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European Union Election Observation Mission to Timor-Leste 2017

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European Union Election Observation Mission to Timor-Leste 2017 Presidential & Legislative Elections 2017 European Union Election Observation Mission to Timor-Leste 2017 i The EU EOM wishes to express its appreciation to the National Election Commission (CNE), the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and all institutions, civil society and political parties of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste for their cooperation and assistance throughout the Mission’s presence. The EU EOM also expresses its appreciation to the European Union Delegation and the diplomatic missions of EU Member States in the country for their continued support. European Union Election Observation Missions are independent from the European Union institutions. The information and views set out in this report are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Union. Neither the European Union institutions and bodies nor any person acting on their behalf may be held responsible for the use which may be made of the information contained therein. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................................... 1 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 4 2. The Political Landscape ................................................................................................................................ 4 2.1 Background ......................................................................................................................................... 4 2.2 Electoral System .................................................................................................................................. 5 2.3 Political Actors .................................................................................................................................... 5 3. The Legal Framework for Elections ............................................................................................................... 7 3.1 The Constitution and International Commitments ............................................................................. 7 3.2 Constitutional Human Rights and Elections ........................................................................................ 7 3.3 Electoral Laws ..................................................................................................................................... 8 3.4 Late Amendments to Electoral Laws................................................................................................... 8 3.5 Electoral Justice: System for Complaints and Appeals Resolution ................................................... 10 4. Election Administration .............................................................................................................................. 11 4.1 Institutional framework: The National Election Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE) .............................................................................................................. 11 The National Election Commission ................................................................................................................ 11 The Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration ................................................................................ 12 4.2 Electoral Calendar and Preparations ................................................................................................ 13 4.3. Training of Electoral Officers and Party Agents ............................................................................... 15 4.4 Voter and Civic Education ................................................................................................................. 16 5. Registration of Political Parties and Candidates ......................................................................................... 17 5.1 Legal framework ............................................................................................................................... 17 5.2 Admission and Refusal of Candidacies .............................................................................................. 17 5.3 Publication of Candidate Lists ........................................................................................................... 18 6. Campaign Funding and Resources .............................................................................................................. 18 6.1 Legal Framework ............................................................................................................................... 18 6.2 Abuse of state resources and advantage of incumbency ................................................................. 19 6.3 Campaigning by Civil Servants .......................................................................................................... 20 7. Voter Registration ...................................................................................................................................... 21 7.1 Legal Framework ............................................................................................................................... 21 7.2 Update of the Voter Register ............................................................................................................ 21 7.3 Out-of-Country Registration and Voting ........................................................................................... 22 8. Civil Society and Election Observation ........................................................................................................ 22 8.1 Participation of Civil Society in the election process ........................................................................ 22 iii 8.2 International Observer Groups ......................................................................................................... 23 9. Women’s Participation in the Electoral Process .......................................................................................... 23 10. Participation of People with Disabilities in the Electoral Process .............................................................. 23 11. Media ....................................................................................................................................................... 24 11.1 Media Environment ........................................................................................................................ 24 11.2 Legal Framework ............................................................................................................................. 25 12. The Presidential Election .......................................................................................................................... 26 12.1. Electoral Preparations.................................................................................................................... 26 12.2 Campaign Environment .................................................................................................................. 27 12.3 Media Monitoring Results .............................................................................................................. 28 13. Presidential Election Day, 20 March 2017 ................................................................................................. 29 13.1 Opening and Polling ........................................................................................................................ 29 13.2 Closing and Counting ...................................................................................................................... 29 13.3 Tabulation of Results ...................................................................................................................... 30 13.4 Role of Party Agents and Observers ............................................................................................... 30 13.5. Analysis of Results.......................................................................................................................... 31 14. The Legislative Election ............................................................................................................................ 31 14.1. Electoral Preparations.................................................................................................................... 31 14.2 Campaign Environment .................................................................................................................. 32 14.3 Media Monitoring Results .............................................................................................................. 34 15. Legislative Election Day, 22 July 2017 ....................................................................................................... 35 15.1 Opening and Polling ........................................................................................................................ 35 15.2 Closing and Counting ...................................................................................................................... 35 15.3 Tabulation of Results ...................................................................................................................... 36 15.4 Role of party agents and observers
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