East Timordeclaresindependencefrom 1975 Elections, Thegovernmenttemporarily Fearing Gangviolenceduringthe2012 2011 and Joseramos-Hortabecomespresident

Home , Falintil, Fretilin, Mari Alkatiri, Taur Matan Ruak

180 | Timor-Leste 2017 1975 The SantaCruzmassacre—Indonesian 1991 disease duringtheoccupation. 100,000 arekilledordiefromfamine occupying itforthenext24years.Over Portugal. Indonesiainvadesthecountry, East Timordeclaresindependencefrom 1975 elections, thegovernmenttemporarily Fearing gangviolenceduringthe2012 2011 and JoseRamos-Hortabecomespresident. Xanana Gusmãobecomesprimeminister clashes duringtheparliamentaryelection. Reconstruction (CNRT)causesviolent the NationalCongressforTimorese Political rivalrybetweenFRETILINand 2007 UN missionisdispatchedtorestorepeace. Prime MinisterMariAlkatiriresigns,anda 2006 Democratic RepublicofTimor-Leste. East Timorofficiallybecomestheindependent 2002 for independence. into WestTimor,butalmost80percentvote population isdisplaced,and200,000flee independence. Nearly75percentofthe during anationalreferendumon Pro-Indonesia militiasattackcivilians 1999 systematic humanrightsabuses. pressure buildsasIndonesiaisaccusedof killing between150and270.International forces fireonpro-independencemarchers, and CNRT,wins the presidentialelection. Francisco Guterres,backedbyFRETILIN 2017 a significantsourceoflocalconflict. remain disputes land and remains unsigned, Ramos-Horta vetoesit.Thelandlaw Parliament passesalandlaw,butPresident 2012 permanently outlawed. violence resumes,andseveralMAGsare bans MAGs.Whenthebanisliftedin2013,

military triggeraviolentpoliticalcrisis. dismissal of600soldiersfromtheTimor Regional resentmentsfueledbythe 2006 momentum. give Timor’sindependencemovement regime followingtheAsianeconomiccrisis The collapseofIndonesia’sSuharto 1998 Indonesian securityforces. which conductguerillawarfareagainst FRETELIN anditsarmedwing,FALINTIL, Timorese nationalism.Resistanceisledby Repressive Indonesianrulestrengthens 1975 between CNRTandFRETILINis formed. FRETILIN primeminister,andan alliance Gusmão stepsdown,pavingtheway fora 2015 supporters andthepolice. FRETILIN, sparkingclashesbetweenangry forms acoalitiongovernmentthatexcludes CNRT winsamajorityintheelectionand 2012 violence. old resentmentscontinuetofuelpolitical Minister Gusmãoraisefearsofacoup,as on Prime attack Ramos-Horta andanarmed An assassinationattemptagainstPresident 2008 continue atabout50perweekthrough2007. and controlofillegalactivities.Clashes and localcommunitiesbattleforterritory martial artsgroups(MAGs),streetgangs, and rapidlyspreadstothecapital,Dili,as Communal violenceeruptsinErmera 2006 and streetgangsthroughoutthecountry. clashes betweenprotesters,securityforces, Over 150,000aredisplacedbyarmed territory. Timor, thelastIndonesiansoldiersleave As amultinationalUNforcearrivesin 1999

* Rankingsarebasedonthelast15yearsandrelativetootherAsiancountries. Timor-Leste are veryhigh. 2003, and was finally approved in 2017. Rates of violence against women and children draft land bill wentback and forth betweenthe parliament and the administration from A rights. usage or ownership determine to framework legal effective an of absence the todue country violencethroughoutthe and friction cause to continue disputes Such resources. to access and land are conflict communal of drivers primary The violence. ofthemajor formostofthe a few MAGs thatwereresponsible permanently outlawed with theliftingofban, violence resurfaced the government lence. AsMAG-related vio and electoral in politics involvement limit their to 2012 election the a yearbefore after 2006. on allMAGs for A temporarybanwasimposed it escalated when violence MAG-related to reduce attempts (MAGs). Thegovernmentmademultiple art groups martial different among violence gang of form the takes often Timor-Leste in conflict manipulated for political gain—also triggered widespread communal conflict. Communal perceptions ofinequality betweeneasterners andwesterners inthemilitary, whichwere in 2017. The 2006 elections crisis—driven by general of the ahead opposition political FRETILINreduced with oneCNRTand to early in2015landscape political the changed An alliancebetween 2007 parliamentaryelection. during the parties political between clashes Reconstruction(CNRT)resultedinviolent National CongressforTimorese East Timor movement, RevolutionaryFrontforan (FRETILIN), Independent and the former resistance the rivalry between conditions. Growing andsecurity ical landscape polit the shape significantly to continues crisis 2006 the of aftermath the Yet period. After apoliticalcrisisin2006,Timor-Lestehasstabilizedthepostindependence At a glance a At Overview Absent Separatism andautonomy Absent Transnational terrorism Decreased from hightolow National politicalconflict Absent National civilwar Urban crimeandviolence Medium Local resource conflict Medium Local politicalandelectoralconflict Decreased from mediumtolow Communal/ideological conflict High - -

181 | Timor-Leste 182 | Timor-Leste ened Timorese nationalism. Resistance to the Indonesian occupation, led by the Revolutionary the by led Indonesian occupation, the to nationalism. Resistance Timorese ened strength rule Indonesian Repressive Timorese. onthe values” “Indonesian considered were whatIndonesianIndonesianlanguage and the government imposed resettlementandforced Indonesia. The of regions movements inrestive to communismorspursecessionist fall would Cruz; theIndonesianauthoritiesclaimedtherewere19deaths. at Santa forces by Indonesiansecurity killed were 150 and 270people between that estimated RapporteurSpecialTheUnitedNations (UN) onextrajudicial, summary, orarbitrary executions he andotherTimoreseactivists hadtakenrefuge. church, where forces ontheMotael security man killedamonthearlierinanattackbyIndonesian Gomes, ayoung to thegraveofSebastiao march pro-independence peaceful, a in participating civilians unarmed on fire opened military Indonesian The international attention. widespread 1991, received in November massacre), Dili forcibly transferredtoIndonesia. children were to 4,500 Timorese against women.Up violence torture, massacres,andsexual and systematic routine executions, extrajudicial violations, including human rights committed forces security internally. most displaced, were Over 100,000 households disease. and famine of 1999. and 1974 between 102,800 civilians died at least Timorese Timor-Leste,CAVR)iação de estimates Reconcil Verdade, e Acolhimento, de Timor (Comissão tion, Truth,andReconciliationinEast forces duringthisperiod. Indonesian security against warfare guerrilla Timor-Leste, FALINTIL) out de carried Nacional ArmedLiberationEast Timorthe ForcesforNational of Libertação the (ForçasArmadasda Timor in 1999. Indonesia left FRETILIN’s for 24years,until FRETILIN), armed wing, persisted Front foranIndependentEastTimor(FrenteRevolucionáriadeTimor-Leste Independente, Timor-Leste Many lives were lost during Timor’s struggle for independence. The CommissionforRecep for independence. lost duringTimor’s Many liveswere struggle 1 Approximately 18,600 of these were killed or forcibly disappeared, while 84,200 died 84,200died while disappeared, orforcibly killed were these 18,600of Approximately Indonesia in December 1975. Indonesia feared that Timor-Leste (then East Timor) East (then Timor-Leste that feared 1975. Indonesia in December Indonesia into incorporated and forcibly country wasoccupied from Portugal,the pendence inde declaring of days Within nationhood. to road difficult a had Timor-Leste National civilwar 3 TheSantaCruzmassacre(alsoknownasthe 4 National level 2 Indonesian - - - - elsewhere in the country. elsewhere and Dili in camps in displaced internally were others while areas, other and Timor West to fled property. ing referendum, pro-IndonesiamilitiasattackedciviliansacrossTimor, killinghundredsanddestroy the and during to up lead In the for independence. voted population the of 80 percent nearly (known asthe1999 1999, Popular Consultation).In August onindependence in areferendum the UN, by talks, and internationally.PortugalIndonesia heldmediated momentum domestically movement togain Timor’s independence year allowed the following Indonesia’s Suhartoregime overthrow of The Asian economiccrisisof1997andthe to gainindependence. another decade hyperpoliticized roleinthe 2006crisis. former Indonesian police. With a significant element of the police loyal to him, Lobato played a againstthe among veterans fanningresentment police, intothe recruited loyal tohimwere those that minister, Lobatoensured F–FDTL. A formerdefense units, undermining the police paramilitary two interior, RogerioLobato,created minister ofthe new as the further escalated police F–FDTL andthe the force. Rivalriesbetween Indonesian police for the worked viously pre had who officers 370 incorporated force police new the while unemployed, others left but veterans FALINTIL some absorbed which F–FDTL, the of creation the and fighters FALINTIL Gusmão havecontinuedinthepostindependenceera. and FRETILIN much ofthe leadership between andtensions since independence, roles political central play to continued have members FRETILIN movement. resistance the of policies the all politicalpartiesrather thanasingleparty.FRETILIN to represent control over lost absolute Resistance, formed FALINTIL new NationalCouncilofMaubere armed wingofthe became the differences, ideological over committee central FRETILIN the from resigned Gusmão as 1987, Gusmão, then commander in chief of FALINTIL, continued into the postconflict government. In FRETILIN inthe1980s and1990s, particularly betweencentral committeemembers andXanana resistance. Tensionswithin during the parties and withinpolitical between torical competition Timor-Leste (UNMIT)inAugust2006tohelprestorepeaceandincreasepolicepresence. resignation ofPrimeMinisterMariAlkatiriandtheestablishmentaUNIntegratedMissionin 150,000 peopleweredisplaced, andover 1,600 houseswere destroyed. 69 injuredintheviolenceofAprilandMay2006. Overhalfofthevictimswerecivilians.Around gangs, MAGs,andyouthgroups, occurredthroughoutthecountry. Thirty-eight werekilledand clashes betweenprotesters,thepolice, anddefenseforces. Widespreadrioting, involvingarmed armed to leading conflicts, political other and rivalries with fused Grievances force. defense the Xanana Gusmãoaboutmismanagementandperceiveddiscriminationagainstwesternerswithin result of a petition submitted in January 2006 to Brigadier General Taur Matan Ruak and President Defesa deTimorLeste, FALINTIL–FDTL orF–FDTL) inMarch2006.Thedismissalswerethe began whennearly600soldiersweredismissedfromtheTimor-Leste DefenseForce(Forças de in 2006, resultinginsomelossoflife, injury,displacement, andpropertydestruction. Thecrisis May 2002,EastTimorofficiallybecametheindependentDemocraticRepublicofTimor-Leste. andin onschedule, transition occurred 2000,the throughout1999andearly active militias were charterUN arrived,the of Indonesianlast the territory. the soldiersleft Whileanti-independence Following the massacre, international pressure on Indonesiaincreased, butittookTimor the massacre, international pressure Following Enmities among ex-soldiers also flowed from the poorly implemented demobilization of demobilization implemented poorly the from flowed also ex-soldiers among Enmities from his resulting disputes of political in partamanifestation The 2006 crisiswas political 5 regarding Timor’s status, and agreed to let the Timorese people decide for themselves regardingTimor’s decide to lettheTimorese people status, andagreed fragile stability for the first four years of its independence, but aa political crisis maintained erupted country The violence. electoral and conflict political to vulnerable is Timor-Leste law, of rule and institutions state weak with country postconflict a As National politicalconflict 6 More than 75 percent of the population was displaced. Approximately 200,000 Approximately displaced. was population the of percent than 75 More 7 In 1999, as amultinationalmilitaryforcemandatedunderChapter7 8 Thecrisis ledtothe - - -

183 | Timor-Leste 184 | Timor-Leste east andthepro-Indonesiawest,inprocessfurtherreinforcingit. pro-independence the between divide the manipulated bases, support own their build to seeking Politicians, and employment. resources, housing, for competition subsequent and the capital, rapid urbanizationinthe of consequences and economic social the occupation, and resistance of by thestresses were exacerbated times. Theseissues citizens datingback to Portuguese between tensions and lingering,unresolved (westerners), and LOROMONU LOROSA’E (easterners) the a failure to define land and property regimes to settle competing claims, latent tensions between included issues economic, andsocialfactors.Underlying of political, web a complex were causes single-party opposition. Exclusion of FRETILIN from the coalition government caused clashes government caused FRETILIN coalition of from the opposition. Exclusion single-party FRETILIN (FM),leaving as a Party (PD)andFrenti-Mudanca Democratic parties, the er small by FRETILIN seats, followedoth with 25seats.CNRT formed acoalitiongovernmentwithtwo 30 majority with CNRT wonthe persisted. of fragility root causes the generation), andmanyof the rebelgroupledbyReinado. by Gusmão on PrimeMinister attack armed separate Ramos-Horta anda on President attempt petitioners’ resentment continued tofuelviolence, highlighted bytheFebruary 2008 assassination rivalries, parties. Long-standingpolitical antagonisms amongFALINTIL of new veterans, and government withGusmãoasprimeminister( form anew to Alliance Parliamentary Majority the authorize to election, 2007 presidential the at theendofcampaign, following thedecisionbyPresidentJoséRamos-Horta, who won injuries, and91 incidentsofproperty destruction betweenMayandAugust2007. supporters duringthe2007parliamentaryelection. Violent incidentsresultedintwodeaths, 100 and their parties political between (CNRT), to violentclashes Reconstruction led for Timorese NationalCongress andGusmão’spoliticalparty,the committee FRETILIN’scentral between Political tensions became further entrenched after the 2006 crisis. Intensified rivalries Intensified crisis. 2006 the after entrenched further became tensions Political While the2006 crisis isoftenattributed solelytothebreakdown ofthesecurity sector, itsroot While the 2012 elections were held peacefully, power remained in the same hands (the old (the hands same in the remained power peacefully, held were 2012elections the While 10 20 0 40 50 0

Incidents ofviolence

ay 21-25 ay

egistration egistration Figure 1.

Source:

ay 2–une 12 2–une ay ampaign ampaign Violent incidentsduringthe2007parliamentaryelection

Timor-Leste ArmedViolence Assessment (TLAVA) une 1–2 une

une 0 une lection day day lection

figure 1

uly 1–12 uly esults esults

). The 2006 to theformation crisis alsoled uly 1–26 uly

uly 27–August 27–August uly epresentation epresentation 9

11 August 10–1 August 10 Violence spiked Violence spiked - in Holland2013, MaukMoruk, aformer FALINTIL commanderandalongtimeopponent exile toTimorfromself-imposed Afterhisreturn attacksagainstpolice. launched cil (KRM), Revolutionary Coun Maubere group, the a rebel of supporters when district in Baucau violence the parliamentandPresidentTaurMatanRuakincreased. FRETILIN was formed, leaving the parliament without an effective opposition. Conflict between CNRT and between Araújo. Analliance Rui Mariade FRETILIN politician successor, his for way down topavethe prime ministersince2007, however, whenGusmão,whohadbeen stepped Dozens of cars and properties were damaged. officers. police injured four and death one to leading police, and supporters angry its between 2006 political crisis led to widespread gang conflict among groups divided by different loyalties. activities and “protection”oftheir communities. emboldened youth gangs to partition Dili into territories, using their influence for both criminal divide, this mobilization of political in the a part played 2006 crisis,which group.The other the controlofDilimarkets. the for competing started country the of parts and western migrantsfromeastern 1940s, when the ratist conflictinTimor-Lestesinceitsindependence. form aminoritygovernment. coalition government, that CNRT making notjointhe would itmorelikelythatFRETILIN will announced Gusmão however vote respectively. of the 29.7 and29.5 percent securing election, parliamentary July in victory gained also CNRT and FRETILIN politics. Timorese in influence Gusmão’s sustaining election, the won CNRT, and FRETILIN both by backed fighter guerrilla predicted that conflicts during the 2017 elections would be small. reports ofviolentincidentsin the 2012 elections. Researchfrom a localNGO,Belun,however, of respondentswereconcernedaboutelectoralviolenceintheirdistricts, arrested andtorturedinthegovernmentoperations. Internationalreported dozensthatof individualssupporting of suspected Moruk werearbitrarily 2015. Amnesty military inAugust and the police by the in ajointoperation Moruk waskilled government. of the legitimacy the of attackscontesting The KRMcarriedoutaseries struggle. independence the of veterans disaffected of up made was which KRM, the formed Gusmão, of Even though CNRT and FRETLIN had formed a peaceful political union, CNRT 2015 political and FRETLIN saw political Even though had formedapeaceful PriorMarch tothe 2017 presidential election, nationwide pollsindicated that66 percent (see the national civil war section for moreinformation). no sepa nationalcivilwarsection There hasbeen the (see of Indonesianoccupation 24 years Indonesia after within autonomy voting against Timor-Leste gained independencein2002, May the majority with the population of Separatism andautonomy rorist groupsinTimor. by transnationalter or attackscarriedout activities noreported There havebeen Transnational terrorism movement and those loyal to Indonesia. An east-west divide stretches back to at least movement andthoseloyaltoIndonesia.Aneast-westdivide stretchesbacktoatleast sian occupation, societybecamedeeplysplitbetweenthose involved intheresistance numberaxes.divideda alongbeenTimoreselongof IndoneDuring has the society Large-scale communalandideologicalconflicts 18 It became common for migrants to associate themselves with one or or withone themselves commonformigrantstoassociate Itbecame 17 12 The political landscape changed in February 2015, 19 Thegenerallawlessnessthat followedthe 14 13 16 FranciscoGuterres,aformer Subnational level 15 despiteonlyafew - - - -

185 | Timor-Leste 186 | Timor-Leste irregularities in the process or results, confusion about the election process, and poor organization irregularities intheprocess orresults,confusionabouttheelectionprocess,andpoor organization suspected results, election the with dissatisfaction included incidents violent ofthe causes primary verbal threats. of 32 incidents and violence physical of incidents 27 including elections, 2009 suku elections. tensions andmoresubtleformsofintimidationhad probablyoccurredduringthe2004and 2009, localized that and 2016. ActionAidAustraliaandSmallArmsSurvey’sreportindicated for mostoftheviolence. the threemain outlaw MAGs—KeraSakti, responsible members were KORK, andPSHT—whose permanently to government decided in 2013returned,the and violentincidents ban waslifted politics and electoral violence. Police officers were also prohibited from joining MAGs. When the involvement in their limit to 2012 election the before year forone enforced was MAGs all ban of week duringthattime. per incidents violent 50 roughly experienced Timor figures, Police UN to According leader. 7-7 of the house after PSHT burned downthe PSHT and7-7 2007, particularlybetween throughout communities. and local gangs of coalition a wider prompted activities andillegal rackets, protection andcontrolofsecurity, dominance forterritorial aggression quent subse PSHT’s PSHT. against fight to 7-7 as such groups clandestine and (KORK), Klaran Rai Colimau 2000 and PSHTtotheformationofanallianceamongColimau2000, led Kmanek Oan mera toneighboring districts andthen into Dili, resulting in seven deaths. Er of district western from the spread (PSHT), rapidly Terate Hati MAG, PersaudaraanSetia an antigovernmentgroup,Colimau2000, largest in November2006 and the between erupted of retaliation. involved, to cycles or MAGsget leading Gang violenceoftenescalates,asmembersfromothergangs or land dispute. over aproperty a gangor spreadtoDili, MAG toattackanotherfamily as onefamilyuses districts sometimes rural in families between conflicts Communal Dili. in incidents violent of pattern the been has territory. This its defend to its youths mobilizes community each as villages, between dispute or politicalgroup. (MAG), group art martial gang, a by influenced sometimes communities, single of territories involved intensionsandclashessince2006. Commission aswereprevious electionsin2004and2009. Technicalauthorities,the Secretariatby not AdministrationforElection Nationalorthe Election by local that July, the 2016 of theelection.Basedona law adopted were implemented elections out violent activities on behalf of parties orbusinesses. ofparties onbehalf activities out violent former resistance figures who acted as procurers or fixers, organizing youths into mobs to carry or networks family of heads usually were people around particularindividuals.These centered to anaverageof54incidentsperweekduringthesecondhalf2007,and36in2008. experienced 70–80 violent incidents per 2007. Dili of end the until in Dili,andcontinued heated particularly was violence Gang-related Mutiple attempts have been made to address MAG-related violence. A temporary blanket violence. Atemporary MAG-related address to made have been attempts Mutiple ( neighborhoods into divided is Dili of suburb Each During the2006 crisis, armed groupswereorganizedbypatronageandkinshipnetworks village council (one female and one male delegate from each subvillage) in 2004, from eachsubvillage) and onemaledelegate village council(onefemale (village) elections for village chiefs, subvillage ( There was no major lethal violence reported when Timor-Leste held three Local politicalconflictandelectoralviolence 22 What sometimes appears to beagangorMAGclashisoftencommunal appears Whatsometimes 27 Belun recorded 59 incidents of electoral violence during the 2016 local the during violence electoral of incidents 59 recorded Belun 26 The two groups signed a peace agreement inAugust2008. Thetwogroupssignedapeaceagreement

week during the first half of 2007, but violence dropped 23 For example, a communal conflict that conflict communal a example, For aldeias 21 These groups have continued tobe continued groupshave These aldeias ), roughly corresponding to the to corresponding ), roughly ) chiefs, and delegates for 25 The conflict continued conflict The 24 The conflict between Local level 20 28 suku The - -

the 1999referendum. followed that displacement the after and properties land of occupation illegal and widespread records public of destruction the to task due a challenging has been claims overlapping through Sorting ownership. property and land to claims official many of basis the form to continue that rights usage and ownership of arange issued governments Indonesian and Portuguese The Indonesian occupation. and colonization Portuguese both of a legacy system, title land lenging rural-to-urban migration, a “youth bulge,” youth unemployment, the growth of gangs and MAGs, growthof gangsandMAGs, the youthunemployment, rural-to-urban migration,a “youthbulge,” total. national 2014 over 1,000 of the and 2016,inDili,32.4 recorded violent incidentspercent Belun 2013, 11.3 per 100,000 people, three times higher than thenational rate of3.6 in 2010. homicide rateinAsia second-highest that ithasthe reported on DrugsandCrime(UNODC) and the 2006–2007 unrest. Although Dili has been stable since 2007, the United Nations Office Indonesian occupation, colonization, the Portuguese the during and resistance of violence a site April 2017.ThelawwasenactedinJune in and expropriation,wasapprovedbyparliamentsenttothepresident territorial integrity, parliament andthegovernment. A packageofthreelaws,toaddresslandtitling, forth between by PresidentHortain2012. ship, itwasvetoed Since then,thelandlawhasbeengoingback and issues. these address communities abouthow localleaders consulting without conducted reportedly surveying was was beingreexamined.In thatlandownership some cases,the realized people nities, thesurveying sparked tensionsover landwhere there werepreviously nodisputes, as 2015and2016. between tosurveying related 31incidents recorded Belun from System, whichdeveloped and 2012. Ita NiaRai program called surveying a land started Justice, of Ministry the Services, under and Cadastral Property, Land, for Directorate National The communities. in disputes land inflaming further these groupsforprotectioninlanddisputes. protection and thejusticesystem,in many rural families areas encourage their youthtojoin law, andlimitedaccesstopolice of aclearlandtitle are rootedin land issues.Duetotheabsence conflicts. other in roots have that disputes community are partoflongstandingfamilyor The International CrisisGroupnotesthatmany land disputes year. that all violentincidents land forfarmingandhousing,10.2 of to 2016 percent related facing localcommunities. principal securitythreats the of as one seen were land disputes that found perceptions on community-police 2015 survey from themduringtheIndonesianoccupation.TheAsiaFoundation’s had beenstolen felt they mon. The 2006 and2007 violence ledtomore displacement, withpeopleforcibly taking back land A wide range of factors make Dili vulnerable to urban crime and violence, including rapid and violence,including urban crime to vulnerable make Dili factors of range A wide the highstakesinvolved, country hasmadeonlyslowprogressonlandtitling, the Despite are com individuals andthestate individuals andbetween land claimsbetween Competing 37 Belun’sdataindicatesanupward trendofviolenceinthecapitalcity( 34 Although parliament approved a land law to establish a set ofcriteriaforlandowner aset parliament approvedalandlawtoestablish Although 32 However, land surveying conducted by theMinistryofJustice’sNationalCadastral However,landsurveyingconducted (Our Land), a precursor to land titling, and collected 55,000 claims between 2007 55,000 claims between (Our Land), a precursortolandtitling,andcollected Local conflictover resources andcommunityrights beyond Portuguese freehold titles. Timor inherited a highly complex and chal titles.complex freeholdTimorPortuguese inheritedahighly beyond oflandandproperty ownership basisfordetermining lacksalegal Timor-Leste as conflict, and friction of source significant a are disputes property and Land country, with a population of over 277,000 (2015 census). Dili frequently served as served Dili frequently of over277,000(2015census). a population country, with significantly affected urban crime and violence in Dili, the most populous city in the Timor-Leste’shave pastandpoliticalsocioeconomic its challenges of legaciesand the Urban crimeandviolence Ita NiaRai , has also triggered disputes in some communities. in some disputes , hasalsotriggered 29 Belun recorded a total of 137 incidents in of 137incidents a total Belunrecorded 31 Many cases of gang and MAG violence and MAG gang of Manycases 33 In some commu Insome figure 2 36 ). Between Between 30 - - - -

187 | Timor-Leste 188 | Timor-Leste community-police perceptions, youthissuesarethehighestsecurityconcerninDili(35percent). on survey AsiaFoundation 2015 the to According youth. among tensions and frustration generate urban youth15–19yearsold,comparedto22.8percentforruralyouth. is a serious problem in Dili.The2010 censusreported an unemploymentrate of 40.2 percent for 30yearsold,youthunemployment majorityofitspopulationunder them.Withthe accommodate to resources and jobs of lack a and planning urban inadequate from suffers city the However, 29 in 200494,349 68,887 to in 2010. for controlofmarkets and land. and competition The numberofmigrantsinDiliincreasedfrom Dili, thaninruralareas. inurbanareas,particularly higher consistently were violence partner intimate and sexual violence manytimesintheirlives. rienced physical expe of violence,and81percent acts severe by theirpartnersexperienced of physicalviolence in theirlifetime. once least at partner an intimate by violence or sexual physical experienced had relationship a in 15–49 whohadeverbeen of womenaged againstwomenandchildren,59percent on violence der-based violenceareaboutdomesticviolence. AccordingtoTheAsiaFoundation’s2016report ( prostitution, andotherviolence. groups have beenincreasing their recruitment ofyouthtocarry outillegalactivities suchastheft, on theiractivities,organizedcrime and restrictions bad reputations with MAGs struggle some and MAGs offer youth companionship, status, protection, services, and a source of income. 15 and25yearsold.Gangs are malesbetween violence The mainprovocateursinMAG-related figure 3 figure 39 High rates of unemployment and rural-to-urban migration, compounded by the youth bulge, High ratesofunemploymentandrural-to-urbanmigration,compoundedbytheyouthbulge, who have moved to the capital city seeking better prospects for education and employment. foreducation prospects capital cityseekingbetter whohavemovedtothe ). Based on the PNTL’s of gen ). Based onthe incidents 2014 of reported data, morethan80percent 100 200 00 400 500 0 for2010 throughreportsdomestic violence 2014an upwardtrendinof show (PNTL) ofTimor-Leste National Police Datafromthe violence. domestic particularly violence, gender-based widespread experience inTimor-Leste girls and Women Domestic andgender-based violence 44 Seventy-seven percent of female respondents who had experienced any form who hadexperienced respondents of female percent Seventy-seven 46 2014 Figure 2. 43 38 The majority of migrants are young people between 15 and between people are young migrants Themajorityof Violent incidentsinDili(2014–2016) Source: 2015 Belun 45 The study found that the rates ofphysical found thatthe Thestudy 2016 40 42 As 41 - -

percent of women had been raped by more than one man at the same time(gangrape).These by morethan one manatthe raped of womenhadbeen percent previous 12 months. Three in the had happened said this and 10percent rape) intheirlifetimes, of 15and49 years had beenrapedbysomeoneotherthanahusbandor boyfriend (nonpartner just 1percentfromsocialserviceorganizations. and friends or neighbors (14 percent). Only 4 percent ofwomen soughthelpfrom the police, and percent), (27 in-laws their percent), (82 family own from their help sought often Women most it toanyone. violence fromtheirpartnerreported of womenwhohadexperienced 24 percent derreported. to havesexualintercoursewithhim. children, orrefuses the him, neglects telling without out him, goes with food, argues burns the she if wife his beating in justified is husband a believed women of percent 86 that found DHS are notviolence, butdiscipline.The2009–10 violence andsexualTimor-Leste forms ofphysical womenwithinintimaterelationships, Timoreseandboth mensome andwomen believeoftenthat against for violence of tolerance degree is ahigh there that indicate and surveys Many studies womenandhow encegirlsare community. treatedandthe regardedandin household the within experienced atleastoneformofphysicalorsexualabusebeforeage18. Asia-Pacific after Papua New Guinea. Seventy-two percent of women and 77 percent of men had in the highest second the also are rates abuse Child past. in the used been has methodology vey figures are higher than any of the 16 countries where the WHO or UN Multi-Country Study sur to solve the problem. Courts often treat domestic violence cases lightly, and tend to suspend a suspend to and tend lightly, violence cases domestic treat often problem. Courts solve the to back totheircommunityleaders referred uncommon. Victimsareoften is still cases violence in domestic system formal justice the to 2010. in May However, appealing Violence Domestic Law Against the passed parliament period, the postindependence in the violence over domestic prison sentenceorsubstituteafine. According to The Asia Foundation’s 2016 study, 14 percent of all women between the ages the between all women of The AsiaFoundation’s201614percent According to study, un in Timor-Leste,andistherefore as aprivatematter regarded is often violence Domestic The weak formal justice and security sectors exacerbate the problem. Amid risingconcern problem. the exacerbate sectors security and justice formal weak The Patriarchal culture and traditional practices reinforce gender inequalities and heavily influ 600 650 700 750 00 47 The 2009–10 Timor-Leste Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) foundthat just 2010 Figure 3. Incidentsofdomesticviolencein Timor-Leste (2010–2014) 2011 51 50 Source: 2012 PNTL 52 201 49 2014 48 - - -

189 | Timor-Leste 190 | Timor-Leste 3 2 1 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 Notes ENG.pdf docs/K-Timor-leste-ava/SAS-Timor-Leste-AVA-IB3- 2009),4, and responses, Electoral Violence in Timor-Leste: mapping, incidents Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment (TLAVA), files/final_report_ever_17_oct.pdf and IFES,2007), tion (EVER) in Timor-Leste: Final Report (IFES), tems Sys Belun andInternationalFoundationforElectoral Output/191219/ tional Development, 2012), Timor Leste Dili, of case the conflict: urban of point tipping the Jovana Carapic and Oliver Jütersonke, Documents/Countries/COITimorLeste.pdf (Geneva: OHCHR,2006), 42, SpecialentofInquiry Commission forTimor-Leste (OHCHR), Rights Human for Commissioner High the of Office RL30975.pdf globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/crs/ Congressional Research Service, 2001), ReportSituationTimor East LarryNiksch, LoisMcHugh,RhodaMargesson, and east-timor freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/ House website, accessedMarch27, 2017, “Freedom intheWorld 1999: EastTimor,”Freedom and theIndonesiangovernment. FRETILIN between tookplace direct negotiations No G94/145/62/PDF/G9414562.pdf?OpenElement https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/ (E/CN.4/1995/61/Add.1) York: UN, 1994), 6–7, (New from 3to13 to IndonesiaJuly andEastTimor1994 mission Bacre WalyNdiaye,onhis Mr. Rapporteur, andSocialCouncil, Economic UN 4,500. are unavailable. Estimates are between 2,400 and figures on the number of children forcibly transferred https://www.etan.org/news/2006/cavr.htm Timor East in Reconciliation and Truth Reception, for mission in 7.8 Child,” part Timor (CAVR), Rights ofthe in East “Violation ofthe Reconciliation Truth, and Reception, for Commission Ibid resisted withthehelpoflocalPortuguesemilitary. following anattemptedUDTcoup, whichFRETILIN (UDT) FRETILIN Timorense and UniãoDemocrática deaths fromabriefcivilwarbetweensupportersof news/2006/cavr.htm and Brussels:CAVR, 2005), 3, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor Reception, for oftheCommission Report ga! Final Violations inTimor-Leste, 1974–1999, Rights Human of Profile “The (CAVR), Timor East in Reconciliation Truth, and Reception, for Commission timor-leste-coalition www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/16/clashes- forms coalition,” “Timor-Leste clashesbreakoutafter primeminister . , 13. . http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/ . Report of the UnitedNations (Colombo and Brussels: CAVR, 2005)and Brussels: (Colombo Election Violence Education and Resolu and Education Violence Election . (London: UKDepartment for Interna Issue Brief Number3 Brief Issue . Guardian http://www.ifes.org/sites/default/ Chega! Final Report oftheCom Report Chega! Final . . The reportingperiodincludes , July 16, 2012, http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/ http://www.ohchr.org/ https://www.etan.org/ (Washington, DC: Report by the Special bytheSpecial Report . Understanding Understanding ”

(Dili: TLAVA, part 6in http://www. (Dili: Belun (Dili: Belun

Independ . (Colombo . Precise https:// https:// . Che , 78, ------ 17 16 15 14 13 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 east-timor-government-in-disarray-as-xanana-gus 2017, presidency,” quitspartyGusmao Xanana disarrayas ernmentin Timorgov East form to “Plans Murdoch, Lindsay ing-31-Marsu.pdf loads/2017/03/Evaluation-on-conflict-potential-dur Belun, 2017), Belun, 2016_public_opinion_poll_for_public_release.pdf www.iri.org/sites/default/files/english_timor- 7–24, 2016 SurveyTimor-Lesteofal NovemberPublicOpinion Centerfor Insights in Survey Research (CISR), asa57/1630/2015/en/ 12, 2015, Timor-Leste,” AmnestyInternational website, May in Tortured and Arrested Dozens “Timor-Leste: html atiri-families-east-timor-president-20160226-gn4ck9. au/world/discontent-about-xanana-gusmao-mari-alk ing Herald Alkatiri families: EastTimor president,” Tom Allard, “‘Discontent’ aboutXananaGusmao, Mari Data were retrieved from Belun’s Early Warning, Early CPP2015TLEN.pdf asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/ Francisco: TheAsiaFoundation, 2015),39, 2015 munity-Police PerceptionsinTimor-Leste andGobieRajalingam, Todd Wassel Election-Violence-Report_1_.pdf www.belun.tl/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Suku- Leste LocalElections Belun, TLAVA, 280. Ibid., Scambary, “Anatomyofaconflict.” Leste TLAVA, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678800902925184 Development & Security 2007Timor,”violence communalinEast 2006– the conflict: a of “Anatomy Scambary, James 2. Ibid., leste-ava/SAS-Timor-Leste-AVA-IB2-ENG.pdf www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/K-Timor- 2 Number Brief Issue Timor-Leste, in violence gangs,andarmed Groups, Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment (TLAVA), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533310903036442 ternational Peacekeeping and Setbacks,” in Timor-Leste:Accomplishments Reform andPolice “UNPOL Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, to-Displacement-September-5-2014.pdf building-Conflict-Prevention-and-Durable-Solutions- uploads/2016/06/TimorLesteLinks-between-Peace 2014), 5, Displacement ing Wassel, Todd ping pointofurbanconflict See Carapic and Jütersonke, mao-quits-party-presidency-20170804-gxpwat.html , Conflict Prevention and Durable Solutions to Solutions Durable and Prevention Conflict . , 5. http://www.smh.com.au/world/plans-to-form- Electoral Violence Related to the 2016 Violence Related toTimor- Electoral Electoral Violence Potential in 2017 in Potential Violence Electoral Groups, gangs, and armed violence in Timor- Electoral violenceinTimor-Leste https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ , February 27, 2016,, February (Washington,DC:CISR,2016), The Herald Sydney Morning Timor-Leste: Timor-Leste: Links between Peacebuild (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, (Washington,DC:BrookingsInstitution, http://www.belun.tl/wp-content/up . .

. (Dili: Belun, 2017), 3, 2017), (Dili:Belun, (Dili: TLAVA, 2009), 4, 9, no.2(2009):265–288, 16, no. 3 (2009): 393–406, , 23. Understanding the tip http://www.smh.com. . A Survey ofCom A Survey Sydney Morn . , 2–3. , August 5, , August Conflict, Nation http:// http:// http:// http:// . (Dili: leste_ (San . . In . . ------ 33 32 31 44 43 42 41 40 39 38 37 36 35 34 Asia Development Bank (ADB), Asia Development net/b110-managing-land-conflict-in-timor-leste.pdf sels: ICG, 2010), Timor-Leste, in flict (ICG), Group Crisis International belun.tl/en/publications/ 2016. December Belun website, through ofFebruary SituationReviews (EWER) Response Women and Children in Timor-Leste: Findings Timor-Leste: in Children and Women AsiaFoundation, The nal.html bulletin.com/2013/10/new-types-of-organized-crimi October 4, 2013, Timor-Leste,” inOperationsOrganizedCriminal Typesof in “New www.youtube.com/watch?v=DC0PwX7ioIk Tubevideo, 5:36,October posted23,2013, types ofcriminaloperationsinTimor-Leste],You new no.60,the report voice [Mahein Timor-Leste” na-ba Forma Foun OperasaunKrimeOrganizaduIha 60,koLianNu Nia Mahein,“Mahein Fundasaun lications/Urban_Violence_Dili.pdf genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/regional-pub Geneva DeclarationSecretariat, 2010), Timor-Leste Dili, of Study Case A Village: Robert Muggah,ed., Perceptions Rajalingam, and Wassel graph.pdf tl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Labour_Force_Mono Population Fund, 2012), 59, onLabourForce Analytical Report 12: Volume 2010, Census Housing and Population (NSD), National StatisticsDirectorate 39. Ibid., Migration_Monograph.pdf wwvw.statistics.gov.tl/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/ (Dili: NSD and UN Population Fund, 2012), 14, Analytical ReportonMigrationandUrbanization 7: Volume 2010, Census Housing and Population (NSD), National StatisticsDirectorate http://www.belun.tl/en/publications/ website, 2016,Belun December January 2014through of (EWER)SituationReviews Warning, EarlyResponse Data were retrieved from several of Belun’s Early gsh/pdfs/2014_GLOBAL_HOMICIDE_BOOK_web.pdf 2014), 128, 147, Global StudyonHomicide2013 (UNODC), Crime and Drugs on Office Nations United timor-leste.gov.tl/?p=18216&lang=en Law majorstepforDevelopment, June14,2017, of Land The GovernmentofTimor-Leste, Enactment uploads/2015/07/SitRev_Jun15_Eng_Final.pdf 2015), Belun, www.belun.tl/en/publications/ 2016. 2015 through December Belun website, ofJanuary (EWER)SituationReviews Early Response Data wereretrievedfromseveralBelunEarlyWarning, assessment.pdf tional-document/84126/timor-leste-country-gender- 81, Gender Assessment https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institu http://128.199.253.240:8088/wp-content/ Situation Review, June 2015 June Review, Situation . . , 29. East Timor Law and Justice Bulletin, Justice and Law Timor East . https://www.unodc.org/documents/ https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront. http://www.easttimorlawandjustice (Mandaluyong City: ADB, 2014), (Mandaluyong Asia Briefing No. 110 No. Briefing Asia Understanding Violence Against Violence Against Understanding UrbanViolence Urbanan in Survey ofCommunity-Police . . http://www.statistics.gov. . Timor-Leste Country Managing Land Con Land Managing (Vienna: UNODC, . (Dili: NSD and UN (Dili: NSDandUN . . (Dili: Belun, Timor-Leste Timor-Leste http://www. http://www.

(Dili, Brus , ascited (Geneva: https:// http:// http:// http:// . . - - - - . 50 49 48 47 46 45 52 51 lications/publication-FR235-DHS-Final-Reports.cfm NSD, 2010), 213–214, 2009–10 Survey Health and Demographic (NSD), National StatisticsDirectorate Women andChildreninTimor-Leste AsiaFoundation, The handle.net/1959.9/518410 2013),44, University, (Bundoora: LaTrobe report healthsurvey–final 2009–10 demographic the of analysis Secondary Timor-Leste: in women LyndseyWatson,and Taft Angela Armed-Violence-Assessment-Final-Rep.pdf docs/C-Special-reports/SAS-SR12-Timor-Leste- 2010), (Dili: ActionAidAustraliaandSmallArmsSurvey, Final Report, olence,” Susan Harris-Rimmer,“Sexualandgender-basedvi 51. Ibid., 52. Ibid., screen-2016-06-01.pdf wp-content/uploads/2016/05/nabilan-main-report- Foundation, 2016), 51, Study Baseline theNabilan from available. the NationalPoliceofTimorandisnotyetpublicly The datawasprovided toTheAsiaFoundationby sources/pdfs/EDDVReport.pdf Foundation, 2015), Timor-Leste in Violence Domestic of ty: Women’s Experiences of the Economic Dimensions DamianGrenfell etal., http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/

in Timor-Leste Armed Violence Assessment ed. RobertMuggahandEmileLeBrun Understanding Violence Against ViolenceAgainst Understanding https://asiafoundation.org/re BeyondFragility and Inequali . http://dhsprogram.com/pub http://asiafoundation.org/ . . Violenceagainst (Dili: The Asia (Dili:The , 21–23. (Dili:TheAsia Timor-Leste http://hdl. . (Dili: - - .

191 | Timor-Leste