issue brief TLAVA TIMOR!LESTE ARMED VIOLENCE ASSESSMENT Number 2 | April 2009
Groups, gangs, and armed violence in Timor-Leste
On 11 February 2008 Major Alfredo Reinado pose, and their use of and access to weapons, leadership, mapping gang territories, and a group of ex-F-FDTL1 soldiers known in particular small arms. It # nds that: monitoring linkages between politicians as the Petitioners, accompanied by allied and gang leaders, and establishing gang ! While a range of membership, ex-PNTL2 members, attacked the residence liaison o" cers in key villages. command and control arrangements, of President Jose Ramos Horta in Dili. ! e and motivations guide armed groups president, returning home from jogging, was in Timor-Leste, they are commonly Towards a typology shot and seriously wounded; security o" cers organized into patronage and kinship killed Reinado and one of his men. Less of armed groups and networks centred around a single # gure, than two hours later, Prime Minister Xanana with loyalty sustained through small-scale gangs Gusmão’s motorcade came under # re from service provision. a group led by Petitioner leader Lieutenant For a country of less than one million people, Gastão Salsinha. ! MAGs have grown signi# cantly in reach Timor-Leste features a breathtakingly diverse and in& uence in recent years; today there array of groups, ranging from MAGs and ! e shock of these coordinated attacks are 20,000 registered members—and social movements to small street-corner ended a brief respite from gang violence that probably at least as many unregistered gangs and youth groups. Like the militia had plagued the country through December members—with in& uence in 13 districts. of 1999, however, they are not a new, 2007. Reinado was known as a key player Dili has become the main battleground spontaneous phenomenon. While some in a wider network of gangs, political front for MAGs, and # ghting is public and might be older, most of these groups had groups, and patronage groups within the frequent. their genesis during the intense militarization political elite. Although the Petitioners ! Factors in& uencing the likelihood of of Timorese society under the Indonesian had been a destabilizing force in Timorese 3 group violence are diverse and include occupation between 1975 and 1999. Most politics and society for two years, the threat pre-existing con& icts and revenge of the current groups either were formed to was not well anticipated. killings among ethnic groups that oppose the occupation or, as with MAGs, are Armed groups and gangs are not a new extend back decades, property disputes, legacies of the Indonesian army’s attempts to phenomenon in Timor-Leste, but evolved systemic unemployment, political impose social control. While the bulk of these from clandestine resistance groups grievances, turf rivalries, predatory groups may be composed of disenfranchised during the Indonesian colonial period to crime, and self-defence. youths, their membership is drawn from all a heterogeneous multitude of collectives, ! Manufactured small arms and light sectors of society, with members in the police including disa$ ected veterans, clandestine weapons do not appear to play a major force, the army, and among the political and groups, political fronts, martial arts groups role in exacerbating gang violence in economic elite. (MAGs), village-based gangs, youth Timor-Leste. Most violence is committed It is both di" cult and contentious to render collectives, and security organizations. with low-technology weapons, ranging clear cut distinctions between these groups. Nine years a% er the end of the Indonesian from stones, arrows, and crude Many exhibit overlapping membership and occupation, the fact that gangs have explosives to home-made dart shooters a number of characteristics in common, diversi# ed and multiplied is a testament to a and rakitans, although pistols and assault such as featuring ex-veterans among their range of social tensions in Timorese society ri& es are also used. membership or being ex-clandestine and the continued weakness of the state and ! State responses to gangs have ranged organizations. Groups routinely reinvent its institutions. During the occupation these from security force-led crackdowns to themselves: the clandestine and disa$ ected groups protected their communities from brokering ‘peace processes’ through groups, for example, grew out of resistance Indonesian security forces and the latter’s the Prime Minister’s O" ce or civil to the Indonesian occupation, but have proxies; now they protect their communities society. Other interventions may also since become protest movements, or from one another. be promising, such as establishing have formed political parties or become ! is Issue Brief reviews the presence and interagency steering committees on criminal syndicates. ! ere are few reliable roles of gangs in Timor-Leste. In doing so, it youth policy and mediation, regulating # gures on the numbers of such groups, examines their recent growth, the threats they and registering speci# c groups and their and the # gures presented here are only
Timor-Leste Issue Brief April 2009 | 1 provocateurs has entrenched the power Figure 1 Relations among various types of groups of these groups and made them more attractive to impoverished youths as a source of income. ! e tolerance shown Disa! ected towards Reinado and the Petitioners, and groups the pardoning of key # gures associated Political with the violence of 2006 have also sent front groups Political parties/ Informal an ambiguous message to the wider MAGs PNTL/ organized crime/ F-FDTL security community, and many observers fear that business interests Procurers/ groups clandestine this will create a climate of impunity. networks/ kinship networks Gangs/ Group structures youth groups While MAGs boast national structures and leadership, their leaders do not appear to exert e$ ective control over their entire organizations. Most commonly, they control estimates. ! is is due to a lack of in-depth that in just # ve years, between 1999 and only those sections of the organization where research and because these groups in& ate 2004, Dili’s population grew from 100,715 to they share personal or kinship ties through their numbers, which also & uctuate over 173,541. According to the same # gures, 56.4 some kind of mutual obligation relationship. time due to splintering and other factors. per cent of this growth was due to internal MAG membership is frequently aligned 5 However, the broad relationships among migration. with kinship networks. Each suburb of Dili groups can be broadly graphically mapped As observed in neighbouring countries such is divided into villages (aldeias). Each village out (see Figure 1). as Papua New Guinea, high rates of rural roughly corresponds to the territory of one MAG and paramilitary leaders generally migration to the city and unemployment extended family and it is not unusual for deny their political a" liations. Unlike some breed frustration and social tension.6 an entire village to belong to one particular of the political party militias in Indonesia Compounding young males’ loss of self- MAG. ! is phenomenon is underscored known as Satgas (satuan tugas), links among esteem through unemployment is their by the fact that most con& icts in Timor- politicians, gangs, MAGs, and the di$ erent subordinate social status, as many youth Leste are between villages, not within them.8 politicized paramilitary groups in Timor- who have come to the city looking for work What can sometimes appear to be a MAG Leste are usually informal and highly & uid. stay with extended family and are o% en dispute is o% en a communal dispute, as each Groups and parties are linked by personal, unwanted guests. Some are little more than community mobilizes its youths to defend kinship, and clandestine alliances, and by domestic slaves.7 Gangs and MAGs o$ er its territory. ! is pattern occurs throughout overlapping membership. Many groups, these youth companionship, status and the country, so that sometimes quite long- especially MAGs, have membership or protection, free cigarettes and alcohol, and standing con& icts are masked as MAG or family ties to the main political parties, o% en a source of livelihood. gang con& icts. Con& icts that begin in a the police, and the armed forces. Many rural district can spread to the capital, as While in some cases local gangs have become gang members are also members of MAGs one family uses a MAG to attack another a nuisance by extorting local businesses, and the larger more politicized disa$ ected family—for example, over a property drinking, and perpetrating violence, in groups. Mobs are therefore mobilized on an dispute—and news spreads; then MAG many cases they are an accepted part of as-needed basis through trusted middlemen members from other families or extended the community. Sometimes gang members or # xers, usually related or known to families in the capital become involved. are even # gures of authority such as village politicians through these networks. Formal ! us what was originally a family dispute chiefs. Gangs also ful# ll an important source links are hard to prove—a reality that gang becomes a more generalized gang con& ict. leaders and politicians are quick to exploit. of patronage and are o% en the only source Table 1 summarizes the various groups by of welfare or credit in poor villages, where Many of the proli# c youth groups and street their geographic locations, date of origin, few people, if any, have jobs. A more general corner gangs that proliferate throughout composition and membership estimates, community ambivalence towards the use Dili are family based. Some families may and political allegiances and other features. of violence to achieve political or social form mutual protection alliances with other change is also troubling. ! e support for families, thus widening con& ict to uninvolved Youth unemployment is a major factor in the violent # gures such as Major Reinado among parties. ! is was most evident in # ghting in growth of these groups. About one-third of disenfranchised urban youths has been the Bairopite area in 2007, where the youth Dili’s labour force aged 25–29 is unemployed much remarked on but his support base was groups connected to several families joined or ‘discouraged’ (no longer actively seeking even broader, including within the political forces to drive Persaudaraan Setia Hati Terate employment). ! is # gure rises to 60 per cent and economic elite and among civil society (PSHT), the largest MAG in Timor-Leste, among male teenagers, and around 50 per groups concerned with gender violence and from their area. cent in the age group 20–24.4 Coupled with human rights. unemployment is a high rate of rural–urban Much of the violence of the 2006 period, migration, predominantly of young males, ! e political elite have not always provided however, was not organized through from the districts to Dili. Around 40 per cent the (positive) alternative role models cohesive, monolithic gangs, but through of Dili’s population is composed of internal required to change community attitudes. personal, family, political, and clandestine migrants, and most of this internal migration ! e irresponsible use of gangs by political networks. Most gangs do not have names and is recent. ! e 2004 Census # gures revealed parties as personal security and agents have no static membership, being more
2 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief April 2009 Table 1 Typology of gangs and other groups in Timor-Leste
Type of group Geographic Date of origin Composition and Political allegiances and and examples range number other features
Disa! ected groups National but generally Mostly early 2000s but some Older, unemployed, or poor Anti-government, not politically aligned except CPDRDTL strongest in rural home areas late 1990s farmers from rural districts opportunistically of leadership with a high percentage of Colimau 2000 Speci! c grievances include jobs for veterans and ex-veterans government assistance for agriculture Sagrada Familia Numbers in the low thousands Persistently feature in violent demonstrations and other actions
Clandestine groups National but generally 1980s Generally composed of Often proclaim neutrality but the main groups 7-7 strongest in Dili and the unemployed youth, with usually identi! ed with one of the main parties western districts membership in the security depending on the allegiance of their leadership 5-5 forces; average age 16–35 but Sections of these groups involved in criminal Bua Malus leadership older activity and also in the violence of 2006–07 Numbers probably in the mid- thousands
Martial arts groups National but often speci! c to Mostly founded under the All ages, both genders, and all Often proclaim neutrality but the major groups (MAG)* particular villages Indonesian occupation in the classes of society, including are usually identi! ed with one of the main PSHT 1980s but some, e.g. KORK, academics and government political parties, depending on the allegiance of claim to be older ministers; strong presence in their leadership** KORK the security forces Mainly legitimate sporting organizations, but are Kera Sakti 15–20 groups and as many as also mobilized by politicians for demonstrations 9 Kung Fu Master 90,000 members and violence, and by organized crime for security, extortion, and other criminal acts
Political front groups Mainly Dili-based 2006–07 Leadership mostly older, Rent-a-crowd out! ts formed by opposition MUNJ usually employed middle class political parties to mobilize youth for demonstrations; also act as umbrella groups for a variety of dissident groups with gang links
Gangs Usually Dili-based, most Some pre-existing 1999 but All ages but average member in Hired by organized crime, business interests, Ameu Van Damme common in suburbs mostly formed after 2000 late teens to early twenties and political parties for arson, intimidation, and Commando Comoro Marrket dominated by rural migrants, Average size of the bigger sometimes murder; livelihoods based on petty Gang around the main commercial gangs is in the low hundreds, extortion, theft, and security provision for illegal zones, including the markets but there are countless street- gambling and brothels; few have o" cial names, corner gangs with no more being more based around one particular older than a dozen members authority ! gure
Youth groups All districts but most Mostly formed in the 1980s Mostly late teens to early Generally apolitical but sometimes mobilized Slebor prominent in Dili; most but many new ones formed twenties, with some mixed for violence; some were involved in attacking numerous in predominantly 2006–07 gender groups, and all social easterners on their own initiative; often Green Villa Blok M rural migrant areas classes, but predominantly support themselves by providing security Aqui Jazz unemployed males for shopkeepers, extortion, and petty theft; many perform positive services, civic duties, or Predator Membership ranges from a dozen to the hundreds sporting, musical and artistic pursuits
Informal security groups Mostly rural districts in Appeared throughout the Mostly older veterans but some Anti-government but not politically-aligned Petitioners the western highlands post-independence period younger ex-F-FDTL soldiers and except opportunistically; grievances centre on particularly border areas but most proli! c in the police o" cers issues related to employment in the F-FDTL; Railos group 2005–07 period Numbering in the hundreds, have access to manufactured arms; although Isolados but individual groups in the temporarily disbanded, have the potential to dozens reform quickly
* A recent report by GTZ posits three types of MAGs: (a) White-suited MAGs that are highly organized, non-violent, and conform to international martial arts standards; (b) MAGs of Indonesian origin such as PSHT and Kera Sakti, not involved in any organized competition in East Timor, and have been implicated in violence; (c) Timorese MAGs who practice an indigenous form of martial arts such as KORK, and build on military command-style structures (some of which have also been implicated in violence).10
** KORK, for example, was aligned with FRETILIN under Nuno Soares, but when its original leader Naimori was released from jail he expelled Soares from KORK and disa" liated KORK from FRETILIN.
*** ! e term ritual arts group is sometimes used to describe groups such as 7-7 and Colimau 2000. ! is is slightly misleading as many MAGs, such as PSHT and KORK, also practice syncretic rituals they believe give them secret powers. In& uenced by Javanese mysticism, a number of MAG groups of Indonesian origin believe that their martial arts practice gives them healing powers.
Timor-Leste Issue Brief April 2009 | 3 by individual gangs with exclusive rights to income from these illegal activities. ! e emergence of a human-tra" cking and & edgling drug trade in Timor-Leste makes crime a much more lucrative option for MAGs and gangs, and the potential for violent competition even greater, given the mass scale of some of these groups. ! e tapping of oil revenues for development funds and a loosely regulated construction boom spurred by the increased international presence are magnets for international organized crime, and therefore business opportunities for these MAGs and gangs. In ! ux: groups from Gang gra! ti on an abandoned house, Dili, 2008 © JAMES SCAMBURY the 2006 crisis to today like patronage networks associated with rapid growth of a number of professional Prior to the 2006 con& ict, armed gangs, a particular # gurehead. Frequently, these security companies has also sparked paramilitaries, and MAGs had been a # gures are ex-clandestine activists or leaders, con& ict, as they have competed with gangs constant, if little reported, feature of the or heads of family networks. Under the for their traditional source of income.13 post-independence period. ! e violence Indonesian occupation, many clandestine unleashed in the capital and rural areas by Protection rackets can occur on a larger networks were based on kinship networks,11 the crisis of April and May 2006, resulting scale as groups seek to pro# t from the and many contemporary gangs are similarly in the destruction of up to 6,000 houses and structured. ! e leaders of these gangs also insecurity. Some gangs heavily involved in the displacement of over 140,000 people, cultivate loyalty through patronage such the 2006 violence subsequently presented demonstrates the destructive potential of as loans, cigarettes, or alcohol, or through themselves to donors (for a fee) as mediators, these groups. thereby # rst creating the problem and then fear. Many of these # gures operate extortion As the political crisis unfolded, disturbances presenting themselves as part of the solution. rackets, distributing their gains in the local began to break out between eastern and community to further their own status. In addition to o$ ering security, gangs western ethnic groups all over Dili, rapidly Youth are not necessarily paid to carry out also operate as mobs for hire by corrupt escalating into daily full-scale street battles. criminal acts but may be motivated more politicians, landowners, and organized ! ere were four main sources of the out of loyalty and obligation. When political crime groupings. During the 2006 violence, violence: parties or business # gures need to organize a in particular, there were persistent and ! Property disputes. It is estimated that crowd these # gures act as procurers or # xers. credible reports of gang members receiving About a half a dozen powerful Dili-based a% er the refugee exodus of 1999, 50 per money for provoking violence and # gures have broad power bases, and may call cent of properties in Dili were illegally carrying out attacks.14 ! e use of gangs and on lesser, more localized # gures to organize reoccupied.16 ! e generalized violence paramilitaries for personal security and youth into mobs, for example, to target was used as a cover to evict primarily intimidation has widespread acceptance. internally displaced person (IDP) camps or eastern migrants from contested For example, CNRT leaders sent the wrong intimidate a business rival. properties. ! ere is also strong evidence message when they appointed Vicente da that the violence provided cover for Income sources Conceição, alias Railos, to coordinate their corrupt property developers to clear campaign in Liquiçá despite his having been land for development, with gangs being Protection rackets are a major source of recommended for prosecution by the UN provided with lists of tenants to evict.17 income for most gangs, and as such have Commission of Inquiry for his role in the ! Gang turf competition. A% er 1999 eastern become a primary scourge for business 2006 unrest.15 and a deterrent to investment. ! ese gangs moved into Dili and controlled Gambling, including poker machines, rackets a$ ect all types of businesses, from the protection rackets and employment cock# ghts, illegal lotteries, and more small corner kiosks to major construction in the two main commercial centres— companies and supermarkets. ! e markets, traditional types, is also a lucrative source of the markets and the bus terminals—in bus terminals, and Chinese supermarkets income—increasingly so with the arrival of addition to illegal gambling and security are particularly vulnerable. While some sophisticated poker machine operations with provision in nightclubs and illegal brothels. businesses have formed uno" cial voluntary a much higher cash turnover. Again, such Although many groups were involved, as contracts with groups to protect them from operations are more likely to be the preserve a result of the 2006 violence, four main attack, extortion—sometimes referred to as of organized crime, but smaller gangs, western gangs now dominate these rackets ‘tax’ or a ‘donation’—is the norm. In most especially the larger MAGs, provide the in Dili. cases, the extortion is small scale and carried security for these operations, as they do for ! Orchestrated violence. ! ere were out by street-corner gangs but increasingly the nightclubs and brothels that proliferate widespread and credible reports of gang these groups operate on behalf of larger with the increased international presence. members being paid to provoke violence,18 groups, including Indonesian and Chinese As a consequence of the 2006–07 violence, and the attacks on refugee camps and other mainland organized crime groups.12 ! e Dili is now carved out into zones controlled areas followed a sustained and persistent
4 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief April 2009 Tensions began to abate in early 2008, and
Box 1 Chronology of the 2006 political crisis while it was feared that the killing of Reinado during the attacks of 11 February 2008 would 16 March: Five hundred and ninety-four F-FDTL soldiers dismissed for desertion result in a major upsurge in violence, this did 24 April: A group of sacked soldiers known as the Petitioners and their supporters not occur. Following a long-running peace stage demonstrations outside Parliament process, two of the main protagonist groups, 28 April: A demonstration turns into a riot and two people are killed PSHT and 7-7, concluded a formal truce in 3 May: Major Alfredo Reinado abandons the F-FDTL military police, taking with August 2008. him other military police o" cers, PNTL o" cers, and weapons 23 May: Five killed in an armed confrontation between F-FDTL and Reinado Responses to gang 24 May: Attack on residence of F-FDTL commander Brigadier General Ruak by violence ten PNTL o" cers led by PNTL deputy commander Abilio Mesquita (also a PSHT warga or master) and member of Parliament Leandro Isaac. One Signi# cant progress has been made in the person is killed and two injured last year in con& ict mediation and e$ orts to resolve Timor-Leste’s complex land ownership 24–25 May: Nine killed when Petitioners and a group led by ex-F-FDTL member Vicente issues. ! e government and communities have de Conceicao aka Railos attacks the F-FDTL base in Tasi Tolu worked hard at ensuring public acceptance 25 May: Nine PNTL members killed in a confrontation between F-FDTL and PNTL of returning IDPs, and there has been an at the PNTL Dili headquarters; PNTL largely disintegrates as a force in Dili extended period of calm since the attacks on 26 June: Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri resigns and Foreign Minister Jose Ramos Horta the two heads of state in February 2008. ! ere appointed as interim prime minister are moves towards implementing a national Source: OHCHR (2006), pp. 5–7. youth policy and ongoing programmes to strengthen the justice system and reform the security sector. While these initiatives are pattern. Truckloads of people regularly going back hundreds of years. ! ere were essential to address the broader, overarching arrived from the districts, organized and also strong indications of competition issues that have sparked past con& ict, there funded by political front groups like the between these groups for control of border is a vital need for coherent, consistent, and National Front for Justice and Peace or smuggling, particularly around the border sustained programmes and policies that their political allies such as Colimau 2000. market in Maliana. speci# cally deal with gangs and MAGs. ! ere Some witnesses described mobs being is little to show on this front to date, despite A broader alliance was quickly formed to coordinated by radio, and a number of a variety of responses, ranging from the oppose PSHT composed of clandestine police radios were discovered in a raid on a enforcement approach of security forces, both groups and Kmanek Oan Rai Klaran gang headquarters in January 2007.19 local and international, to more conciliatory (KORK—the other major MAG). ! e ! Revenge. Apart from anger over the government and civil society approaches. ! e alliance’s public justi# cation for the # ghting results of these e$ orts have been mixed at best. killing of the PNTL members on 25 was that PSHT was an Indonesian-sponsored May, unfounded rumours circulated group. But the more likely rationale, cited widely of a massacre of 60 people by the Government responses by many unconnected groups, was PSHT’s F-FDTL. Many people cited this as a aggressive drive for territorial dominance and On 27 May 2005, with support from the Asia source of anti-eastern sentiment, and the control of security, protection rackets, and Foundation, the Communication Forum F-FDTL, Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, other illegal activities. for Timor-Leste’s Martial Arts Groups the Frente Revolucionária de Timor- (FORKAMTIL) reconvened, a% er an earlier Leste Independente (FRETILIN), and all Dialogue mediated by the Prime Minister’s attempt failed in 2003, under the O" ce of people of eastern origin were collectively O" ce led to the disengagement of most of the President, to help resolve MAG con& icts. vili# ed. ! is rumour exacerbated painful the opposing groups, but con& ict between FORKAMTIL was composed of 14 MAGs, memories of the atrocities committed by the group known as 7-7 and PSHT raged including the two biggest groups, PSHT FRETILIN in the 1975 civil war (although throughout 2007, with a major upsurge a% er and KORK.21 ! e organization ran several atrocities were carried out by both sides). the attempted capture of Reinado in March leadership and violence management training While the violence abated with the by the International Stabilization Force (ISF) workshops in rural districts (excluding Dili) resignation of the prime minister in June, composed of Australian and New Zealand and mediated a code of practice agreed by it continued at a lower level until peace army troops, and around the parliamentary the leaders of the major groups in 2006. talks in October secured a truce through elections in August. Violence was Unfortunately, this agreement had only a the O" ce of the President. Almost as soon particularly intense in the eastern districts of temporary e$ ect, as many of these groups as this political crisis was resolved a new Baucau and Viqueque, although communal could not control their di$ erent factions con& ict erupted in November between con& ict in these regions considerably pre- and local branches, especially in remote Colimau 2000 and the largest MAG, PSHT, dates the birth of contemporary political rural areas. FORKAMTIL still exists, but its 22 spreading from the western district of parties and gangs. Part of this con& ict can funding ran out in May 2007. Ermera to neighbouring districts and then be attributed to forced relocations during ! e O" ce of the President also set up a into Dili, resulting in seven deaths. ! e the Indonesian occupation and the refusal dialogue process in late 2006 to resolve the cause of the con& ict is unclear, but there of settlers to return to their original lands.20 east–west violence. A group comprising the had been a long-running dispute between Similar land disputes motivate other rural leaders of the former main antagonist groups these two groups in Ermera, with roots in communal con& icts in the region, and some organized a series of ‘peace demonstrations’ historical tensions between di$ erent villages of these disputes go back 70 years or more. ahead of the 12 November anniversary of
Timor-Leste Issue Brief April 2009 | 5 Civil society initiatives Box 2 The role of arms ! e most sustained and comprehensive civil Although there were at least 100 gang-related fatalities in 2007, the bulk of gang society-led process speci# cally to deal with confrontations are fought with rocks, and at a fairly long distance. Deaths are generally gang and MAG violence so far has been the a consequence of easily and quickly produced crude homemade weapons. Apart from Action Asia/Hak Association MAG training an assortment of wooden spears and arrows, the most common of these is the rama project. ! is project, which commenced in ambon, a crude dart made from electrical cable or old nails. Fired with slingshots made September 2006, resulted from a partnership from rubber bands, these darts are sometimes tipped with poison or battery acid. Lethal between two international NGOs, Concern at close range, they are generally # red into the air from a long distance and can o% en be and Oxfam, and two national NGOs, seen embedded high in the tops of trees and telephone poles. Yayasan Hak and NGO Forum. Action Asia, Rakitans, or crude home-made muzzle-loading weapons, also present threats. Rakitans a regional peace-building network, was can be # tted to # re nails, rama ambons, arrows, and even real bullets; and while some engaged to run the project. Two members have crude triggers, most do not. ! ey can look quite real and threatening from the long (one senior, one junior) from each of the distances that typically separate gangs during # ghting. Crude explosive devices, including nine main active MAG groups were selected Molotov cocktails, have also been employed, but, except for one notorious attack on an to participate in a collective one-year peace- IDP camp in 2006, they have not been widely used.23 building course. One part of the course While gang members sometimes speak of uno" cial rules of engagement that forbid the involved an exposure visit to the Philippines, use of manufactured guns, there is no doubt that, with links to the security forces, all the where they met with key groups that have major gangs have access to such weapons. One factor discouraging gun use may be that played a role in promoting the peace process communal disputes sometimes pit former friends and neighbours against one another, and and non-violence in that country, including resistance is strong to seriously injuring a former friend. imprisoned gang members, solidarity groups, Most fatalities appear to occur and Philippine army o" cers. at close range in revenge- Although one of the two key combatant style ambushes. ! e use groups, 7-7, was not initially involved, of manufactured weapons it joined the # nal course module and in communal violence in subsequently made a peace pact with PSHT neighbouring Papua New on 27 August 2008, ending a long-standing Guinea has seriously escalated con& ict between the two groups.27 violence there,24 but gangs in Timor-Leste so far seem to Many civil society and international agencies abide by the ‘unwritten code’. have responded to communal violence To date, gun use has been using traditional mediation. A number of limited to gang members agencies have tried to utilize traditional from within the PNTL. ceremonies and traditional authorities, Rama ambons collected in police raid, Dili, 2008 with some degree of success. However, the © JAMES SCAMBARY overlapping nature of communal and gang con& icts can complicate peace agreements, the Santa Cruz massacre to promote the originally a temporary initiative, the MTRC as can the interrelationship of rural and outcome of this dialogue in the community. intends to continue its work with MAGs.26 urban communal disputes. Most of these While east–west tension has not yet been traditional mediation attempts have dealt fully resolved, this truce has largely held. ! e Ministry of Social Solidarity (MSS), with con& ict at the community level, and so supported by the United Nations do not take account of gang rivalries. MAG In parallel, interim prime minister Ramos Development Programme (UNDP), has members moving from the districts to the Horta initiated a separate dialogue process been conducting an ongoing dialogue capital or within the capital sometimes spark in late November 2006 to mediate the new renewed con& icts, as they were not part of con& ict between PSHT and an alliance of process to facilitate the return of IDPs to the original agreements. Also, many of the other groups. As a result of this dialogue, their villages. ! e MSS recently launched a antagonists are migrants from rural districts a proposal was made to form a special new dialogue initiative, with # ve mediation where the village chiefs concerned have no quick-response assistance unit made up of teams working in the # ve sub-districts of authority. Many village chiefs have also been representatives of each group. ! e proposed Dili. While not speci# cally concerned with compromised by their overt politicization.28 unit would be mobilized whenever MAGs MAGs, this is the most comprehensive were involved in violence.25 ! is process was community dialogue process that exists and Traditional mediation processes with gangs successful with regard to most of the groups and MAGs could prove highly e$ ective may act as a curb on MAG violence. involved, but con& ict between PSHT and given that respect for traditional law is still 7-7 continued until late 2007. ! e Ministry Finally, at the initiation of the secretary of very strong in Timor-Leste. As one MAG of Labour and Community Reinsertion state for youth and sport and some of the leader stated, ‘God gets you when you’re (MTRC) has also been involved in the 29 more moderate MAG leaders, a law has dead; lulik (sacred law) kills you now.’ national dialogue process, having set up the A GTZ/EU-funded30 mediation process been dra% ed to more tightly regulate MAGs. National Forum for the Dialogue between supported the national dialogue process Martial Arts a% er the April–May 2006 ! e law has been submitted to the Council with the intention of creating dialogue political crisis, which chie& y comprised the of Ministers and approved by the prime among MAGs, and included organizational four main warring groups: Colimau 2000, minister, but has not yet been promulgated capacity building, especially leadership and PSHT, KORK, and 7-7. While this forum was by Parliament. con& ict transformation skills training.31
6 | Timor-Leste Issue Brief April 2009 Security force responses operation can largely be attributed to the consultative ! e security force has typically adopted approach taken whereby a reactive approach to containing gang local village chiefs were violence. Formed police units (FPUs), the consulted about and even UN Police (UNPOL), and the ISF have all accompanied the searches, conducted rapid response actions against and signed consent forms gang violence, in addition to carrying out were obtained from all the regular patrols and establishing static police posts at a number of key hot spots. ! ere households searched. have, however, been two key initiatives speci# cally aimed at combating gang Conclusions violence, and also an example of a successful community policing initiative. Timorese group and gang violence has & uctuated over In response to escalating gang violence, in time, but there is strong January 2007 the United Nations Integrated evidence that membership in Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) these groups has diversi# ed authorized the formation of the Gang Task and grown in recent years. Force, with members from the UNMIT ! e government and civil Human Rights and Political A$ airs society have taken a number sections, the PNTL, and the ISF. ! e Gang of steps to manage and Task Force at # rst attempted to mediate mitigate this development, between the warring groups, hosting high- but weak political will, level talks with the major MAG leaders on coordination, and # nancial 24 January at the PNTL Dili headquarters. commitment have limited Mother and child standing in front of gang insignia, Dili, 2008 When this failed UNPOL, FPUs, and the © JAMES SCAMBARY ISF, in coordination with the Gang Task the scope of initiatives. Force, raided the headquarters of the ! is is worrying, as more largest MAG, PSHT. In what was probably concerted e$ orts on separate fronts are Finally, it is clear that gangs respond to the largest single operation against a needed. perceived and real de# ciencies in the Timorese security and justice sectors, gang, the raid resulted in the arrest of the ! e multiplicity of mediation e$ orts suggests and that this context is unlikely to be PSHT leader and about 47 of its members, that an inter-agency coordinating committee signi# cantly altered in the near future. But and the seizure of a variety of weapons, for con& ict mediation would be a useful to the extent that police and justice reform including home-made arrows, incendiary # rst step to standardize and coordinate 32 can bridge the gap between the government devices, police uniforms, and radios. approaches, pool funding, retain knowledge, and its citizens, rebuild con# dence, and and build expertise in dealing with gangs. ! e raid generated mixed outcomes. One provide meaningful services, these e$ orts Similarly, the interrelationship between gang criticism was that it created a vacuum would almost certainly contribute to a violence and communal violence points to that actually increased the violence: rival reduction in gangs and gang membership, the need to integrate gang mediation with gangs moved into the empty territory and and the violence associated with them. burned down the PSHT headquarters and community con& ict mediation programmes. other houses owned by gang members’ Apart from acute violence prevention families, spurring a further round of revenge interventions such as these, longer- Notes violence. While the raid stopped the purely term e$ orts addressing the underlying localized violence surrounding the PSHT ! is Issue Brief was based on research motivations for gang membership are by James Scambary, who has conducted headquarters, it continued in other areas, and needed. Bringing rival gang members to other leaders quickly # lled the void. research on Timorese gangs since 2006 for work together on social programmes and AusAID and the Con" ict Prevention and Separately, the new PNTL Task Force was small-business training schemes would Peace Forum (CPPF) section of the New York formed in late 2007 by the secretary of state provide bene# cial opportunities to break the Social Science Research Council. for security. Equipped with riot control cycle of violence and gang rivalry. 1 FALINTIL-Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste equipment, the Task Force was intended Identifying and monitoring the presence (FALINTIL: Forças Armados de Libertacao as a rapid response mobile crowd-control of gang members in state employ is also an Nacional de Timor-Leste). 2 Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste. unit. While it appears to have been relatively important measure to disrupt these linkages. 3 See, for example, TLAVA Issue Brief 1. e$ ective in combating gang and communal Security forces should be required to declare violence, this force has been widely criticized 4 Neupert and Lopes (2006), p. 22. MAG and gang membership in order to for lack of communication with the ISF or 5 Ibid., p. 22. better control the in& uence of these groups 6 Ward (2000), p. 231. UNPOL, and its reputation for brutality. on individual members of the state forces; 7 Interview with Fidelis Magalhaes, MAG It also appears to replicate the work of the a MAG membership register would be a mediation project o" cer, Dili, 31 January 2008. PNTL Rapid Response Unit, the UIR.33 useful tool to keep track of these elements. 8 Interview with Susana Barnes, Australian National University researcher on land and Finally, in late November 2007 UNPOL Compelling politicians and civil servants to property issues, Dili, 19 January 2008. conducted two successful weapons sweeps similarly declare their a" liations would be 9 Ostergaard (2005), pp. 22–3. in the particularly violence-prone Dili equally bene# cial. Transparency can in itself 10 GTZ (2007). suburb of Bairopite. ! e success of the be a powerful tool. 11 McWilliam (2005), p. 39.
Timor-Leste Issue Brief April 2009 | 7 12 Interview with senior PNTL o" cer, Dili, 31 Nations Independent Special Commission of January 2008. Bibliography Inquiry for Timor-Leste. Geneva: OHCHR. 2 13 Interview with senior PNTL o" cer, Dili, 31 Alpers, Philip. 2005. Gun Running in Papua New October. January 2008. Guinea: From Arrows to Assault Weapons in the Ostergaard, Lene. 2005. Timor-Leste Youth Social Southern Highlands. Special Report 5. Geneva: Analysis Mapping and Youth Institutional 14 ‘Magic And Mayhem: Gang Culture ! reatens Small Arms Survey. Assessment. Timor Leste: World Bank. June. E.Timor’, South China Morning Post, 6 Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste. O" ce of Oxfam Timor-Leste with GTZ (Deutsche December 2007. the Prime Minister. 2006. ‘Media Release.’ 1 Gesellscha% für Technische Zusammenarbeit) 15 ICG (2008), p. 18. December. and Timor-Leste Directorate of Land and 16 Neupert and Lopes (2006), p. 33. GTZ (Deutsche Gesellscha% für Technische Property. 2003. ! e Customary Use of Natural Resources in Timor Leste. Timor Leste: Oxfam 17 Harrington (2006), p. 47. Zusammenarbeit). 2007. Securing a Better Future: Martial Arts Groups and ! eir Potential and GTZ. 18 Interview with UNPOL o" cer, Dili, 29 January to Become Part of a Peace Constituency in Timor- ! ompson, Edwina and Sinclair Dinnen. 2004. 2008. Leste. Dili: GTZ. May. Gender and Small Arms Violence in Papua New 19 UNPOL broadcast, 1 February 2007. Haley, Nicole and Robert Muggah. 2006. ‘Jumping Guinea. Discussion Paper No. 2004/8. Canberra: 20 Oxfam Timor-Leste (2003). the Gun: armed violence in Papua New Guinea’. State, Society and Governance in Melanesia 21 ‘Joint Declaration of Martial Arts In Small Arms Survey 2006: Un# nished Business. Project, Australian National University. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Organizations’, Dili, 30 June 2005. UNMIT (United Nations Integrated Mission in Harrington, Andrew. 2006. ‘Ethnicity, Violence, Timor-Leste). 2008. ‘Daily Media Brie# ng.’ 28 22 GTZ (2007), p. 26. and Property Disputes in Timor-Leste.’ August. 23 Interview with UNPOL o" cer, Dili, 29 January East Timor Law Journal.
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