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Timor-Leste's Pre-Election Environment

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Timor-Leste's Pre-Election Environment Timor-Leste’s Pre-Election Environment Report by the International Republican Institute’s Long-Term Election Observation Mission June 21 to July 15, 2017 Timor-Leste’s Pre-Election Environment June 21 to July 15, 2017 International Republican Institute www.IRI.org | @IRIGlobal © 2017 All Rights Reserved Timor-Leste’s Pre-Election Environment: Interim Report by the International Republican Institute’s Long-Term Election Observation Mission Copyright © 2017 International Republican Institute. All rights reserved. Permission Statement: No part of this work may be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system without the written permission of the International Republican Institute. Requests for permission should include the following information: • The title of the document for which permission to copy material is desired. • A description of the material for which permission to copy is desired. • The purpose for which the copied material will be used and the manner in which it will be used. • Your name, title, company or organization name, telephone number, fax number, e-mail address and mailing address. Please send all requests for permission to: Attention Communications Department International Republican Institute 1225 Eye Street NW, Suite 800 Washington, DC 20005 [email protected] Disclaimer: This publication was made possible through the support provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID. Table of Contents Introduction 2 Key Findings 5 Electoral Administration 5 Media Environment 7 Campaign Environment 8 Gender, Youth and People with Disabilities Participation 10 Civic and Voter Education 10 1 Introduction On June 21, 2017 the International Republican Institute (IRI) deployed two long-term observers in advance of its election observation mission to monitor Timor-Leste’s July 22, 2017 parliamentary elections. The observers, Mr. Joerg Meier and Dr. Ken Palmer, were assigned to cover the following districts: • Mr. Joerg Meier: Baucau, Lautem, Manatuto, Manufahi and Viqueque • Dr. Ken Palmer: Aileu, Ainaro, Bobonaro, Cova Lima, Dili, Ermera, Oecusse and Liquica This report summarizes the findings from their first three weeks of observation. The content of this report should not be interpreted as representing the motivations of government officials or bodies, political parties, activists, media outlets or any other election-related stakeholders. From June 21 to July 15, 2017, Mr. Meier and Dr. Palmer attended 110 meetings and events with election-related stakeholders, broken down into the following categories: • 18 meetings with political party leaders, officials or representatives; • 30 campaign events or rallies held by 13 different political parties; • 20 meetings with the National Elections Commission (CNE) and the Technical Secretariat for Electoral Administration (STAE); • Six meetings with the National Police of Timor-Leste (PNTL); • 24 meetings with diplomatic or international organization representatives; • Four meetings with civil society and domestic observation groups; • Six meetings with other government officials; and • Two meeting with private citizens. Mr. Meier and Dr. Palmer recorded the following key findings: Electoral Administration • CNE and STAE district-level offices are well-organized and ready to implement their mandates on Election Day. • STAE district-level offices have noted an increase in the number of polling centers and polling stations for the parliamentary election in comparison to the March 2017 presidential election. • STAE district-level offices noted that their three main concerns for Election Day are: transportation for STAE officials and sensitive voting materials; voter access to polling centers due to road conditions; and a lack of electricity at some polling centers. 2 • The evidence suggests that there has been close cooperation and coordination between the PNTL, CNE, STAE and the political parties to ensure a calm, safe and peaceful electoral process. • STAE officials noted that the country’s three largest political parties are expected to have party agent observers present at nearly every polling station, while other parties are expected to have a more limited number of observers. • CNE district-level offices continue to update the official campaign schedule and monitor campaign events by having CNE officials attend them. In some cases, parties have not informed CNE of changes to their campaign schedules. • CNE district-level offices have not reported any major problems, but have documented some minor issues that have required CNE intervention. • During the first week of the campaign, some political parties had rallies planned at the same location; CNE successfully mediated between parties to resolve these scheduling conflicts. Media Environment • Media outlets have covered nearly every campaign rally, including even sparsely-attended events held by small political parties. • The CNE’s publication of the official campaign schedule has helped media outlets and reporters to cover campaign events. • Anecdotal evidence suggests that most political parties are not especially active on social media or Facebook. However, FRETILIN and PLP do maintain active Facebook pages. • To date, IRI observers have not seen any evidence that press freedoms have been abused or have not been protected. Campaign Environment • The campaign has proceeded peacefully so far, without any significant problems or instances of violence to date. • The most prominent campaign activities are rallies and “mini-campaigns.” • Some parties have focused on holding large rallies in the main cities and capitals of municipalities, while others have favored smaller rallies at the sub- district level. • While many campaign rallies still focus on the legacy of the resistance movement rather than substantive policies, there has been a noticeable increase in the treatment of public policy issues by parties compared to past elections. • IRI observers have encountered some obstacles to observing the activities of smaller parties, as parties sometimes arrive late, postpone events, undertake unscheduled activities or cancel scheduled activities. 3 Participation by Women, Youth, and People with Disabilities • Many parties recognize that they should at least mention equal political participation by women as an issue, but have yet to mainstream an approach to gender in their platforms and policies. • Political parties recognize the need to target young voters as part of their campaign efforts due to their large and growing share of the voting population. • People with disabilities have received limited attention from political parties. Civic and Voter Education • The CNE and STAE have conducted extensive civic and voter education programs since May and developed programs targeted at specific demographic groups. • Many political parties provide logistical information about how to cast a vote for the party on the ballot paper at their rallies. 4 Key Findings Electoral Administration Key Observation: CNE and STAE district-level offices are well-organized and ready to implement their mandates on Election Day. IRI observers met with CNE and STAE officials in all 13 districts – Aileu, Ainaro, Baucau, Bobonaro, Cova Lima, Dili, Ermera, Lautem, Liquica, Manatuto, Manufahi, Oecusse and Viqueque. In each district, officials expressed confidence in their preparations for the election. Rhetoric from the CNE and STAE is consistent with other institutions both inside and outside of their respective municipalities. They seem to be working well with relevant electoral stakeholders, including political parties, to ensure a positive campaign environment. Key Observation: STAE district-level offices have noted an increase in the number of polling centers and polling stations for the parliamentary election in comparison to the March 2017 presidential election. These increases have happened across the country. In Aileu, the number of polling centers increased from 47 to 55 and the number of polling stations has increased from 49 to 58; in Ainaro, the number of polling centers increased from 38 to 46 and the number of polling stations increased to 64. In both districts, STAE officials stated that they were prepared for the increases and have identified experienced officials who worked at polling stations during past elections to staff the new polling centers and stations. Key Observation: STAE district-level offices noted that their three main concerns for Election Day are: transportation for STAE officials and sensitive voting materials; access to polling centers due to road conditions; and a lack of electricity at some polling centers. These concerns were voiced in many districts, particularly those that are far from Dili and have a lower level of infrastructure development. Officials did note that they have contingency plans in place to address these issues; for example, in Viqueque, officials have developed a contingency plan to have villagers carry ballot boxes, ballot papers and other voting materials across stretches of roads that become impassible in the event of poor weather. In Ainaro, officials are planning to utilize vehicles from the municipal administration and government ministries to address transportation concerns, but noted that many of these vehicles are frequently out of service. Overall, the STAE
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