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Home , Alania, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Makhachkala, Mozdok, Ossetia

WHAT NEXT FOR NORTH – COMPLICATIONS OR STABILITY?

Igor Dulayev and Igor Savin

The Republic of North Ossetia- is located in the central part of Greater . Despite its small territory (8,000 square km), there is huge variety, from flat plains in the North to high mountain ranges in the South, from steppes to alpine fields. This diversity determines the occupations of the republic’s inhabitants and where they live. The region’s population was 710,100 people by 1 January 2011. There is significant density in the population – around 89 people per square, one of the densest in . This is exacerbated by the fact that the mountainous part of the republic, which accounts for 40 percent of the territory, is practically uninhabited; only 8,000 people live there. The high population density leads to the region being particularly urbanised – two thirds of the population live in towns, nearly half living in .

The region is characterised by its multi-ethnicity and multi-faith population. The main faiths in the region are Christian Orthodoxy (dominant) and . The most numerous ethnic groups are the (65.1 percent) and (20.8 percent), according to census data from 2010) 1. There are a total of up to 90 nationalities, but the most numerous are the Ingush at 4 percent (28,336), , and .

The main sources of employment are the non-ferrous metals industry, food and light industry. is developing and there are attempts to revive the electrical industry. The republic is a subsidised region, in general two out of three roubles in the republic’s budget come from the federal centre.2 The region has a high level of social differentiation; unemployment, especially among young people, is considerable.

Ethnicity / Identity

The significance of ethnicity as a factor in North Ossetian society is decreasing in comparison to the , but still remains in the common consciousness. First and foremost, this is connected to security problems and therefore varies from region to region within the republic. Ethnicity as a factor is strongest in the Eastern part of the republic – Prigorodny (the epicentre of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict of the autumn of 1992) and districts. It is worth noting that this does not depend on the ethnicity of the region’s majority: in Mozdok, the majority is Russian, in Prigorodny, it is Ossetian.

While discussing the challenges facing society in the sphere of ethnic identification, it is necessary to mention the complexities within the Ossetian itself. Historically, the Ossetians have been divided into three sub-ethnic groups: Digors in

1 2010. 2 This is a popular journalistic cliché based on interpretation of statistics of government income circulated in the press. http://www.mfrnoa.ru/info/category/prikazy_rasporyazheniya_mf_rsoalaniya Saferworld

the West, Yirons in the East and Kudars in the South. For those belonging to lower social strata, differences within the ethnic group are more significant, since among them Kudars are viewed as competitors.

However, despite some tension in relation to Kudars, with the passage of time and influence of external factors, i.e. the war in and the perceived threat from the East, a clear idea of an Ossetian unity is being formed, within which different groups do exist, but this is positive, because they bring variety. The idea that all the republic’s inhabitants, regardless of their nationality, are legitimate members of the Republic of North Ossetia, is coming into existence. “We are all Ossetians, there is one Ossetia.” “We all live here and we have the same problems.” 3 “I am closer to a poor Russian, than an Ossetian official, who robs me.”4

The so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict occurred in the vicinity of Prigorodny district of Northern Ossetia, which became an object of territorial disputes that arose again after the fall of the , when the Ingush and North Ossetia-Alania republics were reconstructed. Before 1944 the Prigorodny district was part of , after that, as a result of the deportation of the Ingush, the region was included into North Ossetia. After returning from deportation, the Ingush often raised the question about returning the Prigorodny region to Ingushetia, which led to an armed conflict in 1992. The active stage of the conflict lasted from 31 October to 6 November. According to the Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation, 583 people died from both sides, 939 were wounded, 261 went missing and 1,093 were kidnapped (Ingush statistics on this are different). Estimates vary, but from 30,000 to 70,000 Ingush inhabitants of North Ossetia were forced to leave the republic. The North Ossetian authorities and to some extent the Ingush authorities assert that there is no more conflict today between the Ossetians and the Ingush. However, according to several Ossetian and Ingush political scientists and historians, the conflict over the status of the Prigorodny district has not been fully resolved.

The Prigorodny district does not have any value in and of itself; it is a symbol: a historical motherland for the Ingush, and for the Ossetians it is a frontier, which, if captured, would lead the ‘other’ to ruin the habitual picture of peace. This is confirmed by constant appeals by both sides to representatives of the federal centre, who ask for a resolution of the conflict, with each side expecting the solution to be favourable to them. “ must say that it will not allow any more territorial demands from the Ingush.” 5

“Nobody asks about your nationality, but if they start talking about theirs, then I talk about mine too.” 6

Ethnicity carries out two functions for the inhabitants of North Ossetia: the first is the manifestation of identity, the second is a defensive mechanism against the

3 Interview with Vladikavkaz administration employee, 14.09.2011. 4 Interview with a representative of the Mozdok district administration, 09.09.2011. 5 Focus group in Oktyabrskoye , 28.09.2011. 6 Focus group in Oktyabrskoye village, 28.09.2011.

2 The : Views from Within neighbours to the East, i.e. the Ingush. The dichotomy ‘us and them’ shows a considerable gulf in this context: the words ‘they’, ‘neighbours from the East’ are used, thus depersonalising the opponent. In general, according to experts and focus group participants, relations between ethnic groups in North Ossetia are quite stable, but this excludes the Ingush. The fact that there are few negative stereotypes is evidence of this. Even the Georgians inspire a benevolent attitude, despite the conflict in South Ossetia and the existence of more than 100,000 Ossetians from the Southern Caucasus. “We have always lived peacefully with the Russians and the Georgians…we have nothing to divide.” 7

The character of interethnic relations can be illustrated by the number of interethnic marriages between the Russians and the Ossetians, the Ossetians and the Georgians, the Ossetians and the Armenians, which has remained stable over the last 20 years, according to the civil registry office, even though the number shrank after the 1980s.

Statistics show that the number of Ossetians has risen, both in relative and absolute terms, and the number of Russians has fallen; according to the 2002 census there were 445,310 (62.7 percent) Ossetians, and in 2010 there were 459,688 (65.1 percent). In contrast, in 2002 there were 164,734 (23,2 percent) Russians, and in 2010 there were 147,090 (20.8 percent). This can be explained by objective reasons: after the expulsion of Ossetians from and their exit from , they mostly settled in North Ossetia. The Russians’ outflow can be explained by the lack of security in the 1990s and by the decline of industry, a source of employment for most of them. (“And where could the Ossetians go, when they were thrown out and their belongings were taken away for peanuts?” 8, “And we (Ossetians) and Russians are both , we have few children. That’s why there are more Ossetians now – because they came here.” “For us it was more important that there was no work and you were always waiting for your neighbours (Ingush) to kidnap someone or cause an explosion in the market.”) 9. It is worth noting that the topic of religion emerges in discussions about identity, which did not happen before.

Nevertheless, saying that everything is well in interethnic relations would not be correct. Especially for the Russians, the ‘perception index’ is an aspect of tension, i.e. the idea that Ossetians have more ability to defend their interests, because they are the most numerous ethnic group. This is supported by the existing mechanisms of traditional society, which are used in election campaigns and lobbying. However, it is interesting that there is no ethnic mobilisation: “Russians are in the majority in my district, why can’t they unite?” 10 , “What difference does it make to me, whom to vote for, as long as I know them and they are a decent person?”11 , with the exception of Prigorodny district, where people do not want to vote for Ingush

7 Focus group in Oktyabrskoye village, 28.09.2011. 8 Interview with an employee of UFMS on the Republic of the North OssetiaAlania, 29.08.2011. 9 Focus group with social workers, 26.09.2011. 10 Interview with a representative of the Mozdok district administration, 09.09.2011. 11 Interview with a former employee of an international organisation, 31.08.2011. 3

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candidates: “anybody but them,” “’t we have any Ossetians worthy of the role?” 12

The reason for the narrowing of opportunities for the ‘non-titular’ population – such phrases are used only in Ossetian newspapers, in the – is the merging of business and bureaucracy, because Ossetian businesses do well with the support of Ossetian officials, and everybody else feels ‘non-titular’. Many believe that Ossetians receive preferential treatment when seeking employment in government services and this naturally leads to the fact that areas and businesses affiliated with it flourish, while obstacles, which provide rent-seeking opportunities for those who control them, are created for everybody else. This also leads to increasing tension in society and closes yet another ‘social lift.’

The ethnic mobilisation of Ossetians in the republic is both situational and negative. “We unite only against somebody, not for somebody or something, only against.” 13 “Remember 2008. We were all ready to help the Southerners, and now we are prepared to slit each other’s throats.” 14 “I am not against the Ingush, I just don’t want them to creep up on us, and we live with Ossetians or Russians.” 15

Symbolism is the most problematic area in interethnic relationships today. People react very harshly to historical myths and perceptions. This is an area where the authorities could do a lot with a little effort. “If you look at our monuments, it looks like history was built only by the Ossetians. Where are the others?” “Vladikavkaz was made into a city by Loris-Melikov, we are proud of what he left us: the avenue, schools, culture. Yet his name is not mentioned anywhere, but there are Ossetians’ names, names of people who have not done anything for the city.” 16 “We have a monument to the mythical Dzaug Bugulov, who supposedly founded Vladikavkaz, but where are the statues to real Russians, who actually built it?” 17 . Such attitudes are based on the perception left by the workings of the Toponymic Commission which, during the renaming of the city’s streets during the last decade, left only Ossetian surnames as street names. Loris-Melikov Street was also given a new name. No monuments were erected for non-Ossetians since the end of the USSR.

Language and education

Tension between ethnic groups is also caused by education policy. “I don’t understand why my son spends more time studying Ossetian than Russian.” 18 “I understand that we are Ossetians and must know our language, but then children need to go to university and everything is in Russian there.” 19 At the moment, Ossetian language studies take up more time than studies of the

12 Focus group in Oktyabrskoye village, 28.09.2011. 13 Interview with Vladikavkaz administration employee, 14.09.2011. 14 Interview with an employee of UFMS on the Republic of the North CaucasusAlania, 29.08.2011. 15 Focus group in Oktyabrskoye village, 28.0.2011. 16 Interview with a journalist, 04.09,2011. 17 Focus group with NGO representatives, 27.08.2011. 18 Focus group with social workers, 26.09.2011. 19 Focus group with NGO representatives, 27.08.2011.

4 The North Caucasus: Views from Within and people are not enthusiastic about this. However, school reform, which will lead to a decrease in hours studying both languages, will lead to even more tension. At the same time, some Ossetians believe that little attention is paid to the Ossetian language within the republic, outside the school system, hence the very positive reaction in March 2010, when member of the republic’s parliament Aslan Khadartsev made a speech in Ossetian.

There are 27 national-cultural centres in the republic, as well as an internationalist movement ‘Our Ossetia’ and the national organisation of Ossetians ‘Styr Nyhas’, but respect for these organisations’ is not very great. The belief that Styr Nyhas is an affiliate of the state has taken root. The low level of authority of such organisations plays on the peace in the republic, because they are unable to consolidate ethic groups. However, this could lead to negative consequences because problems, as they are perceived by ethnic groups, are not being solved.

Relations with the Ingush remain the tensest. Recently, tension is increasing between Russians and Kumyks in the Mozdok district. The Kumyks have lived in the region for a long time, but recently their number has increased and their communities have become more active in influencing life in the district, including influencing the authorities. The local population are mostly Russian and feel less and less confident, since the resources available to them to influence the situation are diminishing. Moreover, the local authorities are interested in the Kumyks, because their leaders provide unified voting of the whole community for the ‘right’ candidate. In return, they expect to promote the interests of their communities, in the situations of domestic and social conflict.

The faith factor is beginning to play a role. Russians and Kumyks are drifting further apart and even everyday confrontations are getting an increasingly nationalist shade. However, this situation is hardly known in the rest of Ossetia and the authorities present all conflicts as ‘hooliganism’ (common legal violations). Yet it is difficult to present the ’ erection of a boom gate at the entrance to the Pavlodolskaya village, to prevent the entrance of Kumyks – whose arrival has already been accompanied by group fights – as hooliganism.

Relations with the Ingush are historically conflictual and the ethnic groups hold opposing views. This is mentioned because the historical factor has arisen among both experts and focus group participants: “they say that this is their land, but when was this so?”20 Everybody was united in the fact that there are political forces, primarily those outside the region, who are interested in charging up the atmosphere. Western countries, or more precisely their intelligence services, were mentioned in this context: “this is all beneficial to the CIA, ordinary people do not need this.” 21 The authorities are especially conspicuous in spreading these opinions, since they benefit if people no longer need to look for internal reasons for social conflicts.

20 Interview with an employee of UFMS on the Republic of the North CaucasusAlania, 29.08.2011. 21 Interview with an employee of the Ministry of Interior, 20.09.2011. 5

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However, the existence of such ‘other’ presents an opportunity for different groups. The authorities get an excuse to talk about using power to put a stop to the conflict and pay less attention to other problems; intellectuals get a field for rhetorical arguments; some among the Ossetian ethnic group gain a reason to feel their ‘difference from the other’, their connectedness to the Ossetian people, the feeling of their righteousness and a strengthening identity.

The information policy of regional and federal authorities is indicative here. They attempt to smooth over and hide all manifestations of interethnic conflict and try not to let knowledge about it spread. The events of 9 September 2010 when an ethnic Ingush suicide car bomber detonated his explosives killing 17 and injuring more than 160 people at the central market in Vladikavkaz, showed that this policy is not effective. After 1992 there were no calls to expel the Ingush, but the explosion in the market 22 became a catalyst for dormant opposition. Another terrorist act led to calls for not only stopping the inflow of Ingush, but also for expelling those already living in the republic. Young people, mainly students, organised a group of over 1,000 people, carrying national flags to go to a settlement in Prigorodny where the Ingush live with the aim of smashing it up. Only at the approach to the settlement, internal armed forced and the OMON managed to convince them to disperse. There were calls for the resignation of the local leadership, who were viewed as having betrayed the interests of the inhabitants of North Ossetia, at meetings in Vladikavkaz. This reaction shows that it is extremely important to work with social opinion and not to ignore it.

The firm conviction that Ossetia is a Russian outpost in the Caucasus is another identifying marker in Ossetia. The Ossetians feels grateful for the rescue of the South Ossetian population in 2008 and feels surrounded by Muslim enemies. This opinion has recently been quite widespread, but after the autumn 2011 elections in South Ossetia the situation changed; the people are unhappy with Moscow because they believe their opinion has been ignored by the federal authorities, which supported the unpopular incumbent candidate Eduard Kokoitu.

Anti-Caucasian attitudes in central Russia, or rather the inclusion of Ossetians in the same group as Dagestanis, and Ingush – who actually are not viewed as ‘belonging to Russia’ by the Ossetians – are a cause of great annoyance in Ossetia. The issue is that a part of the population, especially those who recently lived in rural areas and the younger generation are happy to call themselves Caucasians. At the same time, Ossetia’s urban inhabitants, whose behaviour does not differ from the behaviour of urban dwellers in other regions of Russia, emphasise their difference from those living in the three less-urbanised republics of the North Caucasus: , Ingushetia and . The other side of this is the strengthening of the pan-Caucasian identity (mostly among Ossetian ), especially when attitudes towards Caucasians are negative: “according to them (Russians), we’ve just climbed

22 On 9 September 2010, a suicide bomber detonated a bomb in a car in a market in Vladikavkaz, killing 19 people and injuring 202. It immediately became known that the car had Ingush number plates, but the authorities did not speak about this. Public opinion immediately blamed the Ingush as a whole; an investigation later confirmed that the terrorist act's organisers were ethnic Ingush.

6 The North Caucasus: Views from Within down from the trees,” “we are all the same to them, they don’t differentiate between anybody,” “we are all blacks to them.”

Religion

The religious practices of North Ossetia are very diverse. This is explained by historical reasons and the influence of the social/demographic factors. The re- Christianisation of North Ossetia began in the 18th century. had been spreading in North Ossetia in the 10 th to 12 th centuries, but after the Mongol invasion in the 13 th century, the region’s ties with other Christian regions were interrupted, and began to spread again. Islam is also believe to have began becoming widespread in the 18 th century, hence the emergence of the Ossetian Muslim. Actually, traditional beliefs and rites are widespread among all Ossetians. After the region’s inclusion into the , and Lutheranism also began to spread. The empire exiled Polish Catholics and Christian Orthodox sectarians, like the Molokans, Khlysts and Dukhobors to the region. In the Soviet time, during the era of atheist propaganda, all faiths were persecuted, which bound their followers together. After the fall of the Soviet Union the religions underwent a renaissance, and even became fashionable. Currently, the attitude to faith has become steadier, but religion has become a marker of identity.

Orthodox Christianity and Islam dominate in the region, but Judaism is also viewed as historically inherent, and recently some protestant sects are considered as such. Aside from this, new faiths are entering the region. The relationship between the followers of different faiths has always fluctuated, but it is presented in a way that is most favourable within the faith structure. The fact is that there are no official statistics in this sphere, and it is only possible to rely on experts. Nobody denies that the most numerous religion is Christian Orthodoxy ( – ROC), which is attended by Russians, Ossetians and a large part of Georgians and . According to the Church, 400,000 people classify themselves as Orthodox. The quantity of Orthodox followers has grown at the expense of the aforementioned Christian sects (such as the Molokans) being almost non-existent, even though there were efforts to revive them at the start of the 1990s.

Estimates of the number of Muslims vary from 10–12 percent (according to P. Bzarov, professor at North Ossetian University), 23 up to 30 percent or even 50 percent according to the Spiritual Board of Muslims in North Ossetia (DUM) 24 . History plays a part in these estimates, which leads to tension among the congregation, rather than among experts. Muslims evaluate their number by the family names of Ossetian Muslims and by the number of settlements which were created by the Muslims, not taking into account the fact that since the times of the mohajir in the 19 th century, when a significant part of Ossetian Muslims moved to the , much had changed. A significant part of the population in those settlements today is Christian. This is why the DUM’s announcement in 2008 that 184 (out of 186 in total) children who died during the School No.1

23 GTRK ‘Alania’ from 18.08.2009. 24 DUM announcement, 24.09.2009. 7

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terrorist attack were Muslim became a source of indignation amongst the rest of the population. Beslan was founded by Ossetian Muslims and Ossetian families residing there have historically been Muslim, but according to experts surveyed as part of the research (officials from the Ministry of Public and External Communications, experts on religion, law enforcement agency staff), there were no more than 15–20 percent of Muslims amongst the children killed.

Vladikavkaz has historically been the capital of Russian baptism; other Protestant movements also became wide spread there. However, in the last decade, the number of Protestants has been decreasing due to their migration out of the region. The ethnic composition is changing – Ossetians are taking the place of Russians and other European ethnicities. Other faiths, like Judaism, Catholicism and Lutheranism, are fragmenting out of the region, as are the ethnic groups that follow them. Others are trying to expand their realm, with Jehovah’s Witnesses being the most active. This mix of religious faiths, the historic experience of living together and external threats to religion lead to a religious tolerance amongst the population. Questions of religion did not occupy the people: “if somebody is religious, that’s their business, the main thing is that nobody hassles me or my faith.” 25

However, in recent times the situation is changing, and this is very painfully felt by society. The relationship between the main faiths, if speaking about official structures, is sufficiently ‘stable and professional’ – these opinions were voiced by representatives of the ROC and the DUM. Aside from having lived beside one another for a long time, this is supported by external challenges. However, despite the stated co-operation, these relations cannot be called ideal. Various symbols can become a source of irritation. For example, the construction of a cross in the place of the tragedy in Beslan lead to harsh statements being made by Muslims, who believe that their rights are being violated and that the conviction that Muslims were the ones at fault is gradually taking hold. The Muslim community turns to external actors (mostly federal structures) if it believes its rights have been violated, which causes an ambiguous reaction in society. 26 For example, such was the case of Fatima Bagayeva, who converted to Islam, then married an Ingush and was detained on the border with Ingushetia, according to the law enforcement agents, carrying explosives. The Muslim community denied this and declared its intention to call on the muftiyat of Ingushetia for help.

Regnum information agency’s interview with former mufti Ali-Hadji Yevteev in August 2009 – where he talked about his training in camps of extremists, becoming acquainted with Khattab, the unseemly role of Orthodox priests and rejection of non-Islamic way of life – resonated widely. After this interview, A. Yevteev was compelled to resign as mufti in May 2010. The Orthodox Church is more balanced in this sphere – they even let go Yevteev’s scandalous declarations and were satisfied with formal apologies. It is worth noting that neither the DUM, nor officials from the Ministry of Public and External Communications, who are in charge of Islamic affairs,

25 Interview with a teacher in a higher education institution, 06.09.2011. 26 For example, the announcement by Mufti N. Ashirov, 04.09.2006, www.irp.ru/page/stream document/index7472.html

8 The North Caucasus: Views from Within got involved in this episode, having stipulated that it is in the of the current leadership of the Muslim ummah .

In recent years, Muslims have been viewed with more suspicion by the rest of society. Several factors have contributed to this, one of which is security. Previous terrorist acts and kidnappings were connected in the popular psyche to specific ethnic groups, but now they are linked to Muslims as a whole. Actions taken by the Muslim community – which has begun to defend its rights more actively as a result of its increased self-awareness, for example for ceremonial buildings and participate more in society – were unexpected for the majority. Last but not least is media coverage of some events which often formed a negative context around Muslims. A particularly clear example is when, after the murder of academic Sh. Djigkayev in May 2011, and even before the court hearing took place, those suspected of the murder – they were Muslims – were branded as ‘murderers.’ Djigkayev was killed for writing a poem which condemned the intentional or unintentional defilement of the Beslan by pilgrims from Chechnya. Moreover, the murder was described as ‘ritual’ and society grew firm in its negative stereotype of those who follow Islam.

Processes taking place within the ummah often go unobserved and can only be judged post-factum . It can be said that previously, the community was divided by ethnicities (Ossetians, Ingush, Kumyks etc), but now it is becoming more consolidated. The most closed community is that of the Kumyks in Mozdok, but at the moment the DUM has more influence over it. Situations of 2003–2004, when the first post-Soviet mufti was not allowed to enter a mosque in Vladikavkaz by young Muslims who were thought to be Salafis, are no longer possible. The DUM is strengthening its control over the livelihood of the community as a whole, as well as its Kumyk part, but this also has an opposite side: the leadership is beginning to depend on the people upon whom it leans. It was precisely this that made the DUM react harshly to the detainment of 18 community members after the murder of Sh. Djigkayev, thus practically blackmailing the authorities. During the press conference on 2 June 2011, Mufti Khadjimurat Gazalov threatened to resign and leave his responsibilities at the DUM unless federal and republic’s authorities and the prosecutor’s office engage in the case. The number of renegades and new converts has grown: Russians and South Ossetians are converting to Islam, where they find answers to their spiritual needs.

The suspicious attitude of compatriots, and the detainment of Muslims on the suspicion of being involved in terrorism lead to increasing tension within the ummah . The followers of the Muslim faith believe they are being oppressed, and lock themselves in their own communities to an extent. In the opinion of experts, this tension can lead to the same path that has been trodden by neighbouring republics, when oppression lead to people joining illegal armed groups.

There is no obvious confrontation between traditional and ‘new’ Islam, but radical groups have already sprung up. The first of these appeared in districts bordering Kabarda, the source of preachers like Khodov, a Beslan terrorist and native of a village on the border with Kabarda. There was an Islamic Cultural Centre in

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Vladikavkaz, which the law enforcement authorities thought was Salafi and closed down. After these groups were disbanded, traditional Islam no longer had competition, however now young preachers, who have been taught in Arabic countries, especially Saudi Arabia, are taking the place of those local mullahs. They hold seminars for local recruits, because religious education in the republic remains weak. The question is how much this education corresponds with traditional Islamic education.

The Orthodox Church in North Ossetia has been taking a passive position, trying only to maintain what they already had. This structure is consolidated, but also has an opposite side: it does not always react well to the call of time. The important decision by the ROC to divide the and Vladikavkaz bishoprics from 22 March 2011 lead to a wary attitude from the followers, since the new bishopric of Vladikavkaz and comprises the territory which is dominated by Muslims. At the same time, this decision was one of the demands of lay activists to separate the bishopric of Vladikavkaz.

“The Church was hit like thunder, and it is still only coming back to consciousness”27

However, the church aims to change its behaviour since it understands that if it only acts to defend itself it can lose a lot, because external challenges in the region are only growing. The personnel is changing and more competent and professional staff are now at work. The church uses the media actively; if previously it published only the newspaper ‘Orthodox Ossetia ’, now it is running an Orthodox TV channel, because the young read little, but do watch television. In general, the bishopric’s behaviour had changed, its policy has become more dynamic. Sunday schools have started working, an Orthodox school has been opened in Vladikavkaz, a spiritual seminary has opened its doors. The Church maintains and co-ordinates the work of the faithful to restore and build new churches.

In general, both Islam and Orthodoxy are making their bets on the young generation, trying to attract them to their side. If the Muslims were typically rigid in their relationship with the young, the Orthodox tried to act more subtly. With the ascent of a new leadership on 17 March 2011 in the form of mufti H. Gatzalov and his supporters, who were part of DUM’s leadership since May 2010, the Muslims are trying to work together with the Church. This can be explained by part of the population’s ambiguous attitude towards Muslims. The new Muslim leadership goes to schools, participates in ‘roundtables’ and debates. It is worth noting that faith representatives’ work in schools was ruled as illegal by the Prosecutor’s office from 1 April 2011 and has been stopped.

Another challenge faced by ‘historical’ faiths is the renaissance of paganism, known as ‘the true Alan religion’ ( are the Ossetians’ forefathers). Both the state and the spiritual leadership are trying not to let pagan propaganda become widespread

27 Interview with representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), 19.09.2011.

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in the media and among the youth, although activist groups have cropped up in different districts and are carrying out their work. Monographs are often released which explain the need to return to the ‘native religion’. All the ills of modernity are explained by departure from it.

Both experts and focus group participants view the strengthening role of religion in the life of society negatively. They believe that the increasing fragmentation of society, along divisions including religion, encourages people to repel each other and tear apart their unity. According to them, this is especially applicable to the Ossetians: “there aren’t many of us to begin with, and now we are dividing and dividing…” 28 The active missionary work of Jehovahists (as they are called there) causes dissatisfaction among the respondents. Moreover, the participants cannot justify the dominating negative stereotypes. The attitude towards neo-pagans is also negative, even though people talk about the need to keep the pagan rites which have already become a part of Orthodoxy and Islam. “We have Wastirdji, this is St. George, everybody knows this. And now what? Get rid of him?” 29 The respondents are also wary of the Muslim ummah , but the attitude here is more ambivalent: there are good ‘our’ Muslims, and there are ‘aliens,’ who are promoting the new, which is not typical for those who are ‘ours’, although both are actually from the same region and background.

Official spiritual structures proclaim roughly the same approaches to solving the problems challenging society. Neither the Orthodox Church nor the Muslim ummah approve of the majority of young people’s behaviour, and their lack of spirituality which, according to them, is becoming ‘a parable’. Castigation of social flaws and social injustice remains on the side lines of attention. Possibly, this is because they, according to clergy, are trying to create ‘a symphony of the authorities and the church,’ possibly, because the clergy is dependent on the authorities, as experts think . However, both experts and focus group participants express a need for the castigation of social flaws by these very institutions.

The spread of Islamic education as an alternative to secular education is not happening in the republic. The DUM is currently interested in improving the education of its followers: not everybody can be sent abroad to study in Muslim countries, so seminars are held for those who want to attend. There are Muslim congresses, courses to study the Hadiths, various competitions, for example reading the Koran among women. This is what explains the lack of importance of informal religious institutions – they do not have the authority which would allow them to replace official structures. Of course, here we are talking about the vast majority of the population.

The spread of public forms of religious life often brought the respondents to a dead end. For Ossetians and other ethnic groups, whose rites have merged into one another, maintaining traditions was closely associated with traditional beliefs. These traditions were kept in Soviet times too, and spread further in the post-Soviet era.

28 Focus Group in Tsrau village, 10.09.2011. 29 Focus group in Vladikavkaz, 26.09.2011. 11

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The rites referred to are weddings and funerals, celebrations and national holidays. Naturally the form, but not the content, has remained, but it is the form that is the way to express devotion to religion for Ossetians.

North Ossetian society is largely secular. The number of devout Muslims and rigid followers of other faiths is not great. External observations show that the number of young women in mini skirts far outweighs the number of women in long outfits, which are dictated by tradition. According to the experts, religious constraints are not typical to local society. However, public forms of religious consciousness can be more often seen in towns (not !), and mostly among Muslims, of whom some rigidly obey religious scriptures. This explains the previously atypical Muslim dress: niqabs and hijabs for women and beards for men. They immediately draw the eye, thus confirming that this is a new influence.

The relationship with the state was clearly described by a representative of the ROC: “Don’t disturb us.” There is a on religious policy between regional and federal officials, and above all the security agencies. The regionals try to move towards compromise, while the federals act more harshly. Officials and faith representatives expressed the desire for more co-operation between the different organisations and levels of power. But the security agents believe that this position must be articulated more clearly: “They (the priests) want us to deal with the Jehovahists.”30 The prosecutor’s office actively worked against the work of Jehovah’s witnesses, with the support of ‘historical’ faiths. However, attacks on the Muslim community after the murder of Sh. Djigkayev and suspicions of Muslim participation in terrorist acts immediately led to Muslim criticism of Jehovah’s Witnesses coming to an end.

This is how the population’s devotion to religion is becoming one of the markers of identity. This process enables some challenges to be overcome, social tension to be relieved, society to be unified and values to be resurrected, while also gives rise to new problems and challenges.

Generation differences

Another of society’s challenges is the ‘generation gap’. The republic faces a problem on intergeneration communications, which is a condition of the demolition of the old tradition, which was laid down by the Soviet system and the creation of a new Russian tradition. Three generations stand out: the first, formed in the USSR and carrying its ethos (over 45), transitory (30–45) and young people under 30; the groups differ significantly.

The first generation values collectivism and following traditions as a mechanism of social protection. The second group is more vulnerable – the values they absorbed during the socialisation process do not work now. The third group is adapted to

30 Interview with an employee of the Ministry of Interior, 20.09.2011.

12 The North Caucasus: Views from Within

current reality and they view the Soviet era as “legends of the distant past. They don’t even understand when we tell them about deficits.” 31

According to experts and focus group participants discussing the young generation’s frame of mind (those who were born at the end of the 1980s and start of 1990s), high expectations are typical to them. This generation are the children of a calm era, who grew up along with the wellbeing of their families in the ; they are individualists, who are aiming to succeed. Career opportunities in Russia, – specifically in Russia, rather than North Ossetia, – are mainly linked to natural monopolies and government service (many of which are part of the General Prosecutor’s Office or Russia’s Investigation Committee). Children of high-ranking officials are guaranteed a career in government service from their childhood. They also easily turn to business; the children of officials are universal lobbyists.

“Young people are what older people have brought up.” 32

When we discuss the ‘generation gap,’ we are discussing the perceptions of different generations. For a part of the older generation, the young have many more negative traits than positive, yet there is a growing belief that “they are just different”.33 Focus group participants gave neutral evaluations of the young. The young are also often pitied: “we had aims, a great country, and they have nothing.” 34 “We scold the communists, but they had an ideology, they offered confidence in tomorrow.” 35 Moreover, there is a feeling of guilt: in the 1990s the older generation was surviving, taking any job available, which led to teenagers being outside traditional socialisation: “and what can I ask of him, if he had not been anywhere (at funerals, weddings) as a teenager, hadn’t seen anything”. 36

Ways to achieve social success are limited in the republic, the social lifts are not working, except for the ‘golden youth’. It is impossible to get a job honestly straight after university. Success is seen as getting power, and of course, money. Success in sport is seen as a more realistic way to achieve, because this is an area where success depends on the individual. At the same time, unemployment in Ossetia is not linked to the threat to stability, because relatives do everything to make sure that the young generation is not in need. It is often possible to see ageing parents supporting their grown-up children in the republic.

Incidentally, the situation is changing. The young, unlike the old, believe that professionalism is becoming valued in the republic, meaning that the importance of family ties and bribes when it comes to getting a job is falling. Moreover, the new reality presents new opportunities, and whether a young person uses them or not,

31 Interview with a journalist, 04.09.2011. 32 Interview with an NGO representative, 30.08.2011. 33 Interview with a representative of the DUM, 22.09.2010. 34 Focus group in Vladikavkaz, 26.09.2011. 35 Focus group in Vladikavkaz, 27.09.2011. 36 Interview with an employee of UFMS on the Republic of the North OssetiaAlania, 29.08.2011. 13

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depends solely on him and his abilities. “If I am professional, I will find a job, if not here, then in Russia, if not in Russia, then in Europe.” 37

A new challenge arises here: the level of education. Currently, 85 percent of school leavers 38 go on to higher education, but the level of education is not high. Students often receive a degree, but not knowledge. Both the low quality of teaching in some institutions and the lack of many students’ desire to work hard are to blame for this. Even the knowledge that students do receive is often not what is required by employers. The idea of the prestige associate with a profession is based on myths and limited by, firstly, the republic’s place in the job market, and secondly, the idea of demand in the markets of Moscow and . This explains the large numbers of unemployed economists and lawyers, while business demands qualified labourers and engineers. Those who do not have work experience are limited to working in security agencies; the criminal sector is not viewed as a separate occupation, because people do not see the difference between the two: “criminals and the police have been the same thing for a long time. If before criminals took protection money, now it’s the police.” 39

Role models for the youth are not older people, as would be expected in a traditional society, but their successful contemporaries. This authority is often determined by how much money somebody has amassed, rather than their personality, and the question of where the money came from is not raised. The paradox is that young people would be more than happy to accept an idea, a value system, as well as ethical and behavioural benchmarks which are not based on money, but no authority figure can offer them this. The only visible alternative is or Adat, which become attractive to some parts of the young generation. The young are quite cynical, they do not trust in words, which are so generously handed out by leaders and the older generation. They trust only in deeds – and this is where the older generation is faced with a problem. The young react sharply to lies, but the older generation does not understand this.

Communication between the young is also built differently – many of them spend time in social networks; if a teenager is not on ‘V kontakte’ or ‘odnoklassniki,’ he is crossed out of the social sphere. Mass actions have already been organised through social networks, which worries the authorities, who relay their worry through the media, saying they are motivated to do this by something else, like concern for the young people’s morality and the fact that they have access to porn sites.

Migration

North Ossetia has net emigration of employable people. The republic’s permanent population between censuses (2002–2010) increased by 2,705. Yet, the region is experiencing a 14.5 percent birth rate increase and high migration. In 2010, more than 7,000 people came to the republic and more than 10,000 left. The republic is

37 Focus group with students, Vladikavkaz, 11.09.2011. 38 Ossetiastat annual handbook, 2010. 39 Focus group with entrepreneurs, Vladikavkaz, 25.09.2011.

14 The North Caucasus: Views from Within

losing people who are migrating to other parts of the country, but is receiving immigrants from the post-Soviet space. Internal migration in North Ossetia is less than 3,000 people, net migration to other Russian regions is 4,196 40 . Real mobility is much higher, but this is not picked up by the statistics because a significant part of the population lives in Central Russian cities, while continuing to be registered in the republic.

North Ossetia is attractive to immigrants from the South Caucasus. The Armenian and Azerbaijani attract new settlers. Incidentally, in recent years this flow is getting weaker. However, most of the people who come from South Caucasus are Ossetians, who have been compelled to escape Georgia; according to officials of the Federal Migration Service (FMS), there were more than 100,000 such cases since 1990. It is important that immigrants are not viewed negatively – they become part of the existing social structure, more or less successfully. The inflow of Vainakh and Dagestani people, which is only increasing in recent years, is viewed without enthusiasm. However, it is difficult to make assertions about the numbers, because these people often do not register with the local authorities; since there is no precise information, phobias towards them can arise because of the lack of information.

The federal centre discusses the outflow of Russians first and foremost. The percentage of Russians in North Ossetia is now smaller than in 1926 (23.8 percent in comparison to 20.8 percent). The Russian population reached its peak in 1970 and then decreased in the following way: 1970 – 202,367 (36.6 percent), 1979 – 200,692 (33.9 percent), in 1989 – 189,159 (29.9 percent), in 2002 – 164,734 (23.2 percent), 2010 – 147,090 (20.8 percent). 41 The fall was stable, due to natural decreases and migration from rural districts.

Now there is no point in talking about return of the Russians, but discussion must focus on how to keep those who are still in the region. The group in question are Russians in rural areas, those who are more vulnerable due to low incomes and less opportunity for education. All the participants talked about their desire for the Russians to return, but noted that “this is not a tempting place. Everybody knows how the Caucasus is portrayed on TV and it makes no difference whether it is Ossetia or Dagestan,” 42 “there are no jobs here, industry is at a standstill, it’s not safe, we want to leave ourselves, and who will agree to come here?” 43

It is important to note the high number of those who are ready to leave the republic, especially North Ossetians. The potential for migration is high, but the 2008–2009 crisis sobered many. Now people are preparing to leave – they try to get experience, save money to survive at first, and take a more thought-out approach towards choosing which region to emigrate to. It can be assumed that the fall in mobility is a temporary phenomenon and, if the situation got worse again, the young would leave more intensively and this emigration will be a ‘one way ticket.’ Regional targets for

40 Ossetiastat annual handbook, 2010. 41 Roskomstat. 42 Interview with an employee of UFMS on the Republic of the North CaucasusAlania, 29.08.2011. 43 Interview with a lecturer in a higher education institution, 06.09.2011. 15

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emigration are not NCFD, they are firstly – Moscow, the Moscow region, St Petersburg and district. Ossetians experience few problems integrating into large cities, because the Russian language is native to most, TV culture is familiar and, until recently, Ossetians did not aim to settle in groups, which made their assimilation faster.

Migration from rural areas to towns is insignificant, because the republic is urbanised. Another challenge exists here: the movement from small towns to Vladikavkaz. Young people and people with money are leaving, thus depleting the potential for development. The replacement of former inhabitants with new ones is a problem for the republic. This is relevant to Ossetians, Armenians and Russians, since these communities are faced with the problem of new types of diasporas, which exist simultaneously: new and old, urban and rural etc. This leads to the formal ethnic composition and balance remaining the same, but the quality of the structure is changing: these people are not integrated into society, the human capital is deteriorating and old conflicts are taken to new places.

People and political institutions

Contrary to the opinion that North Caucasian societies are traditional, in actual fact they are transitory, which leads to the unbalancing of previously functioning mechanisms. “Yes, the clan system exists, but everybody tries to solve their problems themselves, without choosing a particular method. More and more we are moving away from ourselves, becoming individualists…the form remains, but not the content.” 44 This is very painfully felt by the population.

This condition of the ‘fraying’ social fabric is actively exploited by the authorities, because nobody can articulate their complaints to the existing leadership. Clear groups, which would be able to express their own interests and, most importantly, stand up for them, are absent. This ‘fraying’ is an obstacle to unification on social grounds and prohibits co-ordinated activity.

The lack of a unified society leads to a more archaic social life, the flow of modernisation is disappearing, government institutions are increasingly less significant, while family ties and ethnicity are gaining value. The authorities benefit from the move to a more old-fashioned way, where the authorities are revered, as is typical of a traditional society, and this means less criticism. Those who do not agree with this are pushed out, firstly from their circle, and then out of the republic, which means that ‘the more forward-thinking are leaving.’ These changes force people to look for support, which leads to simpler forms of identification: religion and ethnicity, but still on the individual level. It is not necessary to discuss the modernisation of society in this context and the region is falling behind the rest of Russia more and more, which is further separating it. At the same time, many people, not just the older generations, are lacking a general ideology which would consolidate society; this gives rise to nostalgia for Soviet times.

44 Interview with a former employee of an international organisation, 31.08.2011.

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A more negative attitude to regional authorities is visible, but recently the federal authorities have been losing their popularity because of this, i.e. because it supports local representatives who are unpopular with the population. Many focus group participants had a negative view of the current situation in the republic. People are not so disturbed by social injustice, but rather by the lack of opportunity to change something. If before the fear of the authorities held people back, now people will take the first opportunity to criticise the authorities. Taboo topics do not even exist: was previously such a topic, but now he is also in the field of criticism: “I don’t understand why Putin is so trusted: nobody I know respects him.” 45 “‘’. I will never vote for these official crooks and will tell others not to either, even though they think the same as I do.” 46 However, all this was said only after the guarantee of anonymity was given.

Social differentiation annoys people because ostentatious consumption – expensive cars, clothes – co-exists with a neighbour’s poverty. The majority of the nouveau riche (mostly government officials in the republic) cannot explain the origin of their wealth: “where does this petty official get a house for 500,000 ‘non-Russian roubles’?47 ”48 Everybody notes the absence of equal opportunities. The reason is not in the clan system, but the absence of social lifts and the build-up of a quasi-feudal society, where children inherit from the parents: “yes, I know that Ogoyev is a good guy, but to be a university chancellor at 30? Yes, they tried to buy a position in Moscow, but it didn’t work out for some reason. And now, as compensation, he is being given a ministry.” 49 Yet, it is not quite feudal, because feudal lords took care of their territories and people: “and what do they care? If anything happens, they will leave and go to Moscow. Their families have already been there for a while.” 50 Experts and respondents from different social strata are united in their opinions on this topic.

Some attacks on Moscow came through in the interviews, because Moscow has responsibility for the officials it appointed. The regional authorities also use this, justifying their failures by the federal authorities’ actions. It is interesting that the attitude to the situation is significantly different between the officials and the population. Officials implore that the population is at the heart of their activities. The population would prefer for this concern to be smaller, because this would hinder development less.

“They (the authorities) are by themselves, and we are by ourselves.” 51

The lack trust among the respondents is applicable to the authorities on all levels. If previously the federal authorities were revered, and people made appeals to it like

45 Focus group with entrepreneurs, Vladikavkaz, 25.09.2011. 46 Focus group with entrepreneurs, Vladikavkaz, 25.09.2011. 47 Meaning US dollars. 48 Focus group with entrepreneurs, Vladikavkaz, 25.09.2011. 49 Focus group with entrepreneurs, Vladikavkaz, 25.09.2011. 50 Focus group with entrepreneurs, Vladikavkaz, 25.09.2011. 51 Focus group with social workers, Vladikavkaz, 26.09.2011. 17

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to an appeal court, now, after the alignment of the ‘power vertical’ – the abolition of local governor elections in 2004 is usually taken as a watershed moment – this has changed. Dissatisfaction has grown against the background of the socio-economic position of the majority of the population, i.e. public sector workers and security agency employees. These groups earn a small income, but pensions and salaries are rising. It is likely that the social contract ‘sausage and stability in exchange for not getting involved in politics’ will stop working.

The United Russia congress caused particular resentment (the focus groups took place straight after it): “Do they think we are idiots?” 52 This confirms that the respondents are an active electorate: the majority were going to vote, because the people believed that only during the election campaign do the authorities react to the demands of the people. However, everybody was convinced that the results would be falsified to benefit the ruling party, but did not want for their to go in the officials’ preference. Everybody was expecting federal elections and how the results will be counted: “nothing has changed since Stalin’s time. We vote and they don’t count it.” 53 After the elections, it was announced that 85 percent of the population voted and 68 percent of those votes went to United Russia. Nobody trusts these figures.

According to expert opinion, on top of the fact that government institutions do not carry out their duties, some actually provoke social tension. The leaders in this context are the law enforcement agencies and courts: “our courts obey the rights of the strongest,” 54 “the one who pays the court more is the one who is right,” 55 “the cops don’t understand anything anymore.” 56 Corruption is another difficult problem “they take bribes even to do things they are supposed to do,” “if you don’t pay, you can’t play.” 57

Experts view the role of official political institutions in responding to these challenges especially carefully. The idea is that if the institutions are driven by the survival instinct, they would change. Yet, another variable comes into play here – the actions of the federal centre do not yet give reason to suppose that change is possible; they are most likely to be preserving ‘stability.’ Little depends on the local and regional authorities in the current conditions. Respondents generally viewed change in the institutions sceptically.

Review of previous efforts

When discussing federal programmes, government representatives immediately mentioned the ‘’ programme, which is improving infrastructure in the republic, and is reconstructing and building new social institutions. The second

52 Focus group with social workers, Vladikavkaz, 26.09.2011ю 53 The same as above (previous footnote). 54 Focus group with NGO representatives, Vladikavkaz, 27 August 2011. 55 The same as above (previous footnote). 56 Focus group with business people, Vladikavkaz, 25 September 2011. 57 Interview with an individual entrepreneur, Vladikavkaz, 25 September 2011.

18 The North Caucasus: Views from Within programme to be always mentioned is the ‘programme to eliminate the consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict’, which included several programmes at once. Within this programme, new homes were built for those who suffered from the conflict, compensation was paid, social infrastructure was reconstructed and a new settlement called Novii (new) is being created for Ingush returnees. North Ossetia and Ingushetia have been included in federal Ministry of Regional Development Programme to ‘Develop the North Caucasus federal district by 2025.’ A programme called ‘Socio-economic development of the suburban district RSO- Alania’ distributes funds from the federal budget at the level of 7,168.4 million roubles. Moreover, the region will also receive funding from the consolidated budget of the NCFD and finance sources outside the budget. The total sum will be 8,944.4 million roubles. According to officials, this programme has been approved by the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation in September 2011.

The federal authorities’ attitude to Ingush returnees and the lack of attention given to Ossetian forced migrants, – who are given two or three certificates for social housing, when they are in fact needed by more than 3,000 families, – was compared. The republic’s programmes were also mentioned. Programme of joint actions of state organs, public and political organisations from both sides in order to develop good neighbourly relations between Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and Republic of Ingushetia , which included humanitarian aspects of co-operation, was particularly noted. These aspects of the relationship suffered most as a result of the conflict and were the most complex to reconstruct.

The programme to harmonise relationships between the nations and the development of civic institutions was adopted in May 2011 and assumes the active participation of the citizens to solve challenges faced by a multi-ethnic society. The programme to counter extremism in 2011–2013 is aimed at educating the youth, with the goal of saving them from the radicals. The programme to support employment in the Republic of North Ossetia in 2009–2012 supports job creation. The Council of Economic and Civil Security, which considers questions that concern the population, is at work in North Ossetia. The Civic Chamber functions in the republic and co-ordinates the work of 557 NGOs, (according to the North Ossetian Ministry of Justice on 1 June 2011). However, trade unions and sport organisations are also included in the third sector. The Civic Chamber made the effort to invite them to a round table, but received only just over 10 responses.

Republic’s and municipal officials gratefully recall the work of international organisations, especially after Beslan. The FSB and federal structures view this differently. Officials highlight humanitarian programmes, but the most effective programmes in their opinion were programmes of the Danish Refugee Council, the Office of Swiss Development and Co-operation and UNICEF. Programmes to overcome the consequences of the Beslan tragedy helped to overcome the trauma imposed on the entire North Ossetian society.

Government programmes were much more far-reaching, and therefore had more spin-off consequences. For example, help for the Ingush lead to increased social

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differentiation, because the Ossetians did not get this level of help. Local communities only knew about the programmes which were carried out in their regions – even large programmes remained unknown. The exception to this were the programmes to rehabilitate Beslan, which everybody talked about. Whether the programme was international or by the federal government is not relevant. International organisations carried out more specific work – they gave the help that was needed by their target groups.

The European Court of Human Rights, which is viewed as the last instance of justice, was mentioned much more than usual. It was noted that international organisations have done a lot for the rights of Ossetian forced migrants, more than the Russian government and Georgia, and decreased tension in this society.

Recommendations

1. The society possesses certain symbols which different parts of it consider socially significant. Thus, it is possible to reduce social tensions by paying careful attention to such symbols and utilising them for political ends. These symbols are especially important for minority groups in Ossetia and impacts upon their collective perceptions. The issues of history and mutual co-existence between different peoples also belong here. 2. A high level of transparency of state organs is necessary, since silencing will not resolve problems, but may lead to the opposite result. 3. Closer co-operation between federal, regional and local structures, and especially the law enforcement agencies is needed. 4. Creation of discussion platforms, where different positions can be voiced. The Civic Chamber may become one of these, if it were to be filled with real discussion. 5. Familiarisation of the younger generation with global experience of solving social problems, undertaken in co-operation with local authorities and international organisations.

Conclusions

The situation in North Ossetia is stable but complex. Challenges standing before society and the authorities must be solved, not put aside. The population has given the following ranking of challenges:

• Unemployment (leading to low standards of living of the majority)

• Security, especially perceived threats arising from neighbouring Ingushetia

• Corruption (“everything is for sale, those who have money will always go unpunished”)

• Lack of opportunity for young people

20 The North Caucasus: Views from Within

• Low level of the leadership’s professionalism

• Tribalism

Several other social processes can be added to the above factors, which can be conventionally called pan-Caucasian: the formation of Ossetian / North Caucasian / all-Russian civic identity, the necessity to provide interconfessional peace, changing social values and the gap between the authorities and society.

All these factors are influenced by two dynamic negative tendencies, which sometimes correlate and sometimes move away from each other, but in any case they strengthen the different attitude towards the same conditions by different parts of the population. The first of these are ethnic emotions, which were at their peak in 1992, but have still not settled down. The second is the series of terrorist acts which have taken place since the Beslan tragedy. The question of security has worried and continues to worry North Ossetia’s inhabitants. Too often threats are formed in the common consciousness using ethnic and faith differences.

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This case study is part of a wider research project implemented by Saferworld in the North Caucasus.

The main report, ‘The North Caucasus: views from within. People’s perspectives on peace and security’ is available at:

Case studies from the individual republics can be accessed on the Saferworld website: www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/chechnya www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/ingushetia www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/kabardino-balkaria www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/dagestan

All research was conducted as part of the ‘People’s Peacemaking Perspectives’ programme. The People’s Peacemaking Perspectives project is a joint initiative implemented by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld and financed under the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability. The project provides European Union institutions with analysis and recommendations based on the opinions and experiences of local people in a range of countries and regions affected by fragility and violent conflict.

© Saferworld March 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material included in this publication.

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Saferworld and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.

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