grew too tenuous in Nicaragua’s northern logistics these troops did not arrive until Eastern Alliance: Ali had been fighting with departments. Conversely, U.S. forces did not mid-December. At the same time, Musharraf the Northern Alliance against the Taliban have a comparable indigenous ally during rejected allowing U.S. forces into Pakistan for several years, and Tora Bora had been Operation Just Cause, but were able to corner in a combat role. Thus, although about a Zaman’s own base of operations during the Noriega by cutting off his possible avenues hundred al Qaeda fighters were captured Soviet war before the Taliban forced him of escape during the invasion’s initial hours, fleeing Tora Bora into Pakistan, this avenue into exile. Moreover, simply from a tactical whether they were his personal yachts and of escape was far from sealed. standpoint, it was necessary to work with planes or the potential sanctuaries in sympa- In case after case historically, the Afghan allies. As Major Fury observes: “To thetic embassies in Panama City. These cases attitudes of the local population (and by push forward unilaterally meant that we demonstrate the importance of foreign sanc- extension the availability and reliability would be going it alone, without any [muja- tuaries and bilateral assistance in denying of intelligence and indigenous forces) and hideen] guides or security. Without a local safe haven in strategic manhunts. neighboring countries proves to be a more guide’s help in identifying friend from foe, Given bin Laden’s ability to slip across important variable in strategic manhunts we would have to treat anyone with a weapon the boundary between Afghanistan and than troop strength. If the target is perceived as hostile.”22 And after two decades of persis- Pakistan, a reliable partnership with Pakistan as a hero or a “Robin Hood” figure, as the tent war, almost everybody in Afghanistan was critical for operational success. As with peasants of Northern Mexico and Nicaragua carried a weapon. Mexico during the Punitive Expedition viewed Pancho Villa and Sandino, or as Although the decision to rely on Ali and Honduras during the Sandino affair, the Habr Gidr clan in Mogadishu viewed and Zaman was defensible at the time, they however, Pakistan proved an imperfect ally. Aideed, the protection offered by the local turned out to be undependable allies. Ali Prior to 9/11, U.S. intelligence agencies had population will thwart almost any number of insisted that the Eastern Shura had the final documented extensive links among Paki- troops or satellites. Conversely, if the target word on what should be done about the stan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) direc- has committed acts that make him detested Arabs holed up in Tora Bora. He assigned a torate, the Taliban, and bin Laden. Although in his area of operations—as was the case ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 45 COMMENTARY | Tora Bora Reconsidered
the Hunt for the World’s Most Wanted Man (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 293. 6 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Major- ity Staff, Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today (Washing- ton, DC: Government Printing Office, 2009), 2. 7 Peter Bergen, The Longest War: The Endur- U.S. Air Force (Jeremy T. Lock) T. (Jeremy U.S. Air Force ing Conflict Between America and Al-Qaeda (New York: Free Press, 2011), 81. 8 Joseph J. Collins, “From the Ground Up,” Armed Forces Journal (October 2006), 46. 9 John Upton Terrell, Apache Chronicle (New York: World Publishing, 1972), 383. 10 Julian C. Smith et al., A Review of the Orga- nization and Operations of the Guardia Nacional de Nicaragua (n.p., n.d.), 30, as quoted in Neil Macauley, The Sandino Affair (Micanopy, FL: Wacahoota Press, 1967), 180. 11 George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: U.S., Canadian, and Afghan forces secure landing zone My Years at the CIA (New York: Harper-Collins, 2007), 227. Emphasis added. 12 Author interview with “Dalton Fury,” April with Geronimo, Che, Noriega, Pablo Escobar, is by preparing the human terrain well in 22, 2010; and Fury, Kill Bin Laden, 293. Saddam, and al-Zarqawi—the lack of sanc- advance of the decision to target an indi- 13 Sean Naylor, Not A Good Day to Die: The tuaries and available intelligence will prove vidual. Long-term investments in indigenous Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York: decisive. Given the reverence with which forces—especially in partner-nation special Berkely Books, 2005), 375. 14 Pashtuns in eastern Afghanistan viewed operations forces—and the development of “Elite Officer Recalls Bin Laden Hunt,” 60 Minutes, October 5, 2008, tran- bin Laden in 2001, it is easy to see why an human intelligence networks in strategically script available at
46 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Secretary Hagel speaks at National Defense University on strategic and fiscal challenges facing DOD DOD (Glenn Fawcett)
BEYOND SEQUESTER Improving National Defense in an Age of Austerity
By Richard H. Kohn n his first day in the job, Sec- than that, we’re all there with you and we’ll retary of Defense Chuck Hagel figure it out.”2 Behind these blunt words lay told the Pentagon that “We live a challenge to the Armed Forces unlike any O in a very defining time . . . a seen for a generation or more: a cutback in difficult time . . . a time of tremendous chal- funding large enough to call into question lenge . . . with the budget and sequestration the policy, strategy, and force structure—in . . . . We need to figure this out. You are doing effect the purpose—underlying the entire that. You have been doing that. We need to military establishment. deal with this reality.”1 Chairman of the Joint Even with congressional permission Richard H. Kohn is Professor Emeritus of History Chiefs General Martin Dempsey put it more for flexibility to manage the reductions, and Peace, War, and Defense at the University of dramatically to Congress a week earlier: the puzzle will remain, in Secretary Hagel’s North Carolina at Chapel Hill and was Chief of Air “What do you want your military to do?” he words, how to “figure this out.”3 The choices Force History from 1981 to 1991. This article is asked. “If you want it to be doing what it’s will be painful. At one extreme, the Services adapted from a speech to the Office of the U.S. doing today, then we can’t give you another could surrender to less capacity to defend the Army General Counsel in May 2012. dollar. If you want us to do something less United States; at the other, they can revisit ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 47 COMMENTARY | Beyond Sequester roles and missions, turning jointness upside families, Congress, and the contractors who sesses the benefit of a long period of strategic down by igniting bitter inter-Service com- will supply and profit from the purchases warning. No Service organizes for, or even petition or making reductions that fracture insist on the most capability with less regard thinks much about, mobilizing the citizenry longstanding relationships with military for affordability. for large-scale war, the assumption being that contractors, retired officers, veterans groups, for lack of time, the Nation will have to fight and even foreign allies. Past as Prologue with the forces, Active and Reserve, present In the short run (fiscal 2013), nothing Austere (or worse) budgets are nothing at the beginning.4 Inducting people would will avoid real hurt—for people personally new for the Services. Inadequate funding be relatively simple; training, equipping, and and for programs, including delays and defer- has been the norm in nearly every peacetime leading a greatly expanded force when all or ments that will reverberate into 2014 and period, which always began (until 1991) most of the Active-duty and Reserve forces beyond, and may add to costs in the long run. with huge reductions. Today’s is the second have been committed to the fight would be something else. Could American industry provide the high-tech weapons, and could the Services quickly train the men and women to use them? Little or no serious planning goes on for such a contingency, and no scenario on the horizon suggests that it is likely to. But the United States has been surprised in
U.S. Air Force (Samuel King) U.S. Air Force war almost every time, to a greater or lesser degree. If the Pentagon is truly preparing for the full spectrum of conflict, planning for a full-scale mobilization beyond the call-up of the Reserves is by definition necessary, and even some preparations would be wise and worth some modest expenditures. Perhaps the most stressful period of General George C. Marshall’s 6 years as Chief of Staff of the Army were the first 2, from September 1939 to the eve of Pearl Harbor, when he struggled to create a modern mass army. Even as the war began in Europe, it was not altogether clear what kind of conflict was coming. The Army could hardly predict that F-35 Lightning II joint strike fighter delivered to 33rd Fighter Wing at official rollout ceremony, “37 percent of the total value of all materiel Eglin Air Force Base, Florida bought by the War Department” from 1940 through 1945 would be for airplanes or that keeping Britain and the Soviet Union in the But in the intermediate and long term, each contraction since the end of the Cold War. war would be the cornerstone of success.5 The Service and the military establishment as a Even during that conflict, in the 1950s Navy, focused determinedly on fleet action, whole can preserve American military power and late 1970s, one or more Service lost did not predict, even in 1941 after 2 years of for the future if they choose wisely in the the budget competition (usually the Army war in the Atlantic, that the first battle to be age-old tradeoff among readiness, modern- because of the need to maintain a strategic won would be against German submarines ization, and personnel. balance with the Soviet Union). Yet even the and that the Navy would lose that battle Outside pressures appear strongest in Army survived to succeed after the reduc- for well over a year.6 Nor did either Service readiness and modernization, the first from tion, largely for three reasons: the country anticipate the indispensable role that landing political leaders at home and abroad and enjoyed strategic warning and thus time to craft would play in both the European and the second from contractors and domestic prepare; the Army understood that it was to Pacific theaters, or the numbers and types constituencies. The country is on record be the core for a mass citizen ground force that would be required.7 as demanding that combat forces be ready, to be mobilized from the population; and although ready for what is unclear to most outstanding military leadership at the top Readiness, Modernization, and everyone, and the record of prediction of during the buildup and ensuing war. Personnel what will be the next war, contingency, or Today differs from the more distant As the United States enters a period deployment has been astonishingly poor for past because the United States both attempts of relative peace, the chief challenge is how over a generation. After more than 10 years to guarantee stability in several regions of the to choose among the three priorities of of continuous war, military equipment needs world and faces terrorist threats, and each of readiness, modernization, and personnel. refurbishing or replacing. Few advocate fore- these challenges could require forces ready Given the uncertainty and unpredictability going the best technologies; Soldiers, their to intervene. The country no longer pos- of future war, the top priority must be to
48 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOHN develop leadership that recognizes the kind unlike their uniformed counterparts, are ing him again and again into combat. The of war that occurs or threatens, is flexible subject to cuts in pay and diminished con- textbook Combat and Operational Behavioral enough to adapt the people and forces to tracts under sequestration. While all the Health, published in 2011 by the Office of the tasks, devises the menu of strategies that Services will shrink, each retains the extraor- the Army Surgeon General, concluded that will support the Nation’s objectives in the dinarily experienced combat forces, as has Department of Defense “behavioral health- conflict, and then executes the decisions of been the case after every war. care delivery has improved dramatically,” the political leadership with speed, secrecy, The future, however, may prove much but “one point that remains constant is that and least cost in blood and treasure. All of the more challenging. First, combat experience the human ability to adapt to the horrors of Services know that wars are won by people, inevitably declines over time even when combat is finite.”15 As the medical services and particularly—crucially—by leadership. retention is relatively high, as people retire or learn more, it may be that such wounds make The quality of the people—how they are leave the Service and operations and training sending these soldiers repeatedly into battle trained, how they are educated, and how they funds level off or drop. is neither militarily helpful nor ethically or are led—will in the end, as much or more Second, as the economy improves, politically acceptable.16 We seem already to be than how they are equipped or whether they recruiting will come under pressure both in breaking new ground in allowing wounded are ready for the first fight, determine the numbers and quality even with cutbacks in soldiers to continue on Active, though outcome. To give one recent example, leader- the size the Army and Marine Corps. Some perhaps limited, duty, and it is unclear how ship largely explains why the Army came so 75 percent of American youth are ineligible far that can go. In any event, it has become close to failing in Iraq, and how in the end it to serve due to deficiencies of health, mental clear that the military health system is not prevailed in that troubled country.8 or other physical incapacities, or criminal adequately covering all the veterans suffer- Douglas MacArthur, an officer of great records.11 Some 85 percent of today’s youth ing from wounds, particularly in the area of accomplishment who was Chief of Staff from plan to attend college within a year of gradu- mental health.17 1930 to 1935 during the depth of the Great ating from high school, few of whom con- The all-volunteer force was never Depression, provided a grim warning. He sider military service. And as the economy designed to sustain a large war or military faced an even more desperate funding equa- expands and unemployment declines—even campaign over time; the last two succeeded tion. He was so frustrated and so burdened by “emotional exhaustion,” as he recounted in his memoirs, that in a meeting with the 75 percent of American youth are ineligible to serve due to President and Secretary of War in the White deficiencies of health, mental or other physical incapacities, or House, he “spoke recklessly and said some- criminal records thing to the general effect that when we lost the next war, and an American boy, lying in the mud with an enemy bayonet through his slowly—recruiting and retention are likely to because of the patriotic surge after 9/11, weak belly and an enemy foot on his dying throat, become more difficult.12 civilian job creation, and the ingenious work- spat out his last curse, I wanted the name not Furthermore, people are expensive now arounds mentioned above. Almost no one to be MacArthur, but Roosevelt.” Roosevelt and may prove to be more so years hence; wants a return to a draft, no matter how tem- “grew livid. ‘You must not talk that way to the cost of soldiers and equipping them has porary; it would be impossible to administer the President!’ he roared.” MacArthur recog- risen dramatically in recent years.13 The all- fairly anyway. The Pentagon would be wise to nized immediately the truth of that, “apolo- volunteer policy survived the campaigns in spend whatever is necessary not only to treat gized,” offered his resignation, and after Iraq and Afghanistan through raising the today’s wounded, but also to improve preven- Roosevelt brushed it off, left and vomited on maximum enlistment age, offering signing tion, assessment, diagnosis, and treatment the White House steps.9 and reenlistment bonuses, expanding educa- so the volunteer force is capable of sustained MacArthur consistently chose poorly, tion and other benefits, upping pay, modify- combat and future budgets are not consumed focusing on the size of the Army, starv- ing standards, the massive use of contractors, by the costs of disability and medical treat- ing modernization, neglecting technology and other changes.14 ment for veterans who will live longer than in (except for the Air Corps, which had its own Other problems loom. The incidence of the past. vocal constituency in the Army and, more Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and traumatic importantly, in Congress), and blaming Con- brain injury, which by some estimates are of The Primacy of Leadership gress for the penury visited on the ground epidemic proportions among combat troops Of greater long-term significance, and forces. His successor, Malin Craig, Chief returning from deployment, is only begin- far less visible, is the effectiveness of the of Staff from 1935 to 1939, actually decided ning to be understood, not only medically but officer personnel systems corps in each of “to freeze weapons development.”10 Yet the also as challenges to treatment and healing, the Services. Officers are critical not only to emphasis on personnel, while it sacrificed impacting the ability to send those affected tactics and operations, but also to the indis- readiness and modernization, may have back into combat. At present, the military pensable function of advising the political lessons for today. does not possess the personnel to diagnose leaders (and through them the American Nowadays, on the surface, personnel every individual, treat him, predict how long people) on the policies and strategies to worries seem secondary or even tertiary it would take to restore him to wellness, and accomplish national objectives. To do that, except for civilians and contractors who, what the consequences would be for deploy- officers at the highest levels must understand ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 49 COMMENTARY | Beyond Sequester
strategy in enough depth and breadth to of wars are possible or likely in the near guide their staffs and decide on the choices and distant future. The possibilities are most likely to succeed with a minimum of far larger and more complex than coun- blood and treasure. In other words, each terinsurgency or high-tech conventional NEW personnel system must develop officers who combat. It is unlikely, after the last decade, from NDU Press are engaged in the serious study of war. It has that the American people will soon counte- to recruit them, educate them, assign them, nance another long, indecisive limited war for the Center for Strategic Research and promote them to the highest commands where American security and interests are Institute for National Strategic Studies in the military establishment. Equally impor- dubious. “As General Marshall once suc- tant, it is this capability—in policy, strategy, cinctly put it, ‘a democracy cannot fight a and the underlying study and understanding Seven Years’ War.’”19 Strategic Forum 280 of war—that will enable a Service in peace- The greatest threats today are transna- Russia Still Matters: time to advise civilian leadership and Con- tional terrorism, particularly with weapons Strategic Challenges and gress about the best choices in circumstances of mass destruction, and cyber attack. None Opportunities for the such as the Pentagon faces today. of the Services appears to have a significant Obama Administration During the first half of the 20th century, role in countering that threat except for their the United States succeeded in military special forces.20 The larger, more indistinct By John W. Parker and Michael Kofman it is unlikely that the American people will soon countenance another long, indecisive limited war where Russia’s recent authoritarian turn American security and interests are dubious and Putin’s pandering to anti-American sentiment have highlighted the obstacles to a genuine partnership with the United strategy but in the second half failed. Ameri- external threats involved in climate change, States, assuring that bilateral relations can arms have been operationally mag- cyber attack, global financial instability, will be a lower priority for both nations nificent but strategically inept beginning in transnational crime on land or sea, and other in the next 4 years. Nevertheless, as a key Vietnam and in almost every significant war political and economic threats hardly suggest United Nations member, a still formida- since.18 It would be easy—and mistaken—to the choices among manpower, readiness, and ble military and nuclear power, and new blame civilian leadership or the American modernization or clarify the military’s role member of World Trade Organization, people for these failures, as many did after in national defense. Other national security “Russia still matters,” and the authors Vietnam. Of course the civilian leaders were requirements—homeland defense—do not find and explore a set of mutual interests part of the problem. But our generals and promise much of a role at least for the Active- and concerns that necessitate pragmatic admirals have little say in determining who duty force unless a disaster is so enormous engagement between Washington and is elected or appointed, how Congress oper- it requires every available resource for con- Moscow. In the near term, U.S.-Russian coordination will be required on the ates, or how the American people feel and sequence management. War is also merging issues of Syria, Afghanistan, and missile react to war. Some of our most successful with crime, both internationally in such defense in Europe. On a longer fuse, war leaders—Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow places as Latin America and the Caribbean, cooperation will be needed on such Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt in the and at home in some of our cities.21 This, too, topics as the rise of China, security and Presidency, and John C. Calhoun, Edwin does not suggest much of a role, although the development in the Arctic, and bilateral Stanton, Elihu Root, Henry Stimson (in his Army has been involved historically, even trade and development. In all these first stint as Secretary of War), and Melvin though that can be controversial given our areas, the authors point out opportuni- Laird overseeing the military—had little or posse comitatus limitations at home and ties for the United States to advance its no uniformed experience. And some of our the unintended consequences of military strategic goals. most knowledgeable civilian officials, such as interventions abroad.22 The “responsibility to Jefferson Davis, Louis Johnson, and Donald protect” that is so prominent at policymak- Rumsfeld, had the least success. Senior gener- ing levels is unclear in meaning and offers als and admirals do have a huge impact on no guidance for the Armed Forces. Thus, the what politicians think, the choices they have, easiest (but not necessarily wisest) choice is to and the goals they pursue, and that requires fall back on the most recent experience and military advisers to have a deep knowledge of what each Service has traditionally assumed war and the keen judgment that arises from to be its chief role, usually defined by its military experience. weapons systems, organization, or doctrines. Such capability is the first and chief It is true that each Service must maintain Visit the NDU Press Web site requirement for making the budgetary core competency, indeed excellence, in suc- for more information on publications at ndupress.ndu.edu choices facing the military today, for that cessful warmaking in its domain against a requires informed guesses about what kinds peer competitor. While each of the Services
50 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOHN needs to be ready for different types of wars, the filling of these joint positions.23 So, too, forfeits their training, education, experience, each has the responsibility to wage the most do the Navy and the media closely watch the and accomplishment. Many officers would be sophisticated conventional war possible to number of commanders relieved for cause, fully capable of serving longer in assignments defeat any possible adversary. which seems to have risen in recent years. they desire and in which they excel. The solution to the puzzle of how to Two years ago the Independent Review To conform to best practices in human absorb large budget cuts lies in developing Panel for the 2010 Quadrennial Defense resources in the civilian world, and to reduce officers who are thinkers as well as warriors. Review proposed several changes to an toxic leadership at the higher ranks, the Over time, officers must be devoted to the officer personnel system rooted in the experi- annual officer evaluation system should profession of arms in all its varied aspects, to ence of World War II and designed for the require so-called 360-degree written evalu- include the serious study of war—and many Cold War. The recommendations below, ations; that is, assessments by subordinates must be promoted to the topmost ranks. The first duty of senior military commanders is to determine what kind of wars they are in.
The same can be said for peacetime periods: U.S. Army what is the situation of the country and what is most likely? Without such officers in the flag ranks, there will be little possibility of breaking out of business as usual, meaning a reaction to whatever comes and a period of catchup as the institution figures out the war it faces and how to adjust to it. These worries about military leader- ship extend beyond the problems of strategy in the last half century. The loss of so many midgrade officers in the late 1990s and again just a few years ago may diminish the quality of the officer corps. So, too, may the high promotion percentages to O4, O5, and O6. In the last 22 years, the military has lost a surprising number of four-star officers to relief or unexpected early retirement Soldiers stand guard during force protection exercise at Forward Operating Base Hadrian, Uruzgan before the end of their normal tours of duty: Province, Afghanistan three chiefs of staff of the Air Force; a com- mander of U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command; a Supreme Allied Commander, taken from that report with an added recom- and peers as well as by supervisors. Officers Europe, and three U.S. Central Command mendation, aimed to prepare officers for the assessing their supervisors as well as their commanders; the suicide of a Chief of challenges of this century and to strengthen peers and subordinates would rapidly learn Naval Operations; a Chairman of the Joint military leadership over the next generation.24 that their Service values delegating author- Chiefs of Staff not reappointed to a second ity, treating others with dignity and respect, term; and the relief of two commanders in Career Parameters communicating candidly, mentoring and Afghanistan. Such turbulence at the top sug- Extend the length of career for every leading by example, deciding with dispatch gests that each of the Services should review rank by 5 or more years to accommodate the and transparency, avoiding micromanage- its officer personnel system from recruit- broader assignment experiences involved in ment and zero-defects expectations, and ment to education to assignment to promo- producing strategists and removing incen- other traits conducive for inspiring leader- tion. It should not escape Army leadership tives to leave the Service for second careers. ship. The Chairman and Service chiefs are that in 2012, with nearly four times more Longer careers would also save money in instituting this system for flag officers; it flag officers than the Marines, the Army recruiting, training, and education, as well as should be extended to officers at all ranks.25 held only 60 percent of the warfighting four- by deepening experience. People live longer star slots and only 50 percent overall of the and are healthier and more productive at Precommissioning Education four-star billets filled by Army and Marine older ages. Already numbers of the most At the Service academies, expand full generals. Certainly in a sample so small senior flag officers serve for more than 35 instruction in ethics, American history, other factors were involved, but this trend years in very high-pressure assignments. military history, security studies, and related has been ongoing for years, and it is common Modify or abandon the system of “up or subjects. War is more a human than an knowledge that the Services monitor the out.” Current personnel policy, constructed engineering phenomenon, so more require- filling of joint billets closely. Indeed, one to avoid a superannuated leadership and ments in the humanities and social sciences Service secretary complained last year about favor youth and vigor, expels many capable and fewer in the technical areas would better his Service being discriminated against in officers at the waste of their capabilities and prepare graduates for the profession of ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 51 COMMENTARY | Beyond Sequester U.S. Navy (Kenneth Abbate)
USS Mobile Bay at sea
arms, leadership at junior levels, and gradu- retaining even stronger officer candidates, ally and to sharpen their skills in critical, ate school in the disciplines relating to war improving their educations, and saving precise, rigorous, and imaginative thinking including staff and war colleges. uniformed personnel for other duties and and writing. If the Services offer fully funded, Also at the academies, radically perhaps saving money. This could be tested in-residence graduate degree study at the reduce the numbers of athletes recruited for with a few scholarship winners, but at a country’s most distinguished civilian institu- varsity teams. As a group, they come in with minimum, the cost of such a system should tions to all promising officers, retention of lower academic scores than their peers, do be compared honestly with the direct and the most capable would increase, as would poorer in their academic work, drop out in indirect cost of ROTC.27 the quality of the officer corps over time. higher numbers, remain in the Service in Require foreign language proficiency To broaden experience and deepen lower numbers, and rise to high rank less and a foreign area familiarity for commis- their understanding of, and connection to, frequently. The academies should not lower sioning, waived only for rare specialties civilian society, encourage the most qualified their standards just to compete athletically, needed in the Services. Officers undoubtedly officers in the middle ranks to take sabbatical as do so many other institutions of higher serve overseas in their careers in a variety of assignments in civilian industry, nonprofits, education. Academy educations cost too unpredictable situations. The study of any civilian government, or elsewhere—actual much, and national security cannot afford to foreign language and country improves an working jobs, not research or study posi- subsidize athletic prowess at the cost of too officer’s ability to understand and respect tions—with the opportunity to drop back many less-capable officers.26 people of different perspectives, behaviors, in year group so as not to fall behind in the Replace ROTC with all-expense schol- motivations, and cultures. opportunity for promotion. arships to schools of choice for high school Require application for attendance at graduates selected on a competitive basis Midcareer Education and intermediate and senior Service schools, and in exchange for enlisted Reserve service Assignments selection by entrance examination admin- while in school and 5 years of Active-duty Require all officers promoted below the istered by the schools in cooperation with service. Many youngsters would take those zone to earn a graduate degree in-residence Service personnel offices. Too many officers scholarships to the most selective public at a top-tier civilian graduate school in a dislike and disparage these educational and private colleges and universities (as war-related discipline in the humanities and opportunities, are unprepared for them, students often equate quality with cost), social sciences. No matter what their college approach them largely as necessities for reconnecting officership with the country’s or undergraduate major, officers headed for promotion, and expend a minimum of effort educational elite, perhaps attracting and high rank need to be challenged intellectu- during the year’s course of study.
52 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KOHN U.S. Army (George Hunt)
Soldier provides security in Paktika Province
Require graduates of senior Service men and women. Extraordinary accomplish- called “the military after next.” To assure the schools to serve at least 5 years of additional ment at the tactical and operational level may strongest, most capable, and most effective Active or Reserve duty after graduation. Too not always produce the best experience for force possible, he should think deeply about many war college and fellowship graduates service at the policy and strategy levels. The its leadership: recruiting the best of American retire within 5 years in the Army (as of 2010, serious study of war goes far beyond tactics, youth who can be attracted to the military, the other Services did not record any data), operations, leadership, and a host of other, educating them effectively, retaining as many thus robbing the military establishment and more specialized subjects. Our Services are as possible, and making sure the officer the American people of a reasonable return unmatched in the world today, and are proba- personnel system develops a large number on the educational investment. bly the champions of all their American prede- of them to compete for the topmost leader- cessors historically, in waging war. But warfare ship positions in their respective Services. Flag Rank is broader. The U.S. military has demonstrated Nothing could provide a greater gift of care Require a tour teaching on a professional weakness in strategy and strategic thinking, and support to the men and women serving military education faculty for flag rank. Teach- which are the translating of national goals and the country in the Department of Defense, ing a subject or discipline to college- and grad- government policy into military operations uniformed and civilian. In doing so, he will uate-level officers provides time for reflection, that will achieve the Nation’s objectives—even assure that his successors, and those in the sharpens critical thinking and rigorous, precise those that change—in the shortest possible White House and on Capitol Hill, will receive writing, and reconnects officers bound for flag time, with the least expenditure of treasure the very best advice the most capable and rank with their disciplinary or military exper- and blood, and the fewest harmful unintended experienced military officers can offer—the tise, which are both helpful for the highest consequences. kind of knowledgeable and sophisticated staff and command responsibilities. thinking that can either keep the Nation out Finally, loosen the rigidity of required The Challenge for the Secretary of of war or ensure that it prevails in the quick- assignments for promotion to the various flag Defense est, cheapest, and most salutary way for the ranks. Must an officer command at every As the new Secretary of Defense best interests of the country. If the Secretary level to reach three or four stars? Marshall grapples with the difficult choices involved can address the broader personnel challenges and Eisenhower did not. Seed the promotion in reducing military spending, he will need today and modernize the officer personnel boards with flags who possess career experi- to address important personnel issues facing system along the lines suggested here at the ences beyond the operational, and instruct the Armed Forces. He will need to nurture same time, his term in office will be conse- them to select a larger proportion of similar the military of the future, or what some once quential indeed. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 53 COMMENTARY | Beyond Sequester
N ote s entry/wwii-vs-today-cost-equipping-gi>; Todd Boardrooms, and Backyards: The New Face of Harrison, Looking Beyond the Fog Bank: Fiscal National Security,” Durham, NC, March 2, 2013. 19 1 “All-Hands Meeting with Secretary Hagel Realities Facing Defense (Washington, DC: Center Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for from the Pentagon,” February 27, 2013, available at for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, April Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 (Washington, DC: 54 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu haring U.S. Marine Corps (Andrew J. Good) U.S. Marine Corps (Andrew Marine prepares to depart on security patrol, Helmand Province INSIGHTS FROM THE Women in Combat Symposium By Ellen L. Haring hen the U.S. Army Sergeant Bringloe rescued 11 soldiers despite invaded Iraq in 2003, suffering from a fractured tibia sustained Specialist Williams had a during the third rescue of the 11 evacuations. W skill set that was desper- At a recent event in Washington, DC, ately needed: Arab linguist. In 2009, Major Specialist Williams described translating Hegar’s skills as a medical evacuation pilot during combat foot patrols in Iraq without were in high demand. And in 2011, combat the benefit of Small Arms Protective Insert medics Olson and Bringloe spent days on plates in her vest because women were not foot patrols or dropping into hot spots in expected to be in combat, and Major Hegar Afghanistan rescuing wounded soldiers. In calmly described being shot down by insur- a particularly demanding 40-hour period, gents and the ground fight that ensued before Colonel Ellen L. Haring, USA, is a Reserve Civil Affairs Officer at the U.S. Army War College. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 55 COMMENTARY | Women in Combat Symposium a rescue team arrived to extract the Medevac from Canada and Norway. The third panel deployed in current operations is likely to end team. All these Servicemembers share a included men and women who studied the up in combat and must be trained and ready common trait. All are women and all hold combat exclusion policy and had important for that possibility. The panelists included “noncombat” military occupations. observations based on those studies. The last an Arab linguist who participated with the In February 2013, these women—along panel included members of the military who infantry in combat foot patrols in Baghdad, with members of partner militaries who have had challenged the exclusion of women from a cook whose convoy was attacked in Iraq, fully integrated their forces, as well as women combat units in the United States and abroad. a rescue pilot whose helicopter was shot who were among the first wave of earlier A post-event survey revealed that many down in Afghanistan, a medic from a Female integration efforts—gathered in Washington, audience members, including members of the Engagement Team who was wounded during DC, to share their experiences. The event military, do not know the extent of female an outreach mission, and another medic organizers’ objective was to collect lessons for Servicemembers’ participation in combat who survived numerous encounters with the integrating combat specialties as the Services operations. There was extensive discussion enemy while hoisting wounded soldiers out move to eliminate combat restrictions that about the need to document the experiences of operations in the Korengal Valley in north- have previously limited the military service of these women to capture the lessons as the eastern Afghanistan. Three of the women of women. military moves forward with full integration. were awarded Purple Heart Medals, two the The event was organized around several Panelists provided many important insights Distinguished Flying Cross, and one the Pris- panel discussions. The first panel included and lessons, but common themes resonated oner of War Medal. testimonials provided by U.S. women whose throughout the day including unique experi- The second panel included U.S., actions in combat are documented with ences that highlighted lessons across a range Canadian, and Norwegian women who awards and decorations. The second panel of involvement. served in the wake of the removal of previ- included women from the United States ous exclusionary policies. Both the first and and abroad who had been in the first wave Common Themes the second panels were asked to identify of earlier integration efforts such as U.S. One of the key lessons of the first panel traits critical to success in combat. The fighter pilots and female combat soldiers was that anyone, male or female, who is most common response was teamwork. A Marine Female Engagement Team officer provides security as Afghan residents are questioned and their vehicle searched for weapons and drug paraphernalia, Helmand Province U.S. Marine Corps (Robert R. Carrasco) 56 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu haring close second was the ability to stay calm and lost important interactions that sometimes Unique Experiences focused in tense situations as well as the led to misunderstandings and the perception Specialist Shoshana Johnson, USA requirement for mental and physical endur- that they were not as committed to mission (Ret.), presented the first testimonial. She was ance. Also mentioned was good leadership accomplishment as their male teammates. wounded, captured, and held as a prisoner of and technical competence. Physical strength Panelists recommended that women never war during the invasion of Iraq. Ms. Johnson was discussed at length since this is a com- be separated from their teams under any revealed an unintended effect of the Geneva monly advanced reason to keep women out circumstances because it negatively affects Convention rules on her captivity.2 Because of combat specialties. While all of the panel- team cohesion. she was the only woman captured, she was ists acknowledged the role of physical fitness, Another key discussion centered isolated from the rest of her team. This segre- none believed that physical strength was a on comments made by General Martin gation had a significant psychological effect predictive factor to success. The panelists Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs on her ability to withstand captivity. While she understands the reason for the rule, she believes it should be exercised judiciously and all the women objected to the requirement for a on a case-by-case basis. “critical mass” and believed it is an undefinable Specialist Heidi Olson, USA, a combat medic, provided a personal experience that and therefore unattainable concept is perhaps not uncommon for many young women in the military. Because of the combat exclusion policy and notions of what agreed that physical standards must be set of Staff, during a Pentagon press briefing women should or should not do in combat, and that women and men should be held to on January 25, 2013, where he announced she often had to petition her unit leaders for the same physical standards. None thought, the lifting of the combat exclusion policy. permission to leave her operating base and however, that upper-body strength was a sig- General Dempsey stated: go out on missions. nificant indicator of an individual’s success in any combat operations. In order to account for [women’s] safety Recommendations Also discussed was the behavior of and their success in those kinds of units we The role leadership plays in any suc- men on mixed-sex teams when that team need to have enough of them so that they cessful integration was a recurring theme is engaged in combat operations. Over and have mentors and leaders above them. You that could not be overemphasized. Time over, the women stated that there is always wouldn’t want to take one woman who can after time, participants provided examples of some trepidation during the first mission meet a standard and put her in a unit where leaders and peers who tried to sabotage the with any new team member, but there is she is one of one. We have to work the stan- integration and careers of women. The panel- nothing like a combat mission to clarify dards and the “critical mass,” if you will, to ists then juxtaposed those experiences with who can and cannot function when a situ- make this work.1 leaders who set examples simply by showing ation becomes dangerous. They further respect for the women and by demanding of stated that the first mission is always a test The “one of one” and the “critical mass” them the same high performance they did of and that after a member proves himself comments generated great consternation for men. Ultimately and unsurprisingly, success- or herself, everyone expects him or her to many participants at the symposium. Univer- ful units are led by people who are demand- perform just like the rest of the team. None sally, the panelists stated that many times in ing, fair, and respectful of all subordinates. of the women ever experienced any men their careers they were “one of one.” However, Many mixed-sex combat support units trying to protect them in any way that jeop- they did not believe that this situation should have missions that are inherently predis- ardized mission accomplishment. be a barrier to any woman who meets the posed to engage in combat. Since the inva- Privacy and hygiene requirements were standards from being accepted into jobs for sion of Iraq in March 2003, military police also discussed. All the women asserted that which they are qualified. Panelists stated units have over 10 years of experience with living conditions only became problem- that a woman does not have to be in a unit to women who have engaged in combat opera- atic when they were arbitrarily separated act as a mentor for other women; men make tions. The dust-off community has extensive from their male team members by socially good mentors, too. experience dropping in and out of kinetic imposed efforts to segregate men and While all the women objected to operations. Moreover, women have been women. In austere environments, they lived the requirement for a “critical mass” and flying combat aircraft in all of the Services and slept in the same rooms and shared the believed it is an undefinable and therefore for almost 20 years. These successful units same bathrooms with their male teammates unattainable concept, Colonel Ingrid Gjerde, reveal that high standards have remained even if the room was a bombed-out school a Norwegian infantry officer on the panel, in place and that there is no adverse effect with no roof and the bathroom was a slit noted that she had had better experiences on the teams attributable to the presence of trench. Any privacy requirements were easily in units where she was not the only woman. women. Morale does not suffer and mission resolved with the judicious use of a poncho Thus, while women have succeeded on teams success is not threatened. These units have or a turned back. The panelists noted that when they were one of one, the inclusion of already dealt with many of the challenges when women were separated from their more women improves their experiences on associated with including women in combat teams while they were on a post or base, they those teams. operations, and they should be studied ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 57 COMMENTARY | Women in Combat Symposium ■■ Interview men and women who have fought together to find out what worked and what did not. ■■ Interview returning combat arms soldiers to determine what physical require- ments they had to meet to accomplish their missions. ■■ Provide the same kind of training and awareness that was provided in preparation for the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.” ■■ Develop a narrative that educates sol- diers about what women add to the dynamics and capabilities of combat units. ■■ Remove leaders who attempt to undermine integration efforts. Conclusion Integration is not new to the U.S. military. We have done it well in the past and we can do it well now. What it requires is an honest commitment from leaders who, even if they do not agree with a decision, are duty-bound to carry out the policy to the best of their abilities. Successful integration is wholly dependent on the committed support U.S. Marine Corps (Holly A. Williams) Marine participates in obstacle course during physical training, Camp Johnson, North Carolina of leaders throughout the Services. Service- members will follow the example set by their leaders. JFQ since they represent communities of suc- midgrade women voluntarily reclassify cessful integration. into combat arms. Many women now have Notes Representatives from Canada, Norway, combat experience in a multitude of deploy- 1 “Panetta, Dempsey on the Women in and Sweden talked about their militaries’ ments. Allowing those who are qualified Service Implementation Plan,” Pentagon press move to full integration. All three countries to move laterally into combat units would briefing, January 25, 2013, available at 58 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Singapore Navy RSS Supreme leads USS Chung-Hoon and Singapore Navy RSS Vigour during Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training Singapore maneuvers in South China Sea U.S. Navy (Andrew Smith) U.S. Navy (Andrew Enhancing the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia ELEVATING ALLIES By James M. Keagle, fter China responded with will require a continuation of the rebalancing belligerence to the Obama strategy in some form. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., administration’s initial offers However, especially in the Pacific, and Brian Johnson A of partnership in 2009, by the success of this U.S. response to China 2010 the United States had embarked on a requires greater allied and friendly nation new strategy of a “pivot” toward Asia, later contributions from a region that abjures rebranded as a “rebalancing.” This strategy North Atlantic Treaty Organization–style contains two interrelated elements: a desire alliances and wishes to retain growing mutu- to pursue deeper “engagement” with China ally beneficial commercial relationships with Dr. James M. Keagle is Director of the Transforming while at the same time preparing for a new China, as does the United States. Yet this National Security seminar series in the Center for level of American and military capabilities to article suggests that these goals are not exclu- Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), continue to deter China, a primary (though sive and can be achieved while strengthening Institute for National Strategic Studies, at the not exclusive) goal of the Air-Sea Battle (ASB) U.S. leadership by pursuing two broad paths: National Defense University. Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is concept. It appears that China’s growing defining acceptable behavior for China while a Senior Fellow with the International Assessment antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) and accumu- strengthening deterrence. and Strategy Center in Alexandria, Virginia. Brian lating power projection capabilities, tied to As has happened in Southeast Asia’s Johnson is a graduate student at the Korbel School an increasing penchant to use its economic response to China’s belligerence in the South of International Studies and former intern in CTNSP. and military power to secure its interests, China Sea, Washington should lead a pursuit ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 59 COMMENTARY | Enhancing the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia of multiple codes of conduct that define The Obama Administration’s Pivot: cooperation with the Philippines. That was minimum expected behavior from China in Response to China’s Regional followed in early 2012 by an update to the further realms such as other territorial dis- Challenge Department of Defense (DOD) strategic putes, cyberspace, proliferation, outer space, In a November 2011 Foreign Policy guidance and defense strategy that called and military transparency, a process that article, then–Secretary of State Hillary for a rebalance of U.S. forces to the Asia- should include but not be dependent on Bei- Clinton first officially articulated the policy Pacific region in order to “emphasize current jing’s participation. Setting goals that could basis for a U.S. pivot to Asia.1 She emphasized alliances” and to “expand networks of col- result in substantial political and economic that ensuring that the Asia-Pacific region laboration” with other nations.4 Finally in benefits would then help U.S. partners justify remains stable and prosperous is key to June 2012, then–Secretary of Defense Leon a higher level of hedging with Washington advancing U.S. interests. Also in November Panetta announced more detailed plans con- to strengthen deterrent capabilities on two 2011, the Pentagon announced formation of cerning the forces the United States plans to broad levels: its Air-Sea Battle Office.2 Though in itself a shift to the Asia-Pacific region in the coming military-diplomatic statement, the Obama decade.5 Together, these statements, actions, ■■ creating a regional intelligence, sur- administration has gone to some length and documents outline an emerging security veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system to deny that the new office’s main mission policy toward Asia, in particular examining that provides constant situational awareness was “anti-China,”3 but was instead to focus how China’s rise could affect the region. of Chinese military activities on the “generic” antiaccess challenge that This followed the Obama administra- ■■ developing and selling a new class of could come from other states such as Iran. tion’s 2009 effort to craft what Secretary missiles that allows U.S. and allied forces to At that time, it was also revealed that the Clinton called a “comprehensive partner- respond with far greater speed to Chinese United States would station 2,500 Marines ship” with China, downplaying differences aggression—and ideally deter that aggression in Darwin, Australia, station littoral combat over human rights and Taiwan in favor of in the first place. ships in Singapore, and seek greater military seeking to elevate China’s leadership status U.S. Ambassador to China addresses reception for delegation aboard USS Carl Vinson in Hong Kong U.S. Navy (James R. Evans) 60 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KEAGLE, FISHER, and johnson in hopes of gaining its positive contribu- actions in the South China Sea during the by the Chinese Communist Party’s politi- tions to solving an expanded list of global July 2012 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.8 cal requirement to prevent an independent concerns such as arms control, climate China’s apparent unwillingness to “Chinese” democracy on Taiwan that would change, and financial stability—in addition accept restraint highlights a divided U.S. undermine the party’s legitimacy, by the to regional concerns such as North Korea.6 perspective on China’s rise. Some Ameri- mid to later part of this decade, the People’s But by 2010, it became clear that Beijing was can viewpoints tend to favor the possibility Liberation Army (PLA) could be fielding a far more interested in advancing its own ambitions than in sharing burdens with Washington, be it climate change, arms where the United States sees a “rising” China, control, its vigorous support for Pyongyang China sees itself reclaiming its following North Korea’s sinking of a South rightful place in the world power structure Korean corvette on March 26, or its rejec- tion of U.S. offers for mediation of conflict- ing claims in the South China Sea at the July 2010 Association of Southeast Asian that China’s resurgence will be peaceful force decisively superior to that of Taiwan’s Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum. given its deep two-way economic links and capable of performing an early A2/AD Foreign Minister Yang Jeichi’s famous with the United States, European Union, strategy within the First Island Chain.16 This emotion-laden retort to the ASEAN and Japan.9 Affirming this view would would also create the beginning of a broad summit—“China is a big country and other be China’s contributions to antipiracy regional and then global projection capabil- countries are small countries, and that’s patrols off Somalia since December 2008. ity. The Chinese “heartland” is becoming a just a fact”7—underscores the attitude of However, rising nationalism and increas- platform for large-scale joint force projection “might makes right” that has characterized ingly outward projection have given some to advance Chinese goals of preserving the China’s increasing use of military pres- U.S. policy experts cause for concern that dictatorship in Pyongyang, containing Japan, sure in Asia. China’s desire for control of China’s aim is to be a revisionist power that suppressing democracy on Taiwan, extending the South China Sea is linked to its future seeks to eject the United States from any control over the South China Sea, contain- power ambitions. Yalong Bay on Hainan role in the region and possibly displace its ing India, and gaining growing power over Island, for instance, may potentially house a status as sole superpower.10 Central Asia. major new base for nuclear ballistic missile One Chinese view of history is that If current trends continue, by the submarines and aircraft carriers that could the United States is a “new” power of only a latter part of this decade, U.S. forces in Asia be crucial for strategic defense and power century or so, whereas China has a history will be confronting a larger PLA A2/AD projection into the Indian Ocean and of regional power dating back thousands of capability that will have multiple layers of could propel China’s desire to push back years. Where the United States sees a “rising” ISR to include 15 to 20 surveillance satellites, Washington’s influence, particularly in the China, China sees itself reclaiming its long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, long- Philippines. With a relatively less-dominant rightful place in the world power structure. range phased array radar, over-the-horizon navy at the time, Beijing took advantage This might explain China’s unwillingness (OTH) radar, and electronic intelligence of a low point in U.S.-Philippines defense to accept restraints on actions viewed as systems. The PLA can also be expected to relations in early 1995 to occupy Mischief threatening by others, be it the curtailment deploy multiple low- and high-Earth orbit Reef, about 230 kilometers (km) from of foreign access to its rare-earth minerals,11 antisatellite systems.17 PLA ISR will be used Palawan. In April–May 2012, after building pervasive economic and cyber espionage to target layers of long-range missile systems, a more powerful navy and coast guard fleet, activity,12 rejection of U.S. appeals to begin from a new 4,000-km intermediate-range Beijing felt bold enough to effectively bar “stability” dialogues regarding its nuclear ballistic missile (IRBM) expected after Philippine ships from Scarborough Shoal, weapons plans, continued proliferation to 2015,18 to the novel 1,500+km-range DF-21D about 240 km from Luzon, thus building dangerous regimes such as its mid-2011 sale antiship ballistic missile,19 and the new X’ian what some in the region interpreted as of transporter-erector launcher vehicles to H-6K bomber modified to carry six or more a zone of denial up the Palawan-Manila carry North Korea’s new intercontinental 1,500-km-range CJ-10K cruise missiles. Trench, a vital sea lane for Asian commerce. ballistic missile13 despite United Nations The estimated 1,600 short-range ballistic China did this despite a half-decade of Security Council resolutions forbidding such missiles aimed at Taiwan20 include multiple revived U.S.-Philippine defense coopera- sales,14 and use of intimidating coast guard versions of the 600-km-range DF-15 and tion including more frequent U.S. exercises ships in its September 2012 dispute with 500-km-range DF-11 and are now being and the beginning of U.S. conventional Japan over the Senkaku/Daiyou islands.15 supplemented by the 800- to 1,000-km-range force reequipment. Meanwhile, China has DF-16.21 To this could be added nearly 1,000 diminished, although not rejected outright, China’s Military Challenge in Asia fourth-, four+, and initial fifth-generation an ASEAN-led effort to create a code of and Beyond fighters, most of which will be multirole conduct that would restrain China’s actions, Absent significant U.S. and allied platforms armed with families of precision- refusing to make a code “binding” and investments, deterring China will soon guided munitions and long-range antiship using Cambodia to rupture “ASEAN soli- become far more difficult due to its galloping missiles, and assisted by surveillance and darity” by its preventing criticism of China’s military modernization and buildup. Spurred refueling platforms. At sea, the PLA Navy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 61 COMMENTARY | Enhancing the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia could offer a force of 50 to 60 conventional capabilities of its radical clients such as North focus on joint operations also meshes with submarines, over half of which would be Korea and Iran, which, if uncontrolled by the goals of the 2012 Capstone Concept for modern Kilo-, Song-, and Yuan-classes. Beijing, could undertake direct and indirect Joint Operations, which names the need to These could be joined by modern surface action against U.S. interests, diverting U.S. handle globally integrated operations as a forces of at least ten 7,000- to 8,000-ton forces and attention to China’s advantage. primary goal of the U.S. military.29 Luyang II and III Aegis-class destroyers, at Third, toward the end of this decade, China’s ASB, at its core, has one clear aim: to least 16 Type 054 frigates, and littoral forces improving nuclear forces may be expand- utilize joint capabilities in dynamic ways to of about 80 SSM-armed Hubei stealthy fast- ing to hundreds of warheads, many on new ensure that the United States retains freedom attack craft and 30 or more new 1,300-ton multiple independently reentry targetable of choice, in terms of military action, in the Type 056 corvettes. vehicle–capable DF-41 or new DF-5 ICBMs.23 Asia-Pacific region. If China is able to use its Growing PLA air and missile forces will The PLA may also have a substantial arsenal A2/AD capabilities to limit U.S. options in a be further integrated with much modern- of tactical nuclear weapons,24 and as it dem- future scenario, it will succeed in “winning ized ground forces that, over the last decade, onstrated in January 2010, is also actively without fighting,” a longstanding tenant of have benefited from intensive investments developing missile defenses. Such a large Chinese strategic thinking. ASB is a tool that in new tracked and wheeled armor, artillery, and defended PLA nuclear arsenal would would parry that A2/AD thrust, retaining the mobility, and information systems. Army undermine the credibility of an extended ability of U.S. commanders to “seize the ini- units in the Shenyang and Beijing Military U.S. nuclear deterrent for Asian allies, espe- tiative at a time and place of their choosing.”30 Regions (MR) facing the Korean Peninsula cially as the United States considers nuclear ASB is a more acceptable future possibility are nearly as modern as the Nanjing and weapon reductions below the 1,550 deployed for U.S. strategic planners, who believe that Guangzhou MR units facing Taiwan, while warheads in the latest Strategic Arms Reduc- to allow China to restrict American freedom upgrading forces facing India has been a key tion Treaty agreement with Russia. of action would be to cede too much control priority more recently. The PLA can draw to China, disrupting the balances of power on an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 troops Developing ASB: A Concept to in the region and weakening U.S. ties with with some degree of amphibious training for Augment the Pivot friends and allies. Taiwan scenarios. Formal PLA amphibious To augment the rebalance and provide However, ASB is not meant to be lift, which could transport about one division an option to ensure that needed capabilities an advocate for certain weapons systems, to Taiwan, could be expanded to five or six exist in an increasingly contested future envi- though the Services do have their early divisions by mobilizing new civilian large- ronment, the U.S. Air Force and Navy have preferences. In a time of increasing austerity and medium-size ferries, according to a 2006 developed a new concept of joint operations when the Services have to accept cutbacks or Taiwan estimate. The extensive development called Air-Sea Battle (ASB). Some tout it as a cancellations of key programs, they also seek of rail and road networks, especially in the panacea to thwart China’s A2/AD capabili- to sustain core capabilities. Having seen the west, plus the incorporation of over 1,000 ties,25 yet detractors denounce the concept as curtailment of the Lockheed Martin F-22 to modern jet transports for “reserve” mobility, a failure foolishly masquerading as strategy 187 in 2010, the Air Force seeks to preserve means that the PLA can far more rapidly shift that will ultimately harm actual U.S. capac- as much as possible of its planned purchase its forces for operations on multiple axes. ity to rebalance to the Pacific.26 Officially, of 1,763 Lockheed-Martin F-35 strike fight- PLA investments in special operations and ASB stands as a platform to further integrate ers as well as develop a new bomber by 2020 “irregular” capabilities also give it options to cross-domain operations and provide the and a sixth-generation combat aircraft by strike decisively in “low-intensity” conflicts with high strategic impact, such as in the East China Sea and South China Sea. The PLA investments in special operations and “irregular” mobilization of hundreds of fishing ships capabilities give it options to strike decisively in near the Senkaku Islands in September 2012 “low-intensity” conflicts with high strategic impact illustrates one irregular capability that could quickly overwhelm Japan’s defenses.22 Three other growing Chinese strategic full leverage of all the various capabilities 2030. As its planned 32 stealthy advanced capabilities further complicate U.S. and of the Services in one coherent operational capability DDG-1000 destroyers was cut to Asian deterrence calculations. By the late concept.27 ASB was born of the Joint Opera- just 3 in 2008, the Navy seeks to preserve its 2020s, China could have an initial maritime/ tional Access Concept, a document issued 10 to 11 aircraft carrier battle groups and air projection force of 3 to 5 aircraft carrier by the Defense Department in early 2012 sustain a nuclear attack submarine force of battlegroups and up to 12 large amphibious that identified three critical areas where the about 50 ships. projection landing dock platforms or landing United States will need to be prepared in While ASB does not specifically call dock helicopter ships, plus growing numbers order to deal with in the near future: A2/AD for specific weapons systems, preservation of of the X’ian Y-20, a C-17 class airlifter, giving issues, changing U.S. international defense the F-35 at current estimates would greatly it the option to “pivot” against U.S. interests posture, and growing space and cyberspace enhance its joint integration capabilities globally. This formal projection capability as contested domains.28 ASB focuses mainly both among forces and allies. The F-35’s is complemented by China’s decades-long on the first objective, promoting joint use of command, control, communications, com- investment in advancing the nuclear missile air and naval assets to ensure access. This puters, and ISR capabilities—spread across 62 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KEAGLE, FISHER, and johnson Air Force, Marine, and Navy platforms, as well as integrated into the South Korean, Japanese, Singaporean, and Australian militaries—present the United States with a chance to leverage unprecedented situational awareness into the ASB concept. Having interoperable platforms across these forces U.S. Navy (Chad J. McNeeley) would enable ASB to utilize F-35s in a “hon- eycomb” strategy, allowing scalable deploy- ment options to provide on-demand and widespread support, and expand the capabili- ties, of surrounding forces. Beyond air and naval deployment plans, another chance to develop a new level of U.S. deterrent capability in Asia was signaled by the August 2012 revelation that the United States would put a second 1,000–2,000-km- range AN/TPY-2 or Forward-based X-Band Transportable (FBX-T) radar in Japan, as well as a yet-to-be identified long-range X-Band radar in the Philippines.31 The first FBX-T allows possible coverage of North Korea and well into China, while a second FBX-T for People’s Liberation Army soldiers an island in southern Japan (approved by prepare for demonstration both governments in September 2012) might reach into Central China. Washington might consider placing a version of the Raytheon SBX radar in the Philippines. Its 6,000-km plus friends such as Singapore, Indonesia, There would also be the option for range32 would enable coverage from Siberia to Malaysia, India, Vietnam, and Taiwan, ASB U.S. friends and allies to calibrate their the Tasman Sea. could affirm U.S. leadership by creating new cooperation with Washington. Most value New U.S. radars are reportedly means to deter China’s growing military their growing commercial relationships intended to provide much-needed early capabilities.34 A new U.S.-led information- with China and may require an added warning for missile defense interceptors. But strike complex would establish a new level measure of flexibility. For example, while their continuous coverage also provides U.S. of nonnuclear deterrence in Asia that could Australia agreed to host U.S. Marines at allies and friends with an expanded real-time increase the effectiveness of Asian missile Darwin in 2011, in August 2012 it decided picture of Chinese military activities. They programs. In October 2012, South Korea that it was necessary to make an awkward can also enable targeting for aircraft and new convinced Washington to allow it to develop public judgment not to allow a U.S. carrier classes of missiles. Navy leaders are seeking missiles up to 800-km in range,35 while in task group to station in Perth, likely in def- a new balance between stealthy and expen- 2011–2012, there appears to have been a erence to China.37 sive “platforms” and new and more capable change in U.S. attitudes toward Taiwan’s Contributing to a regional ISR “payloads” that better exploit the modularity indigenous long-range missile program from network from which U.S. friends also gain of the vertical launch systems on ships and opposition to acceptance.36 While Japan has an expanded and redundant view of the submarines.33 When cued by new U.S. long- not developed offensive long-range missiles Asian theater would allow countries such as range radar, a new class of medium-range due to constitutional restrictions, it has Australia and Taiwan to contribute and gain missiles—to include antiship ballistic mis- developed solid-fueled space launch vehicles substantial strategic benefit without prob- siles placed on ships and submarines—could that could form the basis for an IRBM. lematic stationing of U.S. forces. Australia, greatly enhance deterrence by providing a For the United States and its Asian allies, a Japan, and Taiwan have powerful OTH or new means for more rapidly countering PLA movement toward new classes of missiles phased array radar that could contribute naval and amphibious aggression. Such a would constitute a measured nonnuclear to a regional picture, while South Korea is move would require renegotiation or with- response to China’s emerging ISR/strike A2/ developing its own long-range radar. For drawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range AD combine. Washington should also assist Taiwan, the United States could play the role Nuclear Forces Treaty. with allied missile programs, for example, of “server” that would receive and distrib- by providing sensor-fused, munition-based ute Taipai’s sensor inputs while providing Elevating the Allied Role warheads that could more effectively counter Taiwan with a picture based on its own radar By using elements of ASB to deepen PLA naval swarming tactics and mass in Japan and the Philippines. Providing military ties with U.S. allies such as Japan, amphibious invasion operations—a growing Taiwan with such redundant coverage would South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia, requirement for Taiwan and the Philippines. by itself enhance deterrence by ensuring no ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 63 COMMENTARY | Enhancing the U.S. Rebalance Toward Asia degradation in defensive coverage if Taiwan’s Japanese Defense Force soldiers participate in radar is attacked. For Japan, South Korea, civilian evacuation drill during exercise Cobra Taiwan, and India, sharing an expanded ISR Gold, Rayong, Thailand picture would greatly improve warning time for Chinese military action; Beijing would be less able to conceal military preparations in distant regions. To be sure, China will not be pleased with such a course. In October 2012, it reportedly was forming a new office in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the purpose of better coordinating economic pressures to achieve its diplomatic goals.38 However, it is possible to bolster resolve in Washington and in allied capitals by addressing Beijing on two levels. First, it should be told that the creation of a broad ISR network wedded U.S. Marine Corps (Carl Payne) to new missile capabilities is merely a sym- metrical response to what China has been building over the course of the last two of the Air-Sea Battle Office’s early focus on Notes decades; Beijing did not clear its ISR/strike seeking to enhance the joint capabilities of combination with any other country. existing U.S. forces operating against A2/ 1 Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific But on a second level, it may be pos- AD threats. The August 2012 revelation Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, available sible to short-circuit another Cold War that the United States intends to place long- at 64 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KEAGLE, FISHER, and johnson idUSBRE86G09N20120717>; also see Donald K. in Claiming ‘2,700km Range’; Gen. Chen Bingde 31 Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Emmerson, “ASEAN stumbles in Phnom Penh,” Never Said That,” January 11, 2012, available Plans New Asian Missile Defenses,” The Wall Asia Times, July 17, 2012, available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 65 Thucydides, Benghazi, and Honor By Alan Greeley Misenheimer 66 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu misenheimer Secretary of State John Kerry delivers remarks at the University of Virginia Department of State n his February 20 speech at the uncertainty that prevail in much of the Near mastering techniques of influence and University of Virginia, Secretary East today. America’s diplomats are pressing persuasion, cultivating fluency in the of State John Kerry made the case our nation’s agenda in “some of the most languages, cultures, and history of the I for diplomacy as an instrument of dangerous places on earth,” in the Secretary’s region, and practicing the science of per- national policy. Generations of thinkers phrase. The September 11, 2012, Benghazi sonal and institutional security that State’s have recognized that neither our country’s attacks are a reminder of that fact. Diplomatic Security Bureau has advanced diplomatic weight nor its military power American diplomats in the Near dramatically over recent decades. Since can be applied with full effect unless our East work in an environment that can diplomacy is an ancient profession, predat- national security strategy makes optimal use transform instantly from hieratic welcome ing the modern state by millennia, we also of both. This is true in peace no less than in to chaotic hostility. We prepare for this by benefit from the study of ancient sources. war, and also in the conditions of political studying strategy and human behavior, Ancient Diplomacy Early cultures typically regarded for- Alan Greeley Misenheimer is a career Foreign Service Officer and is currently Director of the Office of Near eigners as inherently threatening and even East and South Asia Affairs in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the Department of State. ritually unclean. Yet many recognized the ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 67 COMMENTARY | Thucydides, Benghazi, and Honor need to communicate with other societies peace proposals were frequently exchanged, to the policy decisions by both the Athenians and developed a class of trusted specialists to and a negotiated ceasefire for recovery of the and their adversaries that brought about undertake the task. It is thus the very essence dead and wounded followed every battle. the destruction of that empire. They are of diplomats’ missions to cross boundaries Treaty agreements were multitiered and intertwined in every decision that every state and serve beyond the limit of their countries’ complex, and recourse to arbitration was adopts today. ability to protect them. Accordingly, it is commonplace. Ambassadors from allied Fear might be equated with the nothing new for diplomats to find them- states met in conference, and well-timed modern concept of national security. Inter- selves in harm’s way. In Asia, India, and demarches from smaller states sometimes est surely relates to contemporary notions Europe, traditions evolved holding diplomats altered the policy of great powers. Indeed the of economic prosperity. As complex as both sacrosanct and allowing them to travel well-calculated (but deceptive) overtures of concepts obviously are, they seem concrete unmolested. As today, these early concepts of the Egestaeans swayed Athens to embrace and familiar. Honor is harder to pin down. “diplomatic immunity” sometimes failed. perhaps the most catastrophic policy initia- I would suggest that honor, for purposes of The 13th-century Shah of Khwarezm tive ever adopted by a democracy: the failed Thucydides’s triad, engages the concept of caused the eradication of his state by tortur- invasion of Sicily, which crushed Athens’s justice and encompasses the values, moral ing and murdering ambassadors bearing last hope for victory. standards, and behavioral norms that shape a goodwill message from Genghis Khan. In studying the war that defined his the way people live. A country’s honor may Even in Greece, where diplomatic practice age, Thucydides accomplished far more be more difficult to measure or quantify was first systematized, violations occurred. than simply chronicling the ebb and flow of than its military capabilities or gross domes- When the Persian King Darius sent envoys an ancient conflict. His dense and uniquely tic product, but the power of honor to spur to the Greek city-states with a peremptory analytical account goes deeper, examining momentous action by states, groups, or indi- demand for earth and water as tokens of the nature of war as an inescapable aspect viduals is undeniable. submission, the demarche was not well of human civilization. In analyzing the Thucydides tells us that it was fear— received. Those who visited Athens were cast political behavior of the Athenians and their “the growth of the power of Athens, and the into a pit, and those who took the message to leaders under the extreme duress of conflict, alarm which this inspired in Sparta”—that Sparta were thrown into a well. The historian Thucydides revealed underlying patterns of made the Peloponnesian War “inevitable.” Herodotus indicates that some interpreted human behavior that can be applied to any But even on the eve of war, Sparta’s king exhorted his people to an alternative that sounds consummately rational and strik- it is the essence of diplomats’ missions to serve beyond the ingly modern: a peaceful solution is still pos- limit of their countries’ ability to protect them sible; send envoys to Athens and negotiate in good faith; and in the meantime, make concrete preparations for future war. The ephor, a lesser official who is nev- the destruction of Athens in the subsequent political system, whether in war or peace. In ertheless entitled to speak on an equal basis Persian invasion as divine retribution for seeking to understand war in his time, the in the Spartan assembly, overcame the king’s these breaches of diplomatic immunity. historian elucidated the nature of statecraft appeal with a simple rebuttal: The Athenians Classical Greek diplomats, known as for all time. have undermined our status and harmed our heralds, credited their eloquence and reten- This universality is reflected in the fact interests; we must vote for immediate war “as tive memory to the inspirational tutelage of that scholars have discerned Thucydidean the honor of Sparta demands.” Even though the god Hermes, whom Zeus often entrusted paradigms in dozens of large and small wars fear was the underlying cause, honor set the with delicate diplomatic missions. For cen- throughout history including the Vietnam tempo of the march to war. As states often turies, Greek and Roman diplomats carried War, Cold War, two World Wars, American do today, Sparta allowed the human pas- a staff resembling the caduceus—Hermes’s Civil War, and even a mid-19th century sions that only honor can incite—especially staff, incorporating two intertwined snakes conflict between rival kingdoms in Fiji. It when ideologues and demagogues enter the topped by wings—as a talisman of their pro- also explains why the book has survived long picture—to overwhelm any objective calcu- fession and symbol of the gods’ protection. enough to become, as the historian intended, lation of interest and security. “an everlasting possession, and not a conten- Thucydides’s History tious instrument of temporary applause.” Frontline of Honor Diplomats figured prominently in Precisely because of this link to notions Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian Fear, Honor, Interest of justice, morality, and human passion, War, which recounts the epochal 27-year Thucydides’s fundamental insight honor is the diplomat’s special concern. conflict between rival alliances led by Athens appears deceptively simple. He identifies Why? Because American diplomats, repre- and Sparta (431–404 BCE). Once hostili- three essential factors that, either singly senting their fellow citizens and the interests ties commenced, all discourse between the or in some combination, motivate policy of their society, live and work on the front- warring parties ceased “except through the decisions: fear, interest, and honor. These line of honor. medium of heralds,” and the narrative high- motives guided Athens’s rise to mastery of a This is not to say that U.S. Foreign lights their role. Truce terms were debated, far-flung empire. They were no less central Service Officers are uniquely “honorable.” 68 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu misenheimer interlocutors to correctly understand the key tenets of the other society’s definition of honor; relay this insight to Washington; convey, through word and action, key NEW tenets of our own concept of honor; and, from NDU Press as possible, narrow the disjunction with an for the eye to averting conflict and establishing a Center for Strategic Research foundation for increasing cooperation over Institute for National Strategic Studies time. For an American diplomat in the Near East today, success in this subtle enterprise requires immense patience, a well-honed Strategic Perspectives, No. 13 ability to listen, and unshakable confidence The New NATO in the American sense of honor. The out- Policy Guidelines on pouring of Libyan sympathy and admiration Counterterrorism: for Chris Stevens after the Benghazi tragedy Analysis, demonstrates that he and his Embassy team Assessments, and Department of State Actions were achieving success in the discourse of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, killed honor despite the extreme constraints of in attack on U.S. consulate in Benghazi, By Stefano September 12, 2012 Libyan society. Santamato with Marie-Theres Conclusion Beumler They would be the first to acknowledge that Medieval Europe believed that their country’s diplomacy is augmented by angels were the first diplomats, entrusted On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic partners from the civil service, military Ser- by Highest Authority to carry messages Treaty Organization (NATO), for the first time vices, and a range of civilian agencies, as well between Heaven and Earth. Few American in its history, invoked the Article 5 collective as the indispensable contribution of their diplomats would claim such a sublime con- defense clause after terrorist attacks on the locally engaged colleagues. nection today, nor do they expect much United States. In the 11 years since, NATO used a pragmatic approach to fight terrorism, but the The point is that American diplo- guidance or protection from Hermes. Yet impact of this approach was mitigated by the lack mats practice their profession where their fortified by professional discipline and of an agreed policy defining NATO’s rightful society’s concept of honor—encompassing shielded by international law, bilateral place among counterterrorism actors. It was not “our deepest values,” as the Secretary put it, arrangements, and their own precautions, until May 2012 that NATO agreed on a policy to including the rights and freedoms on which American diplomats honorably follow the define its role and mandate in countering terror- their society is built—comes into direct example of their ancient forbears. “Over ism. In this study, the authors review the evolu- contact with those of other societies. there,” where differing brands of honor tion of the terrorist threat, NATO’s response, This frontline is not a battle line, and converge, and sometimes conflict, they cross and the new policy guidelines themselves, which the “discourse of honor” diplomats conduct boundaries of sovereignty and culture to focus on NATO’s strengths of intelligence- on behalf of their society is not a war. But in carry out their duties on behalf of the Ameri- sharing, capacity-building, special operations, countries where the disjunction between “our can people. training, and technology. But the guidelines are only a necessary first step. The challenge is honor” and “their honor” is wide, the friction Now, as in ages past, outrages against to define an Action Plan to implement them. inherent in the diplomat’s daily task increases, the inviolability of diplomats will occur. Toward this end, the authors recommend six as does the threat. The challenge escalates Indeed, the February 1 attack on the Ameri- cross-cutting proposals: apply net assessment, further when state institutions are weak or in can Embassy in Ankara reminds us that develop counterterrorism strategic communica- transition, as in much of the Near East today. threats exist even in friendly countries where tions, establish a homeland security constituency Moreover, while disparities in wealth standards of public security are high. The in NATO, promote a border security initiative, and military power are obvious, every best we can reasonably expect is that such develop a “functional” counterterrorism partner- society on Earth demands equal status for its outrages will remain infrequent, and that ship framework, and contribute to the Global sovereignty and equal respect for its prevail- when they occur all voices will again unite Counterterrorism Forum. ing notion of honor. America’s superpower to condemn violators, acknowledge victims, status thus brings little advantage in this and underscore the importance of diplomacy discourse, and a frontal approach—for not only as an instrument of national power, example, advice to a Middle Eastern Muslim but also as a vital buttress to international interlocutor to “lighten up” in responding peace and security. to caricatures or films deemed offensive to Above all, American diplomats in the Islam—is apt to be as well received as the Near East will continue, like their friend Persian king’s demand for earth and water. Chris Stevens and his team, to hold their Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications Rather, an American diplomat must positions on the frontline of honor where dip- at ndupress.ndu.edu engage on an equal footing with foreign lomats work, live, and sometimes die. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 69 U.S. Army (Austin Berner) Unpacking Cyberwar The Sufficiency of the Law of Armed Conflict in the Cyber Domain By Kyle Genaro Phillips he term cyberwar is common in sidered. Lastly, the article examines the law that today’s discussions of the national applies to cyber activity during armed conflicts. security challenges facing the United In conclusion, the analysis of cyberwar reinforces T States and its allies. Understand- the theory that although means and methods may ing what law applies within the cyber domain is change, the underlying rules regulating military critical for all operational planners, whether or operations adapt well to the evolution of warfare. not they are directly involved in cyber operations. Ultimately, the Law of Armed Conflict is suf- This article discusses the basics of how the Law of ficient to deal with the novel aspects of operations Armed Conflict (LOAC) affects cyber operations. in the cyber domain. It does not address the full spectrum of cyber operations, namely, defensive cyber operations The Cyberspace Domain and cyber exploitation (espionage activities). Cyberspace is defined in a recent Chairman The focus is offensive cyber operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum as a and the efficacy of existing international “domain characterized by the use of electronics law in governing the use of cyber and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, capabilities. modify, and exchange data via networked First, offensive cyber opera- systems and associated physical infra- tions (hereafter referred to as structures.”1 The cyber domain is cyber operations) are dis- more than access to the Internet. As cussed generically as they the definition implies, the cyber pertain to military opera- domain encompasses networked tions. Next, the “triggering” effects of certain activities Major Kyle Genaro Phillips, USMC, rising to the level of “use of is an Assistant Professor at the force” or “armed attack” are con- U.S. Naval Academy. 70 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu U.S. Air Force (Leah Young) Airmen discuss Joint Precision Airdrop System prior to mission at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, using GPS to guide cargo to drop zone ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 71 FEATURES | Unpacking Cyberwar of the event, if true, the raid on Syria is an Figure. Spectrum of Cyber Operations* example of utilizing a cyber tool as a support- ing effort to a traditional military operation.5 Cyber Activity and Jus Ad Bellum Jus ad bellum is the international law governing a state’s use of force and is based on the customary international law principle of a state’s inherent right of self-defense. It is codi- fied in Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter governing individual and collective self-defense.6 The threshold question that must be answered to determine what law may apply to military cyber activity conducted by a state is whether an armed conflict exists between a state and adversary, be that adversary a state or nonstate actor. Jus ad bellum provides a starting point for the analysis on the lawful use of cyber activity by a state’s military. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by member states in their international relations against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.7 As specified above, Article 51 recognizes a state’s inherent right to indi- Figure. Description goes here. vidual and collective self-defense against an armed attack. The International Court of systems regardless of whether those systems and Estonia. A bronze statue was erected in Justice in the case of United States v. Nica- are publicly accessed. Additionally, the Estonia recognizing the Red Army’s efforts in ragua highlighted the distinction between cyber domain is a manmade physical entity “liberating” the Estonian population from the activity that would be an impermissible use of and must be distinguished from operations Nazis after World War II. The dispute over the force under Article 2(4) but would not rise to performed within the domain itself. For statue involved Estonian legislation calling for the level of an armed attack, and that which example, information operations may be the removal of the statue due to the increasing would permit military action under Article performed within the cyber domain but also resentment by the population over the history 51’s inherent right of self-defense.8 The cyber through other domains of land, sea, and air of Soviet control following the war. The leg- domain allows a state to conduct operations as evidenced by the dropping of leaflets, per- islation was subsequently vetoed by the Esto- that fall below the use of force, as well as oper- sonal engagements of key leaders with local nian president in response to intense political ations that might cause destruction to prop- populations, and public broadcasts.2 pressure from Moscow. However, nationalists erty or injury and death to persons. Cyber For purposes of the application of the continued to call for the removal or destruc- activity that causes death, injury, or property LOAC, it is important to separate operations tion of the statue. The dispute moved into the damage could rise to the level of a use of force conducted exclusively in the cyber domain cyber domain where the DDOS activity tem- or armed attack under international law. from operations in which cyber activity sup- porarily crippled the population.4 The activity As described by U.S. Cyber Command, ports larger military efforts. Two examples against Estonia is an example of utilizing a cyber activity can be viewed along a spectrum from Richard Clarke’s Cyber War illustrate cyber capability as the primary tool during a of actions ranging from cyber espionage to the distinction. dispute. access operations, and ultimately, on the far First, the Estonia cyber event in 2007, Next, compare the Estonian case to end of the spectrum, activity causing death or although not officially attributed to the an event involving Syria and Israel the same the destruction of property (see figure).9 Russian government, involved attacking year. According to Clarke, the Israeli military Cyber espionage, for example, would “botnets” resident in “zombie” computers utilized a cyber tool to control the detection not amount to the impermissible use of force that created a flood of cyber access requests. systems in the Syrian air defense. The result or armed attack triggering the right of the The distributed denial-of-service (DDOS) was a radar picture that displayed only what offended state to respond in self-defense attacks led to the collapse of online banking, the Israeli military wanted the Syrians to see. because the result is simply theft or access to newspaper Web sites, and government elec- After the air defense systems were “owned” another state’s networked systems. Further tronic services within the state.3 The DDOS by the Israeli military, attack aircraft flew in along the spectrum, cyber disruption opera- activity was conducted during a heated politi- and bombed a suspected nuclear weapons tions likewise would fall short of an unlawful cal dispute between the Russian government plant. Despite a number of contrary accounts use of force. For instance, disruption opera- 72 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu PHILLIPS tions that involve accessing another state’s ing countermeasures or, in the extreme, a law as it exists today (lex lata) to an effects- networked systems and interfering with the military response. The fact that the Iranian based approach to cyber operations, states operations of the network could violate the government downplayed the damage and have a basis for characterizing the nature principle of nonintervention. This principle impact of Stuxnet lessened the likelihood of the activity in order to determine what is grounded on the premise that states are that the activity would be subject to an armed lawful responses are available. prohibited from interfering in the internal response in self-defense. affairs of other states. An aggrieved state may Despite arguments to the contrary, the Cyber Activity and Jus in Bello protest such activity through the UN Security application of jus ad bellum in cyber space The jus in bello is the law applied in Council, but simply accessing and manipulat- is compatible with the traditional approach war. The LOAC presupposes that an armed ing data would not justify an armed response under international law. Matthew Waxman conflict exists. At that point, the jus in bello under customary international law or Article argues persuasively that cyber activity is not regulates violence in the conduct of military 51. The far right of the spectrum in the cyber unlike any other novel weapon introduced in operations. Armed conflict is one of two domain is the use of force/armed attack the international community. Furthermore, varieties, international armed conflict or through cyber operations. The threshold by applying an effects-based approach to noninternational armed conflict. As Gary standard justifying the invocation of self- cyber activity, operations in cyberspace Solis notes in The Law of Armed Conflict: defense under Article 51 and customary should be judged by whether the effect of the International Humanitarian Law in War, the international law is high. The cyber activity cyber activity is tantamount to a prohibited conflict status is critical to determine what must result in either physical destruction use of force or military attack.12 For example, law applies.14 In an international armed con- of property or death or injury of persons if a certain cyber operation results in the flict, defined as armed conflict between two through sufficient scale and effect to meet physical destruction of critical infrastructure or more states, the entire body of Geneva Law the definition of an armed attack justifying a of another state, then the activity could be (Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Addi- proportional response in self-defense.10 characterized as a use of force. Such activity tional Protocol I) and Hague Law governing The closest open-source example of use might constitute an armed attack under inter- armed conflict would apply. However, in a of force in cyberspace is the Stuxnet virus, national law if the force used were significant noninternational armed conflict, defined as which was introduced into Iranian nuclear in the scale and effect against another state.13 armed conflict between a state and an orga- facilities and essentially damaged the centri- The question of what activity rises to nized armed group, Common Article 3 of fuges used to enrich uranium.11 This example the level of a prohibited use of force under the Geneva Conventions, and, in certain cir- is intriguing because what is known about Article 2(4) and whether that activity con- cumstances, Additional Protocol II applies.15 the operation involved exclusively computer- stitutes an armed attack has been subject While the cyber domain is novel in the tools based means to cause the physical destruc- to differing international interpretations in available to warfighters, the current law is tion of a state’s critical infrastructure. Of the context of conventional weapons. Cyber sufficient to govern activity in the cyber course, how a victim state qualifies “action” activity certainly provides unique tools domain within the context of an armed con- as either a use of force, armed attack, or some for states to employ against other states in flict, be it international or noninternational. other activity interfering with the sovereignty furthering national security goals. Department of Defense policy of the state is an essential step in justify- However, by applying the is to comply with the AirAir NationalNational GuardsmanGuardsman usesuses ROVERROVER 55 handheldhandheld portableportable transceivertransceiver toto viewview targetingtargeting datadata whilewhile performingperforming closeclose airair supportsupport U.S. Air Force (Jorge Intriago) U.S. Air Force ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 73 FEATURES | Unpacking Cyberwar Once a target is identified, it must meet SoldierSoldier attemptsattempts toto setset upup the requirement of being a valid military objec- connection with call manager connection with call manager tive, defined in Additional Protocol I as an duringduring exerciseexercise CyberCyber Endeavor,Endeavor, Grafenwoehr,Grafenwoehr, GermanyGermany object that by its nature, location, purpose, or use makes an effective contribution to military action, and whose total or partial destruction, capture, or neutralization offers a definite military advantage.20 Cyber operations may be directed against exclusively military objects or against so-called dual-use structures having both military and civilian purposes. Target- ing dual-use objects must comply with the standards of military necessity and meet the definition of a valid military objective. A unique aspect of operating in the cyber domain is the simple fact that much of U.S. Army (Shawnon Lott) the infrastructure subject to attack also sup- ports the civilian population. The concept of LOAC no matter how an armed conflict is purpose, and more importantly, the effect proportionality becomes critical to determin- characterized and in all other military opera- of the cyber activity is simply to influence ing the lawfulness of cyber operations that tions.16 The four core principles of LOAC and provide information favorable to U.S. result in the physical destruction of dual-use are military necessity, distinction, propor- military operations, the activity would not targets. The principle of proportionality states tionality, and unnecessary suffering. Cyber constitute an attack and the four core prin- that the anticipated loss of civilian life and activity conducted during an armed conflict ciples are not implicated. damage to civilian property incidental to an is governed by the same rules as other capa- A more difficult analysis lies in cir- attack must not be excessive in relation to bilities that a military force may use to ensure cumstances where there will be damage or the concrete and direct military advantage accomplishment of a unit’s mission. However, destruction to civilian property. For civilian expected.21 Dual-use structures such as radio prior to analyzing cyber activity within property to be subject to an attack, the prin- transmission towers, power lines, and oil the framework of the four core principles, ciple of military necessity must be satisfied. refinery stations are some of the most dif- the first question that must be answered is Military necessity authorizes the use of force ficult targeting decisions to work through whether the cyber activity constitutes an required to accomplish the mission. However, because of the effect their destruction will “attack” under the LOAC. military necessity does not authorize acts oth- have on the civilian population. Attack is defined in Article 49 of erwise prohibited by the law of war. Closely Dual-use targets in the context of Additional Protocol I as “acts of violence related to military necessity is the concept of cyberwar are further complicated when the against the adversary, whether in offense distinction, which requires that attacks only target is data contained on a network server. or defense.”17 Michael Schmitt emphasizes be directed against military personnel and It is easy to imagine how certain data that aid in his article on “Cyber Operations and the military objects. To satisfy this principle, enemy operations would meet the definition Jus in Bello” that violent action is required cyber activity must be attributed to a state or of a valid military objective. Also easy to to constitute an attack.18 Cyber operations nonstate actor. The example of the Estonian imagine is how that same data could aid the during armed conflict certainly could result DDOS activity is a classic problem of attribu- civilian population. Professor Schmitt argues in “violent actions” triggering the same tion. The Russian government claimed no that data should not generally be character- legal and operational analysis of the four responsibility and blamed the DDOS activ- ized as an object in itself in the cyber domain core principles as any weapon or capabil- ity on “hacktivists,” patriotic Russians who unless its destruction causes the requisite ity within a state’s arsenal. However, as independently used cyber tools to influence level of harm.22 For example, destroying the discussed in the jus ad bellum analysis of a foreign state.19 Attribution is certainly a entire banking system of a state may severely sub-uses of force in the cyber domain, it is significant problem in cyber operations; affect the civilian population. Additionally, easy to contemplate that most cyber activity however, it is not insurmountable. Terrorist destroying digital art would be analogous to would not reach the violent action standard. attacks and military operations conducted destroying tangible art. Some attacks in the Cyber activity could certainly be used as a by insurgents sponsored by third-party states cyber domain would clearly be impermissible shaping action in conjunction with a much have raised attribution problems in the past. (targeting digital art), while others would larger operation carried throughout the Existing resources can address the attribu- only be permissible if there were articulable military domains of land, sea, air, and space. tion problems in the cyber domain. Detailed military necessity or operations could dis- For example, cyber activity could be used to intelligence, coupled with the experience and tinguish between the valid military objective provide certain information to the civilian judgment of the responsible commander, are and civilian objects. In the case of dual-use population within the battlespace in the just as applicable in the cyber domain as in targets, the principle of proportionality would course of information operations. The target other areas of military operations. have to be satisfied. Cyber operations do is the civilian population, but if the sole present a unique opportunity to specifically 74 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu PHILLIPS target certain aspects of a dual-use structure against the core principle of unnecessary 3 Richard A. Clarke, Cyber War: The Next through methods that would easily satisfy suffering. Cyber tools have the unique advan- Threat to National Security and What to Do About the principle of proportionality. For example, tage of not only mitigating the effects on the It (New York: Harper Collins, 2010), 13–14. the Stuxnet virus was specific as to which civilian population, but also more completely 4 Ibid., 15–16. components of the centrifuges would be taking into account the effects on combatants 5 Ibid., 1–3. affected and what harm would result. If and steering clear of any effects that cause 6 Sean Condron, “The Legal Basis for the Use given the option to “destroy” a target using unnecessary suffering under the LOAC. of Force,” Operational Law Handbook (Charlot- cyber methods that carefully calculate the tesville, VA: The Judge Advocate General’s Legal anticipated damage to the surrounding area, Conclusion Center and School, 2011), 1. clearly that method would be preferable The threat to U.S. national security 7 Brian J. Brill and J. Porter Harlow, Law of to dropping a bomb on the target causing in the cyber domain is real, but is the cyber War Documentary Supplement (Charlottesville, substantially more damage and potentially sky falling? A discussion of all cyber threats VA: The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center resulting in greater collateral effects. It is facing the United States is beyond the scope and School, 2010), 1. important to keep in mind that such opera- of this article. Obvious challenges exist in 8 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Military tions resulting in the “destruction” of infra- the cyber domain, to include attributing and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicara- structure—and in limited circumstances, cyber activity to a specific state or nonstate gua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Judg- data—are at the extreme end of the spectrum actor and the speed of action in the cyber ment of June 27, 1986, LEXIS 4. of cyber operations. The vast majority of domain. Both attribution and speed of action 9 Paul Walker, “Assessing Actions Along the operations discussed in open-source report- complicate the decisionmaking process and Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations,” PowerPoint ing involve a sub-use of force. Operations that effectiveness of existing countermeasures. briefing at the James Stockdale Center for Ethical focus on accessing data, influencing the civil- However, what is apparent is that within the Leadership, Annapolis, February 29, 2012. ian population through information opera- context of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, the 10 Tom Ruys, Armed Attack and Article 51 of tions, or disrupting cyber capabilities will current framework is adequate to navigate the UN Charter (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2010), 140. 11 Gary D. Solis, “Cyberwarfare, the New the effects of the cyber tool must still be considered against Normal,” The Law of Armed Conflict: International the core principle of unnecessary suffering Humanitarian Law at War, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 12 Matthew C. Waxman, “Cyber Attacks as generally not reach the threshold of a “use of through the operational issues facing military ‘Force’ under UN Charter Article 2(4),” Interna- force” or “attack” as currently defined. professionals. From an operational perspec- tional Law Studies 87; Raul A. Pedrozo and Daria Finally, cyber operations must avoid tive, cyber is simply one of five domains P. Wollschlaeger eds., International Law and the causing unnecessary suffering to combatants. (land, sea, air, space, and cyber) that com- Changing Character of War (Newport, RI: U.S. The LOAC principle of unnecessary suffer- manders must understand, plan, and operate Naval War College, 2011). ing (commonly referred to as superfluous in to accomplish the assigned mission. 13 See Nicaragua v. United States; also Oil Plat- injury) recognizes that the harm caused even Similar to the introduction of airplanes and forms Case (2003 ICJ LEXIS 11). to combatants should not be unlimited. The submarines in a commander’s battlespace, 14 Solis, 149. LOAC proscribes certain means and methods cyber tools can be regulated using existing 15 Ibid., 167–168. of warfare designed to cause suffering to laws governing the use of force and military 16 Condron, citing Department of Defense combatants that is substantially dispropor- operations. The advantage of cyber tools Directive 2311.01E, “DoD Law of War Program,” tional to the military advantage.23 Examples exists in the potential to control the effects para. 4.1. of means or methods that cause superfluous during an attack that could dramatically 17 Brill and Harlow, 210. injury include poison gases, certain exploding reduce the collateral damage associated with 18 Michael N. Schmitt, “Cyber Operations and bullets, and glass fragmentation devices that targeting military objectives. JFQ the Jus in Bello: Key Issues,” International Law preclude identifying and treating wounds by Studies 87, 92–93. X-ray. Lawful weapons can also be used in a 19 Clarke, 15–16. manner that violates the principle of unneces- Notes 20 Condron, 12. sary suffering. Incendiary devices used for 21 Brill and Harlow, 211. marking and screening in military operations, 1 General James E. Cartwright, USMC, 22 Schmitt, 96. if used with the intent of causing unneces- Memorandum for Chiefs of the Military Services, 23 Solis, 272. sary suffering by burning combatants, is one Commanders of the Combatant Commands, and often-cited example. Cyber tools must be Directors of the Joint Chiefs Directorates, “Joint treated no differently than any other weapon Terminology for Cyberspace Operations” n.d., 7. system. Cyber tools and activity are not likely 2 David T. Fahrenkrug, “Cyberspace to trigger a prohibition per se, as have poison Defined,” available at By Clifford S. Magee nemies no longer need to launch explosive charges throughout the national without support from the Government. The missiles or fly airplanes into build- electrical grid system?5 U.S. Government does not have a lead orga- ings to attack the United States. A The threats posed in the cyber domain nization to defend all government networks E new weapon has been introduced are, in fact, an existential danger to the Nation. from attacks, much less assist with defending into the world’s arsenal, and that weapon has Currently, the United States does not have an the private sector. DOD needs to be assigned no boundaries or rules, costs little, and has organization with the capabilities or authorities the responsibility of defending the cyber monstrous potential. The weapon is cyber to oversee cyber security for the public and domain with assistance from the Department warfare. The Nation’s security, economy, and private sectors. To develop this capability, the of Homeland Security, Intelligence Commu- critical infrastructure are under cyber attack Nation needs to undergo a paradigm shift on nity, and private sector. every day. Some attacks are from nation-states how it views the cyber domain. DOD needs to develop an active layered such as China and Russia, while others are cyber defense with offensive and defensive from nonstate actors such as terrorist orga- The Cyber Domain capabilities. Currently, most cyber defensive nizations, criminal gangs, teenage hackers, In 1911, British naval theorist Julian strategies rely on firewalls to block attacks. and anarchists. To protect American financial Corbett in Principles of Maritime Strategy This method is similar to the post–World War systems, power grids, telecommunications, stated that the Royal Navy was necessary I French creation of the Maginot Line,8 which water supplies, intellectual property, and mili- because it provided sea power to protect the was an expensive defensive measure designed 6 tary communications, the U.S. Government goods and services that travel on the sea. The to keep the Germans out of France. But in needs to designate the Department of Defense British economy was based on trade, and the 1940 the wall did not work. The Maginot Line (DOD) as the lead organization in preventing, sea lanes for communications and trade were was a single capability; the strategy of the line detecting, and recovering from cyber attacks. extraordinarily important for the security lacked both a layered defensive structure and In 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported and prosperity of Britain. Today, the security the offensive capability needed for defense. To that Chinese hackers had gained access to the and prosperity of the United States is depen- avoid a cyber Maginot Line, the United States U.S. electric power grid and created secret dent on cyber trade routes, but cyberspace needs layered, integrated defenses as well as openings.1 There was no monetary value in is vulnerable to attack. Signals and informa- an offensive capability. gaining control of the electrical grid, nor tion can be intercepted, interrupted, and was there any intelligence value that would exploited. The Nation must develop a strategy Defining the Battlespace justify cyber espionage.2 The only reason to to defend the cyber domain similar to the The cyber domain has been created penetrate the grid’s controls was to prepare to strategies it developed for defending land, in a short time and has not had the same combat American military superiority with sea, and air domains. level of scrutiny as other battle domains. asymmetrical cyberwar.3 The Chinese had Integrated DOD efforts defend these Land and sea domains have had thousands created a capability that could create power domains. Defending air trade and commercial of years of discussion to create generally outages across the United States and possibly routes is not the responsibility of the Federal accepted definitions. The air domain has cause nuclear incidents without firing a shot. Aviation Administration or American Air The victims were unaware their systems Lines; it is the responsibility of the Defense Major Clifford S. Magee, USMC, is a 7 were compromised until the intrusions were Department. Similarly, Maersk Lines is not Communications Officer currently serving with 13th detected by the U.S. Intelligence Community.4 responsible for defense of the sea domain, Marine Expeditionary Unit and a 2012 graduate What would the U.S. Government have done but in the cyber domain, every American from the Marine Corps Command and Staff if it discovered that China had been laying company is responsible for its own defense College. 76 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Magee had approximately 100 years of dedicated Cyberspace is a manmade domain In 2008, DOD suffered a major failure study. The discussions involving cyber as a created by information technologies. It is in its network defense.15 It started when battle domain are still nascent. composed of radio waves, cell phones, fiber an infected flash drive was placed into a The rapid evolution and increasing optic cables, satellites, laser beams, soft- U.S. military laptop at a base in the Middle complexity of the cyber domain have not ware, firmware, and anything that can be East.16 An authorized user brought the allowed agreement even as to the definition linked together to create a network.11 Some flash drive into a facility, but the drive was of the cyber domain. Some define cyberspace elements required to support cyberspace are infected with a virus created by a foreign as “the Internet,” while the Central Intel- electronic components, electricity, and an intelligence agency. Once the user placed the ligence Agency’s (CIA’s) statement to Con- infrastructure to connect it all. flash drive into a computer, the malicious gress is that “cyberspace is the total inter- Understanding the characteristics of code spread throughout the DOD network connectedness of human beings through cyberspace supports an understanding of undetected.17 The virus infected both classi- computers and telecommunication without cyber warfare. Cyber warfare is generally fied and unclassified networks18 and silently regard to physical geography.”9 The official divided into two core operational capabilities: gave control of DOD servers to unknown DOD definition of cyber—“a global domain computer network operations (CNO) and adversaries.19 DOD has not released the full within the information environment con- electromagnetic warfare (EW). extent of the compromise, but the virus did sisting of the interdependent network of CNO is a broad term that encapsulates have the ability to deliver information to information technology infrastructures three subcategories: adversaries clandestinely.20 To clean and including the Internet, telecommunications, recover from what is described as the worst networks, computer systems, and embedded ■ Network defense protects computers breach of U.S. military computers in history processors and controllers”10—is the most and networks.12 took 14 months and cost a billion dollars.21 thorough definition but is so encompassing ■ Network exploitation gains informa- Cyber espionage is a form of network it is difficult to comprehend. Understand- tion from other computer assets.13 exploitation that is currently a low-risk, ing the characteristics of cyberspace would ■ Network attack disrupts, denies, high-gain activity. There are hundreds of assist in understanding the definition of the degrades, or destroys information or exploitation programs and just one mid- cyber domain. capability.14 range program globally exploits 50 times the U.S. Air Force Academy cadets spend summer session in Cyber 256, Basic Cyber Operations course U.S. Air Force (Raymond McCoy) U.S. Air Force ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 77 FEATURES | Awaiting Cyber 9/11 amount of data that was taken in the Wiki The weapon was relatively inexpensive Federal Bureau of Investigation would arrest leaks espionage case.22 China, for example, has to create, but Stuxnet is now a genie out of terror suspects, and the CIA was heavily been accused of performing massive network the bottle. The tremendously dangerous and engaged in intelligence collection against exploitation operations against the U.S. Gov- sophisticated virus that successfully attacked terrorist organizations. Terrorism was not a ernment and private industry. Attribution is a SCADA system is now available for free on DOD focus. The events of 9/11 changed the difficult with network exploitation because the Internet, where one can find tutorials on focus for DOD, and the Defense Department even when perpetrators have been identified how to design and even employ it. Therefore, now fills a major antiterror role because of geographically, nations can claim that the it is a safe assumption that a variation of the ferocity of the attacks.32 Similar to 9/11, exploitation was from a nongovernmental Stuxnet code will be reused to attack another adversaries today will exploit the Nation’s hacker acting independently. Whether state institution in the near future. cyber defenses in an effort to destroy the sponsored or not, Chinese hackers have been Now that the technology of Stuxnet American way of life. stealing intellectual research and development is widely available, it no longer requires a Cyberwar has already begun. Its costs projects, software source code, and manufac- major financial investment or the backing of are low and its impacts can be great. The turing know-how from the United States for a nation-state. It can be copied and recreated United States is the most target-rich country years. The loss of intellectual property and easily. No fissile material or stealth technol- in the world, but military networks are not government secrets due to network exploits ogy is required, and it can be deployed at the the prime targets—those are in the civilian has resulted in significant erosion of previous speed of light. This demonstrates that the sector. Former Secretary of Defense Leon U.S. technological advantages. proliferation of cyber weapon technology Panetta warned, “the next Pearl Harbor will A well-known form of network attack cannot be easily controlled; the technol- be a cyber attack.”33 Just as the attack on Pearl occurred in June 2010 when a computer ogy is cheap and spreading to traditional Harbor finally galvanized the U.S. Govern- virus named Stuxnet was discovered in powers such as Russia and China as well as ment and public sectors after years of aggres- powerplants and factories around the world.23 to terrorist organizations. Cyber weapon sive Japanese actions throughout the Pacific, More complex than any virus ever seen, development is not going away; it will only Secretary Panetta’s warning is déjà vu. State Stuxnet was designed to attack industrial proliferate. and nonstate actors have been performing systems referred to as supervisory control The second operational capability in cyber operations against the United States at and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. It cyber warfare is electronic warfare. The DOD an alarming rate, and the loss of intellectual had the ability to turn up the pressure inside definition of EW is any military action that property as well as U.S. Government secrets nuclear reactors’ centrifuge machines and involves the use of the electromagnetic spec- has weakened the Nation’s defense posture switch off oil pipelines.24 The virus exploited trum to include directed energy to control and negated its technological advantages. vulnerabilities that system creators were not the electromagnetic spectrum to attack an Yet it seems the “sleeping giant” is again awaiting a public, catastrophic event before awakening. Stuxnet exploited vulnerabilities that system creators were not Defining critical infrastructure is a aware of, referred to as “zero-day exploits.” responsibility of Congress, but a series of Presidential decision directives defined critical infrastructure as “those physical aware of, referred to as “zero-day exploits.”25 enemy.30 EW can be broken into three com- and cyber-based systems essential to the Zero-day exploits are rare and extremely ponents: electronic attack, electronic protec- minimum operations of the economy and time-consuming to develop because they tion, and EW support. The use of wireless government.”34 This definition will need to be create vulnerabilities that have not been iden- Internet and cell networks has created a wide revised by Congress often as reliance on the tified. Viruses rarely have even one zero-day range of opportunities for the combination cyber domain continues to grow. exploit, but Stuxnet was so technologically CNO and EW. In 2003, an engineering glitch in advanced that it had four of these highly To protect government, industry, and FirstEnergy, Incorporated, software caused technical exploits.26 Microsoft assessed that national interests, the United States needs a power outage throughout the Northeast to create the virus took more than 10,000 to adjust its current definition of the cyber and Midwest United States and parts of man-hours.27 world and develop doctrine for cyberwar. Canada, and 50,000,000 people lost power in When Stuxnet was deployed, it was To quote Sun Tzu, “Invincibility lies in the 4 minutes.35 This was not an attack. It was an looking for a specific target; if it did not see defense; possibility of victory in the offense.” inadvertent programming error.36 However, if its target, it would lie dormant. Stuxnet was a In the cyber domain, the Nation remains pri- this had been an attack, the U.S. Government precision-guided munition designed to attack marily defense focused, but to ensure safety, would not have had the ability or authorities the centrifuges that spin nuclear material at it needs to advance its doctrine to include to assist FirstEnergy. The United States lacks Iran’s enrichment facilities.28 If this attack offensive cyber operations. Currently, U.S. the ability for cyber coordination between were a traditional kinetic attack, it would adversaries do not fear negative consequences government and private industry. have been an act of war. However, since the from their cyber operations. The possibility Placing DOD in charge of U.S. cyber definition of cyber warfare is unclear and of painful cyber or kinetic retribution must defense would consolidate shared informa- cyber attacks are difficult to attribute, Iran be understood. tion about cyber attacks. A single point of did not declare war because it did not know information collection would create a cyber who executed the attack. Intelligence experts Cyber 9/11 defense team approach between the private report that 1,000 centrifuges in Iran’s main Before the events of 9/11, terrorism was and public sectors. Attacks that occur in enrichment facility in Nantanz had to be largely considered a criminal issue properly the private sector are rarely shared with the replaced after the attack,29 delaying nuclear handled by law enforcement and the Intel- government. Even within the government, 31 production capability by 2 years. ligence Community. Local police and the the .gov and .mil domains rarely share 78 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Magee Sailor uses hash analysis at Defense Cyber Investigations Training Academy U.S. Air Force (Lance Cheung) U.S. Air Force information on cyber attacks. Currently, integration of USCYBERCOM and NSA pro- $38 billion.40 USCYBERCOM thus provides DOD operates and protects the .mil domain, vides the people, expertise, and equipment the Nation an existing cyber defense capabil- the Department of Homeland Security pro- required to defend the United States in cyber- ity, funding, and expertise that cannot be tects the .gov domain, and each private-sector space. General Keith Alexander, USA, serves recreated or replicated. entity is responsible for its own piece of the as commander of both USCYBERCOM and USCYBERCOM has provided the .com domain. There is no incentive for the NSA, and he ensures that the partnership .mil domain with the most capable cyber private sector to reveal to the public sector leverages the capabilities of both commands. defense in the world, but the command is not the amount or types of cyber attacks that are USCYBERCOM integrates the existing authorized to direct the security of the .gov or occurring. Bank of America and most of the pool of personnel, has substantial funding, .com domains. Legal authorities and response defense industrial base are not required to— and is authorized to perform offensive cyber actions need to be authorized before a cyber and do not—reveal the types and numbers operations. It draws its personnel from the attack is launched. Attacks against the United of attacks that are occurring within their private sector, government, and Service States would occur at “net-speed,” and systems. They, in fact, are disincentivized components. NSA employs over 800 Ph.D.s defenders of the U.S. cyber domain require because customers, investors, and govern- and is the world’s largest single employer maneuver space and authorities. If an attack ment entities contracting for their services of mathematicians.37 The 24th Air Force, against the .gov or .com domains occurs, may lose confidence in those companies’ 10th Fleet (Navy), Marine Forces Cyber, it would not stop while the United States abilities to defend themselves. and Army Forces Cyber provide personnel debates authorities. with expertise and experience in defending The technical expertise required to Why DOD? mission-critical networks.38 The nuclear view, understand, and coordinate actions DOD has already created U.S. Cyber command and control Emergency Action in cyberspace is limited. General Alexander Command (USCYBERCOM), which is Network is one of the 15,000 networks that estimates that only about 1,000 people in the collocated in Fort Meade, Maryland, with DOD defends, making the Department the United States are currently qualified with the National Security Agency (NSA). This largest cyber network in the world.39 DOD the proper clearances, technical abilities, and combination leveraged existing cyber capa- networks are located across hundreds of certifications.41 This small pool of trained bilities that could not be replicated because installations in dozens of countries around and proficient “cyber warriors” is a high value the cost is prohibitive, and the intellectual the globe. USCYBERCOM headquarters has commodity that is fought over between the resources resident at these institutions would a fiscal year 2012 budget of $159 million, and public and private sectors. The current model be extremely difficult to recreate. Moreover, the DOD technology budget is approximately of the private sector—which includes vital ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 79 FEATURES | Awaiting Cyber 9/11 U.S. Navy (Tom Jones) U.S. Navy (Tom CAPTION Cyber systems operator with CJTF 435 awaits confirmation that network connections operate properly at Kabul University’s Law and Political Science School infrastructure and provides its own defense ties to monitor, enact, and enforce security adversaries, physical damage, accidents, and without government assistance—does not standards on the Internet. This is a national equipment failures.43 White feeds provide leverage the limited workforce that exists security issue because it affects the U.S. situational awareness of activities outside of in cyber defense. Designating DOD as the economy and defense. the U.S. cyber domain, focusing on emerging lead for cyber defense would leverage the To defend cyberspace, the United States threats to provide defenders a proactive intel- small pool of experts and assist in cyber needs to develop its situational awareness ligence capability.44 collaboration. of the cyber domain. The U.S. Government When the Armed Forces select a posi- and private sector are connected to the same tion in the real world, the focus is on select- Cyber COP commercial infrastructure. The cyber COP ing, capturing, and retaining key terrain. To protect financial systems, power needs the ability to merge government and Similarly, the cyber COP would focus on grids, telecommunications, water supplies, private-sector cyber pictures to focus efforts key cyber terrain. The cyber terrain would intellectual property, and military commu- on known and emerging threats and to need to be a prioritized list of key nodes that nications, the United States must generate provide U.S. “cyber warriors” with the ability encompass the .gov, .mil, and .com domains. a comprehensive picture of cyberspace. A to outmaneuver adversaries in the defense or Visibility of the key cyber terrain would assist cyberspace common operational picture on the attack. in situational awareness of cyberspace. Situ- (COP) that fuses the public and private The proposed cyber COP can be under- ational awareness is vital for timely and effec- realms would provide the Nation a tool that stood by dividing it into blue, red, and white tive cyber responses. Situational awareness of could be used to prevent, detect, and recover feeds. Blue feeds represent friendly devices the land, sea, air, and space domains would from attacks. DOD needs to be provided the that support our cyber networks.42 Red feeds also be vital. For example, a relatively simple command structure, resources, and authori- represent threats to the network to include Global Positioning System denial of service 80 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Magee in response to an attack could have dramatic responsibility to ensure that it and private its intellectual capital, technical expertise, unforeseen impacts on the commercial sector companies of vital national interest are com- equipment, and funding, which cannot be (for example, shipping or aviation) or preci- pliant with current best practices of cyber recreated or replicated; therefore, selecting sion fires for the military. security policies. It also needs to set and DOD would be an efficient use of the Nation’s In the past, DOD has relied on units regulate standards with respect to encryp- resources. DOD already has some authorities moving into position as an indication or tion and data protection as well as task DOD to offensively respond to protect the United warning that an attack could occur. Learn- with ensuring cyber security compliance. States in the cyber domain. State and non- ing of an imminent attack when forces are Cyber security is currently in its Wild state actors currently penetrate and exploit already in place is too late; combatant com- West era where anything goes. There are no American cyberspace with no fear of retalia- manders need more time to prepare effective baseline requirements for cyber security, and tory strikes. DOD is prepared and could responses. Future conflicts will be preceded companies are free to decide for themselves provide a near real-time offensive response to by an increased amount of cyber activity. what constitutes enough security. Yet 73 cyber warfare. An example is the 2008 Russian invasion of percent of American Internet users have The current model of networking in Georgia that successfully coordinated cyber been victims of cyber crimes. According to the United States is indefensible; DOD alone attacks with kinetic attacks. The cyber COP MacAfee, the cost of cyber crimes globally has 7 million devices working off of 15,000 would be able to sense traffic for anomalies has passed $1 trillion because of lost intel- disparate networks managed independently.49 that could provide indications or warnings lectual property and damaged equipment.46 Recent technological innovations such as that could push combatant commanders’ DOD reports that its networks are probed for “cloud computing” must be leveraged to timelines to the left. weaknesses about 250,000 times an hour.47 create a more secure, reliable, and cost-effec- The cyber COP would also assist in The growth of and increased threat against tive cyberspace. For example, collapsing the offensive cyber operations. Recent attacks e-commerce alone has made cyber security 15,000 disparate DOD networks to a cloud on U.S. corporations such as Google, the essential for national defense. environment would provide it the ability to Nasdaq stock exchange, Lockheed Martin, The government has a responsibility react to threats at “net-speed.” This model Symantec, and many others have demon- to set regulations and ensure compliance must be used and coordinated with critical strated the threat to the private sector. After a of cyber security. DOD, with collaboration public and private sectors. lengthy forensic process, some of the attacks from DHS, the Intelligence Community, Vulnerability in the cyber domain were attributed to China and Russia. These and private sector, needs to publish required threatens the security and prosperity of the Nation. Currently, the United States does not have an organization that has the capabilities cyber security is a team sport that requires players from the or authorities to oversee cyber security for the private and public sectors to share information public and private sectors. To defend against the ever-increasing number and complexity of cyber attacks, the U.S. Government needs attacks occur daily and the attackers do not baseline settings for firewalls, antivirus to identify the Department of Defense as lead fear cyber retaliation. Retaliatory cyber tools software, and encryption systems. Regulated in cyber defense and enhance its authorities exist—a cyber tool was recently developed and assured compliance of cyber security to fill that role. JFQ by Japanese defense engineers,45 a digital practices in key industries is a requirement virus that can track down, identify, and for national security. disable attacking systems. The United States Notes needs to assist in the defense of key private- Conclusion 1 sector industries by providing an offensive Today, the only entity not in the .com Bryan Krekel, Capability of the People’s 48 capability. and .gov domains is DOD. China, Russia, Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and The framework for prioritization of terrorist organizations, criminal gangs, Computer Network Exploitation, prepared for fused information from the .mil, .com, and teenage hackers, and anarchists have already the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review .gov domains has been developed and is cur- paved roads into these domains, as well as Commission (McLean, VA: Northrop Grumman, rently operational in DOD, which focuses on into the .mil domain. The United States 2009), 41. 2 categorizing vulnerabilities, threat activities, needs to develop a cyber strategy that pro- Ibid., 42. 3 and their most likely consequences. The tects government and extends protection to Richard Clarke, “China’s Cyberassault on threat category and the severity of the threat the Nation’s privately owned critical infra- America,” The Wall Street Journal, June 15, 2011, drive resources, time, and attention given to structure. Cyber security is a team sport that available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 81 FEATURES | Awaiting Cyber 9/11 10 Joint Publication (JP) 1, Doctrine for the 40 Teresa Takai, “The DoD Information Enter- Armed Forces of the United States (Washington, prise,” Chips Magazine, October–December 2011. DC: The Joint Staff, 2009), I-7. 41 Tom Gjelten, “Cyberwarrior Shortage 11 Fahrenkrug, interview. Threatens U.S. Security,” NPR.org, July 19, 2010, NEW 12 Government Accountablility Office (GAO), available at 82 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu On Military Creativity By Milan Vego DOD (Erin A. Kirk-Cuomo) AdmiralAdmiral Nimitz,Nimitz, commandercommander ofof EasternEastern Pacific,Pacific, briefsbriefs PresidentPresident Roosevelt,Roosevelt, AdmiralAdmiral Leahy,Leahy, andand GeneralGeneral MacArthur,MacArthur, commandercommander ofof thethe WesternWestern Pacific,Pacific, onon operationsoperations advancingadvancing towardtoward JapanJapan DOD n the public mind, creativity is usually What Is Creativity? behavior on the part of the individual that associated with the works of the Creativity is perhaps one of the most is atypical or unusual.5 A creative idea must famous painters, sculptors, musicians, significant but least understood areas of be useful and satisfy some need.6 Unique- I philosophers, and scientists, but not of human endeavor.1 A great deal has been ness means that a certain idea or a product those in the military. Yet the success in a mil- written about what constitutes creativity, but contains characteristics having nothing alike itary domain in both peacetime and in war is no theory is completely accepted. One reason or equal in existence.7 A person could have an hardly possible without considerable creativ- is that different fields of knowledge require idea that is unique for him but in fact might ity on the part of the military institutions as different factors in combination.2 Creativity be very common. The final result must be whole and the commanders and their staffs at can be defined as one’s ability to bring some- something new and uncommon in relation to all levels. War is largely an art, not a science. thing new into existence—to generate novel a particular problem being studied.8 Hence, it is inherent that military command- ideas that are valued by others.3 It involves ers and their staffs must be highly creative one’s ability to properly evaluate and present Military Environment in planning, preparing, and employing already existing ideas or processes in a differ- The military is a unique profession. their forces for combat. While technological ent way. It is characterized by the commitment of innovations should never be neglected, focus In general, to be creative and novel, a its members to unlimited service, extend- should be clearly on those aspects of creativ- product or the idea behind it must transcend ing to the risk of life itself. As in no other ity most directly related to leadership. That is previous concepts or views. A creative product where the outcomes of military actions were should have a high intrinsic value due to its Dr. Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the determined in the past and it is where they essential originality and uniqueness.4 Origi- Joint Military Operations Department at the Naval will be determined in the future. nality is generally defined as any response or War College. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 83 FEATURES | On Military Creativity organization, the military trains its members ence and execution of orders. Leaders are Hart wrote in his Memoirs that “if a soldier to perform tasks they hope will never need to usually selected without consultation with advocates any new idea of real importance, be performed.9 It has a strong sense of group subordinates. The peacetime environment he builds up such a wall of obstruction— identity, and its highly specialized missions encourages breeding of officers who rigidly compounded of resentment, suspicion and and functions have led to a culture that is follow rules. Such officers conform to the inertia—that the idea only succeeds at the vastly distinct from society as a whole. A wishes of superiors and sacrifice their own sacrifice of himself. As the wall finally yields military culture is defined as the sum of intel- independence of action by first ascertaining to the pressure of the new idea, it falls and lectual, professional, and traditional values the preferences of their leaders and basing crushes him.”14 possessed by an officer corps.10 their own conduct on those.12 This problem is Like any other large organizations, In contrast to their civilian counter- compounded in a military where the officer military institutions are often heavily parts, military artists must work within a corps is highly politicized—where ambitious bureaucratized. They force their members rather narrow framework and are subject to officers try to cultivate personal connections to apply numerous fixed techniques and numerous rules and regulations that must be with politicians, which often leads to political procedures in the erroneous belief that this factored in. All organizations, and the mili- interference in military promotions, espe- would enhance effectiveness. Yet it has just tary in particular, tend to be wasteful. They cially at the highest levels. the opposite effect because the rank-and-file are also subjected to various pressures, both The highly centralized and hierarchi- relies on a fixed routine instead of using external and internal. These pressures tend cal command organization reinforces the judgment and experience. The mission of to reduce potential leaders to mediocrity.11 authoritarian tendencies on the part of the the institution is increasingly forgotten or Military culture is generally not conducive higher commanders. Authoritarianism is ignored. The chiefs of various departments to finding a drastic solution to some new a major obstacle to the creativity of both or sections create veritable fiefdoms of challenge. It tends rather either to resist any individuals and the military institution as power and influence and try to devise ways changes or, in the best case, slightly modify a whole. Often, higher commanders are to protect and expand their authority and the existing situation. reluctant or unwilling to acknowledge their power. They are also often resistant to any The main obstacles to military creativ- own failings openly or tacitly. They try to change because change is considered a threat ity are posed by the military’s inherent hier- keep the image of infallibility. They also often rather than an opportunity. Hence, any novel archical command structure—an authoritar- refuse to learn from their errors.13 Finding idea is usually dismissed as impractical, irre- ian, bureaucratized system—and its thinking, someone to blame for errors and accidents is sponsible, or absurd. The existing rules and which is exemplified by conformity, group- a common occurrence in a military organiza- regulations became the ends in themselves. think, parochialism, dogmatism, intolerance, tion. Authoritarian structures allow pressure Another problem associated with and anti-intellectualism. The military is a only to be applied top-down, not bottom-up. bureaucratized thinking is reliance on highly stratified organization, and its leaders Yet in practice, it is from the bottom that cre- various checklists and matrices for planning require prompt and unquestioning obedi- ative ideas are usually generated. B.H. Liddell instead of relying on the intelligent judgment American troops in tanks advance in World War I U.S. Army 84 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO and experience of the commanders and their appropriately reconcile these contradictory War (1861–1865), Russo-Turkish War of staffs. For example, the U.S. military widely requirements. Experience shows that military 1877–1878, Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), uses the so-called universal joint task force organizations that succumb to conformity and Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 was list, universal naval task list, naval tactical eventually decline. The enemy essentially simply ignored. These wars showed enor- task list, and Marine Corps task list. These only delivers the final blow, as the case of the mously increased capabilities for defense.24 lengthy documents aim to replace thinking French army in 1940 illustrates.20 Around In Germany, the cult of the offensive with ready-made tasks that simply have to World War I, the Japanese naval academy was glorified. Field Marshal Alfred von be listed. They are the antitheses of creative increasingly emphasized rigorous regimenta- Schlieffen wrote that “attack is the best thinking. For example, the U.S. military has tion and memory work at the expense of defense.”25 Similarly, the French army was so lost its way in writing concisely, clearly, and originality, individuality, and creativity; the obsessed with the offensive that it spread to using plain language by its overuse and abuse unimaginative emphasis on cramming and civilians. Marshal Joseph Joffre (1852–1931), of various buzzwords.15 The use of buzzwords rote memory ended any original thinking.21 chief of the General Staff, wrote that the can be intended to impress the audience or Parochialism within the Services can French army “no longer knows any other law readers, win arguments, or grossly inflate sometimes be a serious obstacle to creativity. than the offensive . . . . Any other concept the importance of unimportant ideas. By Each Service has a distinctive organization, ought to be rejected as contrary to the very using vague or opaque words, one can give a culture, tradition, and way of warfare. The nature of war.”26 The British military and positive connotation to questionable proposi- individual beliefs of Servicemembers are some other European militaries also believed tions. Bureaucratized thinking is directly institutionalized through education, training, in the superiority of offense over defense. responsible for this sad state of affairs. and socialization.22 Service parochialism is Many officers in France and Britain also Conformism is a major obstacle to cre- reflected in the resistance to close cooperation believed that superior morale would overcome ativity in a military organization, especially during peacetime. A given military force experience shows that military organizations that succumb to has the need for stability, which is ensured by conformity. Within a group, conformity conformity are eventually doomed pertains to members changing their personal attitudes and beliefs to align with the beliefs with other Services during planning, prepara- superior enemy firepower.27 Yet after the of a group as whole. It is most often the tion, and execution of military action. One of battle on the Marne in August 1914 and on result of a peer pressure. The most extreme the most pernicious effects of strong parochial until the final Allied offensive in the fall of manifestation of conformity is so-called views is that the Services often do not fully 1918, the clash on the Western Front degener- groupthink, which exists in small or large agree on a certain organizational options. ated into a war of attrition. The high com- organizations when members mimic the This, in turn, has highly adverse effects on the manders on both sides tried over and over to thinking of their superiors. Groupthink is the performance of a joint force in combat. achieve limited tactical successes and in the antithesis of creativity.16 Many militaries are characterized by process suffered huge casualties. The very structure of the military is rigid if not outright dogmatic views on many In the 1920s, there was considerable aimed to ensure the maximum conformity of aspects of their activities in peacetime and in debate and flexibility about the French army’s its members. This tendency is further aggra- combat. This is often the case with military doctrine. However, that essentially disap- vated by the conditions of peacetime service doctrine. Optimally, doctrine should be peared in the 1930s in part because regression and of human weaknesses.17 The military descriptive, not prescriptive. It should be was seen by the French high command as an organization uses myriad standard operat- highly flexible, allowing its application to fit attack from the left—an infiltration of the ing procedures and regulations to ensure in different physical environments and differ- army ranks by communist agitators. The this high degree of conformity. The selec- ent fundamental warfare areas. Despite great French army became more rigid by applying tion and promotion process is often biased potential value, doctrine can easily slide into the rules of its doctrine almost without excep- against officers who think and act outside dogma. It can become a substitute for creative tion, regardless of circumstances.28 In 1935, the box.18 Moreover, many military theorists thinking about warfare. That is especially General Maurice Gamelin (1872–1958), com- and practitioners are uncomfortable with the the case in an era of rapid technological mander in chief of the French army, tightened notion that warfare is largely an art and not a change. A military doctrine can narrow one’s the control of military writings and required science. They consider warfare as destructive vision by dictating the questions and thereby that all publications receive prior approval; and grim while art is beautiful and creative. imposing certain answers.23 only official views could be presented. In 1934, To allow too much creativity would invari- Prior to World War I, the cult of the Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Charles de ably lead to anarchy.19 offense was dominant in Germany, France, Gaulle (1890–1970) was refused permission The military needs the stability of and Great Britain. The prevalent view, based to publish an article in the Revue militaire conformity so it can successfully function in on the experiences of the wars for German française, and after his pubic campaign for peacetime and in war. Yet at the same time Unification (1864, 1866, 1870–1871), was armored offensive tactics, he was taken off the it also has a paramount need for creativity; that new weapons gave a decisive advantage promotion list. Those who challenged official otherwise, it is doomed to failure when a to the attacker. Consequently, a future war doctrinal views were silenced. Endorsement of supreme test of war comes. One of the most would be short and decisive. The contrary official views was the rule. There was no lively demanding tests for any military leader is to evidence as provided by the American Civil debate. Consider, for instance, the Spanish ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 85 FEATURES | On Military Creativity Civil War. Both German and Soviet military those of superiors. Higher military officers Experience shows many examples in journals devoted enormous attention to the and commanders should avoid setting the which independently thinking and creative study of that conflict. The Revue militaire tone of professional debate, as it was during officers were forced to change or even française rarely covered it, and when it did, it the heyday of U.S. military transformation in abandon views because of open or hidden provided little analysis.29 the early 2000s, and thereby stifling contrar- opposition from their superiors. For example, French army doctrine was based on a ian views. Higher authorities should create Patton and Eisenhower began to seriously carefully orchestrated attack, rigidly con- an environment that encourages and furthers think about armored warfare in 1919–1920. trolled divisional boundaries, and a slow, reasoned debate. Critical thinking should be Patton wrote articles for Cavalry Journal and phased advance in which air, armor, and the norm and not the exception. No military Eisenhower for Infantry Journal. Eisenhower artillery functioned in tightly controlled organization can be successful or even survive was summoned by Major General Charles harmony. That was exactly the opposite of without a free and open debate on important Farnsworth, chief of infantry, and told that the German concept of air-land battle professional matters. his ideas were not only wrong but dangerous. Eisenhower was warned that in the future, his writing should be in conformity with higher commanders should avoid setting the tone of doctrine.37 professional debate and thereby stifling contrarian views In Britain, the prevailing attitude in the 19th century and interwar years of the 20th century was a deliberate spirit of amateurism (Blitzkrieg), which stressed individual initia- Another serious factor detrimental to that valued honor, physical courage, skill in tive, opportunistic exploitations of unex- creativity in the military is the anti-intellec- field sports, and, above all, one’s regiment pected openings, and local vulnerabilities tualism often generated by an overly authori- while deprecating professionalism, school- in the French lines.30 Prior to the German tarian command structure. An officer with ing, and intelligence. The British military invasion in May 1940, the French believed the an impressive academic pedigree and/or was traditionally against book studies. The Germans could not and would not ultimately a scholarly approach to a given problem is preference was character over intellect. This perform radically differently than their own often considered a threat because he or she preference has always taken the form of forces. They refused to see that the enemy makes the aura of infallibility upon which denigration of the staff college graduate38 had other options. The sense of infallibil- the prestige of authoritarianism is built and apotheosis of that splendid chap, the ity was aggravated by an institutional bias dubious. Yet the necessity for intelligent, regimental officer.39 For example, General against feedback that contradicted existing independent, and creative thinking in war J.F.C. Fuller, while chief instructor at the doctrine or preparations. There was little is obvious. At the same time, the cultural British Staff College at Camberley in late learning because the high command had all obstacles to dislodging the all-pervasive 1923, requested permission to publish his the answers.31 assumption of the infallibility of higher book on the foundations of the science of In the 1930s and until the raid on commanders are often very high. Lip service war. His request was refused on the ground Schweinfurt in August 1943, the U.S. Air is paid to the need for independent and cre- that the chief of the Imperial General Staff, Corps embraced the theory of strategic ative thinking, while it is given short shrift Lord Cavan, objected to staff officers writing bombing as dogma despite growing empirical in practice.34 For example, British Prime books. Lord Cavan told Fuller that author- evidence that this theory was based on false Minister David Lloyd George (1916–1922) ship is contrary to discipline for serving premises. In 1937, the U.S. military attaché in observed, the “military mind . . . regards officers because it might call the validity of Spain suggested that high-altitude bombing thinking as a form of mutiny.” Bernard field manuals into question. He also told was ineffective and that small tactical Brodie wrote that soldiers have always Fuller not to publish books while he was an bombers and fighters offered the best combat cherished the image of themselves as men of instructor. Hence, Fuller asked to reduce his capability. The Air Corps, then in the midst of action rather than as intellectuals.35 time on the staff from 4 to 3 years in order to a funding debate concerning the B-17 bomber, In most militaries, there is consider- publish his work.40 brushed aside the report, arguing that such able prejudice against those who seem views contradicted the existing doctrine and excessively intellectual. There is the widely Organizational Creativity hence could not be accepted.32 held belief that fighting depends more upon In generic terms, organizational cre- Often, military organizations lack muscle than brain and that any display of ativity is best defined as the “creation of a tolerance of views that diverge from the so- education is not only bad form but also inca- valuable, useful new product, service, idea, called mainstream. Yet without tolerance no pacitating.36 Yet the most successful military procedure or process by individuals working creativity is possible.33 Intolerance usually leaders such as Napoleon I, Helmuth von together in a complex social system.”41 In a stifles the discussion of professional topics Moltke, Sr., Erich von Manstein, George military context, organizational creativity in peacetime, as was the case in the British Patton, Douglas MacArthur, Ernest King, pertains to significantly enhancing combat and French militaries in the interwar years. Chester Nimitz, and Raymond Spruance effectiveness of one’s forces through inventing Ideally, officers and the rank-and-file should were excellent thinkers and practitioners. a novel and unique way of arranging levels of be free to express their opinions on profes- The lack of solid professional education and command and their constituent elements and sional matters. They should not be ostracized self-education has been one of the underly- thereby opening the way for a nontraditional or punished for having views that differ from ing reasons for military incompetence. employment of one’s forces in combat. 86 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO Perhaps the most novel and effective ing tactical actions and major operations/ The U.S. Marine Corps developed way of organizing naval forces for combat campaigns regardless of the enemy and the an innovative and ultimately highly suc- is the U.S. Navy’s task force concept, used place where these actions would occur. cessful operational concept for conducting extensively from 1941 to 1945 and still in The Soviet Red Army was the leader in major amphibious landings. The document, use today. A task force (TF) was a provi- the development of theory of operational art in Tentative Manual for Landing Operations, sional organization composed of ships and/ the interwar years. The Soviets developed the was issued in January 1934. After a series of or submarines and aircraft from different so-called deep battle (dubokoy boy) concept fleet landing force exercises, it was officially administrative units (squadrons, divisions). in 1935, which envisaged forces no larger adopted by the U.S. Navy as Fleet Training It was usually dissolved shortly after the than corps attacking the enemy simultane- Publication 167, Landing Operations. All U.S. mission was accomplished. The main aim of ously over the entire depth of fielded forces.43 amphibious landing operations in World the TF concept was to enhance operational A year later, the Soviets developed and put War II were based on that manual. flexibility. A TF was in turn broken down into their doctrine an even bolder concept The highly successful and novel into several task groups (TGs), and each of of deep operations (glubokaya operatsiya) to German air-land battle concept of the late these was divided into task units (TUs) with be applied at the operational level of war.44 1930s was relatively simple and highly the latter composed of several task elements This concept was at the heart of planning and flexible. The key was using air and ground (TEs). Each TF was assigned a two-digit execution of (major) operations conducted reconnaissance to locate gaps in the enemy’s number (for example, TF 38). TGs, TUs, and by the armies and fronts (army groups) and defenses. Then the weight of main effort TEs were identified by decimal numbers (TG supported by air and airborne forces to launch (Schwerpunkt) would be in that area. The 58.1, TU 58.1.1, TE 58.1.1.2). simultaneous blows throughout the enemy’s second key element was concentration at the Fast carrier groups created in both entire operational depth.45 Deep operation was weight of main effort (Schwerpunktbildung). the Japanese and U.S. navies in the interwar successfully applied in the Soviet offensives on Speed, mobility, surprise, and utilization years are another example of how integration the Eastern Front in 1944–1945. of windows of opportunity were central of high-strategic mobility and firepower can lead to qualitatively new capabilities through innovative command organization. Carrier groups were capable of theater-wide or U.S. Army operational employment. Another example of successful organizational creativity was the establishment of the first Panzer divisions in the German Wehrmacht in 1935. These divisions included not only tanks but also motorized infantry, artillery, engineers, and signal troops.42 This concept was not emu- lated by the French. The Germans continued their innovative approach in the late 1930s by using Panzer units in close cooperation with the Luftwaffe. In March 1940, the Germans also created the first army-size Panzer forma- tion, Panzer Group Kleist, composed of one Panzer corps and two motorized infantry corps and capable of conducting independent major operations in cooperation with the Luftwaffe. Panzer Group Kleist was part of Army Group A and spearheaded the thrust through the Ardennes in May 1940. Combat Concepts In time of peace, various tactical/opera- tional concepts are created for the employ- ment of combat forces in case of hostilities. A tactical concept is aimed to employ combat forces to accomplish tactical objectives, while an operational concept aims to accomplish operational or, in some cases, partial strategic General Eisenhower, objectives. These concepts form the heart of Supreme Allied Commander the respective tactical and Service/joint doc- in Europe during World War II trine. They are used in planning and execut- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 87 FEATURES | On Military Creativity elements in the concept. The Panzer forces notions. 52 The best test of creativity is to execution.58 MacArthur had the rare gift of would penetrate deeply into the enemy rear. achieve surprise. One of the main methods recognizing the importance of geography They would have little regard for open flanks. is a highly innovative deception plan and its and planning his campaigns accordingly. He The initial aim was to destroy not enemy skillful execution. Commanders should put was well known for his ability to integrate troops but command posts and supply lines themselves in the enemy’s shoes and think both military and nonmilitary aspects of the and to threaten lines of retreat. The key to what course is the least likely the enemy will situation into his campaign plans. He had the success was the psychological effect of the foresee or forestall.53 The art of warfare rests demonstrated ability to think broadly and fast-moving Panzer forces. Often, entire on the freest application of its fundamentals far ahead. In the initial phase of the Korean sectors of a front would collapse even though under constantly changing conditions.54 War, for instance, his actions were instru- the Panzers penetrated the front at just a Making a decision and executing it mental in saving South Korea from falling single point.46 presumes the need for some degree of cre- under communist rule. After initial setbacks, The Air-Land Battle concept of 1981 ativity on the part of military commanders. MacArthur proposed to the Joint Chiefs was an example of an innovative way to A military decision is the result of creative of Staff a bold and innovative idea to land employ the U.S. Army’s combat arms and thinking. A military decision is often unique United Nations forces deep in the rear of the North Korean army at Inchon. The plan was a creative intellect allows commanders to surprise enemy strongly opposed by many officials in Wash- ington because of its high risks. In arguing counterparts and thus render them impotent for his plan to the Joint Chiefs, he stated that he was firmly convinced an early and air force in a major offensive. It envisaged and is based on a specific situation that is strong effort behind the enemy’s front would offensive initial blows carried out from mul- rarely repeated. Successful commanders sever his main lines of communications and tiple and unexpected directions by both land should possess a great deal of good common enable U.S. forces to deliver a decisive blow. and air forces against forces deployed in the sense, logical thinking, and rational decision- The alternative was a frontal attack from operational depth of the enemy’s defenses. making skills. No plan, no matter how sound, the Naktong line that could only result in a It would be followed by actions aimed at could survive the first contact with the enemy protracted and expensive campaign to slowly preventing the enemy from recovering. The without creativity. Hence, commanders and drive the enemy north of the 38th Parallel.59 main idea was to shatter the coherence of subordinates must have the mental agility to In the end, MacArthur’s views prevailed; the enemy forces.47 Air-Land Battle remained the react quickly when facing unforeseen situa- amphibious landing at Inchon (Operation mainstay of the U.S. Army’s doctrine until tions or to take advantage of fleeting oppor- Chromite), some 150 miles behind the North the late 1990s. tunities in order to make new decisions based Korean forces then besieging the Pusan on running estimates of the situation. perimeter, was carried out on September 15, Creativity in Combat The most successful commanders were 1950. The landing was brilliantly executed, Creativity of commanders refers to their well known for their unique and creative style and it quickly led to the collapse of the North ability to find workable, novel solutions to in planning and the employment of forces Korean forces at the Pusan Perimeter. problems—to be innovative and adaptable in in combat. Moltke, Sr., was renowned for Any plan or order should revolve fast moving, potentially confusing situations. thinking broadly in planning and executing around an overarching idea, known generi- All exceptional military leaders have had a his campaigns in three victorious wars (1864, cally as the concept of operations (CONOPS), large measure of creative skills.48 A creative 1866, and 1870–1871). The key elements in suggesting how to employ combat forces most intellect allows commanders to surprise his operational thinking were focusing on decisively to accomplish a given military enemy counterparts and thus render them meticulous deployment planning, seeking objective. In operational warfare theory, the impotent.49 Moltke, Sr., believed that in war, the destruction of the enemy army, giving term operational idea (scheme) pertains to the as in art, there are no generally valid norms. maximum freedom of action to subordinates, concept for a major operation or campaign. In both war and art, rules cannot replace and concentrating forces at the weight of the CONOPS is the heart of any sound plan for talent.50 Success in combat at all levels requires main effort to effect large envelopments and the employment of forces. It is developed from imagination on the part of commanders, who encirclements.55 Like Napoleon I, Moltke, Sr., the most optimal friendly course of action should possess a high degree of creativity in insisted on quick deployment and achieved and is included as an integral part of the com- thinking and a readiness to take risks.51 the greatest victories by concentrating his mander’s decision. A sound CONOPS idea Creative thinking and mental agility armies on the battlefield.56 Moltke, Sr., also requires ingenuity and creativity on the part refer to commanders’ ability to see the whole had a surprising ability to foresee how a situ- of the commander and staff. picture from its individual parts. Leaders ation would develop and to take the right A sound CONOPS should describe should be bold and innovative; they should measures, as he demonstrated in his brilliant in broad terms, concisely and clearly, what not use forces in a traditional manner. This victories at Koeniggraetz on July 3, 1866, and each force element will do to accomplish means not being fixated on the mechanical Sedan on September 1–2, 1870.57 the ultimate objective. Among other things, or schematic employment of combat forces. General MacArthur was one of the CONOPS should avoid traditional patterns. To preserve versatility and variability of deci- most successful Allied commanders in World It should be bold and novel and be speedily sions, commanders should not act according War II. He was known for his thorough executed. It should pose multidimensional to conventional views and preconceived planning, boldness of vision, and energetic threats the enemy has little or no chance of 88 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO countering successfully. It should surprise Not all Allied concepts of operations Godfroy, director of naval intelligence, later and deceive the enemy, further complicating were creative. In fact, many were quite became known for his James Bond novels.64 his response. Most importantly, it should be ordinary. For example, in both the Pacific In addition to Fleming, Godfroy’s naval directed at the destruction or neutralization and European theaters in World War II, the intelligence department employed a school- of the enemy’s center of gravity.60 Allies used similar and highly predictable master, journalist, collector of books on An example of a creative operational operational ideas for their amphibious land- original thought, Oxford classical don, bar- idea was the German campaign in Denmark ings. That made it considerably easier for rister clerk, and insurance agent along with and Norway in April 1940 (Unternehmen the enemy to deduce Allied intentions. It did two regular naval officers, two stockbrokers, Weseruebung—Weser Enterprise) and not lead to defeats largely because the Allies and several women acting as assistants and preceding the first phase of the German had enormous superiority on the ground, typists. 65 campaign in the West from May to June 1940 at sea, and in the air in most of the land- (Plan Gelb-Yellow). For example, the German ings conducted. For example, the Japanese, Conclusion operational idea for the invasion of Denmark by closely observing and analyzing U.S. Creativity is the key element in the suc- and Norway in April 1940 was innovative. amphibious landings, changed their method cessful planning, preparation, and execution Never before had anyone attempted to of conducting antiamphibious defense from of a combat action and ultimately in winning seize positions separated by a wide sea area defending the beaches to digging in and a war. It is directly linked to the art side of without obtaining command of the sea first. establishing several defensive lines farther warfare, so it requires thorough knowledge The Germans envisaged simultaneous and from the beaches. In that way, they coun- and understanding of the true nature of multiple thrusts by ground, sea, and air ele- tered superior U.S. firepower and maxi- war. Creativity in peacetime is essential to ments to quickly seize southern Norway and mized their own advantages. For example, developing sound military organizations, then move north under the protective shield after U.S. troops landed on Okinawa in operating concepts, and doctrine, and to of the Luftwaffe. The operational idea was April 1945 (Operation Iceberg), the Japanese educating and training future commanders also bold, and the Germans took rather high offered stubborn resistance in the interior and their staffs. The need for technological risks to mount such a large-scale effort in the of the island. By the time the last resistance creativity should not be confused with the face of British superiority at sea and its ability to react quickly to any German landing in CONOPS should pose multidimensional threats the enemy has Norway. At the same time, the Germans maintained a high degree of operational little or no chance of countering successfully security, using deception and concealment.61 In the first phase of their campaign in ended in late June 1945, the Japanese had cognitive aspects of creativity. Experience the West in May 1940, the Germans used lost 110,000 men in combat, but they also shows repeatedly that novel technologies by combined penetration and single-sided envel- inflicted heavy losses on the attacker: U.S. themselves are insufficient to win victories opment maneuvers to cut off and destroy the battle casualties were 49,000 including and ultimately wars. New technologies major part of the Allied forces deployed in 12,500 killed or missing.63 must be followed by creative, corresponding northern France and Belgium. It was General Deception is one of the most important changes in force organization. Erich von Manstein’s idea to combine single- supporting plans. Successful deception is the The single most important factor is sided envelopment with penetration. He product of an imaginative story: a series of sound integration of new technologies and selected the Sedan-Dinant sector as the point actions and measures aimed to manipulate creative operating concepts and doctrine; for a tactical penetration maneuver. This enemy intelligence channels so the deception otherwise, ultimate success will be wanting. would be followed by an operational single- target—the enemy commander—believes In contrast to the environment for artists and sided envelopment maneuver extending all what one desires him to believe. Building scientists, the military environment poses the way to the French Channel coast. The a story is one of the most complicated yet formidable obstacles to creativity at all levels. aim was to avoid making a frontal attack on critical parts of deception planning. The Thus, it is incumbent at the highest levels of the Allied forces as they moved into Belgium, most effective deception story reinforces the military and political leadership to create a and rather to cut them off in the rear of the enemy’s belief in what he already expects, climate and provide adequate resources for Somme River.62 underscoring the critical role of detailed creativity and experimentation. Only through The Allied campaigns in the Pacific and accurate knowledge of the enemy’s the open and vigorous struggle of competing during World War II were successful because perceptions and beliefs that is obtained by ideas is it possible to develop and apply sound they included, among other things, some intelligence. Experience has shown the great operating concepts and doctrine. A military highly creative ideas. In the so-called island- value of using the work of artists such as organization that restricts or, worse, does not hopping approach, as exemplified by the playwrights or novelists in providing ideas allow free professional discussion is doomed New Guinea, Solomons, and Central Pacific for a deception story. Artists often have more to stagnate in peacetime and to eventually fail campaigns, the Allies attacked enemy weak- fertile and imaginative ideas than profes- in combat. Finally, the German-style mission nesses and avoided enemy strengths. That, in sional officers. For example, many members command should be adopted and applied turn, greatly enhanced the Allied operational of the British wartime intelligence apparatus in both letter and spirit so as to educate and tempo and thereby never allowed the Japa- were unorthodox personalities. Ian Fleming, train commanders and staffs to think and act nese to recover from their losses. personal assistant to admiral Sir John H. creatively. JFQ ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 89 FEATURES | On Military Creativity 29 Notes Cited in ibid., 86. Army Europe, Foreign Military Branch, Bundesar- 30 Irving B. Holley, Technology and Military chiv/Militaerarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg, i.Br., 10. 51 1 Jeffrey Maitland, “Creativity,” The Journal Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 34, no. 4 (Summer (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004), 25. Arbeitspapier (working paper), Operative Fuehrung 31 1976), 397. Murray, 57. (Hamburg, 1992), 18. 32 52 2 Marshall Dimock, “Creativity,” Public Admin- Robert F. Gass, Theory, Doctrine, and Ball Ibid. 53 istration Review 46, no. 1 (January–February 1986), 4. Bearings: Adapting Future Technology to Warfare B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York: F.A. 3 Cited in Ronald D. Daniel, Creativity and Stra- (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Mili- Praeger, 1954), 348. 54 tegic Vision: The Key to the Army’s Future (Carlisle tary Studies, January 1996), 31, 33. Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, 33 Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 4–5. Edwin R. Micewski, “Creativity and Military vol. 2, Combat and Conduct of War, trans. Karl von 4 Harold H. Anderson, “The Nature of Cre- Leadership in Postmodern Times,” paper presented Donat (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1914), 413. 55 ativity,” Studies in Art Education 1, no. 2 (Spring at the International Conference for Interdisciplin- John English, “The Operational Art: Devel- 1960), 10. ary Creativity in Science and Technology, Bucha- opment in the Theories of War,” in The Operational 5 Norman E. Wallen, “Creativity—Fantasy and rest, February 25–26, 2005, 5. Art: Developments in the Theories of War, ed. B.J.C. 34 Fact,” The Elementary School Journal 64, no. 8 (May Nazareth, 44. McKercher and Michael A. Hennessy, 9 (Westport, 35 1964), 439. Lloyd J. Matthews, “The Uniformed Intel- CT: Praeger, 1996). 56 6 Irvin Summers and David E. White, “Cre- lectual and His Place in American Arms, Part I: Charles A. Willoughby, Maneuver in War ativity Techniques: Toward Improvement of the Anti-Intellectualism in the Army, Yesterday and (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing, 1939; Decision Process,” The Academy of Management Today,” Army, July 2002, 18–19. reprint Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1986), 118. 36 57 Review 1, no. 2 (April 1976), 100. Gabriel Serbu, “The Dangers of Anti- Roland G. Foerster, “Die operative Denken 7 Dimock, 3. Intellectualism in Contemporary Western Armies,” Moltkes des Aelteren und die Folgen,” in Ausge- 8 J. Nazareth, Creative Thinking in Warfare Infantry, November/December 2010, 44. waehlte Operationen und ihre militaerhistorischen 37 (New Delhi: Lancer, 1987), 3. Nazareth, 45. Grundlagen, ed. Hans-Martin Ottmer and Heiger 38 9 Cited in Amos A. Jordan and William J. Matthews, 18. Ostertag (Bonn/Herford: Verlag E.S. Mittler & 39 Taylor, Jr., “The Military Man in Academia,” Correlli Barnett, “The Education of Military Sohn, 1993), 263. 58 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Elites,” Journal of Contemporary History 2, no. 3 D. Clayton James with Anne Sharp Wells, Social Sciences 406 (March 1973), 130. (July 1967), 18. Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in 40 10 Williamson Murray, “Innovation: Past and Nazareth, 45. Korea 1950–1953 (New York: Free Press, 1993), 30. 41 59 Future,” Joint Force Quarterly 12 (Summer 1996), 54. Richard W. Woodman, John E. Sawyer, and Ibid., 162. 60 11 Nazareth, 39. Ricky W. Griffin, “Toward a Theory of Organiza- Walter A. Vanderbeek, The Decisive Point: 12 Ibid., 41. tional Creativity,” Academy of Managerial Review The Key to Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School 13 Ibid., 43. 18, no. 2 (April 1993), 293. of Advanced Military Studies, 1988), 39. 42 61 14 Cited in ibid., 45. Cited in Williamson Murray, “Armored Olivier Desarzens, Nachrichtendienstliche 15 Kate Bateman, “War on (Buzz)Words,” Pro- Warfare: The British, French, and German Experi- Aspekte der “Weseruebung” 1940 (Osnabrueck: ceedings 134, no. 8 (August 2008), 22. ences,” in Military Innovation in the Interwar Biblio Verlag, 1988), 173; T.K. Derry, The Campaign 16 Charles D. Allen and Stephen J. Gerras, Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millett, in Norway (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery “Developing Creative and Critical Thinkers,” Mili- 42 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Office, 1952), 232. 43 62 tary Review, November–December 2009, 80. Richard W. Harrison, The Russian Way of Guenter Roth, “Operatives Denken bei 17 Nazareth, 41–42. War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (Lawrence: Uni- Schlieffen und Manstein,” in Operationen und ihre 18 Charles D. Allen, Creative Thinking for versity Press of Kansas, 2001), 188–194. militaerhistorischen Grundlagen, 292–293. 44 63 Individuals and Teams (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Wayne A. Parks, Operational-Level Deep Roy Appleman et al., The War in the Pacific: Army War College, 2009), 3. Operations: A Key Component of Operational Art Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, DC: Center 19 James Mrazek, The Art of Winning Wars and Future Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School for Military History, 1948, reprint 1991), 473. 64 (New York: Walker and Company, 1968), 33. of Advanced Military Studies, 1998), 24–25. Ben Macintyre, Operation Mincemeat: How 45 20 Nazareth, 41. Harrison, 194–195. a Dead Man and a Bizarre Plan Fooled the Nazis 46 21 Sadao Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende: Der and Assured an Allied Victory (New York: Harmony The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, Books, 2010), 11. 65 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 163. 1995), 419–420. Ibid., 30. 47 22 Brooks L. Bash, “Leadership and Parochial- Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations ism: An Enduring Reality, Joint Force Quarterly 22 (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the (Summer 1999), 64. Army, August 1982), 2-1. 48 23 Jay Luvaas, “Some Vagrant Thoughts on FM 22-103, Leadership and Command at Doctrine,” Military Review, March 1986, 60. Senior Levels (Washington, DC: Headquarters 24 Stephen van Evera, “The Cult of the Offen- Department of the Army, July 31, 1990), 30. 49 sive and the Origins of the First World War,” Inter- Mitchell M. Zais, Generalship and the Art of national Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984), 58–59. Senior Command: Historical and Scientific Perspec- 25 Ibid., 59. tives (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced 26 Ibid. Military Studies, 1985), 49. 50 27 Ibid., 61. Hans Speth, Auswahl, Erziehung und Aus- 28 Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and bildung der Generalsbsoffiziere im Frieden und im British Military Doctrine Between the Wars (Princ- Kriege 19, MS # P-031b, Part 19, ZA/1 1867, Studien eton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 83. der Historical Division Headquarters, United States 90 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu The New Operational Paradigm Operation Odyssey Dawn and the Maritime Operations Center By James G. Foggo III and Michael Beer Rear Admiral James G. Foggo III, USN, is Director of the Assessment Division (OPNAV N81) in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. He served as Director of Operations (J3) for Joint Task Force Odyssey Dawn and as Deputy Commander for U.S. Sixth Fleet. Lieutenant Michael Beer, USN, served as Executive Assistant to Rear Admiral Foggo and was Executive Officer of the U.S. Naval Forces Former Director of Joint Chiefs of Staff Europe/U.S. Naval Forces Africa/U.S. Sixth Fleet conducts news briefing about situation Maritime Operations Center. in Libya DOD (Cherie Cullen) ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 91 FEATURES | The New Operational Paradigm peration Odyssey Dawn ladder from the JTF commander to compo- was both knowledgeable and ready to under- (OOD) was the U.S. response nent level without missing or misinterpreting take the planning efforts required to conduct to United Nations Security each commander’s intent. combat operations during Odyssey Dawn. Council (UNSC) Resolution A joint force air component com- Another benefit derived from MSOC is O mander (JFACC), Major General Maggie 1973, which called for the establishment of a the course’s use of a full-scale mock “battle no-fly zone over Libya and the protection of Woodward, USAF, was assigned to direct the lab” that simulates a joint operation in a real- Libyan civilians from the rampaging security establishment of the no-fly zone under the world environment. The lab, complete with forces of Muammar Qadhafi. The revolt of U.S. Air Force Africa commander. A joint a fully staffed “red cell,” allows the students Benghazi and resulting destabilization of force land component commander was not to engage in warfare at the operational level Libya was a product of the Arab Spring move- designated. With the economy of force1 under within a secure learning atmosphere, where ment sweeping through the Maghreb, which the command of the JFMCC, the Joint Oper- each decision can be monitored and dis- had already caused the downfall of Hosni ations Center (JOC) of USS Mount Whitney cussed by qualified instructors. Due to their Mubarak’s regime in Egypt and the overthrow was manned almost completely by personnel experiences in the battle lab, JOC watch- of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia. Qadhafi drawn from the CNE/CNA/C6F MOC.2 Its standers aboard Mount Whitney required responded to local protests with the brute force ability to fight and plan at the operational little oversight from their senior supervisors of his military, an act that quickly prompted level of war was essential to protecting civil- and were able to contribute directly to the the United Nations to determine that without ians under attack in Libya. decisionmaking process. foreign intervention, tens of thousands of The dynamic and adaptive planning This confluence of expertise, as well innocent civilians could be massacred in that took place in the constrained environ- as the general creativity of young officers direct violation of basic human rights. ment of OOD had its origins in the Naval War serving among the multitude of operational The joint forces of U.S. Africa College’s (NWC) Maritime Staff Operators planning teams during OOD, enabled the Command (USAFRICOM) were poised to act course (MSOC) and Joint Military Opera- staff to provide concise new ideas for course in defense of Libya’s civilians. Unlike previ- tions (JMO) course. NWC created MSOC of action (COA) development, which was ous U.S. joint operations in Afghanistan and to provide the baseline knowledge for naval always in flux based on the evolving situation Iraq, which permitted the buildup of forces operations and doctrine for officers (O3 to in Libya. Whereas the NWC curriculum for and months of planning, Odyssey Dawn was O5) and senior enlisted (E7 to E9) assigned to MSOC and JMO presents the execution of an in execution only a month after a U.S. Naval operational staffs. The requirement for naval operation over a timeline of weeks to months, Forces Europe (CNE)/Naval Forces Africa officers to complete joint professional military OOD demanded a compressed timeline of (CNA)/Sixth Fleet (C6F) operational planning education phase one, which includes the JMO hours to days due to the nature of the upris- group was stood up, and only 15 days after course, adds comprehensive understanding of ing and the swift response of Qadhafi’s secu- the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF)– operational warfare planning and the develop- rity forces. Junior officers assigned to the JOC Odyssey Dawn. This compressed timeline, the ment of the joint force. As a result of this push were instrumental in ensuring that senior dynamic and shifting environment in Libya, forward in specialized education, the C6F staff officers of the JFMCC and JTF staffs could and the U.S. Presidential order of “no boots on the ground” threw the ball directly into the hands of the U.S. Navy. The CNE/CNA/C6F Students and faculty Maritime Operations Center (MOC) reacted members participate superbly in this ad hoc atmosphere due to the in Naval War College education of much of the staff by joint and Maritime Staff Operators naval doctrine, as well as good staff planning course, Newport, Rhode at the operational level of war. Island Operation Odyssey Dawn was created as a joint operation under the command of USAFRICOM but saw Admiral Samuel Lock- lear, commander of CNE/CNA, designated as the commander. Vice Admiral Harry Harris, commander of C6F, was in turn designated as the joint forces maritime component commander (JFMCC). Due to the combined Echelon II/III staff of CNE/CNA/C6F, several personnel were assigned to positions on both the JTF and JFMCC joint manning docu- ment. The resulting situation demanded not only flexibility by the personnel, but also, most importantly, the inherent knowledge to move up and down the operational planning U.S. Navy (Matthew Breen) 92 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu FOGGO and BEER meet this condensed timeline to achieve 2.5 million pounds of fuel to the strike and intelligence because partner nations oper- mission requirements. jamming aircraft conducting missions ated on different communication circuits). President Barack Obama’s “full spec- overland. This heavy fuel consumption rate In the future, JTFs and other operational trum of options” approach to the Libya situ- was driven by the distance each aircraft was staffs must ensure that better protocols for ation, as well as his “no boots on the ground” required to fly from coalition bases in Europe information-sharing are promptly in place, policy, presented several unique planning to designated targets. Without the dedicated and compatible communication paths should challenges that the JTF staff had to overcome. personnel serving in the JFACC staff, the be practiced and rehearsed by international These two policies placed both broad con- strike campaign would not have succeeded partners in specific geographical regions, straints and restraints on the effort. On the with such excellent results. ultimately facilitating the sharing of classified one hand, the JTF was required to develop multiple COAs that covered every possible a major infusion to the JOC’s intelligence preparation and option regarding operational warfare while removing the land component in the joint development was social media operational construct. As a result, the JTF COAs became much more naval- and air- Operation Odyssey Dawn produced material. Operation Odyssey Dawn’s transi- centric, with a focus on degrading Qadhafi’s several lessons learned concerning operational tion to Operation Unified Protector provided military infrastructure while maximizing warfare that were new to the joint planning the necessary ignition to combat this issue. the protection of U.S. forces. Once again, a process. A major infusion to the JOC’s intelli- In the end, the JTF staff capacity to dynamic and adaptive approach to planning gence preparation and development was social adapt to an extremely fluid situation with was required to reduce the risk to the units media, which provided a unique and useful several limitations on its multiple mission conducting tactical operations. tool for the Intelligence Community. The sets allowed for a much more timely and effi- The rapidly shifting operational envi- JTF J2 (Intelligence) staff was able to follow cient decisionmaking process for OOD senior ronment in Libya was similar to the initial sit- open-source Facebook and Twitter posts by leaders. This capability was fueled through uations in Afghanistan and Iraq; however, the civilians in places where the environment was the professional education that many of the scope of UNSC resolutions placed multiple constantly in flux (for instance, Benghazi), officers had undergone, prior to their assign- and wholly unique limitations on JTF plan- which they corroborated with standard classi- ment, in an MOC, as well as the general char- ning. The end result of JOC planning efforts fied intelligence sources, to present an accurate acteristic of “thinking outside the box” that was the destruction of much of Qadhafi’s air and timely picture to the JTF commander and the U.S. military attempts to instill within the defenses and military infrastructure through planning staff. The exploitation of this tech- culture of its officers and leaders. As a result tactical employment of Tomahawk cruise nology and its incorporation into the intelli- of this education, training, and adaptability, missiles and strike aircraft, which protected gence process allowed the staff to stay ahead of U.S. Africa Command and Joint Task Force– the civilian population of Libya and allowed the changing situation on the ground without Odyssey Dawn were able to execute the man- for a successful transition to North Atlantic the benefit of first-hand accounts normally dates contained within the UNSC resolutions Treaty Organization (NATO) command. provided by a land component. for the civilians of Libya while creating a new The role of the U.S. Air Force, under Finally, although Operation Odyssey paradigm for operational warfare. JFQ JFACC control, was vital in the tactical Dawn was successful in protecting the civil- strike, aerial refueling, and suppression of ians of Libya under attack by pro-Qadhafi Notes enemy air defenses during every stage of the forces, the operation was not intended to con- 1 campaign. Admiral Locklear, making his tinue under unilateral U.S. control, but rather The economy of force included Expedition- ary Strike Group Five with 26th Marine Expedi- intentions clear from the beginning, would was to transition to a coalition effort under tionary Unit embarked. not fly a strike mission without Air Force the command of NATO (Operation Unified 2 The USS Mount Whitney is flagship of the F-16 or Navy E/A-18G aircraft to support the Protector). For this transition to take place in Sixth Fleet and contained both the joint task force bombing runs and jam the Libyan force’s a timely and seamless manner, the OOD staff and the joint forces maritime component com- early warning radars and surface-to-air needed to communicate with NATO across mander staffs. missile defenses. the entire range of operational warfare from Compounding the difficulty of the intelligence to operations already in execu- aerial strikes was the lack of a carrier strike tion. Two major drawbacks in the transition group in the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, were foreign disclosure protocols (these held the JFACC staff had to flex to meet multiple vital yet classified information and intelli- mission requirements while flying out of gence concerning the ongoing operation that coalition airbases scattered throughout Italy, could not be shared with certain nationali- Germany, and Greece. The ability of the ties) and actual communication hardware JFACC staff in planning for the air logisti- on the USS Mount Whitney (even though cal requirements allowed an average of 140 classified information could be released to tanker runs to be flown each night during the international partners, it was extremely strike operations, supplying approximately difficult for the JTF staff to discuss this ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 93 FEATURES | Energy Diversity and Development in Kenya Lake Turkana Wind Power Project has agreed to construction of wind power towers in northern Kenya Energy Diversity and Development in Kenya By Albert Kiprop Kendagor and Richard J. Prevost The overall national development objectives of the government of Kenya are economic growth; increasing productivity of all sectors; equitable distribution of national income; poverty alleviation through improved access to basic needs; enhanced agricultural production; industrialization; accelerated employment creation; and improved rural-urban balance. . . . The realization of these objectives is only feasible if quality energy services are availed in a sustainable, cost effective, and affordable manner to all sectors of the economy.1 ince its independence in 1963, a peaceful election.3 It is axiomatic that a Like all countries, Kenya relies on Kenya has been important to U.S. stable, economically developing Kenya will energy for development and growth. In 2004, regional interests. Its significant in turn promote stability in the region.4 Kenya created a national energy policy and role with the United States has Political or economic distress in Kenya not has subsequently made laudable efforts to S only discourages foreign investment but increased as America has developed coun- terterrorism policies, sought stability in East may also impact the stability of neighbor- Africa, and recognized Kenya’s role in the ing countries.5 Energy diversity will help Colonel Albert Kendagor is a 2012 graduate of region.2 The 2007 election crises, its resolu- promote political and economic stability. the Industrial College of the Armed Forces at the tion, the drafting of a new constitution, and This article reviews Kenya’s current energy National Defense University (NDU). He is the Deputy the ongoing role of Kenya in combating posture with a focus on rural Kenya, dis- Commandant of the Kenya Military Academy in terrorism underscore its regional impor- cusses the various sources of energy avail- Nakuru, Kenya. Colonel Richard J. Prevost, Esq., tance. The 2013 election, while contested in able to the nation, discusses Kenya’s current USA (Ret.), is an Associate Professor and Faculty the Kenyan legal system, did not result in national energy structure, and makes policy Lead for the Energy Industry Seminar in the Dwight significant conflict. The United States con- recommendations intended to assist its D. Eisenhower School for National Security and gratulated the Kenyan people on conducting energy generation and distribution. Resource Strategy at NDU. 94 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KENDAGOR and PREVOST address the development of energy sources and the promotion of efficient, cost-effective to maximize returns. According to Policy and transmission. Until recently, the available appliances and technologies11 Paper No. 4 on energy, the national energy forms of energy in Kenya have been limited ■ promote cogeneration and sales to policy “is to ensure adequate, quality, cost to renewable sources. While the country consumers12 effective and affordable supply of energy to has recently developed further prospects ■ establish a rural electrification meet development needs, while protecting for hydrocarbon energy by way of hydraulic program, create a commission to assist with and conserving the environment.”18 This fracturing,6 at this time it produces no oil of this program, and envision a funding scheme policy facilitates the exploitation of abundant its own and relies on imported oil from the to help support electrification.13 renewable energy sources available in the Middle East, the Maghreb region, and central country. The feed-in tariffs were introduced Africa. An agreement to develop a new pipe- The Role of Energy in the Economy. in 2008 and revised in 2010 to accommodate line—which could potentially aid both Kenya The most recent draft of Kenya’s national additional renewable energy.19 and South Sudan—from South Sudan to energy policy recognizes the key role that Kenya and Oil. The country has Mombasa was signed in January 2012.7 energy plays in the nation’s economic several sources of renewable energy that can development. For example, it notes that the be exploited and supplement oil. However, Kenya’s Current Energy Posture energy sector contributes about 20 percent of importation of foreign oil will be necessary In larger towns, cities, and commer- the nation’s overall tax revenue; that Kenya for the short and medium terms. The country cial centers, energy from imported oil is a imports all of its crude petroleum require- imports oil both for domestic use and for significant source of power for domestic ments, which accounts for about 25 percent subsequent export as a refined product. The and industrial activities. Electricity gen- of its national import bill; that Kenya’s one nation’s one refinery at the port of Mombasa eration from oil is supplied to the national refinery meets about 40 percent of local has two distillation units. Next to the refin- grid. However, only about 6 percent of all demand; and that energy prices in a liberal- ery, a pipeline was built that can transport 8 Kenyans have access to the national grid. In ized market are a significant determinant of product through the middle of the country rural areas, oil might be used for electrical the nation’s competitiveness.14 to the Kenya-Uganda border. Rural Kenyans generation; however, the availability of oil The policy emphasizes renewable and those on the outskirts of cities use kero- and refined oil products in these areas is sources of energy to meet the national vision sene and liquefied petroleum gas for lighting much less than in developed ones. In these and millennium development targets. Policy and cooking.20 areas, the population and energy demands Paper No. 4 of 200415 and the Energy Act of Plans have been announced to extend are less. Biomass, specifically wood, is by far 2006, respectively, are the Kenyan policy and the aforementioned pipeline into Uganda and the most widely used renewable fuel. Cur- legal frameworks for energy development. to construct another pipeline from the port of rently, the wood-fuel deficit exceeds 5,000 Through these documents, the government Lamu to South Sudan and Ethiopia.21 These metric tons and is expected to grow. This expresses its commitment to promote elec- pipelines, along with over-the-road transport, excessive demand for wood fuel continues to tricity generation from renewable energy are the major source of transport of refined lead to deforestation, forest fragmentation, sources. Further support for renewable petroleum products. Inland depots have been and land degradation, and threatens water energy development can be seen in Kenya’s established in every major town along the 9 catchments. Moreover, the national demand efforts to obtain outside funding. Kenya national highway. The proposed pipelines, for energy is projected to greatly increase is one of six countries selected by Climate connected to depots, would allow products to by 2030. In response to this increase, the Investment Funds for their targeted program reach consumers faster and more efficiently government must devise creative means to “Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program relative to road transportation. The second develop more energy sources and improve [SREP] in Low Income Countries.”16 port at Lamu will have several berths and energy efficiency. Feed-in Tariff. Kenya has formulated supporting infrastructures and could not The government has recognized the a feed-in tariff (FIT) policy to promote the only improve the energy sector but also spur differences between urban and rural energy 22 generation of electricity using renewable regional economic growth. supply and demand, the current limitations energy resources and to improve the rating on the availability of infrastructure, and Renewable Sources of Energy of its renewable energy sector. By using FIT, the potential for renewable energy. It has Kenyan sources of renewable energy are the government hopes to make Kenya an developed a national framework called Vision diverse and at varied stages of development. attractive destination for substantial private 2030, and it has recognized millennium devel- Hydropower generation is by far the largest sector investment.17 The tariff makes it man- opment goals to bring energy to rural areas. source of renewable energy supporting com- datory for companies transmitting energy to To succeed, Kenya’s government and private mercial and industrial manufacturing.23 purchase electricity from renewable energy sector must cooperate to promote energy gen- Hydropower currently generates 57 percent of sources at a predetermined price. Renewable eration and disbursement programs. national electricity.24 There are seven hydro- energy producers then have a guaranteed electric generating plants set along two major market, and, if the pricing mechanism is cor- 2006 Energy Act rivers, the Tana and Turkwel. The power rectly gauged and equitably adjusted to reflect The 2006 Energy Act established generated is transmitted to the national grid changes in cost, these companies will receive an energy regulatory commission with a for further distribution. 10 an attractive return on investment for the mandate to regulate the energy sector. Geothermal energy is a renewable electricity they produce. Under this act, the Ministry of Energy must: energy source with great promise. In Kenya, Under the FIT system, investment geothermal energy involves tapping geysers ■ develop and manage a comprehen- security and market stability are provided and channeling steam through pipes to turn sive national energy efficiency program for investors of electricity generation from turbines and mainly has been developed based on education, innovations, and incen- renewable energy sources. This is done while along the Rift Valley.25 Currently, geothermal tives, focusing on reducing energy demand encouraging private investors to operate energy converted to electricity contributes through sustainable-use education projects their powerplants prudently and efficiently ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 95 FEATURES | Energy Diversity and Development in Kenya approximately 15 percent of Kenya’s electric meters per second and from the same direc- The development of nuclear energy is energy to the national grid.26 According to tion year round.31 recognized as another source of power that the Ministry of Energy, geothermal gen- Solar power also offers potential as a will be considered in the future.39 Many eration has great potential for development: renewable energy source. Solar power is most experts have long believed that nuclear “Olkaria currently hosts three geothermal prevalent in the outskirts of large towns and energy is the best cure for the seasonal vaga- power plants. Once new geothermal power rural areas. It has huge potential considering ries that tremendously affect the nation’s plants at Olkaria and Menengai are commis- that much of the country enjoys sunlight hydropower generation.40 Notwithstanding sioned, notes [Permanent Secretary Patrick throughout the year. Unfortunately, this the high initial costs, safety concerns, and M.] Nyoike, geothermal power capacity source does not currently contribute any technical skills required to acquire nuclear will increase by 490 [megawatts]. Kenya is electricity to the national grid. Instead, solar power, there remains a strong national will to one of the few African countries that [has] energy is consumed at the generation site or in pursue this option. According to the Ministry successfully tapped geothermal energy.”27 close proximity to it. It is estimated that close of Energy, the government is considering Geothermal expansion builds on the concepts to 500,000 homesteads in Kenya use solar building a nuclear powerplant.41 Developing of Vision 2030 and is intended to promote the power to heat water. The government is com- local and national expertise in the nuclear government and the private-sector partner- mitted to making serious efforts to expand field will be a challenge as will addressing the ship program. this resource.32 Private-sector firms and issue of spent nuclear fuel. These challenges For Vision 2030 to materialize, Kenya individual entrepreneurs, to some extent sup- are made more acute given Kenya’s plan to be needs more than 10,000 megawatts of electri- ported by both governmental and nongovern- a nuclear energy generating nation by 2030. cal (MWe) output, and of this, a minimum mental organizations, are responsible for the of 5,000 MWe is expected to come from development of solar energy. In fact in 1995, Analysis geothermal sources. Kenya’s geothermal Richard Acker and Daniel Kammen reported Kenya has enormous energy oppor- potential is in excess of 7,000 MWe spread that 20,000 to 40,000 small photovoltaic tunities and supply challenges as it faces over more than 14 locations. This opens new systems had been installed in Kenya over the increased energy demand. In 2009, the investment opportunities from supply of previous decade.33 In more recent decades, country separated the generation and distri- equipment to construction of powerplants; Kenya has registered additional increases in bution of electricity. Since then, two national the planned developments are enormous and the use of solar power. This effort is a continu- companies have operated as separate entities. the Geothermal Development Company is ation of past policies. Kenya Generating Company is the major committed to facilitate and stimulate investor The widespread introduction and adop- supplier of electricity to the Kenya Power entry28 and will drill wells and absorb some tion of renewable energy technologies remain Lighting Company. There are, however, other of the costs that usually would be incurred by high on virtually every national development privately owned suppliers that produce and private companies. policy agenda; renewable energy systems can supply power to the national grid. Kenya now Wind energy in Kenya relies on assist national energy autonomy, decentralize encourages the private sector to invest in this windmills that are erected along the wind resource management, promote environ- area, which has been dominated by the gov- path. This source has huge potential as the mental conservation, and serve as a means to ernment for perhaps too long. country experiences strong winds through- reduce global warming.34 The government must account for the out the year. The average wind speed in Biofuels are among the most promis- varying impacts of energy generation on Kenya is 3 to 10 meters per second, and the ing alternatives to fossil fuels, and Kenya is the environment, but impacts from energy country has several sites conducive to wind making significant efforts to develop them. generation are difficult to measure, and it energy. The most recent national energy Many farmers are encouraged to invest in remains to be seen whether there is political policy envisions at least 1,000-MW wind- nonedible plants that have high yields.35 This will to measure the ecological damage caused generation capacity by 2016.29 The Ministry resource remains underdeveloped, and the by human activities associated with energy of Energy—jointly with private investors— government has identified it in the Vision production and to measure the interference has carried out extensive feasibility studies 2030 development plans.36 with ecosystems. Kenya desires to encourage in the Northern Province and construction The last common source of renew- investments in clean energy to augment the is due to commence around Lake Turkana.30 able energy is biomass. This source, which current energy sources to meet increased The Lake Turkana Wind Power Project aims involves the use of firewood and pulp, is by energy needs.42 to provide 300 MW of reliable, low-cost far the oldest in Kenya and the most wide- In addition to encouraging energy wind power to the Kenya national grid, spread source of energy in the rural areas. development investment, the government has equivalent to approximately 20 percent of It is the major cause of deforestation, with tried to increase the efficiency of energy pro- the electricity generating capacity currently great adverse effects on the environment and duction. Greater efficiency can be achieved available. The project is of significant strate- long-term economy. In fact, the country has through acquisition and installation of gic benefit to Kenya and, at a cost of KSh75 lost forest cover from 9 percent at indepen- modern equipment. Significant energy loss billion ($893 million), will be the largest dence (1963) to a mere 3 percent today.37 The occurs from the transmission of energy from single private investment in the country’s government faces great challenges in trying generating plants to the national grid—the history. The wind farm site in northeastern to curb the use of biomass; it meets up to 70 old technology appears to be the major source Kenya covers 40,000 acres and is located percent of Kenya’s final energy demand and of seepage, and modernization may go a long in Loyangalani District, Marsabit West provides for more than 90 percent of rural way toward alleviating this loss. County, approximately 50 kilometers north household energy needs—with approxi- Once energy enters the national grid, of South Horr Township. Data collected and mately one-third in the form of charcoal and Kenya Power and Lighting distributes that analyzed since 2007 indicate that the site has the rest from firewood. It is estimated that energy. The customers can be classified as some of the best wind resources in Africa, 80 percent of urban households’ wood-fuel government, multilateral institutions, non- with consistent wind speeds averaging 11 demand is met by charcoal.38 governmental organizations, corporate insti- 96 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KENDAGOR and PREVOST tutions, and individuals. Jointly with the private sector, the government has begun to support the generation and efficient Wikipedia distribution of energy to rural areas. Where this has been done, there has been a positive economic impact. Over the last 10 years, government-, private-, and nongovernment- supported Kenyan efforts have extended electricity to more than 8 million homes. The SREP initiative and private sector have been instrumental in carrying out surveys and financing installations of the renewable sources of energy.43 This expansion of elec- tricity distribution and the ongoing effort to develop pipelines may provide the most immediate positive return on investment. Also, Kenya has been successful in monitoring and estimating energy waste. Many sectors are improving their energy efficiency to reduce consumption without affecting their production. The sectors leading this effort are motor, chemical, and food-processing plants. According to the Conveyor drill with linkage pump at rear of geothermal powerplant in Kenya Kenya Association of Manufactures, these savings will reduce consumption by signifi- cant margins, between 20 and 50 percent.44 These efficiency efforts will help improve Likewise, global and regional impacts economic capability. The lower individual Kenya’s competitiveness, especially if these because of attacks on Kenyan pipelines, its incomes in rural areas result in relatively efforts can be made regarding cement, steel, power grid, or/and infrastructure would have lower purchasing power. Thus, fewer people pulp, and paper production.45 adverse effects. Electricity-generation compa- and small enterprises in these areas can afford Other exogenous challenges and exter- nies that import and use oil as a steady source installation. Low purchasing power has the nalities arise as Kenya tries to develop and of fuel would have to reduce or stop produc- corresponding effect of further depressing the implement its energy programs. Globaliza- tion if that source of oil is interrupted. Loss of rural customer base for operators, and is one tion affects the energy sector in terms of the the grid would produce electricity shortages, of the limiting factors to what can be charged demand, supply, and prices. Additionally, disrupt production of manufacturers, and for electricity. Lack of electrification impacts rule-of-law and security issues can make it cause price instability to the producers and how much the local population can produce difficult to do business in neighboring econo- consumers that rely on the grid. Reduced elec- and reduces purchasing power. There is an mies; the effects of regional and national tricity, even if controlled by scheduled brown- economy-of-scale issue in rural areas that security challenges can cascade down to the outs, would have cascading effects. Higher reduces operators’ margins and makes it dif- citizens, businesses, and local communities. unit prices for electricity are not only directly ficult to spread out the risk of providing elec- Overall, Kenya has been relatively stable; passed on to consumers in towns and rural tricity. The operators see greater risk as there is a lower per capita income and greater per however, the recent violence in Mombasa— villages, but they are also indirectly passed on capita operating costs because there are fewer and past violence associated with the transi- to higher prices for consumer goods. consumers. Consequently, only a limited tion of government—make one realize how number of operators are willing to invest in fragile a nation can become and how security Rural Electrification these areas. is a necessity.46 The rural electrification program Legal and environmental challenges Members of MEND, the Movement for continues to encounter many constraints. may delay the smooth implementation of the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, moving Generating companies often use old tech- the electrification program. In rural areas, fast in heavily armed speedboats, evaded nologies for the production and generation transmission lines must be installed either security and launched an attack on Bonga, the of power. The antiquated technology results underground or overhead. In either instance, most prominent of all oil platforms, 70 miles in waste and inefficiency of between 10 and companies are obliged to acquire rights of from the shore. Group members managed to 30 percent. The unit of energy produced way in rural areas whereas in urban areas, climb onto the platform, but they were repelled is not economical. Infrastructure support, rights of way may have been previously estab- before they could blow up the computer- even when there is a strong desire to conduct maintenance, is another difficult constraint. lished. National regulations and protocols ized control room. It was a close call, and a Kenya does not have sufficiently developed must be complied with, but they may serve scary one. The Bonga attack sent shockwaves road networks in rural areas, and this to slow development or rural electrification. throughout the market. In an email to journal- hampers private companies accessing their Conservation areas, such as important his- ists, a spokesman for MEND warned, “The equipment. Many investors are discouraged torical sites and aquatic and ecological areas, location for today’s attack was deliberately by dilapidated or nonexistent roads. must remain protected or at least weighed chosen to remove any notion that offshore oil There is a chicken-and-egg aspect to against the value received from rural electri- production is far from our reach.”47 rural electrification as it relates to the area’s fication programs. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 97 FEATURES | Energy Diversity and Development in Kenya in this effort, but public-private ventures may Workers at Olkaria also be lucrative if properly incentivized. Geothermal Power Fifth, the nation needs to address the Plant, Kenya future role of biomass energy. This energy use has been detrimental to Kenya’s limited forests. Adverse impacts of biomass energy on the environment remain a major concern, and the government should take measures to reduce, over time, the use of biomass as an energy source. The government should revise the environmental regulations through the newly commissioned National Environment Management Authority. In view of the forest degradations, the government should con- sider, in addition to regulations, incentives for the use of natural gas and kerosene through tax exemptions to make them affordable. The government should ensure availability of fuels that can be used in lieu of biomass. Finally, the government should encourage sensible reforestation where the climate can support it. Conclusion Wikipedia Kenya is a key nation to building stabil- ity and prosperity in East Africa. The United States has an interest in a stable Kenya that Also, the hydroelectric generation the energy generated reaches the consumer. is involved in counterterrorism, continues intensity of Kenyan energy creates some risk Additional loss is due to pilferage, broken to develop democratic institutions, and sup- for potential rural electrification. Erratic and poorly maintained lines, and aging ports its neighbors. Kenya has huge potential patterns of seasons and variable climatic transformers. for economic growth and development, conditions have put huge limitations on Third, the government should provide and its rural electrification programs are hydroelectric capacity. One current debate is greater focus on generating energy from the important in achieving this potential. Joint whether Kenya’s economic planners should nation’s many renewable sources of clean public-private partnership programs can help anticipate, and to what extent, permanent energy. For example, in additional to feed-in provide rural electrification. As the govern- climate change. tariffs, the government could provide tax ment leads through deregulation and tax incentives for private developers willing to policy, it will help leverage the private sector. Policy Recommendations be part of the rural electrification programs. Ever-increasing energy demands require Public and private recognition of the The private sector may be leveraged through a continuation of the paradigm shift that value of energy generation and distribution other incentives. Tax policy could encour- has begun, from acceptance of intermittent in Kenya is becoming widespread. There is age the importation of solar panels, wind energy supply to one that embraces advanced huge potential for planned, stable develop- turbines, and other key energy accessories. technology, a variety of energy sources, ment, and, at the same time, there are numer- Wind remains readily available, and the gov- greater efficiency, and is friendlier to the ous challenges and negative externalities that ernment ought to encourage entrepreneurs environment. must be addressed. First, the government has to deploy windmills at appropriate locations, Kenya’s opportunities for becoming recognized that rural Kenya does not have all such as around Mombasa, Chulu Hills, and more energy self-sufficient lie in energy the characteristics of a pure market, so gov- the Kapiti Plains. Encouragement could come diversification. We see this diversification ernment intervention and encouragement are in the form of not only tax incentives but as requiring the development of renewable planned. The rural electrification program is also government-sponsored development of forms of energy and, potentially, the develop- a laudable goal and should be pursued. The infrastructure that allows greater distribution ment of nuclear power. The rural electrifi- program should be people-driven, meaning of electricity generated from wind. cation program should be people-driven, that the local population must be educated Fourth, individuals and local entities meaning that the local population must be and involved in the formulation and deci- should be encouraged to invest in smaller educated and involved in the formulations sionmaking process. Such involvement will domestic windmills for off-grid consumption and decisionmaking process. Such involve- not only promote ownership and sustain- at the villages. Notwithstanding these efforts ments would not only promote ownership ability but also build capacity for skills and at the rural level, the government should and sustainability but also build capacity technology transfer. consider investment in wind sources through for skills and technology transfer. Negative Second, we strongly recommend the installation of massive windmills capable of impacts of energy development on the local modernization of electric generation equip- integration to the grid. The Lake Turkana environment can be significantly controlled ment and transmission lines. For example, wind farm in northern Kenya is a good through economic empowerment and educa- in many hydroelectric plants, older genera- example. We see the government, perhaps tion of the citizens. State infrastructure devel- tors are still being used. Only one-third of with international backing, as taking the lead opment in rural areas must be prioritized in 98 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu KENDAGOR and PREVOST order to incentivize the private sector. But 9 United Nations Environment Programme 33 Richard H. Acker and Daniel M. Kammen, first, the private sector and the government (UNEP), Kenya: Atlas of Our Changing Environ- “The Quiet (Energy) Revolution: Analysing the must educate and respond to the needs of ment (Nairobi: UNEP, 2009). Dissemination of Photovoltaic Power Systems in the local citizenry. It can then put in place 10 Republic of Kenya, The Energy Act, 2006 Kenya,” Energy Policy 24, no. 12 (1996). vibrant, actionable plans to provide energy, (Nairobi: Republic of Kenya, 2006); Energy Regu- 34 Ibid. develop the local economy, and reverse defor- latory Commission, available at ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 99 Second Fronts Factors in Success and Failure and Implications for the Future By P hillip S. Meilinger U.S. Army U.S. bomber hits mark deep in Germany 100 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Meilinger ome argue that the best way to which had an uneasy truce with Athens, Athens saw this as a preventive war confront an enemy is to face him and involve a major war with Syracuse, a to abort the presumed union of Sicily and head on. At times, however, a bel- useful trading partner. The expedition would Sparta against it. But there was little indica- S ligerent realizes that he cannot involve enormous risk but offer little gain. In tion such an alliance would have occurred. strike the enemy directly because he is not a prescient comment, Nicias stated: “I affirm Indeed, it was the expedition itself that drove strong enough, it involves unacceptable risks, . . . that you leave many enemies behind you Syracuse into the arms of Sparta. or he believes greater gains can be made by here [the Spartans and their Corinthian opening a “second front.” The purpose of allies] to go there far away and bring more Wellington in the Peninsula second front operations may be to strike a back with you.”3 Nicias urged his fellow citi- After the Peace of Tilsit in 1807, blow to enemy strength, gain resources such zens to focus on Sparta, the main threat close Napoleon controlled most of Europe. Britain as oil while denying them to the enemy, split at hand. Alcibiades argued instead that Sicily still held out, and in an effort to break its the enemy alliance by knocking out a weaker would be an easy conquest that would heap economy, Napoleon instituted the Continen- member, assist an ally under attack by divert- glory on Athens while intimidating Sparta. tal System. He ordered Europe not to trade ing the enemy, or influence a third party, Alcibiades was the more persuasive.4 with Britain, hoping this policy would so perhaps deterring that party from entering The invasion was launched in 415 injure the British economy as to force sur- the war. BCE. Nicias, Alcibiades, and Lamachus were render.9 A tiny country on the periphery of Following are four examples of such chosen as joint commanders, and 136 war- Europe, Portugal, refused to obey Napoleon’s second front maneuvers. Two succeeded and ships—carrying 5,100 hoplites but only 30 decree.10 To teach it a lesson, the Emperor two failed. These operations have implica- horses—set sail.5 Soon after landing in Sicily, sent 30,000 men to conquer it, and they took tions for the way America will fight for the Alcibiades was recalled to Athens to stand Lisbon on November 30, 1807. foreseeable future. Our wars are now wars trial on charges of blasphemy.6 Believing he Napoleon then installed his brother of choice, and the motives and constraints would be found guilty, Alcibiades fled to Joseph on the Spanish throne. To his surprise, driving such conflicts are comparable to Sparta and offered his services. the Spanish population rose up against him those of belligerents seeking to open second fronts throughout history. second front maneuvers have implications for the way The Sicilian Expedition During the America will fight for the foreseeable future Peloponnesian War The Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta was in its 16th year when Thucydides argues that had the in May 1808. This resistance movement, one Athens decided to invade Sicily. Its rationale Athenians moved quickly, they would have of the bloodiest and most effective guerrilla for invasion concerned Egesta—a city-state in overcome Syracusan resistance. Instead, they wars in centuries, became a long-term drain western Sicily allied with Athens. It was being dallied, partly because of Alcibiades’s recall on French resources. The “Spanish Ulcer” harried by Selinus, a nearby city, and asked and partly due to the cautiousness of Nicias. lasted for 6 years.11 the Athenian Assembly to send aid while also Things quickly turned sour. Egesta did not The French army sent to pacify Spain warning of Syracuse, the most powerful city- have the promised money. Horses were in initially numbered 120,000 and was led by state on Sicily. Syracuse, the envoys claimed, short supply so the army had little cavalry. proven commanders. In July 1808, however, was bent on dominating the entire island and The Sicilians did not welcome their liberators an army of 18,000 surrendered to the Spanish was friendly toward Sparta. This meant that and instead the Athenian force united Sicily at Bailen. Europe was stunned; it was the Sparta would have access to huge resources as nothing else could have.7 The Syracusans first surrender by a French army in 7 years. in grain, soldiers, and ships, resources that proved tough adversaries, especially after Napoleon was furious: “I realize that I must could be used against Athens.1 Sparta sent one of its generals, Gylippus, to go there myself to get the machine working Such catastrophizing on what might assist them, along with a contingent of Corin- again.”12 By October 1808, he would have occur was hardly a justification for war. thian hoplites. Sparta then invaded Attica, 270,000 men in Iberia. Nonetheless, the Athenians, led by a gifted the area surrounding Athens, and laid it to A British army under Lieutenant scoundrel named Alcibiades, pushed for waste. As Nicias predicted, Athens was fight- General Arthur Wellesley landed in Portugal an invasion of Sicily to defeat Syracuse and ing a two-front war against two formidable in 1809 and built formidable fortifications conquer the island.2 opponents. there. From this sanctuary he repulsed Nicias warned that an expedition made Nicias, the sole commander after the French assaults.13 Wellesley was aided by the little strategic sense. It would anger Sparta, departure of Alcibiades and the death of tenacity of the Spanish army, which struck Lamachus in battle, continued to delay, continually at the French and their supply pleading for either reinforcements or evacu- lines. Indeed, 70 percent of all French casual- Colonel Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF (Ret.), served in ation. The Assembly sent another army but ties sustained during the war were inflicted 14 the U.S. Air Force for 30 years. He holds a Ph.D. in it made little difference. In 413, Gylippus by the Spanish army and guerrillas. history from the University of Michigan. His latest defeated the Athenians, Nicias was butch- Throughout 1810 and 1811, Wellesley (soon book is Bomber: The Formation and Early Years of ered, and at least 7,000 Athenians were cap- to be the Duke of Wellington) coordinated Strategic Air Command (Air University Press, 2012). tured and enslaved. It was a horrendous loss.8 with the Spanish to pressure the French. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 101 RECALL | Second Fronts Royal Navy Panoramic view of Dardanelles Fleet, 1915–1916 It was a hard-fought war, but everything would quickly silence the enemy cannon. The was intended to bypass. Five more Allied divi- changed in 1812. strait was also heavily mined. No matter, the sions were sent, to no avail. Admitting defeat, Napoleon invaded Russia that year armada would include minesweepers to clear the Allies evacuated in December 1915. with an army of 500,000. Iberia was then a the way. The battleships would confront Con- Overall, the Gallipoli operation was a sideshow. Wellington invaded Spain and over stantinople and shell it if necessary and then disaster for the Allies. It cost nearly 400,000 the next year won a series of battles, liberat- accept the Ottoman surrender. casualties and gained virtually nothing. The ing Madrid in August. The following year, A fleet was raised consisting of 82 ships Ottoman Empire remained in the war, Russia Wellington crossed through the mountains including 18 battleships.19 On February 19, remained largely cut off from its allies, and and invaded France. By then Napoleon was 1915, warships entered the strait and began the Western Front remained stagnant. fighting for his throne in Germany, a fight he shelling the forts. It was expected the enemy would soon lose. guns, numbering over 230, would be silenced North Africa, Operation Torch, 1942 Napoleon’s foray into Iberia was a huge by naval gunfire within a month. That first When the United States entered the war miscalculation. The French suffered 250,000 day, however, no enemy guns were destroyed against Germany in December 1941, Allied casualties, a high price for a failed effort. At despite a barrage lasting 7 hours.20 Several fortunes were at low ebb. Most of Europe was the same time, the war occupied 200,000 more forays were launched into the straits under Axis control and the Soviet Union was troops annually that France desperately but achieved meager results. Clearly, naval reeling. In the Pacific, Singapore was about needed against Russia, Austria, and Prussia gunfire was insufficient to knock out heavily to fall to the Japanese as were the Philippines in Central Europe. Spain was truly an ulcer defended forts. and Dutch East Indies. The Allies needed that bled the Napoleonic Empire white. On March 18, 1915, the ships went in victories. again but this time they hit mines. Three The American and British combined Gallipoli, 1915 battleships were sunk and three others were chiefs of staff met, confirmed a “Europe First” World War I deteriorated into a blood heavily damaged. A third of the Allies’ capital strategy, and discussed taking the offensive. bath by the end of 1914, and a line of trenches ships were put out of commission in a day. General George Marshall, the U.S. Army stretching from the North Sea to Switzerland Attempts to remove the mines at night were Chief of Staff, argued for a landing in France induced a stalemate.15 Britain suggested break- unsuccessful. The Turks used searchlights to in the fall of 1942.24 The British refused. ing the impasse by opening a second front. illuminate the trawlers being used as mine- They had already been forced to evacuate at The First Lord of the Admiralty was Winston sweepers and shore guns drove them back.21 Dunkirk and had no wish to retreat again. Churchill and the First Sea Lord was Admiral A naval-only operation was thus impos- Although Moscow was screaming for a “Jackie” Fisher.16 Their plan was a move sible. Churchill then requested an invasion second front, it would be of little avail if it against the Dardanelles, the narrow strait sep- force to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula and were thrown back into the sea.25 They wanted arating the Mediterranean from the Black Sea. overrun the forts from the land side. The fleet an invasion of North Africa instead. It would Constantinople (modern-day Istanbul), the could then move safely through the straits. not only be easier, but it would also allow the capital of the Ottoman Empire, was located Fisher agreed, arguing that the British effort green American troops to gain experience along this waterway. Churchill opined that a must be totus porkus (whole hog).22 The high- and ensure the safety of Egypt and the Suez move up the strait would push the Turks out gain/low-risk navy-only assault had now Canal. Operation Torch was approved.26 of the war. That would in turn open a supply become a high-risk joint operation. Lieutenant General Dwight Eisenhower line to Russia and allow a venue from which to In April 1915, a force of over 62,000 was chosen to command the operation, largely strike Austria-Hungary from the rear. British and French soldiers landed at Gal- because American troops would supply the Churchill believed a navy-only opera- lipoli.23 They were met by rugged terrain, bulk of the invasion force. He advocated tion would suffice to force the strait.17 This strongly entrenched positions, and spirited landings at Casablanca and Oran. The British passage was flanked on the north by the Gal- and well-led Turkish defenders. For 8 months, disagreed with this limited vision, maintain- lipoli Peninsula and on the south by the Ana- the opposing sides hammered away at each ing that once the Nazis saw the invasion, they tolian mainland. Both coastlines were littered other. Trenches were dug, barbed wire was would rush troops into Tunisia and block the with forts and artillery positions.18 Nonethe- strung, and the Gallipoli battlefield resembled Allies from moving east and linking up with less, he thought the big guns of battleships the Western Front that the entire operation the British Eighth Army in Libya. Instead, the 102 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Meilinger British wanted additional landings at Algiers, Empire out of the war. Other operations, determinant of a second front’s success is Bone, and Philippeville in Algeria. This would such as Torch in 1942, were a combination the logic and achievability of its aim. In put Allied troops close to Tunisia, allowing of several motives: driving Axis forces out of some cases, goals are well thought out—for them to move in quickly and forestall a Nazi North Africa, securing the Mediterranean instance, the decision to launch Torch in advance. A compromise was reached: besides Sea and Suez Canal, and providing experi- 1942 and the Peninsular Campaign during Casablanca and Oran, the Allies would land ence for American troops and commanders. the Napoleonic wars. at Algiers—500 miles from Tunis.27 These objectives were achieved, although the Other goals make less sense. The Sicil- North Africa was under the control of campaign to capture Tunisia was unnecessar- ian Expedition of 415 BCE is an example of Vichy France and heavily defended.28 The ily difficult and protracted. poor strategic vision; it was not obvious how French were distrustful of the British; they Now we turn to some overall observa- the invasion would impact the main enemy, felt they had been left in the lurch during the tions of the case studies described that will Sparta. Syracuse, although friendly to Sparta, battle for France, and the British attacks on shed light on specific factors that helped lead had never taken up arms against Athens. their fleet at Mers-el-Kebir in July 1940 were to either success or failure in these flanking Sending an army to Sicily denuded Athens deemed an outrage.29 Eisenhower kept British maneuvers. of an adequate defensive garrison, leaving troops out of the vanguard of the attacks lest it prey to Spartan attack—which indeed they spur a spirited defense. Success versus Failure occurred. In short, given the risk involved, The invasion took place on November Logical and Achievable Strategic what was the expected payoff? Even if the 8, 1942. French resistance was short-lived, Plan. The first and most important invasion had been successful, it is not obvious and within 3 days Morocco and Algeria were subdued. Unfortunately, the deci- sion to forego landings farther east proved problematic, as the British anticipated. While the Allies were securing their landing areas, German forces flooded into Tunisia. At the time of the Allied landings, there were 11,000 Axis troops in Tunisia; 6 weeks later there were over 47,000.30 A bitter battle would be required to drive them back. Tunisia finally fell on May 13, 1943, and the campaign was over. The Allies suffered 75,000 casualties, but the Axis had over five times that number including 275,000 who became prisoners of war.31 The invasion of North Africa was one of the more successful examples of a second front operation. The goals of the Allies were fulfilled. Torch produced precisely the type of incremental successes such operations were designed to achieve. Observations The dominant reason for opening a second front is to avoid an enemy’s strength. If the enemy elects to defend vigorously at the new venue, he must often disperse his forces. Gaining an economic advantage can also be a major motive, and this was a partial explana- tion for the Sicilian Expedition. Similarly, Britain saw Iberia as a major trade market after Napoleon shut down most of Europe to its merchant fleet. Sometimes, financial gain does indeed accompany such opera- tions, but often they cost far more than they earn. Another motive for a second front is an attempt to split an alliance. This was one goal of the British and French at Gallipoli in U.S. Marine Corps 1915 when they hoped to force the Ottoman Corsair fires rockets toward enemy positions at Iwo Jima ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 103 RECALL | Second Fronts what gains would have accrued to Athens in The Spanish king may have been an imbecile, first place, and his penchant for delay meant its war with Sparta. but he was Spanish. Napoleon could install that his forces were ever on the defensive. In some instances, the objectives sought a Frenchman on the throne, “but he could French generals in the Peninsular Cam- appear worthwhile, but their achievability is not give him popular support.”33 In addition, paign had never encountered such austere questionable. The Gallipoli operation of 1915 Spain was incapable of supporting a large conditions or endured such relentless guerrilla looked reasonable at first glance, but it had army; it was an old adage that “large armies warfare. Most could not adapt.37 On the other glaring flaws. It is notoriously difficult for starve in Spain and small ones are defeated.” hand, Wellington was an excellent general, ships to compel the surrender of a defended Supplying a French army over the Pyrenees although it must be noted that in the Penin- fortress—much less an entire nation—but proved to be a monumental problem.34 sular Campaign he never had to face the best Royal Navy leaders pushed aside such details The net assessment conducted by the French commander—Napoleon himself. On and launched the assault anyway. Reinforcing British at the Dardanelles in 1915 was poor. one occasion, Wellington commented after a failure, the Allies upped the ante and com- They underestimated the strength of the hard-fought victory that “If Boney had been mitted several divisions of ground troops in Turkish forts, the difficulty of knocking there we should have been defeated.”38 a futile attempt to correct earlier misjudg- out coastal fortifications with naval guns, Allied leadership at Gallipoli was medi- ments. The result was an even greater failure. the impossibility of using trawlers (manned ocre and slow to react. In February 1915, there Accurate Net Assessment. A net assess- by civilians no less) to sweep mines in the were only two Turkish divisions deployed ment is the cost-benefit analysis done prior to narrow waters with hundreds of enemy along the strait; that number doubled by a military operation that includes intelligence guns on both coasts, the horrendous terrain the time the naval assault began, but there on the enemy’s positions, strengths, supply waiting on Gallipoli, and the determination were still only six divisions at the time of the lines, armament, and so forth, but also notes of the Turkish defenders.35 major landings. Unfortunately, the Allies the strengths and weaknesses of one’s own The Allies’ assessment was unusually were equally dilatory. B.H. Liddell Hart railed forces. It should contain a weighing of goals accurate for Torch, helped much by the break- against the piecemeal application of force: against expected costs. ing of German top-secret codes—“Ultra” “If the British had used at the outset even a The Athenian assessment was faulty. intelligence transmitted on Enigma machines. fair proportion of the forces they ultimately Not only did Athens not encounter a friendly The Allies knew where Axis troops were expended in driblets, it is clear from Turkish population, but the horses, troops, and located and how they were equipped. More accounts that victory would have crowned the money promised by the Egestaeans were importantly, they possessed insight into undertaking.”39 In addition, the Admiralty never forthcoming. The Athenians were Vichy French forces and leaders in Northwest staff in London did not offer realistic plans for duped.32 They also overestimated the will- Africa, which was crucial for the landings’ how to reduce the forts or overcome the more ingness of Sicilian city-states to support an success.36 than 400 underwater mines within the strait. attack on Syracuse. Leadership. Leadership at all levels was Victory was not inevitable in North Napoleon overestimated Spain’s value, crucial in determining success or failure. In Africa. American commanders were either believing it to be fabulously wealthy. In truth, Sicily, once Alcibiades fled and Lamachus was untested or prone to mistakes. Eisenhower, Madrid was nearly bankrupt. Moreover, estab- killed, Nicias was too hesitant and pessimistic. who had no combat experience, was a consum- lishing Joseph on the throne was a huge error. He had not supported the expedition in the mate planner, but even there he showed a lack NARA Operation Torch Allies storm beaches near Algiers on November 8, 1942 104 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Meilinger of vision and a tendency to conservatism. His It was not necessary to win over the Peloponnesian War, yet that advantage did original intent of landing only at Oran and population and make them allies, although as not provide victory in Sicily because Athens Casablanca was insufficient. After the success noted this occurred in Iberia and was a major was unable to exploit it.45 The fleet could not of the landings at Algiers he procrastinated factor in British success. The Arab populace effectively blockade Syracuse itself and thus in his move toward Tunis, and the delay pro- in North Africa was indifferent to who did not prevent its resupply and reinforce- longed the campaign and cost thousands of occupied the country in 1942, and the Vichy ment from Sparta and Corinth.46 casualties.40 French were easily won over, thus making Similarly, command of the sea was Intelligence. The Athenians were bereft Allied operations significantly easier. seemingly assured at Gallipoli, but that was of suitable intelligence on landing in Sicily. Force Size. It is an aphorism that attack- not really the case. There are two aspects The populace saw them as invaders and ing an enemy in a defended position requires to sea control. First, the enemy is prevented instead channeled information to Syracuse. a three-to-one superiority. Surprisingly, that from using the sea either to resupply himself Similarly, the French in the Peninsular superiority has not always been present. At or to attack the commerce or warships of the Campaign were denied information on the Gallipoli, the Allies fed in divisions in a piece- stronger power. The Royal Navy fulfilled that dispositions and intentions of the British, meal fashion. This slow buildup allowed the requirement. The second aspect is often over- Spanish, and Portuguese. The enemy popula- Turks to simultaneously increase their own looked: the enemy is unable to halt the offen- tions hated the French and served not only as defensive forces, with the result that the Allies sive actions of the attacker. Defeating the guerrillas to harry supply lines, but were also were never able to establish superiority over enemy’s fleet is not an end in itself; control ruthless in tracking down and killing French spies and couriers.41 In World War II, the Allies broke the in all of the second front examples noted, command top-secret German codes early in the conflict. of the sea was a significant factor in success This ultra-secret intelligence was fundamental in staying ahead of the Germans. At Alamein, for example, Bernard Montgomery was the enemy defenders—the Turks eventually of the sea must then be exploited. That was provided with detailed information on the had 15 divisions in defense to the 12 divisions impossible at Gallipoli because Turkish status and dispositions of the entire German of the Allies. land-based defenses and mines prevented and Italian defensive positions as well as, most During the Allied invasion of North the Royal Navy from forcing the straits and importantly, their fuel situation.42 Africa, there was some concern over the achieving victory. Good military commanders appreciate resistance that would be offered by the Vichy In sum, naval superiority was an essen- the importance of intelligence to the success French defenders, but Allied intelligence, tial but insufficient factor in the success of of their operations. Great military command- which proved accurate, placed such resistance these operations. ers work to ensure they actually have timely at an acceptable level. Moreover, the 200,000 Command of the Air. World War II and accurate intelligence. Intelligence is American and British troops hitting the demonstrated from its outset that control always a key to victory, and the commander’s beaches in Morocco and Algeria were suffi- of the sea was difficult to maintain if the air attitude and personal involvement in the cient to overawe the French defenders into but above the sea was not controlled. During the intelligence process are crucial. a token fight. The argument over the venue 1940 Norwegian campaign, the Royal Navy Friendly Population. It is difficult for the second front—France versus North realized on the first day that its ships were for any invader to launch an amphibious Africa—was an important one for this very extremely vulnerable to the Luftwaffe. Royal operation against a defended shore. Largely reason. The French coast would be defended Air Force aircraft based in Britain did not because of that the North African invasion by first-rate German troops, and that pre- have the range to extend an air control bubble was a gamble. Allied leaders predicted barely sented an entirely different level of risk. over the landing areas. The aircraft of the a 50 percent chance of success. Once ashore, Command of the Sea. In all of the Fleet Air Arm had reasonable range, given the invader must move quickly to ensure the second front examples noted, command of that the Royal Navy’s carriers were in Norwe- enemy is unable to concentrate his forces and the sea was a significant factor in success. Sea gian waters; however, they were obsolescent drive him back into the sea. control was crucial to Wellington because compared to Luftwaffe aircraft.47 Even if the landings are unopposed, most Spanish roads were appalling. The fleet Operation Torch similarly illustrated an attacker is still not free of care. He must allowed the British to be supplied with food, the importance of control of the air. It was establish a firm base that will permit resup- ammunition, and reinforcements constantly. not coincidental that a key objective at all ply. Wellington enjoyed such a base in Por- The Royal Navy did more, providing fire landing sites on November 8 was to secure tugal, which allowed him to operate at some support to army units operating close to airfields for Allied use.48 For the rest of the depth into Spain and eventually in France shore, resupplying allied coastal fortresses war, commanders realized that amphibious itself. The opposite was the case for France. under siege while blockading those held operations could not succeed if the enemy The French could not ignore the Spanish by the French, and serving as a rapid and controlled the air regardless of the size of the army that constantly appeared in their rear efficient transportation service for Wel- flotilla supporting the landings. American and along their lines of supply, making it lington’s troops.44 But sea supremacy was not amphibious assaults in the Pacific were impossible to marshal their full strength enough to guarantee victory. The Athenians dependent on air superiority; it was by against Wellington.43 had the greatest fleet in Greece during the design that General Douglas MacArthur’s ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 105 RECALL | Second Fronts “island-hopping” campaign consisted of 300- United States into an invasion of Iraq. That Because American interventions are mile hops; that was the radius of U.S. fighter war, plus Afghanistan peacekeeping opera- now almost exclusively expeditionary, the aircraft at the time. Air superiority was no tions, employed substantial resources in troops United States must have a robust capabil- less crucial in Europe. Eisenhower consid- and material, but any results gained were ity to project power worldwide quickly and ered it a prerequisite and would later testify dearly bought over an unusually long time. sustainably. Sea- and airpower control are before Congress regarding the importance Our melancholy experience in the essential to protecting those long lines of of air superiority for the Normandy inva- Middle East over the past decade stands communication. So too, sea-, air-, and space- sion, stating it was the “deep-seated faith in in contrast to the wisdom and economy of based intelligence and communications the power of the air forces, in overwhelming second front operations that were character- assets are imperative. In addition, the unique numbers, to intervene in the land battle” that ized by restraint. Such caution is increasingly flexibility of airpower, whether land- or sea- made the landings successful.49 necessary. The American use of force is now based, allows extremely rapid and long-range characterized by limited liability and a delib- employment combined with highly accurate Implications erate effort to avoid casualties. The latter, sig- and tunable force application. The action The decision to open a second front nificantly, applies not just to our own forces, in Libya was intended to remove a brutish against a powerful enemy is a time-tested but those of the enemy as well. Because the dictator and give the populace a chance for strategy used for millennia. It provides a less United States is attempting to shape events democracy, but like Kosovo in 1999, it did not risky option when fighting a powerful oppo- in foreign countries, it is imperative that it involve the use of ground troops in combat. nent while at the same time offering a chance not employ or provoke so much force that the As the last of our ground forces prepare for surprise and initiative. Some of these populace is turned against us. to leave Afghanistan, it seems increasingly operations have been successful throughout These unusual objectives and limita- unlikely that America will consider inject- history while others have not. The above tions push us toward military responses ing such conventional troops back into a hot examples offer reasons for success or failure. similar to those that dictated second front area—the costs and risk are simply too high. Since World War II, the United States operations of the past. We wish to avoid Instead, we should take a page from the suc- has fought wars of choice, not necessity. taking on an enemy too directly—continued cessful second front operations of the past. Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and several lesser presence should be avoided; risk must be We should maximize the attributes of our sea operations were entered as responses to minimized; casualties, especially to the civil- and air forces, which can project enormous aggression against allies or strategically ian populace, must be severely limited. but discrete power over great distances at rela- situated nations/populations we chose to As in second front operations, the keys tively low cost and considerably less risk. JFQ protect. These actions were similar to second to success are similar and seemingly time- front operations based on the motives and less: the necessity of a clear and achievable constraints involved—a deliberate decision to strategic goal, the completion of a sound net Notes either limit American commitment or avoid assessment, accurate and detailed intelligence 1 Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A initiating a major war. both before and during the operation, capable Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War, ed. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 if not exceptional leadership at all levels, a Robert B. Strassler (New York: Free Press, 1996), necessitated a strong response. Even so, it was sound base and friendly populace, and both remains the best contemporary source for the war. disastrously faulty intelligence that pushed the sea and air control. U.S. Navy Soldiers from 7th Infantry in Morocco during campaign in Northern Africa 106 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu Meilinger 2 One of Alcibiades’s biographers describes tial. Obviously, Fisher changed his mind due to 32 Thucydides, 387. him as “Vicious, insolent, adorable, detestable, Churchill’s arguments. See Dan van der Vat, The 33 Gates, 9–10. brilliant and fickle; with the face and body of a god Dardanelles Disaster: Winston Churchill’s Greatest 34 Ibid., 33. and the wit of Aristophanes, he was the very incar- Failure (London: Duckworth Overlook, 2009), 20. 35 The Ottoman Empire was neutral at the nation of the spirit of Athens.” See E.F. Benson, 18 Bulgaria had attempted to capture the Dar- start of the war, but one event had enormous con- The Life of Alcibiades: The Idol of Athens (New danelles in 1913. This experience caused the Turks sequences and drove it closer to Germany. Con- York: D. Appleton, 1929), 47. to beef up their defenses significantly, much to the stantinople had ordered two battleships to be built 3 Thucydides, 367–368. Allies’ detriment in 1915. See Edward J. Erickson, by Britain. In August 1914, however, Churchill 4 Ibid., 375. Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign (Barnsley, UK: reneged on the contract, arguing that the ships 5 P.J. Rhodes, Alcibiades (London: Pen & Pen & Sword, 2010), 5–9. were needed for the Royal Navy. The Turks were Sword, 2011), 46. 19 Van der Vat, 99. outraged. See Peter Hart, Gallipoli (New York: 6 It has never been determined whether the 20 Robin Prior, Gallipoli: The End of the Myth Oxford University Press, 2011), 8. charges had validity. Alcibiades was infamous for (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 45. 36 F.H. Hinsley et al., eds., British Intelligence his lavish and decadent lifestyle, but he was not 21 The trawlers were fishing boats crewed by in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy a fool, and the crimes he was charged with were civilians and commandeered by the Admiralty and Operations, 5 vols. (London: HMSO, 1979– punishable by death. for this task; regular minesweepers were thought 1990), II, chapter 24. 7 John R. Hale, Lords of the Sea: The Epic better used in the North Sea and English Channel. 37 For a good evaluation of the various French Story of the Athenian Navy and the Birth of Democ- 22 Van der Vat, 85. commanders, see Richard Humble, Napoleon’s racy (New York: Viking, 2009), 194. 23 The troops sent to Gallipoli included Peninsular Marshals (New York: Taplinger, 1973), 8 Donald Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian French, British, and British Commonwealth forces, passim. Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, notably the ANZAC Corps that was comprised of 38 Moon, 95. 1987), 2–3. Australian and New Zealand divisions. Prior, 93, 39 B.H. Liddell Hart, A History of the World 9 For a good though dated account, see Eli F. gives a breakdown. War (Boston: Little, Brown, 1935), 183. Prior Heckscher, The Continental System: An Economic 24 Maurice Matloff and Edwin Snell, United argues, however, that the Gallipoli operation was Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1922). For a States Army in World War II: Strategic Planning for never close to success, 249. recent update, see Lance E. Davis and Stanley L. Coalition Warfare, 1941–1942 (Washington, DC: 40 Porch, 341–343; Rolf, 44–45. Engerman, Naval Blockades in Peace and War: An Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956), 185. 41 Gates, 35. Economic History Since 1750 (Cambridge: Cam- 25 Ibid., 233. The British and Americans could 42 Hinsley et al., 425–435. bridge University Press, 2006), chapter 2. argue they were already fighting on multiple 43 Gates, 34. 10 Actually, Sweden also frequently violated fronts: in the Pacific, Burma, North Africa, and 44 Ibid., 1–2. the Continental System, as did Russia in 1810, of course in a naval war in the Atlantic and the 45 Hale, 189. although the latter did so largely as a result of strategic bombing campaign being conducted by 46 Thucydides, 434. Napoleon’s troubles in Spain. the Royal Air Force and soon to be complemented 47 For good accounts, see Adam A. Claasen, 11 For the background, see David Gates, The by U.S. Army Air Forces. Hitler’s Northern War: The Luftwaffe’s Ill-Fated Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War 26 Michael Howard, History of the Second Campaign, 1940–1945 (Lawrence: University (New York: Norton, 1986), chapter 1. World War, Grand Strategy: Vol. IV: August 1942– Press of Kansas, 2001); Henrik O. Lunde, Hitler’s 12 David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napo- September 1943 (London: HMSO, 1970), xxi–xxii; Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 leon (New York: Macmillan, 1966), 620. Matloff and Snell, 221, 283. (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2009). 13 Christopher D. Hull, Wellington’s Navy: Sea 27 Howard, 119; Matloff and Snell, 287–293. 48 Wesley Frank Craven and James L. Cate, The Power and the Peninsular War, 1807–1814 (London: 28 Howard, 118. After conquering France, Army Air Forces in World War II, 7 vols. (Chicago: Chatham, 2004), 70–74. Adolf Hitler permitted the southern part of the University of Chicago Press, 1948–1958), II, 55–58. 14 Joshua Moon, Wellington’s Two-Front War: country to maintain a degree of autonomy. This 49 Testimony of General Dwight D. Eisen- The Peninsular Campaigns, at Home and Abroad, government was located at Vichy and led by hower to Senate, Department of Armed Forces, 1808–1814 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Marshal Henri Petain, a hero of World War I. Department of Military Security: Hearings before Press, 2011), 54–55, 221. 29 The commander of the French fleet, the Committee on Military Affairs on S. 84 and S. 15 Stalemate was caused by the immense Admiral Jean Francois Darlan, solemnly promised 1482, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945, 360. increase in deadly firepower brought about by the British he would not allow the French fleet to rapid-fire artillery and the machinegun. The stan- fall into Nazi hands. Churchill elected to take no dard method of achieving mobility, cavalry, had no chances and ordered an air attack on the fleet to chance in the face of such firepower. In addition, guarantee that it could not be used by the enemy. the introduction of the airplane for reconnaissance Over 1,200 French sailors were killed. The British meant that tactical surprise became increasingly had also attacked French positions in Madagascar difficult to achieve for either side. Finally, the and Dakar, further irritating their former ally. growth of huge armies ensured an endless supply 30 Howard, 118; Douglas Porch, The Path to of troops to fill gaps and feed the meat grinder. The Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War result was trench warfare and stalemate. II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), 353. 16 In U.S. parlance, the First Lord was the Sec- 31 George F. Howe, US Army in World War II: retary of the Navy, and the First Sea Lord was the Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West Chief of Naval Operations. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 17 Admiral Fisher had directed a study a 1957), 666, 676. For a good overview of the Tunisia decade prior that argued a navy-only operation to campaign, see David Rolf, The Bloody Road to open the strait was impossible: troops were essen- Tunis (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 2001). ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 107 BOOK REVIEWS sector, and anecdotes that the military is Kane himself acknowledges what a a major source of great leaders and vital long shot his proposal is. However, even if the entrepreneurial thought. Veterans are dispro- reader is unwilling to go as far as the author portionately represented at the highest levels in terms of the solution, Kane presents a real of American business. Yet the military has and serious problem and makes a convinc- historically had trouble retaining that talent ing case that the Defense Officer Personnel and applying it internally to spur entrepre- Management Act needs reform. His appendix neurialism within the military. is perhaps the most useful part of the book. Aside from the survey itself, it is There, Kane provides detailed results of his through anecdotes that Kane’s depiction survey, complete with useful analysis and of mismanagement of high-performing guidance in its interpretation. For those field-grade officers will have real staying officers with whom Kane’s original article power with the reader. The most famous of resonated, the appendix provides the oppor- Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military these is the case of John Nagl—a prominent tunity to dig deeply into academic analysis of Mismanages Great Leaders and Why counterinsurgency specialist with substantial the problem. It’s Time for a Revolution intellectual heft and educational pedigree— The military is rampant with griping By Tim Kane who left the Army as a lieutenant colonel about manpower assignments, distribution Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 after 18 years of service, just 2 years shy of of special programs and incentives, and the 288 pp. $30 a military pension and obvious qualifica- general lack of meritocracy. While such com- ISBN: 978-0-230-39127-7 tion for promotion to colonel. Put simply, plaints are bound to exist in any organization Nagl saw better opportunity on the outside as a part of general human nature, this study for career advancement and to capitalize starts to define a real problem and begins the on his talents. A less-known and perhaps process of forming potential solution sets. By Reviewed by more telling anecdote is the story of Major surveying a broad range of West Point gradu- LINDSAY L. RODMAN Dick Hewitt, an Army officer who was hand ates and framing their responses in a thought- selected for a prime command position in ful and accessible format, Bleeding Talent im Kane’s January 2011 article Korea that would have torn his family apart. provides a voice for those officers within the entitled “Why Our Best Offi- Rather than sacrifice family for career, he left system who are clamoring to be heard. cers are Leaving,” published in the Service in favor of eventual success as an The concern among officers about The Atlantic, gave the world a entrepreneur in finance in central California. the manpower system is more pronounced T The ironic coda to this story is that Hewitt because of current and pending fiscal auster- preview of his new book and was the focal point of conversation across the officer ranks later met another of the command-selected ity measures and therefore merits attention of the U.S. military. In early 2011, American officers who chose to stay in the Army and consideration at the highest levels of military officers were nodding in agreement despite being assigned to another duty station Pentagon leadership. Commentators across with the results of Kane’s study regarding that did not work well for his family. After the defense world have produced numerous Army officers’ decisions to stay in or leave comparing circumstances, Hewitt discovered articles in the past few months about how to the military. His article and book focus spe- that the other officer had been assigned to cut costs and downsize without significantly cifically on a sample of West Point graduates a duty station that would have worked well degrading our national security capability. and their experience, but the outcomes and for Hewitt’s family; the other officer’s wife The easiest way to cut, however, and the conclusions of his survey resonated across was Korean, and she would have enjoyed approach taken thus far, has been across-the- the Services. being stationed in Korea. Had the manpower board reductions. In manpower terms, this The highlights of Kane’s study are system allowed or enabled that conversation translates into encouraging attrition, regard- summed up in the answers to three questions: to happen earlier, both outstanding officers less of who is leaving, in order to draw down would have remained in the Service. as quickly as possible. ■■ The most common answer to why offi- Kane uses this analysis to argue on Kane’s book should be a cautionary cers left the military was frustration with the behalf of a free market system that he calls tale. For each anecdote involving a successful, military bureaucracy (82 percent of respon- the Total Volunteer Force (TVF) that would promising, entrepreneurial, and charismatic dents with 50 percent strongly agreeing). overhaul and revolutionize the military man- officer leaving the Service because it was ■■ Ninety-three percent of respondents power system. He argues that a more flexible unable to capitalize on his talent (unfortu- believed that most of the best officers leave the TVF would enable officers to move in and out nately, there are no anecdotes about women), military early rather than serving a full career. of the military, and among billet assignments our leaders and policymakers should be ■■ Many of the best officers who leave the within the military, using human resource considering manpower reform that would Service would stay if the military were more managers who are able to match talent, entice them to stay. We will face problems in fully a meritocracy (90 percent). preference, and needs of the Service better the future that our leaders will have to solve than the military’s current system of pairing with fewer resources and less manpower. We Bleeding Talent makes a case based on virtually any free qualified mover with any need our top entrepreneurs, most creative this study, external data from the private free billet. thinkers, and most talented leaders to ensure 108 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS that we do not end up with a hollow force. more flexible, free market–based approach to ness to opportunity, and decisiveness in Kane’s book has provided a useful resource ensure that we retain the very best military uncertainty) who he believes would not with important insights that should be at the leaders. survive in the current personnel system: forefront of our concerns as we continue to Kane quickly establishes his credentials Chester Nimitz, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Billy reshape our force structure into the future. on this topic as a concerned veteran, entre- Mitchell, and John Boyd, to name a few. JFQ preneur, and economist. After leaving the Air The author effectively uses a chronol- Force, he reflected on his own experiences, on ogy of the 20th century to lead the reader to Captain Lindsay L. Rodman, USMC, is a Judge those of fellow veterans, and on a West Point an understanding of how this system has Advocate currently stationed at Judge Advocate speech in which then–Secretary of Defense become so centralized and rigid. He begins Division, Headquarters Marine Corps. Robert Gates stated that the greatest challenge by showing how Secretary of War Elihu facing the Army is its personnel bureaucracy. Root employed the unskilled industrial labor Kane laments that, in his view, “all branches methods of his time to form a professional of the military operate more like a govern- army. He follows by describing how Secretary ment bureaucracy with a unionized workforce of Defense Robert McNamara centralized than a cutting-edge meritocracy” (p. 10). authorities in the 1960s. Kane culminates To quantify these assertions, the author with an example of how today’s computer- surveyed networks of 1989–2004 West Point ized personnel system “optimally designates graduates to understand the issue in greater 15,000 officers [to careers fields] . . . in less detail. As an example of survey results, only than 10 seconds” (p. 120). 6 percent believed that the personnel system Kane’s alternative model deserves “does a good job retaining the best leaders,” a much more extensive reading, but here and only 32 percent believed the system briefly is his foundation: give commanders “does a good job of weeding out the weakest conditional hiring authority; end the use of leaders” (p. 15). seniority (known as year groups) as the sole As a result of the survey, Kane con- basis for job selection and promotion, but cludes that the Services’ use of market-based instead broaden the scope to always find the Bleeding Talent: How the U.S. Military forces in the all-volunteer force (AVF) policy best candidates regardless of year group; and, Mismanages Great Leaders and Why is effective at attracting innovative leaders. ultimately, give commanders greater authority It’s Time for a Revolution However, those leaders are then immediately in determining compensation, deployments, By Tim Kane subjected to a centrally planned, coercive promotions, and evaluations (pp. 136–141). Palgrave Macmillan, 2012 personnel system to retain and advance The author ends his discussion by advocating 288 pp. $30 them. It is this centrally managed system that 360-degree feedback as an essential element ISBN: 978-0-230-39127-7 eventually drives out some of the best talent. (an antidote to toxic leaders) to ensure that the His proposal is to extend AVF’s market-based best and brightest rise to the top. approach into a career-long personnel system I agree with the notion that those who that he calls the Total Volunteer Force. have served in the military would embrace Reviewed by It would be easy to discount the notion a much more adaptive personnel system. GREGORY E. SCHWAB of a market-based personnel system until we Change would require real leadership to consider the dynamic that the current cadre assess, adapt, and overcome the institutional n the Chairman’s Strategic Direction of officers is now steeped in. The book quotes inertia of a system with a century’s worth of to the Joint Force, General Martin Army War College Professor Lenny Wong: “In investment. Unfortunately, time is not on Dempsey states that “In the years to today’s Army, many junior officers . . . con- our side. The rapid constraining of defense come, our Joint Force will face several fronted with complexity, unpredictability, and resources and the quickly changing interna- I ambiguity in a combat environment . . . learn tional defense environment require that we challenging transitions. We will transition from war. . . . We will transition from abun- . . . to adapt, to innovate, and to operate with adapt now to ensure that we retain the best dant to constrained resources. And, many minimal guidance” (pp. 54–55). This opera- leaders and not simply retain officers by the Service members—and their families—will tional environment is diametrically opposed seniority-based methods of the past. If we do transition into civilian life. Any one of these to the current personnel environment. The proceed down this path, change would also would be difficult. All three together will test fear is that the best leaders will leave rather require great care. For example, cultivating a our leadership at every level.” than be subjected to the current system. small cadre of disruptive innovators is essen- In the midst of this leadership test Kane interestingly points out that tial in any thriving organization but having comes a book with the intriguing title Bleed- today’s system would not support a Robert too many can have tragic effects. ing Talent: How the U.S. Military Misman- E. Lee (an engineer) to lead an Army or a I also agree with Kane’s notion of sup- ages Great Leaders and Why It’s Time for a Joshua Chamberlain (a college professor) to porting talented leaders who find themselves Revolution. In it, author Tim Kane claims lead a regiment (pp. 66–67). He also provides outside of accepted career tracks. They that now is the time for a change from the the reader a list of names of entrepreneurial fall into two groups. To cultivate talented current rigid, coercive personnel system to a leaders (characterized by innovation, open- leaders who remain on Active duty, we need ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 109 BOOK REVIEWS a program that would identify and shepherd trategy has always been a dif- defined set of strengths and weaknesses, them in a new separate career field–like ficult art, and the challenges and a concerted effort to align one’s own environment. To cultivate those who tradi- that modern strategists now face strengths against enduring weaknesses of tionally leave Active duty, we need a program make practicing that art even the adversary. The goal of a competitive S strategy is to induce one’s opponent to invest to allow a few to freely flow among various more daunting. Some argue that American established career paths, academia, and even strategic thinking is deficient, or that there in the game we want to play, and channel industry (modeled on the Individual Mobi- is a black hole where U.S. strategy should his investments and attention into forms of lization Augmentee program). The target of exist. If true, that does not bode well. As competition that are the least threatening both is to capture unique talent when it is in the United States comes out of protracted to us. the best interest of the Service without side- conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, facing an Like any anthology, several chapters lining them from progression. age with myriad threats but fewer resources, stand out. The overall quality of these Ensuring that the joint force retains the American strategy community must papers is high, and the volume includes and promotes the best leaders to meet the reinvigorate its intellectual tools if the Nation detailed assessments on specific elements challenges facing us will test leadership. Kane is to sustain its position and underwrite of Sino-American competition including provides one possible pathway to get us there international order. missile developments, submarine warfare, by unleashing market-based forces. Bleeding This requirement makes Competitive and aviation capabilities. The strength of Talent is a thought-provoking call to arms. Strategies for the 21st Century a timely and rel- Competitive Strategies lies in the contribu- This book and its bibliography should be evant exploration of an intellectual concept tions of major strategists, including Steve required reading for anyone attempting to known as competitive strategies. It is also a Rosen of Harvard and Brad Lee of the U.S. assess and implement change with the goal of serious examination of the possible contours Naval War College. The latter’s chapter establishing a truly adaptive personnel system of Sino-American strategic interaction. In offers a number of strategic insights drawing conducive to these challenging times. JFQ this volume, editor Thomas Mahnken of the upon both European and Chinese strategic U.S. Naval War College observes that “U.S. thinking and influences. His presentation of Colonel Gregory E. Schwab, USAF, is the Air Force leaders need to develop a well-thought out particular strategies (cost imposing, denial, Chief of Staff Chair and serves as an Assistant strategy for competing over the long term, attacking the enemy’s strategy, and attacking Professor of Military Strategy and Logistics in which mandates an enhanced ability to the enemy’s political system) offers a founda- the Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National clarify and prioritize its goals, conduct a net tion for any student of strategy, and should be Security and Resource Strategy at the National assessment of enduring U.S. strengths and tied to the remaining authors’ more specific Defense University. weaknesses, and formulate and implement a assessments. strategy that leverages our existing or attain- Barry Watts, a former senior Pentagon able competitive advantages against a range official and retired Air Force officer, identi- of competitors.” fies a number of barriers to thinking stra- The concept of competitive strategies, tegically. His chapter merits a close reading originally developed by business strategists and incorporation into the curricula of both including Michael Porter of the Harvard civilian and professional military educational Business School, offers a viable approach for programs that delve deeply into strategy. defining and exploiting such a sustainable, Watts brilliantly captures the complexities competitive advantage. Purists will argue of strategies as mere heuristics, and probes the adjective is unnecessary; strategies are why our capacity to predict their effectiveness supposed to be inherently competitive. But is limited and how our own rationality is just as often, security communities fail to fouled by human biases. He exploits the work examine long-term trends in the operating of Richard Rumelt, author of Good Strategy/ environment and to identify the potential Bad Strategy, whose list of “strategy sins” cor- influence of investment in key technologies relates too highly with U.S. national security or geostrategically relevant capabilities that products. Anyone truly interested in under- Competitive Strategies for the 21st could reduce the potential for violence or standing what makes strategy difficult should Century: Theory, History and Practice establish the conditions for success should examine this chapter closely. Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken a contest of arms occur. While strategies Another invaluable contribution comes Stanford University Press, 2012 should be competitive against designated from Jackie Newmyer Deal, president of the 344 pp. $29.95 adversaries, many are not. Long Range Strategy Group, a Washington- ISBN: 978-0-804-78242-5 There are numerous characteristics of based consultancy. Deal has long been a competitive strategies, which focus on long- student of authoritarian regimes and their term interaction between defense establish- decisionmaking. She notes that Chinese ments in peacetime, long before any conflict history and strategic culture suggest that Reviewed by arises. The authors share an understanding the People’s Republic will seek to mask F.G. Hoffman of these fundamental characteristics: a long- the players, processes, and outcomes of term approach, a distinct opponent with a decisions. Manipulating information and 110 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu BOOK REVIEWS perceptions is a theme consistently present in Chinese strike operations, enhancing the ancient Chinese strategy texts and modern technological capabilities and defensive publications. Her chapter also underscores capacity of friendly regional actors to ensure the complexity of divining competitive they are not intimidated by Chinese pres- approaches against opaque adversaries, a sures, and exploiting internal crises within warning that we should not assume away. China as it comes to grips with its weak The current competition between the banking sector, rising ethnic unrest, demo- People’s Liberation Army and American mil- graphic and environmental challenges, and itary power has been played out near Taiwan. so forth. The authors recommend against This competition includes extensive invest- interfering with China’s internal affairs, but ments in antiaccess capabilities to thwart counsel decisionmakers to prepare to exploit U.S. power projection forces and acquiring any opportunities that could arise. significant numbers of advanced antiship Competitive Strategies is an invaluable cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and target- historical assessment with clear prescriptive Allied Master Strategists: The Combined ing capabilities that could reach most of the utility for modern application. It fills a hole Chiefs of Staff in World War II Western Pacific. Dan Blumenthal captures in of our grasp of strategy, especially for By David Rigby the details of apparent Chinese strategy, con- creating the elusive conditions by which one Naval Institute Press, 2012 cluding that “In sum, the balance of power may attain the Nation’s security interests well 272 pp. $29.95 between China’s control capabilities in the before forces are employed. If the art of gen- ISBN: 978-1-61251-081-1 first island chain and denial capabilities eralship is all about creating the conditions in the second island chain, and America’s for success on the field of battle by maneuver, ability to project enough power into the then competitive strategies represent the Taiwan Strait to defeat China objectives, has highest form of art for strategists before Reviewed by shifted markedly, and in a manner that calls the war even begins. Scholars and serious FRANCIS P. SEMPA into question strategic stability.” He goes on students of strategic studies should find its to predict that the character of competition collective insights valuable. This volume is n The Grand Alliance, the third volume in the South China Sea will be marked by strongly recommended for senior military of his history of World War II, Winston China’s coercive conventional strike and schools and any strategic studies program Churchill speculated that future his- undersea capabilities in an “attempt to bully aspiring to ensure that its students are intri- I torians would judge the establishment Southeast Asian states to accept its claims.” cately familiar with the basics of competitive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) in Augmenting Blumenthal’s pessimistic strategies and the Sino-American rivalry January 1942 as the most valuable and lasting conclusion, Michael Chase and Andrew that could shape the 21st century. JFQ result of the first wartime Anglo-American Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College summit meeting in Washington, codenamed cover the marked growth in China’s Second F.G. Hoffman is a Senior Research Fellow in “Arcadia.” The CCS met more than 200 times Artillery, noting that conventional missiles the Center for Strategic Research, Institute during the war, mostly in Washington but “have emerged as the centerpiece of China’s for National Strategic Studies, at the National also at conferences in Casablanca, Quebec, Defense University. ability to assert control over contested areas Tehran, Cairo, Malta, and the Crimea. The of its maritime periphery.” They offer clear CCS, wrote Churchill, “considered the whole recommendations for American strategists: conduct of the war,” and submitted recom- “Avoid playing into Beijing’s hands by invest- mendations to British and American political ing disproportionately in technologies that leaders. Despite sharp conflicts of views and could leave it on the wrong end of an arms heated, frank arguments, “sincere loyalty to race that might prove too costly to continue the common cause prevailed over national to wage.” or personal interests.” Churchill concluded This volume frames competitive strate- that “[t]here never was a more serviceable war gies in largely military terms. The exception machinery established among allies.” is a superb chapter, the most multidimen- Historian David Rigby in Allied Master sional in orientation and content, by James Strategists: The Combined Chiefs of Staff Thomas and Evan Montgomery. While in World War II describes the CCS as “the careful to note that conflict with China is nerve center of the most highly integrated not preordained, they argue for the need of effort at coalition warfare in history” (p. 1). American strategists to think competitively Headquartered in the Public Health Building and lay out a comprehensive approach. The near the War and Navy Department offices three core components of their proposed in Washington, DC, the CCS evolved into strategy include bolstering American a huge wartime bureaucracy that oversaw military posture in the Western Pacific to Anglo-American planning, production, preclude the possibility of successful sudden logistics, and grand strategy. Its importance ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 111 BOOK REVIEWS to the Allied war effort cannot be overesti- focused its attention on Singapore, Hong Kong, mated. As Rigby writes, “[N]ever before or and Burma/India, while the Americans sought since in history has one military staff been the defeat of Japan primarily by striking across responsible for the planning and ongoing the Central Pacific with sea- and airpower. NEW supervision of as many simultaneous, large- Gradually and inevitably, as the American from NDU Press scale military operations” (p. 210). material and manpower contribution to the Rigby begins his study with brief biog- war effort outpaced Britain’s, U.S. strategic for the Center for Strategic Research raphies of the CCS principals: for the British, preferences guided Anglo-American policy. Institute for National Strategic Studies General Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Rigby notes that there was nothing Sir Charles Portal, Admiral of the Fleet Sir comparable to the CCS on the Axis side. “In Dudley Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir spite of the Tripartite Pact, Germany, Japan, Strategic Forum 278 Arthur Cunningham, and Field Marshal Sir and Italy repeatedly kept each other in the Offshore Control: A John Dill; for the Americans, General George dark in regard to issues of vital strategic sig- Proposed Strategy for Marshall, Lieutenant General Henry “Hap” nificance” (p. 97). This lack of coordination an Unlikely Conflict Arnold, Admiral Ernest King, and Admiral among the Axis powers put them at a signifi- William Leahy. Of these, Generals Brooke and cant disadvantage against the Anglo-Amer- By T.X. Hammes Marshall exercised the most power and influ- ican coalition and its efforts to coordinate ence due to their dual roles as CCS members plans and strategy with the Soviet Union. This paper is the start and principal military advisors to Churchill Rigby faults American and British of what the author and Franklin D. Roosevelt, respectively. Field political leaders for not including Soviet hopes will be a deep, Marshal Dill played a key role as head of the representatives in the CCS. He admits that wide-ranging discus- British Joint Staff Mission in Washington this was a complicated issue given the nature sion of potential where he established a strong relationship with of the Soviet regime but believes that a diplo- strategies for a General Marshall and earned the respect and matic overture by the Western Allies should conflict with China. While such a conflict is trust of most of the other American military have been attempted and, if successful, would undesirable and highly unlikely, it is driving many of the Pentagon’s investment decisions chiefs. Rigby is not alone in concluding that have proved advantageous to the war effort. today. Under a proposed strategy of “Offshore “without the Marshall-Dill friendship the This is too sanguine a view of Stalin’s Soviet Control,” the United States would work with Combined Chiefs of Staff system simply would Union, which was nothing more than an ally Asia-Pacific nations to interdict China’s energy not have worked” (p. 57). of convenience during most of the war and and raw material imports and industrial The CCS mission was to organize and a political adversary at the end. Indeed, one exports, while protecting our partners. This run a global war on every continent, on the cannot help thinking that James Burnham of strategy would have several advantages: it would high seas, and in the air to defeat the Axis the Office of Strategic Services and General slow a crisis down, reducing escalatory pressure powers. To perform that mission effectively, Muir S. Fairchild of the Joint Strategic Survey on decisionmakers; align U.S. strategic require- the CCS had to overcome many obstacles Committee were right in late 1943–early 1944 ments with the resources available; take advan- including the different strategic perspectives when they proposed ending all lend-lease tage of Pacific geography to provide strategic, and cultures of each nation, interservice shipments to the Soviets, who by then did not operational, and tactical advantages for U.S. forces; provide a way for the conflict to end that rivalry within each nation’s armed forces and need them to defeat Adolf Hitler. is consistent with previous Communist Chinese between the British and American militar- Historians can find fault with certain behavior; and finally, provide for conflict reso- ies, clashing personalities and egos within members of the CCS and some of its specific lution that does not require an unobtainable the CCS and among theater and field com- decisions, but in the end it proved its worth “decisive” victory. manders, competing demands for soldiers by winning the war. As Rigby shows in this and material in the different theaters of war, interesting book, “It was the Combined and the peculiar political personalities of Chiefs of Staff organization, not politicians, Churchill and Roosevelt. diplomats, or bureaucrats, that was the most Throughout the war, British and Ameri- important planning agency behind the mili- can members of the CCS clashed over strategic tary victories achieved by the Western Allies priorities and the most effective strategy to during the war” (p. 7). JFQ win the war. In the European theater early in the war, the British, with vivid memories of Francis P. Sempa is an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the slaughter in northern France and Flanders the Middle District of Pennsylvania and the author in World War I, favored a Mediterranean- of Somewhere in France, Somewhere in Germany: centered strategy focused on North Africa, A Combat Soldier’s Journey through the Second World War (Hamilton Books, 2011), America’s Sicily, and Italy in an effort to strike at the “soft Global Role: Essays and Reviews on National underbelly” of the Axis, while the Americans Security, Geopolitics and War (University Press of Visit the NDU Press Web site throughout the war viewed northwest Europe for more information on publications America, 2009), and Geopolitics: From the Cold War as the Clausewitzian “center of gravity” of st at ndupress.ndu.edu to the 21 Century (Transaction Publishers, 2007). the European theater. In the Far East, Britain 112 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu To be effective in a differentiated world, From National to Theater strategists must answer three basic questions. What do we wish to achieve or what are the Developing Strategy desired ends? How do we get there or what are the ways? And what resources are avail- able, or what means will be used? While the first question is largely the domain of civilian By Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook policymakers, military officers are expected to advise and ultimately implement strategy. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey noted, “Strategic Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without coherence . . . does not just happen. Rather, strategy is the noise before defeat. it results from dialogue and debate.”7 With —Sun Tzu regular interactions with their counterparts throughout the world, combatant command- ers are key national security actors in the s a consequence of budget defi- Uncertainty associated with China’s rise, strategy development process. cits and rebalancing the force, the Arab Awakening, and the persistence the Department of Defense of transnational threats suggests strategy Defining Strategy A (DOD) increasingly requires is essential to avoid going from crisis to At a minimum, strategy should link strategy to operate in a fiscally constrained crisis. In general, the United States attempts ends, ways, and means. For DOD, strategy is environment. While resources are in decline, to diffuse situations before they become “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing national security challenges persist as new crises through a strategy of prevention and the instruments of national power in a syn- ones emerge. Reflected in documents such as building partner capacity to control security chronized and integrated fashion to achieve the National Security Strategy and National challenges.3 theater, national, and/or multinational objec- Military Strategy, the United States attempts Strategies are relatively easy to develop, tives.”8 Strategy also is about how leadership to shape the international security environ- but Carl von Clausewitz is instructive here: can use the power available to the state to ment by balancing threats in key regions of “Everything in strategy is very simple, but exercise control over people, places, things, the world, assisting partners in combatting that does not mean that everything is very and events to achieve objectives in accordance internal challenges, and supporting allies to easy.”4 The challenge for the strategist is to with national interests and policies. In fact, solve their own security dilemmas. While coordinate the various levers of national Hal Brands describes grand strategy as a security strategies are developed in Wash- power in a coherent or smart way. Former “discipline of trade-offs: it requires using the ington, combatant commands must translate Secretary of State Hillary Clinton emphasized full extent of national power when essential national objectives into theater strategy to this idea: “We must use what has been called matters are at stake, but it also involves advance and defend U.S. interests. ‘smart power’: the full range of tools at our conserving and protecting the sources of that With a strong notion that strategy disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, power.”9 should prevent “train wrecks,” or at least be political, legal, and cultural—picking the right Henry Barnett visualized strategy prepared for train wrecks, Dan Dresdner tool, or combination of tools, for each situa- as an interaction among key variables: the argues that grand strategies: tion.”5 Calls for smart power were a reaction security environment, ends, ways, means, to George W. Bush’s foreign policy, but more resource constraints, and risk.10 As repre- matter most when actors are operating in importantly underscores that power relations sented in figure 1, strategy is shaped by the uncharted waters. They can function as are differentiated. In the context of military security environment, as it attempts to shape cognitive beacons, guiding countries to safety. power, unipolarity dominates thinking about the security environment. Just as no plan During normal times, decisionmakers will the U.S. position in the world, but recent remains intact after first contact with the extrapolate from current capabilities or past foreign policy frustration illustrates that enemy, no strategy can exist outside the real actions to predict the behavior of others. In power relations are stratified.6 At the military world. Allies, partners, and adversaries can novel times, however, grand strategies can level, U.S. power is unparalleled and unprec- affect successful strategy implementation by signal to outsiders the future intentions of a edented. At the economic level, the United balking at U.S. demands (for example, Turkey country’s policymakers, reassuring or repuls- States is checked by other great economic 1 ing important audiences. powers such as Japan, the European Union, Dr. Derek S. Reveron is the EMC Informationist and the People’s Republic of China, and Chair and Professor of National Security Affairs Hal Brands argues that strategy “should through institutions such as the World Trade at the U.S. Naval War College. Lieutenant Colonel flow not from mere reactions to day-to-day Organization. At the informational level, the James L. Cook, USA (Ret.), is an Associate events, but from a judgment of those endur- United States is but one of many state and Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. ing interests that transcend any single crisis.”2 nonstate actors that influence global events. Naval War College. ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 113 JOINT DOCTRINE | From National to Theater refused to allow the United States to transit can be the product of national policymakers, should also answer a fundamental question: through its territory to invade Iraq in 2003), such as advancing democratic institutions or “What are we willing to die for?”15 That is, imposing caveats on forces in coalition opera- protecting the environment. The attempt to where is the United States willing to put tions (Germany’s refusal to engage in certain distinguish intensity of national interests is Servicemembers’ lives at risk? To this we add, types of combat operations in Afghanistan), important to set priorities. Hans Morgenthau “What are we willing to kill for?” and “What and outright efforts to undermine U.S. differentiated between vital national interests are we willing to pay for?” One relatively objectives (China’s support of authoritarian and secondary interests, which are more dif- simple approach to this rather complex and regimes that forestall democratic change). ficult to define.12 In a 2011 speech, President somewhat ambiguous concept is to stratify At the same time the international Barack Obama offered his priorities and national interests: security environment impacts strategy, so do intimated the conditions under which his resource constraints. As Colin Dueck argues, administration might consider something ■■ Vital interests. What are we willing to the American approach to strategy is flawed: vital: “I have made it clear that I will never die for (for example, invade Afghanistan with “Sweeping and ambitious goals are announced, hesitate to use our military swiftly, decisively ground forces to destroy al Qaeda training but then pursued by disproportionately limited and unilaterally when necessary to defend our camps)? means, thus creating an outright invitation people, our homeland, our allies, and our core ■■ Important interests. What are we to failure.”11 Since the 1990s, the limits (and interests.”13 In the same address, President willing to kill for (for example, participate in frustration) with U.S. grand strategy tend to Obama clarified what he thought were sec- a North Atlantic Treaty Organization air cam- be explained by an expansive view of security ondary interests: paign to prevent genocide in Libya)? challenges that includes subnational and trans- ■■ Peripheral interests. What are we national challenges. While burden-sharing There will be times . . . when our safety is willing to fund (for example, train and equip through coalition operations is the norm, the not directly threatened, but our interests and African Union peacekeepers for Somalia)? United States increasingly identifies more values are. Sometimes the course of history challenges than it and its partners can manage. poses challenges that threaten our common Given the U.S. ability to achieve air Given global defense cuts, the resource gap humanity and common security, responding supremacy or launch standoff weapons, will be exacerbated unless balance is achieved to natural disasters, for example; or prevent- the Nation can kill with limited risk to among ends, ways, and means. Combatant ing genocide and keeping the peace; ensuring its Airmen or Sailors, giving it a coercive commands are key in this process as they train regional security; and maintaining the flow advantage during diplomatic crises. In the and equip partners, sponsor regional exercises, of commerce. In such cases we should not be 1990s, for example, missile attacks against and employ military forces. afraid to act but the burden of action should Iraq and the air war for Kosovo exemplified To set priorities, the strategist can look not be America’s alone. As we have in Libya, that the United States was willing to kill to to national interests as a starting point to our task is instead to mobilize the interna- achieve objectives but not willing to die. In determine ends because they help identify tional community for collective action.14 both cases, the United States deliberately the reasons countries employ military forces. withheld ground force options, which would National interests can be universal and endur- Presidential policy is one source for have considerably raised the stakes. It seemed ing, such as ensuring the security of the state discerning vital from secondary interests. that airpower alone could achieve strategic and its people. Additionally, national interests Peter Liotta observed that national interests interests.16 Advances in remotely piloted vehicles over the last decade have enhanced U.S. ability to conduct casualty-free warfare, Figure 1. The Shaping of Strategy as evidenced by regular drone strikes in Paki- stan, Yemen, and Afghanistan. In addition to using military force, the United States also pursues its national RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS interests through friendly surrogates. In cases such, the Nation is willing to fund others to provide humanitarian assistance, conduct STRATEGY peacekeeping operations, and contribute to international military coalitions. The clearest MEANS example is through the Global Peacekeeping ENDS Operations Initiative, which was designed WAYS RISK to train and equip foreign peacekeepers for global deployment.17 A program such as this initiative seeks to limit the impact of regional SECURITY crises while providing the international com- ENVIRONMENT munity a ready pool of international peace- keepers. Along these lines, Washington was willing to fund African militaries to operate in Somalia, but it was not willing to deploy 114 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu REveron and cook ground forces or establish a no-fly zone. have been granted. Feasibility at the strategic Julian Corbett observed that one has to con- This approach is likely to increase in an era level is more complicated, as strategists have stantly keep in view the politico-diplomatic of burden-sharing where “building partner the dual task of identifying resource gaps to position of the country (on which depends capacity is an essential military mission and guide future investments, while not relying the effective action of the military instru- an important component of the U.S. Govern- on concepts whose resource demands will ment), and its commercial and financial ment’s approach to preventing and respond- never plausibly be met. This is one reason the position (by which the energy for working ing to crisis, conflict, and instability.”18 “Bartlett Model” of figure 1 shows never-end- the military instrument is maintained).27 In After ends are defined, policymakers ing iteration. As Colin Gray notes, strategy its simplest form, defense budgeting is a key and national security professionals develop development is a dialogue.22 variable that impacts strategy implementa- the ways to achieve national interests. Ways If ways provide the framework or con- tion. Former commander of U.S. Central can be thought of as concepts, which are cepts identifying how elements of national Command General Anthony Zinni empha- end-to-end activities that define how ele- power will be used to promote ends, means sized the importance of resources: “In my era, ments, systems, organizations, and tactics are the specific tools or capabilities avail- even if the [commanders in chief] produced combine to accomplish national objectives able for carrying out those concepts. Raw good strategies at their level (and I believe we or tasks.19 By specifying ways or concepts, resources such as money and people are not did), with good ends and reasonable ways to the military departments can then develop means until they are considered and priori- achieve them, we still had no idea whether required capabilities and attempt to limit tized within the context of strategy. Overall, or not the administration and the Congress redundancies. For example, the military the United States has a complex system for would come through with the means.”28 might identify global strike operations as a prioritizing and developing defense capabili- Although it is clearly not ideal, commanders key concept or “way” the force will operate in ties. Details change over time, but essentially are well advised to heed Corbett’s advice. the future (for example, in response to local DOD aims to identify gaps between capabili- A strategy is not considered complete access denial). That concept could be used ties needed to carry out desired strategies and until a risk analysis is conducted to deter- to identify required capabilities, such as the those it actually possesses, prioritize those mine the ability of the organization to carry ability to accurately deliver a strike anywhere gaps given likely resource constraints, develop out the tasks and missions specified and in the world with 24-hour notice. The means programs to create those capabilities, and implied by the strategy. Risk results from a to provide that capability could range from work with Congress to fund the programs.23 mismatch among ends, ways, and means. In submarine-launched missiles to long-range As the eventual consumers of DOD considering military strategy, DOD considers bombers or even sabotage missions con- capabilities, combatant commands provide four dimensions of risk.29 Operational risk ducted by special operations forces, but the important support to concept and capabil- is associated with the current force’s ability concept would provide the key guidance on ity development. The Goldwater-Nichols to execute the strategy within acceptable what means the military would actually need. Department of Defense Reorganization Act costs. Future challenges risk considers the As Presidents and their administrations of 1986 formalized this process to “utilize military’s capacity to execute future missions evaluate ways to advance and defend national the significant experience and knowledge against an array of prospective challengers. interests, criteria emerge suggesting condi- of [combatant commands] in the validation Force management risks consider recruiting, tions for military force employment. Not all of critical capabilities and the development training, equipping, and retaining personnel. crises around the world garner or warrant of future forces in U.S. defense planning.”24 Finally, institutional risks focus on organiza- the commitment of U.S. forces. The public, One of the ways combatant commanders tional efficiency, financial management, and according to the 2012 Chicago Council accomplish this objective is by producing technology development.30 To identify and Survey, increasingly seeks to cut back on an Integrated Priority List (IPL) that sends a measure risk, DOD uses exercises, scenarios, foreign expenditures and avoid military formal “demand signal” to the Pentagon by and experimentation.31 engagement whenever possible, yet 70 percent identifying capability gaps and providing the As the preceding discussion suggests, “support the use of U.S. troops to stop a commander’s “highest priority requirements, strategy is developed in the context of the government from committing genocide and prioritized across Service and functional international security environment, and favor their use in dealing with humanitar- lines. IPLs define shortfalls in key programs strategies must be reviewed as they encounter ian crises.”20 The military, however, favors a that may adversely affect the combatant com- the real world. Reevaluation and interpreting conservative approach to force employment, mander’s mission.”25 Additionally, combatant surprise recalls Sun Tzu’s famous exaltation, tracing its roots to the Vietnam experience command representatives are invited to “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a and embodied in the Weinberger Doctrine.21 participate in Joint Requirements Oversight hundred battles you will never be in peril.”32 When evaluating ways, strategists Council meetings, which are critical to Ideally, perfect knowledge ensures success, should analyze suitability, acceptability, determining and validating DOD capability but history is replete with evidence to the and feasibility? Most importantly, is the requirements.26 Although this goal is intui- contrary. Because “[w]ar is . . . an act of force action suitable or likely to actually achieve tive and rational, in practice, effective com- to compel our enemy to do our will,” the the desired ends? Also, is it an acceptable batant command participation has proved enemy has a vote, too.33 War is character- choice given ethical, legal, political, and challenging given competing perspectives ized by fog and friction. Winston Churchill organizational constraints? At tactical levels, and interests. understood this: “The statesman who yields planners must ensure their ideas are feasible Overall strategic success is based on to war fever must realize that once the signal or can be carried out with the resources they how well ends, ways, and means are balanced. is given, he is no longer the master of policy ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 115 JOINT DOCTRINE | From National to Theater but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrol- trade policy, and President Bush’s counterter- “nested strategic direction” supporting the lable events.”34 The preceding discussion rorism policy. tasks, missions, and intent of the next higher applies to the development and evaluation Deriving strategic guidance from the strategy. One of the ways that is accomplished of strategy in general, but national security country’s grand strategy, DOD has regularly is through the Quadrennial Defense Review professionals are primarily concerned with produced a National Military Strategy (NMS) (QDR), which is a congressionally mandated three specific levels of strategy: national since the 1990s. In 2003, Congress required activity that occurs every 4 years and requires or “grand” strategy, military strategy, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense to conduct a review theater strategy. submit a biennial review of the national mili- that includes a “comprehensive examination tary strategy in even-numbered years. The of the defense strategy, force structure, force Levels of Strategy NMS outlines the strategic direction for the modernization plans, infrastructure, budget Grand strategy is the highest level of Armed Forces (the military lever of national plan, and other elements of the defense strategy and encompasses all elements of power), which should be consistent with program and policies.”40 The QDR sets a national power—diplomatic, informational, the current National Security Strategy and “long-term [20 years] course for DOD as it military, and economic.35 While the country contain the following elements: assesses the threats and challenges that the has always followed a grand strategy (for nation faces and re-balances DOD’s strate- example, containment during the Cold War), A description of the strategic environment gies, capabilities, and forces to address today’s Congress requires the President to publish and the opportunities and challenges that conflicts and tomorrow’s threats.”41 a National Security Strategy. As required by affect [U.S.] national interests . . . a descrip- With this “nesting of strategy” in mind the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act, the strategy tion of the regional threats . . . a description of and an understanding of how to develop strat- describes: the international threats posed by terrorism, egy, the following focuses on how to develop weapons of mass destruction, and asymmet- theater strategy. the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives ric challenges . . . identification of national . . . the foreign policy, worldwide commit- military objectives . . . identification of the Theater Strategy ments, and national defense capabilities of strategy, underlying concepts, and component Using national strategy as a guide, com- the United States necessary to deter aggres- elements that contribute to the achievement of batant commands develop theater strategies sion . . . the proposed short-term and long- national military objectives . . . assessment of that are “an overarching construct outlining term uses of the political, economic, military, the capabilities and adequacy of forces . . . and a combatant commander’s vision for integrat- and other elements of national power of assessments of the capabilities, adequacy, and ing and synchronizing military activities the United States to protect or promote the interoperability of regional allies.38 and operations with the other instruments of interests . . . the adequacy of the capabilities national power in order to achieve national of the United States to carry out the national Though there is no statutory require- strategic objectives.”42 Theater strategy is the security strategy.36 ment, the Secretary of Defense released a bridge between national strategic guidance National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2005, and joint operational planning as it guides Since the statutory requirement, there 2008, and 2012. Since the strategy is written the development of the Theater Campaign have been 10 national security strategies (or at least directed and signed) by the civil- Plan (TCP). Theater strategy, and the TCP released by U.S. Presidents (two from Ronald ian head of the military, the strategy should that operationalizes it, should offer an Reagan, two from George H.W. Bush, three be read as directions to the uniformed integrated approach to achieving security from Bill Clinton, two from George W. Bush, military. Strategic documents are one form objectives: ongoing engagement, assistance, and one from Barack Obama). While each of civilian control through providing broad and presence activities should support con- President responded to particular security policy guidance to the military. The National tingency plans (for example, securing access challenges during his tenure (that is, the Defense Strategy intends to provide a link to bases or improving ally capabilities), but ending of the Cold War for Presidents Reagan between the National Security Strategy and more broadly, theater strategies should seek and Bush, and the rise of nationalist conflicts the National Military Strategy. The 2012 to make conflicts less likely by achieving U.S. and global terrorism for Presidents Clinton NDS, for example, states that the ways the ends through security cooperation and other and Bush), there have been continuous military element of national power will be tools of national power.43 policies related to trade, America’s leader- used to support national strategy will be A major challenge in the development ship in global affairs, and the promotion of through 10 missions to include countering of theater strategy is the requirement to coor- international organizations to unify action. terrorism, deterring aggression, operating in dinate theater security cooperation activities For example, Paul D. Miller argues that cyberspace, and providing a stabilizing pres- with other U.S. Government activities. These “contrary to widespread belief, the United ence abroad.39 With these assigned missions, activities can cover the entire spectrum of States has been pursuing at least one pillar of combatant commanders develop theater conflict—from peace operations to major an implicit grand strategy since the end of the strategies and request new or refined capa- combat operations—and often occur simul- Cold War: building the democratic peace.”37 bilities from the military Services to execute taneously, providing an additional level of Other examples include the continuation of these missions. complexity for the commander’s staff to President Kennedy’s Cuba Policy, President The number of strategic documents consider during planning and execution of Nixon’s China policy, President Clinton’s in the United States can be overwhelming the theater strategy. Theater strategy must and are intended to work together to provide therefore be broad and flexible enough to 116 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu REveron and cook encompass a wide variety of political-military ongoing security cooperation efforts, current to the NMS, NDS, and QDR, the Unified activities across a combatant command’s area operations, the Phase 0 component of con- Command Plan “sets forth basic guidance to of responsibility at the same time.44 It must tingency plans, and resourcing constraints all unified combatant commanders; estab- also take into account other countries’ activi- as part of the combatant commander’s lishes their missions, responsibilities, and ties. General Rick Hillier, former chief of the implementation of his strategic approach to force structure; and delineates the general Canadian Defense Staff, remarked, “Inter- the area of responsibility.”48 This handbook geographical area of responsibility for geo- national cohesion is usually the first casualty acknowledges limited combatant command graphic combatant commanders.”52 of having tactics without a strategy to guide resources in theater and emphasizes the point DOD also publishes Guidance for the you.”45 Consequently, military diplomacy is that the TCP “provides a framework to guide Employment of the Force (GEF) that is the essential for combatant commands to coor- operational activity in order to achieve stra- “method through which [the Office of the dinate their activities with their partners and tegic objectives, while also providing a point Secretary of Defense] translates” the strate- allies in a region to approach unity of effort. of reference for the Services and other agen- gic priorities set in these documents into a Despite the complexity and criticality cies to justify resource allocation.”49 Finally, “single, overarching guidance document” of theater strategy, there is relatively little it also discusses the “interagency nature” of that issues “implementable direction for doctrine or other guidance on developing planning and strategy implementation and operational activities.”53 Specifically, the GEF it. Perhaps this is a contributing factor in the requirement to ensure that the combatant “provides two-year direction to the combat- Charles Bouchat’s observation that “No commander’s strategic objectives are aligned ant commands for operational planning, two combatant commands follow the same with other U.S. Government efforts.50 force management, security cooperation, and process, format, or procedures for developing While acknowledging the complexity of posture planning. . . . The GEF is an essential theater strategy. Each combatant command developing and aligning the various strategy document for combatant command planners has adapted its method to the peculiari- and operational planning efforts, we offer as it provides the strategic end states for the ties of its region and the personalities of its a logic model designed to translate grand deliberate planning of campaign plans and commanders.”46 As part of this unifying strategy and associated strategic direction contingency plans. It also directs the level of effort, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs into theater strategy and associated plans planning detail as well as assumptions, which of Staff has directed professional military including TCP.51 must be considered during the development education institutions to teach senior offi- The model begins with national (grand) of plans.”54 cers to “[a]nalyze how national military strategy, which defines U.S. security interests, In addition to the GEF, the Chairman’s and joint theater strategies meet national objectives, and priorities, and provides guid- Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) is strategic goals across the range of military ance to all who are charged with its execution the “primary vehicle through which the operations.”47 Additionally, to bring rigor including geographic combatant commands. [Chairman] exercises responsibility for to theater campaign plan development, the Given the National Security Strategy, DOD directing the preparation of joint plans.” The Office of the Secretary of Defense released and the Joint Staff produce strategic guidance JSCP implements the guidance contained the Theater Campaign Planning Planner’s that focuses on the military instrument of in the GEF and “provides [focused] military Handbook, which is “designed to assist plan- national power and provides direction for strategic and operational guidance to [com- ners by presenting a broad approach to TCPs the combatant commanders through several batant commanders], Service Chiefs . . . and and country-level planning that considers critical documents. For example, in addition applicable DOD agencies for preparation of campaign plans and contingency plans based on current military capabilities.”55 The JSCP Figure 2. Theater Strategy Logic also provides guidance concerning global defense posture, security cooperation, and other steady-state (Phase 0) activities. RISK ANALYSIS Armed with national strategy and strategic direction and the commander’s GRAND STRATEGIC THEATER guidance, the staff is prepared to begin for- STRATEGY DIRECTION ESTIMATE mulating theater strategy. One of the most critical steps in developing strategy is to conduct a thorough theater estimate, which is SCIENCE and RESOURCE TECHNOLOGY “the process by which a theater commander CONSTRAINTS assesses the broad strategic factors that influence the theater strategic environment, THEATER THEATER CONCEPTS and thus further determining the missions, objec- PLANS STRATEGY CAPABILITIES tives, and courses of action throughout their theaters.”56 The estimate includes a mission IPLs EXERCISE analysis that derives specified, implied, and SCENARIOS essential tasks, as well as theater-strategic objectives (ends) and desired effects.57 Given the complex nature of the security environ- ndupress.ndu.edu issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 / JFQ 117 JOINT DOCTRINE | From National to Theater ment, as well as changes in strategic direc- A good vision must be compelling across the spectrum of doctrine, organiza- tion, the theater estimate requires continuous to a broad audience. For instance, if the tion, training, materiel, leadership and educa- refinement. In addition to a detailed analysis combatant commander’s vision is embraced tion, personnel, facilities, and policy, not just of the combatant command’s mission, capa- by coalition partners, regional leaders, and hardware—that need to be created, modified, bilities, and limitations, the estimate should Congress, there is a good chance that the or accelerated. Such capability requests are address the following: strategy has a critical mass necessary for submitted through an IPL, and in either case, success. A coherent and credible vision sound and clear strategic concepts are invalu- ■■ Identify any states, groups, or orga- serves as a communication tool that provides able in articulating those capability needs to nizations in the security environment that essential continuity and integrity to the senior leaders. might challenge the combatant command’s everyday challenges and decisions within the ability to advance and defend U.S. interests combatant command’s theater. Implementation in the region. This analysis should include an Once the theater estimate is complete, Once the theater strategy is complete appreciation for relevant geopolitical, geo- the strategist must develop strategic concepts and approved, the next step is implementa- economic, and cultural considerations within that articulate the ways to achieve the theater tion, or executing the strategy. Without the the area of operations. strategy objectives or ends. First, the strate- means, competencies, and informed think- ■■ Identify the major strategic and gist must develop and consider strategic alter- ing to carry out the commander’s intent, operational challenges facing the combatant natives that can be expressed either as broad the strategy is just an idea.63 For example, command. statements of what is to be accomplished or deterrence is a key concept in all theaters, ■■ Identify known or anticipated oppor- lines of operations. but Elaine Bunn noted that when the 2006 tunities the combatant command could As a useful reference in this process, the QDR directed that deterrence be tailored, leverage including those states, groups, or strategist can turn to the Capstone Concept “hard work [was] needed to flesh out the organizations that could assist the command for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020 (CCJO), concepts and capabilities underlying tailored in advancing and defending U.S. interests in which provides “potential operational con- deterrence.”64 To implement tailored deter- the region. cepts through which the Joint Force of 2020 rence, combatant commanders must identify ■■ Broadly assess the risks inherent in will defend the nation against a wide range countries and groups the United States wants major uncertainties in the depiction of the of security challenges. Its purpose is to guide to deter, understand the motives of those security environment. force development toward Joint Force 2020, actors, and request capabilities to prevent the force called for by the new defense strate- an adversary taking action the United States The theater estimate is crucial to set gic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leader- seeks to deter. the context for the combatant command’s ship: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.”60 The The theater strategy should also outline mission analysis. Commanders articulate CCJO describes the future operating envi- the structures, policies, technology, and their intent through a vision that describes ronment by focusing on what is new and dif- people necessary to carry out the strategy. how the theater strategy supports U.S. goals ferent, while suggesting “attributes” that will In today’s complex security environment, and objectives. The vision should discuss the define the future force. The document also theater strategy implementation requires the general methods to achieve those objectives emphasizes the concept of globally integrated cooperation of multiple governmental and including international assistance and diplo- operations that require a “globally postured nongovernmental organizations, as well as macy, as well as military means. Additionally, Joint Force to quickly combine capabili- international allies and partners. One of the it may describe where the combatant com- ties with itself and mission partners across most challenging tasks for the combatant mander is willing to accept risk. Finally, it domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, command is ensuring that there is a cred- should introduce and describe the appropri- and organizational affiliations.”61 ible commitment among all participants to ate strategic and operational concepts for the The strategic concept also forms the accomplish the common goals. military instrument of power. basis for subsequent planning efforts that With strategy playing an important When crafting a vision, it should include combat operations (i.e., concept of guiding role in U.S. foreign policy, it is succinctly capture the desired strategic operations plans), security cooperation, and important to know how to evaluate the outcome. The vision is a snapshot of what the other support operations.62 Additionally, strategy. At a minimum, a strategy is combatant commander wants the theater to the concept identifies the means necessary designed to change the security environ- look like in the future. Effective visions are for the command to attain its identified ment by preventing the emergence of a usually short, focused, imaginable, positive, theater-strategic and national objectives. peer competitor, increasing the number of and motivating.58 Constructing an effective The means normally include interagency democracies in the world, and preventing vision statement is difficult: one or two sen- and multinational capabilities, as well as the the spread of nuclear weapons. In a broader tences must reflect the consolidated theater full spectrum of U.S. military resources. In sense, as this article makes clear, strategy strategy’s goal so it is easily understood and many cases, combatant commanders iden- develops and employs all tools of national engaging (for example, “[a]s we look forward, tify capability gaps that can be filled with power to advance and defend national [U.S. Southern Command] seeks to evolve resources that already exist within DOD interests. Consequently, when evaluating into an interagency oriented organization but are not assigned to that theater or do not strategy, one must examine the strategy’s seeking to support security and stability in exist in sufficient quantity. In other cases, the concept of national interests, view of the the Americas”59). command may identify capabilities—from security environment, strategic priorities, 118 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu REveron and cook role of power, impact on resources, required metrics. The essential point is that perfor- 5 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, means, risk, and acceptability. mance measurement systems need to be con- “Statement of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton, In pure combat terms, it is relatively sistent and aligned with strategic goals. Nominee for Secretary of State,” January 13, 2009, available at Decision Making (NSDM) Faculty Paper, U.S. 45 Transcript from the Munk Debate on Naval War College, June 30, 2012, 1. Humanitarian Intervention, Toronto, ON, Decem- 25 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ber 1, 2008, 17. Instruction (CJCSI) 8501.01B, “Chairman of the 46 Bouchat, 13–14. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commanders, 47 CJCSI 1800.01D, “Officer Military Profes- Chief, National Guard Bureau, and Joint Staff sional Education Policy,” September 5, 2012, Participation in the Planning, Programming, Bud- E-D-2. geting and Execution Process,” August 21, 2012. 48 Theater Campaign Planning Planner’s 26 See CJCSI 5123.01F, “Charter of the Joint Handbook (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Requirements Oversight Council,” January 10, Secretary of Defense for Policy, February 2012), 1. 2012. 49 Ibid., 1–2. 27 Julian Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime 50 Ibid., 2. Strategy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1988), 51 Based on the logic of force planning devel- 308. oped by Mackubin Owens, “Strategy and the Stra- 28 Anthony Zinni and Tony Koltz, The Battle tegic Way of Thinking,” Naval War College Review for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America’s Power 60, no. 4 (Autumn 2007). and Purpose (New York: Routledge, 2006), 136. 52 JP 1-02, 324. 29 Sean C. Sullivan, “Defense Resource Alloca- 53 JP 5-0, II-3. tion: The Formal Processes in U.S. Defense Plan- 54 Ibid. ning,” NSDM Faculty Paper, May 15, 2008, 23. 55 Ibid., II-6. 30 Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 56 Joint Forces Staff College Publication 1, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: OSD, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 2000 (Norfolk: Joint 2008). Forces Staff College, 2000), 3–26. 31 For scenario planning, see Peter Schwartz, 57 Bouchat, 12. The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future 58 John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Cambridge, in an Uncertain World (New York: Doubleday, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), 1991); Andrew Krepinevich, The Quadrennial chapter 5. Defense Review: Rethinking the U.S. Military 59 U.S. Southern Command, United States Posture (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Southern Command Strategy 2018: Partnership for Budgetary Assessments, 2005). the Americas, December 2008. 32 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel 60 Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, Force 2020 (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1963), 84. September 10, 2012), 1. 33 Clausewitz, 75. 61 Ibid., 4. 34 See “Churchill on War,” National Churchill 62 Bouchat, 13. Museum, available at 120 JFQ / issue 70, 3 rd quarter 2013 ndupress.ndu.edu NEW from NDU Press Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization Edited by Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, with a foreword by Admiral James G. Stavridis, USN This new title from NDU Press for the Center for Complex Operations delves deeply into important aspects of transnational crime and other illicit networks. Contributors describe the dangers and the magnitude of the challenge of converging and connecting illicit net- works; the ways and means used by transnational criminal networks and how illicit net- works actually operate and interact; how the proliferation, convergence, and horizontal diversification of illicit networks challenge state sovereignty; and how different national and international organizations are fighting back. Convergence is available for download at China Strategic Perspectives, No. 6 China’s Forbearance Has Limits: Chinese Threat and Retaliation Signaling and NEW Its Implications for a Sino-American Military Confrontation from NDU Press By Paul H.B. Godwin and Alice L. Miller for the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies Since its founding in 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has employed military force in defense of its security and territorial integrity. In many such instances, Beijing implemented a calculus of threat and retaliation signals. Beijing implements this de- terrence calculus by a carefully calibrated hierarchy of official protests, authoritative press comments, and leadership statements. If the crisis persists and Beijing perceives its interests are not satisfactorily taken into account, its statements escalate in level and may include at first implicit and thereafter increasingly explicit warnings that it may use military force to achieve its goals. This approach has been employed consistently despite the sweeping changes in the PRC’s place in the international order, the proliferation of foreign policy instruments at its disposal, the more complex crisis decisionmaking pro- cess and domestic political environment, and the dramatic evolution in Chinese media over the decades. This study explores the question of whether improving military capabilities will lead Beijing to substitute sudden or surprise attack for the politically calibrated deterrence signaling it has employed prior to its past use of force. It also assesses the problem in four ways. It first reviews China’s use of force since 1949 to determine the motivations driving Beijing’s employment of military coercion. Second, it assesses China’s crisis de- cisionmaking process and crisis management. Third, it assesses the prospects for China’s more aggressive use of military coercion in Asia’s emerging security environment. Finally, Beijing’s signaling of China’s intent to employ military coercion is assessed in detail using a series of crisis case studies covering the years 1961–2004. Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 Steven L. Rearden’s Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942–1991 surveys the role and contributions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) from the early days of World War II through the end of the Cold War. The JCS, an organization of military advisors and planners established early in World War II, first advised the President on the strategic direction of U.S. Armed Forces in that war and continued afterward to play a significant role in the development of national policy. Because of their relations with the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council, a history of their activities, both in war and in peacetime, provides insights into the military history of the United States. The importance of their activities led the JCS to direct that an official history of their actions be kept for future generations to study. Dr. Rearden’s Council of War follows in the tradition of volumes previously published about JCS involvement in national policy, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. Using a combination of primary and secondary sources, and adopting a broader view of previous vol- umes, this fresh work of scholarship examines the military implications of problems from 1942 to 1991. Although focused strongly on the JCS, Rearden’s well-researched treatise deals too with the wider effect of crucial decisions and their ensuing policies. JOINT FORCE QUARTERLY Published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by National Defense University Press National Defense University, Washington, DC