t % AIR UNIVERSITY Heview

Alr Ur|iversity Librar>

MOV ' 9 1956

' r^xwell AFB, A/a. 3611

f. eme act>©n

USAF’S ROLE IN LATIN AMERICA: MILITARY ASSISTANCE, EDUCATION, AND PREVENTIVE MEDICINE CIVIC ACTION

NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1966

W hy Mil it a h y Assist a n c e for Latin Amer ica ? ...... 2 Col. Frank R. Pancake, usaf (Ret)

T he Lvter-Amer ica n Air Forces Academy...... 13 Dr. A. Glenn Morton

Preventive Med ic in e Civ ic Action Trainixc P rocram...... 21 Maj. Mathew T. Dunn, usaf Maj. James B. Jones, usaf

T he Spe c t r u m Construct of Conflict...... 30 Norman Precoda

Axa l ysis and Technology...... 45 Maj. Paul L. Gray, usaf Melvin Tanchel

F rench Nuclear Wea pon s Policy...... 55 Lt. Col. Norman D. Eaton, usaf

Aer o xa ut ica l Ge r ia t r ic s...... 62 Col. I. R. Perkin, usaf

Satellite Ground Tracks...... 71 Maj. Edward P. Nlazak, Jr., usaf Air Operations in Vietnam T he Air Force En gineer s Problems ln S outheast Asia ...... 76 Maj. Gen. R. H. Curtin, usaf USAF H ospital Clark and the Vie t n a m Casualties...... 85 Col. Arthur B. Tarrow, usaf (mc ) ln My Opinion M anacer-Spec ia l ist Relationships: A T heory...... 90 Maj. Lawrence B. Tatum, usaf Books and Ideas Our Stratecic Dil e m m a s ...... ; ...... 94 Dr. David YV. Tarr H ist o r y and the Long-Rance Planner...... 98 Maj. John Schlight, usaf

T he Contributors...... 102

lhe cover As Winter's breath begins to chili our tempcr- Addreu manuscrípts to the Editor, Air Uni- nte clime, one thinks fondly on the wannth oerrtfv Revietc, Aerospace Studiei Institute, of our neighbor countries to the south. The Maxwell Air Force Ba*e, Ala. Printed by the Government Príntíng Office. Washington, fíeview, in n more pracHcnl look southward. D.C. Subscriptions are sold by the Air Uni- considers several aspects of USAF relation- veruty Boolt Drpartment, Maxwell Air Force ship with Latin America: Col. Frank R. Pan- AU,: yearly $4.50, bacfc Usues 75 cake‘s "W hy Military Assistance for Latin cent». USAF r jc c v iim n o pu bl ic a t io n 50-2. America?” Dr. A. Glenn Morton’s "The Inter- American Air Forces Academy,” and Majors Vol. XVIII No. 1 N ovember-Dece MBEB Mathew T. Dunn and James B. Jones'* "Preven- tive Medicine Civic Action Trnining Program." ■Airün.iuMiiiy I ihmry Index Assistance Program □ USAFSO's task is as big as the territory o f Central and South America, as complex as the geographical, economic. geographical, the as complex as America, South and Central f o territory the as big USAFSO'sis as task

□□ solidarity. and promote a community o f f and solidarity. community a o promote nations prosperous whose f their governments reflecto peoples. the uill and and ethnic In diverse,features are this as trickyand Communist issue as subcersive actii ities it.make can SFOhsteavsr oeofassigi h eeomn onr i ocsudrteUS Mililary U.S. the under air f country forces o development the in f assisting o role advisory the USAFSO has uith Joinl Chiefs o f Staffplans, the United States Air Forces Southern Command (USAFSO) is responsihle (USAFSO) Command United Air Southern Forces States the f Staffplans, Chiefs o uith Joinl r Air Universitv Review Review Universitv Air Treatv o f Reciprocai Assistance (knoun as the Rio pact) in 1947, is committed to a policy o f f is f 1947, inTreatvAssistanceReciprocai committed o Riothe o as preventing to(knounpact) a policy for the capability o f mission, Besides f thismililary U.S. that air up to o back policy. primary the capability forces for ( n eeln het n csofageso gis n onr h mrcs Inaccordance Américas. f the o country any against f aggression o acts threats and repelling and MAP). Throughout all these ejforts. theaim is to foster friendly relations, strengthen hemispheric strengthen relations, is to friendly foster theaim ejforts. these all Throughout MAP). "Inter-American Air Forces Academy" by Dr. by GlennA. Morton, and Academy" Air Forces "Inter-American mrc:”W ” America: Civic Action Training Program" by Major Matheiv Dunn and Major James Jones. Dunn Major Major Matheiv by James and Program" Civic Training Action presents three articles spotlighting seceral phases o f Air Force activilies in Latin in activilies f Force Air o seceral phases spotlighting presents three articles hy Military Assistance for Latin America?" by Colonel Frank Pancake. Frank Colonel by America?" Latin Assistance Military hy for h ihen WInter-Americanthe eighteen lhe signed estern nationsthat Hemisphere AMERICA? WIIV MILITARY WIIV ASSISTANCE underscored antagonism and across antagonism dangers underscored this century of wars tremendous The Asia. America. It isIt America. perhaps not surprising because Southand is what ingoing onabout Central FOR LATIN FOR Most have their family origins in Europe or in in origins family Europe have Most their or West. to the East to the lookedeither have historically States United the of the people O NE of the stubbom facts about the about facts of the stubbom NE C century is its lack of genuine concem is concem century itslack genuine of United States inUnited States the mid-twentieth olonel F rank THE UnitedTHE States, as one f o R. P R.

"Prevenlive Medicine "Prevenlive ancake

4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

the Atlantic and Pacific. In the aftermath of and has over 80 million inhabitants, the lan- World War II, the revolution of ideas and the guage is Portuguese; in the tiny Guianas three emergence of a whole family of new nations languages are spoken—French, Dutch, and ha ve again tended to emphasize the Middle English. And although there is undeniably a East, África, and the Indian Ocean basin. More manana attitude in many areas, still the number recently the war in Vietnam has again diverted of Latin American achievements is notable. To attention from this nearer region that has come name but one, a listing of the seven largest to be called Latin America. cities in the Western Hemisphere in 1960 in- Even the phrase “Latin America is in it- cluded four south of the Rio Grande: Buenos self a reflection of our indifference, since it Aires—third, São Paulo—fourth, Rio de Janeiro provides a convenient term by which to de- —fifth, and México City—seventh. scribe a vast area that we tend to think of as an Nevertheless, there is an undeniable com- entity whereas in realitv its member countries mon denominator in the area, and that com- are very different in background, resources, mon denominator is underdevelopment with State of development, and form of govemment. its inevitable companion, limited Communica- People in the United States refer to residents tions. (“Communications” here is used in its from México to Cape Hom as “Latin Ameri- broadest sense to include roads, railroads, cans” because, after all, aren’t they all swarthy, canais, air routes, wire Services, etc.) These and small in stature, mostly Spanish-speaking, and other factors have perpetuated widespread generally agreed that the best time to get things illiteracy and a chronic State of poverty. Nor done is mafianaP Such is the stereotype that is the poverty that exists in Latin America the comes to mind when the average Yanqui stops kind known by the people of the United States, to think about his neighbors to the south. where poverty is an affliction of the minority. Even a cursorv examination of this image In Central and South America it is the condi- reveals that there are a good many Latinos— tion of the majority. For the principal curse of notably in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Argen- this region is that its resources have always tina—who are neither swarthy nor small. In been controlled by a relative few, and the Brazil, which is as large as the United States benefits of natural abundance have been de-

United States Air Forces Southern Command C-130’s have airlifted more than a million and a half pounds of road-building equipment in Peru and Brazil. U.S. participation in the civic-action program has enabled Latin American military forces to continue their own civic-action projects of opening remote interior regions to surface travei and commerce.

6053 Y WHY MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LAT1N AMERICA? 5

nied the great majority of the people. The tions to a levei that will give reasonable assur- plight of the campesino and the Indian in this ance of internai security and provide certain part of the world is incalculably worse than elements of hemispheric defense. Stress is that of the poor in the United States. Also, placed on support of units that have “nation- there is a much smaller base of the well-to-do building” characteristics, such as construction from which to produee the capital, the man- and transportation units. Congress has decreed agement, and the development required to a ceiling of $55,000,000 on military equipment alleviate the poverty of the masses. To put for this area. The oft-voiced questions are it another way, the industrial revolution that many: Why should we invest good U.S. dollars changed the whole way of life in Europe and in military aid when what is really needed is America has yet to take place—in any complete economic aid? Why strengthen Latin Ameri- sense—in Central and South America. can armed forces when their strength is fre- Thus the problem facing the govemments quently used to overthrow civilian govem- of these countries is to increase, in a very major ment? Aren’t we just encouraging them to fight way, the development of their natural re- among themselves? VVho else is there to fight? sources. This growth will create new busi- Why do such small nations need air forces? nesses, stimulate commerce, and provide the Does it make sense to give them modem so- revenue that will pav more wages to more phisticated weapons like jet aircraft? And so people and supply taxes for more development. on and on. The remainder of this article will Such a program requires (1) capital, (2) indus- seek to answer these questions. trialization, (3) a higher levei of education, Why should we invest U.S. dollars in military (4) an opening of the vast interior lands, and aid when what is really needed is economic (5) internai security and stability. aid? The United States Government is not un- The quick answer is that both are needed. aware of these requirements, nor is it without To see why, let us review the stated require- a program to meet them. The major element ments, starting with the need for capital, with- of the program, the Alliance for Progress out which stepped-up development cannot launched bv the late President John F. Ken- take place. When the U.S. provides military nedy, is endeavoring both to prime the eco- aid, it frees indigenous govemment funds, nomic pump in all nations of the Organization which can be added to available capital. Per- of American States and also to require some haps it is important to clear up, right here, a basic reforms without which meaningful prog- widespread impression that Latin American ress is impossible. The United States has govemments spend a lopsided portion of their pledged its full support—running into billions budget on defense and that then U.S. ma p of dollars—to make this program work. In piles on another massive chunk. Such is not conjunction with this program are the related the case. In the period from 1960 to 1964 the technical assistance, development loans, and average defense expenditure ranged annually Military Assistance Program ( ma p). Together from 12.6% to 13.9% of total expenditures. This these various programs make up “foreign aid.” is not to say that individual countries did not To many U.S. taxpayers the whole matter of spend more, but the highest figure for any foreign aid is viewed with great suspicion, and country in that five-year period was 23.4%, and it is annually attacked in Congress with vary- the lowest was 3.3%. Needless to say, individual ing degrees of vehemence and hostility. Aid country budgets vary from year to year, but it to Latin America seems, for reasons not clear is significant that in no case could the percent- to Latin Americans, the most suspect of all. ages be labeled exorbitant or even excessive. The most criticized component of Latin During the same five-year period, the extent American foreign aid is the Military Assistance of U.S. military aid averaged from 3.5% to 5.3% Program. Its purpose is to raise the effective- of the various defense budgets. Again, this is ness of the military forces of the recipient na- an average, and in individual countries in spe- AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW cific years the figures have been much higher. receive an elementary education. Particularly For example, in one country ma p amounted to noteworthy have been the programs in Bolivia, 32.5% in one year but only 3.8% for the same Ecuador, Guatemala, Colombia, and Honduras. country in another year. 1 he point is that the It is difficult to overemphasize the need to Military Assistance Program is not augmenting open up underdeveloped areas. Here again the Latin American military budgets on a grand military are making a real contribution with scale. But to the extent that the United States equipment provided through map. Transport does supply military aid, country funds are re- aircraft are flying new settlers into lands that leased for economic programs. have never been cultivated. New air routes to To retum to the examination of require- backcountry grass strips are opening up areas ments for progress, regarding industrialization that have never before been in direct contact we will only point to the fact that military with civilization. In Peru anny bulldozers and facilities are contributing to limited industrial graders, flown to interior points and manned development: for example, the Argentine Air by construction battalions, will make possible Force depot at Córdoba is manufacturing light the first overland higlnvay to connect a Pacific commercial aircraft, and the Peruvian Navy is port with the vast region of the Amazon River buikling a commercial cargo vessel in its yard basin lying east of the Andes. Thus in a short at Callao. while the city of Iquitos, more than 400 miles Conceming the next requirement. educa- northeast of the port of Chiclayo, will be con- tion, What does military assistance have to nected to that city by a highway permitting do vvith education? Quite a bit. The recent travei between the two in a matter of a couple comments of a Peruvian officer provide an of days. Right now, any bulk cargo that cannot illustration: move from Chiclayo to Iquitos by air must travei by ship via the Panama Canal, around In your country vvhen you need a motor vehiele the northem coast of South America, and up driver, you can draft a lad 18 years or older who has probably graduated from high school, some 2200 miles of the Amazon River. The has been driving a car for 2 years or more, and time required is reported to be eight months. may ovvn an mg. You show him where the Similar examples of road building could gadgets are on a 6 x 6 truek, you give him a be cited in Colombia, Brazil, Paraguay, and couple of lectures on ground safety, and he is other countries. And in a country like Para- ready to go. In Peru we take an Indian boy guay, for example, there is no local civilian who can neither read nor write and who may contractor available for major road-building never before have ridden in any vehiele except projects; hence almost the entire effort is borne the bus that brought him down out of the hills. by the Paraguayan Army. Similarly, almost all So we begin with teaching him to read and of the Paraguayan Air Force transport force is write. It s a long process. devoted to airlift and liaison to remote areas. There is a key point here. The military are pro- But even the foregoing arguments for viding their personnel the basic stimulus that military aid do not focus on its major purpose, underlies all real progress: education. Not only which is to meet the requirement for intemal are the armed forces engaged in education; in security. The threat of subversive insurgency many countries they are also teaching a trade is widespread in Central and South America to those whose military Service is almost at an today. It is promoted and supported by Castro, end. Thus when a young man is mustered out the U.S.S.R., and Red China. The insurgent and retums to civilian life, he is able to per- effort spawns acts of terrorism, sabotage, riots, fonn as an automobile mechanic, electrician, and kidnapings. The most recent evidence of or radio technician or in some other useful Communist aims and efforts was the first Tri- trade. The armed forces contribute to civilian Continental Conference of Communist and leaming as well. ín recent years they have leftist organizations held in Havana from 3 to devoted a major effort in a number of countries 15 January 1966. Soviet Delegate Rashidov to building schools in which boys and girls can boasted that combined Communist operations Establishment of joint opera- tions centers in Latin American countries has done much to in- crease cooperation and under- standing among military forces.

in the Western Hemisphere would soon cap- ann by its very nature is the strongest arm of ture Peru. Venezuela. Guatemala, the Domini- any govemment, and in Latin America there can Republic, Puerto Rico, and the three will never be a lack of sufficient arms to oust Guianas. unarmed civilian leaders. It is, of course, quite Our Military Assistance Programs are likelv that other countries would be happy to aimed not only at providing the kinds of equip- provide some arms if ours were withheld. ment best suited to resist insurgencv but also A tradition in the countries of Latin at training in the tactics and techniques of America, different from any in the United counterguerrilla vvarfare. This training places States, is that militaiy' leaders look upon them- great stress on coordination of the entire re- selves as guardians of democratic constitu- sources of a nation to control these threats. The tional govemment. The feeling dates back to job requires quick reaction and careful team- the achievements of Simon Bolivar and José work among all military forces, the poliee, and de San Martin in the early part of the nine- govemment economic and information agen- teenth century, when the Spanish empire was cies. In summan, we can sav that militarv finally overthrown. Though we in the United assistance funds supplement economic aid. States have trouble understanding the view- They make possible the environment in which point, we must realize that the Latin American economic aid can get the best results, and they military leaders look upon it as thcir duty to contribute directly to the improvement of the step in and rescue their nation from inept or economy. incompetent leade.rship. Undeniably, the over- throw of some eivilian-led governments, far Why strengthen Latin American armed forces from being a catastrophe, has been a blessing. when thcir strength is frequently used to There have been o\rer 35 golpes in Central and overthrow civilian govem m ent? South America since World War II. It is not This question seems to proeeed from the within the scope of this article to argue the premise that if U.S. military aid were withheld, merits of each of these. There are recent ex- Latin American military forces would become amples, notably in Brazil and Ecuador, where impotent and hence there would be no further civilian leadership clearly did not meet the military coups—or golpes, to use the Spanish needs of the people or of the nation and a term. The percentages already cited of military change in leadership was long overdue. But budgets supplied by ma p underscore the fal- the real answer to the question is that we lacv of this premise. Obviously the military really have no choice. We do not want new The helicopter plaijs an increasinghj vital role in Latin American counterinsurgency and rescue oper- ations. Venezuela and Colombia in particular have used the chopper to excellent advantage in antiter- rorist efforts. . . . One of USAFSO’s primanj ob- jectives is to help improve search and rescue capa- bility in its area of responsibility, and throughout Central and South America btj tie-in with national centers. The USAFSO Aerospace Rescue and Recov- ery Center, under the Military Assistance Program, provides rescue-control training to participants.

Castros in Latin America. These countries de- Arent we just encouraging these countries to serve help in the fíght against internai subver- fight among themselves? Who else is there sion. They need improved equipment—things to fight? like good Communications gear, helicopters, There is no denying that certain historie and more modem aircraft tailored to their enmities exist between neighboring countries requirements. They need training. Perhaps in th is part of the world, just as they do else- most of all they need streamlining of their where. Chile and Argentina periodically de- military organization. Without these things velop a crisis over border incidents. Land- they will not control insurgency. And if these locked Bolivia is still smarting from its defeat things become the tools of a golpe here and in the War of the Pacific and the annexation of there \ve must be mature enough to realize its Coastal lands by Chile. Ecuador and Peru that the tools would have been obtained from have a continuing boundary dispute. But it other sources if not from us. is encouraging that there have in fact been WHY MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LAT1N AMERICA? 9

no recent conflicts between Latin American living and leaming with them as classmates. countries, and today there is reason to believe It is indeed an inspiring occasion at each grad- that the likelihood of such conflicts Ls lessening. uation to hear the student body sing together There is, for one thing, in a very real sense, a “The Hymn of the Américas,” clearly revealing common enemy: Communist-sponsored insur- a sense of unity of which they had never before gencv. Though the threat varies in degree and been aware. though in a few countries it is hardly discemi- A third contribution of map is the major ble, we have the statements from Havana, training effort now being undertaken by the Moscow, and Peking to underscore the likeli- U.S. military Services stationed in the Canal hood that no country shall continue to be Zone in the techniques and tactics of defeating immune. The Organization of American States either incipient or actual insurgency. To this has obviously promoted a greater feeling of end the 605th Air Commando Squadron and the friendship and understanding among the mem- Armys 8th Special Forces send mobile training ber nations. But beyond the political realm, the teams—both jointly and separately, depending Militarv Assistance Program has brought about on the need—to work with counterparts in the some very tangible contributions to peace and various Latin American countries. In addition, friendship. a great deal of emphasis is placed on stream- .An excellent example of cooperative effort lined organization to provide quick reaction is the annual combined exercise involving when trouble arises. The concept of a joint army, navv, and air forces of as many countries operations center has been adopted in coun- as are able to participate. These exercises are tries like Venezuela, Colombia, and Guatemala, plaxmed and executed bv a combined staff to unite and coordinate all military and para- under the leadership of the host country. The military forces. This innovation did not come most ambitious exercise held to date was easily, for military rivalries make cooperation Operation Ayacucho in December 1964. The difficult. participating nations included Argentina, Co- Stress is laid on the importance of civic lômbia, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, and the actions by military units, to convince the In- United States. This exercise involved more dians and campesinos that the armed forces than 7000 troops and lasted three days. Of par- and the govemment are not only interested in ticular significance was the fact that its sce- their welfare but also willing to work directly nario was based on support by neighboring for their betterment. One of the most useful countries to assist the host country in putting programs has been the work of medicai teams down an insurgency which had grown to major which are flown to remote areas, where they proportions. It therefore represented a signif- provide instruction in sanitation, give immu- icant departure from past exercises, which had nization shots, and administer medicai and been predicated on the classical invasion from dental treatment within the limits of time and outside the country. personnel available. Paraguay, for example, Another contribution to peace and friend- flies its Cessna 185 (bought and supported by ship is the two schools which the United States ma p) to 10 different villages. In 1965, 15,000 operates in the Canal Zone: the Armys School patients were treated in the remote areas, and of the Américas and the Inter-American Air 187 patients were air-evacuated. Honduras, Forces Academy. Both are in continuous ses- with its Cessna, provides visits each month to sion and offer numerous courses, which are 13 villages, and 50 patients were air-evacuated made available without charge through the in 1965. Both Honduras and Paraguay give free Military Assistance Program. These schools treatment and medicai care and retum the provide a bonus benefit over and above educa- patients to their village by air. tion and training by bringing into close associa- A regular program has been established tion members of the various air forces and for training medicai technicians at the Inter- armies, so that they get to know something American Air Forces Academy, and light air- about their neighbors from other countries by craft and medicai kits are provided to partici- 10 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW pating air forces to be utilized bv the techni- are under way to make recommendations on cians when thev retum to their country. In a mutual logistics support system and an inter- 1965 the school sent out 20 medicai teams on national central flying training school. combination demonstration and working visits W hy do Latin American ruitions nced air to various backcountry arcas, including the forces? Perlas Islands south of Panama. Tliese teams, This question is raised particularly with assisted bv graduates from the school who had respect to those smaller nations whose air retumed to their countries, treated 18,778 pa- forces are about the size of one usaf squadron. tients, filled 47,381 prescriptions, took care of Our previous discussion has already provided 1895 dental patients, including 3860 extrac- some of the answers to this question, but a few tions, and performed 3277 laboratorv examina- additional observations should be made. The tions and 4620 immunizations. Apart from the first reason for air forces—and the one most humanitarian aspects, efforts Iike these impress often overlooked—is that each of these coun- the natives and create good will toward the tries has a basic pride in its armed forces and armed forces. And it is hoped that they point a realistic concem for its national security. the way to an expansion of such efforts by Each is determined to have some form of air public health agencies of the host governments. power, even though—as in Costa Rica, for ex- A final example, though not directly re- ample—it amounts to only four light aircraft. lated to ma p, is the annual meeting in a se- Other small countries are satisfied to have a lectcd capital of all the chiefs of air forces. The limited number of propeller-driven fighter- sixth such conference was held this vear in type aircraft and some transports. These serve Lima, Peru. Similar conferences are convened limited objectives in providing airlift of troops for the leaders of the armies and navies. These to trouble spots about the country and in pro- are not simplv social affairs; they are working viding reconnaissance and close support if conferences, usuallv lasting for a week or more. needed. The more advanced countries have Militar}' leaders get to know one another and moved into jet fighters and have sent consid- discuss their problems frankly and freely. erable numbers of their pilots to jet training These discussions have produced tangible re- schools in the United States. There is no ques- sults, a good example embodied in recent de- tion that the factor of pride as well as concem cisions to implement an area-wide search and for security has been a driving force in the rescue system, spearheaded by the air force in aequisition of jet aircraft. However, these air- each country. The usaf Regional Center at craft have, for the most part, been tailored to Albrook afb, Canal Zone, has already com- the abilitv of the country to support them. and menced on-the-job training of selected person- only the larger countries have acquired jets in nel from the various Latin American air forces, significant numbers. These jets have a limited and steps are being taken to establish rescue air defense role in those countries of the Carib- centers in each country and subregional cen- bean basin which are directly threatened by ters as required. To support this system and to Castro, and they are useful air-ground support provide direct Communications among Latin weapons in arcas where organized insurgencv American air forces, the Inter-American Air provides targets. The helicopter has assumed Forces Tele-Communications System (sit fa ) an increasinglv important role as a counter- has been established. Seven countries have al- insurgency weapon and has been a major factor ready established stations in this voice net, and in many successful efforts against insurgents the remaining air forces are expected to join it and terrorists in Colombia and Venezuela. in the near future. Thus for the first time it is One need only glance at a relief map of possible for the air forces to talk to each other Latin America to realize how crucial the air- without going through commercial facilities. plane is in helping to solve the transportation The United States has provided the Communi- problem. It is also invaluable in opening up the cations gear to make this system possible. Also vast heartland areas of the Orinoco and Am- as a result of the annual conferences, studies azon basins. Air forces serve other auxiliarv WHY MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR LATIN AMERICA? 11

roles not normally thought of in the United The question is not whether these obsoles- States. For example, the air force pilots of cent F-86’s, Hunters, and Canberras will be most Latin American countries perform regu- replaced, because these countries have made lar tours of duty vvith domestic commercial up their minds that modemization is vital to airlines. As the airlines are operated bv the their security and progress. The only question govemment, for the most part. this use of air concems the type of aircraft that should re- force personnel does not involve any change place them and from what country. The Latin in employer. In countries where agriculture is Americans are not interested in high-priced, an important element of the economv, military high-performance fighter aircraft like the F-105 pilots are given extended leaves of absence to or the F-4C. A number of them, however, are do crop-dusting. But it must be stressed that interested in an aircraft with characteristics the real reason for these air forces is to provide similar to those of the F-5. It would not be for the securitv of the coimtry bv fumishing inexpensive—the price of an F-5 is about a the necessary air member of the total defense million dollars—but it would be less expensive team. than other modem fighter aircraft. Jets with modem design features, including simplifica- Why do Latin American air forces need sophis- tion of maintenance, ruggedness, and reason- ticated aircraft? able ordnance delivery capabilitv, would be There is undoubtedly a great deal of mis- very suitable weapon systems in Latin America. understanding about the nature and quality of Our neighbors there prefer U.S. equipment. It Latin American air forces. This is due in part reduces their logistic problems, it enables to the tendency to lump all Latin American them to work out flexible arrangements as be- countries together and to consider their mili- tween sales and grant aid, and they admire tary forces as having the same requirements. and respect our produets. It should be re- This obviously is a grievous error. There is marked parenthetically that while some coun- no more similarity betvveen the kind of equip- tries want a modem jet fighter and are pre- ment required by the Brazilian Air Force and pared to operate it effectively, others would that required by the El Salvadorean Air Force be content vvith something much cheaper and than there is between the air forces of the with lower performance characteristics, pro- United States and Denmark. Determining the \'ided it coidd fill the role of a “counterinsur- kinds of aircraft a country needs depends on gency fighter." This need is not peculiar to its geography, its resources, and the threats to Latin America, and the United States has been its securitv. Those who pose the question have aware for some years of the pertinence of an not defined the meaning of the word “sophis- aircraft of this kind. There are many countries ticated,” but somehow the term has been taken that could use it if it is ever produced. But to mean jet aircraft. It is quite true that some of regardless of what types of new aircraft are the Latin American countries do not need jet selected, the replacement of the present assort- aircraft. Some of them, realizing that they do ment of aging and fatigued fighter aircraft not need them, do not have them. Other coun- must begin—and soòn. tries have obtained a few jet aircraft, usuallv A word should be said about “sophisti- the T-33. to satisfv national pride and the urge cated" transport aircraft. The C-47 continues to progress; but these aircraft have also been to be the backbone of most Latin American air given the armament to make them useful as forces. Though some sav the marvelous Cooney ground support weapons. They can be quite Bird will go on forever, Latin American re- effective against guerrillas or for rapid recon- quirements, particularly in the civic-action naissance. The larger countries have already field, dictate the need for something bigger and arrived at the levei of the F-86, the Hawker better. There are, of course, some C-54’s in Hunter, and the Canberra jet light bomber, Service, and some C-l 18’s are beginning to which provide tactical air support for their appear. 3’he transport whose performance best armies. suits the needs of most South American coun- 12 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW tries is the C-130. It can carry heavy payloads investment of about $70,000,000 annually (the over the Andes. It is relatively easy to operate difference between this figure and the ceiling and maintain. It is simple to load and unload. of $55,000,000 finances the training of Latin And on the basis of the cargo ton-miles it can American personnel). There is no question that produce, it is reasonably economical—more this money is providing the means and the economical in fact than the C-118. But it is ex- know-how to fight Communist-inspired insur- pensive, costing upwards of $2,000,000. Brazil gency, to promote civic-action projects which has arranged to purchase five C-130’s, but the benefit the economy, and to cultivate ever price tag makes it almost prohibitive for other closer ties among the countries in the area and nations. Thus there is a great need for modem- between those countries and the United States. ization of the C-47, but no one has yet pro- The Military Assistance Program, in short, is duced a low-cost twin-engine version of the not a Wholesale give-away program as some C-130 that might fill the gap. Perhaps a solu- would have us believe. It is an investment in tion mav be found in a condominium arrange- the security of the United States. For unless ment to support a multinational C-130 airlift we are willing to help our neighbors overcome organization that could haul freight for all the the current efforts of subversive elements and member nations. reap the harvest of fully developed resources, we will soon find that we have other neighbors besides Cuba who are members of the Com- T he Military Assistance Program in Latin munist bloc. America yields an excellent retum on the U.S. Hq United States Air Forces Southern Command AIR FORCES ACADEMY

Dr . A. G lenn Morton

HE Inter-American Air Forces Acad- school goes beyond a narrovv interpretation of emy at Albrook Air Force Base, Canal its mission and provides resident training in T Zone, exists specifically to serve the English, management, ojt supervision, special needs of the Latin American air forces and, air operations, and athletics, as vvell as the therefore, indirectly all of the Latin American occupational specialties. All instruction is con- peoples. Its stated mission is to . . provide ducted in the students’ native languages, Span- training in Air Force occupational specialties ish and Portuguese, by United States Air Force for personnel of the Latin American Air Forces instructor personnel and guest instructors from and provide Spanish translation service for Air some of the country air forces. In this respect, Force training publications.” In practice the the Inter-American Air Forces Academy is 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

unique. By maintaining outstanding standards of usaf Missions, to determine the reactions of of performance, the school makes major con- host Air Force officials to the school. The fol- tributions toward strengthening hemispheric lowing comments are typical of those received. solidarity, improving the defense posture of the Latin American republics, and creating friend- From Bolivia: ship and good vvill for the United States. The usaf School for Latin America not only has Formerly known as the U.S. Air Force trained the students in a material manner, but School for Latin America, the school was re- has also brought about a center of confraternity named effective 8 September 1966 to reflect among the Américas, since there are students more appropriately the joint efforts of the many enrolled from all the Latin American countries Latin American nations toward achieving its who meet each other and work together in close collaboration. It can be said with certainty that hemispheric goals. this is an evergrovving and expanding institu- tion for the good harmony of all the Armed hemispheric solidarity Forces of the continent, cultivated through the hospitality and mutual brotherhood shown to The interaction between the United States the students and strengthening the relationship and Latin America vvhich culminated in todays among the countries who fight for a common Inter-American Air Forces Academy began in destinv which is the most solid defense for a 1939 when the Commanding General, Panama demoeracy and civilization. Canal Department, initiated a program of courtesv visits to the Canal Zone by militarv From Colombia: representatives of Latin American nations. One I am pleased also to convev to the Commandant of the chief purposes of these visits was to [mv feeling] that the center for moulding aero eounteract “the residue of distrust and fear of technicians represents a buhvark of continental the United States in the minds of many Latin solidarity, now constituting a symbol of unity Americans, particularly the Latin American among the Latin people of America. militarv." The idea of trying to engender From Venezuela: mutual understanding and good will and of working toward hemispheric solidarity was in- In addition to the educational mission of the herited by the School for Latin America when usaf School for Latin America, there are two it was formed, as an implicit, and at times since important by-products of its operation; I refer to the tightening of the bonds of friendship then explicit, part of its mission. The school among the representatives of the armed forces has been successful in this extremelv important of the different Latin countries, and to the facet of its mission. As earlv as 1943 the Com- standardization of operating procedures, which manding General, Sixth Air Force, received a constitutes a big step toward the formation of message from the Commander, Talara Air an American hemispheric bloc. Base, Peru, conceming the favorable reaction of the first group of Peruvians who hacl been Today, as in 1943 and 1952, the school trained at the Panama Air Depot: promotes and çultivates the spirit of coopera- In addition to being impressed by American tion and friendship and the mutual exchange methods and standards, they are apparently of ideas through an active cocurricular pro- deeply pleased by the friendly attitudes, gen- gram of cultural presentations, field trips, pie- erosity and hospitalitv of a 11 with whom they nics and other social functions, and a vigorous come in contact. There could be no doubt that sports program. Students from nearlv all the during their tour in Panama they have formed Latin American nations live together, play to- a genuine and lasting friendship for America gether, and work together. The students’ atti- and Americans. tude is well summarized by the motto of Class Nearlv ten years later, in July 1952, the 65-A, written by a Mexican student: Nuestro public information officer of the Caribbean Air desígnio, hermandad—nuestro meta, 1a paz Command conducted a poli through the chiefs (Our path. brotherhood—our goal, peace). technical training Although the courtesy visits were initiated to create a better United States image in Latin America, some of the Latin American nations were quick to see the practical advantages that might be gained írom them. In December 1939, just nine months after the visits started, Ecuador requested instruction for its visiting personnel in all fields of interest deemed ap- propriate by the U.S. Armv Air Corps in the Canal Zone. In August of 1940 the Peruvian Ambassador to Panama made a similar request Inter-American Air Forces Academy students repre- for Peru’s visiting officer pilots. expanding the senting the air forces of Latin America assemble in scope of the request by asldng that they be front of thcir barracks at Albrook AFB before class. permitted to remain for one month in order to observe techniques and methods of operation. In September 1940 the Commander, Pana- ma Canal Department, requested and received War Department approval for a program that A valuable by-product for students is the opportu- vvould authorize courtesy visits of the type de- nity to learn English during their six-month stay. To assist them, the academy operates one of the finest language laboratories in the United States Air Force. 16 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sired by Peru. Invitations to the same training ing six-week courses had been established at program were then extended to Cuba, Haiti, the Panama Air Depot: air command radio Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and Ecuador. (operations and maintenance), aircraft armorer, During 1941-42 this program of training and teletype maintenance, bombsight maintenance, observation visits continued, Colombia, Uru- power turret maintenance. guay, and Guatemala being added to the list After two classes had been conducted, the of countries participating. six-week courses were revised and extended to In 1943 Peru initiated another official re- three months. Two facts had become appar- quest, this time asking that Peruvian aircraft ent almost immediately: a period of six weeks mechanics be given formal instruction in the was not long enough for the training in aircraft techniques and procedures used in maintain- mechanics, and the language of instruction ing the aircraft and associated equipment should be Spanish, since the English language which had been obtained by Peru under the proficiency of the students was more limited Lend-Lease program and which was deterio- than had been anticipated. These first formal rating because of inadequate maintenance. Ap- courses were apprentice training in which the proval was granted, and on 15 March 1943 one student worked beside the instructor and en- officer and ten enlisted men arrived at Albrook gaged in maintenance activities, and it was Field for three months of apprentice training necessary for them to be able to talk with each in a formal course designed especially for the other. Peruvian students. This is the first recorded By August 1944 it was felt that the increas- effort by the United States to conduct formal ing number of students and the language diffi- training courses in aeronautics for Latin Amer- culties nullified the advantages of the appren- ican air forces. On 23 April plans were made tice training system. There were some bilingual for the addition of five Nicaraguans to the supervisors available but not enough to meet training course. By the end of June the follow- the demands. For these reasons the depot in-

Curriculum of Inter-American Air Forces Academy

Aircraft Training Department ground communication-navigation equipment re­ aircraft propeller repairman pairman instrument trainer specialist C-11 aircraft pneudraulic repairman instrument repairman Medicai Training Department aircraft electrical repairman aeromedical specialist helicopter mechanic medicai Service specialist aircraft mechanic (reciprocoting) medicai laboratory specialist aircraft mechanic (jet) public health specialist aircraft maintenance supervisor Support Training Department jet engine m echanic (axioi and centrifugai) special air operations orientation course weapons mechanic inventory management and warehousing specialist airframe repairman inventory management and warehousing supervisor reciprocoting engine mechanic (January 1967) administrative and personnel specialist administrative supervisor and personnel technician Electronics Training Department management course for air force supervisors communications-electronics fundamentais technical instructor course aircraft radio repairman OJT administrator supervisor course aircraft communication-novigation equipment re­ fundamental English pairman intermediate English air electronics supervisor/technician advanced English THE INT ER-AM ERICAN AIR FORCES ACADEMY 17

struction was replaced with a curriculum sepa- Air Command. The six words “as required by rate from the maintenance activities. The new the country concemed” placed the school and curriculum of eight courses was directed bv the countries it served in a proper relatioriship civilian instructors. Three months later one to one another, since one of the purposes of officer and ten enlisted men were authorized as the school was and still is to meet the training supervisors and instructors for the “Latin needs of the Latin American nations. American School”; the school, after five vears From this brief historical summary it can of natural, evolutionarv growth, had a name. be readilv seen that the school and its training The nature of the schools evolutionarv, concept of 1949 evolved from a need recog- almost organic growth, is illustrated by the fact nized 10 vears earlier. that a search of records and directives late in As the needs have increased since 1949, 1944 for authorization to issue supplies to the so have school operation and capacity. Many school revealed that not only was there no plans and programs were established between authority for issuing supplies but there was 1949 and 1964, for the most part in order to none even for the existence of the school. This achieve relativelv short-range objectives. Dur- omission was rectified, and training continued ing that time no studv was made to determine until 26 January 1946, when the program was the basis for a usaf training concept for the suspended because of reductions in manpower Latin American air forces; training was based foliowing World War II. upon and justified by the implicit concepts A number of the Latin American air forces that had evolved over a number of years. protested the closing of the school; they were In 1964, however, the Commander of the depending on it for continued training, and so United States Air Forces Southern Command later in the year the Commanding General, directed that such a study be made. From this Caribbean Defense Command, directed the re- studv, Project Vision, has come a more cohesive opening of the Latin American School. To the usaf training concept for the Latin American officers of the Panama Air Depot and the Sixth air forces, with 28 specific recommendations Air Force who had been directing the school, pointing out new directions for the school. it had been intended as a wartime measure in support of hemispheric defense; to the coun- tries training airmen in the school, the peace- Integrated Training Program time need for and uses of the school were just as criticai as they had been during the war. One of the more important recommenda- It should be noted that both the original found- tions, and one which should have far-reaching ing of the school and its reopening were in results, reads in part: “ .. . establish as an inter- answer to the requests and needs of our sister mediate goal a posture whereby realistic republics in Latin America. courses in apprentice skills (3 levei) and tech- The school was reopened in February nician/supervisor skills (7 levei) only are of- 1947 and during the next three vears went fered by the usaf School for Latin America to through a period of organization and reorgan- the Latin American Air Forces requiring them, ization, emerging with a 20-week curriculum with all upgrading to the journevman skill (5 schedule which is still in effect. levei) conducted in-countrv through Career In 1949 a significant change was made in Development Courses, ojt . . the statement of the school s mission: The concept embodied in this recommen- dation has been adopted and developed by the The mission of the school is to train en- school and designated the Integrated Training listed men of the Air Forces of the various Program. The school has aligned all resident Latin American countries in technical special- courses offered to the 3 and 7 skill leveis to con- ties as required by the country concemed. form with this training concept. By July 1966 Through 1948 the commandant of the school a 5-level follow-on Career Development Course had been required to provide instruction in ac- had been translated into Spanish for each 3- cordance with directives from the Caribbean level specialtv taught at the school. This earlv The close rapport of students at the lnter-American Air Forces Academy and their instruc- tors has promoted much good will between the United States and the 13 Latin American countries that regularly send students there. USAF instructors at the academy conduct all classes in the native language of the students, Spanish or Portuguese, enhancing rapport.

target date was made possible by the combined of the academy to establish classification Sys- translation assistance of Ecuador, Colombia, tems and on-the-job training systems. The suc- Peru, Venezuela, Chile, Bolívia, and Spain. The cess of the Integrated Training Program ulti- Career Development Courses are to be studied matelv depends upon the Latin American air in-country while the student is receiving on-the- forces’ acceptance and adoption of a similar job training in a system very similar to the usaf classification system which groups related posi- Dual Channel ojt concept of training. tions into standard career fields and provides The Integrated Training Program is ac- for skill progression from the unskilled to the tually an approaeh toward an improved system supervisor-superintendent levei. of overall personnel management. It is involved The Integrated Training Program repre- with the procurement and screening of airmen, sents the first complete training assistance plan classification, training, assignment, career skill made available to the Latin American air forces. progression. promotion. and career guidance. It is completely adaptable to any air force in If the Integrated Training Program is ac- the hemisphere, regardless of size. cepted by the Latin American air forces, U.S. A disinterested observer might ask why the Air Forces Southern Command will provide the different Latin American nations should adopt translated Career Development Courses, Job a standard training plan when. as independent. Training Standards. Specialty Knowledge sovereign American nations, thev should no Tests, and Enlistment Screening Tests ( Airman more be expected to do so than should, say, Qualifving Examination), and will offer assist- Rússia, France, and England as independent, ance from mobile training teams ( mt t ’s ) or sovereign European nations. There are reasons: other advisorv Services from witliin the facilities first. the Latin American nations, with the ex- ceptiori of Haiti and Brazil, all speak a common After completion of instruction students will retum language; sec-ond, all have a common cultura] to their countries ably trained to perform the main- herítage; third, all are what might be called tenance vital to their air force’s mission. At the “developing nations” and require some organi- present time students are enrolled in more than zational and material assistance; and finally, ticenty different technical training courses at Álbrook. most equipment and training assistance come from the United States. These four factors make an integrated training plan logical and feasible, and there is reason to hope and believe that it will be adopted b> the Latin American nations. preters of two or more eultures in addition to performing their normal duties. faculty student body Manning for the Inter-American Air Forces Academv includes 11 officer, 112 enlisted, and To date, well over 7000 students from all 4S civilian positions. All the instructors are the countries of Latin America and from Spain bilingual, and all technical instruction is offered have been graduated from the school. Instruc- by usaf enlisted personnel. Some of the civil- tion has been offered in French and Portuguese ians are emploved both as English teachers and as well as in Spanish. In the fali of 1966 the class translators. All personnel at the academv are consisted of 1 Argentinian, 34 Bolivians, 51 keenlv aware of the unique importance of their Brazilians, 62 Chileans, 35 Colombians, 59 positions as receivers, transmitters, and inter- Ecuadorians. 7 Mexicans, 7 Nicaraguans, 23 20 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Panamanians, 1 Paraguavan, 39 Peruvians, 8 here culturally, even though the climate is quite Uruguayans, and 23 from the Dominican different from that to which they are accus- Republic. tomed. Our reasons for giving technical training the future of the school in the student s own language go beyond simplv making the leaming situation easier, although It is anticipated that with the realignment it does that, of course. The strongest reason for of courses to implement the new usaf training teaching in the students language is that the concept for Latin America, greater use will be material learned will be more meaningful with- made of the school. The class which began in in the students own cultural framework or Julv 1966, for instance, was 20 percent larger perception of realitv. Scholars of language and than the preceding class and included the fírst culture are generally in agreement that what a group of Brazilian students since 1956. Much of person understands as the “real world” is to a this increase in enrollment is due to the inclu- large extent built upon the language pattems sion of the following categories of students: (1) of his society and that no two languages are Aspirantes or soldados alumnos who have had similar enough to be considered as representing approximately two years of militarv experience, the same social realitv. In a very real sense, the normallv as students in the host countrv pre- worlds in which different societies live are dif- paratory school, and who have a limited practi- ferent worlds, not just the same world with cal background in their technical field. (2) The different names attaehed to things and ideas. basic airman who has received little or no in- The Latin American student at the academv country schooling, who has approximately one assimilates his technical education in terms of year of militarv experience, and who has a very the realities of his “world,” and for that reason limited knowledge of his technical field gained its value is multiplied many times. through praetical on-the-job performance. Finallv, the benefits accruing to the United Theschools3-levelcourses are designed to States in terms of mutual understanding and accommodate these two groups of students, good will, resulting in the strengthening of taking them from the helper levei of proficiency hemispheric solidarity, should not be under- to the semiskilled (3) levei and perhaps a little estimated. The use of a common language beyond and providing the graduate with the among differing groups serves as an especiallv fundamental skills and knowledges to perform powerful symbol of the social solidarity of those on the job. The immediate response from the who speak that language despite differences Latin American countries to this first step of of nationalitv. A moments reflection on the the Integrated Training Program indicates that feeling of kinship between North Americans with full implementation will come a greatly and other English-speaking peoples will show increased participation in our mutual effort to the preceding statement to be valid. Conse- achieve a better life for the American people. quently, when the U.S. Air Force instructor We believe that numerous and far-reach- lectures, discusses, converses, jokes, and sings ing benefits to the Latin American air forces, in Spanish with his students, he is forging a and eonsequently to the United States of Amer- bond with his fellow Americans possibly ica, derive from a school of this sort strategi- stronger, more real, and longer lasting than the cally located in the Canal Zone. The Inter- most solemn official political treaty. The Inter- American Air Forces Academv provides con- American Air Forces Academv recognizes these crete evidence of our interest in Latin Amer- contributions to the social, political, and mili- ica, and its location within a Latin American tarv solidarity of the Western Hemisphere as nation, Panama, adds to the evidence: Students serving our enlightened self-interest by help- from all the countries of tropical America feel ing to forge a world in which freedom and at home here, in a geographical sense. Those democracy can flourish. from both the temperate zone of South Amer- ica and the mountain countries feel at home Hq United States Air Forces Southern Comrnand NE of the major efforts of the U.S. Air PREVENTIVE Forces Southern Command is to en- MEDICINE O courage Latin American air forces to adopt aggressive civic-action programs and so identify themselves. with projects designed to CIVIC ACTION accomplish social and economic improvement. The Basic requirement of each project under- TRAINING taken is that it be in the countrvs interest and PROGRAM direetly beneficiai to the local populace. During 1963, as one step toxvard achieving a broader image of the military, United States A Changing Image for Air Forces Southern Command (usafso) estab- -atin A m e r ic a n A ir F o rc e s lished a Preventive Medicine Civic Action Training Program for Latin American air forces. The goal of the program is to train and Major Mathevv T. Dunn and equip Latin American air forces to provide Major James B. Jones preventive-medicine Services to remote and A Honduran Air Force C-47 Gooney Bird offloads personnel and supplies for a preventive-medicine field trip. The team of USAF personnel and preventive-medicine students was joined by a Honduran Air Force flight surgeon, dentist, and tico Honduran graduates of the preventive-medicine course. . . . All availahle transportation assists Preventive Medicine Civic Action teams in moving medicai supplies from airstrip to village. The carreta or oxeart maij be the onlij transportation available. normally inaecessible areas, primarily through can air forces, then developed a five-phase the use of airbome medicai teams. plan in which the usaf would provide training, From routine preventive-medicine and medicai supplies, and equipment to those sanitation surveys conducted by the command countries willing to participate. The program in those Latin American countries where U.S. gradually increases the extent of the host Air Force personnel have been stationed, it be- country’s capability to undertake medicai civic- came apparent that there is an urgent need to action projects. It was intended that the goal provide basic medicai Services to indigenous of each countrv would be to develop its own populations. This was substantiated further by medical-specialist training program and form information and statisties obtained from nutri- additional preventive-medicine teams. tion and health surveys on the area published Basically, the program is to train five-man by the Department of Defense' and from other teams composed of two preventive-medicine pertinent documents relative to health condi- veterinary technicians, two medicai Service tions in Latin America. technicians, and one medicai laboratory tech- This research indicated that Latin Ameri- nician for six months at the Inter-American Air can air forces, by providing properly trained Forces Academy (formerly usaf School for and equipped preventive-medicine teams, Latin America), Albrook Air Force Base, Canal could do much to reduce the high sickness and Zone. Upon completion of training, the teams fatality rates in remote areas of their countries. return to their respective countries and through The air forces woulcl then be identified as hav- the Military Assistance Program are provided ing a humanitarian interest in the local popu- medicai equipment, supplies, and an aircraft lace and would gain support in their effort to for transportation. With the addition of a host counter Communist insurgency and unrest. country phvsician, a team has the capability to function as a small dispensary, to provide basic medicai care (including air evacuation, five-phase plan if necessary), and instruetion in preventive- Headquarters U.S. Air Forces Southern medicine techniques. Command, in cooperation vvith Latin Ameri- In the first phase, these five-man teams During a preventive-medicine field trip to Chimán, Panama, a U.S. Air Force doctor revived this seven-month-old child suffering from advanced stages of pneumonia. The doctor toas assisted hy a USAF medicai Service technician instructor of the preventive-medicine program, as the anxious mother looked on. No doctor had visited the village in months. are trained and then issued a medicai equip- of first aid and disease prevention. As an im- ment and supply package. Included in the petus for learning first aid, team commanders package are drugs, Chemicals, biologicals, sur- will issue first-aid kits to the villages visited gical supplies, dressings, laboratorv equipment during the expanding program. and supplies. some air evacuation equipment, In progressive phases, eountries partici- and tents and sleeping bags for team members pating in the Preventive Medicine Civic Action to use while working in remote areas. Training Program are provided U-I7A aircraft. In the second phase, medicai Service spe- This light plane was selected because of its cialists are trained in the techniques of first-aid adaptability to a variety of missions and be- instruction and sent back to their respective cause it permits easy operation in and out of eountries with first-aid training kits. Thev, short, rough landing strips. along with other air force medicai technicians, From light aircraft mobility, the program can then travei to villages of the interior or to expands to include aC-47 flving dispensary with isolated communities and teach a nucleus of field equipment, supplies, and air evacuation personnel in each community the fundamentais potential, including a generator set, an X-ray, Public Health Instruction A Bolivian Air Force medicai teclmician lectures Ecuadorian villagers (above) on proper preventive- medicine and sanitation procedures. . . . Ecuador- ian and Bolivian airmen instruct the people of a remote Ecuadorian village in how and where to build latrines to prevent well and stream contamination.

dental equipment, and other supplies neces- and as a counter against Communist-inspired sary for the operation of a mobile dispensary. unrest. The plan was submitted to Headquarters U.S. Air Forces Southern Command, where it on-the-job training program was approved and forwarded to Hq usaf, the The plan was presented to U.S. military Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs commanders in the area and at the Conference of Staff. dod gave the necessary approval for for Latin American Air Force Medicai Chiefs implementation and provided the initial fund- held in March 1963 at Albrook. It caught the ing of $250,000. Overall costs of the program imagination of Latin American air force offi- are funded by the U.S. Military Assistance cials as a vital cold war weapon of potent force Program. in fostering democratic ideais and principies Public relations aspects of the program PREVENTIVE MEDICINE CIVIC ACTION TRAINING 25

called for building upon fundamental atti- far can be measured by what has been accom- tudes, especially the Latin American air force plished since it was implemented. medicai chiefs’ natural attitude toward medi- cine and their desire to increase medicai assist- the start ance throughout their countries. Their response resulted in overwhelming support of this pro- In July 1963 the first increment of air force gram that promised to add trained medicai personnel from nine Latin American countries technicians to their resources. was enrolled at Albrook afb in the Preventive The chiefs of the Latin American air forces Medicine Training Program. Enrolled in the saw in the program an opportunity to enhance first six-month course, conducted entirely in the role of their air forces, to win friends and Spanish by usaf instructors, were 40 trainees support in counterinsurgency activities, and at from Bolívia, Paraguay, Venezuela, Nicaragua, the same time to gain prestige and recognition Dominican Republic, Honduras, Guatemala, for their air forces. These air forces had every- Ecuador, and Panama. These students were thing to gain, since both they and the people definitely a cut above the average, and they would benefit from the program. displayed great zeal, interest, and aptitude for But what of the people in remote areas the preventive-medicine curriculum. Six addi- singled out to receive this aid? How would they tional classes have since been conducted for react? 140 more students. The program was designed as a “we-help- you-to-help-vourselves” project, in which the field trips entire community participates in a combined group effort. In-village demonstrations and As part of their training and after com- assistance point out new facts, knowledge, and pleting five months of classroom instruction, ultimate rewards not previously experienced the students, accompanied by usaf medicai by these people. and Latin American air force personnel, have Working from the premise that maximum made field trips to Chimán, Chica, and the benefit and progress are achieved when people Perlas Islands in Panama, to Ecuador, Bolivia, work together as a group, we saw the program Paraguay, Honduras, and Guatemala. Addi- accepted and highlv praised. Although it is too tional countries visited during 1966 included soon to measure the full impact of the long- El Salvador and Colombia. The trips take the range five-vear plan, the program’s success so students into remote, almost inaccessible areas

U.S. Air Force personnel, Latin Ameri- can air forces students, a member of the Panamanian Guardia Nacional, and villagers join to aid and carry an injured Citizen to an airstrip for evac- uation to a Panama City hospital. 26 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW where they face real-life situations and condi- In Guatemala, the results of air force tions like those they will encounter when work- efforts have been quite gratifying. Chahal, a ing in their home countries. VVithout exception, remote settlement that can be reached onlv the students performed better than anticipated. by air or by days of travei overland, is typi- Before a team was airlifted into its desig- cal of the program’s acceptance. Visits of the nated operational area, a U-10 Air Commando preventive-medicine team are practically the aircraft dropped pamphlets announcing the onlv contact the village of 1200 population has intended visit and made a follow-up flight with the govemment. On a recent medicai broadcasting by loudspeaker in Spanish that visit, when the Guatemala Air Force C-47 with the medicai team would arrive. the air force chief of staff on board landed on In Ecuador, the group, including thir- the rough airstrip, the entire village was on teen students, was divided into three separate hand, a welcome banner held high. Following teams, which were airlifted by helicopter over sick call, attended by hundreds, the air force the dense jungle to the villages of Grama chief talked to the villagers and pledged that Natal, Villanueva, and Santa Rosa, all located the program would be continued on a perma- on banks of rivers that empty into the Rio nent basis. Guayas, the main waterway leading to Guaya- quil. The three-day operation, in which more than 1000 patients received medicai care, was home countrij operations an outstanding success. Doctors and students The third and fourth phases of the plan were unstinting in their aid to the villagers, have already been implemented in several who carne en masse for assistance. An Albrook countries. Bolivia, Ecuador, Honduras, Costa flight surgeon and his team kept clinic hours Rica, and Paraguay have obtained U-17A air- in dirt-floored huts from sunrise to sunset. On craft; the Dominican Republic, Chile, Argen- the last dav there were still so many patients tina, and Peru each has a C-47 for use in waiting for care that the team worked without their preventive-medicine programs. The air- rest until 0400 hours. The other two teams— craft were provided by the usaf, at the coun- one headed by a Paraguayan doetor and the try’s request, through the Military Assistance other by an Eeuadorian doetor—had similar Program. experiences. Accompanying one of the teams Paraguai/. The first report from retumed was a usafso dentist, who, after extracting students carne from Paraguay. There, under 140 teeth, was unable to continue because of the capable direction of Paraguayan Air Force a swollen hand. A student technician relieved Dr. Heriberto Zarate, who was one of the him and perfonned extractions on the remain- on-the-job training students at Gorgas Hos- ing 25 patients. pital, C.Z., Paraguayan Air Force preventive- The report of this Eeuadorian exercise medicine teams have put their training and cited lack of preventive-medicine and sanitary knowledge to work through several highly suc- procedures as a major cause of epidemic para- cessful trips to the interior of the countrv. The sitosis, tuberculosis, malaria, dysentery, and Paraguayan Air Force has also been active in various gastrointestinal disorders. The pri- flving doctors and medicai supplies on humani- mary purpose of the trip was to impress on the tarian missions to otherwise inaccessible areas. people the need to undertake preventive- This country has also designated a military medicine programs on a self-help basis. This doetor as Chief of Preventive Medicine Civic purpose was achieved. The fielcl trip to Chimán, in the interior Actions. of Panama, was similarly successful. During Dominican Republic. Reports indicate the visit, 439 patients received care. One of that the first Dominican Republic graduates these was a baby suffering from pneumonia, of the Albrook afb course are activelv engaged who is alive today because of treatment pro- in preventive-medicine activities. In addition, vided by a team doetor. the medically rigged C-47 was a vital asset during Hurricane Flora. providing medicai A U.S. Air Force instructor explains the internai aid and air evacuation íor the storm victims. workings of the human bodij to a Nicaraguan pre- As an adjunct to the preventive-medicine civic- ventive-medicine student. The preventive-medicine action effort, the Dominican Republic Air program includes six months of classroom training Force has undertaken a project to build dis- and field trips to isolated areas of Latin America. pensaries in towns and villages for use in these activities. Bolívia. Bolívia has utílized the training and personriel to excellent advantage. Four teehnicians have been assigned to Santa Ana the interior regions of that country to treat less de Huachi to work with a public health doctor. fortunate countrymen. In addition to using the A dispensary is under construction at this loca- U-17A, the Ecuadorian Air Force has obtained tion. Four techniciam have been assigned to helicopters to assist in transporting teehnicians Yrilla Montes and are working with the inhabi- to remote areas and evacuating patients. tants there without assistance from a doctor. Guatemala. The Cuatemalan Air Force Other teehnicians have been dispatched to has been actively engaged in preventive-medi- Tarija to work with public health doctors com- cine eivic-action programs. Its efforts have bating a poüo epidemic. Two teehnicians were been so well received by the people that addi- retained at the Preventive Medicine Sehool at tional programs have developed from initial Albrook afb to traiu as instruetors, and they preventive-medicine visits. These include the will ultimatelv retuni to their country and in- building of schools and providing a school struet other Bolivian Air Force personnel in lunch program for ehildren. The Guatemalans preventive-medicine techniques. refer to these medicai team visits as jornadas de Ecuador. LTpon the retum of its trainees, medicina (joumeys of medicine). Ecuador took irnmediate action antl has had Colombia. During 1964, eight field trips to several preventive-medicine expeditions into the interior were made. More than 6(KK) people These are only a few examples of how air forces of Latin American countries are partici- pating in civic-action programs, including pre- ventive-medicine projects, to assist in economic and social development.

a look to the future In villages of Ecuador, Honduras, and Panama the inhabitants, using the democratic process, have elected special medicai commit- tees to head up continuing preventive-medicine programs. As the teams were departing Ecuador, one peasant woman, whose hard life had given her little education yet manv insights into her people, summed up the impact of the three-day After a busy datj of treating patients, team members trip to the Eeuadorian interior as she thankfully of a group of preventive-medicine specialists cata- shook the hand of a usaf medicai instructor and log laboratory samples taken at a Panama village. said, “Senor, the people are crying. The medi- cine is gone and, worst of all, you are leaving.’! During the field trip to the interior of received medicai care. Four military medicai Ecuador, the preventive-medicine teams were personnel are permanently assigned to preven- flown to their base of operation in usaf Air tive-medicine activities. Commandos flown by Eeuadorian Air Force Costa Rica. The air section of the Costa pilots. Following the completion of airlift of Rican Guardia Civil is using U-17A aircraft personnel and supplies, one of these pilots, Lt. in medicai civic-action missions. The Guardia Enrique Lavanan, said, “I feel a bit tired, going also uses eight mobile sanitary units that travei in and out of these areas so manv times. But the to outlying areas and provide medicai treat- folks in the villages really appreciate our efforts, ment, X-rav facilities, sanitation inspection, and and that good feeling makes the whole project immunizations. worthwhile.” ( The Eeuadorian pilots spoke ex- Honduras. In addition to flying preventive- cellent English, thanks in part to their flight medicine teams to remote areas on a continu- training in the United States.) ing basis, the Honduran Air Force is training A schoolbov in the village of Villanueva, military personnel in nursing techniques and gleaming with enthusiasm, summed up the vil- fumishing veterinary technicians to villagers lage response as he said to one of the U.S. Air to assist in raising poultrv and livestock. The Force instruetors, “Senor, todo esto es tan in- air force uses U-17A, L-13A, and C-47 aircraft. teresante. Nunca habiamos sentido tan entusi- Since the program was initiated in Honduras, asmo en nuestras vidas. Esto es mejor que echar more than 480 flights have been made and una fiesta.” (Sir, it is so interesting. We have 60,000 people treated. never known such excitement in our lives. It s Uruguay. The air force has established better than a fiesta.) Sênior Master Sergeant Amold May, for- medicai and dental dispensaries in the interior merlv noncommissioned officer in charge of the areas to provide Services to the civilian popula- Preventive Medicine Program and a member tion. Approximately 15 preventive-medicine of one of the medicai teams, saw the trip from fíeld trips are scheduled per year, using light aircraft and helicopters. The air force has also another point of view: been activelv involved in insect-spraying mis- The technician students, the Paraguayan Air sions. Force doctor, and I were relative strangers to PREVENTIVE MEDICINE CIVIC ACTION TRAININC 29

these people at first, but in only a fevv hours Colombia was continually harassed by a \ve got to know each other and the people. serious bandit problem. After initiating a sound We’re men from three widely separated coun- civic-action program, including preventive tries, getting preventive-medicine civic actions medicine, the military obtained the cooperation into a fourth country \ve had never seen before, of the people and was able to reduce the vet \ve were a team. We did not think of nation- banditry to a controllable levei. alities nor countries, only that we were a team working together to help people who have one In Guatemala, the air force found that foot in the 1960’s and one foot in the past. direct benefits to the people in the form of preventive-medicine functions have resulted in an obvious change of attitude toward the mili- T hat the usafso Preventive Medicine Civic tary. Concentrations of insurgents in remote Action Training Program has achieved out- areas are diminishing rapidly. standing success is evidenced bv the Latin Years ago, Headquarters usae forwarded American air forces’ acceptance of it. The pro- copies of the program plan to Air Force com- gram has provided the needed impetus. Its fu- manders in the Pacific and European areas for ture is unlimited. their consideration and possible adoption. The Civic actions are doing much to allay the cover letter cited the program as “ . . . an out- campesinos’ fear of the military. The preven- standing example of an imaginative and con- tive-medicine part of the program has proven struetive military civic action program . . . to be a vital tool. [which] emplovs the unique characteristics of In Honduras, a high-ranking air force offi- air power to satisfy a real need of an under- cial stated: developed area.” The attitude of the people has always been The goal of broadening the image of U.S. very cold toward the military. Although we and Latin American air forces to include public have been trying to get into these areas for Service will be more easily reached because of some time, the Preventive Medicine Civic this program. It is an outstanding example of Action Program gave us our first real oppor- community/public relations effort being put tunity. The villages have long been a breeding forth to maximum advantage. For the minimal ground for Castro trainee infiltrators. Prior to cost involved, few other projects could accom- our medicai visits the people were harboring plish more for more people. and protecting the bandits; now they are tum- ing them in. At last the people have confidence Hq U.S. Air Forces Southern Command in us.

Notes in the Américas 1957-1960, prepared for the XVI Pan American 1. Nutrition Survey Reports by the Interdepartmental Sanitary Conference, Scientific Publications No. 64, July 1962, Committee on Nutrition for National Defense, Deputy Assistant Pan American Health Organization, Pan American Sanitary Secretary of Defense for Health and Medicai. Bureau, Regional Office of the World Health Organization, 2. Summary of Four-Year Reports on Health Conditions Washington, D.C. OF CONFLICT X oh ma x Piua :oda T HAS been said that the most important These attitudes, these judgments, and these ac- single judgment a political or militarv tions strongly influence, if not govem, not only I leader can make is to forecast correctly the choices of aims and objectives but also the the nature of the war upon which the nation is methods and means used to achieve them. to embark, for all else depends on it. One sub- scribing to the spectrum view of conflict and accepting the intrinsic interconnection of TTie Spectrum of Conflict events in time is led to rephrase this observa- tion. Since tomorrows activities are intimately VVe accept here the spectrum concept of eonnected with, and in fact are more or less a conflict or interaction States, a relativistic view consequence of todays, and todays of vester- of intemational relations and, as well, of human davs, the most important judgment is to assay aftairs. This is to say that, given a sizable num- correctly the nature of the conflict—yesterdays ber and variety of interaction States arranged and todays. If dangerous and destructive con- in hierarchical order of relative strength, po- flicts are ever to be avoided or their most dam- tency, and/or intensity, the whole takes on the aging effects moderated on other than a ran- appearance of a spectrum. The larger and more dom basis, it can onlv be after better under- varied the assemblage, the more nearly it ap- standing has been achieved. Further, this proximates a spectrum. We call this the con- understanding must be repeatable and widely flict spectrum. Given a suitable representation diffused; “repeatable” means that second, third, of interaction States, the totality, albeit simpli- and fourth observers perceiving the circum- fied and imperfect, is a relativistic portrait or stances must be led to approximatelv the same mirror image of realitv—a realitv containing an judgments. infinity of forms and gradations of States. The world has been and remains in a kind Figure 1 illustrates this conflict spectrum of ferment. Widening political consciousness— in terms of what we here call intemational in- the idea that the future need not be a repeat teraction States.0 The potential usefulness of of the past—fueled by the advance and spread this spectrum rests on the premise that its im- of education and remarkable mass Communica- precision is outweighed by the added insight tions technologies, assures that the ferment will obtained from observations which otherwise grow and change and spread. This ferment, seem heterogeneous and often only obscurely showing up in numerous and varied low-scale related if not contradictory. By comparison conflicts around the world, presents opportuni- with its predecessor in a previous article on the ties and dangers. They are dangerous, for while subject,1 this arrav of conflict states incor- shrinking from direct nuclear confrontation, porates numerous, though relatively minor, the great powers are likelv to feel obliged, changes, primarilv in the interest of clarity and when certain of their interests are deemed in- concision. The word “conflict” replaces “war volved, to send arms or advisers or otherwise in the title for two reasons: first, war and peace commit themselves, and the local low-scale ac- activities are easier to define in the abstract tion Ls in danger of escalating to the confronta- than in practical affairs. This fact, plus their tion that neither great power wants. juxtaposed interactions (often extremely com- Those of us who do not accept the idea of plex and subtle), argues the probable futility of “laws of history” must accept that it is also not attempting clean separations. Second, it seems foreordained that our own democratic form of preferable to use the term “conflict” because of society will continue relatively unscathed or the strong emotive connotations associated with even survive this worldwide ferment. Our hope •Familiarity and convenience notwithstanding, it is easy to and indeed our responsibility lie in striving to read too much from the adjective “intemational,” for it is not understand the nature and cireumstances of at all clear that sharp distinctions can be drawn between intra- national and intemational conflict. If ever there was a sharp line these conflicts, for our attitudes and all our sub- hetween them, it is excecdingly fuzzy today. It is hard, for example, to conceive of intranational conflict or civil war in the sequent judgments and actions to a great ex- present-day world without intemational reverberations, espe- cially if such conflict continued for a long time without inter- tent follow therefrom, as the night the day. vention taking place in one form or another. The Conflict Spectrum

„*35 l*!I mi iiisS«£õ

Figure 1. Conflict spectrum. International interaction States (in hierarchical order of intensity, potency)

“war.” VVar, surely, is too serious a matter to be plies precision observations, which, if they are viewed through lenses that vary according to not objectively achievable, means that the the individual and his prejudices. The stakes scale may be deceptive, possibly dangerously are too high, the possible consequences too distorting. A smaller number of gradations fateful. means greater differences between them, dif- ferences which are more easily perceived and consequently likely to be repeatable.® Until index scale more accurate measuring techniques come to To recognize the need for some index or hand, it seems wise to hold to something like yardstick of conflict is one thing; to achieve it our smaller number of scale wavelengths. One is something else. What characteristics of the further point: Absolute scale positions are not conflict states are vve to use? Hovv detailed and inferable from this index. Thus, for example, discriminating should the scale gradations the fourth wavelength position from the left be? Figure 1 is our answer. To help clarify is not to be interpreted as twice as far as the and define the scale positions, each is de- second or halfway to the eighth position. As- scribed twice: once conceptually or in what signment of absolute scale values or magni- might be called theoretical fashion, and then tudes to the intervening scale segments would pragmatically, by historical example, in terms be most useful but cannot now be supported. of experience. Thus, reading across the scale from left to right, each spectrum “wavelength” symptoms and causes is described by both the lower and the upper texts for that scale position. (The numbers 1 The interaction states shown on Figure ]| to 13 are merely a visual aid for later reference.) are in the nature of symptoms, not causes-1 The question of how fine the scale grada- that is to say, they represent the consequences tions should be ( how numerous the wave- Quite in contrast to causes, conflict symptom: | lengths) is related to the representativeness of are usually overt and visible and hence mori j

the arrayed states and, of course, to the repeat- “Repeatable, in contrast to subjective or single sense obsei j ability of the observation. A finely gradated vations, means confirmable; that is, relations between two o I more sense impressions, particularly statements of equality, ca j scale has the advantages of specificity but im- be confirmed by different observers. THE SPECTRUX1 CONSTRUCT OF CONFLICT 33

likely to satisfy the repeatability requirement. and in a different way, a national identity or It is important to be quite elear on war workable consensus on basic principies has and peace and on their causes and symptoms. evolved in the U.S.A. We define peace as the free exercise of activi- Where there is no general consensus or ties in accordance with basic principies that where the area of basic agreement is exceed- are generally and freely acquiesced in. Since ingly small, there is no peace; and where peace what fundamental principies are acceptable is is not, there is war. A relationship wherein a subjective judgment and therefore can range men or groups of men refrain from activities vvidely among individuais, a workable consen- otherwise deemed legitimate (in accordance sus is most likely to exist, if at all, where there with fundamental principies freely and gener- is a widespread sharing of determinant reli- ally acquiesced in) is therefore not a peaceful gious and/or ethical principies. To the degree one. No matter the action or inaction, the pres- that members of a society do not share these ence or absence of violence, the state is that fundamental principies, tensions and antago- of war. The presence of violence is a mere nisms will be present, and peace will be a less technicality, an accidental occurrence or a attainable state. Without this prerequisite con- judgment of the moment as to the most per- dition of fundamental principies freely and suasive means for resolving the dispute. generally acquiesced in, self-determination The habit of taking political stability for and majority rule are unworkable; majority granted, although possibly justifiable in well- rule may be merely legalized subjection. In established societies, may give rise to the idea countries where signifícant fractions of the that such a discussion as this is something ab- population hold dissimilar and strongly op- stract, something which has little immediate posed beliefs, svmptomatized by lack of basic relevance to present-day affairs. Such an idea trust or confidence in each other—the Greeks is dangerous. The existence of underlying dif- and Turks in Cyprus; Mohammedans and Hin- ferences between men or groups of men with dus in British índia; Moslems and Christians respect to acceptable basic principies shows up in the Sudan; montagnards and lowlanders, as civil unrest, insurgency, wars of national Buddhists and CathoUcs in Vietnam—unless liberation, revolutions, etc. Just what are these this lack of agreement and trust is eliminated differences? What do they mean? How best to or moderated, there will be continuing strife cope with them and the resultant symptoms and disintegration, leading finally to (1) po- necessitates clearer understanding of the un- litical fragmentation, (2) some form of legal- derlying forces, the causes, and the processes. ized bondage, or (3) rule by outsiders in whom For these low-scale conflicts around the world the differing groups have a measure of confi- are dangerous in that they tend to refuse to dence. stay local and low scale. The U.S.A. exemplifies the fact that heter- Conflict symptoms are usually overt and ogeneous peoples can live side by side and, visible and, consequently, likely to be “repeat- so far as national politics ( working consensus) able.” They are expressions of attitudes, ex- is concemed, in fruitful unity. But, as Sir pressed grievances, actions themselves.-1 They Arthur Bryant suggests,2 this relatively fruitful may be concrete and specific, as a U-2 over- unity in the U.S.A. is not so much because the flying the U.S.S.R., the blockade of Berlin, people have gotten used to one another and long-range missiles in Cuba; or abstract and their differences as because, living in a new ambiguous: “our national honor,” “freedom land without visible reminders of ancient racial and democracy,” “the victory of socialism.” or national differences, rivalries, and antago- Conflict causes, on the other hand, run far nisms, they have made a new start emotionally deeper, since they have to do with fundamental and psychologically as well and feel themselves outlooks and attitudes, with ethical and/or to be Americans, rather than Anglo-Saxons, or religious principies. It has been argued that Irish, or Germans, Italians, Scots, Slavs, Celts, conflict causes are not usually overtly ex- or Scandinavians. Thus for different reasons pressed.4 This may be because such expression 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW is compromising. For example, it has been of the causes does guide if not govem the suggested that Indonesian aggression against choice of objectives, the choice of means, and Malaysia was largelv to divert attention from hence to a significant degree the shape of the Indonésia s ovvn grave internai problems. It is postwar world. Certainly differing opinions likely that the real Soviet concem at the time regarding U.S. participation in Vietnam reflect, of the 1939-40 VVinter War was far more with among other things, differing views of the basic the strategic situation vis-à-vis Nazi Germany causes of that unhappy conflict. than it was with the unfriendliness or hostile This conflict spectrum, made up as it is actions of the Finns on their common border. of symptoms, has certain utility and certain Then perhaps even the protagonists—either or limitations. Its limitations stem at least in part both—may not be aware of the causes. For ex- from the fact that symptoms are not causes, ample, it is argued by some that man’s innately so care must be taken not to press these data aggressive drives bias him toward war.'1 If so, too hard. Its utility derives from the power the argument continues, the problem of avoid- of order and perspective, the power of “repeat- ing war is one of sublimation. Art, play, and able” observations. In the following sections work are recommended outlets for the aggres- we proceed with applications of this spectrum sive urges—the idea of “a moral equivalent of scale, striving to remain within these general war." It has been suggested that World War I constraints and resting on the hope, in the was far more a struggle for world markets than longer view, that the method outlined will be for self-determination and democracy. Alex- helpful for further and deeper investigation ander Kerensky, in a recently published book into causes. devoted to that historical event, asserts that World War I was basically a struggle for world domination.'1 Whatever the precise reason—if Conflict Action-Limit ever there is but one—truly the causes of con- Lines flict run deep. The fact that some basic differences are The spectrum view of interaction States never settled, that some fade away unsolved (conflict actions) between nations, as pre- or are revived at a later time to be fought over sented in my previous article, shows that the again and again, supports the view that the most intense or highest on the scale—accord- causes of conflict are deep-running and are ing to its hierarchically ordered array—of the affected by many influences in many wavs. All concurrent actions in a given region can be this is to say that our limited Vision and under- represented by an action-limit line that is con- standing and the intractability and apparent tinuous with respect to time. To this concept permanence of certain differences are not war- of conflict and the action-limit line we gave rant for resignation and despair. To point out geometrical form, utilizing conflict data from that Figure 1 is made up of conflict symptoms more than a centurv of the eventful history of and emphasize the distinction between causes the China region. We develop the concept fur- and symptoms has for some an air of abstrac- ther here. tion and digression when clear and present Some prèfatory observations must be dangers call for direct action. The long and made. First, it is important to keep in mind tragic record of human conflict at least sug- that the word “line" in “action-limit line” is in gests that such a view and the failure to look no way as divisive and sharply delineating as to the deeper causes assure continuation of the term might suggest. “Band might have that record. In both world wars, for example, been a better choice, since it has in it the idea many held the view that the eruptions were of width and this width connotes something caused by certain men, rulers, or ruling groups of the imprecision of the data, that is to say, whose elimination would lead to a bright and the uncertainties both in observation and in peaceful world. The point is that one’s view recording. “Line” is therefore a simplification THE SPECTRUM CONSTRUCT OF CONFLICT 35

onlv partially offset by the qualifying words loss in great-area representation; so in seeking in “action-Iimit line" implying a bound in one a least-losses approaeh, we resort to a dualistic direction. A second point to keep in mind has presentation: using action-Iimit lines by eoun- to do with the-great number and variety and trv, then superposing them in combination. possible indirectness of the causes and also the svmptoms of conflict. Direct and indirect, the effects of certain forces are often far-reaching. action-Iimit lines Thus it would seem useful to broaden the action-Iimit lines area of representation to Figure 2 shows a group of action-Iimit decrease the chances of excluding at least the lines, each representing a country (with no significant forces. On the other hand, increas- attempt at relatedness in this grouping). By ing the area represented has a blurring and preparing each limit line on a separate trans- diluting effect on the signiíicance of the action- parency and identifying each according to, Iimit line. Some compromise seems called for. say, whether or not Communism plays a major The historical example (see the figure on role, they can be superposed for viewing in p. 53 of mv previous article) is based on data combinations. One could in this manner por- from the rec-ord of “the China region” and not tray action-Iimit lines for the Middle Eastem on the much more restricted (however de- countries (geographical grouping); action- fined) geographical bounds of “China.” The Iimit lines for a situation primarilv fomented vagueness of Chinese frontiers and the impor- and fueled by Communist forces (ideology- tance and even inseparability of causes and based grouping); and so on. Surely one errs in effects in that immense region argue for the viewing Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Laos, larger and more comprehensive representation. et al., as isolated scenes. It mav be that the Yet. as we have suggested earlier, there is also greater and graver signiíicance of the aetivi-

Figure 2. Conflict action-Iimit lines 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ties of these Southeast Asian countries lies is difficult. One has only to contemplate some more in what they portend or reflect of the of the indicators commonly used to describe relationships between major world powers operational situations—number of sorties and than of activities within the individual coun- missions flown, tonnage of bombs dropped, tries. It is quite likely, for example, that the number of artillery rounds fired, weapon ultimate directions and determinations there counts, kill counts, and so on—to appreciate are much more dependent now on agreement, their crudeness. One can but wonder at the tacit or otherwise, between the United States range of possible meanings that a mission might and China than upon individuais and events have, that kill counts might have, at the vital within any of those strife-ridden countries difference between effort and effect—between themselves.7 It should be noted that the omi- measures of effort expended and those of effect nousness of the 1962 Cuban incident stemmed achieved. But, willy-nilly, such measures are not from Cuba, the land, or the people but used and reported and do influence decisions, from what it implied of U.S.-U.S.S.R. interac- for actions do not wait; they are impatient. tions. Fidel Castro notwithstanding, it was the Bemard B. Fali comments briefly on the confrontation of the United States and the “now famous incident counts”—the use of de- Soviet Union that mitigated the situation. creasing incident counts as indexes of progress That the interaction States between world toward pacification or control of the popula- powers may be most clearly discemible in tion, observing that although decreasing inci- “third” countries probably reflects the fact that dent counts might mean increasing control, the the interests and influences of great powers, in- same relationship holds regardless of which of exorably perhaps, extend considerably beyond the contending sides achieves the increased the limits set by mere cartographic bounds. control/ The conventional military factors, he With certain exceptions—and doubtless there says, are meaningless in “counterinsurgency” are always exceptions—collisions between ma- actions, and in their stead he suggests what he jor powers are likely to be observed most fre- calls Fali Insurgency Nonmilitary Indicators quently and earliest far from their homelands. ( fini) to reflect events more accurately. Some- There is the added and advantageous consider- thing like this is called for, to delineate and ex- ation that, since these early and distant activi- press the encompassed conflict actions. Political ties, be they by proxy or otherwise, do not and military judgments are important and diffi- directly impact on or threaten an adversarys cult enough. Without a reasonably correct view “vitais," the practical effect is that of a certain of the nature of the ongoing conflict actions, “sea room,” valuable to big ships of State cours- they are precarious indeed. But as with so many ing the intemational political waters. ideas, the putting into practice is something else again, for “How is the cat to be belled; who is to do it?” Surely, however, appraising correctly the encompassed conflict actions past and present conflict states is a necessary The action-limit line presupposes the con- step to forecasting the future correctly. Stated current existence of many other, lower-intensity conversely, if we do not understand the past actions. Since the number, form, scale, and in- and present conflicts, we cannot hope to under- tensity of the encompassed conflict actions may stand those still ahead. Figure 3 suggests a range widely, a useful additional step in in- framework the use of which can help us un- creasing our knowledge is to describe the con- derstand the present and with which we can current lower wavelength activities. We can systematically move toward a view of the fu- describe the overall interaction States more ture. Action pattern profiles established at dif- definitively and usefully by indicating some- ferent times (T0, 7\, T ;, Tk) will be instructive thing of the scale and distribution of the en- in what they may reveal not only of the charac- compassed conflict wavelengths. But develop- ter of the encompassed actions but also of pos- ment of meaningful measures of conflict action sible trends. THE SPECTRUM CONSTRUCT OF CONFLICT 37

Information regarding the “background bandits are likely to be against the existing or- noise” levei (What is the normal State?) for a der, with perhaps the principal distinguishing particular countrv is also an important piece feature between them being the formers in- of the overall picture. It is well known that terest in and concem for popular support. This what may be widespread eruptions and a sign derives from the guerrillas’ basic aim: to con- of serious unrest in one countrv may be only a trol and/or constitute the govemment.u A grave rough presidential campaign in another. It is and potentially fatal complication in efforts to important therefore to establish this “back- cope with or adjust to challenges to existing ground noise” by magnitude scale and levei, govemments arises from both the diflBculty and and this, too, is illustrated on Figure 3. the necessity to know and distinguish between Conflict actions may evolve slowlv or rap- revolutionary movements, to recognize the ídly. They grow, change, and spread; some- existence of grays as well as blacks and whites, times toward obscurity and ultimate nothing- of pinks as well as reds. There is in the long ness; then again, gathering momentum and nm no really good substitute for distinguishing glowing redly with the sweep and power of quickly and accurately between banditry and an idea and Vision. Certainly in their earliest revolutionary guerrilla activities—and perceiv- stages, guerrilla activities possess many of the ing the essential character of the latter. Too eharacteristics of simple banditry—and in fact Uttle concem with need for perceptivity and may in reality be only that. Both guerrillas and misjudgments is likely to prove painful and

Figure 3. Encompassed conflicts. Country X record

"BACKGROUND NOISE" IIMITS. MAGNITUDE ANO IEVEL 38 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

costly; continued, it leads to disaster. Human the graphic presentation of the clash of con- history is a long record of vanished societies tending views—each contending that his view that have been unable or unsvilling to adjust to should prevail, one striving to impose his will or adequately cope with new conditions. on the other. Because the underlying differ- Finally, it is worth noting that given a ences have to do with what basic attitudes or suitable selection of action-limit lines—and pat- principies are freely and mutually acceptable, terns of encompassed actions—it may just be it follows that the end sought is political. Strat- possible that a way is opened toward quan- egy we envisage as the Science or art of achiev- titatively supportable statements with respect ing the political end, having to do with to types of conflicts—and hence needed means “orchestrating” means (tools and techniques) —and, possibly even, with respect to assigning of persuasion. But persuading another—modi- relative priorities for development and procure- fying his view—has to do with affecting his ment of future means. State of mind, his behavior. Because modifving state of mind and behavior has to do with psy- chology, it follows that there are and indeed Conflict and Means must be many ways by which pressure can be The hierarchically ordered array of inter- exerted to achieve the modiflcation. action States of the conflict spectrum is but Certainly much more needs to be done in

2 THE SPECTRUM CONSTRUCT OF CONFLICT 39 the wav of filling in the grid of Figure 4, but out, thereby enabling comparison of the respec- even so it illustrates relationships between tive merits of alternative choices. Each wave- means of persuasion and conflict actions, the length segment along the conflict spectrum former defined and divided according to means defines a type of interaction state—that is, a family and spectrum scale levei. Means are type of mission or “problem”—for which the grouped according to whether they are primar- indicated commensurate means are deemed ily political, economic, soeiological, force- appropriate. Prac-tically speaking, this says that supporting, or force-striking, reflecting the no- perfonnance of that type of mission is the tion that minds are changed and behavior primary criterion by which alternative possible influenced through pressing on any of a num- means are measured. The assumption of com- ber of different “nerves.” mensurateness is in part, perhaps, something Since each grid space is defined in tenns of a judgment, too. This is one side of the mat- of means family and characteristic conflict, ter. On the other some arguments, although analvses of relative worth are appropriate and indirect and general, can be made for reason- valid in dealing with the altematives competing ableness of the assumption. for allocations within a given space. Compara- The commensurateness-of-means point is tive appraisals of diflFerent but corresponding- succinctly illustrated in the story of the sledge- level means families are more hazardous inas- hammer and the fly. True, one hit from the much as each family efFects pressure in areas sledge would smash the insect; but wouldn’t and through channels that are not easily or the great disparity in speed and maneuvera- directly assessed. The means families are of bilitv render a hit doubtful, or, given a hit, course not uniquelv definable and separable, wouldn t the damage to the fumiture be too for the very idea of a spectrum connotes an in- liigh a price to pay for liquidation of the fly? finity of variants. But it helps to visualize, as- The question is two-pronged: whether the semble, and organize comprehensive lists and at means to be used can perform the task and the same time helps to acc-entuate the possible whether such perfonnance will result in an existence and availability of options. Strategic integrated plus when one weighs the pros and planning or “orchestration” is the science or art cons of the overall political objective. The lat- of selecting and utilizing various tools and tech- ter consideration has to do with the cost of niques of persuasion in light of a particular ends. Thus, for example, it may be open to problem confronted or anticipated. The two- question whether the defense of South Vietnam dimensional schematic provides a framevvork is very much advanced in the long view if the by which systematic inferences and insights mechanistic and relatively Wholesale efFects of into the nature of relationships between means highlv sophisticated United States means (tac- ( tools and techniques) of persuasion and con- tics and weapons) lead to fewer of the inhabi- flict actions can be achieved. tants’ wanting to be saved. It is thinking along It is at least implicit in the means-conflict these lines that lends a certain credence to the schematic that there must be a measure of cor- possibility that the great numbers of refugees respondence between means of persuasion and streaming from the eountryside to South Viet- the conflict State—between the conflict inter- nam’s cities may be motivated less by fear of action State and its underlving causes. The the Viet Cong or friendliness toward the gov- existence of this correspondence or commen- emment of South Vietnam (“voting with their surateness is something which probably cannot feet”) than by fear of mass destruction and im- be “proved” unambiguously in the sense of personal means of persuasion and their desire scientific" proof, since this presupposes Con- to escape them. But what a difference in inter- trols. However we might wish it otherwise, pretations! human behavior and the onward flow of events The effectiveness or useful span (on the cannot be halted, reversed. and rerun with conflict spectrum scale) of nuclear warheads is another set of tools and techniques of persua- another case in point. It may be, for example, sion to see how events would otherwise tum that nuclear-based striking forces are appli- 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW cable only to the far right end of the spectrum possibilities of “orchestration”; since persuasive scale, in or close to the general-war region. It pressure is cumulative, it follows that all means may on the other hand also be, as has been used contribute to the total. Pressure can be argued, that nuclear warheads have far wider increased by stepping to higher rungs (“escala- span application across the spectrum scale, tion”), by expanding sidewise to other means down-scale to include vvhat are variously called families commensurate with the conflict scale “local conflict,” “local war,” “limited war.”10 levei, and by exploiting hitherto unutilized But the efficacy and appropriateness of given means across the board in the lower-scale lev- means reflect not only the possessor’s appraisal eis. One must not forget that, though obscured but that of the antagonist as well. Thus the at times by spectacular and seemingly dramatic 1956 Egyptian strike to seize the Suez Canal events, persuasive pressures are by nature despite Britains possession of nuclear weapons cumulative. Stated otherwise, a series of low- and realization that the canal was deemed by scale actions may be just as effective, overall, the British of vital importance suggests a nar- as the single major action—and may in fact be rower effectiveness span for nuclear warheads considerably more difficult to combat. Bemard than the wide-span proponents might concede. Fali carne to the heart of the matter in dis- Similarly the Hungarians rebelled against the cussing lessons of Vietnam: “When a country U.S.S.R. despite its possession of nuclear weap- is being subverted it is not being outfought or ons. outgunned, but it is being out-administered— There is danger, in the event of great dis- particularly at the village grassroots, where it parity between the protagonists, that the su- counts.”'- Surely, the immense range and va- perior will think that his great power for de- riety of possible means leave much room for structiveness appears as formidable to his ene- imaginative thinking and orchestration—and my as it does to him. Consequently the superior the comprehensive integrated view of means is tempted to show off his superiority, to parade and conflict shown on Figure 4 presents a sys- his power; e.g., to smash patches of rain forest tematically ordered structure toward this end. to show that he can do it. There is the vague The great varietv, intrinsically, of means thought in all this that one increases pressure, for persuasion, the diverse, often subtle chan- perhaps doubling the overall persuasive pres- nels through which efíects are sometimes pro- sure toward attaining a political end, by dou- duced, the numerous, often complex interac- bling the force exerted; the belief that cam- tions which occur cry for—indeed demand of paigns can be decided. that law and order can the strategic planner—the larger and integrated be established, by force. Cranted that force view of the scene. It is easy to overlook the plavs an increasinglv important role, going up- point that the on-the-spot effect of a decision scale on the conflict spectrum has its reverse, and action may be of considerably less impor- going oppositelv—that is to say, strategy must tance than that achieved in the larger context. rest on increasing (relative) use of nonforce Consider for example the present U.S. B-52 means proceeding down-scale. As Malcolm bomber missions in Vietnam. Whatever the BrovvTie observes, “[we] have failed to grasp the operational aims and the destructive effects on fact that the really unconventional part of [the mountain passes and rain forest, the fact that Vietnam war] is that its major weapons are these aircraft were used may be considerably words. . . .”n more influential in political terms to Peking Fine judgment is still called for, since than to either Hanoi or Saigon. Use of B-52’s in planning strategies are supeqx>sed onto par- Vietnam, an appreciably lower-scale action than ticular problem situations, particular conflict that shown as “commensurate” on Figure 4, States. Figure 4 lists various means, bv families suggests the possibility that their originally con- and scale gradations, which seem appropriate templated and designed method for persuasion, and henee applieable to each conflict levei. force-striking, is not that in this instance but (This may also be useful as a means check-off rather is in the political/psychological family. sheet.) The comprehensive arrav illuminates the (The point is more clearly visible in the case THE SPECTRUXt CONSTRUCT OF CONFLICT 41 of the Soviet May Day parade, shown on on the conflict spectrum scale, for viewing Figure 4 in the sociological categorv.) research and development eíforts in a more Our choice of labeis in Figure 4, viz., orderly and perhaps at least partially integrated “force-striking” and “force-supporting,” war- fashion. The construct may help obtain clearer rants comment. It must be recognized that insight into an exceedingly vital and otherwise "military” can have very different meanings to seemingly so much more complex and discon- different people. The roles played by the mili- nected scene. tary and popular attitudes toward them are Figure 5 presents planned and pro- likely to var>r markedly according to whether grammed research and development projects one is in a reíatively well-established and stable in terms of mission and of estimated time for society or not. In the undeveloped and devel- achievement. Placement along the spectrum oping countries the armed forces are likely to scale of conflict implies a certain relationship be far more than military functionaries. They between project aims—capabilities and/or may be the largest if not the onlv organized and knowledge sought—and tvpe of conflict activi- reasonably cohesive group, constituting the ties feared and/or anticipated. Stated other- principal stabilizing influence and source of wise, it is the mission or conflict activity envi- national leadership. Since it is the onlv large, sioned that constitutes the raison (Têtre of the reíatively cohesive group, with members drawn sought-for capabilities. Placement along the widely from across the country, the peaceful time axis ought to be reasonably straightfor- purposes role of the armed forces ( nationvvide ward inasmuch as project planning involves at development) may be far and away their most least some references to estimated progress important.13 This is not to suggest that such rates. Association of project objectives with leadership is the wisest but rather that where particular segments of the conflict spectrum the competing groups are small and highlv scales activities is, of course, a considerably fragmented, each jealous and convinced of its less straightforward and precise determination. own superiority, there is grave, perhaps fatal, Probablv most large-scale programs have mul- weakness in the country's political fabric. The tiple objectives, unequal in relative weight and armed forces can play dramatically differing priority; not all are always stated explicitly or roles according to their political and social en- remain equally important for a long period; vironments. The conflict spectrum does not and, finally, program objectives are not always separate the reíatively well-established and consistent with one another and may on occa- stable societies from those that are not so; and sion even be contradictory. there are so many of the latter that it is desir- One can visualize program objectives able to avoid the possible ambiguity of “mili- which for one or another reason are unique, tary” and instead use “force.” perhaps aimed at a very specific and limited application. The reíatively imprecise long- range mass-destruction weapon system is one R&D Projects and tlie such, for it points to a particular type of opera- Conflict Spectrum tion contained within a narrow band on the spectrum scale, that of general war. There are What fraction of the budget is to be allo- others, such as are contained or implied in the cated to research and development and, given national space program or perhaps in studies this, what projects are to be pressed and with of earths atmosphere, the eonsequences of what relative priorities? These are difficult and which may have many and diverse purposes. In searching questions. They seem to be growing these there may be significant contribution in ever more urgent and difficult. Whether and the domain of general war (reconnaissance); how these grave questions are answered is not variegated possible contributions to a broad nearly as clear as the fact that their conse- range of actions in the limited-war domain de- quences will one day have to be faced. It is riving from progress toward modifícation and the purpose here to suggest a framework. based “control” of weather and of climate; and, lastly, Figure 5. Technology and conflict

the more general though obscure gains accru- despair than the need for caution. We run the ing from scientific “fallout” and impact on other risk of trying to squeeze blood from stones, for areas. All this is to say that the contribution the size and number of the simplifying assump- and effective spectrum scale application can tions limit the extent of the reasonably justi- vary considerably and that such differences in fiable inferences. effectiveness spans between different projects Figure 5 rests on the general premise that are not always easily perceived or defined. Cer- large-scale publicly supported research and tain large-scale publicly supported programs, development projects are usually “mission too, have to do with objectives such as Inter- oriented. Thus the project objectives stem from national polities, national prestige, and “hon- some particular forecast and image of needed or, as well as with these more specificallv tech- future capabilities, and these in tum from some nical objectives. All this is less to suggest view of future conflict activities. Having THE SPECTRUM CONSTRUCT OF CONFUCT 43 achieved the project objectives and possessing one can hope that the logic of this simple, inte- the sought-for capabilities, we will presumablv grating construct will help set the stage and deal more competentlv with or avoid the feared provide impetus for the larger, deeper, and less and/or anticipated conflict activities. Plotting simple analysis. In expanding the construct to on Figure 5 each of a number of projects ac- encompass more research and development cording to relevant type of interaction State projects, together with a deeper study of each, along the conflict scale and according to time we force attention to consideration of purposes; of attainment, we can present the whole in in- we should have a clearer view of the coverage, sightful fashion. Relating project aims and con- viz., gaps ( in time and wavelength levei) and flict actions will seldom be easy and unchal- overlaps. Finallv, we should have an orderly lengeable. The difficulties are even greater for procedure enabling organization and scrutiny multiple-objectives projects, which mav make of others’ research and development program- significant contributions to each of many types ming. There is a kind of circularity here which and leveis of interaction States by a variety of seems worth exploring. The selection of re- means. It is possible that something like an search and development projects and the applications-distribution curve would be a su- priorities accorded each reflect the planner or perior, more eloquent method for expressing planning agencies’ hopes, fears, and expecta- net worth.° The simple representation of Fig- tions—the planners’ image of the future. Spoken ure 5 is distorting, since placement of the text, otherwise, doesn’t this mean that with the r & d even though purposely set perpendicular to the array we have clues to intentions? And if so, can time axis, may still imply relatively narrow and we not say something about yet-to-be-plotted contiguous wavelengths span of applications. conflict action-limit lines and encompassed ac- Xevertheless the schematic enables organized tion distributions? and c-omprehensive presentation and hence Many questions need to be answered and helps obtain some insight into the larger and obstacles overcome in constructing and care- extraordinarilv complicated scene. Further, fullv fílling in a Figure 5. Simplifications can be visualized, such as considering only publicly supported projects, only those over, say, five to ten million dollars, only those DOD-funded, •Appraising the respeetive merits of narrow “band” proj- and so on. The aim, of course, is to hold the ects is one thing; of broad band capabilities, quite another. Toward the latter. one might make allocations of contributions task to something commensurate with available over a range of wavelengths and then integrate the whole. In this manner one can envision constructing an applications- time and effort and yet “prove” the general distribution curve or, say, profile for the project in the sense, perhaps, that Figure 3 provides depth to Figure 2 data. concept. Santa Barbara, Califórnia

Notes

Norman Precoda, “What Is W ar?’’ Air Vniversity 4. Ihid. Revtew, XIV, 4 (September-October 1963). 46-55. 5. Marjorie Hope, who has devoted many years to the yrihur Bryant, The Illustrated London News, 30 August study of war, differs. She argues that while aggressive impulses l“o8, p. 330. are part of our biological makeup, a deeper look suggests that 3. International Conflict and Behavioral Science. Rogerarmed conflict is rather the result of socially leamed pattems. risher, editor, The Craigville Papers, Basic Books, 1964; Anotol Depending on institutional pattems and the particular experi- Rapoport, pp. 13-26. ences of the individual, aggressive impulses may be developed 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

into fighting techniques or chronic grumbling, or they may be to take over completely upon signal. (2) Wherein a new organ- overlaid by quiet self-control. See Manorie Hope, “The War izational structure is created, designed to take over full adminis- Urge," War/Peace Report, September 1965, pp. 3-6. trative control. It can be illustrated by Nazi-occupied France, 6. Alexander Kerensky. Rússia and History’s Turning where in 1942 the Conseil de la Résistance began creating a Point, Duell, Sloan and Pearte, 1965, pp. ix. xiv. full-fledged nationwide parallel network of underground ad- 7. Robert Shaplen, in his The Lost Revolutiun (New York: ministrative organs. Another example has been during both the Harper and Row, 1965), argues that this was not always so; first and second Indochina wars (1945-54 and 1954- ), where that during the earlier years of the past two deeades or so the a large part of the South Vietnam population and countryside West—in particular the United States—neglected important op- carne under complete Viet Cong administration and where also portunities to foster democracy in Vietnam. This also illustrates the VC administrative structure coexisted more or less elan- the escalatory tendencies of what are originally local, low-scale destinely with Saigon's. actions: continued for long, they seem inexorahly to involve 10. As among those expressing this view, see “USAF major powers. Doctrine and National Policy,” a speech by Air Force Chief of 8. Bemard B. Fali, “lnsurgeney Indicators,” Militanj Staff General Thomas D. White, reprinted in Air Force mag- Review, April 1966, pp. 3-11. azine, January 1958, pp. 47-51; Nuclear W eapons and Foreign 9. Bemard B. Fali, The Two Vietnams, A Political and Policy, by Henry A. Kissinger. Military Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), 11. Malcolm W. Browne, The New Face of W ar (New pp. 133-34. The French hiérarchies parallèles has something York: Bobbs, 1965), p. 38. of this meaning and in practice may be conceived of in two 12. Fali, Military Review. ways: (1) Wherein the existing administrative structure is infil- 13. Hugh Hanning, "The Peaceful Uses of Military trated by members of the challenging movement. This is illus- Forces,” Statist, I, 8 (October 1965), reprinted in Survival, trated by Nazi-occupied France where anti-Vichy resistance January 1966, pp. 28-32. Mr. Hanning points out not only that members worked into key posts of the pro-German govemment. the armed forces in developing countries are often by far the Here the aim was to mitigate or counter govemmental actions. most effective body in the country but also that its young officers It is illustrated in post-World War II Czechoslovakia where are often “the most go-ahead, the most cosmopolitan, and the Communists inflltrated the Czech govemment so thoroughly as most nationally ambitious members of the community.” ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY

M ajor Paul L. Gray and Mel vin Tanchel

NALYSIS, which had its genesis as a procedure quite naturally form a proper basis formalized technique during World for an objective approach to the application of A^ War II, has since matured considera- the analysis technique. A predetermined, rig- bly. In the past, the analyst dealt with equip- orous process which can be duplicated by ment and systems whose characteristics were knowledgeable practitioners is followed. It known or readilv available, since the systems can be readily assessed in criticai examination existed and could be tested if necessary. Un- and can be readily modified as new informa- knowns were at a minimum and could readilv tion becomes available. According to E. S. be treated parametrically where desired. To- Quade,1 the major problem-solving elements day, the systems and equipment with which of analysis are as follows. (See Figure 1.) the analyst works are largely conceptual or The Objective(s). Analysis is undertaken paper designs. He must still apply rigorous ex- primarily to suggest or reveal a course of ac- perimental and sc-ientific techniques to help tion. This effort has an aim or objective. Poli- the decision-maker evaluate potential options, cies, strategies, forces, equipment, etc., are but his main role today is to separate fact examined and compared on the basis of how from opinion and labei each accordingly for well and how cheaply they can accomplish proper evaluation by the decision-maker. In this aim or objective. the highlv complex area of research and devel- The Altemutive(s). The altematives are opment this function requires a blending of the means by which the objectives may be technical and analytical skills. The techno- achieved. They need not be obvious substitutes logical race may well depend on the applica- or perform the same specific function. tion of our extremely criticai r &d manpower and material resources to only important areas The Costs. Each altemate means of ac- of high potential retum. Systems analysis plavs complishing an objective involves certain dol- a big part in identifying those areas. lar costs or specific resources used up. The proven steps embodied in the time- The Model(s). The model is a set of rela- tested, experimental, scientific problem-solving tionships—mathematical or logical—relevant to olternatives in order of models criterion preference prom ising olternatives aircraft characteristics range effectiveness (+'S) A. speed payload A. armor A.

A,

A, attrition

/\(probability of cost (— 'S) kill) target set

Figure 1. The elements of analysis, thc objective of which is to array alternativa delivery aircraft in some meaningful order

the problem at hand. Thc model provides, for making up the whole. The knowledge thus each altemative, the means for estimating costs gained may provide the basis for generating incurred and the extent to which the objectives new contenders that outmode original con- are attained. cepts being considered. The intellectual in- Thc Criterion. The criterion is the rule or teraction of thought and idea, where theory test nceded to tell how to choose one altema- and concept are tested, tried, and improved. tive in preference to another. For each altema- forms the verv essence of the analysis method. tive, the criterion attempts to measure the Progress comes from trying an idea, testing it, extent to which the objectives are attained as combining judgment, logic, and reason—often compared with the costs or resonrees nsed up. failing and trying again—until all the contend- In onr societv the highest overall intellec- ing alternatives have been fullv explored and tual skills exist within the formalized profes- their advantages and disadvantages fullv re- sions. Ideally, the analysis organization should vealed. be composed of representatives from these In analysis, as with most formalized disci- professions. where each member is a special- plines, certain ground rules must be practiced. ist in his given fíeld or subfield. In this aggre- The analyst must gation we find engineers, physicists, matlie- —have freedom to do objective, unbiased maticians, statisticians, operations researchers, work, psychologists, political scientists, economists, —have access to all information relevant to etc., as required to fulfill the needs of tlie his analysis subjects, dccision-maker. As analysis problems orig- —have freedom to reveal his findings just inate, teams composed of the pertinent pro- as they fali, reporting them to a decision- fessional skills are formed as elements within maker at a levei high enough in the organiza- an ongoing. hard-core analytical group that tion to employ effectively the insights revealed maintains continuitv of knowledge and capa- bv his analysis. bility. Analysis is a continuous, iterative process analysis for research and development in which a potential concept is evaluated and insight is gained regarding just what consti- In our free-enterprise society decision- tutes an effective solution as well as the con- makers attempt to maximize the retum on re- tributions made bv the various components sources expended. However, research and de- ANALYS1S AND TECHNOLOGY 47

velopment decision-makers probably have the role, one of the measures of value is the degree most difficulty in determining what to maxi- of Hexibility offered the commander in the use mize. More oíten than not, quantitative rela- of this system. In other words, in an all-out tionships between variables will not exist. It war, the commander in chief has Hexibility is not always clear how technology goals and with his xcbm s and Polaris missiles in that they objectives can best snpport national goals and have a degree of invulnerability while he objectives. Inherent in the development and makes up his mind as to what portion he will proper use of technology outputs is a higher order to fire and what portion he will hold back. degree of uneertainty than in most other ven- On the other hand, bombers on the ground are tures. Many problems possess a complexity considered extremely vulnerable to enemy ac- bevond intuitive comprehension and assess- tion in a total war. Therefore, two alternatives ment. In this environment the rigorous proc- must be considered. One altemative is that the esses of analysis can provide a common means aircraft would have to be flushed on waming, of bringing judgment to bear on the maximiza- and then a decision to use them would have tion of retum. to be made within the limited flight time of the In ròcD. analysis functions in two ways. bomber. This reduces the Hexibility to a num- The first is the evaluation of altemative or ber of hours rather than days or even weeks. competitive systems to determine optimum ef- The sensitivity of the Hexibility measure of fectiveness and or technological force strue- value to time aloft is quite apparent. Ignoring ture for either minimum costs or some fixed or all other factors, this would indieate that our constrained cost levei. Here each new pro- r &d efforts should concentrate on providing posal is contrasted with other contenders to technology to keep aircraft aloft for days to determine which provides the greatest gain in weeks. The second altemative would be to marginal utility per resource expenditure. Xor- disperse the bomber aircraft over many air- mally, this analysis is done at higher-level fields or sites. The value of each target (airfield agencies based on the inputs from lower or aircraft site) would then be so low that echelons. A very important by-product of these its destruction would no longer be a lucrative technological-force and eífectiveness compari- objective for an opponent. Again, considering sons is the guidance retumed to the lower Hexibility as a measure of value, under this echelons through the evol\'ed criteria and altemative reduced take-off distance (in order measures of effectiveness. to inc-rease potential airfield availabilitv) be- Second, analysis provides a means of clar- comes a driving consideration. Ignoring other ifying and optimizing a particular system. factors, this would indieate that our r &d efforts These efforts are intimately related to system should concentrate on providing technology design, and logically thev are best performed to permit aircraft either to take oft from short at lower echelons in direct consonance with runways or to attain the ultimate in short take- the pertinent scientific and technical skills. off, vtol (vertical take-off and landing). Both Both these applications of analysis have a these alternatives might introduce completely useful by-product whose value has been largelv new bomber concepts for consideration. Ob- tinderplayed in the past. In the process of viouslv, there are other factors bearing on de- analysis, some system characteristics may be cisions of this nature. But these oversimplified found to have major influence on measures of examples illustrate the impact of analysis, sen- value. The determination of these sensitivities sitivities, and driving assumptions on command is significant in the analvtical process. By and guidance. focusing r &d attention on these areas of sen- In their iterative processes, analysts search sitivitv, significant advances may be made and out. identify, and highlight new technological entirely new c-oneepts formulated. This im- alternatives in the offing. They estimate tech- portant aspect of analysis can be illustrated by nological breakthroughs and provide some in- the following fictional example. In the course surance that the worth of new knowledge is of analyzing a new bomber in the strategic war properly assessed. The iterative How in ana- 48 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW lytical efforts prompts enhanced objectivity in the desirable and undesirable conditions in- this discipline. (See Figure 2.) In the process volved in each altemative course of action. of evaluating a potential system, insight is ob- The trade-off between cost and effectiveness is tained regarding just what would constitute a inherent in the budget-constrained search for more effective system. This, in tum, provides optimal systems and force structures. As shown the basis for new contenders that may out- in the accompanying diagram ( Figure 3), usu- value the original system that was being eval- ally a gain in effectiveness ( £ , to £•.) is ac- uated. Analysis objectivity requires that the companied by an increase in cost (C t or C-. to analyst bring these facts to the decision-maker’s C3) and vice versa. On the other hand, when attention so that the more cost-effective con- we are cost-limited, the analysis centers around tenders can be exploited. identifying the greatest effectiveness for a In most situations it is not possible to given cost. identify initially a one-best solution. More Within this general and overall trade-off often there is a trade-off or balancing between there is often a balancing of subfactors. If an

Figure 2. Iteration. the ketj to analysis ANALYS1S AND TECHNOLOGY 49

aircraft svstem is the subject of the analysis, a rational basis for estimating these future Sys- both range and payload factors will probably tem needs and guiding teclmology toward this be involved. It is seldom possible to obtain the goal. maximum in both long range and high pay- Performance, cost, time availability, and load, and if one is emphasized it will be at the utility of the various altematives are all some expense to the other. The end result is highly uncertain during the early time period usually a trade-off based on total problem of a system concept. Yet these are precisely constraints. the factors that are crucial in determining The dominant objeetive of analysis in re- which altemative is best. Most often it is pos- search and development is to identify initiallv sible to balance and trade time along the de- a c-ourse of aetion consistent with a wide velopment cycle for more information—infor- range of altematives and then to narrow the mation that will enable the decision-maker to choice as development proeeeds.2 This proc- discriminate better among the altematives. ess is often confused with the operational type Then the problem changes from one of choos- of analysis, where the problem is essentiallv ing an end product directly to one of selecting one of choosing among specific end-product possible courses of aetion that will ultimately altematives. When we are dealing with envi- produce a system concept and that will, more ronments of 10 and 15 years hence, it would be immediately, require the “buying” of infor- extremely fortunate if, early in a development mation to enable the decision-maker to im- program, our initial choice was one that would prove his choice. vield an optimal final product. If we could, To illustrate, assume that we have two the limited r &d budget would go much fur- r &d decision-makers, Mr. Rigid ( R.) and Mr. ther. Components such as aircraft engines and Flexible ( F.). Assume that analysis has indi- electronic Systems could be designed and de- cated a need for an anti-intercontinental bal- veloped to meet the requirements of the listic missile ( aicbm) ten years in the future, specific aircraft for which they are ultimatelv and each man is responsible for developing intended. Development schedules would be such a system. Mr. R. sits down at the outset much more orderlv. and svstematically analyzes and compares all But the operational environment for weap- the altemative final systems that he thinks are on systems of 10 and 15 years hence cannot most promising. He carefully estimates the be accuratelv predicted now. Neither is it pos- State of the art over the time period for each sible to forecast how and where large techno- component and tries to inc-orporate the best of logical advances will be made. Even if we each into his system. He tries to be compre- studiously plan to develop a fighter with per- hensive bv considering all altematives and formance higher than that of the best experi- factors. Finally, based on his best estimate of mental model, or a bomber whose speed is in the future operational environment and appro- excess of todays fastest fighter, or a missile priate criteria of choice ( such as cost, accuracy, with range and circular probable error ( cep) mid-course or teímmal-phase intercept), he twice as good as last years, the certainty of decides which end product will be best. attainment is largelv unknown now. Mr. R. is committed from this point on. Often the r &d managers most practical True, he can efficiently allocate his resourees, method of approaching this problem is to optimize component design and mating for his choose initiallv a course of aetion that is con- system, and probably avoid many develop- sistent with a wide range of end produets. ment delays. But he is very much limited in Then, as more knowledge is gained, he can the number of alternate components and sys- narrow the range to the best single altema- tems that can be developed because develop- tive later in the development process. Some- ing duplicate items as final hardware is ex- times analysis may indicate that early devel- pensive. opment of a certain class of weapon system is By contrast, Mr. F. does not try to resolve necessary. Here this same analysis can provide at this time which altemative final system will 50 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

be best. He selects a strategy that is con- can be found in the history of aircraft systems sistent with a wide range of final systems. His development. For instance, in the first two de- analysis considers the possible altematives, velopmental years of the B-52, both the con- but he does not try to simulate the uncertain tractor and the Air Force planned for it to be future operational environment in any great a turboprop aircraft. But during this period detail. He has little confidence in his esti- the comparative potentials of the turboprop mates of the production and operation costs and the turbojet changed. Fortunately the Air of future missile defense or which intercept Force had exercised sufficient objectivity and phase is optimum. Therefore, he utilizes analy- had supported the altemative propulsion sys- sis to determine the sensitivity of various pa- tem so that we were able to take advantage rameters to be developed. of the new possibilities. The B-52 gained the While Mr. R. probably defined his de- more effective turbojet system. Similarly, new fense system by selecting specific performance aerodynamic data obtained during develop- factors, such as a terminal-phase intercept and ment of the B-47 prompted a major design a weapon cep of 50 meters, Mr. F. has con- change in the wing and led to use of the more ceived of the optimal defense over a range of advanced sweptwing. The same situation oc- performance factors, such as intercepting the curred during the development of the F-102 incoming missile as early as possible and with when it was discovered that aerodynamic weapon cep of between 10 and 60 meters. He qualities of the early models would not permit does not try to define the optimal more spe- supersonic flight. Evaluation revealed the ne- cifically because there is not even expert cessity of changing the configuration to con- agreement as to which combination of propul- form with the area progression rule in order sion, boost guidance, and warhead is the best. to achieve the desired effectiveness. In this situation he maintains an open choice In some instances, Mr. R.’s method can of combination of altematives. If continuing be more efficient; that is, if his early estimate analysis reveals that propulsion is sensitive should tum out to be correct, he will win that and that the engine needed to provide ex- round of play. However, in the long run or the tremely high velocities is lagging, then he can equivalent of a game with a number of plays, concentrate on this area and through concen- it is much more likely that Mr. F .’s method trated use of resources possibly improve this will be more effective. Stated another way, if particular technology. If he is considering Mr. R. is correct, his costs are 25 percent three types of propulsion units, he may con- lower than Mr. F .s and he attains an earlier tract for a prototype of type one and a test initial operational capability (ioc); but if Mr. version of types two and three. Then, at a R. is not correct, his costs will be double those later time he can choose, with increased con- of Mr. F. and his ioc considerably delayed. fidence, the type that most nearly meets his We can see many other examples of the needs. wisdom of a flexible course in early devel- Using the “building block” concept, Mr. opment, coupled with continuing and rigor- F. does not delay development action for the ous analysis. One summary of 24 Air Force details of the final configuration but instead and Navy aircraft developed after World War attempts to mature ideas to practical appli- II showed that in only three programs was the cation potential. He intentionally keeps his final engine the one initially planned. Most of course flexible in the early stages of develop- these changes occurred because better en- ment until he can capitalize on an increase in gines became available. In 12 airbome elec- knowledge. Then, as development proceeds, tronics programs, it was found that both cost the range of altematives can be narrowed on and time factors were less when preliminary the basis of the knowledge gained, and eventu- models were tested, knowledge was gained, and ally the final optimal system is selected. then selection and final development for op- The need to evaluate continually the cost eration were accomplished. In the early ic bm effectiveness of new technological altematives program, guidance problems were so severe £= alternative II

Iternative I Figure 3. Cost and effectiveness

* ^ ------I______I c. C, c , cost that the rest of the program was not pushed. Department of Defense, and national goals, When the H-bomb made less accurate ic bm s the object being to provide a defense against useful, we were in no position to benefit from his offensive threat and at the same time make this development. However, because an alter- your offense more effective so that his defense nate system—the rocket booster in the Navaho becomes more complex and costly. The com- cruise missile—had been so much further de- plexity of threat evaluation can be realized veloped, it was possible to use it as a basis when we change from a two-sided game to a for ic bm propulsion. Thus we can see the need three-sided game, or to an n-sided game. The for flexibility early in the r & d cycle, in com- policy established by higher echelons, be they bination with a continuing pervasive applica- usaf, dod, or the national govemment, has a tion of analysis to identify or promote the major influence on the direction of the thrust most cost-effective altematives. of our efforts. For instance, if the major policy goals appear to be “stabilization” rather than “revolution,” this decision will determine the the Ri?D cycle direction of our overall efforts and influence Let us examine the foregoing discussion assumptions going into analysis as well as in the context of an r & d programming cycle, to measures of criteria. illuminate more clearly the sahent factors. If The roles and missions have an important we consider time along the abscissa of Figure effect on our analysis in that they determine 3, the start of the r & d cycle begins with the somewhat varving bounds ( not hard and fixed consideration of new ideas, basic research, ones) on our proposed altematives. All the threat, policy, and roles and missions. No one above factors enter into the initiation of the group or organization has a comer on the r & d cycle. market for new ideas. They may emanate from Exploratory Development. All efforts di- industry, from universities, from laboratories, rected toward the solution of specific military or any one of many sources. Quite frequently, problems short of major development projects basic research may create new concepts of are classified as exploratory development. technology which must be considered and The first following step can be either the which may generate new ideas. conceptualized study or the cost-effectiveness The threat has many aspects. Basicallv, analysis. This is a chicken-and-egg situation— the most important is knowing what your po- it cannot be determined which comes first. In tential opposition is capable of doing, as well some cases the conceptual study can be first, as what he plans to do. This is a chess game in and in others the analysis leads to a new con- which the offense is played off against the de- cept which is then studied. In the example of fense for the ultimate attainment of Air Force, the airbome platform for early waming, as a 52 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW result of the analysis a study could be initiated experimental or operational test are in the to conceive of a platform that would remain on advanced development stage. station from three days to tvvo weeks, depend- The feasibility study looks at the specific ing on broad design trade-offs. In a different system concept in considerably more detail example, assume that technology advances than previously. It examines the supporting make practical the emanation of coherent en- technologies in relation to the requirements of ergy from the nucleus of a given atom rather the system. Trade-off analyses are condueted than from the electron shells. The attendant between varying components and subsystems, high energies associated with the nucleus so that a confidence levei can be determined source would represent a significant break- as to the attainment possibilities (technical through. Here a study to conceive of a kill attainment) of the overall system concept. At system using this new technological develop- this time it may be determined that, while ment would be in order. Then, if a new kill varying technologies needed for the system system concept evolves, a cost-effectiveness have been shown to be possible within the analysis is in order to evaluate the new poten- laboratory, there is insufficient confidence that tial. these laboratory-proven techniques will, in At this stage a system is conceptualized actuality, provide the same or similar capa- in broad aspects, not in detail. The varying bilities under a working environment. Or technologies that in combination make this there may be insufficient confidence that the system possible are considered and their capa- combination of separatelv identified laboratory- bilities, limitations, and trends recognized. proven techniques and components, when This conceptual study provides the basis for combined into a subsystem, will give the esti- exploratory development programs. This does mated capability. This provides the guidance not mean or imply that all exploratory devel- and justification for the advanced develop- opment derives from a conceptualized system. ment program. Exploratory development, by its very nature Advanced development is, to a consider- in many instances, must be carried out based ably larger extent than exploratory develop- on the best judgment of the project engineers ment, system concept oriented. This does not and the laboratory directors. Exploratory de- mean that the system has been clearly defined. velopment is not, however, carried on in a It means that advanced development is con- vacuum. The degree of guidance provided by dueted because it is necessary or desirable to the conceptualized system varies from tech- raise the confidence levei in the ability of that nology to technology, but this is the end ob- system concept to provide the effeetiveness jective or goal for which exploratory devel- postulated. It is at this time that the system, opment is condueted. Before much effort is which is now better defined, is evaluated in expended in developing projects to support the context of a force strueture analysis. Vary- the conceptualized system, some evaluation ing numbers of this system are postulated to must be made as to the value of that system determine the effect on the overall force pos- in the time frame projected. This value deter- ture. This does not mean that the decision- mination is attained by a cost-effective analy- maker is faced with a decision to build so sis. Using the rigorous scientific process pre- viously described, we evaluate the system many of that given system; it merely means concept against the contenders and against the that in the context of a total force it is neces- existing systems for the time frame in which sary to postulate varying numbers of a given it is determined to be potentially operationallv system in order to determine resource require- possible. This is a first determination as to ments and to determine the incrementai change whether the conceptualized system has anv in force effeetiveness. At this stage we enter real merit. into the dod Instruction 3200.9 controlled area Advanced Devei&}rment. Those projects of formalized procedures. involving the development of hardware for Engineering Development. Programs be- ANALYSIS AND TECHNOLOGY 53 ing engineered for service use but not yet ap- fied before the system can progress further proved for procurement or operation are clas- along the programming cycle: sified as in engineering development. • The system must be within the state After sufficient advanced development has of the art, and mainly engineering rather thari been performed to establish the desired confi- experimental effort must be needed. dence levei on specific components and sub- • Mission and performance limits must systems and after the evaluation of any specific have been established. system proposal has shown its worth in tech- nological force structure analysis, formal docu- • The best technical approaches must mentation is prepared to pass the concept into have been selected. engineering development.3 In fact, Depart- • A thorough trade-off analysis must ment of Defense Directive 3200.9 specifies sev- have been made. eral stringent prerequisites that must be satis- • Analysis, evaluating cost efFectiveness

Figure 4. RirD programming cycle

time 54 AIR UNIVERS1TY REV1EW

across the complete spectrum of competing strong points. With the passage of time, analy- altematives, must have revealed a favorable sis refines and redefines each candidate. This advantage for the proposed system. is done by evaluating its contribution in chang- • Cost and schedule estimates must be ing environments while assessing its cost effec- credible and acceptable. tiveness in the technological force structure. In short, it helps decision-makers reject the losers The engineering development phase, then, and gives more force to the winners. represents the big “moment of truth” for Since successfully passing the formal pre- analysis within the r &d programming cycle. If requisites can lead to contract definition and credible analysis has subjected a high-potential acquisition, through top-level decision, it is proposed system to a “survival of the fittest” essential that effective communication exist environment over the variable time span írom among all leveis of analysis and decision. The inception, passing this acid test can be a rou- greatest benefit comes from the proper mating tine formality. Obviously, a low-potential sys- of national objectives with technology poten- tem with inadequate analysis will be culled tial through the communication, understand- here, if not earlier. However, one combination ing, and use of common criteria. The proper must be guarded against: if a high-potential flow of these decision guidelines, both up and proposal should suffer from inadequate analy- down, can well be the difference between con- sis, it may never arrive at this point; or it can certed and directed technology development easily be lost here and thereby insidiouslv un- and a eonfused, stagnated Science pool. dermine national effectiveness. Again, the significance of the closing lines of the funnel should be noted. In the early time stages of this cycle, many more small- A nalysis should not be viewed as a one-time scale projects are initiated than will ever com- event in its Service to the decision-maker. W ith- plete the cycle. As we go further along the in the funnel lines of Figure 4, it works both time scale, individual tasks and projects be- across and down. Across, from left to right, come more costly. More is leamed about the analysis aids in identifving system concepts potential end result, and decisions are made with high pavofl potential. It serves to high- to select those having the most promise and light those promising ones that are in among the greatest payoff potential. Near the end of the mvriad number of ongoing efforts. Also, the time scale, systems become very costly in by assessment of possible force deficiencies oc- resource requirements and therefore only the casioned by changes in threat, analysis can illu- best—often a relatively few large-scale, costly minate altemative means of achieving tech- projects—can be expected to come out of the nology goals. Thus analysis can provide a funnel. Within this framework, the proper ap- rational basis on which to base decisions for plications of analysis can lead to the best pos- guiding the r & d process. sible allocation of technology resources in sup- Working up and down in the funnel, anal- port of national goals. ysis very early exposes a candidate to its com- petition, showing up its weak as well as its Hq Air Force Systems Cornmand

Notes rhe RAND Corporation, P-1054, 3 March 1958). 1. E . S. Quade, Military Analysis (Santa Moniea, Califór- 3. Department of Defense Instructions 3200.9 and 7045._. nia: The RAND Corporation, November 1965), p. 7. 'ormat B refers to the formal documentation used to register 2. B. Klein and W. Meckling, Application of Opcrations ímnrnvni fnr nrnrepdinc with encineerinc develop- Research to Development Decision (Santa Moniea, Califórnia: ment. L ieu t en a n t Colonel Norman D. E aton

sç

HE CRISIS in the nato alliance has issue and her allies on the other. Outside Eu- been developing over the past several rope, France seems to oppose U.S. policy on T years. The French govemment has reg- every possible occasion. ularly voiced dissatisfaction with the nato However exasperating this may be, it is a structure ( without, unfortunately, offering logical enough consequence of Francês desire specific altematives) and has backed up its to play a major role in world affairs. In the words by systematically reducing the commit- following discussion of French nuclear weap- ment of French forces to nato commands. A11 ons policy, French foreign policy objectives are the while, nato spokesmen have discounted assuined to be (1) to play a crucial, if not the growing disarray, even suggesting that it dominant, role in European affairs; (2) to re- was a sign of robust health. But the problems duce American influence in Europe and Eu- can no longer be glossed over: France has now ropes dependence upon the United States; taken measures that are resulting in a major and (3) to play an independent role in world realignment of the command structure and the affairs. These are ambitious objectives for a logistic system in Allied Command Europe. nation of onlv 50 million people. To achieve The militaiy consequences of these realign- them, the French think possession of an inde- ments must be carefully considered by the pendent nuclear force highly desirable, if not other fourteen members of the North Atlantic indispensable. France already has her modest Treaty Organization. force de frappe, equipped with físsion weapons France’s differences with her allies are not and the Mirage IV bomber, and she looks limited to military questions. In fact, more toward a thermonuclear/ballistic missile often than not France is on one side of any capability. 56 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The purpose of this article is to explore sile and space systems and is therefore the further the rationale behind France’s develop- basis for the advanced technologies essential ment of an independent nuclear force and to to modem industrial power.;t Thus, as nuclear investigate the French strategic concepts for weapons are essential to first-class citizenship making that force support French policy.0 in the political sense, so the technology which The French nuclear weapons program has they develop and support is essential to eco- absorbed a very considerable amount of re- nomic and industrial leadership. sources and has involved some real sacrifices. The French rationale also rests on the Just as some Americans might prefer an ex- fundamental responsibility of a govemment for panded antipoverty program to an expensive its own security. Since in the realm of foreign limar landing, so some Frenchmen vvill tell you relations national interests are more permanent they would rather have a super highway than than friendships, France is unwilling to rely a super bomb. One appreciates the point of upon the United States to fumish the weapon view when he compares the French autoroute that is the key to her own as well as Europes system, still in its infancy, with the excellent defense. One suspects that it also serves the Italian autostrada and German autobahn net- French govemments purpose to impugn the works.00 But the French govemment has set reliability of the United States as the bulwark its priorities and sticks to them; the reasons of European defense. Moreover, experienced must be compelling. observers have reported that American policy France justifies construction of an inde- has raised doubts in the minds of the other pendent nuclear force on closely related nato govemments by insistence on a buildup political, military, and economic grounds. Pos- of conventional forces, by large-scale force session of even a small nuclear force, so goes augmentation exercises ( such as Big Lift), and the argument, is a guarantee that France will by a general reluctance to permit any meaning- be heard by both friends and potential enemies. ful sharing of decision-making in nuclear The nuclear weapon is a jeton de présence affairs within the Alliance. These remarks are a token entitling the holder to representation on not in judgment of U.S. policy but rather to cite the highest councils, to membership in the club some consequences of it. At any rate, military of first-class powers. “The only stable and per- defense is the first responsibility of any gov- manent advantage that possession of nuclear emment, and this is particularly to the point weapons gives,” observes a French officer, “is when related to French political objectives. a certain augmentation of political influence in French writers advance purely military intemational relations.”2 arguments in support of an independent Directly related to considerations of polit- nuclear capability. French planners are at- ical prestige is the question of economic power tempting to develop a rationale for considering and influence. In the short run the French nu- nuclear weapons as inseparable from conven- clear weapons program is very expensive and tional arms and as an essential part of a modem is requiring sacrifices in other sectors of the armed force. General Ailleret, who occupies a national economy. However, as a French gen- position approximately equivalent to the Chair- eral not long ago reminded an American tele- man of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, has made vision audience, a nuclear weapons program an analogy between military operations and stimulates development and production of mis- construction techniques. Modem construction techniques require mechanical shovels and

°French views are presented directly from French printed bulldozers for the gros work, he observes, but sources and from discussions with many French officers with whom I worked during my assignment as a staff officer at Su- men with hand tools are still required for the preme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). détails. He describes nuclear weapons as nec- °°This remark prompted a French officer in NATO Standing essary for the heavy work of destroying large Group who reviewed this article to make the following observa- tions: (1) The autobahncn were built by slave labor under the concentrations and for creating general havoc Nazi regime. (2) Costs of the nuclear weapons program affect other military expenditures more than they affect funds available on the battlefield; but he insists that the infan- for civilian projects. (3) The nuclear weapons program has popu- lar support in France. tryman, rifle in hand, is still indispensable in FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS POL1CY 57 the role of cleaning up the battlefield and argument to justify France’s independent nu- occupying the terrain. His views on the essen- clear force, though analysis of the strategic tial unity of conventional and nuclear weapons implications of the argument will come later. are summarized in this statement: This is a concept, developed in great detail by General André Beaufre, that the effectiveness It is therefore of verv great interest that not of nuclear weapons in the deterrent role re- only the ,\rmy but also the entire nation be quires that there be several centers of nuclear convinced of the fundamental unity which nee- power, each capable of loosing nuclear war- essarily exists between these complementary elements—nuclear and conventional—which are fare.'' Such a concept obviously accepts prolif- by the very fact of nature totally inseparable eration of nuclear weapons—at least a degree things in the accomplishment of the defense of proliferation. It would be assuming too much of the nation.4 to say that France’s decision to build her nu- clear force was much influenced by the Beaufre General André Martin says about the same concept, but Beaufre’s views do support French thing: “To the essential arm which conquers policy. Furthermore, as will be seen shortly, and occupies the terrain by shock, the conven- the Beaufre concept emphasizes some signif- tional forces cannot be anv longer but the icant differences in U.S. and French strategic instrument of support and exploitation for nu- thinking. clear actions.”5 There is, however, an interest- In summary, the French rationale is a syn- ing difference in emphasis in the two articles thesis of political, economic, and military ar- just cited which is not apparent from the mate- guments supporting the conclusion that an in- rial quoted. General Martin is Chief of Staff dependent nuclear force is essential to the role of the French Air Force, whereas General France wants to play in world affairs. “One Ailleret is an Armv offícer. General MarthTs cannot,” writes General Martin, “be at the same article stresses the pre-eminence of air opera- time black and white, nuclear and dependent, tions in nuclear warfare, while General Ailleret on the world chessboard.”7 is considering the unity of conventional and It was just noted that French nuclear strat- nuclear weapons in the general sense. egy emphasizes deterrence ( in French, dis- In the following discussion it will be noted suasion) and that a policy of deterrence may that French nuclear strategv emphasizes the be construed to support a degree of prolifera- deterrent role of nuclear weapons (essentiallv tion of nuclear capabilities ( at least it has been a political role) over the operational use of nu- so construed by General Beaufre). These obser- clear weapons (basically a military problem). vations highlight some areas in which French Xevertheless, French planners have thought and American policies differ and which are out carefully the operational aspects of war in worth separate analysis. the nuclear era. In their consideration of opera- tional questions, Generais Ailleret and Martin seem to visualize a general war in which an French strategy: the application of nuclear force exchange of strategic blows and battlefield nu- Insofar as the defense of Europe is con- clear operations take place simultaneously. cemed, French nuclear strategy is shaqjly at Indeed, it is for just this kind of war that sh a pe odds with that of the United States. Francês has planned. High-level American policy- strategy rests on the threat of unrestricted re- makers have stressed the need for a capability taliation with nuclear weapons, even if the en- to mount a nonnuclear defense of Europe emy possesses the capability to destroy France against conventional attack, at least initially. with a counterblow. This is “massive retalia- As has already been mentioned ( and it will be tion" of a sort, although France is unlikely ever touched upon again), this U.S. policy has raised to have a “massive” capability vis-à-vis the only some doubts in the minds of the nato allies. power that now threatens French vital inter- Before tuming to a discussion of French ests. Is such a strategy sound, and is such a nuclear strategv, we should touch upon a final threat credible? To those who are accustomed 58 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW

to the nuances of counterforce, countervalue, clear operations rather than give up their damage limitation, flexible response, multiple offensive.10 options, and escalation (called by General Furthermore, American enthusiasm for a Ailleret “a great subtlety”), the French strategy conventional defense in Europe (or for a nu- looks altogether too simple—and out-of-date. clear defense not including a strategic nuclear But isn’t there another side of the coin? attack on the Soviet homeland) raises doubts Having divested herself of her colonies, in the minds of Europeans conceming U.S. Francês vital interests lie in Central Europe. willingness to hold to a deterrent policy that That is not to deny important interests else- would risk destruction of American cities. A where but rather to emphasize that the French Frenchman who chooses to remain anonymous deterrent operates directlv in Europe and is has this to .say: elsewhere more a matter of prestige. In Europe, The Americans will be touched directly only if France rejec-ts the idea of limited war. She of the “escalation” takes place. The Europeans course recognizes the possibility of border will be so touched certainly—and hard—even incidents, easily recognizable and readilv dis- if it does not take place. The Americans have tinguishable from a premeditated act having time to bargain on “escalation”; the Europeans, official sanetion. General Ailleret uses the ex- who would enter at once into the catastrophe, pressions “apparent” aggression and “charac- want above all to avoid it; in their eyes, it is terized” aggression, to make this distinction that which counts, much more than the re- behveen an incident and “real” aggression.8 occupation later of a mass of ruins and a long He States that a defense of Europe without the series of cemeteries. . . . general use of nuclear forces, or with nuclear If all the inhabitants of Mayence [Mainz] had operations limited to the battlefield, is possible to submit to atomic fire that would reach them in a second, would they die more content in but not practical. He points out that large and telling themselves that the New Yorkers con- vital areas, perhaps everything east of the tinue peacefullv taking care of their business?11 Rhine, would be lost before VVarsaw Pact forces could be stopped, since they would pos- Notwithstanding his insistence that the sess superioritv in ground forces, advantages of European area does not admit a limited-war geography and interior lines, and the initiative. strategy, General Ailleret does not categor- Thus, savs General Ailleret, clearly attempting ically nile out the flexible response.0 Rather, to speak as a European: he defines the circumstances wherein it is admissible. [A defense by conventional weapons alone], which would culminate in allowing the aggres- [Under certain circumstances]—which means sor to seize a part of Europe which might not that nuclear weapons are not used necessarily be recaptured for a long period of time, or even to solve secondary or minor problems, and recaptured at all if conventional methods were which are not therefore directly vital to those held to, does not seem satisfactory to us, Euro- possessing nuclear weapons—French strategy peans that we are, as a method for defending does not dispute the theory of the flexible Europe and should in our opinion be mled out.9 response.12. But conceming the defense of Europe, the The United States insists that Europe can French view is clear. It is well summarized be defended successfully with conventional in a statement by General Beaufre. forces against a nonnuclear attack, if only the nato countries are willing to provide the forces; that nato assets can match VVarsaw °It is interesting to note that there is not a good, ^ short equivalent in French for the expression “flexible response and Pact capabilities, if a real effort is made. But General Ailleret uses the English. “Flexible response has of course become a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy. The term General Pierre M. Gallois argues that the So- itself, however, has undergone its own metamorphosis, wruch further complicates the problems the NATO allies have in viets would not attack in Europe without hav- understanding U.S. military doctrine. It is reasonable to argue that in the early days of the Kennedy Administration (1961-hJ? ing considered the risks of nuclear war and the concept included tactical nuclear war and perhaps even would therefore be prepared to shift to nu- selective counterforce exchanges with strategic weapons. FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY 59

. . . Europe is bv instinct resolutely hostile to It must be underscored that, contrary to certain all formulas which admit a limited war, vvhich affirmations, the objective aimed at is not dis- would render the outbreak of war more likely. proportional to the means and resources of our VVhile the Americans, justly fearful of the country. It is not a question in fact of deploying menace which weighs on the continent, are a nuclear force comparable in volume to that disposed to explore the possibility to control of the two great atomic powers, which would the eonflicts and to keep them local in char- be beyond our possibilities. acter. the Europeans know that every conflict But that is not the objective. It is for us, in the would open for them unforeseeable conse- game infinitely more subtle than a simple bal- quences and would prefer to safeguard the ance of forces, to have the means to inflict on peace in that part of the world by the threat the adversary, destruction at least of the same of general war. Without alwavs having a very order and preferably superior to the benefit clear notion, they prefer generally total peace that he would gain from an oecupation of our through great danger, rather than to see country. Europe become again a theater of even minor The volume of our nuclear forces, or more operations.13 exactly, our capacity for a nuclear strike, must And not only does General Beaufre ride out therefore be not comparable to that of the limited war in Europe, he suggests that one enemy forces, but rather calculated in propor- tion to the stake which our country represents should not even discuss it, since to entertain in the eyes of the enemy.10 the idea weakens the nuclear deterrent: Thus, we see that the French strategv for That tendency [to consider a nonnuclear de- the defense of Europe differs rather sharply fense of Europe], logical in its ensemble if war broke out, unhappily is contrary to the efficacy from American policv, which contemplates of the deterrent: in rendering war acceptable, meeting a Soviet nonnuclear attack, even if it one renders it possible.14 be “characterized” aggression, with a conven- tional defense—at least until a nuclear counter- Some critics of French nuclear policv ar- offensive becomes necessary to prevent serious gue that the French independent nuclear force nato reverses. At the root of this difference is will never be large enough to reckon with. the French (and generally European) convic- Xoting that the nuclear world is essentiallv tion that any “characterized” aggression will bipolar, they insist that French options are inevitably result in serious reversals. completely circumscribed by the two super powers. But a counterargument holds that it is preciselv within this framework that the a controversial concept: stability deterrent force of a médium power c-an func- through proliferation tion: To a less easily defined degree, one finds The deterrent between the two great powers another difference between French and Amer- does not in all cases operate, but only where ican thinking. The U.S. lias a profound, al- their vital interests are involved. Thus we see most emotional, commitment to nuclear non- the framework for the médium size power. The proliferation. But there is a French view great power wants to avoid a risk, even with a holding that the efficacy of nuclear weapons médium power, when the interests of the latter in the deterrent role requires several centers are at stake. Thus we have the double condition capable of making the terrible decision to [for a médium power to benefit from its nuclear loose nuclear war. deterrent]: the vital interests of a médium General Beaufre has developed this con- power are at stake, but not those of one of the great powers.1 s cept in great detail. It is a concept of pure de- terrence, with almost no attention given to how In a similar pattem of logic but with nuclear operations would be conducted—and different emphasis, General Martin sets the this is an important point, since General Beau- parameters of influence of French nuclear fre accuses the United States of having de- power as follows: voted so much attention to the problems of 60 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

employing nuclear vveapons that it has failed aggressor will have to consider—with the lim- to appreciate fully the problems associated ited benefits he would be able to realize from with deterrence.17 the use of force. . . . That is why a policy of General Beaufre is concemed that the decentralized deterrence, at the national levei nuclear weapon in its deterrent role is in dan- and founded on the possession of some nuclear weapons, could some day be added to a Sys- ger of losing its effectiveness. He points out tem of collective defense of which the Ameri- that practically speaking the present nuclear can guarantee of nuclear intervention is the environment is bipolar. He argues that the trump.20 standoff has become almost complete, with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in agreement that Quite clearly the Beaufre thesis holds that almost anything is preferable to nuclear war; a degree of proliferation is desirable. But and he argues that this situation compromises where does proliferation begin to become un- the deterrent. Thus, says General Beaufre: acceptably dangerous? Beaufre argues that independent nuclear forces which are coordi- . . . if one of those opponents were to think that nated with one another ( but not under a uni- such weapons would not be used in any cir- fied command, of course) simply augment the cumstances, the resulting situation would be deterrent and that to this extent proliferation even more dangerous, for there would then be is a positive good. Furthermore, he says, pos- the risk of the loss of the advantage of the stability which the mere fear of a nuclear con- session of nuclear weapons by peaceful and flict has imposed upon Europe. . . . That is responsible countries, such as Switzerland, why special efforts need to be made to preserve Sweden, and the Netherlands, would not really for nuclear weapons that capacity for engen- add to the danger. Cuba, the United Arab dering fear from which we have hitherto so Republic, and Indonésia present a totally dif- greatly benefited.,s ferent problem, Beaufre admits: “It is neces- sary to avoid putting matches in the hands of This leads General Beaufre to the con- children.”21 He insists that proliferation must clusion that the world needs several centers eventually be arrested and argues that the nu- of decision, each capable of initiating nuclear clear powers will be able to enforce worldwide war, and that this condition would restore a control through some kind of concert of nu- desirable “state of uncertaintv” in intema- clear powers.22 In the final analysis General tional affairs. Some interesting considerations Beaufre seems to consider that proliferation follow from the Beaufre thesis. A French in- applies to those countries which do not have dependent nuclear force, for example, serves the capability of producing nuclear weapons the interests of France’s allies. On the other in the near future. hand, the multilateral force would not; it would not be an independent center of decision, since its employment would be decided ultimately bv the United States.'9 .A.T a time when French policy is Beaufre’s arguments expand upon ideas disrupting the nato alliance and is in conflict advanced some years ago bv General Gallois. with U.S. objectives elsewhere in the world, In October 1959 he noted the difficulty of there is a strong tendency to react emotionally making the American deterrent credible as to every instance of Franco-U.S. difference. concems the defense of Europe. He suggested But it would be unfortunate not to treat objec- that the solution tivelv the differences in nuclear policy which are fundamental and which are not going tc . . . resides partly in a decentralization to the be reconciled by deploring them. national levei of certain nuclear arms. As soon There is nothing the United States can dc as the thermonuclear guarantee accorded the to keep France from continuing her construe- Allied Nations becomes hazardous, the national tion of a nuclear force, and there probably levei can impose itself. It is not necessary to have a powerful atomic arsenal, but a small never has been a chance to influence this supply, the effects of which, also small, the course of action since General Charles de FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY 61

Gaulle carne to power in 1958. The objectives ize that it fíts logically the French view of which De Gaulle has set for France make an how to defend Europe (to deter war; that independent nuclear force almost indispensa- failing, to fight a nuclear war). And this strat- ble. If U.S. policy-makers were in the same egy fits the nuclear resources of France (lim- political framevvork, it seems certain that they ited), Second, the United States must encour- would decide upon the same kind of program. age French nuclear power to serve U.S. and Nor is there probably very much the nato interests, to the extent that this is possi- United States can do now to influence French ble, through policy and operational coordi- doctrine and strategy for the use of the French nation. Policy coordination should be possi- force, although it may be argued that there ble through normal govemment-to-govemment was a time when U.S. ofifers of teclmical and channels, Operational coordination might be material assistance (such as was given to the effected through the sh a pe representation to British) would ha ve permitted some bargain- the U.S. Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff ing. It may not be too late yet, because the ( js t p s ). The same machinery used to coordi- U.S. could still save the French some of the nate the nuclear effort of the Allied Command immense costs of research and development Europe could be used to coordinate the na- connected with thermonuclear/ballistic missile tional forces of an ally. svstems, at practically no cost to the United In short, it would appear that it is time to States. accept the French independent nuclear force But assuming that French policy has been as a reality, to understand the French rationale irrevocablv determined, realism suggests cer- and doctrine, and to try to make the French tain courses of action. In the first place, it is nuclear capability compatible with United essential to understand the French nuclear States interests. strategy ( almost pure deterrence) and to real- Hq United States Air Force

Notes Nationale, August—September 1964. 1. "La Dissuasion Française," Recue de Défense Nationale, 9. Ibid. June 1965. p. 993. 10. Général Pierre M. Gallois, "Réflexions sur 1’Evolution 2. General Ollion, "Com m ent L tiliser la Force des Armes des Doctrines Américaines," Recue de Défense Nationale, July 1'jEre Nucléaire," Recue de Défense Nationale, Juiy 1965, p. 1964, p. 1227. 11. "A Chacun sa Guerre,” Recue de Défense Nationale, 3. General Pierre M. Callois (Retiredt discussed French January 1965, p. 11. nuclear weapons policy with Mr. Erú Sevareid of CBS in a 12. Ailleret, address at NATO Defense College. television presentation, “Our Fnends the French,” 8 March 13. Général André Beaufre, "Dissuasion et Stratégie,” 1966, 10:00 P.M. Eastem Standard Time. General Gallois, Recue de Défense Nationale, December 1964, p. 1877. whose articles appear often in American periodicals. is a well- 14. Ibid., p. 1878. fcnown authority on nuclear policy and strategy. He has had 15. "La Dissuasion Française,” Recue de Défense Na- extensive experience on French and Allied staífs and has served tionale, June 1965, p. 990. as advisor to the French Minister of Defense. 16. Martin, p. 1508. ■ 4. General d’Armée Charles Louis Ailleret, "U nité Fonda- 17. Beaufre. "Dissuasion et Stratégie,” p. 1877. It is inter- mentale des Armements Nucléaires et Conventíonnels," Recue esting to note Beaufre’s conclusion that the United States has de Défense Nationale, April 1964. pp. 568, 577. not given sulficient attention to the deterrent role of nuclear 5. General d'Armée Aérienne André Martin. "L ’Armée weapons but rather has concentrated on the question of employ- de I Air dans le Contexte Nucléaire," Recue de Défense Na- ment of nuclear forces in war. Partly to this fascination with tionale, October 1964, p. 1517. the problems of wartime operations does Beaufre attribute the 6- General André Beaufre is the author of two important American refusal to grant to her allies any meaningful sharing books on strategy, Introduction d la Stratégie and Dissuasion et of nuclear responsibilities. W hile most Americans would deny Stratégie. which were recently reviewed in these pages; see Dr. Beaufre’s allegation, it must be conceded that the problem of Joseph W . Annuziata, "General Beaufre on the W est's Need for sharing nuclear responsibilities is a serious one and one which Common Political Coais and a Common Strategy,” Air Uni- has exacerbated our relations with the French. cernty Review. XVII, 5 (July-August 1966), 53-59. Beaufre’s 18. André Beaufre, “The Sharing of Nuclear Responsi- appear frequently in both English and French language bilities: A Problem in Need of Solution,” International Affairs, publications. He is particularly concem ed with the problems of a Çuarterly Rcciew, London, July 1965, p. 415. nuclear weapons in the deterrent role. He was formerly French 19. Beaufre, "Dissuasion et Stratégie," p. 1877. representatrie on the NATO Standing Group and is now Dircctor 20. Pierre M. Gallois, " L ’Equilibre par la Terreur est °* _ French Institute for Strategic Studies. Stable pour 1’Amérique mais Précaire pour rE u rop e," Forces 7. Martin, p. 1517. Aériennes Françaises, October 1959, p. 576. 8. Charles Louis Ailleret, “Opinion sur la Théorie Strat- 21. Beaufre, Dissuasion et Stratégie (Paris: Armand Colin, egique du Flexible Response/ ” address at NATO Defense 1964). p. 109. College. Paris, -6 June 1964. puhlished in Recue de Défense 22. Ibid., p. 110. AERONAUTICAL GERIATRICS COLONEL /. R. PERKIN

On 29 January 1966 the following item appeared in an indus- trial trade jo u rn al:

Air Force planners are conceding that the 350 B-52’s and 80 B-58’s which will be phased out in the next few years will serve no better purpose than a junk yard in the desert, probably at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona. The aluminum, titanium and stainless Steel airframes could go to the scrap aluminum smelters.1

Maybe so. But there will be some raised eyebrows in Southern Arizona if it actually turns out that way. In fact, if one were to ask the personnel of The M ilitary Aircraft Storage and Dis- position Center (TM A.SDC) about this glib story of bom ber disposal, the rcaction might well bc: “Nothing could be further from the truth!“ For they know what will happen if and when the B -52’s and B -58’s com e to this desert storage center of the Air Force Logistics Com m and. They know that in all probability the aircraft will be preserved, cared for, husbanded, cycled back to operational use if needed, or utilizcd as parts banks. Only after exhaustive investigation and soul searching will they be dismantled and salvaged in such a manner as to produce a maximum dollar return. In other words, as pre-eminent prac- titioners of the evolving Science of aeronautical geriatrics, they take sharp exception to the accusation of running a “junk yard.’'’ They know better. To speak of their job as managing an on-the-shelf stock- pile of residual aircraft—i.e., auxiliary air power—would more aptly describe their role, for in truth this is really what the USAF is accomplishing at its vast, sprawling, 3000-acre storage center near Tucson, Arizona. And it is Department of Defense air power, since storage and disposal responsibilities for Army * í ■* t • r In the main storage area at The Military Aircraft Storage and Dispositicm Center (TMASDC), Davis-Monthan AFB, near Tucson, Arizona, nearly 4000 Air Force, Navy, and Army aircraft are stored. Since 1946, over 14,400 aircraft, valued at more than $9,300,000,000, have been reclaimed, used for paris, or hept in fiyable storage. and Navy aircraft as well are now being Consolidated at Davis- Monthan AFB. The Air Force is responsible for executive man- agenient of the overall centralized operation. It is true that past events may have warranled the “junk yard” or “bone yard” im age. Stacks of W orld W ar II aircraft, aluminum smelters, and piles of ingots did create the impres- sion that consignment to Davis-Monthan was the end of the line for obsolescent, no-longer-needed aircraft. And many a veteran B-17, B-24, P-47, B-29, and B-36 ntet this fate. They were melted down because, after serviceable parts had been removed, there simply was no further use for the remaining carcass. The recovered metal was sold to Steel mills for use as aluminum chloride in deoxidizing processes, or to the automo- tive industry for use in pistons, grills, engine blocks, etc., which benefit from the strength and lightness of alum inum . Beyond question, some of the m aterial also found its way into the housewife’s pots and pans. However, bitter lessons learned since Korea, along with the rem arkable “staying power” of many aircraft, dictate a new approach to managing nonactive inventory aircraft. Time and again the ability to reach into diverse stockpiles of old bombers, trainers, cargo carriers, and reclaimed usable parts has paid off. Most im portant, the new approach permits options which are invaluable in terms of insurancc against unforeseen re- Parts are removed and made quirements—options in consonance with a national policy that available for use. Serviceable stresses a strategy of flexible response. tires are retumed to supply; con- Here are some pertinent statistics. For the six-month demned ones are used during period November 1965 to April 1966, aircraft with an original storage and desert movement. cost of over $161,000,000 were withdrawn from storage and Loio-time J-57 engines (right) returned to the active inventory. In term s of replacem ent costs, removed from stored B-52 this figure m ight be double. T he overriding logistic considera- Stratofortress will replace Guam- tion, however, is that these aircraft were on-the-shelf, readily based engines needing overhaul. available.

By July 1967 all storage operations at Litchfield Park Naval Air Station (above), near Phoenix, Arizona, will be Consolidated at Davis-Monthan, where in Operation Cabbage Patch Navy and Air Force engineers (below) are testing techniques for optimum storage under desert conditions. And, during «his «ame six-month period, over 826,000,000 worth of engines and parts were reclaimed for lhe active invenlory. If we consider lhe tim e period FY 6 2 -6 6 , lhe figures be- come even more m eaningful. Over one billion dollars worth of aeronautical material was salvaged, returned to the invenlory, or reclaimed. During tliis period, operaling costs of TMASDC amounted to some 825.5 million, a return of almost forty to one. And there is a good chance that the ratio will improve when consolidation o f Army and Navy storage operations is completed. Currently, TMASDC has custody of over 3800 aircraft. Projections for the next few years will raise this figure. Of the present crop. approximatelv 60 percent are preserved for pos- sible future use, 30 percent are serving as parts banks and are in various stages of dism antlem ent, and the rem ainder are shells or hulks awaiting final disposition. The uses to which surplus aircraft and parts are being put are many and varied. The Department of Agriculture, for ex- ample, received six C-45’s and one C-47, along with special- purpose equipm ent, for use in an experim ent to hall inroads of the screwworm fly from México into the southwestern States, The venerable C-47, recalled from desert where range eattle were being affected. Male flies are sterilized retirement to a neto career in Vietnam, by exposure to cobalt rays and then airdropped in boxes that has been redesignated the AC-47 (popu- open on ground contact. The border area stretching from the larly the “Dragon-ship” or “Puff the Magic Culf of México to the Pacific Ocean wa$ “treated” with these Dragon’) and armed with three 7.62-mm sterilized male flies to arrest and curtaii propagation of the cannons for its latest role, providing species. ground support against the Viet Cong. In another instance the Indian government asked for help in constructing the Rojasthan Canal, which is located in a desert area. A thousand two-wheel excavation carts were needed that would not sink into the sand and could be towed by camels. To support the request of lhe Agency for International Develop- ment, TMASDC provided wide-tread airplane tires, wheels, and axles for building sim ple yet effective “ sand buggies.” The greatest veteran of them all—the C -47—has com e out of desert retirement for a most unusual job as an attack-cargo (AC) aircraft in Vietnam. Dubbed “Puff the Magic Dragon,” it has been equipped with three 7.62-m m miniguns, each with a 6000-round capability. These 18,000-round-per-minute Catlings, mounted on their low- and slow-flying platform s, com- prise a devastating firepower system when used in a ground support role. Surplus B-47’s are shedding some of their armament for Vietnam operations. Through a cross-servicing agreem ent, one hundred 20-mm machine guns were stripped and key compo- nents shipped to Rock Island Arsenal for use on like armament mounted in Army Chinook helicopters. A recent reclamation program paid high dividends that may well be an augury of things to come. The first reclam ation job managed by the USAF for the Army recently yielded well over a million dollars worth of aircraft parts, almost half of which went to meet Air Force and Navy requirements. The list goes on and on: two KC-97 carcasses for use in a research projeet involving an orbiting space station — a C-54 to This C-124 Glohemaster has been modified for use as an aerial test bed for jet engine development. Originallij costing $1,646,406, it was consigned to the desert for reclamation and has since ijielded $1,423,864 worth of parts(acquisition cost) to keep active fleets fhjing. H-43 Huskies are prcpared for over- NASA for salellite ground-station calibrulion, another to the Innd shipment to a repair and modi- Army in »upporl of the Nike-X program — a C-121 from storage fication center. Helicopter storage at to NASA for downrange instrumentation cliecking — aircraft TMASDC is on the increase as Air parts to lhe Norlh American Aviation Company for an experi- Force and Armij inventories grow. mental “ hoverbuggy” — twenty-five J-73 engines to supporl F-86’s of an Air Force Mililary Assistance Program. The bonanza in the desert keops yielding relurns, limited only by imagina- tion and knowledge of resources. In large m easure, this bonanza is made possible by the favorable weather conditions. The benign desert environmcnt, with its low m oisture and low acidic soil content, is ideal for aircraft storage. Conditions in Southern Arizona are not unlike those of Cyrenaiea in Á frica, where the B -24 Lady Be Cood was found. This World War II boinher, which went down in 1943, remained in a reniarkable State of prcservation after sixteen years of exposure to the elements. Generally, preparation for desert storage by TMASDC fol- lows an engineered sequence involving safetying (remova 1 of arm am ent, initiators, ete.), renioval and storage of loose equip- ment, and preservation of engine and fuel and oil systems. Openings and ports are sealed, and acrylic surfaces are sprayed. Under current aircraft storage proeedures, complete cocooning is unnecessary—in fact it has been found to be impractical, expensive, and inefficient. Essentially, the reverse procedure takes place when aircraft are withdrawn for active Service. The airplane is depreserved, washed, and cleaned; equipment is replaced; functional checks are made of all System s; and the entire aircraft is readied for flight test. All flyaways receive a complete flight check prior to release to ferry pilots for what is usually a one-tim e flight to an appropriate refurbishm ent facility. Many of the civilian employees at TMASDC (over a thou- sand) are form er servieemen, and their eyes light up when they recognize an old bird on which they worked while in uniform. Their stored knowledge is invaluable; it has contributed im- measurably to the outstanding flight safety record m aintained by the center since its inception in 1946. Some one hundred m ilitary personnel are also assigned. They are interspersed throughout lhe organization for management control and surveillance. Consolidation with the Navy, whose like facility at Litch- field Park, Arizona, will close by 1 July 1967, is on schedule. W hile the merger has progressed unusually well, some problems have arisen due chiefly to differences in Service technical orders dealing with preservation methods and proeedures. These are honest differences, since the current Air Force methodology The “Pregnant Guppy,” which was involving preservation and storage was arrived at independ- constructed frotn excess C-97 Strato- ently, whereas the Navy’s concern was directed prim arily at cruiser-type aircraft, is designed to sall-waler and salt-air corrosion. haul large-diameter missile parts. T o reap the benefits tlial can be achieved by a com m on approach, as well as Io seltle controversial issues, we set up an environm ental lest profiram , O peration Cabbage Patch, in October 1965. Ten represenlalive aircraft are now undergoing exlensive lests. Som e are preserved in accordance with Navy procedures, olhers in accordance with Air Force directives. This comprehensive look-see (including airframes, fuel cells, en- gines, pumps, regulators, landing gear, propellers, etc.) is ex- pected Io yield conclusive results on the “best” way to do the job. All aspects of Operation Cabbage Patch are controlled by a joint Air Force—Navy team of qualified engineers, and expec- tations are high that findings witl contribute significant econo- mies and efficiencies to the state of the art of storage and pres- ervation technology. A dynam ic, vigorous approach to this technology is strongly indicated. Sophisticated aircraft with delicate electronic guid- ance and control systems will require speciai handling. Experi- ence indicates, however, that time, money, and effort spent on this Science of aeronautical geriatrics pay substantial dividends in term s of latent air power. The growing reserve air fleet resting on the Arizona desert is truly a national resource. One thing is certain—not in concept, mission, or operation does The Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center qual- ify as a “ ju n k yard.” For old airplanes, like old soldiers, never d ie ; th ey ju s t fad e . . . and fa d e . . . and fa d e . . .

T he M ilitary A ircraft Storage & D isposition Center

Note 1. “Disposal of 350 Old Bombers for Scrap,” W aste Trade Journal. 29 January 1966, p. 9. SATELLITE GROUND TRACKS

M ajor Edward P. M azak, J r .

HERE is little doubt in the minds of the flight paths of aircraft and those of satel- most military men that space will be- lites. The aircraft has an infinite variety of T come an increasin^Iv vital area for paths available to it, limited only by the capa- military operations, even thongh the future bilities of the machine and the pilot. Needless scope of these operations cannot be completelv to say, the ground track of an aircraft flight defined. The present usefulness of military path is similarly unrestricted. The flight paths space systems is based predominantly on the available to a satellite, in unpowered orbital ability to perform such essential military func- flight, are much more restricted. tions as waming, weather reporting, command Bodies in orbit move in accord with the and control, and Communications. If these laws of Kepler and Newton. Exeepting satel- tasks are to be accomplished in the most effi- lites that escape from the earths gravitational cient manner, a thorough knowledge of the influence, there are only two types of paths factors that describe and limit the ground for a satellite—the ellipse and the circle. Fur- track of a satellite is required. For successful ther, these orbital paths are in a plane con- operations, the military space planner must taining the center of the earth. (Figure 1) For be able to select the orbital parameters that elliptical orbits, the center ol the earth is a establish the proper relationship between the focus of the ellipse; for circular orbits, the satellite and the ground. center of the earth is the center of the orbit. Of The purpose of this article is to identify course there is an infinite number of planes the factors that influence the ground track of that contain the center of the earth; therefore, an earth satellite and to indicate the varieties an infinite number of orbits is possible, irre- of tracks available to space planners. The spective of the two-dimensional characteristies most effective use of space as an arena of mili- of the path. The point is that orbital paths tary operations requires that the mission pa- must be examined in three dimensions: the rameters be carefully selected so that the sat- size and shape of the orbit within the orbital ellite ground track is the optimum path. plane and the location of that plane with re- spect to the earth. What is a ground track? The ground track of a satellite can be most readily visualized if it is assumed that a There is considerable difference between line, called the radius vector, exists between retrograde orbits, those with a westerly com- ponent of motion. The inclination is deter- mined at the point of injection into orbit by the latitude and by the heading from true north, or azimuth, bv the following formula: cos i = (cos latitude) (sin azimuth). Figure 2 shows the effect of inclination on the ground track. Note that, regardless of the size or shape of the orbit, the northem and South- ern limits of travei are at latitudes equal to the Figure 1. Orbital paths inclination angle. For example, a satellite in orbit with an inclination of 30° will have a ground track that lies between the limits of 30° N and 30° S latitude. The particular shape of the track will, of course, depend on the other factors involved. the satellite and the center of the earth. As the Period. The period of a satellite, F, is de- satellite moves in its orbit, the intersection of fined as the time it takes to complete one orbit the radius vector with the surface of the earth in inertial space. As deduced by Kepler in the will trace the ground track for that particular seventeenth century, the period is a function orbit. To ascertain the exact shape of the of the semimajor axis of the orbit, a, or, more ground track involves the instantaneous com- simplv, one-half the distance between apogee parison of the speed of the satellite with the and perigee. speed of the point on the earth directly below. This comparison is not always obvious or F = k( ah intuitive. Fortunately, the general character- where k is a constant. istics of the ground track can be determined by examining the parameters that affect the If the earth did not rotate, it would be a relationship between the speed of the satellite simple matter to sketch anv ground track. In and earth below. the general case, except for orbits in polar or equatorial planes, they could be represented by a sinusoid, with successive orbits repro- parameters that influence ground tracks ducing the exact same ground track. The de- There are five parameters that must be piction of ground tracks is complicated by controlled to define the ground track of a satel- lite: inclination, period, eccentricity, argu- ment of perigee, and injection point. Their combined effects must always be considered by the space mission planner if the optimum path is to be achieved. Inclination. The plane containing the or- bit is referenced to the earth’s equatorial plane. The angle between these planes is defined as the inclination angle of the orbit, i. When i = 0o the orbit is in the equatorial plane; when i = 90°, a polar orbit exists. Inclinations between 0o and 90° refer to posigrade orbits, those with an easterly component of motion; inclinations between 90° and 180° refer to Figure 3. Effect of period

the obvious fact that the earth rotates to the original line of longitude has it actually circled east at a constant angular velocity of 15° per the earth or completed a “revolution”; thus a hour. Further, as a result of this rotation, the revolution is longer than the period for posi- instantaneous easterlv speed of a point on the grade orbits. surface of the earth varies with latitude. Maxi- As the period of the satellite increases, the mum speed occurs at the equator, and the speed loops of the sinusoid curve are further com- decreases to zero at the poles. pressed to the west. If the period is 23 hours, the Thus the effect of period on the ground regression to the west is 23 hrs x 15°/hr or 345°. track is to reduce the easterlv travei over the (Figure 4) Thus the ground track progresses earth (for posigrade orbits) during each orbit through only 15° of earth longitude during by the amount of earth rotation occurring in each 23-hour orbit. If the period of the satellite the same time span. If a satellite is in a circu- is equal to the earth’s rotational period, ^ 2 4 lar orbit with an inclination of 30° and has a hours, the ground track is a closed curve which period of 3 hours, it will complete one orbit is repeated on successive orbits. For circular at an earth longitude 45° west of its injection 24-hour orbits (Figure 5), which occur at an point. (Figure 3) This 45° is the amount of altitude of 19,360 nautical miles, the closed earth rotation to the east in the 3 hours it took curves resemble a figure eight, the size of the to complete the first orbit. Ground tracks of loops determined by the inclination of the each successive orbit would also regress 45° orbital plane. If the orbit is in the equatorial to the west. Only when the satellite crosses the plane, a true earth synchronous orbit exists, and

Figure 4. Twenty-three-hour-period orbit Figure 5. Twenty-four-hour-period circular orbits or 180°, the paths above and below the equator are symmetrical. (Figure 7) But for other loca- tions of perigee, symmetry does not exist. If perigee is north of the equator, the lobe of the ground track in the northem hemisphere will increase in size; the lobe in the southem hemi- sphere (near apogee) will decease. This occurs because the relative speed between the satel- lite and the earth is greater near perigee than near apogee. A similar effect occurs with the ground track of 24-hour-period satellites. In general, an eccentric 24-hour orbit with perigee not on the equator will produce an unsymmetrical closed the ground track will be a “spot” on the equator. track of the figure eight type, with the smaller Eccentricity and Argument of Perigee. loop in the hemisphere containing apogee. The eccentricity, e, of an orbit is descriptive ( Figure 8) Certain combinations of eccen- of its shape and indicates variance from a circle. tricity, e, and argument of perigee, range from 0 o to 360°. The combined effect of these two param- eters,

accomplished bv careful selection of the point of the shape of the ground track and its relation and time of injection of the satellite into orbit. to the surface of the earth. If exact ground paths At injection (or bumout), the characteristics of are required, more detailed graphic and analyt- the orbit are completely determined ( unless, ic techniques can be applied. One such meth- of course, in-space maneuvers are later to be od is included in The Space Planners Guide executed), and the exact ground track can be recently distributed throughout the Air Force. plotted by manv different techniques. All methods of determining satellite ground tracks must consider the factors listed herein. For the near future, the value of most mili- T he ground track of a satellite is completely tary space systems will be related to their care- determined at the time of injection into orbit fully selected paths over the surface of the by the speed, altitude, location, and heading earth. It is important that military planners rec- of the vehicle. However, visualization of the ognize that, although the orbital paths of satel- ground track by examining these complex pa- lites are limited to circles and ellipses, the rameters is difficult. Consideration of the five ground tracks resulting from these orbits are factors presented in this article—inclination, endless in variety and are selectable by the period, eccentricity, argument of perigee, and planner. An appreciation of the factors that injection point—provide the space planner with influence ground tracks will assist in achieving an approach that will permit a rapid estimation the most effective use of our space systems. Warfare Systems School, AU

Bibliograpby Bielkowitz, Peter. Time Relations and Shape Variations for the Space Handbook for Aerospace Operations Course. Maxwell Cround Track of 24 Hour Satellite. W right-Patterson A FB, AFB, Alabama: W arfare Systems School, Air University, 3d Ohio: Air Force Institute of Technology, A FIT Research revision, July 1965. Project AFIT 64-38. The Space Planners Guide. Andrews AFB, Maryland: Air Force Satellite Cround Tracks, U.S. Air Force Motion Picture TF 5733. Systems Command, 1 July 1965. Operations in Viet Nam

THE AIR FORCE ENGINEER’S PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

M ajor Gen er a l R. H. C urtin

E SOM ETIM ES fail to realize that the has already been widely noted elsewhere. W major Air Force missions in Southeast Manpower resources providing complete Asia are largely supported by a base structure Civil Engineer support to the Air Force include: that was substantially developed by, or at least ( a) the Base Civil Engineer ( bc e) as the initiated under, early Military Assistance Pro- key or focal point; grams. The tremendous expansion of our force (b) the Base Civil Engineer work force of structure ovemight has forced us to crowd as pc s personnel, supplemented by local hire; many missions as possible onto the existing (c) a Base Engineer Emergency Force, des- bases. We have resorted to crash programs of ignated “Prime beef,” under which small, se- all types to realize the needed basic facilities at lect, highly qualified teams are deployed to as early a date as feasible. Key installations sea on temporary duty; and have all felt the impact of the rapid expansion. ( d) Heavy Repair Squadrons organized un- A close relationship exists in the Air Force der the code name “Red Horse.” between base facilities and mission accom- The Prime beef teams are manned and plishment. This is clearly demonstrated in equipped to do specific preselected tasks at Southeast Asia ( sf . a ), where our Civil Engi- identified bases. To the extent possible, design neers face the tasks of keeping what they have and procurement of materiais are completed in going at maximum effectiveness; doing all they advance of the teams arrival so it can hit the can “in-house” to meet urgent unforeseen fa- job running and get the most out of the 120 cility needs by modification, improvisation, and days tdy. new construction; and working with construc- The first two Red Horse squadrons of 400 tion agents (Navy oiccs, Corps of Engineers men each, capable of horizontal and vertical divisions and districts, and Army Engineer construction and repair work, were recently de- Construction units) to site, design, and build ployed to the Republic of Vietnam ( rvn). major new facilities for the Air Force. Special A major element of the total force, often consideration will be given here to the first two overlooked, is the Air Force Civil Engineers tasks, since the major construction program fire protection and crash rescue activity. In sea , AIR OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM 77

this task takes on expanded significance. The The power problem is and will continue to densitv of facilities, the tempo of wartime op- be a nightmare until our large central power erations, and recovery of battle-damaged air- plant construction is much further advanced. craft make this facet of the engineers job Meantime the Base Civil Engineer must rely challenging and hazardous. The 500 Civil En- on the multitude of smaller units, with their gineer firefighters on the job in sea man some attendant operation and maintenance prob- 115 pieces of heavy firefighting equipment as lems. He is often forced to ration power and well as augment the crews of the H-43B heli- restrict new uses as much as possible. A related copters used for crash rescue. The courage and problem is that of the distribution system, professionalism of this gronp of men have re- where overloaded lines and transformers are a peatedly paid off in lives and materiel saved. reality of everyday business. Our present con- struction program will do much to ease this BCE general problems situation, mostly through the installation of major power plants. The great and rapid expansion of the ex- isting bases has saturated our facilities and Housing. As added operational and sup- overloaded the Utilities. There has been little port units have been placed “in-country” and chance to reallv master-plan. In general, nu- adjustments made in deployments, a major merous tenants, often unexpected, have simply problem facing the bc e has been the job of entered into a kind of “dog eat dog” competi- “bedding down” personnel. Generally there has tion for allocation of the limited land and facili- been very little reaction time, and tents are ties available. From the start, the expansion of still the principal recourse. For the longer pull the mission has outpaced plant growth. There- we resort to the “hootch,” a light-frame one- or fore today the Base Civil Engineer still has the two-story structure that goes up fast and is major problems of povver, housing, water and relatively cheap. Our bc e and Prime beek teams waste, dust and foreign-object control, and have become very proficient at this sort of construction work. At Tan Son Nhut the bc e petroleum, oil, and lubricants ( po l ) and ammo storage. Let us consider each of these problems has erected the equivalent of over 125 hootches briefly. (each 20' x 100') in the past year. Recentlv a Prime beef team on tdy to sea , headed by a Power. In the initial period, we felt that Civil Engineer second lieutenant, set quite a our prime and backup electrical power needs record: Manned by 29 airmen and employing could be met by units of 200 kilowatts and some 240 local nationals, this team built a smaller. The resultant shipment of a multitude 1250-man single-story frame camp—a tum-key of makes and models included high-speed units job, including roads, walks, light, water, la- designed only for a backup power role. The trines, and sewer—in less than four months. mushrooming power requirements necessitated This project involved about 95 separate build- a more flexible approach to the problem. In ings of some 160,000 square feet. Julv 1964 we had 255 units in the 5- to 150-kw The upgrading of quarters presents a con- range in sea ; by January 1966 the number had grown to over 900. More will be required— tinuing problem. Lumber of marginal quality possibly a doubling of this number—because and the need for speed dictate attention to major power plants simply cannot be pro- longer-term maintenance, repair, and possible grammed and constructed ovemight. In the replacement problems. Progress is being made, large generator area, we initially relied on and this year should see a substantial improve- some 30 to 35 200-kw units to meet our needs. ment in our position. Today we have 45 of the 200-kw size, 140 of W ater and Waste. The vast increase in the 500-kw size, and 44 of the 1000-kw units. It the need for potable water has also produced is now evident that we must plan to continue problems. Locating sources, which frequently filling a considerable gap with small units after means drilling a well, is difficult. Pumping these major plants are in operation. equipment, treatment plant, and storage facili- Prime BEEF Thirty-man Base Engineer Emergency Force (Prime BEEF) crews, deployed to Vietnam on 120-day duty tours, have done a notable job of construct- ing steel reoetm ents at Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, Da Nang, filling them with sand from old revetments.

ties have not kept pace with growing require- ments. Thus over half our bases in rvn still have a major water problem, though our Red Horse well-drilling units are bringing it under control. Soon water will no longer be the seri- ous concern it has been. Coupled with the problem of water sup- ply is waste disposal. Without adequate water, the bc e has had to resort to pit latrines and buming. In the tropics at fixed installations with crowded conditions this constitutes a serious sanitation problem requiring close attention. Waterbome sewage is the only effective an- swer, but this will be possible only with the development of adequate water systems and completion of major sewage-disposal construc- tion projects. Dust and Foreign-Object Control. Many bases have unpaved roads and open areas that have been cleared of vegetation. During the dry weather there is a serious dust problem, which is aggravated by heavy traffic. This is a considerable annovance to personnel and a real problem in the maintenance of aircraft and other sensitive equipment, virtually in the open. Paving and dust palliatives have reduced AIR OPERATIONS IN VIETNAM 79

the problem somewhat, but the real answer lies 10,000-barrel bolted-steel tanks and some in more extensive paving and planting. The welded tankage for early backup storage in our paving of roads and other areas has, to date, follow-on replacement of the bladders. As this taken a backseat to airfield construction, how- program advances, we will be in an improved ever, and this order of priority will remain for position and able to provide better service with some time to come. At sandv locations, wind- less operations and maintenance effort. blown sand creates an even more severe prob- One of the first impacts of our current lem, again requiring paving and planting. operations in sea was an urgent requirement Cover planting is receiving more attention as for facilities to store bombs and ammunition. bc e management takes hold. The difficulties in finding convenient sites that Congestion and activity have made the would meet the stringent explosives-safety con- control of foreign objects on airfield pavements siderations and then in getting access for con- a pressing one for the bc e. Rotary and vacuum struction have been serious bottlenecks. We sweepers had to be pressed into earlv service have had to improvise in many cases, and to to cover all aircraft-movement areas, and they date operations have been supported mainly are now working at full capacity to minimize with interim facilities. We look forward to jet-engine damage from foreign objects. The completion of more pennanent facilities be- loss of combat capability resulting from fore 1967. foreign-object damage has to be reduced. The Base Civil Engineer has a key role in this pro- gram of relentless preventive measures. BCE technical problems POL and Ammo Storage. We are still re- Until now, the bc e in sea has really had to Iving heavilv on the “bladder" svstems for on- scramble to keep up. In doing so, his major ef- base po l storage, with aircraft generally being fort has gone into improvised Utilities and new refueled by trucks. The bladder system was construction. Capability has just not been avail- designed as an air-transportable hydrant fuel- able for tackling the day-to-day maintenance ing system to fumish refueling support to Air problems, which have groxvn more and more Force strike units in fonvard areas. The entire criticai. Moreover, management has not kept system can be transported in one C-124 air- pace with the growth of the bc e organization craft and placed in full operation within eight and is a serious problem today. hours by an experienced crew. Operational tempo has, for the most part, As presentlv used in sea , a system consists precluded any but the most essential repairs to basicallv of eight 50,000-gallon bladders, two airfield pavements. Three of the airfields in 600-gallons-per-minute turbine pumps, and hvn are among the worlds busiest airports in two water-separator dispensing carts with con- daily aircraft movements. High volume and necting hardware. The system weighs approxi- essentially round-the-clock operations hardlv mately 35,000 pounds. The 50,000-gallon blad- permit inspection, let alone preventive and rou- der is of two-plv nylon fabric impregnated with tine maintenance as we know it at home bases. svnthetic rubber and measures 62'6" long by This means that extensive maintenance/repair 24' wide. VVhen filled, it is approximately 512' capability must be in-being, on site, to take high. full advantage of the limited time when pave- At new bases, this system is the main on- ments can revert to the bc e for work. base storage as well as the only dispensing The list of Civil Engineer problems in system for servicing aircraft. A bladder system sea would not be complete without mention- of this type can be supplied by pipeline, truck, ing several others: or drums, and additional bladder tanks can ( a) The large quantities of refrigeration and be added as required. These fíeld systems, in- air-conditioning equipment introduced to sup- tended for short-term use, pose heavy opera- port criticai materiais and processes have tion and maintenance problems for the bc e, brought significant maintenance and repair but they have been “lifesavers.” We are using problems, plus increased power requirements. 80 AIR UN1VERS1TY REV1EW

(b) Corrosion as a problem is primarily as- work, erection of inflatable structures, and sociated with exposed metais—pipes, tanks, other vertical construction, but only very lim- buildings, etc. An extensive program of ited horizontal work. protective-coating application must be incor- A good example of team capability is seen porated as part of day-to-day maintenance. in the fact that, with experience, a 30-man team Here, again, time is an impacting factor: what can erect a Type “A” (fighter) revetment in is good enough for a short haul is not neces- less than three days, 285 linear feet (lf). This sarily suitable for the longer pull. involves the fabrication of 22 tons of Steel (c) Many of the major drainage structures (almost 1800 pieces, with 11,000 bolts), seal- in sea were hastily conceived and built. A high ing, and backfilling with 630 cubic yards of water table, coupled with fairly levei airfield fill. These revetments were improvised by the terrain, makes surface drainage a real problem. Air Force, with the help of industry, from off- The rapid buildup of bases, with attendant ex- the-shelf components, and they have already pansion of impermeable surfaces, compounds proven their value. In section, the wall is 5/á' this problem. Maintenance, repair, and rebuild- wide by 12' high and extends 80' to 90' on ing of drainage structures, preferably prior to each side and 105' across the rear, a total of monsoon or other wet weather, are high-priority some 285 lf for a typical installation. In rvn, the bc e tasks. Here, again, management is a criticai teams have to date erected over seven miles of factor, for if the problems are not recorded dur- this revetment wall in various configurations. ing the monsoons the next bc e will face them We are extremely pleased with Prime beef again and without prior planning. results. To quote one base commander: “lf I need it now, I give it to Prime beef . I have Prime BEEF never heard the team at my base use the phrase ‘We can’t do it’!” Or to quote the bc e of a large One can readily appreciate that the bc e, sea base: “Without Prime beef , I couldn’t have on a base with 75 to 150 usaf aircraft and some existed.” We have leamed a lot about manning, 3000 to 5000 usaf personnel, plus a like num- equipping, deploying, and using these teams. ber of vnaf and U.S. Army aircraft and per- This experience will go a long way toward giv- sonnel, is a busy man. The scope of his re- ing us a real credible capability to provide sponsibilities is vast, as is the importance of his needed ce support to Air Force needs anywhere job to accomplishment of the Air Force mis- and anytime. It has been said that “nothing sion. No wonder, then, in sea when one encoun- great or substantial was ever achieved without ters a base or wing commander his bc e is usu- enthusiasm.” In Prime beef everybody has been ally with him! enthusiastic—airmen, officers, commanders. As an indication of its magnitude, from January 1965 to January 1966 our bc e force in Red Horse sea expanded six- to sevenfold in terms of people as well as items of heavy equipment. Notwithstanding the fine results, Prime Despite this growth, there were many essen- beef as a tdy concept was intended and de- tial tasks the force could not meet, especially signed to meet needs of relatively short dura- in the light construction area. tion. To fill the gap on a longer-term basis, the The Air Force thus resorted to its previ- Air Force now has in the field its first Red Horse ously established Prime beef forces. Under this or Civil Engineering Heavy Repair Squadrons. concept, we have had 34 teams totaling about The first two of these units were organized, 1000 men on tdy in Vietnam over the past 9 to trained, equipped, and deployed to sea in less 10 months. (The one headed by the second than four months. Additional units are now in lieutenant is more typical than not.) The proj- training. ects generally assigned these teams have in- These 400-man units give the Air Force cluded revetment construction, troop camp field commander organic Civil Engineer capa- construction, Utilities work, light structure bility short of that we would hope to have Red Horse squadmns construct, install, or repair structures on a longer-term basis than Prime BEEF forces. With the help of Army and Navy, the Air Force got its first two 400- man Red Horse units to Vietnam within four months. There, typical jobs include erecting the Steel for a 30 x 60-foot prefabricated building and bolting POL tank lid in place. A Prime BEEF team on TDY from Air Training Ci mand pours the cement floor for a building at Da Na

provided by Army construction battalions. gave the Air Force a real helping hand in get- Typical construction or installation projects ting Red Horse units trained, equipped, and assigned the initial squadrons have included moved out in such a short period of time. This cantonment areas ( including hootches, latrines, attitude of helpful assistance was wonderful mess facilities, personnel and medicai facili- and certainlv appreciated. It reflected what we ties, with Utilities); supplv areas; ammo sup- all know: there s plentv of work out there to plv areas; motor pool areas; base drainage Sys- go around, and we ean use all the help we tems; bolted-steel po l tanks; runway barriers; can get. engine test cell pads; runway lighting; liquid oxygen pads and shelters; aerial port facilities; lessons learned vehicle maintenance shops; utility systems; in- flatable shelters; and revetments. Some of these The most important lessons for engineers are militarv construction program projects that have come out of sea are not startling. which are assigned to Red Horse, by theater Manv of them we had learned before and construction authorities, as being in our overall somehow let slip by. best interest. We know that there will be some Time. Regardless of how we might wish “shakedown" in manning and equipping of otherwise, it just takes a certain amount of these units based on our experience. We are time to get things done. For this reason, the getting this feedback and cranking it into more we can improve anticipatory engineer follow-on units. planning and contingency planning, the bet- At this point we in the Air Force publicly ter off we will be. The more we can preselect thank the Army and Navy, not only the engi- altemate sites or prestock kits for airfield mat- neers of these Services but others also who ting, lighting, power generation, water supply, iicing lumber for neto buildings at Da Nang consti- tes another phase of Prime BEEF construction work.

pre-engineered buildings, etc., the fewer our headac-hes and the more rapid our reaction in time of need. Saving time by better planning is well il- lustrated by the rather widespread problems encountered in sea in the detennination of ag- gregate sourc-es and their production. In manv cases wider and earlier source selection would have insured much earlier high-volume deliv- ery to the job site. In a like manner the earlier installation of heavier high-volume aggregate cnishing, screening, and handling equipment would have significantly aided in providing the tremendous volumes of sound aggregates and suitable fíll materiais generally so badly needed in the verv early davs of on-site construction. More and more-timely source exploration and higher-volume equipment are essentials and must be planned for.

Design. In the main, in sea , we are con- cemed with relativelv simple structures. Re- flecting this, our design must be kept simple. More important, our design must be keyed to 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the materiais on hand or those known to be engineering matters that can certainly stand reliably available. Designs must be flexible and more research and development effort. We in must permit easv and quick substitution of the Air Force are working on this and have a materiais. There is considerable merit in hav- comprehensive program moving. Within the ing a designer/contractor unity rather than militarv engineering community, we sense the design by one element and construction by need for a médium by which we can exchange another. ideas and keep each other informed of our Research and Development. It is clear that efforts, so that we can speed progress and if we had not had AM-2 airfield matting for avoid duplication. use in sea , we vvould have been in deep trou- ble. The mat is not a substitute for a good base, as we know. The better the base, the less main- E xperien ce is a great teacher, and we have tenance and the longer the mat life. We have leamed a lot in sea . We have a lot yet to di- not leamed all we need to know about the gest as well as to leam. The Air Force Civil placing and maintenance of mat, but we will. Engineers recognize this, but we face the fu- We have improvised airfield lighting kits; ture with confidence. We are a small part of the same for revetments. We have used po l the total military engineer effort in sea . We are, bladder tank systems and “invasion” pipelines. however, proud of being a part of the “team” We have tried inflatable as well as relocatable out there and appreciate all the assistance given shelters, and we can make more progress here. us by our sister Services. By continuing to work We are depending greatly on pre-engineered together, we will all give the military effort the buildings, a wide open field. outstanding engineer support it must and will We suggest that there are innumerable have. Hq United States Air Force USAF HOSPITAL CLARK AND THE VIETNAM CASUALTIES r

COLONEL Ak THUF B. TARROW, USAF ( mc)

T THE FOOT of the Zambales Moun- pital for further stabilization. The others are A . tains, near Manila in the Philippines, sent on their way in as little as six hours, but stands a new multimillion-dollar medicai fa- usuallv in about 24 hours. cility, the usaf Hospital Clark. This beautifully Air evacuation casualties from Southeast designed building, set among cocoanut palms Asia are normally transported into Clark Air and flowering bushes, is a welcome sight to Base by C-118 or C-130 aircraft specially con- the wearv Vietnam casualties as they arrive in figured to provide maximum comfort as well as ambulances from the nearby flight line. The space economy. In early 1965 only one flight usaf Hospital Clark is one of the Air Force’s was scheduled per week from Southeast Asia. best equipped and staffed medicai centers. It Now there are fifteen scheduled flights, with is ideallv situated to render medicai Service in an average of five additional special flights per the Southeast Asia conflict. week. The aircraft arrive daily, manned by ex- Casualties received from the medicai units perienced flight nurses and aeromedical flight located in the zone of hostilities are routed by technicians. Selected medicai specialists or the Medicai Regulating Officer in Saigon to the flight surgeons, from either usaf Hospital Clark various hospitais in and outside the Pacific or rvn hospitais, are on board when patients theater where specialized treatment is avail- are known to be very seriously injured. able. The usaf Hospital Clark, only 3 to 4 hours’ The Thirteenth Air Force band salutes the flying time from the zone of hostilities, has sick and wounded as each flight arrives. This become the center for care of many of the seri- added welcoming touch has a profoundly mov- ously wounded casualties. Here, also after re- ing effect on many of the combat evacuees and examination by fully qualified specialists, some their attendants. Immediately upon landing, casualties destined for further transportation each patient is checked by a physician while to other hospitais may be admitted to the hos- still in the aircraft. At this point a patients 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW evacuation schedule may be changed because hepatitis are frequently encountered because of a reverse in his condition. He may be sent of the living conditions in the zone of conflict. direct to the usaf Hospital Clark instead of the Most of these patients are treated and retumed 19th Casualty Staging Unit transienl vvards. to duty. Ambulances meet each flight at the airfield About six percent of the air evacuation and immediatelv take the more criticai cases to patients are psychiatric cases. These range from the main hospital. Dome lights flashing, the extreme psychiatric disturbances to character- ambulances—the larger ones are air-conditioned ological disorders, brought on by the stresses —make the two-mile trip carefully. The less of combat or from being in isolated areas. Char- criticai patients, who will be evacuated still acter disorders are dealt vvith administratively. further, are sent to the nearby 19th Casualty Psychosomatic illnesses are treated jointly by Staging Flight transient vvards. Administrative the Psychiatric and Internai Medicine Depart- matters are quickly completed by liaison offi- ments, and these patients are usually retumed cers and enlisted men of the Air Force, Army, to duty. Very few flvers are admitted for psy- Navy, Marine, and Republic of Korea forces. chiatric illness, attesting to the effectiveness of The 19th Casualty Staging Flight vvith 250 beds the Air Force selection process. Fewer battle- is responsible for processing all casualties upon fatigue cases have appeared than had been an- arrival. Its vvards and administrative buildings, ticipated, perhaps because of the elite regular next to the main hospital, xvere the hospital troops present for duty. until 1965. On arrival, the casualties are separated management of USAF Hospital Clark into three categories: those who will remain For those casualties needing immediate ovemight and be air-evacuated to another fa- surgical care, usaf Hospital Clark has avail- cilitv the next dav, those who are too ill to able the latest in anesthesiology and operat- travei and must either be fullv treated at Clark ing equipment. Its laboratory not onlv provides or stabilized before further movement, and sophisticated clinicai testing but maintains, those Air Force patients who can be treated and through volunteer donations by Clark per- retumed to duty vvithin 120 days. It is the task sonnel, a complete blood bank. Patients vvith of the 19th Casualty Staging Flight to see that cardiac arrhythmia (abnormal heartbeat) can these casualties receive necessary care and com- be treated with the hospitai s cardioverter, a forts, to double-check each patient for any remarkable piece of electronic equipment that change in condition, to take care of orders and first stops the heart and then restarts it in a other administrative necessities, and to prop- nomial beating pattem. erly direct their further movement. An artificial-kidney team is functioning at Roughlv about 35 percent of the casualties Clark for patients with disease or injuries dis- brought into usaf Hospital Clark are the result rupting kidney function. Most such patients of hostile action. Of these, more than half re- have been wounded, but some suffer from se- quire the attention of an orthopedist, for frac- vere “black water fever malaria,” vvith precipi- tures, amputations, etc. About one-fourth of tation of blood constituents in the kidneys. the hostile-action casualties have head and The artificial kidney cleans out accumulating chest wounds requiring the care of the thoracic waste in the blood, supplying kidney function and neurosurgeons, or facial injuries requiring until the “sick” kidney can heal. This unit has the maxillofacial team ( otorhinolaryngologists performed in the first three months of its op- and dental surgeons). The remaining hostile- eration three times as many dialyses as a action casualties are usually general surgery similar unit did in its entire eighteen months cases. of operation during the Korean conflict. Time Approximately 55 to 60 percent of the cas- is so important a factor when kidney function ualties from Southeast Asia have diseases rather is disrupted that this unit often means the than wounds. Malaria, amoebic dysentery, and difference between life and death. Screening Vietnam casualties on inbound C-130 Flight nurse attends casualties en route to Clark.

Ambulances and ambulance buses at Clark Air Base receive the offloading sick and wounded. Radiologists scan X-ray for skull-imbedded shrapnel.

The artificial kidney team treats patient with ma- chine that substitutes for body kidney functions.

Night or day, skill and selfless devotion typify the care given Vietnam casualties at USAF Hospital Clark. From the battle zones of Vietnam to USAF Hospital Clark in the Philippines is often a matter of as little as six hours. The distance from Saigon to Clark is 898 miles; Da Nang to Clark, 799 miles.

The Radiology Department plays a sig- bassies, the Peace Corps, and Military Assist- nificant role in the treatment of Southeast ance Groups as far west as New Delhi, índia, Asian casualties. Along \vith its usual function and as far south as Inkarta, Indonésia. It helps of X-raying for fractures, ulcers, tuberculosis, keep two 75-bed tactical hospitais and three etc., the Radiology Department is concemed squadron medicai elements trained and ready with the loc-ation and identifícation of shrap- to deplov to anv area in the theater. It takes nel fragments imbedded in the various body care of food inspection. It offers education areas. and training to Filipino intems and residents Casualties who are severely injured and and to medicai officers from other countries retained in the hospital receive physical ther- under the Military Assistance Program. During apy in the main clinic or on the wards. This manned space flights, the hospital keeps ten section also assists in cleaning infected wounds. “walking” blood donors in readiness to meet A program of Whirlpool and sonic therapy its responsibility for care of any injured astro- speeds maximum rehabilitation of joints and naut. Meanwhile, construction proceeds on an muscles for patients scheduled to return to expansion of the facility to add 100 hospital duty. beds, a 300-bed casualty staging unit, and larger clinics, laboratory, X-ray and adminis- trative space. other hospital respomibilities

usaf Hospital Clark, while concentrating A new chapter was written in Air Force his- on its primary mission of caring for the war torv when Hospital Clark was called upon to casualties, carries on other normal functions. fumish general hospital care to all branches Its research program assists in controlling and of the armed forces during wartime. Every- conquering tropical diseases such as malaria, one can rest assured that the care given is the tropical sprue, and Japanese encephalitis. Its best possible with this superb medicai facility Medicai Depot provides an average of over and the wholehearted dedication of its profes- half a million dollars’ worth of supplies monthly sional and ancillarv staffs. to 37 accounts, including all Air Force units in Southeast Asia as well as American cm- USAF Hospital Clark, PACAF In My Opinion

M ANAGER-SPECIALIST HELATIONSHIPS: A THEORY

M ajor Lawrence B. T atum

ILITARY organizations today have concem the entire society, or at least large seg- M grown to gargantuan proportions. It is ments of it.° the thesis of this article that neither m ilitary The requirement for meshing knowledge commanders nor their subordinates have and large-scale organization tends to produce understood adequatelv how to ensure the effec- two groups wliich our contemporary literature tive functioning of their organizations because labeis bureaucrats ( managers) and intellectuals they have not seen that current organizations (specialists). These are the repositories of succeed or fail on the basis of how well they knowledge. Members of these two groups ac- marry discipline and creativity. VVhile corpora- quire societys leadership positions. The rela- tions and other units operative in the modem tion between the bureaucrat and the intellec- civilian world also have this problem , many tual is, essentially, the relationship between dis- characteristies of m ilitary Service make the nec- cipline and creativity.00 This relationship is essary coupling of discipline and creativity one of the most criticai problems of our time much harder for the m ilitary than for most and can be neither wished away nor ignored. professions. By presenting a thesis regarding the proper Eighteenth and nineteenth century social relationship between modem-day managers thought was dom inated largely by the relation- and specialists, perhaps I can illustrate how ship between propertied and nonpropertied difficult the marrying of discipline and creativ- classes. In our century the place of propertv has ity really is—especiallv in the military, where been taken by knowledge because our political, tradition and the necessity for control in com- econom ic, and social w ell-being depends to an bat have led frequently to an emphasis on ever increasing degree on our understanding of Science, technology, the social Sciences, and administrative technique. Being industrialized •Many of these ideas are expressed by Richard Pipes in and urbanized, twentieth-century man bands The Russinn Intclligentsia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), Foreword. _ _ together in large-scale organizations so that he °»For the purposes of this article, I use “creativity’ to mean advancing specialty knowledge within the organization may bring knowledge to bear on problem s that rather than increasing knowledge of management techniques. IN MY OPINION 91 discipline at the expense of creativity.® edge expand exponentially, the manager can- The generalizations I am about to make not possiblv be the best specialist in the organ- are admittedly inexact. A man is seldom exclu- ization. Even if he was chosen to be the man- sively either a manager or a specialist. Far ager because he was the best of the specialists more frequently his job calls for him to be a (and this becomes daily more unlikely), the little of both. Furthermore, whether a man press of his managerial duties ensures that he plays the role of manager or specialist is often will not long be the best specialist. Therefore, a function of his personality as well as his posi- he must manage, not dictate. He must be recep- tion. Nevertheless, I beheve the designations of tive to ideas from below— and not only to prob- manager and specialist are meaningful tenns lems conceming specialty methods. He must to describe different types of persons necessarv be receptive also to specialists who offer man- for the effeetive operation of large-scale organ- agement judgments, because the operational izations. For instance, in the military organiza- institutional environment always affects the tion, “manager” most nearly reíers to the com- specialists’ abilitv to exercise their expertise. In mander—or to anvone higher in the organiza- this area, the success of the manager is a func- tional command chain than the actual user of tion of his willingness and ability to get his skill. “Speciahst,” then, would refer to the oper- specialists to maximize their capabilities. ator—the pilot, the instructor, or anvone whose Third, the manager, especially the military primaiy task is to perform a skillful function manager, must remember that the description deemed necessary to his Service. of his job as a "manager of specialists” is differ- The following observations seek to adapt ent from traditional formulations. Therefore, organizational practice to the realities of or- many of the tried and true leadership “princi- ganizational existence. pies” may no longer be applicable, particularly First, the manager should remember that those based on the assumption that the man- he is a manager of specialists. His primary re- ager knows best (because of experience fac- sponsibility is to create the environment in tors) and does not need the advice of lower- which his specialists can successfullv applv ranking specialists. their skills. He must understand their needs and Fourth, the manager must guard against provide for them to the greatest practicable de- excessive centralization and standardization. gree. He must explain the whys and wherefores The specialist needs guidelines regarding ob- of environmental factors imposed by higher jectives and information conceming the opera- leveis so that the specialists (1) understand tions of organizations whose specialties com- organizational goals and bring their expertise plement his ov\n—but he does not need point- to bear in the most efficient manner and (2) can bv-point instructions conceming job methods tell the manager when (and why) those im- because he knows best how to apply his spe- posed environmental factors inhibit the special- cialty to a given task. Also, his success as a ist’s abilitv to aid in the accomplishment of specialist is directlv proportional to the extent objectives. In this latter instance, the manager he is free to apply hi,s specialized abilities. Fur- has the duty to ensure that higher headquarters thermore, he will feel a greater responsibilitv understands that its directives are impairing and loyalty to his organization if he is allowed the accomplishment of organizational objec- to participate actively in Creative as well as tives. mechanical endeavors. Second, the manager must understand that Of all the requirements placed upon the he is a manager and not a specialist. In today’s manager, the dietum not to overcentralize and complex world, where the boundaries of knowl- overstandardize is the most difficult. Perhaps this is so because the tendency in large-scale organizations is to hold the manager respon-

The management theory outlined herein must be altered sible for all the errors ( including sins of omis- radicaUy for com bat and other crisis situations. M ost situations m the military, as in other large-scale organizations, are not sion as well as commission) of his subordinates. cnsis situations. While one must hope that the higher-level man- 92 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW

agers will come to understand how destructive T hese, then, are the difficult re- the “responsibility” principie can be, the lower- quirements placed upon the manager by the level manager should, I think, have the courage, necessity of marrying discipline and creativity. wisdom, and integrity to err on the side of But what responsibilities does the specialist giving too much initiative to subordinates (if have? he must err at all). Ironically, in the final analy- First, the specialist working in a large sis, a manager who is afraid to let his organiza- organization must understand that he is not tion be judged on its overall long-term perform- a specialist for the specialty’s sake. The special- ance probably will be fired—because his spe- ist is trained because his organization (e.g., cialists will be operating normally at substand- the military) has established a need for ex- ard leveis. pertise in a certain specialty field ( e.g., opera- Fifth, the top-level manager must be con- tions, research and development, political Sci- stantly on guard against growing bureaucracy ence, administration) to accomplish its overall at his levei and at all leveis between him and objectives. The specialist must identify with the line specialist. Perhaps this requirement is those objectives and believe that his perform- no more than complementary to our fourth re- ance of the specialty can contribute to the quirement, because centralization requires accomplishment of the objectives. He must not large staffs. Staffs tend to isolate the manager identify with the specialty per se, as he may from his specialists, precluding the interaction then pursue specialty interests unrelated to the necessary for effective operation of contempo- objectives of his organization. For instance, a rary large-scale organizations. Managers’ jobs rocket scientist told to build an ic bm must not must be kept few and must be justified as being work on space platform technology simply be- vitally necessary. As Parkinson says, energetic cause he likes working on space platforms. managers are bound to create enough work However, if the scientist believes that his or- ( imposed on specialists) to justify the existence ganizations objectives can be better fulfilled of their own jobs. Under bureaucracy gone by work on space platforms, he has the duty wild, the poor specialist has little time to oper- to present that argument to the manager. ate because he is too busy fulfilling other re- Second, the specialist must believe that he quirements laid on him by managers. Further- has the duty (not just the option) to communi- more, promotion, prestige, and monetary re- cate specialty views to his manager, who can- wards must not be so aligned that the ambitious not be effective otherwise. These views not only will seek only (and always) to be managers. update the managers knowledge of the special- Good managers are invaluable; but there must ties he manages but enable him to understand be excellent specialists to manage or the mis- how the environment he creates affects the sion itself will be prostituted. specialist’s ability to operate. Loyalty demands If these five requirements hold, the mili- —not prohibits—such upw'ard communication, tary managers principal task can be reduced to regardless of its criticai nature. Of course, hu- this: He must inculcate in his specialists a man nature being what it is, the specialist must motivation to the missions of the organization, be tactful and use good judgment regarding the Service, and the country, and he must do his communication timing and method. part to ensure that the missions of all three are Third, the military specialist must realize complementary. If he does not, the specialists that he is a specialist and, in the final analysis, will have loyalty problems that are inherently cannot possibly know all the factors that in- demotivating. Finally, the manager must be fluence ultimate decisions on preferred mis- impeccably honest and his example must be sions and methods at country, Service, or organ- of the highest order, because the specialists he ization levei. He has a duty to find out as much manages are intelligent and simply will not be as he can about preferred missions and methods motivated by men whose arguments and per- —and the manager has a duty so to inform him. suasions are unrelated to the specialists’ con- Still, it is inevitable that he will be uninformed ception of reality. on many occasions. It is also inevitable that IN MY OPINION 93 intelligent, responsible people will differ some- slamming the door shut. Although the specialist times in the selection of altematives. This may realize that loyalty demands his upward means that the specialist must exercise humility projection of ideas and criticism, few are likely and tolerance conceming the views of others to continue their efforts to the point they risk and must recognize that the manager, not he, either punishment within or ouster from the will be held responsible by higher leveis for organization. mission accomplishment. He must be willing to do his best on personally undesirable as well as desirable tasks. However, the specialist can T his analysis of manager-specialist, com- hardly be expected to react in a “do or die” mander-operator problems is, I believe, one manner if managers do not observe the realities way to demonstrate how difficult is the busi- of modem complex organizations which we ness of establishing the proper relationship be- have discussed. tween discipline and creativity. The problem Finally, assuming that proper motivations cannot be wished away. It requires good will are existent ( and this, I believe, is usually the and understanding on the part of all managers case), communication is the oil that smooths and specialists or combinations thereof. We in a proper manager-specialist relationship. While the military especially need to understand the fault for blocking or impeding communica- managers requirements because seldom will tion lines may well be shared, it is the manager we be purely specialists. We deceive ourselves who has the greater responsibility. The man- if we believe that the specialists below are in- ager who says (or indicates by his actions) herently Creative, regardless of the impedi- that he will not listen to ideas from below is ments we place in their way. Vietnam Books and Ideas

OUR STRATEGIC

DILEMMAS A

D r . D avid W. T arr

HARLES BURTON MARSHALL has re- clude Strategic Studies as a major subject cently observed that the application of area, on a par with American Government, the term “strategy” as a “synonym of higher Comparative Politics, and International Rela- policy” is very much in vogue, not only because tions. it “souncls big” but because If the militarv profession sometimes feels strategy suggests the idea of discriminating that civilian scholars are encroaching upon choices. More dimensions are implicit in it than its domain, that sentiment is profoundly mis- in any other word. Any response or purpose placed. It is not that strategy is too important inight qualify to be called a policy, but a strat- to be left to the generais; the point is that strat- egy seems to suggest deliberateness, scope, and egy is too complex to be left to one profession. romplex calculation. So probably the preva- The strategists of our society have con- lence of the term reflects a sense of our having tributed measurably to the advancement of gone beyond the simplicities characteristic of strategic thought over the past decade and earlier times in world affairs.1 more. It is becoming increasingly difficult to Not only is “strategy” ubiquitous but the keep up with the proliferating literature of the “strategist" also. This is, of course, a sign of the field. Fortunately in recent vears a number of times. Books on strategy abound, as do centers “readers" on nátional strategy have been pub- for the studv of strategy and the scholars who lished, collections of the more significant ar- populate them. Universities now recognize it ticles on a wide varietv of topics subsumed as a “field” of study, enhancing the collabora- under the subject of national strategy. Profes- tion of academic and militarv professionals’ sor Henry A. Kissinger, a prominent “strate- efforts to elaborate and analyze the subject. gist” in his own right, has produced one of the Even the annual professional meetings of the best collections of readings currently available.f American Political Science Association now in- In the Kissinger reader the main problems

f Henry A. Kissinger (ed.), Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readings (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, $8.50), 477 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 95

of American strategy are explored, analyzed, have arisen because the deterrent enterprise and argued by academic and govemment de- has on the whole been so successful that, in fense analvsts. The authors ( and in many cases the minds of many, the fear of aggression from the selections) are already well known. Among Communist sources has been supplanted by a them are the expected members of the strategy fear of undue provocation by the United States. “establishment,” including Herman Kahn, Al- The second and related dilemma arising bert Wohlstetter, Thomas C. Schelling, and out of the success of deterrence pertains to the Malcom Hoag; some notable critics of the tactical and strategic alterations of the adver- main course of U.S. strategic doctrine, such as saries’ approach to the West: there is a per- Arthur Waskow, Leo Szilard, and Pierre Gal- ceptible tendency to avoid the dangers of lois; and a fevv official spokesmen, including direct confrontation and to explore indirect, Dean Rusk and Robert S. McNamara. ambiguous, and by and large more subtle ways The book is divided into fixe groups of of exploiting military power for aggressive readings: U.S. strategic doctrine and defense purposes. This development raises at least two policv, alliances, insurgency, arms control, and political problems: First, critics of American national security organizations. In the real deterrence policies tend to assert that this world, of course, such security problems are trend demonstrates that nuclear weapons are so intertwined as to defy separate treatment. no longer politically or militarily relevant to As a consequence, most of the selections in the contingencies most likely to arise. This fact treat more than one categorv. point of view ignores the contribution of nu- Greatest emphasis is on strategic issues clear deterrence to the avoidance of direct con- that relate to the use and control of nuclear frontation; yet it is politically significant that weapons. This is perhaps justified because many critics are beginning to think along these nuclear weapons in themselves constitute a lines. Second, the more subtle and indirect grave danger to mankind and also because the methods of aggression of themselves consti- United States has come to relv heavily upon tute a grave problem for American security their deterring functions. because, quite obviously, ambiguous and low- Although the emphasis on nuclear-related level violence is the most difficult to deter and strategic problems is appropriate, it is regret- —as experience in Vietnam suggests—the most table that only a few of the selections concem difficult to defend against. the dilemmas that arise from the successes of It is somewhat disappointing, therefore, nuclear deterrence. I have two salient ones in to find that Professor Kissinger has included mind. The first arises out of the obvious fact only two selections explicitly concemed with that as a strategy of deterrence succeeds over a unconventional ( guerrilla) warfare and only a period of time, the argument is strengthened few others in which the relationship between that the adversary never had any intention of nuclear deterrence and the challenge of in- attacking in the first place. This paradox is surgency warfare are discussed in any detail. mentioned briefly by the editor in his intro- The rather sparse attention paid to the wider duction, where he notes that "an effective de- ramifications of insurgency warfare does not, terrent strategy may thus have built-in pres- however, seriously detract from the general sures to strengthen the arguments of those worth of the readings. The major strategic is- who argue that a defense effort is unneces- sues are discussed with considerable skill and sary.”- Unfortunatelv, none of the selections Irom a variety of viewpoints.3 Some critics of treats this point, important as it is to the pol- American defense policv are likely to find Kis- icy process in the United States. It seems fairly singers selections “unbalanced” because in- clear, at least from this reviewers perspective, sufficient challenge is made to the basic pur- that many of the political problems currently poses of U.S. security policies. But for those plaguing American policy-makers—particularly who are interested in the debate over the best domestic and foreign dissent over the course combination of means ( and doctrinal guidance of U.S. security policies in Europe and Asia— for their employment) for adequate deterrent 96 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW and defensive effects, the Kissinger reader is as well? This question is not often faced di- likely to be regarded as an instructive, thought- rectly in the book of readings under review. provoking collection. The “schools” of strategy are, however, well This point, the probable difference in reac- represented, and the reader would do well, tion of the fundamental dissenter on the one after reading the arguments which the authors hand and the moderate critic and supporter on have generally developed in the context of the other hand, brings me back to an earlier nato and deterrence of the Soviet Union, to point: the paradox of successful deterrence. In apply them to Asia and the prospects for de- whatever troubles the United States currently terring China and North Vietnam. finds itself involved, from the policies of De The two contexts, Europe and Asia, are Gaulle to the challenge of the Viet Cong, there of course fundamentally different. Whatever is a signiücant and growing munber of critics the differences among the nato allies, they do who regard U.S. security objectives themselves have basic shared political values, prospering to be dangerously out of date. A rising chorus economies, and deepening self-confidence aris- of voices contends that the Communist States ing out of a sense of relative security from ex- should not be treated as a single, undifferenti- ternai threats. The United States is deeply com- ated adversarv or “bloc,” that few if any of the mitted to the defense of Europe, as manifested Communist govemments seek extensive terri- in its long-term major deployment of American torial expansion, and that, in any case, exces- military povver on the Continent, backed by sive intransigence on the part of the United enonnous strategic retaliatory power. The States stands in the way of political accommo- United States may differ with France over fu- dations and a more “natural” set of relation- ture doctrines and military arrangements for ships between the Communist nations and the maintaining an adequate security svstem for West. For many of them clétente, rather than Europe, but the very fact that France feels se- deterrence, should be the main object of Amer- cure enough to advocate a course that is partly ican strategv. independent of the United States is itself an The point is, of course, that clétente is indication of the success of the Atlantic secur- quite probably more likely to be accomplished ity system. through deterrence than without it. In dealing But whereas in Europe the American with a group of nations dedicated to objectives commitment has been firm, continental, and explicitlv at odds with our own—indeed a group based on mutual interests, in Asia U.S. involve- which, whatever its internai disagreements ment has been largely peripheral, hesitant, and might be, has shown itself both in ideological plagued by diverging interests. The Korean commitment and in action to be inclined to War was preceded by decisions by the Joint resort to force and the threat of force to achieve Chiefs of Staff and an explicit statement by the its goals—the U.S. is more likely to reach ac- Secretary of State that America s defense pe- commodation when they perceive that their rimeter extended along the island chain from objectives cannot be reached by military means. Japan to the Philippines—i.e., that no part of the It is certainly highly probable, although not Asian mainland was included. American com- beyond the realm of argument, that the Soviet mitment to Taiwan and the Pescadores has Union has adopted a course of peaceful or been a matter of continuai domestic political competitive “coexistence” in prudent reaction dispute, leading mainland China to test this to the overvvhelming strength of the Western policy on occasion. American determination in coalition. The United States obviously seeks to Southeast Asia has at most been uncertain over persuade the Communists in Asia that similar the past two decades and despite the creation caution on their part is required in that region of a paper aDiance ( sea t o ) did not involve a of the world. significant display of power until American Are the deterrent doctrines that have combat forces were sent to South Vietnam. In largely succeeded in providing a firm founda- the light of these considerations, Américas tion for security in Europe applicable to Asia commitment to defend the nations along the BOOKS AND IDEAS 97

south and southeast Asian are has been no- a plausible message of capacity and determina- where near as plausible as its commitment to tion to potential adversaries. Yet ( and here is defend Europe. In Asia the problem has not where the largest vacuum exists in the Ameri- been to maintain credibilitv but to establish can literature of deterrence) how is it possible credibilitv. to convey such clear commitment when, both The “agonv of power” that the United within our own domestic political framework States is now experiencing in Asia arises from and in the intemational political coalitions we another dilemma of deterrence: the effort to have constructed, public dissent and dispute estabhsh a credible commitment, now manifest are an inherent, indeed an essential, aspect of in the war in Vietnam, is inherently escalatory. the political process? The enforcement of po- It is not in the interest of the Communist pow- litical solidarity endangers democracy and un- ers for that credibiíity to be estabhshed. These dermines voluntary alliance. Since free associa- escalatory risks, which the United States ap- tions require persuasion rather than coercion pears to be willing to accept, frighten allies and for long-term effectiveness, the elegant logic neutrals who are largelv helpless in the face of of particular deterrence doctrines is likely to be the power struggle. They fear the immediate compromised at every stage by the requisites consequences of escalation more than they do of polities. the long-term and less demonstrable conse- America^ role and responsibilities in world quences of the failure of American securitv ob- affairs are subject to perennial review. That is jectives in Asia. Manv domestic critics of Amer- not too heavy a price to pay for democracy. ican foreign pohcy share these fears. One might wish, at times, that the review was If there emerges a consensus among the more thorough, more informed, and less biased strategists who have contributed to the Kis- by preconceived conclusions, but polities is singer reader, it is this: whatever the character hardly ever that tame or rational. The strategic of the militarv posture necessarv for deterrence doctrines and defense policies of the United and defense, the United States must exhibit a States must be publicly debated so that the clear willingness to meet and defeat aggression. problems of national strategy are widely under- Conveying the will to act and the determination stood. Then the executive branch can base its to see the action through to a successful con- policies upon a broad and supportive political clusion requires a psychological operation in- consensus. Kissingers Problems of National volving an orchestration of militarv power, in Strategy contributes substantially to that ob- relevant varieties and strategic locales, in con- jective by providing both the professional and cert with sets of poliey statements from Ameri- the lavman an informed and provocative col- can and allied govemment officials that carry lection of readings on national securitv affairs. Madison, Wisconsin

Note» authors in appropriate "schools” of thought, I suggest reference Charles Burton Marshall, “Strategy and Purposes in to the following: Robert A. Levine, “The Arms Debate,” in United States Foreign Poliey,’' in Robert A. Coldwin (ed.), The Polities of Military Poliey (Security Studies Project, Uni- in22n<^ t*lert W ar (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, versity of Califórnia, Los Angeles, 1965), pp. 9-13; and William 19o5), pp. 2—3. R. Van Cleave, “The Nuclear Weapons Debate,” United States 2. Xissinger, p. 6. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 92, No. 5 (May 1966), pp. 3. For those who may need some guidance in placing HISTORY AND THE LONG-RANGE PLANNER

M ajor John Schlight

S A HISTORIAN I am periodically that of Hitler. The book was bom in a seminar A . brought up short by rebuffs to my craft on military affairs held at the Institute for on the part of long-range military strategists Advanced Studies, Princeton, Newjersey. Edit- and others vvho have made a concern for the fu- ed by Edward Mead Earle, it bore the title ture their principal occupation. You historians The Alakers of M odem Strategy. Contributors have nothing to offer, they imply. Part of the to this volume trained their historical acuity on blame for this attitude rests, I am sure, on his- the question of continuity and diversity in the torians themselves, who too often imply that military thinking of the preceding four and a history repeats itself. When history fails to per- half centuries. Although the book contained form the second time, the entire profession essays by twenty different authors, it was seems to be discredited. This is unfortunate held together by certain well-defined themes. because history’s main contribution to plan- Among the more prominent of these were the ners for the future lies elsewhere—in the realm relationship between war on the one hand and of perspective. The future is anchored in the society, politics, economics, and technology past, and history is the story of the past. It is on the other; the militia versus the professional my conviction that when the moment for im- army; the role of discipline in military forces; mediate decision conceming the future arrives, limited versus unlimited warfare; whether war the planners greatest ally is sound perspective is primarily an art or a science; and the relative on the past. A good example of the type of book value of the offensive and the defensive. Each that can help in the building of such a per- of these topics, plus a host of subsidiarv ones, spective is a recently published volume entitled was handled with the scholarly depth that one The Theory and Practice of War. f A fruitful would expect from such a galaxv of contrib- discussion of this work itself requires a bit of utors. perspective. The book s subsequent tenacity is witness Twenty-five years ago, on the eve of our to its value. Despite its age it continues to form entrance into the Second World War, a volume the basis for many, if not most, undergraduate of essays by leading contemporary historians courses in military history. It has been used appeared which traced the evolution of mili- with success at the Air Force Academy in the tary theory from the time of Machiavelli to basic Military History course, as well as in the

fMichael Howard (ed.), The Theory and Practice of War: Essays Presented to Captain B. H. Liddell Hart (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965, $10.00), x and 376 pp. BOOKS AND IDEAS 99

advanced course in Military Theory. Extensive tire period 1870-1914 by Jay Luvaas. Brian references to it are found among the footnotes Bond of the University of Liverpool highlights of articles on military theory appearing in pro- the conservatism of the British cavalry and the fessional joumals. Its appearance earlier this resistance of human nature to change. Each of year in paperback gives promise of even more the essays in this section is brief and concise widespread dissemination of its contents. while lacking nothing in thoroughness. To- Yet The Makers of M odem Strategy suf- gether they provide an intellectual joumey from fers from one serious defect— it is dated. VVhile theory to practice and present a panoramic this is true to some degree of everything pub- view of the application (or misapplication) of lished, it is particularly serious in this instance. the theories of Jomini and Clausewitz by the For in 1941 the world was on the threshold of major actors in the First World War. the atomic revolution—a development which The middle third of the volume concen- has proved important enough to force a re- trates on the two interwar decades, 1919-1939. thinking of much previous strategic doctrine. The essays in this part display a less even qual- The imphcations of the nuclear age have chal- ity than those of the earlier section. While the lenged manv of the conclusions found in Earle’s overall objective of showing the influence of work and have demanded, as a minimum, the the theories of Liddell Hart and others on the publication of an updated volume to carry for- armies of the period is attained, several of the ward the story of military theory into the atomic chapters lack the historical approach and re- period. It is mv opinion that this new volume, main mere memoirs. The best of the lot is The Theory and Practice of War, serves this Maurice MatlofFs story of the quiet revolution purpose. Like its predecessor, this is a volume in strategic thinking that prepared the United of essays by military historians. Edited by Mi- States for its role of moulding allied strategy chael Howard, it was dedicated and presented during the Second World War. Military de- to Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart on the occa- velopments in France, Germany, and England sion of his seventieth birthdav in the fali of are the subjects of essays by General André 1965. Beaufre, Captain Robert O Neill, Sir Frederick Although each of the fifteen essays in this Pile, and Norman Gibbs. volume comes from the pen of a different au- The final section focuses on the fate of thor, I was able to detect three elements that military theory and practice in the nuclear age. knit them together. The first is Liddell Hart Since this fate has yet to be determined, this himself, whose imaginative and penetrating part of the book remains inconclusive. As one spirit, if not always his name, is recognizable on would expect, the United States and Rússia almost everv page. share the majority of these pages. Three of the The books chronological arrangement also five essays, those by J. M. Mackintosh, Henry makes for unity. Each of its three parts contains Kissinger, and Alastair Buchan, recreate the five essays dealing with a specific time period. tortuous attempts by both East and West to Part One discusses the evolution of miütary construct a strategy for the cold war. Two final theory in the nineteenth century by detailing chapters illustrate the revival of limited-war the relationship between society and military concepts and practices in the face of nuclear theory on the one hand and between military stalemate. theory and military practice on the other. Less mechanical, and on that account less Jomini and Clausewitz are sympathetically and obvious, is the third ingredient which binds delicately placed in their context by Michael these essays together. This takes the form of a Howard and Peter Paret. Professor Gordon set of themes to which many of the chapters Craig comes up with a new explanation for contribute. Most of these topics are the same Austrias surprising military defeats in 1859 as those dealt with in The Makers of Modem and 1866—command and staff problems in the Strategy, and by continuing the story of their Imperial Army. General European military evolution past 1941 and into the nuclear pe- thought and doctrine are examined for the en- riod The Theory and Practice of War forms a 100 AIR UN1VERS1TY REVIEW perfect complement to the earlier volume. It theory and practice continued to be influenced is the historians analysis of these themes that by extramilitary evolution. Much of the mili- represents his strongest contribution to those tary history of Rússia and Germany, for in- who must plan for the future. stance, can be explained in terms of the polit- Take, for example, the question of the re- ical ostracism of those nations from Europe. lationship betvveen war and society. Former The technological breakthrough in the twenti- Secretary of the Air Force Eugene Zuckert eth century has had profound repercussions on wrote in the pages of the Air University Review: the military. All these relationships, plus many “It [the military mind] should recognize not more, are treated at length in the Howard vol- only military considerations but also the so- ume. I can think of no better way to illustrate ciological, political, economic, and technical Zuckerts words than to read it. forces that influence this complicated world.” There is a corollary to the view that war ( November-December 1965, p. 9) But how and policy ( to include economics, technology, does one recognize such considerations? Cer- and society) merge at every point. There are tainly one way is to study the close interaction understandable reasons why military strate- of these areas in the past. The point here is gists have often in the past tended to operate not simply that military strategy and practice without the aid of historical perspective. As should reflect these other areas of society; it lifelong professional soldiers, their education is that theory and organization always have and experience outside their chosen field have been determined largely by society and social often been limited. But there is no excuse for change. the future. Military academies and war colleges It is one of the values of The Theory and are equipped to fill the gaps and are busy im- Practice of War that it emphasizes the depend- pressing on their students the importance to ence of military progress upon “civilian” ad- military strategy of such apparently “nonmili- vances throughout the nineteenth and twenti- tary” areas. eth centuries. The French social revolution Craigs chapter on the Austrian army adds introduced the Citizen into Western society and perspective to this question of military educa- the nation-in-arms into the military arena. The tion. Austrias tradition of military prowess was industrial revolution brought advances in the undermined in the nineteenth century by two areas of armament, transportation, and commu- factors: a mortal degree of misunderstanding nication whic-h were, after much trial and er- and distrust between the civil and military seg- ror, to revolutionize warfare. Jominis princi- ments of the society; and a basic divergence pies of war originated less in their authors of opinion regarding the nature of war. Al- experience as chief of staff in iMarshal Neys though the first of these was not entirely the headquarters than in the composite intelleetual fault of the military, it does emphasize the atmosphere of the eighteenth century, usually responsibility of professional military men to summed up in the term “rationalism.” The the- understand national policy. The second de- ories of Clausewitz, as well, sprang from pre- structive tendency is more to our point. Craig dominantly “civilian” developments—the de- attributes the corrosion of the Austrian Gen- struction of the absolutist political system and eral Staff to “intelleetual slackness” and a “de- the intensely empirical attitude of his own liberate flight from intelligence.” The most im- times. The controlling theory and practices portant element contributing to this failure which led to the defeats of the Austrian army was a widespread disregard of the importance in 1859 and 1866 were likewise outgrowths of of leaming as a military virtue, which led after forces outside the military sphere—the rulers’ 1848 to a general feeling of positive distrust of continuing tradition of suspicion and jealousy the intelleetual. Our own society must be con- toward outstanding field commanders and the tinually on guard against such a tendency. sad State in which the general staff found itself The development of the theme of vital re- as the result of a “deliberate flight from intelli- lationship between war and society, begun in gence.” Between the two World Wars military the Earle volume, is continued by its succes- BOOKS AND IDEAS 101 sor. The same is true of the concepts of limited the British trip-wire concept. Nonnuclear lim- and unlimited war. In our generation this has ited war includes guerrilla warfare and con- become a topic of the greatest immediacy. ventional war for limited aims. Both are cov- Long-range strategic planning is predicated ered in the Howard book. A serious omission, upon a particular vievv of the nature of future in my estimation, is the absence of an essay on wars—whether thev will be limited or total. Vietnam. A chapter on this subject would il- Neither of these volumes, of course, makes a lustrate even more forcibly the shift in think- pretense of predicting the future. This is out- ing that has taken place from unlimited to lim- side the province of the historian. What these ited military thinking. Perhaps had this volume books do, however, is provide perspective to been under American editorship such a chapter those charged with supplving a view of things would have been included. to come. They contribute to the “educated” There are other threads of continuity in part of the “educated guess.” The Theorij and Practicc of War, such as war Bv 1941 the topic of limited warfare was as an art or Science, the value of offense and a museum piece. Today, after a whole genera- defense, the professional army versus the mi- tion has sat in the shadow of the mushroom litia in history. As with the two cases cited, cloud, the subject has been revived. Limited- each of these topics has modem application. war concepts have been revitahzed in two If vou approach this volume looking for tailor- forms, nuclear and nonnuclear. Limited nu- made answers as to the future, you will be clear war in this context refers not so much to disappointed. If you seek perspective on the the employment of tactical nuclear weapons past and present course of military thinking, as to such concepts as graduated response and you will find it rewarding. United States Air Force Academij Tlie Contributors

C olonkl Fhank R. P anc ake, USAF (R e t), ( B.A., Virginia Military Institnte) was Special Assistant to the Commander, U.S. Air Forces Southern Command, at the time of his retirement 1 July 1966. After graduation from flying school in 1939, he was assigned to Puerto Rico, and in 1942 he became Commander, 395th Bomb Squadron, Rio Hato, Panama. In 1944 he was designated Director of Training in the B-29 program. Later that year he was assigned as Deputy Commander, 502d Bomb Group, and in the summer of 1945 took part in B-29 operations against Japan. He later became Assistant A-3. Hq Twentieth Air Force. Subsequent assignments have been as In- structor, Air Command and Staff School (1946-49); Deputy Group Commander, 509th Bomb Group (1949-50); Professor of Air Science and Commandant of Cadets, VMI (1950-54); student, National War College (1954-55); Director, Strategic Studies, Plans and Policy Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (1955-59); Assistant Deputy Director Plans and Policy, DCS/PírO, Hq USAF (1960-63); and Vice Commander. U.S. Air Forces Southern Command (1963-66).

D r . A. G lenn Morton (Ph.D., George Peabody College for Teachers) is a member of the Evaluation Branch, Education Division, Hq AFROTC, Maxwell AFB. Until August 1966 he was Chief, Curriculum Section, Directorate of Academic Plans and Programs, USAF School for Latin America, Albrook AFB, Canal Zone. Other f>ositions held by Dr. Morton have been as National Defense Fellow, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1959-62; teacher, William T. Samson Navy Depend- ents’ School, Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, 1956-59; and teacher, Marine Corps De- pendents' School, Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, 1954-56.

M aj o r James B. Jo .ves (B.S., Univer- sity of Pittshurgh) is Chief, Public Information Division, Office of Infor- mation, U.S. Air Forces Southern Command. After completing flying training he was assigned to the 57th M aj o r Mathew T. Dunn (B.S., University of Phil- VVeather Reconnaissance Squadron and ippines) was recently assigned to the Public Affairs participated in "Operation Castle,” the Office, Hq CINCLant, after three years as Director atomic testing project in the Marshall of Information, Hq U.S. Air Forces Southern Com- Islands in 1954. In 1957 he was as- mand, Albrook A FB, Canal Zone. During World \\ ar signed as Assistant Chief, Advertising II he completed a com bat tour in ETO as a lead and Publicity, 3501st USAF Recruit- navigator. Recalled to active duty during the Korean ing Group, Mitchel A FB, New York. War, he has since served as aide-de-camp to Major Following a tour as Navigator Instruc- General Chester A. McCarthy, 315 Air Division tor at Harlingen AFB. Texas, he was (Combat Cargo Command), FE.AF, and later as assigned as Information Officer, 3565th Chief of Information for that command; as Chief, Navigator Training Wing, James Con- Magazine and Book Branch, SAF-OI, Hq USAF; as nally AFB. Texas. He has completed student, Armed Forces Staff College; as Director of the USAF Public Relations Course at Presentations, Hq TAC; and as Executive Officer, Boston University and has been as- War Plans, DCS/Plans, later as Planning Officer, signed to USAFSO since June 1963. Combined Plans Division, Hq USAF. N ohman Phecoda (M .S., Johns Hopkins University) is un uuthor-consultant in Suntu Barbara. Califomia. since leaving General Electric Compuny’s Technico] Military Planníng Operation (TEMPO) in 1966. Before joining tbut company in 1953, he wus for two years u scientific warfare udviser in the Office of tbe Secretary of Defense. Eurlier he wus un aeronauticul reseurcli scientist, Bureuu of Aernnuutics, Department of the Navy. Mr. Precoda's urticles and translutions, covering a voriety of military, historicui, und literary topics, have been widely published in professional journals, and several of his articles have been required reading at sênior wur colleges.

M aj o r Paul L. Cray (M .B.A., University of Michigan) is a Special Scientist. Operations Research, in the Directorate of Analysis and Long Range Planning, DCS/Plans, Headquarters Air Force Systems Command. After completing pilot training in 1951, he served as a flight instructor with the Air Training Command and later as a day-figbter pilot with the Tactical Air Command. Other assignments have been as studenl, aircraft maintenance school; as flight-test pilot, Air Materiel Command depot in Japan; as a headquarters squadron commander, later assistant professor, AFROTC; in aircraft operations and flight test, Maxwell AFB; and as student, A FIT graduate program in operations research, University of Mithigan. Major Gray is a graduate of the Air Command and Staff School.

M elvlv Tanc hei. ( M .S.I.E., Ohio State University) is Deputy Director of Analysis and Long Range Planning, DCS/Plans, Hq Air Force Systems Command. A career civil servant, he started as an engineering draftsman and has held positions as laboratory test engineer, project engineer, branch chief, war planner, Systems engineer, and technical consultant for analysis. His military Service has included tech- nical assignments in Alaska during World War II and commissioned ac- tive duty during the Korean War, one assignment being as organizer and op- erator of the initial management im- provement Office, Air Research and Development Command. Upon termi- nation of active duty, he established and managed a private management Consulting firm. Retuming to Civil Service at the request of the Air Force, he served in engineering Services sup- port and planning jobs prior to his present assignment. C olonel Irving R. P erkjn (USM A; M.B.A., University of Chicago) is Commander, The Mili- tary Aircraft' Storage and Disposition Center, Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. After graduating from West Point in 1941, he eamed his pilot’s wings and served with the Troop Carrier Com- mand during World War II. He commanded the 20th Troop Carrier Squadron in Panama and later in Germany during the Berlin Airlift. Fol- lowing graduation from Air Command and Staff L ie u t e n a n t Colonel Norman D. E ato n ( USMA; M.A., University of School, he was assigned to the staff and faculty Wisconsin) is a staff officer in the Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. After of Air University. Since receiving his graduate graduation from West Point in 1949 and pilot training in 1950, he was an degree in research and development management instructor pilot in the Air Training Command for three years, then a fighter- in 1952, Colonel Perkin has served as Chief, interceptor pilot in Iceland and the U.S. for two years. In 1955 he joined Development Division, Air Force Special Weap- the Department of History, United States Air Force Academy, and in 1959 ons Center, ARDC; Director of Flight Facilities, was appointed an Assistant Professor of History. He attended the U.S. Army Europe, África, and Middle East; and Director Command and General Staff College in 1961-62 and then was assigned of Maintenance Engineering, Middletown Air to the Operations Division, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe Materiel Area and Oklahoma City Air Materiel (SHAPE). Area. M aj o r General Robeht H. C ur tin (USMA; M.S., Harvard University) is Director of Civil Engineering. DCS/Programs and Resources, Hq USAF. Commissioned in the Corps of Engineers in 1939, he was assigned to the llth Engineering Regiment, Canal Zone. Subsequent assignments have been as Plans and Policy Officer, later Executive OHicer, Hq 30th Engineering Aviation Unit Training Center, MacDill Field, Florida, 1943-44; Assistant Chief, later Chief, Air Force Engineering Branch, Engineering Division, SHAEF, 1944-45; Chief, Air Projects Branch, Corps of Engineers, ETO, 1945-46; DC/S, later C/S, 924th Engineering Aviation Regiment, ETO, 1946; Air Engineer, USAFE, 1947; at Hq USAF, 1948-53, as Deputv Director of Installations for Engineering and Construc- tion, DCS/O; Assistant Chief of Staff, Installations, Third Air Force, England, 1954-57; and at Hq USAF from 1958 in DCS/O successively as Deputy Director for Facilities Support, for Real Property, for Civil Engineering Operations, and for Construction until July 1963. General Curtin is a graduate of the Air War College (1954) and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces ( 1958).

M aj o r Edvvard P. M azak, J h . (M .S., Air Force Institute of Technology; M.B.A., George Wash- ington University) is assigned to the Defense Atomic Support Agency, Sandia Base, New Méx- ico. He has served previously as Assistant Mainte- nance Officer, Air Training Command (1951-52); as Project Officer, Air Force Special Weapons Center (1954-57); in guided missiles training with industry (1957-58); as Project Officer, GAM 77, Weapon System Project Office, ASD (1958-62); as student, Air Command and Staff College ( 1962-63); and as Instructor and Course Director, Space Fundamentais Course, Director- ate of Space, Warfare Systems School, from July 1963 until his present assignment in July 1966.

M aj o r Lasvr ence B. T atum ( USMA; Ph.D., Syracuse University) was a member of the Politi- cal Science Department, United States Air Force Academy, prior to his current assignment. His contributions have appeared in recent issues of the Air University Review.

C olonel Artiiur B. T arrow, USAF (M C), is Commander, USAF Hos- pital Clark, Philippine Islands. He received his M.D. at Syracuse University in 1942 and has had continuous Service since 1943, with assignments at Wilford Hall USAF Hospital, Laekland AFB, Texas, and USAF Hospital. Wiesbaden, Germany. He attended the School of Aviation Medicine, AME Course in 1946 and Base Wing Surgeon Course in 1954. He received the M.S. degree from Baylor University in 1951 and is a member of the American Medicai Association.

M aj o r John Schlight (Ph.D., Princeton Uni- D r . D avid W. T ar r (Ph.D., University of Chicago) is an Associate versity) is Associate Professor of History, U.S. Professor. Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Air Force Academy. After completing navigator and also Acting Director of the National Security Studies Group of training in 1953, he served as a C-124 navigator that university for 1965-66. He taught political Science at Amherst and Education Services Officer, Southern Air College and Mount Holyoke College in 1958-59. Other positions have Materiel Area, FEAF, Tachikawa Air Base, Japan, been as National Defense Analyst, Legislative Referente Service, Li- 1953-56, and as Instructor Navigator, Naviga- brary of Congress, 1959-62; and as Research Associate, Washington tion Training School, Ellington AFB, Texas, Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University, from 1956-58. Since joining the faculty of USAFA in 1962 until his present appointment in 1963. Dr. Tarr has contributed to 1958, he has been Instructor in Philosophy and W estern Political Quarterly, Orbis, and Annals of the American Academy History (until 1960) and Assistant Professor of of Political and Social Science and is the author of American Stratcgy History from 1962 until his present designation in the Nuclear Age (Macmillan, 1966). in 1966.

AWARD

The Air University Review Awards Committee has selected “Trends in Military Thought” by Colonel Francis X. Kane, USAF, as the outstanding article in the September-October 1966 issue of the Review. EDITORIAL STAFF

L ieu t en a n t Colonel Eldon W. Downs, USAF, Editor J ack H. Mooney, Managing Editor Major Robert C. Spa r k ma n , USAF, Chicf, Acquisition Branch E dmund O. Barker, Financial and Administrativo Manager J ohn A. W est c o t t , J r ., Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston, Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition L. Mid o si May Patterson, Assistant Editor. Portuguese Language Edition W il l l a m J. De Paola, Art Editor and lllustrator Second Lieu t en a n t Jer r y R. Strincer, USAF, Editorial Project Officer

ADVISERS

C olonel Robert B. G ood, Hq Air Force Logistics Command C olonel R. F. T il l e y , Hq Pacific Air Forces C olonel W il l ia m L. T udor, Hq Air Defense Command C olonel Ken n et h F. G antz, usae (R et), Historical Adviser L ie u t e n a n t C olonel M. G. Gahner, Hq Military Airlift Command D r . H arold Hel ema n , Hq Air Force Systems Command L a V eh n e E. W oods, Hq Air Force Cumbridge Research Laboratories UNITED STATES AI R FORCE AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW