2(78) И Ю Н Ь 2 0 2 1 ISSN 1812-3694 №2(78) J U N E 2 0 2 1 SCIENTIFIC, ENGINEERING, INFORMATION and ANALYTIC MAGAZINE
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Naval Postgraduate School Thesis
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS A STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION OF THE FRENCH MISTRAL AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT WARSHIPS by Patrick Thomas Baker June 2011 Thesis Advisor: Mikhail Tsypkin Second Reader: Douglas Porch Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2011 Master‘s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS A Study of the Russian Acquisition of the French Mistral Amphibious Assault Warships 6. AUTHOR(S) Patrick Thomas Baker 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. -
The Global Submarine Market 2014–2024
The Global Submarine Market 2014–2024 The Global Submarine Market 2014–2024 Report Price: US$4,800 (Single User) 1 The Global Submarine Market 2014–2024 Summary “The Global Submarine Market 2014–2024” offers the reader detailed analysis of the global submarine market over the next ten years, and provides market size forecasts. It covers the key technological and market trends in the submarine market. The demand for global submarines is anticipated to be driven by growing regional tensions, coupled with maritime conflicts. The new technological advancements in the sector will also drive demand. The market is expected to be dominated by North America, followed by Asia Pacific and Europe. In spite of the budget sequestration measures, the US still has the highest spend in the sector and is almost equal to the spending in Asia-Pacific, which is the second largest spending region. Asia Pacific is the second largest market for submarines with major spenders in the region including China, India, Australia and Japan. “The Global Submarine Market 2014–2024” provides detailed analysis of the current industry size and growth expectations from 2014 to 2024, including highlights of key growth stimulators. It also benchmarks the industry against key global markets and provides a detailed understanding of emerging opportunities in specific areas. Key Findings A major finding in the report entails that the sector demand will be largely driven by increase in maritime security threats and need for replacement of obsolete submarines; leading to consistent growth in the market. The demand for submarines is also anticipated to be driven by the need for the balance of power by countries with major militaries. -
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RCHITECTURE DURING THE EPOCH OF PETER THE AGREAT (1703-1725) Galina P. Chudesova*11G.P St Petersburg National Research University of Information Technology, Mechanics and Optics (ITMO University) St Petersburg, Russia Keywords: architecture, St Petersburg, maximaphily, Cabin of Peter the Great 1. Introduction In recent decades, there has been increasing interest in the House of Romanov. An almost total absence of information on the life and activities of the members of this dy- nasty during the Soviet period led to an explosion of interest in this theme after the col- lapse of the USSR. In the post-Soviet period, a stream of literature about the Romanov dynasty looded society, focusing on the architects of that time as creators of particular architectural monuments. As a result, during the translation of collective knowledge, information about the role of the monarchs in creating the architectural heritage of St. Petersburg is practically absent. The present article offers an unusual way of looking at St Petersburg. This is the irst in the series of articles entitled “Architectural Chronicle of St Petersburg”, devoted to deining the contribution each monarch made to the development of the city. The aspects relating to the formation of social memory in society and its implications for the future have been suficiently studied in the historical and philosophical sense, therefore, the author of the paper has considered any scientiic insights unnecessary. Of all the approaches scientists have taken in studying heritage, the author is closest to the informative approach proposed by Ya.K. Rebane and further developed by such scientists as V.A. -
Russia's Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean
Russia’s Naval Strategy in the Mediterranean By Dmitry Gorenburg Executive Summary • Over the last decade, Russia has expanded its military footprint in the Mediterranean. Since establishing its Mediterranean Squadron in 2013, it has largely maintained a permanent naval presence in the region, based primarily on ships from the Black Sea Fleet, with support from ships and submarines of the Northern and Baltic Fleets. • Russia’s strategy uses the Mediterranean’s geography to protect Russia’s southern flanks while seeking to challenge the naval supremacy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia depends on maintaining and gradually expanding its naval presence in the Mediterranean while also securing expanded access to ports and bases, with the possibility of eventually contesting NATO’s dominance in the central Mediterranean as well. • Although the Russian Navy’s missions in the Mediterranean are primarily related to coastal defense and protection of territorial waters, conventional deterrence has come to play an increasingly important role since the development of a ship-based cruise missile capability. The Russian Navy has sought to establish credible maritime conventional deterrence versus NATO through the combination of air defenses and cruise missile– equipped ships, which work together to signal that any use of NATO naval forces against Russian ships and facilities would be highly costly for the adversary. Russia’s Strategic Goals Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is focused on three key goals: taking advantage of the Mediterranean’s geographical position to improve Russia’s security, using Russia’s position in the Mediterranean to increase Russia’s status as an alternative world power to the United States, and providing support for the Syrian regime. -
Admiral Gorshkov Frigate Reveals Serious Shortcomings in Russia’S Naval Modernization Program
March 2016 Admiral Gorshkov Frigate Reveals Serious Shortcomings in Russia’s Naval Modernization Program Paul Schwartz Since 2008, as part of its ongoing military reform, Moscow has embarked on a large-scale program of naval expansion intended to recapitalize its ailing shipbuilding industry and rebuild and modernize its fleet. Rebuilding the fleet has received especially high priority in Russia’s 2011–2020 State-Armament Program, with the navy set to receive nearly 5 trillion rubles (about US$70 billion), or fully one-quarter of the total amount to be spent on military modernization of Russia’s entire armed forces through 2020.1 Russia’s fleet development plans were further elaborated in its “Action Plan 2013–2020,” an overall modernization road map released by the Ministry of Defense in 2013. According to this plan, the percentage of modern equipment in Russia’s navy was set to increase from a level of approximately 40 percent in 2013 to over 70 percent by 2020.2 Despite substantial efforts to make good on its naval modernization plans, including significant state spending, what has been delivered thus far to the Russian Navy has fallen well short of expectations. While official Russian rhetoric routinely proclaims that the fleet is undergoing a major renaissance, in reality Russia’s shipbuilding programs have been severely hampered by enduring problems, including budget shortfalls, underinvestment in naval R&D, poor design, obsolescence in its shipbuilding industry, system- integration challenges, reduced access to foreign technology, and widespread corruption, among other problems, all of which have led to long-standing delays in several naval programs and outright cancellation of others.3 The Admiral Gorshkov–Class Frigate A particularly important case in point is the seemingly endless project to build a new blue-water frigate. -
The Most Reliable Warships and Solutions CONTENTS
Special analytical export project of Industrial Weekly № 01 (19), March 2018 FSMTS of Russia The best from Russia ‘Pantsir-ME’ Pride and honor Rules and successes Navy innovations Absolute protection Оne of the main of defense exports at DIMDEX 2018 for any ships national symbol .8 .14 .20 .36 SPECIAL PARTNERSHIP The most reliable warships and solutions CONTENTS NEWS SHORTLY 2 DIMDEX 2018 EDITORIAL 2 Сooperation #1 (19) March, 2018 agreement ‘Industrial Weekly’ special export project 2 Success of KamAZ Registered in the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology 2 Maritime Show and Mass Media (Roscomnadzor) 09.12.2015 2018 in Vladivostok PI № FS77-63977 2 Light Aircraft TVS-2DTS 4 1500 new technologies 4 Russian Small Submarines 4 Techmash in 2017 6 Russia-India: Military-Technical The magazine ‘Russian Aviation & Military Cooperation Guide’, published by the United industrial edition, is a winner of National prize 6 Russia at Defexpo ‘Golden Idea 2016’ FSMTC of Russia India 2018 6 Rosoboronexport General director in 2018 Editor-in-chief Innovations for the Navy Valeriy STOLNIKOV MAIN TOPICS Political situation in the world (conflicts, sanctions, 8 Defense Export Chief editor’s deputy from Russia threats of war and other) makes nations once Julia GUZHONKOVA again reconsider their defense possibilities Elena SOKOLOVA including sea lines. Threat of local conflicts to be EXPORT REGULATION evolved into global ones, failure of worldwide 14 Innovations system of safety and nonending crisis – all of this Commercial director at DIMDEX 2018 leads to an unstable and dangerous situation. Andrey TARABRIN One can predict raise of defense means DEFENSE SENSATION market in times like this. -
Reform, Foreign Technology, and Leadership in the Russian Imperial and Soviet Navies, 1881–1941
REFORM, FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY, AND LEADERSHIP IN THE RUSSIAN IMPERIAL AND SOVIET NAVIES, 1881–1941 by TONY EUGENE DEMCHAK B.A., University of Dayton, 2005 M.A., University of Illinois, 2007 AN ABSTRACT OF A DISSERTATION submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Department of History College of Arts and Sciences KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY Manhattan, Kansas 2016 Abstract This dissertation examines the shifting patterns of naval reform and the implementation of foreign technology in the Russian Empire and Soviet Union from Alexander III’s ascension to the Imperial throne in 1881 up to the outset of Operation Barbarossa in 1941. During this period, neither the Russian Imperial Fleet nor the Red Navy had a coherent, overall strategic plan. Instead, the expansion and modernization of the fleet was left largely to the whims of the ruler or his chosen representative. The Russian Imperial period, prior to the Russo-Japanese War, was characterized by the overbearing influence of General Admiral Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, who haphazardly directed acquisition efforts and systematically opposed efforts to deal with the potential threat that Japan posed. The Russo-Japanese War and subsequent downfall of the Grand Duke forced Emperor Nicholas II to assert his own opinions, which vacillated between a coastal defense navy and a powerful battleship-centered navy superior to the one at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean. In the Soviet era, the dominant trend was benign neglect, as the Red Navy enjoyed relative autonomy for most of the 1920s, even as the Kronstadt Rebellion of 1921 ended the Red Navy’s independence from the Red Army. -
The Baltic Sea in Russian Strategy Development of World Civilisation in the Third for Strategic Reasons Russia Insists on Its Exclusive by Alpo Juntunen Millennium
NR 4 NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 2010 DISKUSSION & DEBATT sources provide one of the major directions of fective buffer zone for Russian core areas, and The Baltic Sea in Russian Strategy development of world civilisation in the third for strategic reasons Russia insists on its exclusive by Alpo Juntunen millennium. The national policies of the major right to the northern sea route. Presidents Putin maritime powers and the majority of the world’s and Medvedev have made several public remarks nations will be implemented through independ- about the importance of the Northern Fleet in ent action and cooperation, but competition on the defence of the Russian Federation.5 the world’s oceans will be inevitable. This is why The disintegration of the USSR was detri- ocean strategy and naval policy occupy centre mental to the military. Worst hit was the navy, stage in strategic planning.4 which was reduced to a catastrophic state. The Russia considers itself a leading maritime redevelopment of the Russian navy that started power bordered by three oceans. Its national during President Putin’s reign focuses mainly on evolved from the Grand Duchy of Moscow, Rus- trol of the sea. Despite the Soviets flexing their maritime policy must look after the interests of the Northern Fleet. Development of the other sia is a superpower. Geography makes it a conti- muscles, the power of the USSR was limited the state and society from the inland waters to fleets takes place in order of importance as fol- nental nation, but for centuries Russia has striven because NATO controlled the Danish straits. -
The Russian Maritime Industry and Finland Hanna Mäkinen
Hanna Mäkinen The Russian maritime industry and Finland Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute 2/2015 ISSN 1795 - 5076 The Russian maritime industry and Finland Hanna Mäkinen 2/2015 Electronic Publications of Pan-European Institute http://www.utu.fi/pei Hanna Mäkinen PEI Electronic Publications 2/2015 www.utu.fi/pei Executive summary 1) Due to historical reasons, the civil shipbuilding industry is weakly developed in Russia and is currently not competitive in commercial sense. The Russian shipyards are in a rapid need of modernisation and the shipbuilding industry suffers from low productivity and technological inferiority compared to other shipbuilding nations. In order to improve the industry’s competitiveness, international cooperation is needed. 2) The Russian maritime industry has recently received increased political attention and funding. Particularly the growing interest in the Arctic hydrocarbon fields and sea routes as well as the continuous importance of energy exports for the Russian economy have boosted the development of the shipbuilding sector. In addition, as Russia has engaged into rearmament, the demands of the Russian navy significantly direct the development of the Russian maritime industry. 3) The current unstable political and economic situation, particularly the ruble’s decline against the euro, the plunge in world oil prices and the economic sanctions imposed on Russia, have complicated the implementation of maritime and offshore industry projects in Russia. The sanctions have a negative impact on the Russian shipbuilding and offshore industries as they complicate companies’ possibilities to attract foreign financing and prohibit exports of products and services and technology transfer to Russia if they are related to defence and oil industries. -
Moscow Defense Brief 2/2008
Moscow Defense Brief Your Professional Guide Inside # 2, 2008 We’llWe’ll BeBe BackBack Advertisment HIGH TECHNOLOGIES SAFEGUARDING PEACEFUL SKIES Russia’s largest defence holding company more than 40 industrial and research organizations powerful research and productive potential full range of air defence systems and assets integrated technological process from development to serial production of weapons and military equipment llment of contractual obligations Our products are successfully operated in 50 countries worldwide ALMAZ-ANTEY CONCERN 41, Vereiskaya str. Moscow 121471, Russia Теl.: (495) 780-54-10; Fax: (495) 780-54-11 E-mail: [email protected] CONTENTS Domestic Policy #2 (12), 2008 Rites of Spring in the Defense Industry Complex 2 PUBLISHER Urbi et Orbi: Military Parades on Red Square 4 Centre for Analysis of Strategies and International Policy Technologies Recent Evolution of Russian-American Relations 7 CAST Director & Publisher Ruslan Pukhov Nagorno-Karabakh: Shift in the Military Balance 9 Editor-in-Chief The Rise and Fall of Georgia’s UAVs 13 Mikhail Barabanov Advisory Editors Konstantin Makienko International Cooperation Alexey Pokolyavin Thales Group in Russia 15 Researchers Ruslan Aliev Sergey Denisentsev Industrial Policy Polina Temerina Dmitry Vasiliev Maiden Flight of the SSJ-100 17 Editorial Office 3 Tverskaya-Yamskaya, 24, office 5, Moscow, Russia 125047 Arms Trade phone: +7 495 251 9069 Russia on the Arms Market of Sub-Saharan Africa 18 fax: +7 495 775 0418 http://www.mdb.cast.ru/ To subscribe, contact Facts & Figures phone: +7 495 251 9069 Export Contracts of Warships or e-mail: [email protected] From Russian Shipyards 1992 – 2007 21 Moscow Defense Brief is published by the Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies Russian Arms Trade in the First Half of 2008 23 All rights reserved. -
Passport of St. Petersburg
Passport of St. Petersburg Saint Petersburg (St. Petersburg) is situated at the easternmost tip of the Gulf of Finland of the Baltic Sea. The exact geographical coordinates of the city centre are 59°57' North Latitude 30°19' East Longitude. St. Petersburg, located in the node of several major sea, river and land transportation routes, is the European gate of Russia and its strategic centre closest to the border with the European Union. Inland waters constitute about 10% of the city territory. The total area (with administrative subjects) covers 1439 km². The population amounts to 5 225.7 people (as of January 1, 2016 by the data from the federal statistical agency “Petrostat”). St. Petersburg is the second (after Moscow) largest city of the Russian Federation and the third (after Moscow and London) largest city in Europe. St. Petersburg is the administrative centre of the Northwestern Federal Region which is characterized by considerable potential in natural resources, well developed industry, a fine traffic network and furthermore provides contact of the Russian Federation with the outside world via the sea ports of the Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean. The city hosts the following institutions: • The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation; • Regional offices of federal ministries and departments; • Representations of 24 entities and 2 cities in the Russian Federation; • 65 consular offices of foreign countries; • Offices of international organizations: CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the Eurasian Economic Community, representatives of international organizations, funds and associations, UN agencies and representative offices and branches of international banks. • Offices of international cultural institutions: the Goethe German Cultural Center, the French Institute, the Finnish Institute, the Dutch Institute, the Danish Cultural Institute, the Israeli Cultural Center and the Italian Cultural Institute. -
How to Invest in Industry in St. Petersburg
Committee for industrial policy and innovation of St. Petersburg HOW TO INVEST IN INDUSTRY IN ST. PETERSBURG 4th edition 2017 HOW TO INVEST IN INDUSTRY IN ST. PETERSBURG Dear friends! I’m glad to welcome the new edition of the guide to in- vesting in the industry of St. Petersburg! Over the course of this handbook’s existence, it has be- come a true guide for business people. It provides com- prehensive information both about the terms of conduct- ing business in the Northern capital and about specific investment projects. St. Petersburg is a major industrial, transportation, scien- St. Petersburg’s key competitive advantages are its sup- tific, educational and tourist center in Russia and Europe. portive business climate and qualified human resources, The city currently holds leading positions in many eco- well-developed infrastructure and quick access to major nomic and social development sectors. Since the city’s Russian and EU markets. The Government of St. Peters- foundation, industry has been the city-forming core of St. burg prioritizes the implementation of manufacturing in- Petersburg, and it currently provides close to 50% of the vestment projects, and a balanced development of city budget revenue on all levels. territories, including the so-called “industrial belt”. En- terprises and investors who implement modern technol- Along with the traditional sectors — shipbuilding, pow- ogies are offered tax exemptions and other preferences. er production and machine building — modern, inno- Residents of the Special Economic Zone, technoparks vative high-tech enterprises are being established and and business incubators, industrial parks and zones operate successfully. The automobile and medical and enjoy unique conditions for establishing their industrial pharmaceutical clusters have become tangible drivers of enterprises.