THE REPUBLIC OF KABARDINO-BALKARIA: HAS THE SLEEPING BEAUTY BEEN 1 AWOKEN?

Janna Khamdokhova

The Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR) is situated on the Northern slope of Greater Caucasus. The density of the population is high at 71.8 people per square km, which is significantly above the average of the Russian Federation (8.5 people per square km) and the average of the North Caucasus (53.3 people per square km). The population is 893,800 (as of 1 January 2010). 2 The republic’s national composition is varied. Kabardins make up 57.2 percent of the population and Balkars account for 12.7 percent, according to the 2010 census. The proportion of Russians is relatively high at 22.5 percent. Another 90 nationalities make up 7.7 percent. The Kabardins speak the Kabardin-Circassian language, which originates from the Abkhaz-Adyge branch of the North Caucasian family. The Balkars speak Karachai- Balkar, which is a Turkic branch of the Altay linguistic family. The region’s traditional religions are Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Judaism, and they are also the republic’s official religions. The majority of the Kabardin and Balkar religious population are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi mazhab .

The Kabardino-Balkar autonomous oblast was formed in 1922. Presently, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria is one of the 83 subjects of the Russian Federation. The main sectors of the KBR economy are industry – 14.7 percent, agriculture – 21.5 percent and construction – 9.9 percent of gross regional product. In the ranking of employment, the republic occupies the 79 th place in the Russian Federation, while it is 77 th in terms of average income. 3 At the same time, the republic’s economy has made a strong leap forward in the last few years. According to Presidential Envoy to the North Caucasus Federal District Alexander Khloponin, the republic is developing quickly and dynamically, and he would give it “one of the highest marks”.4

1. Sources of social tensions in KBR

The history of relations between the Russian Empire and the Caucasus projects a certain destabilising influence on the contemporary situation in the KBR, when as a result of the Caucasus war of the 19 th century the Adyge people 5 found themselves dispersed throughout different countries, as well as by the history of mutual

1 For a long while Kabardino-Balkaria enjoyed a well-earned reputation as an island of stability and relative prosperity against the background of other North Caucasian republics. It was not accidental that Johar Dudayev, the first president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Ichkeria, used to call Kabardino-Balkaria a ‘sleeping beauty,’ not hiding his hopes to wake it up. 2 All-Russia Census, 2010, Roskomstat 3 Regions of Russia. Socio-economic indicators, 2010. pp. 34-35 4 ‘Потенциал субъектов РФ на Северном Кавказе очень высок.’ http://www.interfax russia.ru/South/exclusives.asp?id=141914"http://www.interfax russia.ru/South/exclusives.asp?id=141914 5 ‘Adygei’ is the name of a family of ethnic groups – Kabardins, Cherkes, Adyges – living in KBR, Karachayevo-Cherkesiya and Adygeiya. They are widely known as Cherkes/Circassians by other Eastern and European peoples. Saferworld relations between the North Caucasus and the Soviet state when Balkar people were deported to Central Asia in March 1944 as a result of the Stalinist repression. Events of recent history are not forgotten, when in 1992–1994 a declaration of sovereignty by the Balkar people threatened the very existence of a unified Kabardino-Balkaria. Conflict was avoided, and interethnic tensions did not grow into armed contestation. The other prominent event was the large-scale armed uprising by militants on 13 October 2005, when a group of young radicals numbering 150 made an attempt to seize the capital of KBR, Nalchik city. 144 people died during this attempt, including 35 law enforcement officers, 14 civilians and 95 militants. 6

The following four factors have the biggest influence on the wellbeing of KBR’s population: unemployment, low living standards, security issues and corruption.7 According to the director of the Centre for Social and Political Studies at the KBR Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the current situation in the republic cannot be presented as some sort of tangled web of contradictions, irresolvable within the framework of functioning state and social institutions. “But the republic’s authorities do not have the power and resources to carry out any sort of ‘policy’ – economic, social or national. Their only mechanism for solving problems and impacting the situation is the administration system, which is minimally effective and maximally corrupt.”8

According to one expert’s opinion, the situation does not require external intervention. However, there are sources of social tension; since the socioeconomic situation continues to be unsatisfactory, living standards are not high and there is also a range of other problems faced by the population on a daily basis:

“What do most people need? To have jobs, a secure future, and to be able to not only give their child a cup of tea with sugar for breakfast, but also put a sandwich on the table.” (Valentina, a pensioner). 9 “I don’t want parents to worry about their children who leave the republic to seek work elsewhere. I want our children to stay here, at home, and earn a decent wage.” (Zarema, a teacher). “Children, who have no money, whose parents left the republic to work, are more easily temped to join the Wahhabists for money. We are all worried about our young men and women.” (Marina, a librarian).10

Objective economic indicators become sources of conflict in those societies, where social groups are relatively organised, i.e. those that can evaluate these conditions as unsatisfactory, formulate demands and aims, and organise co-ordinated action in

6 ‘They gave their lives in the name of the future’ in Kabardino-Balkarskaya Pravda no. 194 (23236), 13 October 2011. 7 Case Study, ‘Public opinions on corruption in KBR,’ January 2010 8 Interview with the director of the Center for Social and Political Studies, KBR Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. Borovoy, 15.09.2011, city of Nalchik. 9 Focus group with representatives from different segments of the population in the village of Novo- Ivanovka, Maiskii District, 09/08/2011 10 Focus group with representatives from different segments of the population in the village of Kishpek, Baksan District, 13/09/2011

2 The North Caucasus: Views from Within order to achieve those aims. Then, an individual’s economic dissatisfaction turns into a source of social tension, which takes on an open form of opposition:

“…but in a population, with strong elements of traditionalism and clan, family, and regional ties, where there are strong collective beginnings, actually, problems are solved by the individual…everyone survives by using what they know. They save themselves using all sorts of collective units, structures, connections, relationships, but none of these are public institutions.”11

The root of this distinctiveness lies in the time of unchallenged supremacy of family and social structures, in the cult of valour and adroitness for a man, who was at the same time both a warrior and a provider. The man did not act alone, but as part of a small group, in which both competition and mutual support existed, and individual and group achievement was evidenced by ‘the catch’. Conditions which have arisen in economy and society in the last two decades have made these archetypes of social psychology quite relevant. On the contrary, collectivism, as a product of division and co-operation of labour in large enterprises or as an expression of social solidarity (professional, class or civil) has already either been lost, or has not yet been formed.

The current situation in Kabardino-Balkaria looks more like a battle for survival. According to an expert’s view, the deregulation and de-normalisation of socio- economic life is typical of modern KBR society. Today, the sources of survival and income of the majority are not originated in households, but in the ‘economic’ sphere, and the only universal regulator of this system is money. One can say that the republic’s economy is not a ‘market’ economy, but a ‘money’ economy. Yet the lack of ‘objective’ market regulators and their replacement by other rules – administrative and bureaucratic (much worse than those imposed by the state or by plans), clans (in the wider sense of the concept), personal (i.e. personal and subjective) – causes chaos in socio-economic life. These conditions, in which personal connections dominate the system, lead to a very low level of interpersonal trust in society. 12

According to the expert, this situation is favourable to the current authorities, both in the republic and in the country as a whole, because there are no active platforms for social protest and social tension. According to a December 2010 survey, nine percent of survey respondents in KBR 13 view participation in social protest as a possibility; this is significantly less than in other Russian regions. 14 However, the outlook for solving existing problems in the republic is not positive:

11 Interview with the director of the Center for Social and Political Studies, KBR Research Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. Borovoy, 15.09.2011, city of Nalchik. 12 Interview with Aslan Borov, the director of the Centre for Socio-political Research in KBR, Nalchik, 15 September 2011. 13 Sociological study ‘Extremism and terrorism among the young’ carried out by the Institute of Humanitarian Research of the Government of KBR and KBNT RAN in December 2010. 14 Available at http://news.km.ru/v_rossii_narastayut_protestnye_n 3

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“It would be better for social tension to be visible, for there to be social programmes which would demand finding solutions to problems. It would be better to have an open and public platform, which would have special rules, norms, language etc. this would say that society has moved towards a social, political, cultural modernisation and is becoming modern.” 15

The expert said that this does not mean that there are no individual people and no civic organisations which express their dissatisfaction, but this does mean that these individuals and organisations do not have mass social support and do not have the ability to mobilise a wide enough cross-section of society, to transgress social, national and political boundaries. Results of sociological studies show that the majority of the population is indifferent to national movements and political parties.

1.1 Ethnicity/ Identity

Ethnic consciousness of Kabardins and Balkars remains quite intense, but does not get in the way of integration processes. Young people identify themselves more confidently as ‘Russian citizens’, which gives them the basis for combining both identities. In answer to the question ‘Who do you feel you are first and foremost?’, 43 percent of young people answered ‘Russian citizen’; the group to give this answer was composed of 45 percent Kabardins, 34 percent Balkars and 54 percent Russians. The answer choice ‘a representative of my nationality’ was picked by 20 percent of those asked, and this group was comprised of 45 percent Kabardins, 23 percent Balkars and 3 percent Russians. 16

The core of the Kabardins’ and Balkars’ ethnic identity is the focus on the micro- group (we are Kabardins, we are Balkars) and a focus on the macro-group (Kabardins: we are Circassian, we are Adyge; Balkars: we are Karachai-Balkar, we are Turkoman 17 ). In the construction of ethnic identity of Kabardins and Balkars there is a series of complexes, typical to the traumatised psyche of a colonised people. A component of the modern Circassian nation is the feeling of a people who have survived ‘genocide’ during the Caucasus war. The trauma of deportation during Stalin’s time has still not been healed in the Balkar consciousness.

However, neither trauma acts as a strong mobilising force, either for the Kabardins or for the Balkars. This comes more from the toolbox of political and ideological efforts of national movements’ activists (which are undoubtedly successful), than is typical for the notions in mass consciousness, where the trauma is still so current that it must be a barrier to social solidarity, and does not let citizens absorb new values and does not let society develop.

15 Interview with Aslan Borov, the director of the Centre for Socio-political Research in KBR, Nalchik, 15 September 2011. 16 Sociological study ‘Extremism and terrorism among the young’ carried out by the Institute of Humanitarian Research of the Government of KBR and KBNT RAN in December 2010. 17 The Karachayevs are part of the same ethnic family as the Balkars and live in the North Caucasus.

4 The North Caucasus: Views from Within

“In answer to the question whether there is adversity between the nations, I would say this: there are national problems, and they are real.” (Aslan Borov, expert)

In May 2011 in his speech at the KBR Parliament Zalim Kashirov, representative of the KBR Presidential Administration, commented in the discussion on the concept of nationalities policy of KBR that

“‘the attempt to explode’ relations between the nations within the republic is doomed to failure. Several public organisations and media are of the opinion that we are almost sitting on gunpowder. Yet when we speak to the population, we get an entirely different result. Among the problems which bother the population of the republic, relations between the nations never get above the 15 th place.” 18

Judging by the views of focus group participants, interethnic relations in the republic are generally stable. Indicators of this are the lack of negative stereotypes of other nations and ethnic groups that have direct contact with each other. The history of relations between Kabardins and Balkars does not include serious interethnic conflicts and wars. A commonly-held view of life brings them closer, which reflects positively on interethnic relations, communications and contact:

“We do not have the concept: he is Balkar, he is Kabardin. Kabardins speak Balkar, Balkars speak Kabardin. There are many mixed families.” “People say that when our people were deported from here, the Kabardins cried and threw bags of food into the train carriages. We have always lived peacefully. We don’t want to be set against each other.” “I am Balkar, my grandmother is Kabardin. Nobody talks about nationality.” “The old people say that Kabardins were always in cattle breeding and Balkars tended to the land. They went to each other’s houses, they were each other’s guests of honour, they slept in each other’s homes.” 19

The friendly character of relations between the Kabardins and Balkars lead to many having mixed family ties and marriages. According to Nalchik’s marriage registry office, 22 percent of all marriages registered from January to October 2011 were mixed; of those, every fourth family is Russian-Kabardin (27 percent) and every fifth is Kabardin-Balkar (19 percent).

Some focus group participants recalled the existence of discord between the nations in KBR, which did sometimes lead to conflict among teenagers and young people. However, the respondents either pointed out the transient nature of these conflicts, or they stipulated that these types of problems arose ‘in the courtyard’ [of apartment blocks], i.e. they were applicable only to young people. Some believe that

18 ‘The concept of national government policy has been approved” in Goryanka no. 20 (613), 18 May 2011. 19 Sociological study ‘Extremism and terrorism among the young’ carried out by the Institute of Humanitarian Research of the Government of KBR and KBNT RAN in December 2010. 5

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these problems were more often than not connected with petty youth crime, which is often called ‘gopnichestvo ’ in other Russian regions.

“I think that national relations do not play a big role in all these street clashes. At least, the question of nationality has never arisen in front of me. Or, even if it was raised, it had never been emphasised. I know, for example, that in a Nalchik borough there was a youth gang, which consisted mainly of Russians. They picked on everybody else. Generally speaking, they would harass loners, those who they didn’t see as one of them on the street – and it didn’t matter whether they were Russian, Balkar or Kabardin. Anyway, this was important up to a certain age. At a certain point people either stop participating in this or become complete criminals.” (Pyotr, IT specialist) 20

Other respondents noted that animosities between the nations, which are inevitable in any multiethnic society, had a specific character among schoolchildren and teenagers, which is likely to be connected to the formation of a value system among teenagers: “I remember well, what our class became like in the second half of the 1990s – just between the two Chechen wars. Kabardins stuck to each other, as did the Balkars and the Russians. When we were in the senior classes, we were all friends again, so the nationality of whom you are sharing the desk with stopped having a big significance again. Society itself became different. Now I have two very close Kabardin friends, but I don’t think about that at all when we talk.” 21

The majority of focus group participants, when discussing social relations between Russians and Caucasian nations, said that relations were always proper and positive. According to the respondents, this is especially obvious among the middle-aged, who grew up in the Soviet Union. The latter does not mean that there are no instances of everyday nationalism , however only a few respondents think that this is becoming a general tendency among the masses in KBR.

Many focus group participants blame the inflation of tension between the nations on groups which can gain political capital from emphasising intergroup differences and exploiting xenophobia: “There are babblers, who keep on harking back to problems of deportation…Balkar money, Kabardin lands, Balkar lands…Lets first sort ourselves out in our little republic, lets calm down and talk it out.” (Dalkhat, a builder) 22 “They only ignite the fire. That’s just stupid. Ordinary people will always reach an agreement.” (Hasanbi, post man) 23

As a result of active propaganda carried out by the Council of Elders of the Balkar People (CEBP), which criticises ‘ethnocratic’ motivations of the republic’s authorities, a stereotype has been formed in the social consciousness of the Balkar people, according

20 Focus group with migrants from KBR, Moscow, 23 September 2011. 21 Focus group with migrants from KBR, Moscow, 23 September 2011. 22 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Elbrus village, Elbrus region of KBR, 22 September 2011. 23 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan region of KBR, 13 September 2011 .

6 The North Caucasus: Views from Within to which Balkars are excluded from socio-political processes in the republic. One of the focal points of tension between the nations is the reminder that Kabardins usually hold more prestigious or economically-viable positions in industry, business and culture, as well as politics; they achieve this by pushing out other nationalities. It is true, that the ‘Kabardin majority’ do have strength in numbers and have more ability to influence the power hierarchy, thus limiting access to management and economic resources for the ‘Balkar minority’:

“I am often in villages, talking to people I know. They ask many questions about hiring policy. I ask, why do you care if a minister or a prime minister is a Balkar? You work in your vegetable garden all day. What benefit would you get if the prime minister was a Balkar? 24 Many cannot answer this question, but it is a source of annoyance – it is a piece of string, on which you can play.” 25

Many Russian focus group participants believe that it is impossible to get a relatively well-paid job in the republic without patronage; they explain this by the clan character of society. According to the respondents, hiring in the state apparatus and successful business structures is controlled by representatives of relatively important families and clans of the republic, who keep ‘bread places’ for their relatives. At the same time, many say that representatives of all ethnic groups encounter this problem, but Russian speakers feel this more intensely than anybody else, as they are a more vulnerable part of the population. It is worth noting that some of those surveyed believe that this is the result of ‘ethnic discrimination’:

“Discrimination along national characteristics does exist. Look at who most of our leaders are in business and the state administration. And who will they hire to work with them? Their relatives of course. And to a Russian guy, even if he was the brightest of them all, they would say ‘Bye bye’.” (Katerina, Moscow university graduate) 26

According to other Russian-speaking respondents, the issue is not ‘ethnic discrimination’, because the deciding factor is not the employee’s nationality, but their family and connections:

“I think in business, representatives of non-indigenous nationalities would find it very difficult to succeed in the republic. We do not have many Russian businessmen, in fact we have very few. Because all the officials try to ‘push through’ their relatives wherever they can and get them some sort of preferential treatment.” (Pyotr, IT specialist) “It is also impossible to say that the clan system does not leave any chances to those who do not have the

24 Currently, the KBR President is Kabardin, the Chair of KBR’s Parliament is Balkar, the Chairman of the KBR Government is German, which is a cause of dissatisfaction among the Balkars, because they believe that the prime minister position is ‘Balkar’. 25 Interview with representatives of a profiled ministry about co-operation with religious organisations (anonymous), Nalchik, 19 September 2011. 26 Focus group with migrants from KBR, Moscow, 23 September 2011. 7

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necessary connections. A person with brains, whichever nationality they are, will find a job. Maybe he will be the third deputy of a boss with a small mandate and he will do all the work himself. His boss will be some sort of relative of the director, who will have a good job and a good salary, but will not do any work. I think good specialists are needed everywhere. If you are easily replaceable, then you will be replaced by a relative or an acquaintance. Nationality is not the issue. If they want, they could push through another Russian – one whom they know somehow.” (Alexander, press secretary of a political party) 27

A.G. Zdravomyslov and A.A. Tsutsiyev have come to the conclusion that the main factor to influence the size of Russian migration from the region is “probably the fact that Russians, possess much less ‘capital of primary informal networks’”, much less than indigenous people. This social capital is the aggregation of connections, which could be effectively converted into advantages in the competitive battle for scarce or prestigious positions. Moreover this social capital is ‘natural’, a habitual resource. 28

It is worth noting that many Kabardin respondents insist that without the infamous social capital, Kabardins find it as difficult as anybody else to win the battle for prestigious positions in the republic. Due to the policy of ‘parity’, career-focused Kabardins cannot lay claims to so-called ‘Balkar’ or ‘Russian’ jobs.

Historically, the Statute of Unification included the principle of ‘parity’ between Kabardins and Balkars – equal representation of both nations in state structures, regardless of their correlation within the population. The main problem was creating legitimacy for the Balkars to have enough representatives to influence and make decisions, despite their relatively small number in the population. This problem was solved by the embedding of the idea of ‘parity’ into practice. 29 The ‘parity’ principle is violated from time to time during hiring in state structures, but in general, if the manager is Kabardin, then his deputies are Balkar and Russian, and vice versa.

Nevertheless, suspicion, the feeling of offence and injustice arise more often among representatives of the ‘Balkar minority’. In July 2011 the Council of Elders of the Balkar people proposed that the KBR Parliament consider a plan for a new constitution for the republic, according to which the republic would become a federal state entity. According to the plan, the head of the republic is subject to rotation between two ‘subject-forming’ peoples (Kabardins and Balkars) – one term will be given to a Kabardin and another to a Balkar, and both ethnicities would have equal numbers of representatives in the judicial bodies of the republic. 30 A public movement called ‘Kabardin Congress’ announced that “the project presented to the Council of Elders contradicts the constitution of the Russian Federation. The

27 Focus group with migrants from KBR, Moscow, 23 September 2011. 28 Zdravomislov A G, Tsutsiyev A A ‘Ethnicity and ethnic population: conflict of theoretical parAdygems’ in Sociological journal no. 3, 2003, pp 20–50. 29 Kalmikov B Z, Articles and speeches, Nalchik, 1983. 30 Orazayeva L, ‘The Balkar Council of Elders has offered a plan for a new constitution for KBR’ at http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/189768/

8 The North Caucasus: Views from Within formation of an ‘administrative-national territory’ of Kabarda and Balkaria precludes putting the plan into action, and if any of the KBR authorities begins to examine the proposed plan, the Kabardin Congress will immediately put forward the motion for a law to define borders between Kabarda and Balkaria along ethnic lines.” 31 The KBR Parliament did not examine the constitution project. 32 The idea of separating the republic does not have mass support among the Balkar people: “In my opinion, there is no people less prone to conflict with the Balkars than the Kabardins in the North Caucasus. Even if the Balkars unite with the Karachais, there will be very strong contradictions between them.” 33

The Balkar Council of Elders started petitions, appeals and protest actions. 34 In the context of the problem of incomplete rehabilitation35 the Council’s activists emphasised poignant problems: reforms of local self-government and the land question, which had been a source of tension between the two nations for a long time. The core of the problem is that, after the 131 Federal Law on ‘the general principles of organisation of local self-government on the territory of the Russian Federation’ came into effect, so called tight-knit settlements were created. This led to protests by the Balkar who lived in villages, because they said that their territories had been significantly cut. According to the citizens, this led to the violation of the traditional way of life of the population, who could no longer engage in various agricultural activities on their territories, and it also removed several lucrative items from community budgets.

Following a decision by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the KBR Parliament accepted changes to the laws of the republic, which annulled tight knit settlements in the Balkar-populated areas. In July 2011, the KBR Parliament issued a law on ‘Determining territories and land use for livestock breeding’ which confirmed the status of distant pastures as republic’s property. 36 According to this law, livestock distant pastures will become the republic’s property and will be available to legal entities and individuals only for rent. In Zalmi Kashirov’s opinion, this compromise,

31 Gazeta Yuga , 2 June 2011. 32 The idea of separating the republic into Kabarda and Balkaria has been voiced in the 1990s. Ethno- national representatives were chosen to work out the common principles of dividing the republic. As a result, it became obvious that it would be impossible to find a fair solution to the territorial question for both sides, and separating the republic would inevitably lead to conflict. Therefore both sides came to the conclusion that they have no other option than to live together in the same republic. This view was also supported by society. According to a survey in Spring 1993, 86 percent of the respondents were for the unity of the republic. 33 Interview with the head of administration of a Balkar village (anonymous), Nalchik, 18 September 2011. 34 For example, action by representatives of the Balkar Council of Elders, which was carried out over many months in 2010 in Manezh Square in Moscow. 35 This refers to total territorial rehabilitation of the repressed Balkar people (reconstruction of damaged districts) within the framework of the Federal Law on ‘Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples’, adopted by the High Council of the RF in April 1991. 36 By 1 January 2014 the representative commission, with the participation of municipal groups and society, will carry out an inventory and prepare a database description of the borders of lands designated for cattle breeding according to the demands of land law. 9

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while not being fully satisfactory to either the Balkars or the Kabardins, is the “first step in dealing with the land question.” 37

At first glance, these questions have an obviously economic interpretation, however, there are also very strong political and symbolic aspects. From a political point of view, the question is not only about the battle for status and real positions in the structure of power, but also about the symbolic concepts of ideology, which has arisen from real and imagined historical facts, such as the celebration of the 450 year anniversary of KBR’s unification with Russia 38 or the celebration of 300 years since the Battle of Kanzhal. 39

Recently, the so-called ‘Circassian question’ – the idea of creating a single Circassian entity within the Russian Federation and finding a solution to questions regarding support for repatriation and the re-examination of the official view of the Caucasus War (admitting the genocide of the Adyge people) – became the main topic of discussion among Adyge (Kabardin) national activists. The relatively rigid rhetoric of some of the representatives of public organisations (including the Balkars) can become a reason for the increase in social tension among the nationalities.

According to an expert, solving the Circassian question with minimum negative and maximum positive consequences is not easy. The tremendous weight of the moral issues surrounding the question prevents its sensible discussion.

On 16 May 2011 there was a meeting of representatives of the Circassian diaspora and members of the Russian parliament in the Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation in Moscow. The topics discussed were repatriation and the preservation of the Circassian language and culture in regions inhabited by them. However, according to the participants’ views, no actual decisions were made. On 20 May 2011, the Georgian Parliament recognised the genocide of the Adyge people. Non-governmental organisation (NGO) representatives surveyed by the ‘Caucasus Knot’ believe that “the recognition of the genocide by the Georgian Parliament has a

37 Protsenko N. ‘KBR Parliament has accepted the law giving a chance to regulate an old conflict’ http: //expert.ru/dossier/author/342103/ 38 Events which are said to have supported the date of the 450-year anniversary of KBR joining Russia are the marriage of Ivan Grozny to the daughter of a Kabardin prince. According to opponents of celebrating the anniversary, the marriage did not have anything to do with the Balkar people and could not be a reason for celebration across the entire republic. 39 On 15 September 2008, participants in a horseback campaign dedicated to the 300-year anniversary of the battle of Kanzhal, where the Kabardins (along with other Cherkes tribes) defeated the Crimean Han, were supposed to have gone through the village of Kendelen. The inhabitants of the village did not allow the campaign to pass through for two days, having blocked the only road. High- ranking officials from the KBR Government and the Administration of the KBR President went to the village to attempt to unblock the road, and KBR President Arsen Kanakov, who had recently signed the decree to celebrate the Kanzhal battle anniversary, publicly criticised the behaviour of Kendelen’s inhabitants. As in the issue of the 450-year anniversary, the opponents of the anniversary of the Battle of Kanzhal viewed the authorities as their primary opponents. Kazenin K, ‘Elections in KBR will be held to national ‘music’’ http://www.tyrnyauz.ru/news.php?id=1193&

10 The North Caucasus: Views from Within

politicised character; the basis of this decision was Russia’s unwillingness to seriously engage in finding solutions to the Circassian question.” 40

According to an expert, both the Circassian and the Russian societies and the government must find topics and forms of discussing the Circassian question, which would bring together the Circassians in Russia and the Circassians abroad with the Russian government. 41

“Young people need to find the meaning of life. These symbolic games become real to them, imbued with meaning, and they are ready to participate in this issue quite passionately.” (Aslan Borov, expert)

Both Circassian and Balkar activists are putting most of the emphasis of their activities on young people. According to Alexander Khloponin, “there are several directions at the centre of our opponents’ attention – one is the Circassian theme, which will continue to strengthen, and will pull young people in.” 42

“They judge us based on information from the police and the FSB” (Murat, public sector employee)

There is yet another problem in relations between the nations, which is frequently brought up by focus group participants and experts: the attitude of the Centre towards the region, the formation of a negative image of the Caucasian in the eyes of Russians.

The external image of Kabardin (as well as the North Caucasus in general) is closely associated with terrorism and armed conflict. However, those who live in the republic are faced with completely different problems in their everyday lives: how to make ends meet and find a decent job. The fact that focus group participants name ’the lack of economic development and unemployment’ as the main problem in the republic is indicative of this.

According to the respondents, there are no problems between the nationalities in the republic, instead they exist at the federal level:

“How many movies have you seen where there is a neutral image of the Caucasian Muslim? And I’m not even talking about a positive one. I can’t recall one. In every movie he is a terrorist, drug user, pimp, murderer, thief or rapist.” 43 “Look at how the natives of the North Caucasus are treated. We are alien to them, and they make us feel it every day. If we are alien to them,

40 Available at http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/189768/ 41 Expert (A. Borov) specifically mentioned that his opinions do not reflect the results of the research, but personal impressions. He admits that these opinions may be contradicted from a factual point of view, but is convinced that they are adequately representative of the problems. 42 Burnatsayeva R ‘The Cherkes question: new incarnation of ethnic nationalism in Russia’ at http://www.politcom.ru/11673.html 43 Interview with a representative of a profiled ministry about co-operation with religious organisations (anonymous), Nalchik, 19 September 2011. 11

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they also become alien to us. If they want to solve nationalities’ problems easily, they should Russify everybody. There are whole universities working on this, giving recommendations so quickly, that they lead to the opposite result.” 44 “A guy came from Moscow and was surprised. It turns out Caucasians speak Russian and they’re educated. They all think we only climbed down from the trees yesterday.” 45

The concept of danger posed by the Caucasians and their lack of social awareness propagated in Russian political discourse by the media and through every day conversations is becoming the basis for an increase in xenophobia in Russian society and the formation of ‘anti-Caucasus’ ideas. Yet this can strengthen the pan- Caucasian identity of the peoples of the North Caucasus on a negative basis.

1.2 Religion

The high crime rate and religious extremism play a specific role in the escalation of tension and destabilisation in the republic. Crimes linked to attempts on the lives of law enforcement agency employees have increased: in 2009 26 such crimes were registered, 108 in 2010 and 47 in 2011. According to data from the Public Prosecutor’s Office of KBR, in the last 18 months the participation of members of illegal armed groups and their affiliates has been noted in the murders of 44 civilians, which includes several high-profile cases, like the murder of the Chairman of the Muslim Spiritual Leadership in KBR, three tourists from Moscow, seven hunters from the Stavropol region and the head of KBR’s the Chegemskii Regional administration. 46

Since March 2011 a Counter-Terrorist Operation (CTO) has been taking place in several territories in KBR in order to prevent terrorist actions and stabilise the situation in the republic. From March to October 2011 48 militants, including leaders and active participants of illegal armed formations, have been eliminated by the FSB and the police. According to Rashid Nurgaliev, the Minister of Interior, a complex of special preventative measures is taking place in the republic, which have helped to halve terrorist-related crime. 47

On the one hand, the increase in violence has been caused by the spread of radical Islam (primarily among young people), and on the other hand, by disproportionate, inadequate and illegal action by state representatives under the guise of efforts to ‘counteract terrorism and the spread of extremist ideology.’ According to Alexander Zhukov, an expert, this was mostly a pretext of ‘preventing Muslim extremism’, carried out as an ‘answer’ to events which took place in other regions. Throughout

44 Interview with a representative of the business community, member of national community organisation (anonymous), Nalchik, 6 September 2011. 45 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 46 56 law enforcement employees were killed in KBR in 6 months, and 5 were wounded. http://www.rosbalt.ru/main/2011/07/11/868235.html 47 ‘The main task is to defend the citizens from criminal attacks’ in Kabardino-Balkarskaya Pravda , no. 194 (23236), 13 October 2011.

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several years KBR state authorities often accused ‘religious extremists’ of spreading materials calling for violence and raising interreligious differences in KBR. However, they did not actually make any serious effort to use legal methods to find those responsible for spreading these materials. 48 ‘The prevention of extremism’ was carried out through mosque closings and beatings of believers. According to Alexander Zhukov, state representatives did not show commitment to developing a dialogue with the KBR Jama’at ,49 at the same time the Jama’at was not aiming for a serious and open dialogue with the authorities. On the other hand, violence originated in the Jama’at itself, which in turn increased its powers and changed its quality from the aggressive propaganda of its teachings to open violence on 13 and 14 October 2005. Pressure which was originally aimed internally – against the members of the Jama’at , and had a moral character, such as imposing an interpretation of faith and active counter-propaganda against others, the threat of boycotts against defectors – then became external, but in a completely different format. 50

13 October 2005 changed life for many in Kabardino-Balkaria to ‘before’ and ‘after’. The traumatic events of that day are a cause of deep suffering among the people of the republic. Many ask themselves how this became possible in Kabardino-Balkaria, a place which had the deserved reputation of an island of stability and relative wellbeing in comparison to other republics in the North Caucasus. 51

It would be inaccurate to say that these events divided KBR’s society into two warring sides. This is evidenced by the fact that during those tragic days people were equally sympathetic to families on ‘different sides of the barricades’ – families of killed law enforcement agencies, civilians and militants who went against their own people. 52

“Sharia law is good, it has no loopholes” (Musa, student)

The ideology of the ‘young Muslims’ movement in Kabardino-Balkaria began to form in the 1990s. Its foundation was the idea of activation and partial modernisation of Muslim life in the republic. The Ummah of KBR was separated into two camps; the loyalty of young Muslim leaders to Salafi ideas played a key role. The differences in

48 Zhukov A ‘Kabardino-Balkaria: On the way to catastrophe’ at http://kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz- uzel.ru/articles/142989 49 The Djamaat of KBR is the community of informal Muslim groups (Djamaats ) which existed in KBR from 1998 to 2005, and were based on the principle of self-rule by each of the groups individually, and by society as a whole. This was carried out through so-called ‘amirans ’, i.e. religious leaders of different ranks, each of which was represented in the KBR Djamaat (Zhukov A ‘Kabardino-Balkaria: on the way to catastrophe’ at http://kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/142989 50 Zhukov A ‘Kabardino-Balkaria: on the way to catastrophe’ at http://kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz- uzel.ru/articles/142989 51 It is not by accident that Djohar Dudayev, the first President of the self-proclaimed Chechen republic ‘Ichkeria’ called Kabardino-Balkaria ‘Sleeping Beauty’, not hiding his hopes to ‘wake her up’. 52 In Kabardino-Balkar society family ties and intercommunity relations are traditionally strong, and it is typical for hundreds of people, who are tied by different bonds, to be part of weddings and funerals. In those tragic days, the situation arose when the same people wanted to sympathise with both the families of killed law enforcement agents and civilians, and the families of killed militants. 13

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religious opinion of young Muslim leaders and imams of ‘old (Soviet) beliefs’ were not as deep as those in other North Caucasian republics like Dagestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya. It is possible, that at some stage it would have been feasible to neutralise the contradictions between KBR’s Jama’at and ‘traditionalists’. A key role in the fact that this did not happen was played by the ambitions of young Muslim leaders and their desire for sole leadership of KBR’s Muslim community on one hand and the reluctance of the ‘official imams’ (DUM KBR) to resort to negotiations on the other. 53

According to focus group participants, the reasons why young people turn to radical Islam can be grouped in the following way: the first group (the one mentioned most often) consists of socio-economic reasons: ‘unemployment’, ‘lack of opportunity and ability to fulfil their potential’, ‘poverty’. The second group consists of ideological and educational reasons: ‘they have been ideologically brainwashed’, ‘lack of appropriate upbringing, irresponsibility of youth’, ‘lack of education, fundamentalism’, ‘lack of attention paid to youth’. The third group consist of political and judicial reasons: ‘lack of a youth policy’, ‘corruption’, ‘impunity of law enforcement agencies’, ‘repressions of Muslims as part of the anti-Wahhabist campaign’, ‘social injustice’, ‘hatred of the authorities’. The fourth group consists of other reasons: ‘easy money’, ‘thirst for profit’, ‘desire for power’ and others.

Moreover, the inability of the traditional Muslim spiritual leadership to create an alternative influenced the spread of radical ideas: “The Muslim spiritual leadership is currently in a very lamentable state, because they were always silent. Whenever there were conflicts between young Muslims and the authorities, they were quiet. Now their authority is seriously weakened.” (Bulat, a student) 54

According to a specialist on the interaction of community and religious organisations, the situation has changed for the better. DUM KBR and the authorities are actively working with young people who believe in building a Muslim state. Official spiritual leaders and law enforcement agencies are also working with other young radicals who have overstepped the line of the law, by working with their parents and respected local figures to convince them to surrender of their own accord. “There was a period when faithful young people, who were opposed to the official spiritual leadership, did not go to the Friday mosque, it was practically empty. The events of October 2005 had a sobering effect. Today young people are not as zealous about joining the ranks of ‘new’ Islam”. 55 A specialist notes that today, in Russia and in some parts in the North Caucasus, it is impossible to have effective co- operation between the authorities and religious organisations: “There is no strategy, no concept of this co-operation. There is no foundation document. No directions

53 Zhukov A ‘Kabardino-Balkaria: on the way to catastrophe’ at http://kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz- uzel.ru/articles/142989 54 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 55 Interview with representatives of a profiled ministry about co-operation with religious organisations (anonymous), Nalchik, 19 September 2011.

14 The North Caucasus: Views from Within

have been set. There is no co-ordination of the actions of different state bodies – federal, regional and municipal.” 56

According to a representative of the Muslim Spiritual Leadership, there are no interconfessional contradictions within the republic, and there are no tensions with non-traditional denominations, but there is also no co-operation. Religious policy of the KBR authorities is making obvious progress. Representatives of religious denominations work closely with the authorities. There are unified moral and spiritual and educational works in all educational establishments in the republic. Moreover, regional authorities give a lot of support to traditional religions. Mosques and churches are being built, a synagogue is undergoing major works. A religious education centre in Nalchik, which will house a university, a mosque with capacity for 5,000 people and a library, will work against the spread of radical Islam. 57

Will there be conditions for contacts and supporting dialogue with Muslims who think differently, including the fundamentalists? Would the Muslim community independently find a way out of the current crisis and hold open and honest elections for a new Mufti, which would suit both sides of the Muslim community, in the context of continuing raids by armed militants? Alexander Zhukov sees this as the big question. 58

“We have formal Islam, formal Christianity. It’s as if we are not living our lives, but somebody else’s.” (Nazmi, businessman)

A large number of Kabardins and Balkars, who have traditionally been Muslim, have a secular view of life and neither obeys nor regularly practices Muslim scripture, such as fasting and prayers five times a day. People who identity themselves as Muslims, but do not practice, are known as ‘ethnic Muslims’.

The older generation’s attitude to the process of ‘Muslim renaissance’ is complex, possibly because the events of 13 October 2005 were also sobering for them. 59 The deputy chairman of DUM KBR Alim Sizhayev insists that many parents panic if they find out that their son or daughter expresses an interest in a faith discipline. Instead of trying to understand the motivations of the child, the parents impose a total ban. This is exactly when young people are much more likely to join underground organisations. 60 “How can we talk about freedom in this country, if you are banned from doing what you want to do? Speaking of religion, why shouldn’t I pray?” “Here is a stereotype: if a young woman wears a hijab, she is a terrorist, and those who

56 Interview with representatives of a profiled ministry about co-operation with religious organisations (anonymous), Nalchik, 19 September 2011. 57 Interview with a representative of the Spiritual Leadership of KBR Muslims (anonymous), 23 September 2009. 58 Zhukov A ‘Kabardino-Balkaria: on the way to catastrophe’ at http://kabardino-balkaria.kavkaz- uzel.ru/articles/142989 59 The older generation then believed that the conversion of young people to religion is a good thing, a way to reach spirituality in the context of declining morality. 60 ‘Is a repeat of the events of 13 October 2005 possible?’ in Kabardino-Balkarskaya Pravda, no. 194 (23236), 13 September 2011. 15

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grow beards – they are bad. I think another stereotype is more frightening: it is better to be an alcoholic than to be clean, pray five times a day and grow a beard.” 61

Adult focus group participants and interviewees said that neither the Kabardins nor the Balkars were particularly religious: “Islam is the third religion for the Balkars, before that we were pagans and Christians, now we are Muslims. Having changed our religion three times, we have saved ourselves as a people thanks to our traditions.” (Khasan, builder) 62 “Everything begins at the federal level. The Russian Orthodox church is the fifth and sometimes the fourth branch of power. Isn’t it true? We have never been religious, never been zealots, and now you see that the government is building mosques. Why? Kabardins have never been fully-fledged Christians and Muslims, and now instead of channelling efforts towards improving education, we are being given religion” (Kanshoubi, businessman). 63

Other focus group participants express opposing opinions: “Islamisation is a good thing, in fact it’s great! There is a moral downfall in the whole world right now. Nobody needs an educated person, it is consumers that are needed, and this is a flock of sheep, with which you can do anything. What is Russia, when its flock of sheep is focussed on the Western market? Such a country can be torn apart piece by piece. Our country’s main problem is alcoholism. Morality is disappearing in front of our eyes. And there is no need to hold back this religion.” (Musa, student) 64 “Every religion preaches peace, happiness, respect for the older generation. And we will not be worried about our children.” (Valentina, pensioner) “People must believe in something at least.” (Tatiana, medical worker) 65

Respondents speak quite critically about the state’s actions to curb the spread of religious extremism in the republic. The majority of those surveyed view the measures as ineffective and only a few disagree with this view.

The development and adequate use of political methods to prevent extremism must be the priority for the federal authorities and regional and local state bodies, rather than the forceful suppression of extremism post-factum . Half of those surveyed share this view. “The authorities only use force. But what are we doing to educate and focus society on the positive? Nothing.” (Kanshoubi, businessman) 66 “As soon as something happens, OMON arrives in the village, and they are allowed to kill. While some are guilty, they take the innocent. We are afraid, we worry. Why can’t they

61 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 62 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Elbrus village, Elbrus region of KBR, 22 September 2011. 63 Interview with a representative of the business community, member of national community organisation (anonymous), Nalchik, 6 September 2011. 64 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 65 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Novo Ivanovka village, Maiski district of KBR, 8 September 2011. 66 Interview with a representative of the business community, member of national community organisation (anonymous), Nalchik, 6 September 2011.

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bring us law and order? Why is the FSB waiting for our children to be recruited by the militants?” (Marina, librarian) 67

When discussing preventative measures, respondents talk about the need for an ideological counter to extremism, strengthening the law, forming consolidated public thought and a law-abiding position, developing national KBR customs as alternative ideas to radical Islam. A results-oriented information programme must be carried out with the population through online and print media in the republic.

Actions of the power structures

Late in the evening of 6 July 2011, a group of around 600 young men blocked a motorway, demanding a ‘stop to murders and the cancellation of the Counter- Terrorist Operation regime.’ The action lasted until three in the morning, when the protesters left.

This was grass roots action spurred on by the murder of Beslan Zeushev, a 24-year- old inhabitant of Baksan. According to eyewitnesses, he was shot in a train station in the town in the presence of a large crowd and was with his mother. Eyewitnesses insist that they say how people in military uniforms tried to put weapons into the hands of the young man’s corpse. It is this particular event which provoked anger. 68

Militants are very rarely captured alive. Focus group participants say that this is because law enforcement authorities do not want to have extra witnesses and gather evidence because they are more interested in reporting new achievements: “They can’t capture a single militant. They kill everybody. They allege that the militants are wearing explosive belts. What belts? This is all lies! Many parents are afraid because their children are taken for questioning. When they are questioned, they are told – either you head for the forest, or we will beat you to death.” (Ismail, builder) 69

Adult focus group participants give a negative view of the work of law enforcement authorities. They believe that the work is ineffective, that it is necessary to insist that the authorities do not break the law, do not detain people illegally, do not torture and have a differentiated approach to protesters: “The OMON 70 stopped my son and asked him ‘Do you do the namaz ?’ They found some sort of reason and took 2,000

67 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan district of KBR, 13 September 2011. 68 Tlisova F ‘The republic’s inhabitants are protesting against the regime of the counter-terrorist operation’ at http://www.voanews.com/ russian/news/Analysis-and-perspectives/caucasus-violence- 2011-07-07-125187394.html 69 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Elbrus village, Elbrus region of KBR, 22 September 2011. 70 OMON Otryad Mobilinii Osobogo Naznacheniya , Special Purpose Mobile Unit – Russian riot police. 17

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roubles from him and let him go”. (Madina, unemployed) 71 “Why are they making lists of young men who do the namaz ? How are they used? Young Christians are not put into these lists.” (Betal, government worker) 72 “20 years ago our republic was full of all sorts of foreign emissaries, all types of intelligence services. MVD, FSB made out that they didn’t notice anything. Traditional Islam has been broken. Who let this happen? We, the locals? We did not let this happen. Why do we support this huge army of law enforcement bodies? They live on our money.” (Omar, entrepreneur) 73

Young focus group participants share this view: “KBR’s current interior minister closed all the mosques. The law enforcement agencies started killing people and this continues today. Hatred begets hatred.” “A rudimentary dialogue is what is needed, not a truncheon. Do you know how lists of Wahhabis were made? If a man shaves his moustache, grows a beard and wears cropped trousers, he is a Wahhabi .” 74 “it is unclear who is killing whom. How does a terrorist get a 15-litre canister, four guns and three hand grenades in his pocket?” “I want to live peacefully in my republic. Not to be afraid to walk home, to be certain that my sister will get home.” “There is a civil war, a cold war, and they all suffer from it.” 75

Respondents also note the mismatch in the information on the success of counter- terrorist measures given by various power structures. Incomplete or inconsistent information on the actions of the law enforcement agencies also leads to misunderstandings and lack of trust, which is usually based on rumours rather than facts. This, in turn, encourages the formation of negative stereotypes in the communal psyche: “Why such false information (from the police)? It is false because, if there is no person, there is no problem. They should arrest at least one person, question then, lead an investigation, prove that he did it. There is not one piece of evidence.” (Omar, entrepreneur) 76

Not all participants speak negatively about the actions of the law enforcement agencies. The majority does not support terrorism and believes that the rise in terrorist activity by the illegal armed formations at the end of 2010 and beginning of 2011 could have only been suppressed by force, which is why the population reacted to the introduction of the CTO regime correspondingly: “Thank God, they brought law and order. We lived in fear: the militants killed somebody every day.” 77

71 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan district of KBR, 13 September 2011. 72 Interview with a representative of republican authorities (anonymous), Nalchik, 17 September 2011. 73 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Elbrus village, Elbrus region of KBR, 22 September 2011. 74 Focus group with employed and unemployed young people, 11 September 2009, Baksan. 75 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 76 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Elbrus village, Elbrus region of KBR, 22 September 2011. 77 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Novo Ivanovka village, Maiski district of KBR, 8 September 2011.

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Focus group participants in Elbrus village gave the following views on the introduction of the counter-terrorist operation: in the first few days after CTO was introduced by the local authorities, some work was carried out with the population – on how to act in the new circumstances and how to avoid conflict with the law enforcement agencies. “Zalikhanov Kanshobi, the former head of the police in the Elbrus region helped in this process. He used to come and meet people. He did not hide from anybody, did not go around in an armoured car. He was doing this when the special operation was taking place here. This was both very wise and very brave of him.” Then the local people became active too – they thought they could not sit and do nothing. Some started upgrading works, others worked to reconstruct the irrigation and drainage systems. At that time, almost everything was cleared of rubbish and large rocks, fences were mended; people did things themselves that had not been done for many years. 78

“What did our elders say? The time will come when the beauty of our mountains will become our enemy.” (Osman, public sector worker)

The CТО regime has been active in the Elbrus and Baksan districts since March 2011. The inhabitants of the Elbrus district have suffered from it more than most, since tourists are no longer allowed to enter the region. The tourist industry is the main source of income for the local population, so they view the CТО regime as an economic blockade: “Lets have CТО, but let tourists be allowed in here. Somebody must be gaining from this. They just can’t split the region.” “We are not against CТО. Lets keep the troops, but why close the cable car? Who are they protecting? They are protecting themselves.” “The population has been living in a vacuum for seven months already. The worst, is that the people are losing faith in the authorities, because nobody, not one representative has been here and asked us how we live.” “Zhirinovksy said: we need the Caucasus without the Caucasians. This is where it’s all heading to.” “The economy works for big business. Let big business from central Russia work in natural resources, Tyrnauz (chemical) works. 79 But agriculture and leisure – this is what we have been doing all our lives. They can’t take it away from us.” 80

At the same time, focus group participants in Elbrus village do not shy away from their responsibility in what is happening: “we are blaming somebody for everything that happens to us, but for some reason nobody says: maybe I am to blame for what has happened. Who will bring up a child who headed for the forest, how do they come to this? Parents, close relatives, neighbours, respected people etc. If there was some sort of influence, this would not have happened.” “Maybe, today’s situation will put some common sense into people? It is useless to say that somebody should come here and

78 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Elbrus village, Elbrus region of KBR, 22 September 2011. 79 The Tirniauzskii Tungsten plant is situated in Elbrus district. 80 Interview with a head of administration of a Balkar village (anonymous), Nalchik, 18 September 2011. 19

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regulate our fate. An Eastern saying goes: “When misfortune comes, when times are hard, the wise blames himself and the fool blames his friend.” 81

According to the local administration, the situation in the village is not one of conflict. There is social tension due to the population’s lack of income and because many people are in need – they even buy bread on loans. But he sees the source of tension in that “…there has been no co-operation between the state and the community, between the law enforcement agencies and the community, and even the state and the law enforcement agencies. The situation has now made them co- operate somehow, but it is not enough in my opinion. The law enforcement agencies are now more in contact with the population and maybe the attitude to them is changing quicker than to the state. The state has shown its indifference.” 82

1.3 Generation differences

“To tell the truth, our poverty lies in the fact that we do not educate our children in the family. The fault lies with all of us, nobody will come and do this for us.” (Nazmi, businessman)

The older generation is more likely to see more negative qualities among young people; they see the young as lazy, while at the same time pragmatic, focused on making money quickly, of which people who are used to different adaptation strategies cannot approve: “There is a generation which does not know anything, does not want to work, but wants everything and in large quantities.” 83 “Young people are not used to working. They want to work little and earn a lot.” 84

The younger generation sees itself very differently – as independent, educated, goal- oriented, and their focus on financial success is seen as an effective approach to life:

“The older generation think that you have to work and we think, you have to make money. These are different things. You can work all month and make no money, but you can also make money and not work.” “The older people are so used to working, that they don’t want to take a rest, even on the weekends. And we are not used to work. The older people think: they are so lazy, they just want to take it easy.” 85

The older generation does not absolve itself of responsibility in bringing up the younger. In the last several decades, parents were mostly concerned with survival and gave little attention to bringing up their children:

81 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Elbrus village, Elbrus region of KBR, 22 September 2011. 82 Interview with a head of administration of a Balkar village (anonymous), Nalchik, 18 September 2011. 83 Interview with representative of the business community, Nalchik, 15 September 2011. 84 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan district of KBR, 13 September 2011. 85 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011.

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“Before, a child’s upbringing in the family was aimed at the child’s education to achieve something and be a worthy person. Now, all the parents’ efforts are aimed at feeding and dressing the child.” “The majority of parents leave to earn money, leaving their children to grandparents. The grandparents will feed the children, but they do not have the strength to raise and teach them.” 86 “We brought up young people who cannot modernise and defend their Motherland, neither can they bring up the next generation well. Before it’s too late, something needs to be done.” “We gave them the example, that you don’t need to study, but you need to steal, give bribes and adapt somehow.” 87

Most of the answers to the question of how modern young people differ from their parents’ generation were neutral. Focus group participants said that today’s young people are just ‘different’, not like their parents’ generation: “we were brought up differently”, “they have different views, different aims”, “before there was ideology, now there isn’t one.”

The majority of the older generation agreed that the loss of ideology and confidence in the future, which used to exist in the past, has a negative impact on the younger generation. They believe it is necessary to have a national idea, which will give hope and bring people together, in an atmosphere of socio-economic crisis and murky future. Then there will be no radicals and extremists and the younger generation will gain confidence in tomorrow.

The younger generation views this somewhat differently:

“We are living in a time of the re-examination of values. My parents still believe in the state, but I have grown up in a time when the government doesn’t give a damn about you and you also don’t need it on any level.” “The Soviet Union – I think that’s bad. Everybody lived according to a pattern – they knew that they would finish school, go to university and get a job. As soon as everything fell apart and the freedom of action came into existence, people did not know what to do anymore. It’s like keeping a wild animal in the home and letting it go free, and then it dies.”88

The older generation talked about the social sphere inhabited by the young and about the fact that today’s environment is now more complicated for the younger generation than it was for their parents, that it is more difficult to find a good place in modern life:

“It is difficult for them to get an education and find a job.” “Today’s young people have all the conditions for going down a bad road.” “Only a few can get a good job straight after graduation. I mean, by normal methods and not

86 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Novo Ivanovka village, Maiski district of KBR, 8 September 2011. 87 Interview with representatives of the business community, Nalchik, 15 September 2011. 88 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 21

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for a bribe or through patronage.” 89 “There is nothing in the villages and the young don’t do anything – they drink, take drugs. Somebody has to give them something to do.” “Around 40 percent of our young people have left the republic to look for jobs.” “Do you know how much a young teacher earns, who is not a qualifying category? His wages are about 3,000. Will he be able to feed his family on this?” 90

Around a quarter of the young people surveyed share this view:

“It’s not a secret that family networks and corruption exist here. If your dad is in the government, you have more opportunity to get in there.” “Those who like stealing live well here.” 91 “Wherever you go, they want you to have work experience. To have work experience, you need to start somewhere. Nobody gives you a chance, that’s why people leave.” “3,200 roubles – that’s not a wage, it’s shameful. Really, it is shameful! A rich guy will spend 3,000 in an hour and a poor guy will take a month to earn it. The homeless in Germany get €800 and they get fed and dressed for free.” 92

However, more than half of the young people surveyed think that the situation today presents more opportunity to young people:

“You can achieve anything, you just have to understand that you can achieve it. Feel sorry for yourself less, that you are unlucky and unhappy. If you take all that away, there is a very big scope to do things.”

These opportunities, though, are not in the republic, but in other regions and abroad:

“Half of my friends are working in Moscow or St Petersburg. They’ve done really well.” “I would prefer to work in Europe or America, even if not in my speciality. You can make good money there.” 93

The young people’s view of the prestige and attractiveness of jobs outside the republic is quite rational, because it is set against the situation in the republic: “You choose from what there is. And what is there? Law enforcement agencies and crime, that’s it. Recently, there is no distinction between the two anyway.” 94 Young people do not only view prestige in how much they can earn, but the status they can get from doing this job. Prestige is determined by a job’s ability to give a high salary and is associated with power.

89 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan district of KBR, 13 September 2011. 90 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Novo Ivanovka village, Maiski district of KBR, 8 September 2011. 91 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 92 Focus group with employed and unemployed young people, 11 September 2009, Baksan. 93 Focus group with employed and unemployed young people, 11 September 2009, Baksan. 94 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011.

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Working for the government, law enforcement, justice sector, finance or economics is seen as prestigious, as well as going into business:

“If you ask, why do you go to work for the police, half will say – it’s money and power.” “I am for working for the government. It’s always prestigious.” “I am used to freedom. I would rather spend the time I would on wearing a tie to work for the government on my own business. In the government you earn 10,000, if you open your own business, you earn 30,000.” 95

The younger generation said that it is more important for young people to get an education and then work, but they do not see the education system as effective.

1.4 Migration

The population of the North Caucasus Federal District increased by 6.3 percent between 2002 and 2010. 96 The population grew in all subjects of the North Caucasus, except in Ingushetia and in Kabardino-Balkaria, where the population dropped by 5 percent. This fall can be attributed to an increase in migration which exceeds the birth rates. 97 According to data provided by Rosstat, around 0.2 percent to 0.3 percent of the population, or 26 to 27 people per 10,000, left KBR every year from 2002 to 2010. 98 In comparison to migration from other republics, Kabardino-Balkaria is in second place after Dagestan. 99 It is worth noting that these figures do not reflect actual migration, because they do not include the movements of ‘grey migrants’ which are not recorded by FMS.

There is no official data on the gender, age or ethnic make up of the migrants, however it is widely known that most people to leave are young men under 35. This is especially true for people from KBR who have received higher education outside the republic. Most migrants are from ethnicities not indigenous to the North Caucasus, i.e. Russians, Ukrainians, Armenians, Tatars, Jews etc.

According to Ruben Oshroyev of the Humanities’ Research Institute, recently most attention has been paid to the outward migration of Russians, rather than indigenous peoples. The idea that Russians are keen to leave the North Caucasus has taken hold and information on the decrease of the Russian population in the North Caucasus is presented without differentiation among the republics:

“According to a survey of social opinion in KBR, indigenous ethnicities, as well as Russians, expressed the desire to emigrate. In comparison to the growth in migration by Kabardins and Balkars, the proportions of Russians leaving has decreased significantly. According to data of the state statistics service, 3,057

95 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 96 According to the preliminary results of the all-Russian census of 2010. 97 Предварительные итоги Всероссийской переписи населения 2010 года. - ИИЦ «Статистика России», http://www.infostat.ru 98 Available at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b09_14t/IssWWW.exe/Stg/ug/04.htm 99 Available at http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_113/IssWWW.exe/Stg/02-13.htm 23

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Russian people left the republic in 2005, 2,686 left in 2008 and 2,450 left in 2010.” 100

A significant part of the focus group participants view migration negatively:

“The young people are leaving. This is bad not only for the village, but also for the republic as a whole. For an ethnic group as small as the Balkars, the outflow of young people is a catastrophe. They leave, get married and stay away. We are losing our young people, our gene pool.” (Miryam, public service employee) 101

The reasons given for the outflow of Russians from the republic are mostly economic (lack of opportunity, stable jobs and good salaries). This opinion is shared by both the Kabardins and the Balkars:

“The media often give false information about what is going on here. It’s as if Russians are being chased out of the Caucasus. This is not true. They lost their jobs, that’s why they are leaving and this is bad for all of us. Where were they working before? In the biggest enterprises in the republic. Because there were many qualified specialists among them. The enterprises have fallen apart, so what can they do? Russians have never been treated badly here.” (Mohammed, pensioner) 102

According to focus group participants in Moscow, 103 the reasons for the outflow of young people from the republic are less to do with the specifics of KBR and the North Caucasus, while the same tendency is felt in other regions of Russia which are economically depressed. Instead they believe that migration to Moscow is a special case, because most young people believe that life in the capital is generally more attractive than life in the provinces:

“The Moscow factor has more meaning. This city pulls you in. If somebody gets here and manages to make a life for themselves, they are unlikely to go back to live in a provincial town. If this survey was taking place in some sort of backward little town, then I am sure that the answers you would get would be completely different.” 104

Around half of the Moscow focus group participants said that they are not currently considering returning to the republic and do not view this as a possibility in the near

100 Interview with a leader of a group focused on studying the problems of modern society at the Institute of Humanitarian Research of the KBR Government and KBNT RAN Ruben Owshroyev, Nalchik, 21 September 2011. 101 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Elbrus village, Elbrus region of KBR, 22 September 2011. 102 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan district of KBR, 13 September 2011. 103 Former inhabitants of the republic, currently living and working in Moscow and the Moscow region. 104 Focus group with migrants from KBR, Moscow 23 September 2011.

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future. Others said that they do not plan to move to KBR permanently right now, but do not exclude this possibility in the future. It is indicative that the focus group participants who do not see returning as a possibility, aside from purely economic reasons, point out the political instability in KBR and the region as a whole: “I grew up in a military town near Nalchik, where a large military unit is stationed. My mum still lives there. The people of our little town are constantly reminded of the fact that there is a conflict going on in the region.” 105 Those who see returning as a possibility point out the upbringing of their future children as a factor: “They don’t see all the filth in people’s behaviour, which you see here… that’s why I would like my children to be educated there, at least at some point, probably until when they are around 12.” 106

1.5 The people and political institutions – relationships and trust

The sharp differences in people’s incomes is becoming an important marker of identification, which helps form the idea of ‘them and us’ – and leads to tension and confrontation. “The gap between rich and poor is very wide in Kabardino-Balkaria. There is hardly any middle class. This gap has only widened in comparison to ten years ago.” (Oksana, construction engineer) 107

The division between the income from entrepreneurship and the bureaucracy is getting blurred. This process is taking place in different formats, including property and ownership rights; these relationships permeate all of society and create channels for pumping government funds into the private sector. According to the businessmen surveyed, it is impossible to be an entrepreneur without this. Free business, which is not supported by the government, is destined to die. The more connections an entrepreneur has in the bureaucracy, the more chances he has to succeed. “A guy said to me: ‘Here, business without an official’s input is empty rhetoric. If you are not an official and you do not have the levers of power, then your business will suffer, people will try to bankrupt you and take everything away from you.’” (Arsen, businessman) 108

“They say that they made something. Then you find out, that it’s not the state’s, but it belongs to somebody – the same somebody to whom everything belongs.” (Musa, student)

Rather than being unhappy with specific displays of social inequalities or low incomes, focus group participants focus on the socio-economic relationships in the country, including the division of property and income distribution. The point is not the negative attitude of focus group participants to private property in principle, but to the lack of legitimacy in its distribution; i.e. when the results of many generations’

105 Focus group with migrants from KBR, Moscow 23 September 2011. 106 Focus group with migrants from KBR, Moscow 23 September 2011. 107 Focus group with migrants from KBR, Moscow 23 September 2011. 108 Interview with a representative of the business community, member of national community organisation (anonymous), Nalchik, September 2011. 25

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“Now everything is free and good, but this privatisation is horrible, Ford or Rockefeller, to become billionaires collected and multiplied their wealth generation by generation throughout 200 years. Here, some have become billionaires by the stroke of a pen. This causes resentment towards today’s government.” (Karalbi, pensioner) 110

All the respondents view social justice as a major issue, including those who have a good income according to Russian standards, and who can expect their social needs to be satisfied. All the social groups surveyed note that the principle of equal opportunity is not obeyed. Another reason for popular discontent is the mismatch of social and professional status with their social expectations. Most respondents are certain that they earn much less than they deserve; only a few believe that their jobs are fairly valued.

It is worth noting that dissatisfaction is growing against the background of an improving economic situation in the republic and an increase (albeit very small) in real incomes. This means that a significant part of the population is no longer satisfied with the socio-economic model of stability, but which does not convert economic growth into higher standards of living for the majority of the population. 111

Young people’s answers to the question about how different spheres in KBR’s society have changed in the last five years are indicative: “Maybe something has changed, but not the way it is reported. They have to throw a bone to the people; they do vote after all.” (Adam, unemployed) 112

Most of the focus group participants believe that ordinary citizens do not trust the authorities, and that the authorities do not care about their needs. Respondents give examples of the authorities’ indifference to people’s needs, when attempts to be heard by different levels of government have resulted in failure: all complaints simply returned to source. It is quite understandable that actions like this do not add to the authorities’ legitimacy in the eyes of the people. In these conditions, the lack of trust becomes inherent to the social order.

The increase in distrust of the authorities is the population’s reaction to deep social inequalities. Besides, this dissatisfaction is not addressed to anybody specifically (local, republican or federal authorities) and is more dangerous, because it is difficult to predict when and how this dissatisfaction will come to light. A society where the

109 Gorshkov M K ‘Russian society as a new social reality. Instead of a foreword’ in Reforming Russia, 2007, p 5 110 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan district of KBR, 13 September 2011. 111 Gorshkov M K ‘Russian society as a new social reality. Instead of a foreword’ in Reforming Russia, 2007, p 5 112 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011.

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majority of the population, in varying degrees, feels itself to be representatives of the lower orders, is unstable. This situation is not only fraught with social tension, but also with possible social disruption: “Everybody knows that social revolutions happen when there are big gaps between the ruling elite and the lower echelons. This widening is happening now and we are getting closer to the boiling point. Here you can add relations between the nationalities, crime and whatever else you want.” (Shagovan, agriculture specialist) 113

Here are typical views given by focus group participants, which are evidence of the dominating mood in KBR’s society: “immoral people have come to power,” “people do not trust anybody,” “we are already moving towards the fact that people are enduring and tolerating, and when they become even poorer and have nothing left to eat, then there will be civil war.”

“We have no public discussion, we don’t even have a platform for it. If we don’t try to make the discussions of important issues public, then problems will keep getting pushed further under the carpet and nothing will be solved.” (Kanshoubi, businessman)

The general backdrop of social tension lends a weak legitimacy to the government in Russian society: “The people are separated from power. Absolutely. How are parties created? How are decisions made? How is the government formed? You don’t need to go to elections, the whole republic doesn’t need to go. We don’t have transparent elections. The country doesn’t even choose its president. Yeltsin chose Putin, Putin chose Medvedev. And now everybody is waiting to find out who appoints whom next.” 114 “How can the authorities win back the people’s trust? They could at least remove their monopoly on power. Why was the re-appointment of the KBR President not done through elections? If that’s not what I want, what should I do? This is a monopoly on power. They are taking everything and we must just agree with them. We have democracy, not authoritarianism. My dad voted for democracy… how have we come to this?” (Andrei, student) 115 “The moment of truth will obviously come in March, when the presidential elections are due. If they happen like they did before, others will come (like in Egypt and Libya), but this time they will be armed. We need fair elections. Remember, in the 1990s the KBR authorities squeezed social movements and the healthy opposition. And now what? In 2005 others came, but this time they were militants with guns, with their own ideology. We have to talk about this now.” (Zaur, entrepreneur) 116

“We don’t know where we are going after the fall of the USSR, we need a direction” (Natalia, public sector worker)

113 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Novo Ivanovka village, Maiski district of KBR, 8 September 2011. 114 Interview with a representative of the business community, member of national community organisation (anonymous), Nalchik, 6 September 2011. 115 Focus group with students, Nalchik, 7 September 2011. 116 Focus group with representatives of the business community, Nalchik, 15 September 2011. 27

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After 20 years of reforms, this question is still relevant. In the name of what does the society and government live? What is the aim of a person’s life and what must he do? The older generation wants to have a clear idea of where society is going and what it will become. The majority of adult respondents believe that for society in Russia, which is undergoing change (part of which is the uncertainty of values), it is important to gain a new ideology, which would consolidate society into a national idea: “Everybody is involved in laying their hands on the national assets, property and wealth. Even those who are ruling the country now do not think about ideology.” 117 “Youth politics is absent at any level in Russia. Before we had pioneers, Komsomol, had some sort of ideology, now some get rich, but they don’t know where they’re going.” 118

The lawlessness of the law enforcement authorities reigns in KBR’s society. The majority of the respondents believe that the main bodies violating citizens’ rights are the various different levels of the authorities; going against them is usually useless and dangerous for ordinary citizens. Businessmen surveyed note the growing role of shadow rules and norms in the economy, politics and other spheres of social life: “The strongest corrupt networks and officially-permitted lawlessness exist in the republic. I could not defend myself if some sort of problem arose. There are no guarantees that the court or the law enforcement agencies will protect me. Courts often take absurd decisions, and it is impossible to appeal. Officials have great power. Even if you do get a decision in your favour, there is no guarantee that it will be carried out.” “Absolutely everything is mired in corruption…right now the city council is pushing through a decision which is obviously steeped in corruption. Everything is leading towards giving them the right to do whatever they want. For them, neither the Civil Code nor federal laws have any meaning.” 119

The respondents believe that the main reason for corruption is the government’s lack of real interest in fighting it. The respondents also do not shirk their own responsibilities in this regard: the authorities remain uncontrolled by society and separated from the main electoral mass due to the weakness of social and civic institutions. In today’s KBR, the space which is to be occupied by institutions which enable communication between the interests of the state and the interests of its citizens is practically empty: “We encourage the lawless behaviour of officials ourselves. People bow before representatives of the authorities. A solution to the problem is a transparent budget and the public accountability of officials. The President of KBR is making efforts to do this. But people themselves must demand believable reports of how the money in the budget is being spent.” 120

The respondents believe that law enforcement agencies and the judiciary are doing what the state tells them to: “There is absolutely no democracy in Russia. Nobody

117 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan district of KBR, 13 September 2011. 118 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Novo Ivanovka village, Maiski district of KBR, 8 September 2011. 119 Focus group with representatives of the business community, Nalchik, 15 September 2011. 120 Focus group with journalists, activists of community organisations, Nalchik, 12 September 2011.

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should stand above the law – not the president, not the government. In our country, the court is completely in the hands of the government.” (Karalbi, pensioner) 121

Ordinary citizens are using non-legal methods to adapt to their new conditions, as they become accustomed to functioning in a widened non-legal space. Acting outside the law is now a norm not only among the authorities, but also among ordinary citizens, and it is becoming a part of young people’s mentality as well. For example, a third of young people surveyed believe that these methods are more effective than legal ones. It is most important, “that you do everything within sensible limits, so you don’t get caught.” Non-legal practice gradually pulls in different social groups; for example, entrepreneurs have not only learnt how to cope in this environment, but are now also used to hiding their profits.

This is how non-legal methods are becoming institutionalised, i.e. they are becoming a solid, constantly-multiplying phenomenon, which is integrating into social relationships and is becoming the behavioural norm for actors on very different levels of society and is gradually being internalised by them. 122

However, a part of the respondents admits that non-legal practices get in the way of the path towards a legal democratic government and society. “I’ve travelled throughout Europe, I see how they live and work…We live in this republic, so we must pay our taxes and be honest. The worst is to be a dishonest person, but we are constantly lying.” (Nazmi, businessman) 123

Focus group participants have voiced another problem of government – the officials’ low level of professionalism. Protectionism, clan ties, corruption often lead to people being appointed to jobs for which they have neither the qualifications nor the experience. Along with this, the respondents have outlined the problem of professional training of administrators and the policy makers: “If somebody is rich, or in power, he must serve society. That means that this social elite must be educated.” “Civil society’s task is to educate officials. But people don’t really believe that this can be achieved.” (NGO representative)

A review of previous measures aimed at addressing issues of social tensions

Focus group participants were not well aware of federal and republic’s programmes aimed at solving differences and decreasing social tension in KBR. Officials surveyed mentioned the following programmes.

Republic-wide programme ‘Prevention of corruption in Kabardino-Balkaria in 2008– 2010’. The aim of the programme was to decrease corruption and its influence on business, government departments and citizens’ daily lives and the protection of

121 Focus group with representatives of different social strata in Kishpek village, Baksan district of KBR, 13 September 2011. 122 Zaslavskaya T N, Shabanova M A ‘Social mechanisms of the transformation of non-legal practices’ in Community Sciences and Modernity no. 5, 2001, p 22. 123 Focus group with representatives of the business community, Nalchik, 15 September 2011. 29

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citizens’ legal rights, and the protection of society and governments from threats posed by corruption, and the creation of a system to counter corruption in KBR. It is unlikely that these aims were achieved. Most of the respondents who were aware of anti-corruption measures being taken in the republic, thought that they either had little effect or no effect at all. It is hoped that the same programme for 2011–2013 will be more successful.

Another programme by the republic’s authorities ‘Programme of the President of Kabardino-Balkaria to prepare human resources for Kabardino-Balkaria’s economy in 2007–2011.’ The aims of the programme were to prepare a new generation of professionals in KBR, involving the younger generation in the business arena etc. Hundreds of young men and women went through retraining programmes as part of the programme, some of which were abroad, but the majority did not use their new skills: “Those young people who studied abroad cannot find jobs in the republic regardless of their nationality. Moreover, they have seen and felt a better quality of life, had more attention paid to them as specialists, and simply as citizens. They leave the republic when they see they are not appreciated here.” “How rich our republic is apparently! After having educated the young on the state’s budget, we let go of new specialists without regret.” 124

Another programme by the republican authorities ‘The Youth of Kabardino-Balkaria (2002–2006)’ was aimed at creating and developing judicial, economic and organisational conditions for the development of a civic consciousness among the youth, in the context of a democratic society, market economy and legal government, and individual self-realisation of young people as participants in modern society. The lack of financing of this programme meant that it could not be carried out in full.

The same can be said about another programme by republic’s authorities on the ’Co- operation with religious organisations in KBR and the government’s support of them in 2007–2010.’ At the ‘Role of religion in youth education’ conference which was held by the Commission of the Public Chamber of KBR, Tatiana Khashkhozheva, chairperson of the KBR Parliamentary Committee on youth, social associations and media, spoke about the lack of financing for the programme, which lead to it not being implemented. Conference participants noted the low level of delivery of education carried out by Muslim clerics. Djambulat Gergokov, KBR Deputy Minister on Youth and Social Associations noted that there is no structure to implement state religious policy. The lack of experts in communication with religious organisations in municipal regions and urban districts does not allow this type of work to be carried out systematically. 125

In March 2011 the republic adopted another regional programme for the ‘Prevention of terrorism and extremism in the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria’ 2011–2015. The aims of the programme were to improve the system to prevent terrorism and

124 Focus group with journalists, activists of community organisations, Nalchik, 12 September 2011. 125 ‘Religion can help moral education’ in Kabardino-Balkarskaya Pravda , no. 180 (23221), 24 May 2011.

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extremism, strengthen and encourage tolerance, and increase the effectiveness of dialogue between different ethnicities, faiths and nationalities. The programme was aimed at solving a series of problems, including countering the spread of terrorist ideology, implementation of information programmes to prevent terrorism and extremism, with the participation of all levels of state power, society, non- governmental structures, media, academics and spiritual leadership. According to the officials surveyed, the programme will help the development of the peace process in the republic, only if it is really implemented (rather than being simply a box-ticking exercise) and financed.

In July 2011 the KBR Parliament issued a law on the ‘Method of determining territories and use of distant pasture lands’, thus confirming their status as property of the republic. In the opinion of the republic’s authorities, this decision will help to regulate the land question, which is currently a cause of tension between the republic’s two main ethnic groups. According to Arsen Kanokov, the President of KBR, a commission, in co-operation with heads of municipal entities will decide if and how much land is needed by each village, after the distant pasture lands’ boundaries are determined. Appropriate changes to the law will be made on the basis of this process. 126

In order to improve co-operation between state authorities and civic institutions, and an open dialogue between the authorities and society and the protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms the Public Council under the KBR President’s office was created in July 2011.

Currently, at the behest of the KBR President, a draft concept of nationalities policy has been proposed for nationwide discussion.

The KBR President’s website contains a Memorandum calling for unified action against violence, extremism and division between the nations and calls for a peace process in the Caucasus. The Memorandum has been signed by around 700 Russian citizens, both in and outside KBR.

A youth centre was opened in December 2010 in Baksan, with UNICEF’s financial support. According to focus group participants, building more centres like this would help solve the problem of organising young people’s leisure activities: “We need youth centres, as well as specialists who know how to organise activities with the youth.” 127

More than eighty social organisations and associations are registered in the republic; every third one is a youth organisation and every fourth, a national cultural centre. However, only a small number of these actually works.

The main problems which impact NGOs are the lack of co-ordination in their activities, a limited number of the right specialists and little demand among the

126 Conversation with President A. Kanakov http://vestikbr.ru/?p=17610 127 Focus group with journalists, activists of community organisations, Nalchik, 12 September 2011. 31

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population. “As an NGO director, I have found that even if you tell many people about what the organisation is doing, this does not automatically guarantee many visitors. Our citizens are not in a hurry to get help in advice centres, community organisations and the like, even though they know that our organisation was created to help with NGO registrations. However, people prefer to spend their time and effort running around the offices of KBR’s Ministry of Justice.” 128 The surveyed respondents said that an umbrella council of NGOs which would co-ordinate them would help this issue.

Conclusions and recommendations for overcoming social challenges and securing peaceful development

Recommendations for state agencies, as proposed by the respondents:

Republican authorities:

1. Create necessary conditions to employ the population, especially the young people.

2. Organise platforms for public discussions on the republic’s level, and also on the levels of municipal boroughs and urban districts (in the format of roundtables, televised talk shows, social gatherings etc.) where people can openly and informally (not for box ticking) discuss currently critical topics.

3. Strengthen preventative measures against extremism and terrorism: use methods of ideological counter-force/counter-argument, carry out a focussed information and clarification programme with the population through the online and print media, support the preservation and development of KBR’s national customs and traditions as alternatives to ideas of radical Islam.

4. Do not allow incompetent people fill posts in the civil service.

5. Provide a balance of representatives of quantitatively dominant ethnic groups (Kabardins, Balkars, Russians) in the power structure.

6. Solve the land question through open and public discussion.

7. Find solutions to the problem of organising young people’s recreation, for example by creating youth centres with a wide variety of activities.

NCFD:

128 Focus group with journalists, activists of community organisations, Nalchik, 12 September 2011.

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1. Create close co-operation of NCFD staff with the republic’s executive state bodies to solve socio-economic and political problems (“We greet them as guests and see them off as guests”). 129

2. Create commissions which include state representatives and community organisations to work on solving problems together. To create a unified commission for the North Caucasus, and along with this, commissions on each entity and for each ethnic group. The goal of these commissions would be to find out what the problems of ethnic groups are and to find ways of solving real (rather than made-up) problems.

To Federal authorities:

1. Create an independent structure within the executive of the Russian Federation, which would have appropriate powers and finance to co-operate with religious organisations.

2. Adopt a foundation document to regulate the interaction of the state with religious organisations.

3. Form an ideology, a national idea to unify the most important priorities in the country’s development.

4. Increase the effectiveness of training for civil servants, to create a system of professional training for specialists in ideology and nationalities’ policy. Only appoint people who have the relevant qualifications and experience to positions of responsibility.

Conclusions: The socio-political situation in the republic can be said to be stable, but complex. The sources of social tension are various threats to everyday life. In the social sphere these are existential fears: fears for families, for loved ones in the face of the terrorist threat. In the political sphere it is the lack of trust in the authorities, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary. Many of these problems are quite solvable provided the existence of political will among the authorities of the republic and federal bodies, with the active co-operation of civil society and ordinary citizens.

129 Interview with representatives of the republican authorities, Nalchik, 17 September 2011. 33

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This case study is part of a wider research project implemented by Saferworld in the North Caucasus.

The main report, ‘The North Caucasus: views from within. People’s perspectives on peace and security’ is available at:

Case studies from the individual republics can be accessed on the Saferworld website: www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/chechnya www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/northossetia www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/ingushetia www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/dagestan

All research was conducted as part of the ‘People’s Peacemaking Perspectives’ programme. The People’s Peacemaking Perspectives project is a joint initiative implemented by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld and financed under the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability. The project provides European Union institutions with analysis and recommendations based on the opinions and experiences of local people in a range of countries and regions affected by fragility and violent conflict.

© Saferworld March 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material included in this publication.

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Saferworld and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.

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