RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION AND LIBERATION The East People’s Struggle for National Liberation Denis Freney

In the six months since the article below was written, the main trends outlined have been confirmed by events. Fretilin forces continue to fight throughout the territory, despite the heavy blows Inflicted by the death of President Nicolau Lobato and the betrayal of Xavier do Amaral (now ’s puppet Vice President) and Alarico Fernandes. The genocidal war continues on Suharto’s side, but, even on Jakarta’s own census figures, they control only half the population of . Within , the Suharto regime has never been more under challenge. Workers, driven to desperation by high inflation and low frozen wages, have engaged in a series of illegal strikes; students are reorganising following the repression of the last half of 1978, while intellectuals, dissident military men, and even some of the puppet parliamentarians, are criticising the regime. Internationally, however, Suharto continues to manoeuvre within the context of the conflicts in Indochina and between the Soviet Union and China. This inevitably places East Timor in a difficult position in attempting to win support, for example, within the non-aligned nations movement. Nevertheless, the crucial and decisive factor is the continuing resistance of the Maubere people — the final guarantee of victory. — Denis Freney July 13, 1979. UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG LIBRARY 2 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW NO. 70

Introduction The International Context The East Timorese revolution cannot be While much was written about East Timor understood unless it is placed in an before December 7, 1975, little if anything international context which includes both has been written about the struggle that has the global context — the contradictions occurred since then. With the exception of between imperialism and those countries reports on Indonesian atrocities in the past which have abolished capitalism, and the three years, no consistent attempt has been contradictions among the countries which made to analyse the struggle of the Maubere have abolished capitalism — and the specific people during the past three years — a regional context in which East Timor exists struggle that must enter into the annals of and the specific ideological-political history as one of the most tenacious and influences which affected it as a Portuguese difficult yet seen in the colonial revolution. colony. In the global context, East Timor’s As a result, much that has been written by political awakening occurred in the final journalists and other commentators since death agony of imperialism in Viet Nam, December 1975 has been through the prism Kampuchea and Laos. American of what they witnessed before the invasion, imperialism was seriously weakened by its including their analysis of individuals and humiliating defeat, but equally determined political forces at play. Yet, just as it would be to crush any sign of rebellion. For some time impossible to analyse occurrences between it had been sponsoring its agent-regimes as April 1974 and December 1975 in East Timor ‘strong men’ able to intervene, now that it through the prism ofjournalistic observation was politically impossible to send in the before April 1974, so is it impossible to marines and B-52s any more. In west Asia understand the current situation in East and the Middle East there were Iran and Timor without analysing in depth events Israel. In South-East Asia, Indonesia was since the full-scale Indonesian invasion. the logical choice as gendarme. It was in this context that Suharto was There are, of course, major difficulties in encouraged to invade East Timor. In doing that. East Timor has been blockaded literature dealing with American by Suharto’s forces since December 1975. No imperialism’s role in East Timor, there has independent observer has entered the been a passive noting that Ford and country and only a few joumalists have been Kissinger were in Jakarta a few days before allowed to go on a short guided tour (with one the invasion, and that America has been the exception) lasting 24 or 48 hours. Naturally, major supplier o f military hardware for the those who have gone on these guided tours Indonesian aggression. Generally, there has have produced virtually nothing of value in been a ‘journalistic’ failure to draw the terms of independent observation. conclusion that is clear: the invasion of East Timor was an act of aggression inspired and That leaves three sources: the most totally supported by American imperialism, valuable is the result of three years of two­ which fitted into its post-Viet Nam strategy way and one-way radio contact with Fretilin. of using puppets to crush liberation The second source are reports by refugees movements wherever they may develop; of who left the country after the invasion, and Asians fighting Asians — with the from letters smuggled out from to the oppressors armed with American military outside world. These are usually both anti- hardware. Fretilin and anti-Indonesian, and also have The Fretilin Central Committee has limited access to events in the mountains. always been very clear in identifying The third source is Indonesian propaganda imperialism and, above all, American — itself usually so blatant and self­ imperialism as the main enemy, with contradictory that it must be totally Suharto’s regime as its willing and discarded. But, as with any propaganda, the bloodthirsty puppet. It is time this internal contradictions it contains are conclusion was clearly spelt out in the themselves useful in getting a view of what is solidarity movement as well, and an end really happening. made to attempts to put a gloss on this easily RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION, LIBERATION 3 established fact. American imperialism’s In Australia, the East Timorese people support for Suharto was no mistake, no more could equally have expected support from the than Carter’s support for the bloody-handed first Labor government in 23 years. But, on Shah is or was a ‘mistake’. Both fit within the contrary, they were shamefully betrayed, imperialism’s strategy and are not due to the by Whitlam in particular. There is no need to decision of one group of ‘baddies’ in the State repeat the disgusting story of this betrayal — Department or Pentagon going against the it is well documented now. It must also be ‘humanitarian’ policies o f Carter. said that the Australian left has no excuse in The East Timorese revolution has also pleading the crisis that developed here in been a victim of the contradictions which 1975 for its lack of stronger action in those have reached explosion point between China days. and the Soviet Union; between Viet Nam and It was only in the former Portuguese Kampuchea in South-East Asia. I do not colonies in Africa that the East Timorese intend here to go into the rights and wrongs people found their true friends and - of these contradictions, or say which country in-arms. But in Mozambique, Angola, has been more guilty. Guinea-Bissau and so on the final stage of It is sufficient to note that the dictators of revolution was just being achieved and their possibilities for action were severely limited. South-East Asia — Suharto, Marcos, the Thai generals, L*e and Onn — were It was only after the invasion that these comrades-in-arms could more fully mobilise shaking in their shoes after imperialism’s their still limited resources. defeat in Viet Nam and Kampuchea and from the interplay of these contradictions. Of course, there were many many All parties concerned have launched a great deficiencies in Fretilin’s diplomacy in the competition to woo these dictatorships, and period of April 1974 to December 1975. In the the Suhartos and others have been able to main, this was due to the speed with which exploit these contradictions. the situation developed. It was only 16 After the defeat of imperialism in months after the formation of ASDT-Fretilin Indochina, the East Timorese people had the that the UDT staged its coup and 17 months right to expect the fullest possible support after the start that Fretilin was in full control from all anti-imperialist countries. True, all of the country. That is a very, very short time nations concerned have voted with East to develop an international diplomacy able Timor in the United Nations and have to to meet the needs of the invasion to come. different degrees given moral, diplomatic But there were other factors: the influence and political support. But too often this has of the conservative wing of Fretilin was been dictated in its degree by the diplomatic dominant in this diplomacy and was centred considerations in South-East Asia vis-a-vis on the need to win Australia to a position of the attitude Suharto has taken to the Sino- support for East Timor’s right to Soviet-Viet Nam-Kampuchean independence. When it became clear — very contradictions. early — that Whitlam had sold out to Suharto, this conservative diplomatic line Similarly, the East Timorese people should turned to the Liberal-Country Party have been able to expect solidarity and as its mainstay, and particularly support from the Portuguese government^) following the overthrow of fascism in April to that hypocritical little man, Andrew 1974. But, despite the ‘decolinisation’ Peacock. Peacock’s advice was, naturally, to trust him, not to turn to the natural allies of declarations of successive governments the East Timorese people, and, above all, to since April 1974, the East Timorese people reassure Suharto with promises, for have been betrayed at each step by regimes instance, to follow ASEAN foreign policy. who showed no interest in East Timor except to disengage as quickly as possible and even The hypocritical reassurances of Peacock acquiesce in the Indonesian takeover led to illusions that Indonesia would not (despite diplomatic protests). Sadly, this openly invade, but would continue the border applied even to the most left of those war for some time. Valuable time was lost, governments, for whom the plea of over­ despite the initiatives of Nicolau Lobato in involvement in Africa and at home is no visiting Mozambique and , in an excuse. attempt to widen the diplomatic front. This 4 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 70

does not negate what we said earlier: it was The Two Lines Within Fretilin the conservative wing of Fretilin that determined the main line of foreign policy Despite the clearly stated policy for total and diplomatic efforts towards (of all people) independence, there existed from the Andrew Peacock, and the continuing efforts beginning inside the Fretilin leadership, a of this conservative wing to dovetail minority, conservative wing which never Fretilin’s foreign policy with Australia — really believed that the Maubere people could and Indonesia. In other words, the win total independence from imperialism conservatives’ control of Fretilin diplomatic and Suharto’s fascist-military clique. For efforts was used in an effort to foist on this group, the strategy was always to Fretilin a neo-colonial solution — an effort attempt to win Fretilin to acceptance of East that in turn negated the mass line and Timorese ‘independence’ as that of a ‘client revolutionary policy Fretilin was adopting state’, whose independence would be as real internally. It was only after the invasion that as that of Bhutan from India. Fretilin’s diplomatic orientation turned to its The aim of making East Timor a ‘client natural allies — after the most favourable state’ was also that of a strong wing of period (Fretilin’s control of the whole Australian mini-imperialism, represented by country) had changed. the Defence Department and JIO. The To sum up: What seemed to be a highly clearest exponent o f this line was Peter favourable international context in 1974­ Hastings {who unashamedly admitted in the 1975 turned out to be an illusion. The East Sydney Morning Herald of January 1, Timorese people have had to fight using their 1979 that he held this as the best alternative). own resources, with solidarity greatly A ‘client state’ is in fact the most extreme limited on all fronts. Essentially, the form of neo-colonialism which denies the disappointments with the international ‘client’ even the semblance of independence context werenotof Fretilin’s making, despite in anything but name. From the earliest days mistakes made before and since. There is no of ASDT, the conservative wing of that doubt that the failure of the superficially organisation proposed concessions to favourable international context to provide Indonesia in the form of economic and the support hoped for was, initially at least, a foreign policy which added up to an blow to the East Timorese people. But it is a acceptance of a ‘client state’ status. Later blow they have survived and as early as this was broadened to try to entice March 1976, the Supreme Council of Struggle Australia to join Indonesia as the masters of adopted a policy of total self-reliance, this puppet ‘independent’ state. counting on their own resources. This is a On the other hand, the revolutionary slogan often voiced by liberation movements majority of the Fretilin Central Committee and, of course, in all cases has a basis of after the transformation of ASDT into truth: no nation has ever won its liberation Fretilin, had the front adopt a clear-cut from outside alone and not through its own policy opposing neo-colonialism and of efforts. But never — to my knowledge — has struggling for total independence. This line a movement and a whole people had to apply was confirmed in the May 1976 meeting of the slogan o f self-reliance so totally as the the Supreme Council of Struggle and has East Timorese people. Their astonishing been reinterated at all such meetings since. success in the past three years and their continuing success despite all the difficulties It is in that sense that we must understand will bring the possibility of their not the rejection of ‘negotiations’ by the Fretilin having to be so totally self-reliant closer in Central Committee. Let us state quite clearly the future. that those in the conservative minority of the Fretilin CC have all understood In such a situation of total self-reliance, the ‘negotiations’ as meaning a ‘compromise’ in different lines among the Fretilin Central which East Timor would accept a ‘client Committee which, in the pre-invasion period, state’ status. This was so for the Xavier do were contained within a certain division of Amaral poup and was even more clearly so labour and a democratic process of decision­ for Alarico Fernandes and his group. The making which led to a united front, became debate about ‘negotiations’ inside Fretilin clearer and antagonistic in the post-invasion throughout the past three years has not period. revolved around the use of ‘negotiations’ for RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION, LIBERATION 5

diplomatic purposes, to divide the enemy and question o f‘negotiations’ was interpreted by put them diplomatically on the defensive, both sides. As in any such debate, it is never while refusing to ‘compromise’ on the an abstract or ‘theoretical’ one, but deeply demand for total independence. This, of reflects the basic questions posed for the course, is the way ‘negotiations’ were carried revolution: to surrender or to fight for final out by the liberation movements in the victory, former Portuguese colonies and by the Vietnamese. In the solidarity movements, we must also ask those who have taken the side of In East Timor, the debate on ‘negotiations’ ‘negotiations’ in the debate within Fretilin: was really a debate on whether Fretilin Are you supporting ‘negotiations’ because should accept a ‘compromise’ and a 'client you believe that the East Timorese people state’ status, or whether they fight on to final cannot win total independence, and that a victory. Both sides —the conservative and ‘client state’ status is all that can be won, revolutionary wings — understood the short of total integration in Suharto’s debate in those terms. The slogan empire? Do you support ‘negotiations’ and a ‘negotiations never’ meant for both sides a ‘compromise’ (neo-colonial) solution for rejection of neo-colonial solutions: and that ‘humanitarian reasons’, to stop the genocide is why Xavier and then Fernandes staged Suharto has unleashed against the East their attempted coups — to prepare the way Timorese people? for a neo-colonial solution. I believe that, in fact, these are the reasons In the outside world and in the solidarity many have supported a ‘compromise’ movements, the clear position of the Fretilin solution. Many people oppose Suharto’s CC on ‘negotiations’ has been invasion for humanitarian reasons, and that misunderstood. Some have attempted to is natural and, in part at least, correct. The present the CC position as ‘ultra-left’, as an same happened, of course, in the big abstract, ‘theoretical’ one, ignoring the very movement in Australia and around the world real struggle inside Fretilin and how the in opposition to American aggression in Viet 6 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 70

Nam and Kampuchea. With Viet Nam, to have made such a decision, and they will desire to stop the genocide was a deep and not be the last. Objectively, not to support correct feeling among the masses around the their decision is to increase the suffering and world who opposed the American war. But the cost in lives they will have to pay. To what was the answer? Was it to demand that support the traitors inside Fretilin who want the Vietnamese people surrender or agree to a neo-colonial solution is in fact to prolong be a ‘client state’ of American imperialism? the war. As for being ‘fanatical’: if to do Or was it to respect (and support) the right of everything possible to support the East the Vietnamese people to fight for their Timorese people, to support their rejection of independence, despite the terrible cost neo-colonialism or surrender, is fanatical, inflicted on them by American imperialism, then so be it. Indeed, it seems to me that the and demand instead that American and ‘fanaticism’ often comes from the other side Australian troops withdraw from Viet Nam of the debate. and end their ‘Vietnamisation’ of the war? To my knowledge, no one raised the demand To be ‘fanatical’ is to be irrational, to not that the Vietnamese people stop fighting and study a question deeply, and to blindly follow accept a neo-colonial solution — no one, that an ‘ideological’ position, without is, except the Pentagon and the Thieu consideration of the human aspects regime. involved. It is my belief that the revolutionary position, in this case, is the The Vietnamese, Kampuchean and real ‘humanitarian’ position; it is the Laotian people, like the Mozambican, rational position. Angolan and Guinean people paid a terrible price, in terms of human lives and physical The struggle in the liberated areas and ecological destruction, for their independence. Similarly, imperialism and As already stated, there have been two the Suharto military-fascist regime is fundamentally opposed lines within the imposing a terribly high cost on the East Fretilin CC, and over the past three years Timorese people for their independence. Who these two lines have increasingly come into has the right to tell the East Timorese people conflict in the question of whether to fight for not to fight? final and total victory, or to accept a neo­ colonial solution. In the two major In fact, the enemies of the East Timorese explosions of the contradictions between people interpret every sign of desire for a these two lines, the revolutionary line has ‘compromise’ or neo-colonial solution as a been victorious, and the ‘conservative wing’ sign of weakness, including when it comes leaders (Xavier do Amaral and Alarico from the supporters of the East Timorese Fernandes) have been forced to recognise the people. The surrender of Xavier do Amaral reality of their line’s logic: total surrender. and Alarico Fernandes, in fact, prolong the war, because they boost the morale of the To understand the evolution of this Indonesian troops, who begin again to internal struggle in the liberated areas, it is believe that the ‘end of the tunnel’ is in sight necessary to look at the main outlines of the and the resistance will collapse. The revolutionary resistance offered by the East Maubere people will pay with thousands Timorese people in the past three years. more dead for their betrayal. In some respects, the East Timorese people Yet those who support the right of the East were in a stronger position at the beginning Timorese people to fight for total of the invasion than liberation movements in independence are sometimes accused of other countries when they began their wanting to fieht to the last Timorese, and of guerrilla wars. First, Fretilin had total beintr fanatical. Let us be very clear: they control of the whole country; it had captured themselves have decided that they will fight the substantial arsenal of the Portuguese for ‘independence or death’ — their decision colonial army (captured — not surrendered was not, and is not, made in Sydney or by the Portuguese). They had at least a anywhere else. The Maubere people have skeleton administrative structure operating. accepted the terrible cost they are being Thus the invaders were entering a terrain forced to pay, rather than live in slavery they did not know, and the positions were under Suharto. They are not the first people reversed when compared, for example, with RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION, LIBERATION 7

Mozambique, where the Portuguese fascists a number of respects: it marks the arrest of were ‘in place’ and Frelimo had to begin the Xavier do Amaral by Fretilin and the defeat reconquest of their cou ntry from small bases. of his attempted coup, and secondly, marks the beginning of Suharto’s new offensives Of course, the overwhelming military which are described by Fretilin as superiority of the Indonesian invaders enabled them to capture Dili, Baucau and ‘campaigns of encirclement and some of the other main administrative annihilation’. These campaigns aimed at centres (which, however, had a low encirclement of liberated areas and the population) within a relatively short period systematic destruction of crops and of the civilian population. — by mid-1976 they had captured a dozen such small towns. However, Fretilin not only But first let us look at developments in the maintained near total control of the liberated areas from December 1975 to countryside where 90 per cent of the September 1977. Alarico Fernandes failed population lived, but also threw cordons over a period of three years to give anything around the isolated Indonesian outposts, but the most general outline of the situation and on many occasions forced the in the liberated areas. However, the best Indonesians to pull out. The first six months source is the speech of President Nicolau were crucial: Fretilin and were able Lobato on September 14,1977 after the arrest to organise a stable resistance and stabilised of Xavier do Amaral. This speech is an liberated areas which in fact took over 80 per excellent source because a picture emerges of cent of the country. Falintil established its the life in the liberated areas, incidental to ‘front lines’ surrounding the Indonesian the main theme of the speech. outposts and protecting these liberated areas, where life was able to proceed with It should be noted that security was strong some normality and the revolutionary within the liberated zones. For example, the organisation of the masses for production, meeting of the top Fretilin leadership — the self-defence and education and health was Supreme Council of Struggle and the able to develop with the necessary speed. Political Committee took place in Soibada from May 20 to June 2,1976. The same bodies At the end of 1976 and beginning of 1977, held a joint meeting in Lalini from MarchSto Suharto’s forces launched a number of May 20,1977 — in other words, major leaders desperate and large-scale offensives which of Fretilin were able to meet for nearly three aimed at destroying key liberated areas. But months in full security, to discuss the Fretilin, with amazing success, defeated development of the struggle. (Another major these offensives. As a result, from meeting of these two bodies occurred in approximately March to September 1977, October 1977 which elected President Suharto’s forces were forced to abstain from Nicolau Lobato and Vice-President Mau- any large-scale attacks, and were content Lear to head Fretilin. Details of the length with small-scale raids which met fierce and place of this meeting have not yet been resistance. At the same time, they stepped up released.) air raids on the liberated areas, with the Movement around the country, from one strategy of destroying food crops, liberated area to another, was safe and massacring the civilian population, and relatively easy. Xavier do Amaral was destabilising the liberated areas. Yet it can condemned for his ‘visits to festivities with be said that until September 1977, the big noise and big banquets; long voyages in Indonesians had suffered a major and cavalcade with the noise of numerous guards demoralising defeat: they were unable to end and opportunists and hangers-on, authentic their isolation in a dozen small towns, or parasites who lived off the people break Fretilin control of the vast liberated everywhere; big colonial-style dances, areas and the vast majority of the lasting all night and sometimes all week...’ population. While President Nicolau Lobato was, of It is convenient therefore to divide the course, absolutely correct in condemning struggle and resistance in East Timor into this feudal-colonial style of living, the fact the two periods of December 1975 to that Xavier do Amaral was able, as a person September 1977, and September 1977 to the not notedTfor his courage, to act in this way, present. September 1977 is a turning point in shows the degree of security in this period, in 8 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 70

the liberated areas. : marginally disturbed by the massive Production was well organised in this Indonesian military offensives launched in period. Seed grains were distributed this period. throughout the country from a central point In September 1977, the Indonesian and according to an organised plan. Xavier military began to adopt a new tactic: it do Amaral was accused of seizing seed grain concentrated its forces in a small area and being sent to other sectors and of boycotting began an intensive campaign of plans to mobilise the population for ‘encirclement and annihilation’, production as decided by the Permanent accompanied by intensive air, land and sea Committee of Fretilin in September 1976. bombardment, aimed at surrounding Fernandes reported, in May 1977, that the liberated areas, capturing the civilian harvest over the previous year had exceeded population, destroying food crops and stores, any previous harvest in the colonial history and destabilising Fretilin and Falintil of East Timor. Production was organised organisation in these areas. Helicopters through co-operatives and the collective carried troops and heavy artillery to labour of the whole population in the strategically placed mountain tops, to liberated areas. continuously shell the liberated areas in which they were situated and to ‘soften up’ Fretilin organised the ‘political, military Falintil for massive infantry and armoured and technical organisation, modernisation attack. and training of Falintil’ in this period, to better prepare it to defend and extend the The first attacks, in early September 1977, liberated areas. Front lines were organised were timed to coincide with the planned coup around the Indonesian garrisoned small by Xavier do Amaral. This was prevented by towns, and anyone crossing these lines had his arrest. These attacks were concentrated to produce authorisation from Fretilin. in the south and north border areas. The next Falintil was shaped into a regular army, offensives occurred in the centre-north sector with special units or ‘shock brigades’. in June 1978 and soon after in the centre- south and centre-east sectors. Fretilin campaigned against the remnants of feudalism and obscurantism in the On May 20,1978, President Nicolau Lobato liberated areas — the lulics, arranged described how the campaigns of marriages, lurais, tribalism and encirclement and annihilation in the border regionalism, feudal servitude — and the sectors were near collapse because of the colonial practices of subservience to ‘big fierce resistance of hundreds of thousands of men’ and so on. Mauberes. Just before exposing his betrayal, and while still in contact with Organisational work included efforts to Falintil headquarters, Fernandes reported, Replace supplies cut off by the blockade and on September 27, that Indonesians had been invasion: sugar was grown and processed — forced to withdraw to a few strategic places and it was on display at the May 1976 in the north border sector. The latest news, meeting. Traditional medicines were from a letter smuggled out of Dili, reports developed and researched to replace medical fierce fighting recently in the Railaco area in supplies cut off from the liberated areas. this north border sector. Gunpowder and mines were produced from raw materials in the liberated areas. What, then, is the situation in East Timor Education continued using the most basic now? It is a fact that the campaigns of materials. Printing facilities were developed, encirclement and annihilation have only including for leaflets and booklets in Bahasa had success in the centre-north sector. This is Indonesia for circulation among Indonesian not accidental. The centre-north sector (the troops. area south and east of Dili) was the ‘feudal fief of Xavier do Amaral; it was also the In short, despite the boycott on scene of Alarico Fernandes’ planned counter­ information about the organisation of life in revolutionary coup, called by him ‘Operation the liberated areas imposed by Alarico Skylight’. At first under Xavier do Amaral Fernandes, particularly from mid-1977, a and then under Alarico Fernandes, this picture emerges from documented material centre-north sector had been the scene of all available, of a stable, organised life, only plots hatched against the revolutionary RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION, LIBERATION 9

majority of the Fretilin Central Committee. have all occurred in the centre-north sector: it It was in this area, and part of the centre- was from here that Alarico Fernandes south sector that Xavier do Amaral released Xavier do Amaral, as the advance- boycotted organisation and production, set guard to contact the Indonesians for up his own feudal-type administration, 'Operation Skylight’; it was from here, too, encouraged obscurantism and regionalism that Alarico Fernandes himself surrendered. and generally disorganised life so much that It was in this sector that Nicolau Lobato was it was even then particularly vulnerable to killed when he was, perhaps, attempting to Indonesian attack. There is no reason to reorganise the resistance after the betrayal believe this changed much under Alarico of Fernandes. Similarly, the many people Fernandes, who himself in the secret who have left the mountains and who were Saturno messages admitted his organisation previously part o f the educated elite who for ‘Operation Skylight' began in October supported Fretilin, have come from the 1977 — that is, almost immediately after centre-north sector in their vast majority. Xavier’s arrest. It is clear then that the situation in the We must fear then that the situation centre-north sector has deteriorated badly described by President Nicolau Lobato, as and that it is here, and here alone, that the existing in September 1977, had not changed Suharto regime has won its first substantial m uch in the centre-north sector by June 1978. ‘victory’ since the beginning of the invasion. The Maubere Revolution had swept the The ‘victory’ in this sector is not a defeat for remainder of the country and provided the the revolutionary line of Fretilin, hut rather social and political basis for the defeat of the is an indication that its revolutionary line is Indonesian offensives in the two border an absolute necessity for final victory. It sectors. These offensives have also been shows that the line of the revolutionary severely checked, or even may be by now majority of the Fretilin Central Committee, defeated, in the centre-south and centre-east led by President Nicolau Lobato, Vice- sectors. President Mau-Lear and National Political The ‘victories’ won by the Indonesians Commissioner Sa’he, is the guarantee for 10 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW No. 70

victory. real, deep revolution taking place among the No doubt, the resistance will be broad masses, so that every man and woman reconstructed in the centre-north sector. No becomes a soldier and militant of the doubt, also, the Indonesians will have their revolutionary war, constantly deepening his morale boosted by this victory, which I or her political understanding, and throwing believe will only prove temporary, although up cadres and leaders from among the it could have the result of increased military Maubere people themselves, able to carry the pressure on the centre-south sector where struggle forward. Xavier do Amaral also infected some parts That said, I wish to conclude by examining with his feudal and tribalist approach, and the perspectives of the Maubere revolution where Alarico Fernandes boasted he had and the possibilities by which Suharto’s sent some of his agents before his surrender. military-fascist forces can be forced to accept But such defeats and retreats must be their defeat and withdraw from East Timor. expected in a protracted people’s war — indeed, it is a sign of the strength of the Perspectives for the Revolution resistance of the Maubere people and of their revolution that it is only now, after three I want, first, to make some comments years of war, the Suharto military regime about the ‘Revolution’ and its perspectives has achieved such a ‘success’. But it is a before going on to the more general question ‘success’ built on clay — a win gained of how victory will be won. through the political weakness and disorganisation in the centre-north sector There has been a profound revolutionary and the betrayal of Xavier do Amaral and process going on in the liberated areas of Alarico Fernandes. East Timor. It began in one sense from the founding of ASDT, then took a leap forward We can expect Suharto’s propaganda with the transformation of ASDT into machine to make much of this very limited Fretilin in September 1974 and the adoption ‘victory’. After all, they have been starved of of its political program. Next came the real success in the past, and have been forced attempted UDT coup in August 1975 and the to manufacture ‘victories’ and declare successful Fretilin counter-offensive, which repeatedly that Fretilin has been defeated brought Fretilin into power throughout the over the past two years. Moreover, the morale country from September 1975 to December of Suharto’s troops in East Timor is very low 1975, during which period Fretilin had to and weariness with the war is growing. We cope, not only with the border incursions by can expect fabrications built on the very real Suharto’s troops, but also with the complex difficulties in the centre-north sector. The problems of social, political and economic Australian and world capitalist media will organisation, which gave rise to the print all the Suharto propaganda as gospel embryonic forms which developed after the truth. invasion. The invasion in December 1975 The solidarity movement must ‘kee'p its resulted in the first wave of betrayals — the head’, avoid the pressure to demoralisation, weakest and most corrupt surrendered very and remain confident that the struggle soon after the invasion. continues and that Suharto will finally be The May 1976 meeting of the Supreme forced to withdraw from East Timor. It has Council of Struggle and the Fretilin Political the weapon on a concrete, realistic, political Committee was a decisive meeting which analysis towards which, I hope, this paper reaffirmed the determination to continue the will be a contribution. Anyone who thinks struggle to final victory, to reject a that revolutionary war proceeds in a straight ‘compromise solution’, and to proceed with line to victory without reverses, partial the organisation of the liberated areas for a defeats, betrayals and then resurgence, long-protracted revolutionary people’s war. deepening o f the revolution and new The next meeting, from March to May 1977, victories, is living in a dream world. reaffirmed and deepened these decisions. In Revolutionary war, particularly one as October 1977, a second major turning point difficult as that in East Timor, is a occurred with the defeat of the Xavier coup contradictory and complex phenomenon. attempt and the election of President Nicolau Above all, revolutionary war depends on a Lobato, Vice-President Mau-Lear and RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION, LIBERATION 11

National Political Commissioner Sa’he to worsening economic situation, following the head the struggle. The following year saw recent 50 per cent devaluation, is an the further deepening of the revolutionary explosive ingredient in the crisis. Previously process in the liberated areas. The question cautious observers are now tipping Suharto of transforming Fretilin from a movement will not last out 1979. into a revolutionary party also took shape Of course, it cannot be excluded that the and it was within this framework of the deepening of the revolution that Alarico CIA will favour a ‘preventive coup’ by another group of generals who can present Fernandes prepared his coup in the form of ‘Operation Skylight’. themselves as ‘cleanskins’. If that type of coup occurred, there would be no guarantee Throughout the past four years, the that the new group of generals would retreat Maubere people have been fighting not only from East Timor. They would have two a war of resistance but also to deepen their alternatives: blame Suharto for invading in revolution against the internal reactionaries the first place, contrary to the Indonesian in the liberated areas. That very clearly Constitution, and seek a ‘compromise shows the dual nature of the struggle of the solution’ with East Timor as a ‘client state’, Maubere people — to defeat the Indonesian or blame Suharto for the mismanagement of fascist aggressors, and to develop their own the war and promise the soldiers that they revolution, in which exploitation will be will manage it successfully to final victory. defeated. These two aspects of the struggle It is for this reason that Suharto and his are not independent, but are intertwined. Without the victory of the revolution in the clique were so jubilant at the murder of Nicolau Lobato. It was to boost morale, to liberated areas, the aggressors will not be defeated. And, of course, without the defeat claim a ‘victory’ that Defence Minister of the aggressors, the revolution cannot General Yusuf flew to Dili to decorate the achieve its full flowering. soldiers who carried out the alleged killing, and to bring back Nicolau Lobato’s alleged There are a number of ways in which we rifle to the Jakarta military museum! It was can foresee final victory of the Maubere because the war in East Timor is a thorn in people occurring. The Indonesians could be Suharto’s flesh that a special nationwide TV totally defeated militarily as the puppet broadcast was made immediately the death troops were in Viet Nam and Kampuchea. of Lobato became known in Indonesia. However, Fretilin would have to have heavy But Suharto’s jubilation will be short­ and more sophisticated weapons than they lived. He will learn very soon that the do at present to achieve such a goal. struggle continues. The cannon-fodder in his Alternatively, the process could be more like army will learn that many more thousands what happened in Mozambique, Angola and of them will have to die in East Timor. Guinea-Bissau: Indonesian soldiers and lower-ranking officers could refuse to fight The convergence of the continuing any more in a war which they cannot win in revolutionary war in East Timor with the East Timor, and demand to return home, and upsurge of the mass struggle in Indonesia if that is refused, finally themselves itself will result in the overthrow of Suharto. overthrow or join the masses in The longer time passes before Suharto is overthrowing, the Suharto dictatorship. In removed, the more likely it is that the next other words, Suharto could go the same way regime in Indonesia will be a progressive as Caetano did, and after some attempts by a one, and the order given to withdraw the new regime to salvage a ‘compromise troops from East Timor. That is why the solution’, unconditional withdrawal of the Americans are preparing a ‘preventive coup’. Indonesian troops from East Timor could be After all, they have learnt something from won. Iran. They don’t want the streets of Makarta to be like those in Tehran. Given the ‘international context' outlined in the first part of this paper, it is my belief There is no basis for defeatism and that the second alternative is the more likely demoralisation when we examine the East one. The Suharto regime, while seemingly Timorese Revolution. having overcome the agitation that occurred Victory is certain and only a matter of early last year, is nevertheless unstable. The time!