The Gulf Military Balance: Volume II: the Missile and Nuclear Dimensions

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The Gulf Military Balance: Volume II: the Missile and Nuclear Dimensions The Gulf Military Balance: Volume II The Gulf Military Balance: Volume The Gulf Military ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN AND BRYAN GOLD AND BRYAN ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN Balance 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW| Washington DC 20036 Volume II: The Missile and t. (202) 887-0200 | f. (202) 775-3199 | www.csis.org Nuclear Dimensions ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Lanham, MD 20706 t. (800) 462-6420 | f. (301) 429-5749 | www.rowman.com AUTHORS Cover photo: http://www.flickr.com/photos/yeowatzup/4324097467/. Anthony H. Cordesman ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Bryan Gold ISBN 978-1-4422-2793-4 Ë|xHSLEOCy227934z v*:+:!:+:! A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy JANUARY 2014 Blank The Gulf Military Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions Authors Anthony H. Cordesman Bryan Gold A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy January 2014 ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK About CSIS For over 50 years, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has worked to develop solutions to the world’s greatest policy challenges. Today, CSIS scholars are providing strategic insights and bipartisan policy solutions to help decisionmakers chart a course toward a better world. CSIS is a nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center’s 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded at the height of the Cold War by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS was dedicated to finding ways to sustain American prominence and prosperity as a force for good in the world. Since 1962, CSIS has become one of the world’s preeminent international institutions focused on defense and security; regional stability; and transnational challenges ranging from energy and climate to global health and economic integration. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn has chaired the CSIS Board of Trustees since 1999. Former deputy secretary of defense John J. Hamre became the Center’s president and chief executive officer in April 2000. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2014 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-4422-2793-4 (pb); 978-1-4422-2794-1 (eBook) Center for Strategic & International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... IX The Near-Term Impact of the Iranian Missile Threat ........................................................................ xii The Mid and Longer Term Risk of an Iranian Nuclear Weapon and a Nuclear-Armed Missile Threat ........................................................................................................................................................... xiii The Uncertain Prospects for Effective Negotiations, Agreements, and Verifiable Arms Control..... xiv The Uncertain Prospects for Containment ......................................................................................... xv Looking Beyond Negotiations ........................................................................................................... xvi The Key Provisions of the November 2013 Interim Agreement ................................................................................... xvii Enforcement, Verification and Iranian Compliance ....................................................................................................... xix US Enforcement Capabilities and Israel Threats ............................................................................................................. xx IRAN’S MISSILE PROGRAMS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE GULF AND REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCE ......................................................................................................................................................... 1 Source: Steven A. Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, Congressional Research Service R42849, December 6, 2012, p. 15. .................................................................................................................................... 2 US Assessments of Iran’s Missile Programs ............................................................................................ 2 Iran’s Shorter Range Missile and Rocket Programs ................................................................................. 4 Source: Steven A. Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Programs, Congressional Research Service R42849, December 6, 2012, p. 16. .................................................................................................................................... 5 Iran’s Shortest Range Missiles ............................................................................................................. 6 Zelzal (Meteor or Shooting Star) ...................................................................................................................................... 7 Fateh-110 (Conqueror) ...................................................................................................................................................... 8 Khalij Fars and Guided Ballistic Missiles ......................................................................................................................... 9 The Shahab 1 and Shahab 2 ............................................................................................................... 10 Shahab-1 (Meteor 1) ....................................................................................................................................................... 10 Shahab-2 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 11 Military Potential and Effectiveness .................................................................................................. 13 Current Combat Role ...................................................................................................................................................... 13 Attacks Across the Gulf .................................................................................................................................................. 13 Iran’s Potential War Fighting Capabilities ...................................................................................................................... 15 Iran’s Medium and Long-Range Missile Programs ................................................................................ 15 Key Uncertainties in Making an Assessment...................................................................................... 17 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles ....................................................................................................... 27 Shahab-1 (Meteor 1) ....................................................................................................................................................... 27 Shahab-2 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 28 Longer Range MRBM/IRBMs ............................................................................................................ 28 Shahab-3 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 29 Ghadir-1 .......................................................................................................................................................................... 33 Sejjil-2/Ashura ................................................................................................................................................................ 36 BM-25 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 39 Stacked Threats and Basing on Mobile Launchers and in Silos ........................................................ 40 Iranian Statements About its Medium and Longer-Range Missile Programs .................................... 42 Iran’s Possible Search for an ICBM ....................................................................................................... 45 Cruise Missiles ....................................................................................................................................... 47 Assessing Warfighting Capabilities of Iran’s Current and Future Medium and Longer-Range Missile Force ....................................................................................................................................................... 50 The Accuracy and Reliability Challenge ............................................................................................ 51 The Range-Payload Challenge ..........................................................................................................
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