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Finding Partners: -Leste’s Evolving Security Ties with Southeast Natalie Sambhi May 2019

he Democratic of Timor-Leste of vulnerability which, coupled with domestic gained its in 2002. Since imperatives, shape its strategic outlook. then, small country has been busy T As Southeast Asian states grow in economic diversifying its foreign relations, building on nascent bonds forged through and terms, it makes sense for Timor- missions on its soil since 1999. Amid the Leste to build closer ties with them. , international flurry, Timor-Leste must contend , the and , with a range of pressing domestic issues. The among others, will remain important partners country has only 1.3 million citizens, 74% of for Timor-Leste. However, Southeast Asian whom are under the age of 35.1 Timor-Leste partnerships draw dividends, in both material aspires to become an upper middle income and non-material terms. This essay assesses country by 2030 with healthy and educated the burgeoning relations between Timor- citizens, a diversified economy, high quality Leste and its Southeast Asian partners. The infrastructure and food self-sufficiency.2 first section outlines Timor-Leste’s strategic Timor-Leste’s oil dependence, as well as its outlook and security vulnerabilities as well erratic economic growth, do not bode well for as describing the current state of its defense the secure future the young nation’s leaders capabilities. The second section discusses have described. Its location in-between the reasons for closer Southeast Asian much larger states adds to a further sense engagement and assesses three bilateral partnerships (,

Natalie Sambhi is a Research Fellow at the USAsia Centre and PhD scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian University.

1 Future of the Asian Order and the ) as well as broader communication (SLOCs). With the small regional cooperation. The third and final nation also located northwest of the illegal section analyses the benefits of ASEAN fishing hotspot of the Arafura and Timor , security cooperation and summarizes the maritime surveillance and protection challenges for Timor-Leste ahead. controls are key concerns. Oil forms 80% of Timor-Leste’s GDP4 which makes securing oil Strategic outlook and security threats installations in the Timor and exports a Timor-Leste has a unique geographic critical part of the country’s future economic position, with ’s largest state, well-being. In addition, Timor-Leste is Indonesia, to its west and north, its South vulnerable to a range of maritime-borne non- Pacific neighbours to its east and Australia to traditional security threats including people its south. Its includes a main and . Indeed, that shares a land border with Indonesia; an Timor-Leste has sadly become a destination enclave (Oecussi) surrounded by Indonesian country5 for persons trafficked from other territory; and two smaller , Atauro and parts of the Indo-Pacific. Jaco. Other than the Indonesian , Timor-Leste is surrounded by the Bandan, change remains a key threat to Savu and Timor Seas and located to economic and food security in Timor-Leste. the strategic choke points of the The government has requested further and Strait. By virtue of this , attention from the international donor Timor’s leaders have prioritized Indonesia community on climate-resilient infrastructure, and Australia as integral regional security which will be able to withstand expected partners, followed by partnerships with China, frequency and severity of extreme climate Japan and , Southeast Asian states, the events associated with . In United States and other Portuguese-speaking Timor-Leste, extreme weather can not only countries. cause flooding, erosion and landslides, but impact the yield of , the country’s Timor-Leste’s security is most threatened by second most important export. With domestic instability, driven by factors such approximately 80% of Timorese reliant on as underdevelopment and . agriculture as their main livelihood, managing 3 According to the Bank, 41.8% of climate adaptation—including accounting for Timorese lived below the poverty line in 2014, irregular rainfall—is a priority for the state. with estimated rates of unemployment ranging from 25 to 40%. This carries the Current defense capabilities risk for conflict between domestic groups, To these external and internal including organized crime groups, gangs threats, the country can rely on the Timor- and militias, over land rights and access to Leste Defense Force (Forças de Defesa de resources. Some of these groups comprise Timor-Leste, F-FDTL), national (Polícia former independence fighters who were Nacional de Timor-Leste, PNTL), defense excluded from the military as well as ex- bureaucracy and National Intelligence militia members and unemployed youth. They Service, among other bodies. The current are often based and can be linked defense is Filomeno Paixão, a former to organizations. Timor-Leste Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces requires economic growth and job creation but and an ex- commander of , also good governance and a professional and the defunct military wing of the political party legitimate police force to deal with domestic , which had sought independence from stability. and then Indonesia. Democratic civilian control remains incomplete. Although Timor-Leste’s strategic priority is defending its Falintil was officially disbanded in 2001, its sovereignty, especially across the land border former members remain influential. Fretilin with Indonesia and in the maritime domain. continues to serve as a major political party With a large portion of its trade being maritime in government. One report argues that in nature, Timor-Leste has a strong interest normalized civilian control will occur only once in ensuring open and secure sea lanes of 2 a defense minister from outside Falintil is to upgrade military facilities at Timorese appointed.6 bases and in health clinics in the surrounding community. Now in its sixth year, the exercise Timor-Leste’s challenge is to rebuild a aims to further develop F-FDTL technical professional military and police force, infrastructure and leadership skills.14 weakened by fighting between the forces in 2006 when a combination of historical fissures Training with international partners is an and conflict over resources escalated into integral part of developing the F-FDTL violence. In the wake of violence in 2006 beyond its history of . Timor- and ongoing tensions between the services, Leste can become a active member a joint command of military and police was of regional security arrangements and established in 2008.7 Some analysts worry multilateral activities if it is able to modernize that this arrangement further confuses the its capability as well as develop its personnel. roles between military and police. Moreover, The Timorese government plans to double the the of the PNTL is undermined by military’s personnel by 2020,15 though the plan perceptions among Timorese citizens that is seen as unrealistic and unaffordable due the police are ineffective, factionalized and other pressures on the country’s economy. thus untrustworthy.8 Thus the state must build Indeed, in 2017, the economy contracted by confidence in law enforcement and justice 5.3% while projected growth for 2018 was a systems as effective alternatives to grievance mere 0.8%.16 resolution through vendetta and gang violence. Growing security and defense cooperation with the According to SIPRI,9 the country’s 2017 There are three major reasons for Timor-Leste military expenditure was US $25.4 million, to draw closer to Southeast Asia. The first is which currently amounts to 0.9% of GDP. that strengthening ties with Southeast Asia With approximately 1,000 active service states builds up the Southeast Asian pillar members, the military has only army and of Timor-Leste’s identity as well as providing navy components and does not operate greater access to growing economies, any aircraft. In November 2017, Australia advanced expertise and capital. To this end, and Timor-Leste confirmed the transfer of Timor-Leste applied for formal membership two Australian patrol boats in late 2023,10 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations together with crew training and sustainment (ASEAN) in 2011. Timor-Leste also sees itself support. Currently, the navy’s fleet comprises (and is seen by partners such as Australia) as two ageing Albatroz-class patrol boats from a South Pacific state, owing to its location and Portugal, three Sea Dolphin class patrol boats comparable levels of economic development donated by South Korea11 and two Type-62 with other small Pacific states. However, () class patrol boats from China. Pacific Island groupings cannot offer the high- However, the Korean and Chinese vessels profile diplomatic standing of ASEAN-centric are unsuitable to patrol the seas around multilateral fora or trade and investment Timor.12 To meet its maritime security needs, opportunities found in Southeast Asia. the Timorese Navy will need significant investment. A second reason for Timor-Leste to look to Southeast Asia is to reduce its vulnerability The Timorese military currently engages as a small, underdeveloped state. China in exercises and training with a range of is an attractive and easy source of capital, partners outside of Southeast Asia, notably goods and military capability. While relations Australia, , China, Japan, , with China have grown significantly in recent Portugal and the United States. For instance, years in economic and strategic terms, in 2018 during annual exercise attracting additional trade and investment Harii Hamutuk, engineers from the from Southeast Asia is one way to avoid of Australia, Japan and the United States overreliance. Thus far, China has constructed worked alongside F-FDTL counterparts13 the buildings hosting Timor-Leste’s foreign affairs department, the defense department 3 Future of the Asian Order and the presidential . Last year former Defense cooperation is marked by high- President Jose Ramos-Horta suggested17 that level meetings between senior officials his country could turn towards an “alternative and military training. In 2011, former partner” in China if it could not get support Indonesian military commander and former from partners such as Australia, Japan or the Vice President General Tri Sutrisno (Ret.) US. At the same time, he has denied claims18 attended a ceremony to commemorate the of “growing Chinese influence” in his country founding of Falintil.22 Sutrisno was the military as “absolute nonsense.” commander at the time of 1991 Santa Cruz massacre and the 1992 capture of Timorese A third reason for Timor-Leste to look north independence leader Xanana Gusmao. In is that relations with its southern neighbor 2016, the former chief of army and Australia have been strained in recent years. Minister for Defense Ryamizard Ryucudu This largely due to competing claims over oil discussed strengthening defense cooperation and gas reserves in the ’s Greater with his counterpart23 during a visit to . Sunrise field. While the issue was resolved in At lower levels, junior F-FDTL officers train March 2018, after both countries signed the at Indonesia’s military academy while mid- Treaty of Definition of the Maritime Frontier ranking and senior officers train at the between Timor-Leste and Australia, bad blood National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas)24 remains. In 2012, the Timor-Leste government and Staff and Command College.25 alleged that the Australian Secret Intelligence Indonesia’s Ministry of Defense is also Service (ASIS) had bugged Timorese offices 19 opening up opportunities for training Timorese in 2004. And in 2013, agents of the domestic soldiers as engineers. agency Australian Secret Intelligence Organization (ASIO) are alleged to have Military exchanges also extend into the removed material containing client information humanitarian sphere. In 2016, the Indonesian when they raided offices of a acting for navy’s medical experts and doctors provided the Timorese government20 in negotiations. assistance to civilians and military personnel This has strengthened perceptions of in Dili .26 There is also potential for Australia as a colonial bully, stealing further training at Indonesia’s resources by spying on a much smaller and center in Sentul, given Timor-Leste’s nascent poorer neighbor. While Australia continues to steps into peacekeeping missions. These be a key partner for Timor-Leste, particularly exchanges help build a reserve of positive in terms of and cooperation, recent events Indonesia–Timor-Leste interactions among a have given impetus for Timorese leaders to younger of military personnel. This shore up other ties. can counterbalance any residual animosity in the Timorese military and in broader society Indonesia towards the Indonesian military whose legacy In Southeast Asia, Timor-Leste’s relations includes violations during the with Indonesia are the closest and most occupation. diverse. Despite a bitter separation in 1999 after 24 years of occupation by Indonesia, Timor-Leste has also become a potential the salving of the relationship began with the market for Indonesia’s burgeoning defense Commission of Truth and Friendship, which industry. In 2011, the country ordered two was commissioned by both governments patrol vessels from Indonesia’s domestic in 2005 to jointly investigate human shipbuilder PT PAL.27 A recent report also rights violations. Ties are further bolstered confirms28 that Timor-Leste is interested by decades of intermarriage, interaction and in purchasing the Anoa armored vehicle proximity. Timorese leaders now describe the manufactured by Indonesia’s PT Pindad, from relationship as “mature” with a “focus instead which it has already acquired rifles.29 Further on the future.”21 Presently, Indonesia is a orders will depend on increases to Timor- significant trading partner and an important Leste’s defense budget. source of capital for investment and of Despite these areas of progress, challenges expertise, including building infrastructure. remain in the broader bilateral security

4 Timor Leste relationship. The success of Indonesia’s of police.35 Just before UNMIT’s conclusion crackdown on illegal fishing in the Arafura in 2012, the Malaysian forces Sea, for one, has had a deleterious impact donated their police vehicles to the Timor- on Timor-Leste’s surrounding waters.30 Leste government.36 Companies have shifted their operations from the to the Timor Sea. Malaysia has also supported the development of Timor-Leste’s nascent security forces. In In 2014, estimates of the economic loss 37 of illegal fishing for Timor-Leste stood at 2003, Malaysia contributed $2.56 million US $40 million, with further losses due to as part of it efforts to assist Timor-Leste in developing its defense forces. In 2015, destructive harvesting techniques used by 38 poachers such as dynamite.31 This is an Malaysia’s Ambassador to the UN reported of common concern to both countries and the that since 2002, 43 Timorese military officers displacement of IUU fishing activity from one had attended courses as part of the Malaysian sea to another demands dialogue both at the Defense Cooperation Program, including a bilateral and multilateral levels. ship diver’s course, language training, the law of armed conflicts, joint warfare and training Another issue that remains unresolved is as UN military observers. Malaysia has also the delimitation of both nations’ land and provided capacity-building and training for the maritime . Although the main border PNTL. separating east and has been successfully negotiated, the 120km border Philippines between exclave Oecussi and West Timor The Philippines and Timor-Leste share a long remains under dispute. This unresolved history as the only Catholic majority countries border is a source of tension and conflict in Southeast Asia. The Philippines’ military between communities over customary land. ties with Timor-Leste, however, are relatively Both countries currently hold joint patrols32 recent, and originated in 1999 when it sent given the area’s propensity for unrest and 600 personnel as well as military hardware use for trafficking of humans, drugs, wildlife in support of INTERFET and, later, to or timber.33 Guarding the border is also made UNTAET (where, in January 2000, Lieutenant more difficult by logistical issues such as General Jaime de los Santos was appointed access to clean water for soldiers at remote Force Commander of the missions’ military and deteriorating posts.34 A meeting between component), to UNMISET, and to UNMIT the Indonesian and Timorese foreign ministers (during which a Filipino, Dr Rodolpho Asel Tor, in January 2018 failed to deliver a negotiated was appointed UN Police Commissioner for a 39 result. These issues aside, however, period). Indonesia remains a critical partner in Timor- Since then, bilateral engagement has Leste’s bid for ASEAN membership and a expanded through a number of defense source for trade and defense. cooperation agreements signed in 2008. In Malaysia recent years, both countries have hosted a 40 Aside from proximity and a common tie of number of high-level visits during which officials have signed cooperation agreements Portuguese , Timor-Leste also 41 enjoys strong security ties to Malaysia. covering defense, signaling growing support This relationship stems from Malaysia’s at official levels for deepening the relationship. early involvement in Timor-Leste, sending For instance, in 2013, leaders established a bilateral mechanism between troops to be part of the post-referendum 42 in 1999 known as the two countries’ foreign affairs agencies INTERFET. This was followed by further for dialogue and exchange on bilateral, contributions to UN peacekeeping missions regional, and international issues of mutual including UNTAET in 1999, UNMISET in interest, including military consultations 2003 (including a lieutenant-general who and intelligence sharing. Then-Philippines served as commander) and UNMIT in 2006 President Aquino said the agreement was for which it was the top contributing country “vital to maintaining peace and security on our part of the world.”43 5 Future of the Asian Order

Like other Southeast Asian nations, military leaders must contend with threats such as assistance provided by the Armed Forces of domestic unrest and illegal fishing. Ensuring a the Philippines (AFP) focuses on capacity diversified economy and long-term growth will building in the F-FDTL.44 With both countries help the country invest in training professional being majority Catholic, a shared religious– military and police forces as well as in cultural outlook could be conducive to building purchasing modern military hardware. Until people-to-people relations between armed then, cooperation with partners in Southeast forces. The experience from transitioning Asia not only provides a source of much between a to a in the needed capital, trade and investment, but also Philippines might also yield useful lessons military training and exercises. Being able to for future civil-military relations challenges join ASEAN in the future will allow Timor-Leste for Timor-Leste’s leaders. While there to benefit from multilateral arrangements are legitimate questions about the future including intelligence sharing as well as character of the Philippines’ democracy under defense dialogues. In these fora, Timor- President Duterte, the military has been Leste will also be able to lobby on behalf of thus far exempt from policies that undermine the region on issues such as climate change democratic processes such as the drug war. which are disproportionately impacting smaller island states. With most Southeast Asian Broader cooperation with Southeast Asia states supporting Timor-Leste’s membership Aside from those three major relationships, for ASEAN, the future could look brighter. Timor-Leste also engages with Southeast In the rush, however, to better enmesh their Asian states in multilateral exercises and young nation within the region, Timorese training. For example, Timor-Leste, Australia, leaders will have to ensure resources are not Indonesia, Philippines and the United States spread too thinly across too many areas and joined forces in Suai, Timor-Leste, for a with too many partners.49 humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise in June of 2018.45 That said, this kind of multilateral engagement remains limited. Conclusion Looking to the future, membership in ASEAN could increase Timor-Leste’s cooperation with Southeast Asian states. For one, accession to ASEAN would open the door for Timor-Leste to be involved in ASEAN-specific exercises such as the ADMM-Plus Maritime Security exercise or arrangements such as the “Our Eyes” intelligence-sharing sub-group. Timor- Leste could also participate in future bilateral ASEAN activities such as maritime military exercises with China,46 air force training with Japan,47 or mine-clearing with India.48 Constraints in Timor-Leste’s capabilities, such as its current lack of air force, can limit the range of engagement. Nevertheless, dialogue with bilateral partners in a range of senior official or ministerial defense meetings held alongside ADMM-Plus will be beneficial for raising the country’s diplomatic profile and promoting its strategic interests. Overall, coupled with its urgent economic and infrastructure issues, Timor-Leste’s

6 Timor Leste

Endnotes year-harii-hamutuk/. 14 Australian Timor-Leste, “Preparations 1 Udoy Saika and Merve Hosgelen, “Timor-Leste underway for Exercise Harii Kamutuk 2016”, media National Human Development Report 2018: release, September 29, 2016, https://timorleste. Planning the Opportunities for a Youthful Population”, embassy.gov.au/dili/HH16MediaRelease.html. presentation, United Nations Development Programme, 15 Government of Timor-Leste, “Council of Ministers 4, 2018, http://www.tl.undp.org/content/dam/ Meeting of , 2011”, media release, timorleste/docs/reports/HDR/2018NHDR/TLNHDR%20 September 21, 2011, http://timor-leste.gov. 2018%20PPT%20Presentation_Dili%20Public%20 tl/?p=5752&lang=en. Seminar%2004.04.18.pdf 16 , “Timor-Leste: economy”, 2 Government of Timor-Leste, “Timor-Leste accessed , 2018, https://www.adb.org/ Strategic Development Plan 2011–2030”, countries/timor-leste/economy. 2010, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/ 17 content/documents/1506Timor-Leste-Strategic- “Jose Ramos-Horta warns gas dispute with Australia Plan-2011-20301.pdf. risks pushing closer to China”, ABC News, May 5, 2017, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-05-05/ 3 , “Timor-Leste: data”, accessed November ramos-horta-china/8502370. 1, 2018, https://data.worldbank.org/country/timor-leste. 18 Raquel Carvalho, “Chinese influence on rise in 4 U.S. Embassy in Timor Leste, “Ambassador Kathleen East Timor? ‘nonsense’, says former president José M. Fitzpatrick Remarks at the Harii Hamutuk 2018 Ramos-Horta”, South China Morning Post, September Closing Ceremony”, , 2018, accessed 6, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/ , 2018, https://tl.usembassy.gov/ article/2163107/chinese-influence-rise-east-timor- ambassador-kathleen-m-fitzpatrick-remarks-at-theharii- nonsense-says-former. hamutuk-2018-closing-ceremony/. 19 Steve Cannane, Sashka Koloff and Brigid Andersen, 5 The Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking in “’Matter of death and life’: Espionage in East Timor and Persons and Related Transnational Crime, “Statement Australia’s diplomatic bungle”, ABC News, November by the Head of Delegation of Timor Leste”, 4th Bali 26, 2015, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-11-25/ Regional Ministerial Conference, March 30, 2011, east-timor-greater-sunrise-spy-scandal/6969830. accessed November 6, 2018, https://www.baliprocess. 20 net/UserFiles/baliprocess/File/BRMC%20IV%20 Tom Allard, “Australia accused of playing dirty in Timor%20Leste%20Statement.pdf. battle with East Timor over oil and gas reserves”, Morning Herald, December 28, 2013, https:// 6 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “Timor-Leste: www.smh.com.au/national/australia-accused-of- after Xanana Gusmão”, 16, 2014, IPAC report no. playing-dirty-in-battle-with-east-timor-over-oil-and-gas- 12, http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/07/ reserves-20131227-2zzmi.html. 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Minister and Trade Minister go to Timor Leste], 9 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, .com, August 19, 2011, https://nasional. “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1949–2017”, kompas.com/read/2011/08/19/13554235/Menhan.dan. accessed November 17, 2018, https://www.sipri.org/ Mendag.Ke.Timor.Leste. databases/milex. 23 “Timor Leste, Indonesia Establish Cooperation on 10 “Two patrol boats confirmed for Timor Leste”, Defense”, Tempo, , 2016, https://en.tempo. 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Timor Leste” [Indonesia sells two patrol boats to Timor media release, July 7, 2008, https://unmit.unmissions. Leste], Tempo, March 22, 2011, https://nasional.tempo. org/unmit-announces-appointment-un-police- co/read/322017/indonesia-jual-2-kapal-patroli-ke-timor- commissioner. leste. 40 Government of Timor-Leste, “Timor-Leste continues 28 Dzirhan Mahadzir, “Anoa prototype by year end”, to strengthen relations with the Philippines”, Asian Military Review, February 3, 2017, https:// December 17, 2015, http://timor-leste.gov. asianmilitaryreview.com/2017/02/anoa-prototype-by- tl/?p=14436&lang=en&n=1. year-end/. 41 Rosalinda L. Orosa, “Philippines, Timor-Leste affirm 29 “Timor Leste Pesan Senjata Laras Panjang Made in strong relations”, The Philippine , Jun 6, 2013, ” [Timor Leste orders long-barrelled weapons https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/06/06/951211/ made in Bandung], detikfinance, , 2013, philippines-timor-leste-affirm-strong-relations. https://finance.detik.com/industri/d-2344820/timor-leste- 42 Natashya Gutierrez, “PH, Timor Leste renew pesan-senjata-laras-panjang-made-in-bandung. partnership”, , June 6, 2013, https://www. 30 Australian National University, “Trends in IUU Fishing rappler.com/nation/30785-ph-timor-leste-renew- in the Shared Arafura and Timor Seas”, NARU Public partnership. seminar series, accessed December 5, 2018, http:// 43 Gutierrez, “PH, Timor Leste renew partnership”. www.anu.edu.au/about/campuses-facilities/events/ trends-in-iuu-fishing-in-the-shared-arafura-and-timor- 44 Frances Mangosing, “East Timor military chief on seas. 5-day visit to enhance cooperation with PH armed 31 forces”, Inquirer.net, July 25, 2012, https://globalnation. Asian Development Bank, “State of : inquirer.net/45485/east-timor-military-chief-on-5- Timor-Leste”, 2014, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/ day-visit-to-enhance-cooperation-with-ph-armed- files/publication/42394/state-coral-triangle-timor-leste. forces#ixzz5W3G3QBQ9. pdf. 45 32 Benjamin W. Stratton, “Pacific Angel 18-1 Concludes “Indonesia, Timor Leste hold joint patrol along in Timor-Leste”, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, July 2, border”, The Jakarta Post, May 26, 2014, http://www. 2018, http://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article- thejakartapost.com/news/2014/05/26/indonesia-timor- View/Article/1566026/pacific-angel-18-1-concludes-in- leste-hold-joint-patrol-along-border.html. timor-leste/. 33 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Border 46 Lim Min , “China, Asean kick off inaugural Patrol Units and Customs Officers in Timor Leste maritime field training exercise in Zhanjiang, Receive International Border Interdiction Training by Guangdong”, The Straits Times, 22, 2018, U.S. Customs and Border Protection and UNODC”, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china- media release, October 24, 2014, https://www.unodc. -kick-off-inaugural-maritime-field-training- org/indonesia/en/2014/10/border-timor-leste/story.html. exercise-in-zhanjiang. 34 Nani Afrida, “TNI to build more posts on RI-Timor 47 “Japan to invite ASEAN air force officers to observe Leste border”, The Jakarta Post, December 29, 2014, SDF training”, Nikkei Asian Review, October 20, 2018, https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/12/29/tni- https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-Relations/ build-more-posts-ri-timor-leste-border.html. Japan-to-invite-ASEAN-air-force-officers-to-observe- 35 United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste, “UN Police”, SDF-training. accessed , 2018, https://unmit.unmissions. 48 “ASEAN Plus military exercise “watershed event”: org/un-police. Dalbir Singh, Army chief”, The Economic Times, July 36 Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance, “Handover of 12, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/ UNMIT- FPU Malaysian Vehicles to the Government defence/asean-plus-military-exercise-watershed-event- of Timor Leste”, media release, accessed, December dalbir-singh-army-chief/articleshow/51317265.cms. 6, 2018, https://www.mof.gov.tl/handover-of-unmit-fpu- 49 Rebecca Strating, “Small states and security malaysian-vehicles-to-the-government-of-timor-leste- in the Asia-Pacific: Balancing, Bandwagoning 2/?lang=en. or Hedging?” Institute of International Affairs, University 37 Malaysia Permanent Mission to the United of Iceland, June 26, 2018, Policy Brief no. 26, http:// Nations, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hussein ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Small-states- Haniff, Permanent Representative of Malaysia to the and-security-alliances-in-the-Asia-Pacific-Balancing- United Nations at the Security Council debate on Bandwagoning-or-Hedging_.pdf. the situation in Timor-Leste, New York, 22 February 2012”, accessed , 2018, https://www. un.int/malaysia/sites/www.un.int/files/Malaysia/2015- Statements-Security-Council/66unga68_timor-leste.pdf. 38 Malaysia Permanent Mission to the United Nations, “Statement by H.E. Ambassador Hussein Haniff”. 39 United Nations Mission In Timor-Leste, “UNMIT announces appointment of UN police commissioner”, 8 Timor Leste

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