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Timor-Leste's Evolving Security Ties with Southeast Asia

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Timor-Leste's Evolving Security Ties with Southeast Asia Finding Partners: Timor-Leste’s Evolving Security Ties with Southeast Asia Natalie Sambhi May 2019 he Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste of vulnerability which, coupled with domestic gained its independence in 2002. Since imperatives, shape its strategic outlook. then, the small country has been busy T As Southeast Asian states grow in economic diversifying its foreign relations, building on nascent bonds forged through United Nations and military terms, it makes sense for Timor- missions on its soil since 1999. Amid the Leste to build closer ties with them. China, international flurry, Timor-Leste must contend Japan, the United States and Australia, with a range of pressing domestic issues. The among others, will remain important partners country has only 1.3 million citizens, 74% of for Timor-Leste. However, Southeast Asian whom are under the age of 35.1 Timor-Leste partnerships draw dividends, in both material aspires to become an upper middle income and non-material terms. This essay assesses country by 2030 with healthy and educated the burgeoning relations between Timor- citizens, a diversified economy, high quality Leste and its Southeast Asian partners. The infrastructure and food self-sufficiency.2 first section outlines Timor-Leste’s strategic Timor-Leste’s oil dependence, as well as its outlook and security vulnerabilities as well erratic economic growth, do not bode well for as describing the current state of its defense the secure future the young nation’s leaders capabilities. The second section discusses have described. Its location in-between the reasons for closer Southeast Asian much larger states adds to a further sense engagement and assesses three major bilateral partnerships (Indonesia, Malaysia Natalie Sambhi is a Research Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre and PhD scholar at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. 1 Future of the Asian Order and the Philippines) as well as broader communication (SLOCs). With the small regional cooperation. The third and final nation also located northwest of the illegal section analyses the benefits of ASEAN fishing hotspot of the Arafura and Timor Seas, security cooperation and summarizes the maritime surveillance and border protection challenges for Timor-Leste ahead. controls are key concerns. Oil forms 80% of Timor-Leste’s GDP4 which makes securing oil Strategic outlook and security threats installations in the Timor Sea and exports a Timor-Leste has a unique geographic critical part of the country’s future economic position, with Southeast Asia’s largest state, well-being. In addition, Timor-Leste is Indonesia, to its west and north, its South vulnerable to a range of maritime-borne non- Pacific neighbours to its east and Australia to traditional security threats including people its south. Its territory includes a main island smuggling and human trafficking. Indeed, that shares a land border with Indonesia; an Timor-Leste has sadly become a destination enclave (Oecussi) surrounded by Indonesian country5 for persons trafficked from other territory; and two smaller islands, Atauro and parts of the Indo-Pacific. Jaco. Other than the Indonesian archipelago, Timor-Leste is surrounded by the Bandan, Climate change remains a key threat to Savu and Timor Seas and located next to economic and food security in Timor-Leste. the strategic choke points of the Ombai Strait The government has requested further and Wetar Strait. By virtue of this geography, attention from the international donor Timor’s leaders have prioritized Indonesia community on climate-resilient infrastructure, and Australia as integral regional security which will be able to withstand expected partners, followed by partnerships with China, frequency and severity of extreme climate Japan and India, Southeast Asian states, the events associated with climate change. In United States and other Portuguese-speaking Timor-Leste, extreme weather can not only countries. cause flooding, erosion and landslides, but impact the yield of coffee, the country’s Timor-Leste’s security is most threatened by second most important export. With domestic instability, driven by factors such approximately 80% of Timorese reliant on as underdevelopment and unemployment. agriculture as their main livelihood, managing 3 According to the World Bank, 41.8% of climate adaptation—including accounting for Timorese lived below the poverty line in 2014, irregular rainfall—is a priority for the state. with estimated rates of youth unemployment ranging from 25 to 40%. This carries the Current defense capabilities risk for conflict between domestic groups, To address these external and internal including organized crime groups, gangs threats, the country can rely on the Timor- and militias, over land rights and access to Leste Defense Force (Forças de Defesa de resources. Some of these groups comprise Timor-Leste, F-FDTL), national police (Polícia former independence fighters who were Nacional de Timor-Leste, PNTL), defense excluded from the military as well as ex- bureaucracy and National Intelligence militia members and unemployed youth. They Service, among other bodies. The current are often family based and can be linked defense minister is Filomeno Paixão, a former to martial arts organizations. Timor-Leste Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces requires economic growth and job creation but and an ex-company commander of Falintil, also good governance and a professional and the defunct military wing of the political party legitimate police force to deal with domestic Fretilin, which had sought independence from stability. Portugal and then Indonesia. Democratic civilian control remains incomplete. Although Timor-Leste’s strategic priority is defending its Falintil was officially disbanded in 2001, its sovereignty, especially across the land border former members remain influential. Fretilin with Indonesia and in the maritime domain. continues to serve as a major political party With a large portion of its trade being maritime in government. One report argues that in nature, Timor-Leste has a strong interest normalized civilian control will occur only once in ensuring open and secure sea lanes of 2 a defense minister from outside Falintil is to upgrade military facilities at Timorese appointed.6 bases and in health clinics in the surrounding community. Now in its sixth year, the exercise Timor-Leste’s challenge is to rebuild a aims to further develop F-FDTL technical professional military and police force, infrastructure and leadership skills.14 weakened by fighting between the forces in 2006 when a combination of historical fissures Training with international partners is an and conflict over resources escalated into integral part of developing the F-FDTL violence. In the wake of violence in 2006 beyond its history of guerrilla warfare. Timor- and ongoing tensions between the services, Leste can become a more active member a joint command of military and police was of regional security arrangements and established in 2008.7 Some analysts worry multilateral activities if it is able to modernize that this arrangement further confuses the its capability as well as develop its personnel. roles between military and police. Moreover, The Timorese government plans to double the the legitimacy of the PNTL is undermined by military’s personnel by 2020,15 though the plan perceptions among Timorese citizens that is seen as unrealistic and unaffordable due the police are ineffective, factionalized and other pressures on the country’s economy. thus untrustworthy.8 Thus the state must build Indeed, in 2017, the economy contracted by confidence in law enforcement and justice 5.3% while projected growth for 2018 was a systems as effective alternatives to grievance mere 0.8%.16 resolution through vendetta and gang violence. Growing security and defense cooperation with the region According to SIPRI,9 the country’s 2017 There are three major reasons for Timor-Leste military expenditure was US $25.4 million, to draw closer to Southeast Asia. The first is which currently amounts to 0.9% of GDP. that strengthening ties with Southeast Asia With approximately 1,000 active service states builds up the Southeast Asian pillar members, the military has only army and of Timor-Leste’s identity as well as providing navy components and does not operate greater access to growing economies, any aircraft. In November 2017, Australia advanced expertise and capital. To this end, and Timor-Leste confirmed the transfer of Timor-Leste applied for formal membership two Australian patrol boats in late 2023,10 of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations together with crew training and sustainment (ASEAN) in 2011. Timor-Leste also sees itself support. Currently, the navy’s fleet comprises (and is seen by partners such as Australia) as two ageing Albatroz-class patrol boats from a South Pacific state, owing to its location and Portugal, three Sea Dolphin class patrol boats comparable levels of economic development donated by South Korea11 and two Type-62 with other small Pacific states. However, (Shanghai) class patrol boats from China. Pacific Island groupings cannot offer the high- However, the Korean and Chinese vessels profile diplomatic standing of ASEAN-centric are unsuitable to patrol the seas around multilateral fora or trade and investment Timor.12 To meet its maritime security needs, opportunities found in Southeast Asia. the Timorese Navy will need significant investment. A second reason for Timor-Leste to look to Southeast Asia is to reduce its vulnerability The Timorese military currently engages as a small, underdeveloped state. China in exercises and training with a range of is an attractive and easy source of capital, partners outside of Southeast Asia, notably goods and military capability. While relations Australia, Brazil, China, Japan, New Zealand, with China have grown significantly in recent Portugal and the United States. For instance, years in economic and strategic terms, in September 2018 during annual exercise attracting additional trade and investment Harii Hamutuk, engineers from the militaries from Southeast Asia is one way to avoid of Australia, Japan and the United States overreliance.
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