ISRAEL AND THE WMD THREAT: LESSONS FOR EUROPE By Cameron S. Brown*
Having faced a growing threat from the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for the past several decades, Israel has been forced to make counter-proliferation a top national defense priority.(1) It has invested billions of dollars in developing a multi-layered national defense strategy that is arguably the most highly developed of any country on earth. As such, Israel's experience in this field can offer several important lessons (from its mistakes and successes) for European countries that are only now coming under the range of several rogue countries' long-range missile systems, not to mention the growing threat of WMD terrorism
(This article was originally written for a project and conference on "Countering Threats in the Era of Mass Destruction: Accounts from the Middle East and Europe," co-sponsored by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.)
THE ISRAELI THREAT Secondly, in any conflict, Israel is PERCEPTION heavily dependent on a system of calling up In order to understand what policies reserve solders to reinforce its small Israel has devised and employed in order to standing army. Should one of Israel's counter WMD proliferation, it is imperative adversaries use a WMD in the first few to consider the threats Israeli security hours of hostilities--and especially if it hit planners have taken into consideration near a mobilization center--it would when formulating these strategies.(2) unquestionably impede any efficient The gravity of the situation for Israel lies mobilization of the reserve forces. An in a combination of factors that play to attack on its airforce bases could be Israel's disadvantage. The first factor is the similarly disabling.(4) country's small geographic size (just over Lastly, almost every country that Israel 20,000 square kilometers) and its small might have to confront in war is believed to number of highly valuable targets (e.g. possess WMD of some sort, many are three major seaports, one major civilian attempting to enhance their capabilities, and airport, and four central power stations). some have directly threatened Israel with This is then compounded by the country's their use. Before the war in Iraq, security extremely high population density, with planners believed the country to be within two-thirds of its residents living within a range of over 1,000 surface-to-surface 75km radius in three major metropolitan missiles (SSMs), mostly Scuds that can be areas.(3) These factors would increase the armed with non-conventional--mainly temptation to actually use WMD, knowing chemical--warheads.(5) Even worse, most that the consequences of their use could of these missiles would be fired from have a major strategic effect, possibly even mobile launchers, which (as the 1991 Gulf ending the country's very existence. The War demonstrated) are much more difficult country's small size might also persuade an to eliminate than fixed launchers.(6) While adversary that it is possible to destroy any many of the following estimates have been potential Israeli second-strike capacity with amended lately as new information has a big enough initial surprise attack. come to light, a consideration of what Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe
Israeli policymakers believed were the while Libya did possess advanced designs WMD threats the country faced is important for nuclear weapons and several undeclared in understanding why they chose to pursue sites whose purpose was to create nuclear the policies they did. weapons-grade material, the country was Starting closest to Israel's borders, Syria extremely dependent on foreign suppliers, is considered to have an advanced chemical and at the very earliest, was several years weapons program (capable of producing away from producing an indigenous nuclear sarin and VX nerve gas) and a small device.(14) biological weapons program. Syria can Still, the threats that have concerned deliver these weapons via air-dropped Israel most have been from Iraq and Iran. bombs or Scud-B, -C, and eventually -D While today's pundits claim that Saddam missiles--the last having a range covering Husayn's WMD was all a figment of the all of Israel's territory, even from Syria's Bush Administration's imagination, after northeast corner.(7) To Israel's south, Egypt the Gulf War in 1991, the situation was was the first country in the region to obtain exactly the opposite: UNSCOM and and use WMD (using mustard gas in International Atomic Energy Agency Yemen), and it is still believed to possess a (IAEA) inspectors were surprised by significant chemical weapons (CW) exactly how far advanced the Iraqi program and is suspected of also possessing programs were. The Iraqi nuclear effort was a small biological weapons (BW) program, especially noteworthy for its immense size, as well as Scud-B, Project T, and possibly financial and human resources investment, even Scud-C missiles for delivery.(8) multi-directional approach, and that despite Looking further afield, Libya and Saudi all of the above, it was chiefly able to Arabia each have pursued small, but not remain undetected by Western intelligence insignificant WMD programs. While it throughout the 1980s.(15) With this possesses anywhere from 40-60 CSS-2 experience in mind, and with the medium-range missiles (with the longest knowledge of what technical progress the range of any missile force in the region),(9) Iraqis had made, almost all assessments Saudi Arabia is not thought to possess throughout the 1990s believed that without nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons at intrusive inspections, Iraq could have a present.(10) Before it admitted to the extent nuclear weapon within a few years; if they of its proliferation activities, most observers obtained highly enriched uranium from considered Libya's WMD program tiny and abroad, that time was thought to be under a rudimentary compared with those of any of year.(16) the other major regional actors.(11) For this Iraq admitted to creating about a dozen reason few took seriously Israeli Prime biological agents in vast quantities, most Minister Ariel Sharon's comments in importantly 8,500 liters of anthrax.(17) October 2003 that "One would not be Reportedly, Iraq even weaponized about 25 surprised if Libya would be the first Arab surface-to-surface missile warheads and country [to] have nuclear weapons."(12) 166 air bombs with BW agents.(18) This However, when Libya revealed everything amount, as Richard Butler (former head of in its possession two months later, Libya's UNSCOM) claimed, was enough to "blow progress towards a nuclear weapon was away Tel Aviv."(19) In addition to mustard, much more substantial than previously sarin, soman, and tabun gas, Iraq's CW suspected, and did indeed fall in line with program had also developed 3.5 tons of VX the prime minister's comment. Similarly, by nerve agent (of which a single droplet can the end of the decade the Libyan program, be lethal within minutes), beginning as with cooperation from North Korea, was on early as 1985.(20) its way to producing 50-100 long-range In April 1990, not only did Iraq test ballistic missiles capable of hitting Israel flight its Scud missile with a chemical and most of Europe.(13) Nevertheless, warhead, but Saddam gave a speech where Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
Cameron S. Brown he admitted to possessing binary chemical to possess a small BW program that may be weapons and threatening that, "By God, we capable of producing small quantities of will make fire eat up half of Israel if it tries agent.(26) [anything] against Iraq."(21) Having used While Iran reasonably claimed it needed chemical weapons without hesitation in his these weapons in order to deter future Iraqi war against Iran and against the Kurds in WMD use, what makes Iran's WMD 1988, these were not considered empty development so worrisome is its intensely threats. With all this in mind, it is easy to resolute efforts to obtain missiles with understand why Israelis panicked as ranges far beyond any target in Iraq. In Saddam fired 39 Scuds at the country only addition to its fleet of Scuds, Iran has also eight months after his overt threat, and why been developing several medium range that crisis caused the country to begin ballistic missiles, including the Shihab-3 investing enormous sums to counter such a (range 1300km, 700kg payload), Shihab-4 threat in the future. In fact, without Saddam (estimated range 2000km, 1000kg payload), even using one chemical or biological and Shihab-5 (estimated range 5,500km), weapon and with only 8 of 39 missiles all of which have been developed with the actually hitting populated areas, Israel still aid of North Korean, Chinese, and Russian suffered two direct deaths, 230 wounded, of technology.(27) The Shihab-3 has not only them one seriously, nine moderately, and 60 been tested nearly a dozen times (though were hospitalized. Indirectly, 4 died of heart some tests were failures), but Israel believes attacks, seven died from suffocation due to that Iran also has one to two dozen missiles improper use of their gas masks, 226 people that are currently operational.(28) injected themselves with atrophine, and 539 It is important to note that Israel was not suffered from shock and anxiety. The total necessarily the primary reason why these financial losses to property were estimated countries developed or acquired WMD or at roughly $40 million.(22) missile delivery systems, and so it is While Israel can now consider the Iraqi difficult to claim that this alarming situation threat to have been eliminated (at least for is all the result of a prisoners dilemma the foreseeable future), the Iranian threat whereby Israel's actions have caused its has only worsened. Recent Iranian adversaries to seek WMD. For example, admissions to the IAEA have given Iran's main reason has been its experience credence to the claims of Iran's critics that it during its eight-year war with Iraq, in which has been developing a crash nuclear it was hit mercilessly by Iraqi chemical program despite its NPT obligations; and weapons. Today, a prime rationale is its indeed, Iran appears to be following the concern about the United States.(29) Iraq Iraqi model of diversifying its nuclear sites and Saudi Arabia have pursued WMD in as well as its enrichment and reprocessing order to deter the more populous Iran. methods.(23) Recent Israeli intelligence When Egypt deployed CW, it did so in assessments see Iran deploying nuclear Yemen, not in the Sinai. The problem is warheads no later than 2006.(24) that even if the primary motivating spark Even without Iran obtaining nuclear was not Israel, it is all too convenient to add weapons, it is already considered to have Israel onto these countries' lists of threats one of the largest CW programs in the their WMD is meant to counter once they Third World--with several thousand tons of have made the decision to acquire these sulfur mustard, phosgene, and cyanide weapons. In fact, should a comprehensive agents in stock and a capacity to produce an Arab-Israeli settlement come along, it is additional 1,000 tons of these agents each highly doubtful that any country will roll year. Moreover, Iran has weaponized these back its WMD programs, because distrust is agents, putting them into artillery mortars, the common denominator amongst rockets, aerial bombs, and possibly even countries in the Middle East. Scud warheads.(25) Iran is also considered
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The last element of Israel's threat perception is the threat of WMD terrorism, Yet, as Eli Karmon pointed out, this is either by Palestinians or al-Qa'ida more a matter of psychological than actual operatives--a threat which has grown warfare. Biological agents are extremely significantly during the past decade. While problematic for terrorist groups to develop there is no unclassified evidence that the and deploy, both because of the danger of Palestinians have taken active steps towards infecting oneself and the great difficulty in procuring WMD, the thought has at least dispersing the agent. BW has, in fact, only crossed their minds. In March 2003, one been used twice by terrorists--and even then captured Fatah terrorist told his with very limited achievements.(32) Even interrogators that among the attacks his cell the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult, which had planned to carry out, one involved used sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system using an explosive device that would in 1995 (the only known use of a chemical disperse HIV-infected blood. However, for agent by terrorists), decided to abandon its technical reasons, such an attack would plans to use biological agents precisely clearly not have been very successful, and because of the inherent difficulties and the IDF and Shin Bet security services both risks.(33) agreed that the plan had not reached a stage Al-Qa'ida and groups linked to it may be where it could have been practically closer to using WMD in terrorist attacks. implemented.(30) There is significant evidence that al-Qa'ida Another example of the potential for successfully developed and tested cyanide Palestinian WMD terror occurred in August and sarin.(34) Still, as John Hamre points 2001, when Tawfiq Abu Khosa, Deputy out, while many groups may be capable of Chairman of the Palestinian Center for developing these agents, "the tasks Information Sources in Gaza, published an associated with weaponization [of BW or article in the Lebanon-based Palestinian CW] generally go beyond the skill of weekly Al-Manar, in which he wrote: amateurs."(35) A "dirty" or radiological device would arguably be easier for ...serious thinking has begun for a terrorists to weaponize and use (though while about developing a Palestinian harder to transport undetected). By simply weapon of deterrence. . . . detonating conventional explosives [Obtaining this weapon's] primary wrapped in radiological material, terrorists components, whether biological or are able to disperse the radioactive particles chemical, is possible without too over wide areas, causing death, illness, and much effort, let alone the fact that the contamination of the area. Evidence there are hundreds of experts who does, in fact, suggest that terrorists have are capable of handling them and been moving in this direction. For instance, [using] them as weapons of a Thai national was arrested in Bangkok in deterrence, thus creating a balance June 2003 with 30kg of cesium in his of horror in the equation of the possession. Following the man's arrest, Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Eliza Mannigham-Buller, head of Britain's A few bombs or death-carrying MI5 espionage agency, said it is "only a devices will be enough, once they matter of time" until a terrorist attack is are deployed in secluded areas and perpetrated using a dirty bomb.(36) directed at the Israeli water resources or the Israeli beaches, let ISRAEL'S COUNTER- alone the markets and the residential PROLIFERATION STRATEGY centers. [This will be carried out] Israeli policymakers first began to devise without explosions, noise, blood, or a counter-proliferation strategy in the mid- pictures that are used to serve the 1960s, as it watched its main adversary, Israeli propaganda.(31) Egypt, use CW during the war in Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
Cameron S. Brown
Yemen.(37) By the end of the first Gulf the attack, Iraq had declared that it would War three decades later, Israel had block any IAEA inspections of its weapons developed a multi-layered strategy that facilities.(39) rested on four pillars: non-proliferation, In addition to Israeli intelligence deterrence, active defensive, and passive (or concluding that the reactor was designed to civil) defense. produce Hiroshima-sized nuclear devices, Saddam Husayn had explicitly declared (in Non-Proliferation an attempt to ease Iranian fears) that Israel The first pillar of Israel's counter- was the intended target of its future proliferation strategy is to deny its weapon. Knowing that the plant would adversaries the opportunity to develop become operational in September, after WMD in the first place, or in other words, which destroying the core would have an active non-proliferation effort. First and created massive radioactive fallout over foremost, this means constant gathering of Baghdad and thus would have been intelligence, and when appropriate, sharing politically impossible to hit, Israel decided this intelligence with other governments or to strike before the core's scheduled agencies such as UNSCOM or the IAEA in completion in July.(40) Critics would order to increase the diplomatic pressure on argue, however, that the timing was these countries or block certain sales or extremely suspicious as it also came three technology transfers. Sometimes Israel will weeks before Israel's general election, in leak intelligence or false intelligence to which Prime Minister Menachem Begin's media outlets in order to bring these party was running in an extremely tight programs into the spotlight.(38) race. However, Israel is at a disadvantage in Recently, there were stories in the press this area. On the one hand, it runs the risk about supposed Mossad plans to sabotage of highlighting its own WMD programs and Iranian nuclear facilities (or alternatively, to bringing unwanted attention and criticism have the Israeli Air Force repeat its 1981 whenever its adversaries' arsenals are bombing operation), hinting that Israel has mentioned. On the other hand, because of not abandoned the pre-emption option.(41) Israel's general diplomatic isolation, it Similarly, some accused Israel of usually is unable to garner support for UN sabotaging the Libyan chemical weapons resolutions of its own. plant when a fire broke out there in 1990, With such a poor diplomatic hand to though the fire was later believed to be a play, Israel has also decided it prudent to Libyan hoax perpetrated to avert an incorporate an element of pre-emption in its American pre-emptive strike on the plant. non-proliferation strategy should its diplomatic efforts fail. The most famous Deterrence Israeli act of pre-emption was the strike on When non-proliferation efforts have Iraq's Osiraq (Tammuz) nuclear reactor on failed, the next pillar of defense is June 7, 1981 Israel undertook this establishing a deterrent threat. Deterrence operation after it failed in its diplomatic can be defined as using the threat of severe efforts to convince France to end its retaliation to convince one's adversary that construction of the reactor. Israel had been it would lose more than it would gain by especially concerned about the reactor's undertaking a certain course of action. purpose for three reasons: first, with one of Strategies of conventional deterrence have the world's largest known oil reserves, Iraq been a cornerstone of Israeli policy since surely did not need nuclear energy. Second, the state's establishment, and in general, the reactor used highly enriched uranium-- have enjoyed a fair degree of success. necessary for weapons production--instead Yitzhak Rabin once stated Israel's particular of alternative reactors that run on low deterrence strategy in the following terms: enriched uranium. Third, even a year before
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If the worst an Arab leader can 4,800km and 1000kg payload). Israel also perceive as happening as a result of possesses the Delilah, Gabriel-4, and a war he initiates is that he will not Harpoon cruise missiles (with ranges of achieve his goal, then this is 120-400km), and several fighter jets with insufficient deterrence on Israel's ranges exceeding 1,000km--most notably part. Rather, an Arab leader. . . must the new F-15I, whose range is believed to constantly bear in mind that, should be 3,500km.(43) Over the past few years, he initiate war, his armed forces will there have also been contradictory reports be badly clobbered, along with in the press about whether the new Dolphin sensitive targets causing disruption submarine has the capability to fire nuclear- to the local population, and in a way tipped missiles.(44) that will endanger his regime. The other important aspect of Israel's Otherwise, our deterrence will be deterrence strategy has been that it has minimal. . . . largely left its capabilities and threats What kind of army is required by opaque. While frequently promising Israel. . . to fulfill this formulation massive retaliation in the event of a WMD of deterrence? To be explicit: armed strike against it, Israel has never officially forces with the greatest offensive said what it has at its disposal to retaliate potential. For if attacked, we must with, nor has it elaborated specifically how be able to immediately transfer the it would retaliate to a WMD strike (e.g. war to enemy territory, to destroy as would it use nuclear or chemical weapons much of the aggressor's armed in retaliation for a CW strike). One forces as possible, and to pose a illustration of a typical Israeli warning was credible strategic threat to that given in July 1988 by then-Defense country's very regime. . . . Again, Minister Rabin, as a result of the increasing the basic strategy of Israel is use of CW by Iraq against Iran and its own defensive, to prevent war, to deter Kurds: from war. Yet, ironically, the best means for preserving the status quo One of our fears is that the Arab is by possessing this ultimate world and its leaders might be offensive capability in reserve. . deluded to believe that the lack of .(42) international reaction to the use of missiles and gases gives them some When it came to forming a policy to kind of legitimization to use them. deter Israel's enemies from using WMD, it They know they should not be has followed a similar logic. Israel is deluded to believe that, because it is thought to have anywhere from 100-400 a whole different ball game when it nuclear weapons (possibly including comes to us. If they are, God forbid, thermonuclear weapons), mustard and they should know we will hit them nerve agents, and possibly even a biological back 100 times harder.(45) weapons program. Israel has also developed an extensive range of delivery systems. Its If there is one serious problem with ballistic missiles include an estimated 50 Israel's deterrent strategy, it is that Israel Jericho-2 missiles (1,500km range and has failed to build reinforced silos for its 1,000kg payload, on mobile launchers); 50 missile fleet, and has instead sufficed with Jericho-1 missiles (500km range and 500kg storing both its Jericho-2 missiles and payload); MGM-52 Lance missiles (130km nuclear weapons (both warheads and range and 450kg payload); and gravity bombs) in limestone caves that unconfirmed reports of Jericho-3 program cannot be reinforced. Since the missile site under development using Shavit space covers an area smaller than 24km-square, it launch vehicle technologies (range up to is possible that just a few nuclear-tipped Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
Cameron S. Brown missiles could neutralize Israel's missile of "massive retaliation": doomsday threat and damage the nearby bunkers weapons cannot be used in retaliation for holding the air force's nuclear gravity non-catastrophic blows. In other words, bombs.(46) While Israel has most likely when Saddam struck with conventionally found this step unnecessary until today, armed ballistic missiles, he made it so Israel with Iran on the verge of gaining a nuclear could not legitimately respond with its weapon, Israel may now have to reconsider WMD deterrent, which the international that decision. community would have considered overkill. Without question, the most difficult Secondly, while normally Israel might have period for Israel's deterrence doctrine came retaliated with a conventional military with the 1990-1 Gulf War. There are those strike, the Gulf War also created a situation who have argued that Israeli deterrence Israeli planners had not taken into account suffered as a result of the Gulf War. These previously: not all conflicts will be solely arguments are usually focused on the claim between Israel and its adversary, but may that because Israel did not retaliate against include complex international alignments the Iraqi Scud attacks, other Arab regimes that could be greatly affected by any Israeli will now think that they could do likewise military action. In effect, there are times without facing Israeli retribution. when all offensive operations are not This analysis is mistaken on several politically-feasible options. This, then, is counts. To begin with, it is critical to point the primary motivation for Israel's focused out that in 1990-1, Saddam Husayn fired drive to acquire an effective active defense Scuds at Israel precisely because he was option. hoping that Israel would retaliate as promised. Husayn was following a strategy Active Defensive of escalation vis-a-vis Israel because he Should Israel's adversaries obtain WMD believed that Israeli involvement in the war and not be deterred from using them, the would likely force the coalition to collapse- third pillar of Israel's strategy is generally -or at least force its Arab members to referred to as active defensive. This strategy desert.(47) Further, it can be argued that the aims to thwart WMD from successfully combination of American and Israeli hitting its intended target. deterrence was effective at preventing To begin to define and understand active Husayn from equipping his Scuds with defense, it is important to begin by noting chemical warheads, as he realized that the that while there are many conceivable ways price might be a nuclear strike on Baghdad. to deliver WMD, most are unlikely to And while Israel might have retaliated for succeed because they are easy to spoil or the conventional missile strike, it was have short ranges. The three delivery highly unlikely that Israel's conventional methods that are the most difficult to stop retaliation would even be felt given the are ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial coalition's massive aerial bombardment vehicles (UAVs), and terrorist attack.(48) then underway. Finally, as the past decade Policymakers, however, throughout the has demonstrated, no Arab regime has 1990s frequently forgot the second and become convinced that it could fire ballistic third (and likewise dedicate relatively little missiles (and especially ones armed with funds to their defense) when discussing WMD) at Israel without suffering massive active defense, thus spoke of active defense retaliation. In other words, they all saw the as equating anti-missile systems--those 1990-1 Gulf War as an exceptional state of systems which aim to disable missiles affairs. before they reach their targets. This said, the Gulf War did expose two However, improved border control, for unexpected problems with Israel's defense instance, is also a form of active defense-- doctrine. First, Israel encountered a similar and a critical one at that, as it can stop dilemma to that faced by America's doctrine WMD from crossing a country's borders in
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe order to be used in terror attacks. Many The Patriot was first deployed in Israel countries have already taken steps to detect in 1990-1 with its use in the Gulf War, as radioactive material at border crossings, and the U.S. attempted to give its ally some way the equipment is quite sensitive. For to deal with the Iraqi missile threat, other example, in May 1999, Bulgarian customs than a counterstrike. At first, the system officials (trained by the U.S.) seized 10 was considered a raving success, as during grams of highly enriched uranium.(49) Of the 47 engagements over Saudi Arabia and course, detecting chemical weapons is Israel, it was originally claimed to have much more difficult, and biological accomplished 45 hits.(54) Yet, as Theodore weapons even more so, because neither Postol, a researcher at MIT would later give off radiation and because BW in write, "While the U.S. Army and Raytheon particular requires only a small quantity to (the Patriot's manufacturer) initially be effective. Israel has been a leader in claimed that the Patriot had successfully employing advanced technology at its intercepted all but 4 percent of the Scuds it borders. For several years it has used engaged, further revelations would be quite sophisticated UV equipment to detect the opposite." Israelis suggested soon after conventional bomb-making material the war that the real success rate was (similar to what has been installed in somewhere between zero and twenty airports after the September 11 attacks), and percent.(55) recently it has begun to use biometrics to The U.S. Army would eventually revise identify those entering from the West Bank its assessment, stating that it was highly and Gaza, as well as returning Israeli confident that 25 percent of Patriot-Scud citizens at Ben Gurion airport.(50) engagements resulted in warhead kills. Yet, In terms of missile defense, there are amazingly, for only a little over a third of two types.(51) The type that most people this number (i.e. 9 percent of the total) did are familiar with is the anti-missile missile the Army actually have direct evidence of a systems--especially the Patriot and the kill, with the rest relying on radar tracking Arrow. There are, however, about a dozen data that showed the Patriots simply came such systems that are in development, close enough to the Scuds to potentially almost all of them by or in cooperation with destroy them.(56) While no assessment is the United States.(52) The second type of very reliable (because the Army did not anti-missile system is what is known as collect performance data during the Boost Phase Intercept (BPI). war),(57) the available evidence does seem to support Postol's contention that the "first The Patriot wartime experience with tactical ballistic The original Patriot was an air defense missile defense resulted in what may have system that could track about 100 targets at been an almost total failure to intercept the same time at distances of up to 90km quite primitive attacking missiles."(58) away. With 5 to 8 launchers and 20-32 Why were the Patriots so ineffective? interceptor missiles, the Patriot could The first problem is the difficulty of the automatically manage the engagement of 9 task of knocking down a missile during targets, sending commands and tracking descent. On the one hand, the incoming information to each interceptor missile as missile (Scud) may be traveling at speeds of they engaged targets.(53) While originally 3600 to 4400mph, while the interceptor is geared to defend against "air-breathing" also traveling at 3700mph (in the case of targets (i.e. aircraft and cruise missiles), the Patriot-2), with a total closing speed of with Saddam Husayn threatening to use 7300-8100mph. This means that the Scud missiles to deliver WMD payloads, its interception is happening at a thousandth of mission changed in 1990 and the Patriot a second.(59) The Patriot, it appears, was became the world's first operating anti- not up to the task: researchers analyzing theater ballistic missile system. video following the Gulf War found that the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
Cameron S. Brown median minimum miss distance was still contain burning rocket propellant. roughly 600 meters (in order to stand a When that hit the ground, the detonating reasonable chance of success, the miss had rocket fuel and high explosives in the to be no more than a few tens of Patriot warhead could "cause greater meters).(60) ground damage than an intact Scud."(67) This problem is compounded ironically Reuven Pedatzur interviewed a high- by the primitiveness of the Scud, which is ranking IDF officer who said that four based on German V-2 rocket Patriot interceptors impacted in Israel due technology.(61) When the Scud-B range to a failure in their self-destruct was extended by the Iraqis by adding a mid- mechanism.(68) section to lengthen the missile and give it Lastly, the Patriot system was apparently more fuel, it undermined the structural far from bug-free. Originally deployed in integrity of the missile, and so they usually 1982 as a defense against aircraft and cruise broke apart when re-entering the missiles, the Patriot underwent two atmosphere (generally at an altitude of 12- significant upgrades before its use in the 18km).(62) Because the Patriot would home Gulf War (and would subsequently undergo in on the incoming missile using surface- another massive overhaul thereafter). This based radar (it attempted to intercept at 4- new upgrade, the PAC-2, was originally 12km altitude), when the Scud would break scheduled for delivery in January 1991, but apart, it would in effect create multiple due to the circumstances, was rushed to radar decoys. With the tail end creating a U.S. forces four months ahead of time.(69) larger radar cross-section than the front end Arguably as a result, the system required (which contained the warhead), the three software upgrades during the period interceptor generally targeted the wrong preceding Desert Storm (i.e. Desert Shield), piece of missile debris.(63) and two additional upgrades after hostilities Also, by falling apart into so many began.(70) These upgrades included pieces, the missile was able to spread its corrections to a timing error on the radar-- damage over a much wider area due to the an error which may have caused the failure falling debris. This danger was made even at Dhahran in which a Scud hit a U.S. worse, ironically enough, when the Patriot barracks, killing 28 U.S. solders and began engaging the Scuds, as its own injuring 98 more.(71) In addition, once the fragmentation warhead would not destroy war was over, it was discovered that there the missile as often as it would split it into was a serious miscalculation in the sections or many additional pieces.(64) In interceptors' warhead fuse--as it was set for fact, while the Patriot sometimes scored "a the slower speed of a Scud missile and not hit," it rarely if ever scored "a kill."(65) the faster Iraqi al-Husayn variant. In large With a falling 1500-pound missile fuel tank part due to these errors, Israeli sources hitting with the velocity of a subcompact reported no successful intercepts during the automobile dropped from half a kilometer course of the war.(72) in the air, and with each coke can-sized In short, while the Patriot was a piece of debris able to penetrate a five-inch- politically and psychologically useful tool, thick piece of concrete, this debris was helping to give countries like Israel, Saudi extremely dangerous. Even a successful Arabia, and Turkey some sense of control Patriot intercept at 5.5km altitude could and a way to fight back against Saddam's result in a trail of debris 5km long.(66) Scuds--and indeed, it did help keep Israel As if this were not enough, another out of the war--the system itself was a reason for the Patriot increasing damage serious failure. Moreover, its failures was that the Patriot itself would pointed out the extreme challenges facing occasionally fall back to the ground (and the scientists and engineers who have tried there were usually two or three patriots to create an effective missile defense. fired for every Scud), and would frequently
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PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile system. Moreover, it Following its failure in the 1991 Gulf was designed in the aftermath of the 1990-1 War, the Patriot system underwent a major Gulf War, and so was able to incorporate upgrade, and would afterwards be known as the lessons learned from the Patriot's the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (or PAC- failure. From the outset, with its extended 3). In addition to several system range (the Arrow can intercept missiles 50- refinements including its radar, 90km away), the system can shoot down communications system, and remote launch missiles over the enemy's territory, that of a capability, the most important change to the third country, or at a minimum, over more PAC-3 was the introduction of an entirely scarcely populated areas in Israel, thus new, smaller interceptor missile with a hit- solving the problem of damage caused from to-kill warhead rather than a blast- debris and lessening the pressure to ensure fragmentation one.(73) warhead destruction. That being said, the One of the biggest technological Arrow also has much more proven challenges the designers had to overcome capability than the Patriot in destroying was creating a reliable hit-to-kill warheads, as demonstrated by a series of interceptor, which instead of detonating a tests conducted by the Pentagon's Ballistic high-explosive fragmentation warhead near Missile Defense Organization using a demi- the incoming missile, aims to hit the missile chemical warhead. In those tests, the Arrow directly. Throughout the 1990s, this warheads succeeded in destroying all the technology did not look promising as most chemical cargo.(78) of the tests for it failed. However, between The Green Pine Radar's 500km range is 1999 and 2001, the Patriot's hit-to-kill also a very significant improvement over system made significant improvements, and the Patriot, and allows for much better data was able to successfully intercept theater collection for a missile's incoming flight ballistic missiles five times, cruise missiles path calculation and several more minutes three times, and a remotely piloted F-4 to prepare. Additionally, the Arrow was once.(74) This new PAC-3 interceptor, able to overcome the problem of Scuds derived from the ERINT (Extended Range disintegrating by aiming to intercept them Interceptor) missile, has a launch weight earlier in their flight before they begin to one-third its predecessor and can destroy break apart.(79) In case an adversary should incoming missiles at altitudes of up to deploy planned radar decoys, the Arrow 30km, thus giving a defended area (or closes in on its target using an infrared 'footprint') of 40-60km in diameter.(75) sensor.(80) As Uzi Rubin, former head of Still, while its performance has the project at the Ministry of Defense has improved, the cost of the system was not said, "The heart of the Arrow's envelope is cheap. Total costs for PAC-3 development its ability to intercept Al-Hussein missiles and interceptor purchase (over 1,000 or Scud-C missiles or any other missile missiles are planned for purchase) are over with a range of between 550 and 650 $10 billion.(76) Moreover, there were not kilometers that Iraq may fire. We developed enough of the improved missiles ready for the Arrow in order to deal with such deployment when the 2003 Gulf War missiles. That is why it was designed. That occurred, leaving Israel to use the five was the first operational requirement."(81) PAC-2 batteries deployed in the country What is still a problem for the Arrow, more as a standard anti-aircraft system than however, is the threat from the Iranian as back-up for the Arrow.(77) Shihab-3, a missile that travels three to four times faster than the Scud. While Aryeh The Arrow Herzog, the current head of the Arrow As opposed to the Patriot, the Arrow is a project at the Ministry of Defense, has system that from its very beginning was stated several times that the Arrow is conceived of--and engineered to be--an capable of knocking out the Shihab-3, most Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
Cameron S. Brown outside experts believe it still lacks that exclusively on deterrence, while Barak capacity. Herzog himself backed down on thought it would be quicker and cheaper to the claim more recently when he said, "We have the Americans build the radar and will continue development [of the Arrow]. command and control.(89) We want to achieve capabilities against On the American side the criticism was future threats, such as those being much harsher, especially because it was developed in Iran."(82) And indeed, when paying most of the $1.6 billion dollar cost put to the test against a similar missile in for development--and there were worries August 2004, the Arrow was unable to that the cost could go as high as $7 or $10 knock out the incoming missile.(83) billion, though the total development cost Lastly, one of the chief flaws in the actually ended up close to the original Patriot system is that its missile battery and figure.(90) There were those who saw the radar system are separated by only a few system as in competition with other U.S.- hundred meters. According to Rubin, made systems (especially Theater High- "When you are talking about a national Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, which anti-missile defense system, you must place will eventually be faster and able to reach the radar system in the best possible greater ranges and altitude than the Arrow). location and the missile battery where the They also argued that the Arrow is a system missiles can be the most effective--and that the U.S. and its armed forces will never use, location is not necessarily close to the radar and argue that it raises serious issues about system."(84) transferring sensitive technology that is Therefore, the Arrow was designed so forbidden under the Missile Technology that the intercepting missile batteries are Control Regime (MTCR).(91) separate from both the radar system and the This criticism was not helped by the fact launch pad control system. The fire- that the Arrow began with a track record management system, from its base in similar to the Patriot. During the initial Palmachim (south of Tel Aviv), activates phase, the tests in August 1990, March the two missile batteries at Palmachim and 1991, and October 1991 all failed. As a Ein Shemer.(85) This system layout, when result of these failures, the development combined with the interceptor's much timeline was pushed back and an American increased range, enables a defense umbrella Failure Analysis Team was sent to Israel to for a large section of the country with only identify the problems. In September 1992, a small number of missiles batteries.(86) the Arrow test succeeded, but its scope was Similar to the Patriot, the command and very limited and did not even include control system is designed to respond to as intercepting an incoming missile.(92) As many as 14 simultaneous intercepts.(87) with every other anti-missile system in Israel's defense planners deserve development during the 1990s, the Arrow considerable credit for having the foresight has since shown substantial improvement. to see the threat posed by theater ballistic On September 15, 2000, the Arrow missiles even before the 1990-1 Gulf War, succeeded in its first frontal intercept of a having signed the agreement with the U.S. missile aimed at Israel, and indeed, did so to produce the Arrow in 1988.(88) It is against a relatively small incoming test important to note that when it was first missile.(93) As of August 2004, nine of the announced, however, the Arrow had many last eleven tests were successful, including detractors. On the Israeli side, opposition several other successful intercepts at originally came from then Chief of Staff altitudes up to 330,000 feet (approximately Ehud Barak and then head of the Israel Air 100km).(94) Most importantly, in a test Force, Avihu Bin-Nun. Bin Nun saw the conducted by the U.S. Defense Department project as being too expensive and as flying in July 2004, the Arrow succeeded in its in the face of Israel's previous counter- first attempt against a live Scud missile.(95) proliferation strategy, which relied almost
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Which leads to the biggest benefit the overwhelming barrage of missiles becomes Arrow currently has to offer: it is functional fairly unrealistic. In fact, during the 1991 and operational today, whereas THAAD Gulf War, Iraq managed only once to fire will not currently be operational in the U.S. 14 missiles in a day, and its average was until 2007 or 2008, and the Navy Theater actually between 1.5-4.7 missiles fired per Wide system until 2010.(96) Given Israel's day.(102) security situation (and this was emphasized There are two other responses to the by the 2003 Gulf War), waiting another 5- critics' claim. The first is that just as one 10 years was not an ideal option for Israeli could overload a missile defense, it is policymakers. equally possible to overload an anti-aircraft While it has waned, the debate over the defense system--this does not make it Arrow does continue. Its critics' primary foolish to invest in anti-aircraft defense. claim is that at $3 million an interceptor, it The second response is that the cost of an becomes much more expensive to defend interceptor is considerably less than the than attack, especially when multiple damage that would be caused by a Scud interceptors are fired at each incoming hitting the ground, as demonstrated missile.(97) The critics also claim that it is above.(103) only a matter of time before Arab states will Still, this does not mean that the Arrow build arsenals that will simply overwhelm is a perfect system. For example, the Arrow the Arrow's capabilities.(98) is unable to knock out the Syrians' highly There is some truth to this claim. The accurate SS-12 missiles. Their short range high cost and low number of interceptors (about 80 kilometers) and their brief flying currently in stock is one of the reasons why time do not give the Arrow enough time to the command and control system is often intercept them.(104) It should be noted in run manually, so that interceptors will be response, however, that every system has its spared if the missile will fall limitations, and therefore is used in harmlessly.(99) In order to solve this complement with others. In this case, short- problem, Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) range missiles would be targeted by Patriots recently signed a deal to jointly produce the or a Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL), a interceptors with Boeing in the United system which uses a deuterium fluoride States. When that deal goes into effect, it chemical laser to shoot down rockets at a will not only lower the cost of production, range of up to 5km.(105) but the pace of production will be tripled as The most serious problem that remains well.(100) for the Arrow is how to overcome the many At the same time, this picture painted by potential countermeasures a ballistic missile the Arrow's critics is not entirely accurate. can use (such as cooling off warheads, While this arms race is true in theory, in electronic radar jamming, maneuvering practice, most rogue regimes are not warheads, and radar decoys). While as of capable of deploying hundreds of missiles. today there is no evidence that any country First, as stated above, most fixed launchers in the region has employed these would be destroyed very early in a war, and countermeasures,(106) Iran, North Korea, so would at most be able to only launch one and Syria are suspected of developing a missile each. Secondly, although mobile fragmentation or cluster warhead, which launchers require only 2-4 hours to reload, would give single missiles the possibility of they must constantly be on the move in overwhelming the Arrow's order to avoid detection. As a result, it is capabilities.(107) unlikely that they will be able to fire more There are two possibilities for dealing than one missile a day.(101) When with this countermeasure: the first is the combined with the fact that each country development of BPI, and the second is has relatively few mobile launchers, the passive defense--both of which are idea of an adversary firing an described below. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
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built UAV and an interceptor called the Boost Phase Interceptors (BPI) Moab, which can travel at 1.4km/sec. A As described above, destroying an large UAV could carry two ABIs, while incoming ballistic missile upon descent is another possible variant of this technology an extremely difficult technical challenge. would utilize fighter jets, which could carry Yet, in the minutes after a missile is between 4-8. Global Hawk, a large U.S.- launched (in what is known as the boost built UAV, can remain in the air for 24 phase), the task of defeating a ballistic hours at a time, meaning that two such missile is in many ways much easier as the UAVs would be required to maintain 24- missile is large (the booster stage is still hour coverage over a given territory, though attached and the missle has not begun to this would limit the number of missiles that break apart), slow moving, does not could be intercepted to one. Fighter jets can maneuver, and is significantly easier to maintain combat patrols for 8 hours, so with destroy in a single shot than during decent. one back-up in case of maintenance The missile is also much easier to track problems, it would take four to maintain because of the large launch bloom and similar 24-hour coverage.(110) massive exhaust, and it is easier to confirm Despite the numerous advantages missile destruction than warhead described above, ABI (and BPI in general) destruction. Furthermore, whereas during suffers from several problems. The biggest descent a defensive system must make a problem is that the interceptor must be direct hit on the target warhead, during within range of the launch site at the time of ascent it is enough to send interceptor the launch to be effective. As a result, either warhead fragments into the target booster a fleet of these weapons would need to be fuel tanks, guidance system, or the rocket on station continually, or advance warning motor. Also, it is very difficult to build of several hours or days would be needed effective countermeasures (such as booster before an attack.(111) Complicating decoys), and shooting down at boost phase matters, Dean Wilkening has estimated that overcomes the problem of MIRVs or ABI's intercept range would eventually be submunitions. Lastly, by shooting down a about 135km for Scud-C missiles and missile over enemy territory, any warhead 170km for the Shihab-3.(112) With such and all of the debris falls back onto the small ranges, it would require roughly four shooter rather than onto the defender's to six platforms flying simultaneously to territory.(108) cover the entire territory of Iraq, though that In general, there are three types of BPI: number would be greatly lessened if 1) Airborne Interceptor (ABI), which would intelligence could identify where launches fire high-speed interceptors launched from would likely come from (as was the case in a fighter aircraft or UAV; 2) Airborne Laser 1991 and 2003).(113) (ABL), which uses a high-power laser There are several other drawbacks to the carried aboard a converted 747-400F; or 3) ABI system. Due to its limited range, ABI a space-based laser. While the first two platforms would most likely need to enter have the potential of becoming operational an adversary's airspace in order to be this decade, the third will take much longer effective. Yet, violating enemy airspace before it is no longer merely science with an armed aircraft before hostilities fiction.(109) have begun could escalate the conflict, and ABI would fire a high-speed rocket even be considered an act of war. Even using a small kinetic-kill vehicle, which after the beginning of hostilities, ABI would use infrared sensors and airborne platforms would have to contend with radar to home in on the booster (such a enemy air defenses, though this would radar could track launches up to 500km likely be a significant problem only at the away). Israel and the U.S. have been jointly beginning of hostilities as Israel would developing this type of BPI, using an Israeli
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe likely disable such air defenses MMD (pronounced mamad, short for quickly.(114) Merhav Mugan Dirati or 'secure Besides ABI, the other major BPI apartment space'), a room specially system under development is the Airborne designed to withstand shrapnel blast and Laser (ABL) (though this is being the use of a CBW agent(118) developed by the United States alone). This · deploying CW and BW detectors system uses a three-megawatt oxygen- · stockpiling antibiotics and vaccines iodine laser carried aboard a converted 747- · pre-vaccinating health officials and 400F, three to four of which would be emergency personnel ('first responders') required to maintain 24-hour coverage. Its · equipping first responders with advantages over ABI is that its range is protective gear and decontamination estimated to be more than twice as great equipment, and training them to deal (470km for a Scud-C) and its ability to with such contingencies knock down a single missile is likely to be near 100 percent. However, compared to To understand the true importance of ABI, this system is much more vulnerable passive defense, it is important to remember to countermeasures, such as hardening the that what differentiates weapons of mass missile booster, launching multiple destruction from conventional munitions is missiles, or even rotating the missile in that they have the potential to kill many flight to distribute (and thus lessen) the times more people per munition. While laser energy.(115) there is very little that can realistically be Currently, the development costs for the done to lessen the effects of nuclear or ABL prototype alone is $1.6 billion--nearly radiological weapons, this is not true of equal to the entire cost of the Arrow--and CBW. In fact, with the proper use of total costs over 20 years are estimated at passive defense and sufficient warning, it is $11 billion.(116) Besides its potential cost, possible to reduce the casualty rates of the other reason Israel chose to invest much CBW by as much as 95 percent.(119) CW more heavily in the Arrow instead of ABL agents, for example, are easily detected or ABI is that while the Arrow has already once used because they all tend to cause been operational for a few years, BPI is still similar symptoms and are radically very much in the development phase. ABL, different from the organic materials of their for instance, has yet to even be tested and environments. At the same time, while will not be operational until 2007, and significantly restrictive and slightly maybe even as late as 2014--that is, if it can uncomfortable, Mission Oriented Protected overcome the significant technical Posture (MOPP) suits offer nearly 100 challenges it faces.(117) percent protection against all CW threats. For those without MOPP suits, using gas Passive (Civil) Defensive masks can offer protection against some When all else fails, the final pillar of threats and quick application of atropine Israel's strategy is passive or civil defense. after exposure can be very effective.(120) This strategy has included: As for BW, a standard issue protective mask offers virtually 100 percent protection · the development of a Homefront against all BW threats (no MOPP suit Command needed as in CW defense). Antibiotics can · distribution of gas masks (fitted for also be used before and after infection to infants, children, elderly and help treat victims, as well as treating handicapped) and atropine to the exposed individuals with immunoglobulins. general population While vaccines do exist for viral BW · sealing rooms during times of crisis agents, they have shortcomings, in that they · changing Israeli building codes to require a significant amount of time before ensure each new apartment included a exposure to be effective, and they can be Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
Cameron S. Brown overcome by a high dose of biological protective kits, including gas masks and agent.(121) atropine, for each of its citizens--which is That casualty rates of CBW can be less than the cost of one year of Arrow greatly reduced using passive defense is development.(124) The one notable especially important to bear in mind exception to this is changing building codes because it is CBW that are both the easiest to ensure each new building includes a technologically, logistically, and financially secure shelter or room (MMD): Israel's total to produce, and also the easiest to produce annual national cost for creating MMDs in and transport without detection.(122) This homes and public buildings is estimated to also means that when considering an attack range from $125-325 million.(125) from an enemy state (and arguably for the In terms of Israel's experience with WMD terrorist threat as well), it is CBW passive defense, one can point to numerous that are the more likely threats policymakers successes and occasional failures. One will have to face. success has been that for several decades, With this in mind, the most obvious Israel has equipped its military with gas value of passive defense is that in the case masks and protective suits, nerve gas of a chemical or biological attack, serious antidotes, and other defense equipment, and preparedness can greatly reduce death and Israel has made training with this injury, reducing the potential equipment a routine part of military destructiveness of these weapons. Secondly, exercises. Yet, at the same time, when the passive defenses are critical for their 1990-1 Gulf War approached, the Defense psychological effects. Not only does Minister and Chief of Staff were extremely lessening the vulnerability reduce the terror reluctant to distribute this same equipment that these weapons can impose, but it is to the civilian population; this despite the incredibly important for helping calm extreme nervousness of the population and civilian panic as well. By giving them the fact that the army had the capability to specific things they can do to protect distribute gas masks to the entire themselves, it gives civilians a sense of population.(126) control over a situation in which they Still, today, Israelis are easily the most otherwise have little.(123) well-protected population on earth, and the Lastly, both active and passive defense government bureaucracy has become have another major benefit: by reducing the extremely efficient (especially relative to potential impact of using a CW or BW, a other governments) in reacting to crises and defending country is able to increase its improving the level of protection for its deterrence, as the attacking country would citizens. One shining example occurred in now stand to gain little by launching a October and November 2002 (in response CBW attack, while the price it would pay to the threat of another Gulf War), as Israel would remain exceedingly high. Taking this conducted a program to vaccinate about logic one step further, it is possible that 15,000 health-care workers and other first deploying effective defenses would even responders against smallpox, which would diminish (though doubtfully extinguish) the allow them to be protected while they treat incentive for adversaries to spend resources and immunize others in the event of an developing CBW agents in the first place. attack. Equally as important, pre- In addition to its numerous benefits, vaccination would significantly help build passive defense can also be relatively up a supply of antibodies to the virus, as it inexpensive. Compared to the billions of is possible to extract them from blood of a dollars a country must spend on acquiring pre-vaccinated person and then inject the active defense, passive defense can be antibodies into a person who has a deficient achieved for a fraction of the price. For immune system. Smallpox, it should be example, during the 1990s, Israel spent noted, can kill between 30 to 40 percent of between $50-62 million on personal
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe unvaccinated people exposed to the face in the near future? Deciding how disease.(127) realistic certain threats are is central to In what was considered by many to be a deciding what strategies to embrace in very efficient and decisive move, the Israeli response. For example, if EU policymakers government went from making the decision are concerned about WMD blackmail by to nearly completing the task of vaccinating countries like Iran or Libya, then missile in just three months.(128) In fact, Israel had defense should be critical.(131) If these already implemented its plan while the U.S. threats are seen as not very serious--at least and other countries were still in the for the next 5-10 years (as most estimates committee process deliberating. Moreover, seem to suggest)--then missile defense is while Israel had in place a plan to inoculate probably an enormous waste of resources at the entire population within four days by this time. opening vaccination clinics around the When conducting this threat assessment, clock at 200 schools, in the U.S., the only it is also important to consider what proposal discussed was to vaccinate a half- European countries' foreign policies might million hospital workers, which would have be. In other words, if Europe (or parts of it) been quite insufficient to implement the are considering an active foreign policy, Center for Disease Control's own mass then it should also be concerned about vaccination plan--a plan which would potential WMD attacks on EU forces require 10 days for total inoculation.(129) abroad. For example, while the German Besides quality of the plan and the speed Army possesses about 30 PAC-2 systems in with which it was implemented, the operation (and another six in storage), as program was also considered a success the discussion above has shown, this system because Israel managed to avoid any does not offer serious protection from a serious side effects amongst the vaccinated, ballistic missile threat. As a result, while even though the vaccine statistically kills the current threat to EU territory may not one in a million people and causes justify acquiring active defense capabilities, encephalitis (swelling of the brain) in one in an active foreign policy would likely 300,000. This success was the result of the demand a heavy immediate investment in Health Ministry's carefully screening of this field.(132) those vaccinated--avoiding those on While the ballistic missile threat to steroids, with immune deficiencies, those Europe is quite debatable at present, the who have undergone an organ or bone threat of WMD terrorism appears to be a marrow transplant, and those who were clear and present danger to European never inoculated against smallpox before. security. When countering this threat, The success was also the result of the European defense cannot be based on a decision to minimize the numbers strategy of deterring groups like al-Qa'ida. vaccinated. Professor Manfred Green, This makes non-proliferation and director of Israel's Center for Disease intelligence gathering (and sharing) critical, Control, stated that if all Israeli residents as well as improved border controls and were vaccinated, then between 6-12 people guarding of nuclear power plants, chemical could have died from the vaccine--which plants and storage facilities, and nuclear given that in the end there was no smallpox research facilities--the latter of which are attack, could have been considered a high neglected more often than is realized.(133) price to pay.(130) Given the EU's quickly expanding borders, stepping up these measures will become a LESSONS FOR EUROPE serious challenge for the Union over the Any discussion about EU next decade. Likewise, the EU has every counterproliferation policy must begin with interest in supporting the U.S. Department the questions: what threats does the EU face of Defense's Counterproliferation Threat at present and what threats is it likely to Reduction Program. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
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In this regard, Europe also has two defense (such as changing building codes) options not available to Israel. First, as the or in developing an active defense program. Iranian case has demonstrated, Europe can Especially because as time goes on, engage in aggressive diplomacy in order to American and Israeli engineers will forestall WMD proliferation. Though, as continue to develop the technology, and the Iranian case has demonstrated, potential should the time come where the EU would proliferants will not take Europe seriously need it, European countries will most likely unless it backs up its diplomacy with the be able to buy the most up-to-date realistic threat of painful action. Second, defensive systems from those two countries. while Israel is not a signatory to any non- With this in mind, Germany and Italy proliferation regime, all of Europe is, and should not be too concerned about the early thus can continue to work towards death of the Medium Extended Air Defense strengthening non-proliferation treaties, System (MEADS) missile defense project. regimes, and especially enforcement--this is Nor should the EU begin investing in a most critical for the biological weapons continental missile defense similar to the convention. national missile defense being planned by Less obvious for EU policymakers is the United States. In fact, most EU that Europe should already be exploring countries have no need for a national passive defense measures. This could mean missile defense of the sort planned by the considering an EU-wide stockpiling of U.S., but could suffice with TMD systems antidotes like atropine and antibiotics, as like THAAD or the Arrow, which have well as personal gas masks, and preparing footprints of over a hundred kilometers in the groundwork for future vaccinations of diameter.(134) For example, the U.S. first responders and medical personnel. For Department of Defense estimated that-- instance, the EU should begin conducting depending on how many radars were used-- preliminary studies on the feasibility and by deploying four to six THAAD batteries, cost-benefit of such programs, and even they would be able to protect all of Japan begin creating contingency plans for their from any North Korean attack (versus an implementation in the case of emergency. It estimated 100 PAC-3 systems).(135) Most also means training and equipping first European countries could make do with a responders to deal adequately with such an similar number of missile batteries. attack. Especially because of its size, the EU could take these measures for relatively *Cameron S. Brown is the Assistant little cost per person. Director of the Global Research in Investing in these types of passive International Affairs (GLORIA) Center at defense is prudent even if EU policymakers the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, were to see no direct security threats at Israel. He is most recently the author of present. It is crucial because in the current "Wanting to Have Their Cake and Their era of massive international travel and Neighbor's Too: Azerbaijani attitudes immigration, it is no longer sufficient to towards Karabakh and Iranian ensure the defense of one's borders in order Azerbaijan," Middle East Journal, Vol. 58, to ensure the defense of its citizens. For No. 4 (Autumn 2004) and "Israel's 2003 instance, when SARS broke out in East Elections," Middle East Review of Asia, it quickly spread to cities as far away International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, Vol. as Toronto. Therefore, should a biological 7, No. 1 (March 2003). agent (for instance, smallpox) be used against a distant country, it might have a NOTES serious impact on the EU as well. 1. In this paper, non-proliferation refers to At the same time, given the threats the policies and efforts aimed at stopping facing the EU today, there is probably little other countries from acquiring WMD, and point in investing in expensive passive counter-proliferation refers to the policies
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe enacted to oppose the potential use of launch site, greatly increasing its WMD. vulnerability to a counterforce strike. 2. This will not go into great detail as a Center for Nonproliferation Studies detailed threat assessment would require a resource page on Saudi Arabia paper all its own.
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People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, February 19. "Report: Iraq Hiding Weapons," 20, 2004, p. 6 Associated Press, January 27, 1998.
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27. Amir Oren, "New Iranian missile threat as well, there were only 18-22 infected and worries Israel," Ha'aretz, July 4, 2003; five deaths. Ely Karmon, "Are the Central Intelligence Agency, "Unclassified Palestinians Considering Biological Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Weapons?" ICT website, August 14, 2001 Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Cameron S. Brown
Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Effectiveness," International Security, Vol. Armaments, Disarmament and International 17, No. 2 (Autumn 1992). Security (NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), p. 49. "Customs Seizes Radioactive Uranium 617; on the Jericho-2, see Harold Hough, at Rousse Check Point," FBIS, 29 May "Could Israel's nuclear assets survive a pre- 1999, cited by Department Of Defense, emptive strike?" Jane's Intelligence Review, International Counterproliferation Program, September 01, 1997 "Success Stories: Impact of the ICP
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe is meant to knock down tactical rockets assessments as proof, these assessments mid-flight. were in large part based on ground damage 53. Theodore Postol, "Lessons of the Gulf assessments that were not coordinated and War Experience with Patriot," International frequently relied on interviews with Saudi Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Winter 1991/2), nationals to determine the extent of the pp. 124-5. damage. For Raytheon's assessment, see 54. 158 Patriots were fired at 47 Scuds, and Stein & Postol, "Correspondence: Patriot 39 other Scuds were not engaged as they Experience in the Gulf War," p. 211. For were outside the Patriot perimeter or the how these assessments were conducted, see impact was anticipated to occur in an area United States General Accounting Office, where damage would be minimal. "Operation Desert Storm: Data does not 55. Bob Davis, "Patriot Missile, High-Tech Exist to Conclusively say How Well Patriot Hero in Gulf, Comes Under Attack as Less Performed," Report to Congressional than Scud's Worst Enemy," Wall Street Requesters, September 22, 1992, p. 3-8, Journal, April 15, 1991 as cited by Postol, esp. 7-8. "Lessons of the Gulf War," p. 134. Number
Cameron S. Brown he is aware of besides the V-2 that uses fins and Strategic Stability," p. 46; Federation of and jet vanes for stabilization during American Scientists website powered ascent. Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe htm>; and Ha'aretz, May 04, 2003. and Strategic Stability," p. 52. 88. Duncan Clarke, "The Arrow Missile: 102. Ibid. The United States, Israel, and Strategic 103. These arguments were both made by Cooperation," Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, Uzi Rubin. See Barzilai, "An Arrow to the No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 476, 478. heart." 89. Ibid.; and Barzilai, "An Arrow to the 104. Pedatzur, "The Damaging Effect of the heart." Arrow's Success." 90. A "more realistic" estimate of $5-7 105. John Pike and Peter Voth, "Current billion is used by Clarke in his "The Arrow Plans for Missile Defense," Disarmament Missile," p. 483. However, by 2002, the Forum, United Nations Institute for total costs had remained as projected. See Disarmament Research, January 2001, p. 5 Barzilai, "An Arrow to the heart." As of Cameron S. Brown 118. The building codes were changed in billions of dollars, huge, expensive 1992. For apartments, MMDs are required equipment that has little other purpose and to have external concrete walls with a width is relatively easily tracked, and at a of 30cm and interior walls, ceilings, and minimum, a laboratory the size of a floors made of concrete with a width of 15- warehouse. In addition, clandestine nuclear 20cm. In addition, the rooms' windows weapons programs are difficult to hide must have blast shields and must have a because nuclear sites often leak special door. David Klein, Hitgonnenut radioactivity which can be easily detected HaOref: Bichinat HaHashka'ah HaLeumit from a considerable distance and for a (Hebrew, "Protecting the Homefront: considerable length of time. Considering the National Investment") (Tel 123. Along these lines, I would argue that Aviv: Jaffee Center, April 2001), p. 30. during the 2003 war in Iraq, when many 119. One Scud missile with a chemical Israelis decided not to carry their masks warhead hitting an urban area is likely to with them as they went along their business, kill 60-100 people if the population is they had to make a decision that the threat unprotected, but only 5-10 if they are was not imminent, and thus they need not protected by passive measures. If 20 Scuds be too overly anxious about it. are used, the numbers are 1400-1800 versus 124. Klein, Hitgonnenut HaOref, p. 30; 120-170, respectively. Klein, Hitgonnenut Barzilai, "An Arrow to the heart." Another HaOref, pp. 25-6. Klein cites Lord Lyell, media report claimed that Israel had spent 2 Chemical and Biological Weapons: The billion shekels (approximately $450 Poor Man's Bomb, North Atlantic million) between 1990-2003 on gas masks, Assembly Draft General Report, AN 253 / and that to maintain them in the hands of STC (96) 8, October 4, 1996. the public would cost another 200 million 120. Also, in order to be very effective, shekels a year ($45 million). As a result, there must be a continual bombardment of and as a result of a lowered threat chemical weapons, thus reducing the utility assessment after Saddam's regime ended, of a single warhead or terrorist bomb. the Israeli Army has apparently decided to Matthew Meselson, "Implications of the collect the gas masks and store them in Kuwaiti Crisis for Chemical Weapons army warehouses. AP, February 15, 2004, Proliferation and Arms Control," Chemical citing an Israeli Channel 2 news report. Weapons & Security in the Middle East It is worth noting that only one month (Washington, DC: AAAS, 1990), pp.15, earlier, the IDF had announced it would be 22. replacing the standard black gas masks 121. Robert P. Kadlec, Biological Weapons Israelis had been given with a newly in the Post-Cold War Era. Unpublished., pp. designed sapphire one. However, a serious 6, 10. disagreement existed between the head of 122. The gap in difficulty occurs on almost the Homefront Command and the IDF's every level. With $10 million, one small chief medical officer, Brigadier General room with an industrial-size fermentor, 1 or Hezi Levy, who refused to approve the 2 trained experts, and 2ml of biological change, claiming that a medical corps panel agent seed stocks can produce significant disqualified use of the Even Sapir model biological weapons. Chemical weapons can unless it is outfitted with a special be produced with a similar amount of exhalation tube to forestall carbon dioxide money, chemical precursors found in build up. Amnon Barzilai, "Despite Medical industry, a two-room apartment, and a Opposition, IDF to Replace Gas Masks," handful of moderately trained personnel. To Ha'aretz, January 19, 2004. produce nuclear weapons, however, 125. The numbers Klein gives are actually requires hundreds of well-trained scientists 500 million-1.3 billion shekels. In 2001 and technicians, a large quantity of fissile when the monograph was published, the material, a complex bomb design, tens of exchange rate was roughly 4 shekels to the Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004) Israel AND the WMD Threat: Lessons for Europe dollar. As for a breakdown of the cost, each so long ago, we must remember, it was new apartment had an additional cost of Qadhafi who threatened to use his missiles 5,000-20,000 shekels ($1,250 to $5,000), against the southern flank of NATO." He and the total expenses on public buildings then continued to suggest that Iran's was about 45 million shekels ($11.25 development of the Shihab-5 missile, with a million) a year. Klein, Hitgonnenut HaOref, range of 4,000-6,000km, "could reach deep pp. 32-7. into the heart of Europe. One must ask: 126. The army stated that it had acquired 'Why do the Iranians want missiles with the necessary supplies as early as 1981. such ranges?'" While I concur that the Steinberg, "Israeli Responses to the Threat Shihab-5 should trouble EU policymakers, of Chemical Warfare." it is highly unlikely the missile will be 127. Jackie Northam and Richard Knox, ready in the near- or medium-term. Herzog, "Profile: Smallpox Preparedness Of Israel "The Israeli Perception of Missile Defense." And The U.S." NPR's All Things 132. Ha'aretz, December 2, 2002. Considered, November 1, 2002 133. Even two years after the September 11 Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)