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Санкт-Петербург  Local Short Form: С.-Петербург | Петербург  Former Names: St

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Санкт-Петербург  Local Short Form: С.-Петербург | Петербург  Former Names: St a Doing business in St. Petersburg 2 Enterprise Europe Network - Russia, Module A Regional Center – St. Petersburg | www.doingbusiness.ru Doing business in St. Petersburg Enterprise Europe Network - Russia, Module A Regional Center – St. Petersburg | www.doingbusiness.ru 3 Doing business in St. Petersburg Guide for exporters, investors and start-ups Current publication was developed by and under supervision of the Enterprise Europe Network - Russia, Gate2Rubin Consortium, Module A Regional Center – St. Petersburg operated by St. Petersburg Foundation for SME Development with the assistance of the relevant legal, human resources, certification, research and real estate firms. © 2012 The Enterprise Europe Network - Russia, Gate2Rubin Consortium, Module A Regional Center – St. Petersburg operated by St. Petersburg Foundation for SME Development. All rights reserved. International copyright. Any use of materials of this publication is possible only after written agreement of St. Petersburg Foundation for SME Development and relevant contributing firms. Doing business in St. Petersburg 4 Enterprise Europe Network - Russia, Module A Regional Center – St. Petersburg | www.doingbusiness.ru Table of contents Welcome to St. Petersburg ............................................................................................... 7 1. The city ...................................................................................................................... 8 1.1. Geography ............................................................................................................................. 8 1.2. Public holidays and business hours ....................................................................................... 9 1.3. Population ............................................................................................................................. 9 1.4. Political system .................................................................................................................... 10 1.5. Economy .............................................................................................................................. 13 1.6. Foreign trade ....................................................................................................................... 15 1.7. Foreign investments ............................................................................................................ 17 2. Key business sectors ................................................................................................. 19 2.1. Overview of St. Petersburg’s industry ................................................................................. 19 2.2. Automotive industry ........................................................................................................... 22 2.3. Food and beverage production ........................................................................................... 25 2.4. Information and communication technology (ICT) ............................................................. 30 2.5. Pharmaceutical industry ...................................................................................................... 37 2.6. Shipbuilding industry ........................................................................................................... 42 2.7. Transport and logistics ........................................................................................................ 46 3. Business solutions .................................................................................................... 55 3.1. Headquarters ....................................................................................................................... 56 3.2. Research & Development .................................................................................................... 58 3.3. Production сenter ................................................................................................................ 61 3.4. Distribution сenter .............................................................................................................. 68 3.5. Test market ......................................................................................................................... 70 4. Doing business ......................................................................................................... 72 4.1. Establishing a legal presence ............................................................................................... 72 4.2. Foreign investments ............................................................................................................ 80 4.3. Taxation ............................................................................................................................... 85 4.4. Contracts ............................................................................................................................. 92 4.5. Employment ........................................................................................................................ 95 4.6. Product conformity assurance in Russia ........................................................................... 102 4.7. Intellectual property rights and franchising ...................................................................... 108 4.8. Special economic zones (“SEZ”) in St. Petersburg ............................................................. 114 4.9. Public private partnerships and infrastructure development ........................................... 116 4.10. Obtaining rights to state-owned land in St. Petersburg .................................................... 120 4.11. Buyout of land plots in St. Petersburg............................................................................... 129 4.12. Regulatory issues. Antimonopoly compliance .................................................................. 133 5. Costs of doing business ........................................................................................... 142 5.1. Costs of starting a company .............................................................................................. 142 5.2. Human resources .............................................................................................................. 144 5.3. Office, retail and warehouse market ................................................................................ 148 5.4. Communication ................................................................................................................. 154 5.5. Utilities .............................................................................................................................. 155 Doing business in St. Petersburg Enterprise Europe Network - Russia, Module A Regional Center – St. Petersburg | www.doingbusiness.ru 5 6. SME support ........................................................................................................... 157 6.1. Overview ........................................................................................................................... 157 6.2. Definition of SME – EU vs. Russia ...................................................................................... 157 6.3. Statistics ............................................................................................................................ 158 6.4. SME support and development programs ........................................................................ 160 7. Contacts of the business support infrastructure ....................................................... 164 7.1. Overview of the business support infrastructure in St. Petersburg ................................. 164 7.2. Authorities ......................................................................................................................... 164 7.3. Investment support ........................................................................................................... 166 7.4. SME business cooperation support ................................................................................... 167 7.5. SME support ...................................................................................................................... 168 7.6. Financial support ............................................................................................................... 170 7.7. Techno parks and business incubators ............................................................................. 172 7.8. Educational programs and internships ............................................................................. 174 7.9. Chambers of commerce and industry ............................................................................... 175 7.10. Business associations ........................................................................................................ 175 7.11. Audit, tax and consulting firms ......................................................................................... 176 7.12. Banks ................................................................................................................................. 177 7.13. Certification and testing .................................................................................................... 177 7.14. Exhibitions ......................................................................................................................... 178 7.15. Law firms ..........................................................................................................................
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