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The East Timor People's Struggle for National Liberation

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The East Timor People's Struggle for National Liberation RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION AND LIBERATION The East Timor People’s Struggle for National Liberation Denis Freney In the six months since the article below was written, the main trends outlined have been confirmed by events. Fretilin forces continue to fight throughout the territory, despite the heavy blows Inflicted by the death of President Nicolau Lobato and the betrayal of Xavier do Amaral (now Suharto’s puppet Vice President) and Alarico Fernandes. The genocidal war continues on Suharto’s side, but, even on Jakarta’s own census figures, they control only half the population of East Timor. Within Indonesia, the Suharto regime has never been more under challenge. Workers, driven to desperation by high inflation and low frozen wages, have engaged in a series of illegal strikes; students are reorganising following the repression of the last half of 1978, while intellectuals, dissident military men, and even some of the puppet parliamentarians, are criticising the regime. Internationally, however, Suharto continues to manoeuvre within the context of the conflicts in Indochina and between the Soviet Union and China. This inevitably places East Timor in a difficult position in attempting to win support, for example, within the non-aligned nations movement. Nevertheless, the crucial and decisive factor is the continuing resistance of the Maubere people — the final guarantee of victory. — Denis Freney July 13, 1979. UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG LIBRARY 2 AUSTRALIAN LEFT REVIEW NO. 70 Introduction The International Context The East Timorese revolution cannot be While much was written about East Timor understood unless it is placed in an before December 7, 1975, little if anything international context which includes both has been written about the struggle that has the global context — the contradictions occurred since then. With the exception of between imperialism and those countries reports on Indonesian atrocities in the past which have abolished capitalism, and the three years, no consistent attempt has been contradictions among the countries which made to analyse the struggle of the Maubere have abolished capitalism — and the specific people during the past three years — a regional context in which East Timor exists struggle that must enter into the annals of and the specific ideological-political history as one of the most tenacious and influences which affected it as a Portuguese difficult yet seen in the colonial revolution. colony. In the global context, East Timor’s As a result, much that has been written by political awakening occurred in the final journalists and other commentators since death agony of imperialism in Viet Nam, December 1975 has been through the prism Kampuchea and Laos. American of what they witnessed before the invasion, imperialism was seriously weakened by its including their analysis of individuals and humiliating defeat, but equally determined political forces at play. Yet, just as it would be to crush any sign of rebellion. For some time impossible to analyse occurrences between it had been sponsoring its agent-regimes as April 1974 and December 1975 in East Timor ‘strong men’ able to intervene, now that it through the prism of journalistic observation was politically impossible to send in the before April 1974, so is it impossible to marines and B-52s any more. In west Asia understand the current situation in East and the Middle East there were Iran and Timor without analysing in depth events Israel. In South-East Asia, Indonesia was since the full-scale Indonesian invasion. the logical choice as gendarme. It was in this context that Suharto was There are, of course, major difficulties in encouraged to invade East Timor. In doing that. East Timor has been blockaded literature dealing with American by Suharto’s forces since December 1975. No imperialism’s role in East Timor, there has independent observer has entered the been a passive noting that Ford and country and only a few joumalists have been Kissinger were in Jakarta a few days before allowed to go on a short guided tour (with one the invasion, and that America has been the exception) lasting 24 or 48 hours. Naturally, major supplier o f military hardware for the those who have gone on these guided tours Indonesian aggression. Generally, there has have produced virtually nothing of value in been a ‘journalistic’ failure to draw the terms of independent observation. conclusion that is clear: the invasion of East Timor was an act of aggression inspired and That leaves three sources: the most totally supported by American imperialism, valuable is the result of three years of two­ which fitted into its post-Viet Nam strategy way and one-way radio contact with Fretilin. of using puppets to crush liberation The second source are reports by refugees movements wherever they may develop; of who left the country after the invasion, and Asians fighting Asians — with the from letters smuggled out from Dili to the oppressors armed with American military outside world. These are usually both anti- hardware. Fretilin and anti-Indonesian, and also have The Fretilin Central Committee has limited access to events in the mountains. always been very clear in identifying The third source is Indonesian propaganda imperialism and, above all, American — itself usually so blatant and self­ imperialism as the main enemy, with contradictory that it must be totally Suharto’s regime as its willing and discarded. But, as with any propaganda, the bloodthirsty puppet. It is time this internal contradictions it contains are conclusion was clearly spelt out in the themselves useful in getting a view of what is solidarity movement as well, and an end really happening. made to attempts to put a gloss on this easily RESISTANCE, REVOLUTION, LIBERATION 3 established fact. American imperialism’s In Australia, the East Timorese people support for Suharto was no mistake, no more could equally have expected support from the than Carter’s support for the bloody-handed first Labor government in 23 years. But, on Shah is or was a ‘mistake’. Both fit within the contrary, they were shamefully betrayed, imperialism’s strategy and are not due to the by Whitlam in particular. There is no need to decision of one group of ‘baddies’ in the State repeat the disgusting story of this betrayal — Department or Pentagon going against the it is well documented now. It must also be ‘humanitarian’ policies o f Carter. said that the Australian left has no excuse in The East Timorese revolution has also pleading the crisis that developed here in been a victim of the contradictions which 1975 for its lack of stronger action in those have reached explosion point between China days. and the Soviet Union; between Viet Nam and It was only in the former Portuguese Kampuchea in South-East Asia. I do not colonies in Africa that the East Timorese intend here to go into the rights and wrongs people found their true friends and comrades- of these contradictions, or say which country in-arms. But in Mozambique, Angola, has been more guilty. Guinea-Bissau and so on the final stage of It is sufficient to note that the dictators of revolution was just being achieved and their possibilities for action were severely limited. South-East Asia — Suharto, Marcos, the Thai generals, L*e and Onn — were It was only after the invasion that these comrades-in-arms could more fully mobilise shaking in their shoes after imperialism’s their still limited resources. defeat in Viet Nam and Kampuchea and from the interplay of these contradictions. Of course, there were many many All parties concerned have launched a great deficiencies in Fretilin’s diplomacy in the competition to woo these dictatorships, and period of April 1974 to December 1975. In the the Suhartos and others have been able to main, this was due to the speed with which exploit these contradictions. the situation developed. It was only 16 After the defeat of imperialism in months after the formation of ASDT-Fretilin Indochina, the East Timorese people had the that the UDT staged its coup and 17 months right to expect the fullest possible support after the start that Fretilin was in full control from all anti-imperialist countries. True, all of the country. That is a very, very short time nations concerned have voted with East to develop an international diplomacy able Timor in the United Nations and have to to meet the needs of the invasion to come. different degrees given moral, diplomatic But there were other factors: the influence and political support. But too often this has of the conservative wing of Fretilin was been dictated in its degree by the diplomatic dominant in this diplomacy and was centred considerations in South-East Asia vis-a-vis on the need to win Australia to a position of the attitude Suharto has taken to the Sino- support for East Timor’s right to Soviet-Viet Nam-Kampuchean independence. When it became clear — very contradictions. early — that Whitlam had sold out to Suharto, this conservative diplomatic line Similarly, the East Timorese people should turned to the Liberal-Country Party have been able to expect solidarity and Opposition as its mainstay, and particularly support from the Portuguese government^) following the overthrow of fascism in April to that hypocritical little man, Andrew 1974. But, despite the ‘decolinisation’ Peacock. Peacock’s advice was, naturally, to trust him, not to turn to the natural allies of declarations of successive governments the East Timorese people, and, above all, to since April 1974, the East Timorese people reassure Suharto with promises, for have been betrayed at each step by regimes instance, to follow ASEAN foreign policy. who showed no interest in East Timor except to disengage as quickly as possible and even The hypocritical reassurances of Peacock acquiesce in the Indonesian takeover led to illusions that Indonesia would not (despite diplomatic protests).
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