THE SOCIAL SITUATION IN THE CHECHEN REPUBLIC: PROBLEMS AND TRENDS
Musa Yusupov
Introduction
The Chechen Republic lies at the very heart of the North Caucasus. Its territory comprises around 15.6 thousand square km. It shares its western border with Ingushetia, but this border is not yet defined. In 2011, the population was 1,275,219, of which 34.4 percent were in urban areas and 64.4 percent in rural areas. 95.3 percent are ethnic Chechens, 1.9 percent are Russian, 1 percent Kumyks and 1.9 percent come from other ethnic groups – Ingush, Avars, Nogais and others (2010 census).
Chechnya was annexed by Russia as a result of the Caucasus war in 1859, and in 1922 the Chechen autonomous oblast was formed as part of the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic. The Chechen and Ingush autonomous oblast were unified into a Chechen-Ingush autonomous oblast in 1934, and in 1936 the unified area became an autonomous republic. In 1944 the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported to Kazakhstan and other parts of Central Asia. In 1957 the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was reinstated. On 6 September 1991 there was a change in Soviet leadership in Chechnya-Ingushetia, on 1 November the sovereignty of the Chechen Republic was announced and in 1992 the Ingush Republic was formed.
The Chechen conflict in 1991 did not take place on the basis of interethnic, interreligious or intra-religious tensions, but on the basis of a socio-political crisis: the sharpening of contradictions between socio-economic groups, the population and the authorities, which grew into a nationalist political conflict between the Federal Centre and the Republic. The conflict in Chechnya grew into wars (1994–1996, 1999–2003). During the second campaign, the conflict was extinguished by military force. Subsequently, the administration of the Chechen Republic, which was nominated by the centre, was legitimised by the 2003 referendum on the new Chechen Constitution, the presidential election and then Chechen parliamentary elections. On 26 April 2009 the Counter-Terrorist Operational (CTO) regime was abolished in the Chechen Republic. The head of the Chechen Republic and its Parliament are elected for 5 years. The Parliament has one chamber, and works on full-time basis. Ramzan Kadyrov is the Head of the Republic.
The post-conflict situation in the Chechen Republic is characterised by active efforts to reconstruct and develop its socio-economic infrastructure. In recent years, there have been significant achievements in the reconstruction and development of Grozny, as well as other towns and communities. Currently, Grozny, which was destroyed during the war, has been reconstructed and several modern cultural and social facilities have been built; the towns of Gudermes, Argun and other communities are also being reconstructed. Social institutions, including those providing healthcare, education and culture, are functioning. The opening of Grozny City, a business centre and large medical complex, on 5 October 2011 was a socially important event.
Saferworld
The revival and development of the economy is not flowing as quickly. The oil industry, agriculture and the service sector are at the core of the economy, and over 90 percent of the republic’s income is subsidised. More than half of the population of the working age does not have a job. Registered unemployment is 27.2 percent.1
Methodology
Research Approach
The approach identifies the socio-economic interdependence between the quality of life, social sense of wellbeing and the people’s confidence in the future. Meanwhile, cultural values and norms, ethnic, religious and other types of self-identification are viewed as relatively independent phenomena which are not directly connected to the current situation.
Methods
These consisted of collecting information through interviews conducted by experts, focus groups and conversations with officials. In total, there were 11 interviews with specialists in the social sciences, and representatives of youth and human rights organisations. Focus groups were organised in September 2011 with non-governmental organisation (NGO) leaders; representatives of small and medium business and farming enterprises; students and young people not in education; the self-employed; and doctors and teachers. A theme-based questionnaire was prepared for each meeting and a key focus of all conversations was the social aspect of everyday life. The work mainly took place in Grozny, there was one focus group in Urus-Martan, and there were separate conversations with people living in Shalinski and Vedenski rural settlements. The participants chose the language they preferred to speak in; all the interviews took place in Russian, there were two focus groups in Russian, three in Russian and Chechen and one in Chechen.
The aim of the research investigation was to identify social problems of concern to the population, unveil their underlying causes, determine to what extent the measures to address them are effective, and determine and evaluate the potential for further improvement of the social situation and the wellbeing of the people.
The results of the study
The problems which emerged through the discussions can be classified as follows: social, economic, judicial, cultural and political. Some of them require solutions at an institutional level, while others – on the organisational/operational level; the federal, regional and local institutions and organisations each have their areas of responsibility and a role to play in solving these problems.
1 The figure was given by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin during his trip to Gudermes on 20 December 2011, in Кира Латухина, «Кавказский Маршрут», Российская Газета, 21 декабря 2011. 2
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
Discussion participants raised socio-economic and judicial themes on their own initiative, while problems in the cultural, ethnic and religious spheres were most often addressed only when the moderator introduced the topics.
Key social gradations
Ethnicity/identity
The political component of ethnicity, or rather of a region’s ethno-social commonality, manifests itself through the self-organisation of the republic and the existence of limited sovereignty along with the right to autonomy. However, ethnicity has become somewhat less instrumental since the 1990s; the ‘ethno-political’ has declined from being at the centre stage to a sleeping regime, and how active it will be in future will depend on processes within the country and the North Caucasus region.
At this point it is appropriate to contrast two differing opinions from the interviews. In one, the political aspect of ethnicity was regarded as a ‘favourite political myth’. According to this view, if the desire for ethnic identification is ‘justified’ in society undergoing a transition, as a defensive reaction, which exists for the ethnic group’s survival, then in times of peace this desire leads to a further escalation of conflict. 2
According to another point of view, today ethnicity cannot be a factor in community development by itself; it leads the society to self-isolation. Only inclusion into the international civilisational process will allow the ethnic group to take its rightful place in the general mosaic of different peoples. The concept of multi-ethnicity has a strong political aspect to it, since in this context it is relevant to both a multi-ethnic country and a ‘super-ethnic’ region – the North Caucasus.3
According to sociological studies, interviews and focus groups, national (ethnic) commonality in the Chechen social consciousness is primarily characterised by features like traditions, language and religion; other characteristics mentioned were territory, self- awareness, character traits and appearance, historical memory, ‘blood’ and the existence of nationhood (the republic).
Opinions given in interviews, and shared by humanitarian experts, are that ethno- territorial identification in Chechnya is significantly more important than pan-Russian identification and self-identification as Russian citizens.4 This is likely to have been the result of the armed conflict in the region and its consequences, i.e. the localisation of social and physical survival. Feelings like this can change in the long run. In this situation, a more important factor is the dominance of traditional elements in social and cultural life and within the social consciousness. It is the existence of a traditional segment within the culture that determines the dominance of local identities in the region, such as family,
2 Interview ‘Social and ethnic situation’, No 1, 14.09.2001. 3 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 4 Sociological study ‘Interests, norms, values’, Chechen Republic, 2003, sample size: 1,060 people. Sociological study ‘The region’s socio cultural problems’, Chechen Republic, 2009, sample size: 1,000 people. 3
Saferworld
relatives, friends, people of the same generation, those who share the same territory – a community or a republic. Humanitarian experts also share this view.
For example, one of the interviewees said that a person’s world view and social behaviour are influenced by ethnicity more than by anything else. “This is explained by the fact that ethnicity is an older phenomenon than religion; in pagan times ethnic culture had already been formed. Throughout the development of ethnic qualities the ethnic group came into being as a distinctive phenomenon.” 5 Another interviewee pointed out the wide variety of self-identifications. “More often than not, for those who live in Chechnya but who are not from here, identifying themselves through ethnicity is more important than any other self-identification. However, there are people – mostly academics, politicians and some others – for whom identifying themselves as citizens first and foremost is much more acceptable.” 6
In a focus group discussion, students identified the distinctive qualities of the Chechen to be temperament, kind-heartedness, honour, and, as the young often do, they highlighted socio-psychological qualities. The people, in their view, are distinct by their language, culture, traditions, customs and anthropology. They believe that ‘Chechenness’ (ethnicity) is equally obvious in both men and women.7
At school, teachers attempt to influence the formation of their pupils’ self-identity. “In our lessons I say: Russia is our country, and we are only an entity within her. We are Chechens, like other peoples we must hold on to our identity. All those who live in Chechnya must be respectful of one another. All people have good qualities and we must respect that.” 8 Some drew attention to the socio-ethnic structure and the differences within territories and settlements, for example, between the inhabitants of the mountains and the flatlands.
Many believe that the teip , as a sub-ethnic division, does not play the same role in social communications and relationships. Previously, the teip used to represent a community settled in given territory with an internal organisation structure. There are around 130 teip in the Chechen society, they are numerous and their members often live dispersed throughout the territory. For over 100 years the teip has not been a socio-political entity and no longer has its internal organisation, but within the teip there are ‘communities’ based on blood relatives, which have some elements of traditional structures.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, belonging to a ‘clan’ has been especially relevant to getting a job, surrounding oneself with trusted people, and to the ability to protect them if necessary. In other words, a mental quality of the Chechens comes forth – mutual security and support.9 Another view puts the emphasis on the ‘authoritative’ teip , the dominance of clans, and the importance of their role as the regulator of personal
5 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 6 Interview ‘Social and ethnic situation’, No 1, 14.09.2001. 7 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 8 Focus group No 5 ‘Social situation post conflict’ 24.09.2011. 9 Interview ‘Social landscape of young people’s livelihoods’ No 5, 23.09.2011. 4
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
conflicts, organiser of weddings, funerals etc.10 Yet another viewpoint states that inter- teip relationships exist, but they are diminishing as modern capitalism displaces them.
A similar view was expressed by another interviewee, who believes that the foundation of the Chechens’ ethnic culture has always been the collectivism of social relationships. The principles of collective solidarity, i.e. support for one another, were a consolidating basis in the absence of state structures. These principles were upheld by morality, which permeated everything, and the highest regulator was a person’s conscience. Today, a strong secular state can be the guarantor of a strong social cohesiveness, meaning that the supreme dominance of the law and regulation of social relationships through judicial means is a necessary requirement.11
The aforementioned comments view ethnicity as a static category, as an entity with its own features. Several participants tried to present ethnicity within a dynamic. A humanitarian studies professor affirmed that traditions and customs are simultaneously preserved and developing, not in their form, but in the content of the national ethos – its character loses its shape and erodes. The processes of globalisation and spread of capitalism erode ethnicity more than any other process. The commitment to ethnicity is most strongly felt amongst the older population in the diaspora, and mostly within the diasporas living in the West and in Russia’s mainland. In general, the younger generation does not feel the need to preserve their ethnic culture. External attributes, e.g. clothes, behaviour, etc. do not yet reflect the reality of the situation.12 In other words, the youth is trying to be independent, is focused on professional achievement, the simplification of traditional norms and forms of communication.
In the context of individual and collective social identification, it is important to evaluate the image of ‘us’ and ‘other’. In its primary sense, the dichotomy does not have a confrontational character: the word ‘other’ is understood by most to mean different or belonging to something/somebody different.
Interviewees’ answers to this question:
“Unfortunately, a category of modern young people, who grew up within the republic and whose worldview is limited by the republic (or even by their village or region), see outsiders as ‘aliens’, and therefore view those whose culture differs from them as enemies. In this context, society has gone back hundreds of years to an earlier period, before active interethnic interactions of the Chechens in the 19th century.”13
10 Interview ‘Social and ethno cultural situation’ No 1, 14.09.2011. Focus group No 2 ‘Social life in the village: circumstances, problems and possibility to solve them’ 16.09.2011. 11 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 12 Interview ‘Social landscape of young people’s livelihoods’ No 5, 23.09.2011. 13 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 5
Saferworld
“The images of ‘us’ and ‘others’ evolve, they have an interethnic and interconfessional context. Yet the concepts that are becoming more and more filled with meaning are ‘rich’ and ‘poor’, ‘elite’ and ‘the rest’ etc.”14
“‘Us’ or ‘ours’ is one who thinks like ‘us’, who dresses like ‘us’. One who is not with ‘us’ is the ‘other’. The images of ‘other’ / ‘us’ come especially to the fore in the context of new rules regarding appropriate dress at work, especially for women – discrimination is obvious. Who does not agree, is not ‘a Chechen.’ If you think otherwise, your boss will tell you straight to your face that nobody keeps you in the job [against your will]. How is this not banishment? Of course, it is better to become one of ‘us’, in order to retain your socio-economic status.”15
Currently, the concept of ‘us’ and ‘other’ is most often projected onto social strata. People identify lines which distinguish people from each – the rich from the poor, from the mid-income; from those who are for or against the state; those who believe in God and those who do not. The poor are humble and behave with civility; the poor have closer relationships than the rich, both with their relatives and with people outside the family. The rich have tenser relationships, they behave like competitors, and view each other haughtily. 16
In the process of managing a society, ethnicity is used as a factor of social mobilisation, a way to solve problems, build facilities, maintain order, reproduce traditions and customs, and pass on moral and ethnic values to new generations.
Culture and language
The state’s cultural policy is aimed at preserving and reproducing historical/cultural heritage and enabling society to adhere to moral and ethnic norms. Some of these measures are viewed positively, while others are not received well and cause disagreements. One can often find an inconsistency in the social psyche between the values which are stated openly, and actual social practice. Different positions can be seen in the judgements of the interviewees. For example, it is considered unjustifiable to praise one’s culture, while simultaneously it is impossible to ignore it. Ethnic culture is a socio- historical phenomenon and can be strengthened only if it answers the society’s needs in society’s current stage of development. 17
Another viewpoint is as follows: “the internet and Western culture have a negative impact on our children. Our traditions are embedded into them by nature; they know how everything should be but Western culture tempts them. I think this spoils our children’s psyche.”18 The difficulty of adapting traditional norms to modern life is evidenced in the comments of another focus group participant: “As a teacher of the
14 Interview ‘Social landscape of young people’s livelihoods’ No 5, 23.09.2011. 15 Interview ‘Social and ethno cultural situation’ No 1, 14.09.2011. 16 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 17 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 18 Focus group No 5 ‘Social situation post conflict’ 24.09.2011. 6
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
Chechen language, and as a psychologist, I believe that there is not one lesson in which we do not touch upon the spiritual and moral. But children do not know how to communicate, although I have talked to them about traditions and customs for two years. They have not absorbed this.”19 For example, traditional norms of communications require a certain tact when addressing people of different ages – a custom more often adopted by rural children. A different experience of communication is developing in towns, one which does not quite coincide with previous norms of ethno-cultural ethics.
From various opposing viewpoints, specific problems do emerge, including those about the development of professional art forms, the upkeep of the Argun conservation park, military and civilian towers from the early Middle Ages and the organisation of leisure. However, the topic of discussion to arouse the most tension is the clothing policy in official institutions and the introduction of uniforms in universities. Some see this as a “violation of their rights, being coerced into something. Disagreements about religion are mostly caused by headscarves.” 20
Nevertheless, there are differing preferences: around 20 percent of young women want to wear the hijab , but around 50 percent do not want to wear headscarves.21 Most women and female students wear headscarves rather than the hijab , and many parents do not approve of the women wearing the hijab , as they do not see the hijab as a national dress. “Our nation has its preferences and traditions. It is fine to wear very modern clothes, but everything must be done within the framework of our nation, customs and faith.”22 A significant proportion of young women and girls, rather than married women, views wearing the headscarf as a problem. Interestingly, according to a sociological poll carried out three years ago, before wearing the headscarf became compulsory in educational institutions, both young men and women spoke favourably about headscarves, even though most women did not wear them. This demonstrates a sociological pattern of co-existence of changing social behaviour and weakened, but still existing, tenets about the headscarf as a marker of ethnic identity and exemplary decency.
It is appropriate to highlight that questions about women’s appearance have become a topic of discussion not only in Grozny, but also in other Russian towns. Recently, representatives of the Orthodox Church have been speaking out about the expediency of reinvigorating society through the imposition of a dress code.
The social context has contradictions between those who support expanding the function of the Chechen language and those who want to preserve the current dominance of the Russian language in social management and in education. This discussion has been taking place for several years, with varying intensity, amongst the creative intelligentsia, teachers, civil servants and population.
19 Focus group No 5 ‘Social situation post conflict’ 24.09.2011. 20 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 21 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 22 Focus group No 5 ‘Social situation post conflict’ 24.09.2011. 7
Saferworld
The mother tongue is viewed as one of the most significant characteristics of a people. Modern reality means that it is more important than ever to be able to speak several languages, but it is difficult to find an all-inclusive solution to this demand of the modern world. An agreement for a model of co-existence of the state and regional languages must be reached by consensus. Differing views are interesting here – some believe that the level of knowledge of the Chechen language is not high:
“If it is to be judged on a five point scale, then I would give it a three. Young people know the spoken Chechen language, and they speak it with Russian words thrown in intermittently. Nobody speaks pure Chechen.”23 Yet, the young people see this somewhat differently: “what can we say about the Chechen language? We speak it at home and to each other. At break time, we mostly speak Chechen.” 24 However, they do acknowledge that they would be unable to study faculty disciplines in Chechen, because they would not know all the necessary words in the language. Therefore, conversation would be in a mixture of Russian and Chechen, since some Russian words do not have a Chechen translation. 25 A measured approach was expressed by a teacher: “I tell the children that in order to become educated they must know Chechen and Russian equally well. A person who can speak several languages will always be more intelligent and will take the best from different nations. For example, to speak English well and Chechen badly – this is not good.” 26
Some citizens are in favour of expansion of the Chechen language in official use: “all documents could be translated into Chechen. This would support the renaissance of the Chechen language and it would make it easier to learn. We could have Chechen TV programmes only in Chechen – not half Chechen and half Russian.” (Here the interviewee is referring to the mixture of Chechen and Russian which is used in everyday life and in public announcements). 27
According to the 2002 census, 97.8 percent of Chechens in the republic speak the Chechen language (95.9 percent in the Russian Federation overall), and 82.9 percent speak Russian. These indicators reflect an increase in the Chechen population who can speak Russian of 9.5 percent in comparison to 1989, and a decrease in those who speak Chechen of 2 percent.28
According to the results of sociological polls conducted in 2003 and 2009 in the post- conflict conditions in the republic, only 27 percent of respondents wanted children to be taught in Chechen language at school compared to 67 percent in 1991. 29
The attitude to languages and social motivation is more obvious in answers to the questions ‘Which language would it be more useful for children to learn?’ and ‘Improving
23 Interview ‘Social and ethno cultural situation’ No 3, 17.09.2011. 24 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 25 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 26 Focus group No 5 ‘Social situation post conflict’ 24.09.2011. 27 Interview ‘Social and ethno cultural situation’ No 3, 17.09.2011. 28 All Russian census 2002. Goskomstat of RF. www.gks.ru 29 All three polls were conducted by the case study author. 8
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
the teaching of which language must be prioritised at school?’ 94.4 percent of people surveyed in Grozny believe that Russian would be more useful (94.4 percent), followed by English at 69.4 percent and Chechen at 58.9 percent. The answers to the second question were more varied – both children and parents said that Russian is more important to receive a good education and be successful. 30 Russian is used not only in public life, social structures, science and entrepreneurship, but also in social life and has become the formative language of Russian citizenry and ethno-national identity.
Religion
Religion occupies a special place in the hierarchy of self-identifications. Currently, Islam is actively developing in the republic. Religion has become firmly established in the epicentre of social, political and ideological life. In a context where many among the population do not work, religion has taken on the function of social organisation and social mobilisation in the framework of widely accepted moral, ethical and legal norms and values, thus encouraging the loyalty of the faithful to the state. In turn, the development of religious infrastructure, upgrading of holy places, building of mosques and the opening of the Russian Islamic University in Grozny serve as a confirmation of the republic and federal authorities’ loyalty to religion.
Every year, international Islamic conferences and widely celebrated religious holidays are held, which include aspects of secular celebrations, such as fireworks. The Prophet Mohammed’s birthday has been celebrated since 2009; large numbers of guests from Russia’s regions and abroad are invited to the celebrations. The religious leadership acknowledges that conditions for the existence of Islam, its religious bodies and rituals have never before been as favourable. All this creates an opportune setting and solidifies the foundations of the harmonious development of religious and ethical identity. However, the formation of Islamic identity currently dominates the system of ideological practice, such as sermons, round tables, conferences, plans for moral education based on religious values. Religious leaders categorise believers as both a part of the multi-faith country that is Russia, and as part of the global Muslim community. A centre for Spiritual and Moral Education has been opened in the republic, which is staffed by teachers who have had religious and secular educations. The theme of spiritual and moral education runs through the education system, the community religious network and the media.
The stabilising function of religion, which provides believers with a world view, was weakened during the conflict. Imams and believers found themselves dragged into tensions and battles between political groups. At the same time, contradictions were forming inside the religion itself – between ‘Wahhabis ’ and ‘Traditional Islam’. After the conflict, religious leaders became more active, because their roles as peace makers and stabilisers became necessary. These roles were carried out through the consecration of social norms and values through sermons and religious ceremonies. State and religious institutions began to co-operate and influence each other in impacting the social order. The authorities use the ideological support of religion, while religious leaders get material
30 Sociological study ‘Multilingual education’, Grozny, 2009. 9
Saferworld
support in creating a religious infrastructure. The work of religious figures must be especially highlighted, particularly in their involvement in family conflicts. Commissions to reconcile blood relatives were created throughout all districts and also on the republican level; they were staffed by religious figures, respected authority figures and state representatives. More than 400 families were reconciled. Reconciliation takes place on the basis of an old institution ‘Maslaat ’ – ‘Mediation’. This is a complicated procedure, which involves several stages: studying the core of the conflict, setting up contact between the conflicting sides and defining possible routes to reconciliation. The final stage is a public act of forgiveness of the person who has committed a violent crime (murder, bodily harm etc) and the reconciliation of the relatives on either side of the conflict.
Post-traumatic stress is a consequence of armed conflict, and this calls for the compensating and adapting function of religion. Religious policy pays particular attention to the inculcation of tolerance, patience and commitment to work, and other constructive initiatives among the youth. There is a Spiritual and Education Centre, headed by a religious figure and a centre of Islamic Medicine, open since 2 February 2009, which had 60,000 patients in its first year.
Conflict and the social hardships faced by the population support the marginalisation of a part of the population, and the weakening of ethno-cultural norms and values. The spiritual leadership aims to prevent these processes, strengthen historical and cultural memory and adherence to religious ideals. Another issue faced by the theologians is the recreation of cultural and civilisational identity. According to the results of a sociological study, 31 97.8 percent of the Chechens and 92.7 percent of other historically Muslim groups surveyed said they had affiliated themselves with Islam, 92.3 percent of Russians and 3.6 percent of others said they affiliated themselves with Christianity. The level of religiosity of different social and demographic strata and ethnic groups varies. Among those surveyed, 97.2 percent of Chechens said they were believers, while the same answer was given by 34.1 percent of Russians and 81.1 percent of respondents of other nationalities. 32
Ethnicity and religion are contradictory on some level, they penetrate each other and merge into one concept of culture and spiritual identity in the people’s minds. Experts do not see the possibility of confrontation in this sphere, but do point out the contradiction.
One of the experts has pointed out that contradictions within the ideology, which was formed during the Arab Middle Ages, must exist in the Chechen culture – a different socio-cultural space and ethnic group. The first President of the Chechen Republic Akhmad Kadyrov also discussed this problem, insisting on the compatibility of religion and ethnic identity. 33 The alienation of believers from official religious leaders is more pronounced. Interview participants believe that religion, or rather religious figures defend social injustice, because politics and religion have merged, and religion is now
31 Sociological study ‘The region’s socio cultural problems’, Chechen Republic, 2009, sample size: 1,000 people, study conducted by the current author. 32 Sociological study ‘The region’s socio cultural problems’, Chechen Republic, 2009, sample size: 1,000 people. 33 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 10
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
preoccupied with justifying politics. For example, the establishment of Sharia law is applied only to women, while these laws are broken by men in power. According to Sharia law, a man must provide for the woman and for the family, but society does not give the man that option. The authorities must not use the benefits which are unavailable to their ‘subjects’ i.e. the public; nevertheless, those with power show off their luxuries. 34 In another interview, participants emphasised that declarations of justice in the name of God do exist, while in reality there is no such justice – something especially felt by the youth. 35 There was also a very negative opinion in the discussion: “for many, religion is last in importance. It is devastating to see that these religious figures do not stick to our religious values themselves – this does happen around here. Yet civil consciousness is stronger on an individual level.”36
Currently, there are no conditions for open discussions and other ways for official representatives of Islam and the Wahhabis to challenge each other. There are probably not many supporters of Salafism (Wahhabism) and they do not have separate mosques, even a prayer house, or a well-known spiritual leader, and generally do not make themselves known. The republic’s authorities and the Islamic High Council of the Chechen Republic do not yet allow the existence of a platform for their ‘ideological opponents’, i.e. the Wahhabis . Society also has a negative view of them; educational institutions and districts are carrying out a religious education programme to prevent young people turning to Wahhabism and extremism.
Excessive centralisation is taking place in the religious sphere, as well as in the political; the Islamic High Council [Muftiyat] appoints district quadis , mosque imams and community quadis , reviews example texts of sermons and sends them to the imams as a basis. Following their historical and religious practice, some communities choose their own imams – the High Council [Muftiyat] may agree or could propose an alternative. The Muftiyat is an independent body of spiritual governance. The Ulema Council of the Chechen Republic, which includes mosque imams, cadis, Islamic scholars, as well as the Head of the Republic can have a certain influence on the development of the Muftiyat ideology. Chechnya’s Muslims are Sunnis and belong to different virds (religious communities or ‘fraternities’) and are divided into tariqats : Qadariyah and Naqshbandiyah. There are around 400 mosques in the Chechen Republic, and around 300,000 gather for Friday prayer. 37
Before the armed conflict of 1994 there were ten Orthodox parishes and seven churches. Now three churches are working, two of which are in modified buildings of the Naurskii and Shyolkovskoi districts, and the other one – the Church of the Archangel Gabriel – is in Grozny. It is worth noting that this church was built with help from the Chechen officers, on the donations of Armenians, the Terek Cossacks and others. An eyewitness recalls how, on 30 April 2000, in the most difficult conditions in Grozny, the town which had just been cleared of bodies, the first Easter service was held. “It was an overcast day, the
34 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 35 Interview ‘Social landscape of young people’s livelihoods’ No 5, 23.09.2011 36 Interview ‘Social and ethno cultural situation’ No 3, 17.09.2011. 37 Electronic resource viewed in 26.08.2010, available here http://dumm.ru/NEWS/_detailed/972 11
Saferworld
church walls were ruined almost up to the windows and instead of a floor, we stood on the bomb-torn ground. The people were tense – the situation in the city continues to be dangerous, and every once in a while there were rumours that somebody has been killed by a sniper. Against this background ring the guarded and triumphant voices of the priests. I still remember a feeling of some sort of detachment, like stone inside – no fear, no thoughts, only the words of the prayer can be heard clearly…God, save us sinners!” 38 The church was rebuilt and the ceremony to consecrate the restored church was held on 26 April 2009.
Intergenerational contradictions
The conflict encouraged the destruction of many connections, a significant part of the population was disoriented, and in the absence of work, the need for social organisation is compensated by increasing closeness to and identification with various social groups. For example, 48.2 percent of those surveyed in Grozny said that they feel a closeness with other people of the same generation. At the same time, a tension can be seen arising between the generations – this is not a general social phenomenon, but is more applicable to specific cases. The problem of ‘young’ / ‘old’ and ‘children’ / ‘parents’ is not at the epicentre of social consciousness, but it does cause some people to worry. A previously-unknown polarisation of age groups is developing; the groups are bound by a common solidarity on the basis of shared values and standards. A relatively full picture of relations between the generations is given by humanities specialists; they see an objective process of socio-cultural and socio-historic change. 39
However, there is no obvious tension rising between the generations. Both the older and the younger generation are feeling lost in today’s reality. There are some contradictions between them, and they are mainly in their approach to values. The values of the older generation are loaded with ideas of humanism, whereas those of the younger generation – with pragmatism. 40 The modern youth is more oriented towards wellbeing, achieving material wealth, pleasure; they are attracted to work in government departments, private enterprises, agencies and security services. 41
One of the most important intergenerational contradictions is the mismatch between expectations and reality, for both parents and children. Young people can become disappointed as a result of being unprepared for independent life. Of course, the expectations may not be justified for a myriad of other reasons: socio-economic, ethical etc. 42 One interviewee, a historian and lawyer, sees the weakening of the transfer of traditions from one generation to another, in that the older generation, i.e. the parents, spend little time educating their children, causing society to lose its cultural and national character.
38 Memories of E. Belyakova, 29.11.2010. 39 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 40 Interview ‘Social landscape of young people’s livelihoods’ No 5, 23.09.2011. 41 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. Focus group No 4 ‘Individual employment: opportunities and boundaries’ 22.09.2011. 42 Interview ‘Social landscape of young people’s livelihoods’ No 5, 23.09.2011. 12
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
However, the problem of the ‘father’ and ‘child’ dichotomy is obviously eternal. Today this is compounded by the fact that the two generations have been created by different epochs, and spiritual values which are completely inconsistent with each other. On the one hand, we have the generation which grew up prioritising effort, patriotism, contrition (in the sense of a person abiding by a moral compass), the superiority of the spiritual over the material; on the other, there is the generation which prefers materialistic values, which leads to a condescending attitude towards spiritual values. 43 As we can see, the relationship between the generations is contradictory; conflicts between them will evolve gradually, sometimes finding internal mechanisms to combine different values, and thus renew socio-cultural life.
Migration
Migration was generally characterised by a small net negative movement between 2003 and 2009, with around 1,000–1,500 people leaving per year. In January – November 2011 interregional migration constituted 5,518 new arrivals and 8,487 departures. Migration away from the Chechen Republic occurred amongst all ethnic groups. According to the results of a sociological poll taken in 2008, more than a third of Chechens asked said they wanted to leave, as did more than 40 percent of Russians. 44 A sociological study in October – November 2009 showed that Russians’ intention to migrate have remained the same, but the proportion of Chechens who wish to leave has fallen. Amongst the reasons given by Chechens and others for wanting to leave were: first and foremost – the lack of jobs, then the desire to improve one’s material wellbeing, and the lack of security; Russians named the lack of security, desire to give children a good education and the lack of faith that the situation will improve.
Migration waves in different periods had their own specific reasons and differed amongst ethnic groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, Chechens mostly left due to a lack of jobs in rural areas. In the 1990s, there was a large outflow of non-indigenous people, such as Russians, Armenians, Jews and others. As the atmosphere became tense, many felt that war was looming and saw moving to other regions as the only way to save themselves from the catastrophe. As a result of the two wars there was a final exodus of Russians. It must be noted that during the conflict, more than 200,000 Chechens also left the republic. It is probably understandable why people preferred to leave and did not stay in Chechnya, like others: from 1995 to 2005 people had to buy water every day and carry it up to the fourth or fifth floor; electricity and gas was supplied only intermittently and flats had no heating. Not every Russian and not every Chechen could understand the hard fate that befell them and left to go to a more civilised place, if they had the opportunity. However, even today, when the aforementioned problems have been left in the past, and there is a communal infrastructure, some people are overcome by the desire to leave Chechnya. Focus group participants discussed the motivations to leave; the reasons they gave can be separated into moral/judicial and social:
43 Interview ‘Ethnicity and religiosity’ No 6, 24.09.2011. 44 Sociological study ‘Russian nation’, Grozny 2008, sample size: 515 people. 13
Saferworld
“Those who are leaving feel like they live on somebody else’s land.” “Due to weak social defences, people have to look for other alternatives, especially the poor. Actually, I’m not opposed to leaving myself.” “Many want to leave. Even my friends say, they would live anywhere but here if they had a chance. Laws are broken here, there is unemployment, that’s why so many young people want to leave.” “The reasons are: lawlessness and the desire to live like normal people. The hope to make money, problems with accommodation, people have to build a home”.
The attitude towards those Russians who left during the conflict and have since returned can be called moderately positive. However people ask themselves – how can the unemployment and accommodation problems be solved when there are over 200,000 without jobs and many have nowhere to live after the war?
“If people made a good life in Russia, why come back here?” “If they come back, we will take it positively.” “Everybody wants the Russians to return, but amongst those who came here, there are some who want to go back.” “I think most people will not return, this is not a very alluring place.” “Today we are for the return of the Russian-speaking population. If they were given accommodation and jobs, they would have come back long ago.” “Regarding the Russians’ desire to come back to the republic – we are calm about it. We would prefer that qualified specialists, like doctors, teachers and economists came here.” “Our people have nowhere to go themselves.” “And how many of our people do we have that have no money to buy bread? Why don’t we help our own people?” “They will be given flats, we are not given flats.”
The people and political institutions
Reconstruction achievements cannot disguise the depth of the social problems: two thirds of those surveyed view themselves as underprivileged or poor. 45 Amongst issues to cause anxiety are unemployment, living quarters, health, high fees for municipal services, low compensation for the loss of goods and accommodation (350,000 roubles). Many people (around a third) have not yet received the compensation:
“2,000 roubles to victims and 20,000 for those killed is not paid out properly. You can get it through court orders, and even that is difficult. We know that in other parts of the Russian Federation this compensation is paid at once, and we are also a region of the Russian Federation.” 46 “My closest relatives – two brothers and a sister, basically my family, they have lost their homes and there is no hope that they will be rebuilt any time soon.” 47 “Salaries are not paid for about 5 to 6 months at government
45 Sociological study ‘The region’s socio cultural problems’, Chechen Republic, 2009, sample size: 1,000 people. 46 Focus group No 3 ‘Formation of civic institutions: outlook for establishing partnership and dialogue with the authorities’, 21.09.2011. 47 Interview ‘Position of women in society: the socio economic aspect’, No 4, 19.09.2011. 14
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
construction sites. I am personally owed 40,000. My father built many fountains in the republic. There was one project for a large sum, but the contract was never made. As a result, their team is still owed 650,000 roubles.” 48 “Honest work does not guarantee minimal comfort and does not provide it. Honesty is a sign of poverty.” 49 “If only factories and plants were being built, people would have a stable wage and feel protected.” 50 “The questions which could be solved at a government level – they are still not being solved today.” 51
The relationship of state institutions, the population and NGOs developed differently throughout the different stages of the conflict. In the last 20 years, after every power change, there is a fall of one set of social alliances and a rise of another. Such frequent change in the composition of NGOs limits the ability to form strong core community groups and gather experience of co-operating with state bodies. More than 400 public organisations are registered with the Department of Justice of the Chechen Republic; most of them sprung up during the second military campaign and after the conflict, but “only about 50 of them are actually active.” 52 The social portrait of the NGOs is characterised by the fact that they were established by people who were not only educated, but who had some sort of prominent position citizens. “There were many educated people who left the republic, and people who were worried by this situation, who went through cold, dirt, hunger, all the horror of war, we call them social activists. Those who are willing to get involved in civil action, they became a key link in the chain for the NGOs. For example, I am a former headmaster. In one organisation, we have a former biology teacher, in another, yet another teacher, in another, an engineer, in another someone unemployed. In another one we have a former policeman etc. Many NGO managers do not have a base, most don’t have their own office or colleagues.” 53
NGOs’ activities, especially those who work to defend human rights, are fraught with danger. In 2009 Natalia Estemerova, an employee of Grozny’s branch of ‘Memorial’, was kidnapped and murdered and soon after that, two other NGO workers suffered the same fate.54 As a result of these events, several human rights workers went abroad. Memorial has new staff now, but they do not yet have the experience to make a difference with their work.
Human rights violations are decreasing; in 2003 87.9 percent of those asked said that human rights in Chechnya are violated constantly and often; in 2009, the same view was given only by 17.4 percent of those asked. Feelings of personal safety improved over
48 Focus group No 4 ‘Individual employment: opportunities and boundaries’ 22.09.2011. 49 Focus group No 5 ‘Social situation post conflict’ 24.09.2011. 50 Focus group No 4 ‘Individual employment: opportunities and boundaries’ 22.09.2011. 51 Focus group No 3 ‘Formation of civic institutions: outlook for establishing partnership and dialogue with the authorities’, 21.09.2011. 52 Interview ‘NGOs and the authorities: citizens’ rights and demands,’ No 11, 28.09.11. 53 Interview ‘NGOs and the authorities: citizens’ rights and demands,’ No 11, 28.09.11. 54 Focus group No 3 ‘Formation of civic institutions: outlook for establishing partnership and dialogue with the authorities’, 21.09.2011. Interview ‘NGOs and the authorities: citizens’ rights and demands,’ No 11, 28.09.11. 15
Saferworld
time: during the day and night only 1.2 percent did not feel in danger in 2003, whereas in 2009 fully 42.9 percent did not feel in constant danger.55
According to an expert, “the feeling of freedom arises when there is freedom of speech and freedom of opinion. Today – I do not feel this, but I do feel safe. Yes, it is safer to walk on our streets, our courtyards, in the town. Now you can get around the republic at any time of day.” 56
However, there are still cases when “law enforcement agencies torture, kidnap and abuse people.” 57 For example, “drug enforcement agents beat up a guy and made him sign a confession that he is dealing drugs. Now he needs to pay 150,000 to close the case. Yet the guys who actually do this have been left alone for a bribe.” 58
Despite the positive changes which have taken place since the end of the conflict, the social arrangements are seen as unjust, as they do not guarantee freedoms and rights. Focus group participants noted that those who live in the republic do not feel free and safe:
“It is better not to express your opinion openly, especially when you are talking about certain things to some people. This is likely to lead to bad consequences. And our opinions will be ignored anyway.” 59 “There is no freedom of speech in our republic and people are not used to expressing their opinions.” 60 “An example of the authorities’ lawless behaviour: a man had a car repair shop, and it was demolished in two days. He can’t even find out why it was demolished. How can compensation even be a topic of discussion?” 61
Against this background, the illegal amassing of wealth is viewed very negatively:
“Power in this republic is the power of the mighty, because nobody else is considered. The ones with full bellies are the prosecutors and all the officials. Those who support the authorities are those who are close to those with power – their relatives, friends, and those who agree with the authorities. Those who are not happy with the authorities are also not satisfied with their lives. There are many like that here, many unemployed people.” 62
Some people have a different attitude to their social reality and defer justice, calling the guilty to answer for their crimes in the future. “The bosses and ministers will not live
55 Sociological study ‘Interests, norms, values’, Chechen Republic, 2003, sample size: 1,060 people. Sociological study ‘The region’s socio cultural problems’, Chechen Republic, 2009, sample size: 1,000 people. 56 Interview ‘Position of women in society: the socio economic aspect’, No 4, 19.09.2011. 57 Interview ‘NGOs and the authorities: citizens’ rights and demands,’ No 11, 28.09.11. 58 Focus group No 4 ‘Individual employment: opportunities and boundaries’ 22.09.2011. 59 Focus group No 4 ‘Individual employment: opportunities and boundaries’ 22.09.2011. 60 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 61 Focus group No 6 ‘Social conditions for the development of small and medium enterprises’ 27.09.2011. 62 Focus group No 3 ‘Formation of civic institutions: outlook for establishing partnership and dialogue with the authorities’, 21.09.2011. Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 16
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
forever, once they leave their positions, people will ask them: do you remember what you did?” 63
In general, reactions to social problems can be classified as either passive or active. Some do not believe in their ability to influence the situation and do not do anything to defend their interests:
“As people who believe in God, we bear it, people do not dare to openly express their dissatisfaction, because they need to work somewhere. If you start expressing your dissatisfaction with the authorities, you don’t know where you might end up tomorrow. 64 Our citizens are not confident that they can solve problems legally, through the system. If there is a conflict, then of course the court decision will favour the one who has paid the judge more.” 65 “There are those who mostly seek help in the mosques, who turn to the mullahs, or the most senior in the teip , because if you go to court, you need to hire a lawyer, pay money. There is no certainty that you will be understood.” 66
Others try to get heard by the state and court system, thousands of appeals and letters are sent to the federal and republic structures about those who have disappeared, about jobs, accommodation, land plots, lack of compensation payouts for the loss of accommodation and livelihood, months-long delays in receiving wages at building sites and more. Few young people take extreme measures because they are so dissatisfied: some go “into the woods because they are unhappy with the situation, others go there because they believe in it, others go for the money”. “Those whose family or friends have been murdered, the unemployed, those who are unsatisfied with the authorities’ behaviour and injustice become Wahhabis .” 67
The NGOs try to make and improve contacts with state agencies to help find solutions to the above problems. A human rights activist said:
“We had a meeting with the Head of the Republic in 2009. In 2011, with the Head of Parliament, and the leader of the Civil Chamber, the Minister of Internal Affairs and his deputy. We have meetings with the Internal Affairs Ministry every month. There are NGOs which are in the Civil Council of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They meet once every three months. Every month we meet at the Mayor’s office. We make these meetings happen to find solutions to problems.” 68
At the same time, those who want to protest are not united and express their dissatisfaction as separate individuals. They do not form organised groups, which express a unified position and have unified demands. Existing social organisations and regional branches of Russian political parties do not serve to express these interests, at least this is
63 Focus group No 1 ‘The role of young people of Chechnya’s social self organisation: way of life, benchmarks’ 21.09.2011. 64 Focus group No 4 ‘Individual employment: opportunities and boundaries’ 22.09.2011. 65 Focus group No 6 ‘Social conditions for the development of small and medium enterprises’ 27.09.2011. 66 Focus group No 5 ‘Social situation post conflict’ 24.09.2011. 67 Focus group No 4 ‘Individual employment: opportunities and boundaries’ 22.09.2011. 68 Interview ‘NGOs and the authorities: citizens’ rights and demands,’ No 11, 28.09.11. 17
Saferworld
how the population sees it. An expert said, “as a rule, regional branches of all-Russia parties show their existence during election campaigns, and at all other times they don’t know anything and don’t hear anything. Sometimes United Russia puts on some events, but we do not see any active political work taking place in our republic.” 69
“The legislative authority of the republic does not discuss the law making process with society: when discussions take place in the parliament of the Russian Federation, before confirming the law, the bills get sent to social organisations in order for them to make their suggestions. But I do not remember a single case when we would have seen at least one law…we had a civil society, but the state took it away, so today, the state is on its own and the people are on their own. The state doesn’t trust the people and the people don’t trust the state.”70
According to the interviewees, “peace is built on prosperity, work, a good wage, safety and the total absence of corruption and bribes. In order for peace to become entrenched in the republic, for everybody to live together peacefully…laws must be obeyed.”71 NGO representatives emphasise that when serious and effective projects get financed, then “we can show what we are capable of. Local NGOs would benefit from getting grants. Our organisations are created to defend our people. This is our aim.”72
A review of measures aimed at resolving conflicts
Since 2006 there have been active works to reconstruct the republic within the framework of the special federal programme to regenerate and develop socio-economic infrastructure in Chechnya. The programme is intended to last two to three years and is periodically renewed. Ministries and departments also have programmes aimed at developing the region. Currently, a programme has been prepared to modernise the republic’s healthcare. These changes to the social infrastructure are confirmed by the growth of the Chechen Republic’s budget. In 2003, the consolidated budget was 9,116 million roubles; in 2007–2009 it was 63,565–65,259 million roubles. 73
As well as social infrastructure, business enterprises are also being built. A Lada car plant has been built on the foundations of the former Pishemash factory in Argun, elevators are being made in Grozny’s former Orgtechnika factory, there is a tin food plant in Gudermes etc. This helps to create jobs; unemployment was at 79.7 percent in 2004, 54.1 percent in 2009 74 and 27.2 percent in December 2011.75 The high speed of building and the improving living conditions in towns and villages are well received in Chechnya and beyond. In New York, the UN awarded Grozny a prize for reconstructing the city in a short time period.
69 Interview ‘NGOs and the authorities: citizens’ rights and demands,’ No 11, 28.09.11. 70 Focus group No 3 ‘Formation of civic institutions: outlook for establishing partnership and dialogue with the authorities’, 21.09.2011. 71 Focus group No 6 ‘Social conditions for the development of small and medium enterprises’ 27.09.2011. 72 Focus group No 3 ‘Formation of civic institutions: outlook for establishing partnership and dialogue with the authorities’, 21.09.2011. 73 Electronic resource viewed on 14.03.2011, available here: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_113/IssWWW.exe/Stg/06 met.htm 74 Electronic resource viewed on 14.03.2011, available here: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b10_113/IssWWW.exe/Stg/06 met.htm 75 Putin in Gudermes, Ibid. 18
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
Social memory
The population speaks gratefully about the humanitarian aid given by international organisations and says that it would be very difficult to survive without this. People find it difficult to recall specific projects, but they recall the organisations with satisfaction: the Red Cross, UN, the Danish Refugee Council, humanitarian organisation Caritas Czech, the European Commission and others.
Focus groups held with teachers, doctors and NGO workers recalled projects more specifically. There was a programme for medical examinations for the population and health examinations for children. There were many projects and programmes in education, e.g. ‘Best Teacher of the Year’, ‘Best Student of the Year’ and ‘A Million for a School’. The government and the Mayor’s office give out various grants. As part of a federal project school No.18 has special places for the disabled. For many years, UNESCO ran a food programme, there was also a Care International programme to help the people. The Danish Refugee Council fed the population after the war. The ‘People in Need’ programme worked with schools. At school No.50, equipment for after-school activities was given out, a sewing workshop was established and people were also given equipment to start small businesses, such as sawmills and bakeries. The European Commission organised education courses for lawyers and human rights workers.
Conclusions
Despite some specific impressive achievements, the population is not satisfied with their social situation. There are major consequences of the conflict, many problems remain unsolved, including social and humanitarian traumas. People do not feel that their social and legal rights are protected, and there are still instances of unexplained detention, and clashes with underground militants.
In the post-conflict period there is the material and the social segment. The material segment, which includes the reconstruction of roads and towns, is viewed positively; but in the social sphere, a part of the inhabitants has seen their lives improve in comparison to life during the conflict, while another significant part of the population feels that it does not have social protection.
In conditions of almost total ethnic homogeneity, many life problems are viewed purely in the social context. In this socio-territorial space, ethnicity often shows itself not in an ethno-cultural, but in a socio-cultural way in everyday life. In everyday cultural life there are contradictions between retaining and reigniting traditions and customs, and the affirmation of modern citizenship concepts and norms. This contradiction is not loaded with general social discussion, but finds solutions in individual and group discussions and disputes about choosing a cultural direction.
People are determined to articulate their needs and discuss social problems; but they do not believe that they can influence the authorities. There is a social tension between the authorities and the population, which is socially vulnerable. This tension is dominating 19
Saferworld and is the determining factor in the context of the ethno-cultural mosaic of religious and other problems. Religion has become a component of managing and organising society; it is at the epicentre of socio-cultural life and is supported by the state, which aids the development of religious infrastructure.
The dominance of authoritarianism, concentration of power in the hands of the leader and limited democracy are all evident in social administration. This strategy can solve problems which require mobilisation, but does not have a historical perspective. The inability to defend oneself legally, the inability to defend one’s rights in court and the lack of opportunity for free expression are all serious problems. The current authorities have a monopoly on territorial and economic power, which limits competition and entrepreneurship.
Social/judicial problems of the region are neither impressive nor important in the historical perspective in comparison to the achievements made in rebuilding cities, where human rights are not a priority. However, in their entirety they strengthen social tension, dissatisfaction and lack of trust in the authorities.
After the conflict, society is developing in a contradictory fashion, which in turn deepens social stratification, where a small group is becoming richer and the majority is becoming poorer. Factors like the need for survival, migration, religion and the moral belief that it is inappropriate to express dissatisfaction following successful reconstruction process overshadow social dissatisfaction.
At the same time, the gathering of negative energy, based on the marginalisation of a non-demanding society, could lead to destabilisation. Therefore, it is very important to give multi-faceted support to NGOs, encourage the formation of social institutions and social consciousness, and encourage people’s ability to solve their problems through civil and legal mechanisms.
20
The North Caucasus: Views from Within
This case study is part of a wider research project implemented by Saferworld in the North Caucasus.
The main report, ‘The North Caucasus: views from within. People’s perspectives on peace and security’ is available at:
Case studies from the individual republics can be accessed on the Saferworld website: www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/chechnya www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/northossetia www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/kabardino-balkaria www.saferworld.org.uk/PPP/dagestan
All research was conducted as part of the ‘People’s Peacemaking Perspectives’ programme. The People’s Peacemaking Perspectives project is a joint initiative implemented by Conciliation Resources and Saferworld and financed under the European Commission’s Instrument for Stability. The project provides European Union institutions with analysis and recommendations based on the opinions and experiences of local people in a range of countries and regions affected by fragility and violent conflict.
© Saferworld March 2012. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution. Saferworld welcomes and encourages the utilisation and dissemination of the material included in this publication.
This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of Saferworld and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union.
21