DOI: https://doi.org/10.15388/Relig.2014.14-15.10827 BUT IN THE END, WHY IS DELEUZE “ANTI-HEGELIAN”? AT THE ROOT OF THE HEGEL–DELEUZE AFFAIR

Giacomo Pezzano Università degli Studi di Torino Dipartimento di Filosofia e Scienze dell’Educazione Sant’Ottavio Str. 20, 10124 Torino, Italy Email: [email protected]

Deleuze said that he detested Hegelianism and dialectics: this paper claims that Deleuze is contra Hegel because he has and proposes a different philosophical system. Thus, I suggest that if we want to understand the reason of such a “disgust,” we need to focus the philosophical question that moves the entire Deleuzian system (§ 1). Then, I explain that if the ground-question of Hegel’s philosophy is “how is it possible that things are surpassed, that they go on?”, the Deleuzian one is “how is it that there is always something new, that things come out?” (§ 2). Finally, I discuss how desire can be considered as a key-example for seeing how the perspectives of the two thinkers diverge (§ 3). Keywords: dialectic, recollection, creativity, transformation, philosophy of difference, desire.

I have always felt that I am an empiricist, education in the history of philosophy “was that is, a pluralist. […] The aim is not to Hegelianism and dialectics” (N: 6). It is also rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to quite known that Deleuze had in mind the find the condition under which something French reading of Georg Hegel, according 1 new is produced (creativeness) (D: vii). to which the human consciousness would Indeterminacy […] does not invite us to proceed toward an ultimate state of perfec- abandon reason but to reconnect with the tion through a process of negation, that is, true reason of the thing in the process of in a more ontological sense, the Absolute being made, the philosophical reason that is would finally return “forward back” to not determination but difference DI( : 31). itself via negation. But, in brief, what does Deleuze conceptually say about Hegel? 1. Thumbs Down for the Dialectic Already in 1954, Deleuze affirmed that “contradiction is less and not more than One thing is pretty well known, at least difference,” that is, contradiction is the among Deleuzian scholars: Gilles Deleuze phenomenal and anthropological aspect of stated that what he “most detested” in his difference (DI: 15–18), while – as he will express later in his major work dedicated 1 Deleuzian works explicitly quoted will have to the problem of difference – actually following abbreviations: EP – Deleuze 1990; difference “is the noumenon closest to phe- B – Deleuze 1991; DR – 1994; N – Deleuze nomenon” (DR: 222), so that difference is 1995; DI – Deleuze 2004; NP – Deleuze 2006; RF – Deleuze 2007; D – Deleuze- more profound than contradiction, and Parnet 1987. “it is not difference which presupposes op- 90 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano position, but opposition which presupposes 207, 235–236). Furthermore, the process difference” DR( : 51). of actualization could not be thought as a Two years later and through Henri determinatio via negatio, neither as a realiza- Bergson, Deleuze underlines that meant as tion through the limitation of possibilities: internal – that is, as duration – the difference it should be rather conceived as an expression could be no more confused with negativity­ of virtuality, or as a position and a develop- (difference of a thing from everything it ment of problems. is not), neither with diversity (external So, here we have the core of the issue: in difference of one thing from another), nor Deleuzian perspective, if things limit and with identity (difference of things sharing oppose each other, it is because, first of all, a common element or ground): difference they affirm themselves, and not because is pure heterogeneity that differs from itself, they need to determine themselves through in itself and by itself, or – better said – it is negation, neither because as such they are the continuous process of “heterogenization,” only referring to a general common identity. alteration and not alterity, immediate dif- In other words, if, from the point of view of ference and not mediate difference, and so the “reactive forces,” the negativity comes on (DI: 24–51; see also B: 37–49). first, then from the point of view of “active More specifically, Deleuze thinks that forces,” it is affirmativity that comes first; Hegel subordinates difference not just to in talking about forces, it means that rather negation or to identity, but to the identity than being logical operations, affirmation of identity and difference, so that difference and negation are first of all qualities of would be already placed on a path laid out becoming (NP: 54) – namely, a matter of by identity (DR: 44–50): in Hegel’s system, intensity and energy. difference is destined to the development If it is true that Hegel may appear as a of opposition into contradiction and the philosopher of the becoming, for him – resolution of contradiction (NP: 157). If from the Deleuzian point of view – beco­ we have negation, we don’t have difference; ming actually consists of the unity of a qual- if we have homogeneity, we don’t have dif- ity with its negation, that is, “in the ‘always ference: Hegel would have summed these already’ of being having passed over into mistakes, linking negation and identity, so nothing and nothing having passed over that his dialectical would not be able to into being”: Hegel treats becoming in terms grasp difference as such. of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be, so that At first instance, according to Deleuze he always selects just one of the qualities in difference is a matter of tendency and not of the qualitative unity of becoming, and “uses distinction between static entities: for sure, this to define movement” (Bryant 2008: we can distinguish one actual thing from 141–142). In Hegel’s becoming, what is another actual one, and we can also say that important is the identity of the becoming, they are in a relationship of contradiction an identity reached through a mediation or opposition (that they negate each other); “of negation of negation of negation, and but this is possible because of their process so on,” which is always already at work. of actualization, of their differing dura- In sum, the main features of Deleuzian tion – in the verbal sense (cf. also DR: i.e. “Anti-Hegelianism” are two. They are, as But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 91 the saying goes, two sides of the same coin: wing, several position are being assumed, in Hegelianism, it happens that (a) identity and even very technical analysis are more “overlaps” difference, and (b) contradiction and more available, stressing that Hegel “exhausts” difference. a) Every particular and Deleuze could be put together again difference is what it is only if it is referred for the first time (cf., i.e. Baugh 2009; to the general identity of the concept, or to Duffy 2006; Hardt 1993; Houle-Vernon the specific identity of another diffe­rence 2013; Simont 1997; Somers-Hall 2012). (which, in turn, is different from that ii) I will claim that if we want to under- identity, and so on). b) Every particular dif- stand the reason why Deleuze is contra ference is negated from the general identity Hegel, we need to focus on the core of the concept, or from the specific identity of the Deleuzian problem, that is, the of another difference (which, in turn, is philosophical question that moves the everything it is not, and so on). This implies entire Deleuzian system, outlining­ that, according to Deleuze, difference is not a comparison with the core of the difference from, neither simply of, but it is Hegelian one (§ 2). Then, I will claim differencefor , with, between, or – better, as it that desire can be considered as a key will become clearer – difference in-between: example for seeing how the perspectives it is this kind of difference that is “the suf- of the two thinkers could be widely ficient reason for change” DR( : 223). divergent (§ 3). Up until now, I have just resumed the Thereby, I claim that one should not general sense of Deleuze’s aversion toward believe that Deleuze is contra Hegel because Hegel’s philosophy. That said, I will try to Hegel is an emblem of philosophy as a explain why Deleuze cannot be anything system, that is, because Deleuze is against else than an “Anti-Hegelian” thinker, that system and systematicity as such; rather, is, that there are structural philosophical Deleuze is contra Hegel for he has and reasons for this strong hatred. In order proposes a different system. By system, we to do this, the field should be primarily should intend not something governed delimitated, declaring (i) what I will not by specific argumentative or rationalistic claim and (ii) what instead I will claim. norms, neither by an end point of truth i) I will not claim that there could not and knowledge, but instead something be a relationship between some (even governed by the immanent lines of the important) aspects of their philosophies articulation of the problem which itself or that they could not share a same com- is posing; that is, not something “whose mon ground. I will not claim that Hegel coordinates are the Identical, the Similar, is not important in the development of and the Analogous,” but instead something Deleuze’s thought. I will not claim that “in perpetual heterogeneity,” or – even Deleuze could not be read as a dialecti- better – “a heterogenesis” itself (RF: 361). cian – although in a peculiar way. I will Briefly, a system is something that insists not claim that the Deleuzian reading of and persists in posing and developing some Hegel is true (or false). I will not claim fundamental questions (in actualizing a that one of them is right. After all, on all virtual), without answering to any general these topics, the debate is currently gro­ and external criterion (transcendence), but 92 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano inventing its own conditions (immanence). the philosophies of Derrida and Deleuze In this sense, it’s true that Deleuze’s philoso- could be traced back in their different phy has “global systematic ambitions,” and philosophical heritage: a German one for is “a philosophy of everything,” construc­ Derrida and a French one for Deleuze. In ting “a system that maximizes its conceptual the first, the problem of the form is equal reach across fields and across different kinds to the problem of its origin and end, namely of cases” (Williams 2016: 142). of its birth and death; in the second, the Said otherwise, here I just want to out- problem of the form is equal to the problem line a synoptical vision of the Hegelian and of its transition, namely of its becoming Deleuzian systems of thought, which clearly (Nancy 2008: 15–25). Here, Nancy refers opens up to – if not necessitates of – a more mostly to – respectively – Martin Heidegger analytical enquiry on the details of these and Henri Bergson, but we could easily say systems and their relationships. But – as that the German fil rouge involves also the Hegel himself would have said – we should Hegelian system, at least in a double sense. not miss the forest for the trees, and above The first takes in Nancy himself, who all here I will start from one simple – almost elsewhere has presented Hegel as the ingenuous – question and I will attempt to thinker of the “restlessness of the negative,” answer it: but in the end, why does Deleuze where this negativity is to be understood show all that animosity against Hegel? Fur- not as a denial that fulfills and satisfies thermore, this attitude is – to be honest – itself in totality, discovering its own end in quite strange for a philosopher who has identity, but rather as the incessant work done of the stigmatization of the reactivity of transfiguration of the self through the his own emblem. In conclusion, this paper negative, without a final return to itself tries to clarify if this strangeness could be (cf. Nancy 2002). In other words, even if better understood stating the key-questions in Hegel the end would not be the same that Hegel and Deleuze pose through their of the origin, we have nevertheless a rest- philosophies to themselves and to us: to less movement of taking and losing form, offer a preliminary formulation, I suggest driven by the labor of the negative: forms that if Hegel asks something as and after are born, forms die; they are born thanks that, what happens? Deleuze instead asks to the negativity, they die owing to the something as and during that, what happens? negativity. In the next pages, I want to explain the The second instead takes in Catherine meaning of such a statement. Malabou, who has gone deeper in this issue, stating that plasticity should be considered 2. Different Solutions for Different as the main ontological category of Hege- Problems. Unveiling the Trick lian thought (cf. mostly Malabou 2005). This means – first of all – that Hegelian 2.1. Separated at Birth synthesis is not a thinking of the closure of Jean-Luc Nancy, pointing out that Deleuze’s the totalization, but of the openness. Thus – thought is a philosophy of transformation, secondly – futurity would play the main states that the “parallel difference” between role within Hegel’s system due to the fact But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 93 that in order to be transformable (plastic), That said, it would be too simple just the self should be opened to the alterity of to say that Hegel is a (or the) philosopher the future, which is by definition wholly of the negation and Deleuze a (or the) inscrutable and unexpected, together able philosopher of affirmation, thus Deleuze to give and receive form. It is quite hard would be against dialectics, and that’s the to be sure that this “futuristic” Hegel is end of the story. This is obviously true: to say actually the real Hegel, that is – as it is to the least, we can remember Hegel’s expres- be explained – that the original and note- sions, such as “tarrying with the negative,” worthy reading of Malabou gives account of “Calvary of absolute spirit,” “negativity the true problem posed by Hegel. However, relating itself to itself,” “this Night, this even in such a perspective, it persists to be empty nothing which contains everything true that Hegel would care about the ques- in its simplicity,” and so on. Again, it is tion of the assumption and dissolution of true that while Hegel seems to point out form, of the emergence and explosion of a teleological becoming, Deleuze looks for form. In this sense, it could be true that the a sort of “adestinal” becoming, so that he movement does not go toward identity, and cannot but refuse to recognize lack – the also that it is not an endless process of unre- absence of the end – as the driving force solvable negativity; but this happens owing behind becoming – and this is true even if to the fact that the triumph of the identity one could say that Deleuze underestimates and the definitiveness of the disruption are Hegel (cf. Malabou 1996). Lastly, it is nothing but the two moments of a dialecti- true that for both Hegel and Deleuze the cal process of contradiction, that cannot core of reality is movement, productivity be – in the Hegelian sense – abstracted. and effectiveness, but while for the first Here, transformation is conceived as the the substance is the subject that goes out passage from birth to death and vice versa, from itself and comes back to itself passing as their contradictory alternance; but – we through negation, for the second nature is will see – Deleuze states that transformation the process that endures in affirming and is rather something different, or – more disclosing relations. But once we have made properly – the difference in itself. these opportune statements, have we really So, it seems that, on the one hand, understood what is at stake? Hegel and Deleuze walk the same path In order to explain these aspects, I think (the attempt to understand the form), that we need to go deeper in the sense of but also, on the other hand, that they can Hegelian insistence on negation, and – never really meet each other, at least for two consequently – in its Deleuzian rejection: reasons. The first is that one is moved by the my claim is that we should ask ourselves negativity, the other by the affirmativity; the what kind of problem is Hegel posing and second is that one seems to seek for form- facing, and if this is the same that Deleuze configuration, the other for form-traversal.2 faces and poses – and I will answer no. I should declare myself: this kind of approach 2 I have discussed this problem of the “form- traversal” also in Pezzano 2016b and Pezzano is already Deleuzian, because it considers 2017. that what is more relevant and remarkable 94 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano in a philosophical theory are not the solu- Historically, as it has been suggested, this tions but the problems. Said otherwise: in question could be considered a sort of “sym- order to understand a philosopher and how bolical doubling” of some social problems he thinks (even before “what he thinks”), that troubled Hegel and his times: is it you need first of all to clarify what kind of possible to leave behind both the theocratic questions he is posing, to himself and to us. and aristocratic Ancien Régime and the Rather than looking for the (un)truthful- bourgeois and capitalistic Enlightenment ness of the specific statements of a philoso- without simply erasing them? Is it possible pher, first of all you have to look for what to legitimate the idea of an association of kind of problem a philosopher makes you free and equal individuals, able at the same see, perceive, or – more precisely – conceive. time to conserve, if not enrich, the previous In sum, you need to identify the ground traditions of civilization, mutual help and impetus or the driving force behind a phi- reciprocal benevolence? Is it possible to losophy as a whole: to find a problematic integrate the emancipatory effects of the way through a philosophy in its entirety. Enlightenment with the exigence of not In this way, you can also, to all effects, being overwhelmed by its radical individu- understand why a philosopher could be alism and its abstract universalism? Or also, even radically divergent – implicitly or is it possible to save the classic harmony explicitly – from another one, as in the together with the modern fracture? That Hegel-Deleuze affair. is, finally, is it possible to deal with the Now I will expose briefly, on the one contradictions that permeate the society? hand, which is the Hegelian problem and And if all this is possible, then how is it which is the Deleuzian one, and – on the possible? (cf. above all Lukács 1948, but also see De Giovanni 1970, Michéa 2006 other hand – which are the main models and Pezzano 2014). underlying the formulation of these prob- Beyond this, such a question about lems. In a few initial words, my idea is that the “overcoming” is not the same as, for Hegel and Deleuze do not just offer diverse example, “why things are”, neither as “why or opposite or incommensurable solutions, things become” and so on, because here but they pose different problems and give the problem is not just that things are, so conceptual form to different experiences, to speak, both always different and always thus their solutions could be even very the same. Rather, here the problem is that distant. in their passing away, things do not simply persist, but they do “evolve” in a proble­ 2.2. Once It Happens, You Have to Deal matic way, we can say. It is well known With It. Hegel’s Recollection that the Hegelian answer will be that this Starting with Hegel, I suggest that the can happen because things are lifted up or ground-issue of his philosophy is the at- sublated, namely because of the Aufhebung, tempt to answer to the question why are but here it is important to note that this things overcome? That is, “how is it possible kind of answer could have sense only in that things are surpassed, that they go on?” respect of that problem. Briefly, the role of But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 95

Aufhebung is to put together preservation Notion that should be finally “recollected.” and suppression, or – as said before – for- In other words, Hegel’s logic is a logic of the mation and deformation, the fact that a Erinnerung, namely “one of recollection, of form resists to deformation and the fact memory, its necessity is the internal consis- that deformation however occurs. tency of what is remembered” (Bencivenga From another point of view, it is as if 2000: 55): under this regard, in Hegel’s Hegel would like to understand how history world there is no real space for novelty works: in fact, in history, things do nothing and future, but this does not simply mean but go ahead, but they are also “stored” that for Hegel, once a story has been told, or “saved,” and it is precisely in this way there won’t be any new event. Rather, in that they can become part of the history. his perspective, what matters is that “all Said otherwise, Hegel thinks that if things chronology has been redeemed: everything can be overcome, it is thanks to a peculiar that is, and was, the case has been proved process of negation that can both “erase” necessary” and so “everyone is at the end and “preserve.” of (her own) history when she takes the If we move from this, it is clear how retrospective, rationalizing position with identity and negation could play a key role respect to it”: for her, “everything has al- in Hegel’s system: there is something (iden- ready happened because, trivially, the range tity), but this is to be overcome (negation), of that “everything” is precisely what has in turn producing something else (identity); already happened,” and for Hegel “there are this “something else” is nothing but the no other demands: no reference to other, reflected “something of the beginning” possible, future data even makes sense” (identity and negation are all in one). Here (Bencivenga 2000: 69–70). we can see the general structure of Hegelian Undoubtedly, telling a story requires reasoning and conception of time: the “in events, and new ones above all, so Malabou itself” could be not separated from its own could be right under this regard. But the “for itself” in order to finally develop “in problem is not simply if Hegel’s system and for itself”; the origin could be not sepa- states that a future does not exist (this is, I rated from its own extrinsecation in order would say, quite impossible); rather, it is if to come back to its own “originary future.” this system incorporates the question of the Thus, there could be different stages, modes future as a decisive one within itself. Said or forms during the process, just because otherwise, it is clear that identity demands they are inserted in a progressive becoming, for differences as material for its own diges- whose end is to put in light its own origin tion, but, finally, this would mean nothing and fully develop its necessity. but the differences are to be assimilated. As it has been insightfully claimed, I would say that if any future counts for Hegel’s logic is a narrative one, one that Hegel, it is the one of the future form, that wants to explain the historical identity po­ is, a future to be ultimately recollected, to sing a narrative connection between potency be in the end put into form. The future and act, and according to which every single must be digested into the past, so to speak. mode is a moment of the identity of the In this respect, we are not so far from the 96 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano

Aristotelian definition of ousia as the “what Furthermore, it seems to me that the it was to be” (to ti en einai) of a thing. main experience that shapes and influ- So, the key point is that Hegel does not ences the position and development of want to explain how something new and the Hegelian problem is the way in which different could ever come, but how is it self-consciousness works. In fact, it is in possible to encompass, reflect, comprehend, consciousness that – at least in Hegel’s realize, incorporate, and so on, what has al- view – things are continuously “digested,” ready come. In this sense, “Hegel is located “removed” and “conserved” at the same at the threshold of the future” (Bencivenga time, and it is this movement that consti- 2000: 71), but he is not really engaged with tutes the Self as such; it is in consciousness the future: he is more interested in how we that – at least in Hegel’s view – everything can judge what has happened than in how passes in everything without going out from we can avoid to prejudice what will happen this same process, but, on the contrary, en- (as Deleuze instead does). For Hegel, it is lightening the sense of the process itself; it just a question of re-reading, acknowledge- is in consciousness that – at least in Hegel’s ment and recognition (of Anerkennung, view – there is no immediacy apart from a or of the transition from kennen to erken- movement of mediacy, that is, apart from nen) – or, as it has been noted – of brooding a reflection. The Logic is the Effective for and digestion (cf. Bodei 2014: 129–136), Hegel, for sure – that is, what is logical although it may involve not a process of is what is real (“the Real is the Rational defecation, consumption and reappropria- and the Rational is the Real”) because it tion, but one of swallowing, constipation represents the structure of the reality in and defecation (cf. Žižek 2006: 348–353). itself; but the rhythm of this Logic is traced In this respect, the final act of the process from the proceeding of self-consciousness. would be the “excremental” maneuver of What mind does is to ruminate. In Hegel’s dropping, releasing and letting go, instead view, finally, the fundamental activity of the of the “incremental” one of recontraction, Mind, Consciousness, or Spirit, namely, recovering and reassimilation. But this of the Subject, is the reflection, which – as means exactly that what comes in the re-flection – is led by negativity. end is not something new; rather, it is the Moreover, we can observe – but this recomprehension of something that has is nothing more than a first sketch of the already happened, which in this way could matter that the main ontological concepts be finally set free in itself. of Hegel’s philosophy are linguistic (just To be clear, I’m not claiming that Hegel as the Aristotelian ones, as well): notion, is wrong, or that his problem is irrelevant concept, idea, noun, substance, subject, or uninteresting; I’m simply saying that logic, being, nothing etc. One could say this is his problem and the propeller of his that they are nominal concepts rather than reaso­ning: one could easily say that grasping verbal, adverbial or prepositional; this what has already happened is as important may be true (as I will discuss again in next as – or even more important than – opening paragraphs), but – apart from this and fol- the way to what will or could happen. lowing the theses of Agamben (2006) and But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 97

Virno (2013) – the point is that if language problems, but it must be clear: this is not is the place of negativity, then a linguistic the Deleuzian problem. Deleuze observes ontology cannot but be a negative ontology. that things are first of all different, rather Lastly, this also implies that there is a than similar, and tries to explain why and strict connection – if not even a coinci- how this can happen. dence – between language and thought, In other words, Deleuze asks how is the between language and mind, between creation of the new possible; Deleuzian language and consciousness, as it is for questions are such as: how is it that there Hegel: if Mind, let me say, continuously is always something new? How are novelty digests, it is because it has interiorized the and change possible? How can we account digestive process of language; if Self, let me for a future that is different from, and not say, continuously changes form, it is because merely predetermined by, the past? How do it has interiorized the process of nomination things come out? His answer is firstly that if of language. things are empirically different one from In a few words, it is as if the Hegelian each other, it is because they are internally perspective highlights that – as the saying moved by a process in which the impelling goes – life is like photography, because we force is not simply similar to what expresses all need the negatives to develop. Under and that they take in charge of its élan, and this regard, the Deleuzian perspective vice versa. Said otherwise, it is the internal, could probably underline that if life is transcendental or noumenical difference like photography, it’s because we all need the research and the “capture” to make a that can explain the external, empirical or creation possible. phenomenical difference. The point is not that things or individuals have or assume 2.3. How Can It Happen? different forms, that is, that they become Deleuze’s Creation something (and can cease to be that thing); it is rather that things or individuals can In fact, Deleuze said that if “why is there transform, that is, that they always are something rather than nothing” is a false transformable: what counts is the innova- problem, a true one is “why this rather tive, and endlessly alive, core of things and than something else,” or – better – “why a individuals. thing is itself rather than something else,” namely, “why this tension of duration,” That the Deleuzian philosophy is a “why this speed rather than another” (B: philosophy of the creation of the new is 13–35; DI: 24–26, 50–51): the problem widely stated, also in several different ways that Deleuze formulates and poses concerns (i.e., see Hallward 2006; Lambert 2008; how it is possible that things are different, Lundy 2012; Shaviro 2009), even if not or – better – that things become different. all totally appropriate, and developing all Immediately, one could object that things the systematic implications of this fact with are not different, but they are similar, they completeness is a work still to be done. do share something, and this needs to be We can say that Deleuze is one of the explained. This is, it goes without saying, first philosophers who attempted to build one of the most classical philosophical something like an “ontology of what is not 98 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano there,” whose importance is now beginning which finally is grounded on the future as to be stressed (cf., i.e. Poli 2006). However, bifurcation of states (openness). What is here I can solely outline those elements that relevant to stress here is that in Deleuze’s could be more relevant for the comparison argument, the third synthesis is necessary with Hegel’s thought. They can be sum- to render the past searchable, explorable, marized as follows: problematizable and developable, and to i) Time is future-oriented; avoid that the past would become a simple ii) An Idea is a principle of innovation; celebration of the mythical origin that iii) Everything is a problem; would contain everything in advance. For iv) In a relation, there is much more than these aims, it needs a force of searching mere opposition. and innovation, an action of invention Again, these elements are all reciprocally and creation, that is, a dimension of time intertwined, but the clarification of such which is properly “rushing,” “leaping,” and connections would take too much space, “bouncing”: the future, the pure form of and it cannot be done here; hence, I will continuity and determinability. In this way, explain them separately and shortly.3 the future – and time in general – becomes a First. One of the hardest and most pure principle of novelty. The third synthe- debated parts of the entire Deleuzian cor- sis points out not just that time as future is pus is definitely the deduction of the three pure variability; rather, it puts in evidence syntheses of time in the second chapter of the force of the moment in which it emerges DR (70–128). Thus, its articulation cannot the new, that is, the propelling and even be fully discussed here, but it is however cracking dynamism that opens up to the important to note its structure: the present creation of the new. It is proper in this sense (Habit) is founded on the past (Memory), that the third synthesis can be both named but the past is in its turn founded on the Eros and Thanatos, for the “erotic” tension future (Eros/Thanatos). Deleuze states that of the effort of transformation is all in one ne fait revenir que l’à-venir: the present is with the “mortal” shattering of the trigger the repeater (the moment of the return), the of differentiation – as if in the beginning past is the repetition itself (the returning), was the “original delay.” In other words, for but the future is that which is repeated (the Deleuze, time is duration in the sense of the “object” of the return). If there is a present, persistence of the creative endeavor and of it is because there is a condensation of the the force of transformation (that stores in past, but if the past can have effectiveness, order to prolong and vice versa: memory), it is because it is open by and to the future. not in that of the permanence of a given The present is linked with the coexistence state, but neither in that of the continu- of states (contraction), but this relies upon ous flow that simply devours and destroys everything, or simply passes away (panta the past as succession of states (collection), rei). Said briefly, in Deleuze’s view, time is the open process of the genesis of the new. 3 I have gone a little bit further in this issue in Pezzano 2016a, where more detailed refe­rences Second. For Deleuze, an idea is not to Deleuzian works can also be found. an objective model (Platonism) neither a But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 99 subjective representation (Modernism), “to conceive” and so on. We could even because in both cases ideas are thought say of the “unground principle” of the through the principle of identity and metaphysics of the difference, that Deleuze under the scheme of similarity and like- opposes to the “ground principle” of the ness. This part of the story is the core of metaphysics of the identity, corresponds the Deleuzian vulgate, but here it comes to the shocking “breakthrough” of an idea, as another part, which is less-stated but that is, to the future as an empty form of is really important in order to understand time, which has removed any ground for some apparently weird Deleuzian pages putting in advance events and things in (such as DR: 168–261): Deleuze conceives one order rather than another. Said briefly, the idea as an invention. Deleuze, I suggest, in Deleuze’s view, an idea is a demand for is the first philosopher who has tried to give creation. a true philosophical status to the meaning Third. As Deleuze himself has under- of the word “idea” which can be found in lined, everything has its own reason, but expressions such as “I have an idea,” “that’s this is its idea, and ideas are problems, really a good idea,” “what an idea!”, and or – if you prefer – ideas are problematic. so on. Deleuze, in fact, considers ideas as A problem, for Deleuze, has a specific potentials that are already engaged in one ontological status (the cryptic “?-being” mode of expression or another and that are or “quasi-cause”), according to which it is inseparable from the mode of expression: distinct and obscure at the same time; there- a creator only does what is needed and he fore, it is objective without being already needs to do, and this necessity is a very done: that’s why it could be described as complex thing in the literal sense, for it a question. In fact, a question is nothing requires to be explicated or unfolded. In this but an exigence, an impelling force, that sense, an idea is the in-between in respect of is, something which moves and animates the object and the subject, and – more in a process of development that: a) On the general – it points at what has a potential one hand, refers to the demand, while, on that needs and requires to be developed the other hand, it cannot be similar to this in an original and creative way. An idea is demand; b) On the one hand, tells about not a static and atemporal principle, but the exigence, while, on the other hand, it a genetic and temporal one, it comes out cannot tell this exigence; c) On the one everywhere where a transformation occurs hand, actualizes the inducing dynamism of or can occur: it is necessary, but just in the the question, while, on the other hand, it sense in which a need to be taken in charge cannot exhaust this dynamism. As Deleuze in a creative and unforeseeable way emerges puts it, problems do not disappear with (it is necessary to do something, but what, their solutions, since they are the condition and how?). More than in the question of without which no solution would ever exist; the essence of the noun idea, Deleuze, let at the same time, without solutions, no me say, is interested in the question of the problem would ever take shape. A problem modes of the verb ideare, which in Italian is an active power that compels for taking means exactly “to have an idea,” “to create,” charge of it and discovering its solvability. 100 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano

In this sense, the problem and the virtual at stake in understanding the relations for are all in one: the virtual is what needs Deleuze is the possibility to grasp nothing an actualization, without predetermining less than the difference-in-itself: a relation which and how this could or will be; the is external to its terms, but it also in some actual is nothing without referring to the sense constitutes its terms (it can constitute virtual, but the way of this referral is still its terms because of its externality). Hence, to be created. When we ask a question, we a relation is not “a thing,” but nothing else are posing a sort of constraining instance than a “thunderbolt” (the “dark precur- of dissimilarity: how could it be answered? sor”): the principle of differentiation, of But, firstly, how should it be properly pure alteration, which has not identity in posed? What could it mean? Finally, it is itself and cannot be thought as similar to an imperative not in the commanding form a given something, for it is the occurrence of “do this!”, but in the provoking one of of an encounter, that can produce or not “can you do something with and of this?” something, that can give birth or not to A question circulates in all the answers a “disjunctive synthesis”, that can be or that itself has opened, without coinciding not actualized. So, the “creative AND” with none of them; that is, it makes them (“in-between,” “in the middle,” “inter- circulating and communicating: a question being,” “intermezzo,” “transversal,” “fold,” is the “object=x” that circulates within a “interstitial,” “extra-being” etc.) is the pure structure and enables it to function as such power of the affirmation of the difference as (it distributes differences), and which, in such that constitutes the real genesis of the its turn, is also produced by this structure reality, because the relations cannot change (it is expressed through the variation of without the terms changing. We can say the differential relations). So, the affirma- that the pure relation is experienced in the tion that Deleuze cares about is not the so-called “aha moments,” in which we have subordination, overwhelming, overtaking, an idea, just while it is it that comes to us: overpowering etc. of something or someone in similar cases, we become a sort of passive else: this would be to all effects an affirma- recipient of a message from a mysterious tion through negation. Rather, he conceives outside force; that is, we are activated, for the pure force of the affirmation under the we have the insight of a sudden and unex- paradoxical form of the position of a ques- pected possible relation, which still needs tion, that is, under a problematical form. to be articulated and developed (cf. Irvine Said briefly, in Deleuze’s view, a problem 2015). Therefore, the most important thing is what asks for the construction of a field to underline is that the tensor-relation, that of possible solutions. is, the relation as transitive and transitory, Fourth. Deleuze has stressed the im- is the pure agent of becoming, the absolute portance of the concept of relation since vector of heterogenization, the virtual of his first book on David Hume, and has the actual – for pure relation is at the same again and again remarked it throughout all time completely undetermined (obscured) his work, particularly in his last interviews, and fully determinable (distinct). Or, also, seminars and interventions. What is really it becomes the name of the pure event, of But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 101 the pure temporality, of the pure duration: opposita sed diversa is the formula of a new of the becoming in all its own consistency. logic” (EP: 60). This means that, for Deleuze, the difference In Deleuze’s view, finally, the fundamen- is the most generic name that can be given tal activity of the “subject” is the position to the relation, that this, any possible rela- of problems, which – as questioning – is tion is first of all a relation of difference, led by affirmativity, a spontaneous and a pure alteration, only then it can be a unconscious affirmativity. In fact, to be relation of opposition, contrariety, contra- more precise, in Deleuze’s view, there is no diction and so on. It is, in this sense, that main-place for the subject, the conscious or difference comes first and all other kinds of the person in the strict sense, just because his relation, particularly the Hegelian negative insistence on the impersonal, pre-individual, ones, come after: difference here becomes or un-/pre-conscious wants to emphasize constitutive of identity, rather than the that the main experience of our being in contrary; that is, it becomes productive and the world is not the conscious or linguistic genetic. Relations such as identity, analogy, one (the problematic is the unconscious opposition and resemblance, are all secon­ and vice versa). Rather, it is the “energetic” dary effects or results of prior relations of one, connected with the order of the affects difference. Relations of negation, finally, are and, above all, with the affirmative plane of all secondary in respect of the preliminary reality. As a matter of fact, it’s easy to see that relations of affirmation – in the problematic the main Deleuzian ontological concepts sense. Said briefly, in Deleuze’s view, the are traced from this kind of “intensive” and difference is theUr-relation by excellence. “active” experience or condition: power, At the opposite, we can synthetically duration, desire, conatus, sense, sensation, say that, from a Deleuzian perspective, in intensity, future, energy, force, movement, Hegel’s view: virtual, tendency and so on. i) Time is the process of the origin’s reco­ As it has been noted – even if with a vering; negative accent – one could even say that ii) An idea is a movement of the reappro- Deleuze ignores language; that is, he em- priation of its own sameness; braces an energetic model made of intensi- iii) A problem is oriented toward its own ties, connections, virtuality, immediacy, end-solution; strengths, overabundance etc., in which iv) Contradiction is the Ur-relation. there is no space for separation and con- If, as seen, Hegel’s logic is a logic of traposition, just because this model rejects recollection, Deleuze’s “logic of the AND” the “linguistic turn” of the 20th century or “logic of the multiplicity” wants to be as the analysis of linguistic mechanisms. a logic of pure differentiation and of mere Therefore, Deleuze would not be not able alteration – that is, a logic of affirmative to give account of the medial, negative, creation, free from opposition and priva- splitting or divisive phenomena: when tion: a paradoxical energetic logic, as is to be he talks about “logic” (The Logic of Sense, explained. It is this same logic that Deleuze The Logic of Sensation and so forth), to all had already spotted in Spinoza’s world: “non effects he would always be talking about 102 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano

“physics” (cf. Bottiroli 2013: 77–89). Even etc.), not finally grasping though concepts when Deleuze talks about concept, he talks something like the nature in itself, and – about conception, namely, about the creative maybe – he is not even conceptualizing the process of conceiving: he always points not most relevant kind of human experience. As at The Concept, but at a concept, at a process it could be seen, this objection raises, then, of conceptualization, at a process of creation a wider and deeper problem, perhaps the of a concept. most crucial for all philosophy: is it possible My conviction is that in this respect for our thought to relate, no matter how, Deleuze is less anthropocentric than to reality in itself? Hence, here I must leave Hegel: the first efforts to conceptualize the this point4 sub judice, not only because what essence of the reality itself, conceived in a now matters is to stress that – according to naturalistic sense, namely, made of forces, the former paragraphs – Deleuze intends to energies, relations, durations and so forth; think that pure effectiveness as such, that the second disqualifies nature and attributes is, as affirmation/alteration/differentiation, to the reality in itself the main features of is free from any form of negative mediacy, the mind, conceived in a self-conscious but also because in doing this he shapes his meaning. However, I admit that at least two concepts referring to all those “energetic” valid objections could be posed; the second events that occur in nature. could be considered as a development and If Hegel continues the classic tradition a radicalization of the first. of ontolinguistic metaphysics, based on The first is that Deleuze is actually just privileging some other linguistic aspects, that 4 For instance, one could also say that Deleuze is, verbs, adverbs, or even prepositions, and is actually giving conceptual consistence to so on, rather than proper names, adjectives, another dimension of the same “interio­rity.” copula, predication and so on. This objec- In fact, rather than on consciousness, Deleuze tion hits the target if we think that Deleuze always insisted on thinking: the first is linked with a conscious process of mediation (logi- often emphasizes linguistic traits, such as cal, argumentative, rational etc.), conscious infinitive verbs, modes of verbal attribution, properly insofar as mediated; the second, performative speech, pragmatics, indefinite instead, is paradoxically much closer to the articles etc., or prepositions, such as “be- unconsciousness, as it represents an effort of concentration, that refolding for which one tween,” “infra,” “inter” etc., or conjunctions, is in the process of grasping or catching some- such as “and,” “or” and so on. Nevertheless, thing, that concentration for which one doesn’t if we look at the entire Deleuzian corpus, realize that a suspension of the ordinary use of we can see that to Deleuze, all these more faculties was happening. The first is on the level “active” and “dynamical” linguistic elements of good and common sense, of recognition (I am me), while the second on the level strictly are the secondary effect, or the redoubling, creative, as – so to say – problematic and not of the main dynamism of natura naturans mechanical concentration (“to be taken with” as such rather than vice versa. what one is doing). Actually, the moments in The second is that Deleuze is “symboli­ which we say to be thinking are moments of zing” in concepts just another kind of human deep “unconsciousness”: moments in which we doubt, waver, hesitate etc. in an almost experience (desiring, sensing, being affected “ecstatic” way – atopic and alienated. But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 103 concepts, such as substance, predication, of the richest differences. In a few words, judgement etc. (cf. also Chiurazzi 1996), Deleuze does not say or wish that every- Deleuze continues instead that sort of tra- thing would expand into infinity, nor that dition of cosmological metaphysics, based it is only through negation that there could on such concepts as energy, force, field be expansion (which would rather imply and so forth. Here, in general, eternity is limitation); on the contrary, he says exactly not the permanence of a form (of a given that everything expands as far and as long as substance), but the persistence of an effort it can. Again, it is in this sense – as it should of transformation (of a process): it’s not be clear now – that Deleuze thinks that one a problem of continuity of a state, but of of the main errors of the Hegelian dialectic “continuosity” of a lasting. It is not the case was to focus on the confrontation between that Deleuze often uses a language full of opposing, contrary or contradictory solu- images taken by the natural sciences, or tions, rather than stressing the importance that his work could have shown so many of the affirmative and objective power of the connections with some contemporary issues problems, which is instead the real core of of the natural sciences.5 the Absolute – putting it in Hegelian words. It is in this kind of energetic and, so to speak, prelinguistic world that, in example, 3. To Be Hungry. Trauma and Desire all truth-criteria could be not a question of adequacy, neither of recollection, nor It may seem that, so far, I have just drawn of reconciliation, but always of interest, two more or less accurate drafts of the Hege- relevance and importance, namely, of lian and Deleuzian philosophies, in a too the expanding-power or of the capacity speculative, foggy and even partisan way to to extend (“what can…?”). What counts really be able to clarify why Deleuze is not here is, I would say, the “differential coef- and could not be Hegelian. For this reason, ficient,” remembering that this does not now I want to make an example, which entail a simple, uncontrolled proliferation could be a paradigm not simply of the irre- of virtual forces, but the actual consistence ducible, essential divergence between Hegel and Deleuze, but instead of what, given 5 About this, cf. mainly DeLanda 2002; Gaff- a certain condition or experience, Hegel ney 2010. But I can also add that some of the and Deleuze can differently sharpen. I am most relevant contemporary scientific ideas talking of the desire, which – as known – are, let me say, deeply Deleuzian. I.e.: the plays a key role in the Deleuzian production idea of a structural physical realism in which there is nothing but vibrations, that is, ten- (mostly in the works with Guattari) and is sive relations (cf. French 2014); the idea of a also a key moment in the development of world made not of the endure of substances, the Gestalten of the Hegelian Mind. but of the perdurer of processes (cf. Esfeld 2012: 74); the idea of something as an ideal Before this, let me highlight another virtual empty element as engine of the entire more general situation that can help us in universe (cf. Deacon 2011), or – lastly – the this understanding. Think of psychological idea of an info-world inhabited by info-org, traumas: what do they reveal to and repre- made of diaphora, that is, of pure difference (cf. Floridi 2010; 2011). sent for a subject? 104 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano

In the Hegelian world, they act as a sort subject and thus can be the source of his of formative medium, as if Hegel would reshaping-delimitation, for Deleuze, it renew the saying “learning by suffering” reveals above all that there was a demand (already stated in Aeschylus’s Agamemnon, still unanswered within (rather than “of”) but cf. also Gadamer 2004: 350–351), the subject and thus it – and the subject or they even represent – as Malabou has with it – could be now better developed particularly insisted – a transformative and shaped. Also, from the external point of opportunity. In other words, they denote view, a trauma represents an obstacle in the that the encounter with the negative – when problematic sense for Deleuze: an event to “removed” and “digested” – is even neces- be counter-effectuated, a case the prolonga- sary in that journey within oneself, where tion of which is to be tested, an occasion of several forms of the Self contrast with each de- and then re-individuation. Involution other and which constitutes the Self as and virtualization of form, diagonalization such. I would say that the protagonist of the of form, the becoming as in-between forms: Hegelian transformation is always a subject, this is Deleuze’s transformation. even when he projects himself toward and Said briefly, in the Hegelian world, a exposes himself to the unexpected and the trauma exposes an external negation, that unforeseeable, it is in order to become a new the Self should himself negate in order to re- subject. As said before, every deformation, appropriate his own identity, insofar as this every reformation and every transforma- could have another form; in the Deleuzian tion is, first of all, a matter of formation, world, a trauma shows an internal-external that is, a problem of the presence or the differentiation, the reemergence of a virtual, absence of a form. Undoubtedly, forms pre- and trans-individual question that do change, but this means that one form should be tested, prolonged and developed is negated and this negation is negated in in order to make a subject take shape, or – order to constitute a new form and so on: better – in order to see if and what a subject what counts, finally, is that a form is to be can do. If a Hegelian says to himself, “now I determined thanks to the negativity. Loss have to overcome it and leave it behind!” – of form, restoration of form, becoming as a Deleuzian instead asks “how can this passage from one form to another form: instance be reintegrated – if it can – in the this is Hegel’s transformation. path of one life?” In the one case, negation is In the Deleuzian world, instead, a the engine of consciousness’ development; trauma is a sort of a sign, almost in the in the other, problematization is the source literal sense of the problem, as a complex of the construction of an experimental of hurling and hindering, that is, something field. There, we are always looking for the which points not at an external limit (that result of the process, even if this would be negates the subject), but, firstly, at internal only momentary; here, we are always in the research (the movement of affirmation middle of a process, in the enduring of it. of the subject). In other words, while for This contrast of Hegel-Deleuze may Hegel a trauma testifies, first of all, the appear too dualistic – and it probably is – irruption of something that negates the but I think that nevertheless it is useful to But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 105 better circumscribe the core of the issue here kind of energy, now as a free enjoyment, discussed, and to understand the presenta- that is, now as a free flow to be celebrated, tion of the key example that follows in a now as a free flow to be demonized. By clearer way. looking philosophically at the desire and Coming to the desire, here I don’t want its immanence, instead, it allows us, for to reconstruct all the aspects of its presence instance, to see that: in the work of the two philosophers; after i) The desire is linked with the force of a all, these are quite widely known, and questioning and the affirmation of an there are also relevant specific texts about instance to be expressed; the comparison between Hegelian and ii) The experience of desiring is thus expe- Deleuzian­ ways of conceiving the desire riencing intensity and energy; (cf., above all, Adkins 2007). Hence, I just iii) In order to respond to this and extend want to put in evidence some general traits, this quest – that is, in order to affirm this in relation with the previous pages. affirmativity, it needs to be developed by If we look at the way in which Hegel both the interior endeavor and the pos- describes the desire and its process, we can sibilities of encounter and composition easily see the following: with something exterior to oneself; i) The desire is linked (since the form of iv) Every interlacement of different desires the animal need) with the feeling of a gives birth to a process of differentia- defect and the perception of a lack; tion – that is, to an entanglement of ii) The experience of desiring is thus expe- problems and solutions that could be riencing pain and sufferance; good as bad, expressive as repressive and iii) In order to respond to this and overcome so on – but which is always transforma- the lack – that is, in order to negate tive. this negativity, it needs to be negated Thinking of the image of the nutrition, with both the interior stimulus and for Hegel, it entails a process of annihila- something exterior to oneself, which, tion, assimilation and digestion, that is, the in its turn, opposes itself to oneself; attempt to overcome the lack of the appetite iv) When desires stricto sensu meet, their through the negation of the immediacy of encounter is always a question of a the object and the negation of oneself im- struggle to get recognition, that is, an mediacy (I negate the immediate form of attempt to reciprocally negate the other the object by its transformation, I negate and the negation operated by the other my own immediate appetite through work, and so on. I finally negate the object and my appetite Deleuzian desire has been often misun- through digestion). Instead, for Deleuze – it derstood or – more properly – it has been is quite clear already since his reflection on discussed mostly in the political, social and the tension between instincts and institu- psychoanalytical senses, but not so much tions in the 1950s – it entails a process of in the philosophical one. The consequence expression, folding and satisfaction – that of this general attitude is that desire has is, the attempt to prolong and extend the been painted now as a free, revolutionary demand of the appetite through its flection, 106 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano the invention of a way to satisfy it and the which go toward a transformation when composition of a good encounter, able to they undergo an encounter (the relation of avoid poisoning (the appetite is affirmed, difference), which, is in its turn, an affirma- but also the object, because it is put in a tive agent (the agent of becoming): all we relation that differentiates and expands have – in short – is the constitution of an itself, and the satisfaction produces both the open, problematic field. We do not have I enjoying and a new configuration of the two subjects trying to negate each other, object). There, we go from the immediate thus put in a contrastive relationship. to the mediate and vice versa by opposing Simply said, it’s just like Deleuze wants negations; here, we go from the virtual to to stress that we cannot take one kind of a the actual and vice versa by repeated dif- relation (master-slave as a struggle to the ferentiations. Or, so to say, what matters to death) and say, “that’s relation as such!” Hegel is to come in the end to digestion and Rather, we should understand – let me defecation, while what counts for Deleuze say – what different kinds of relation are is to live in the middle of the process of shared (mother-son, friendship, hammer- satisfying and tasting. worker and so forth), that is, the fact of Furthermore, if we take the master-slave being relations, of posing a transformative dialectic, which is precisely one of or the difference between the relata. All relations main locus of Hegelian desire, we can focus share the fact of being differences, of affirming on in which sense for Deleuze contradiction differences, nothing more and nothing less.6 is – at best – nothing but a case of the more Going to the conclusion, let me add just generic relation of difference. First of all, the another thing. Desire could also be a good relation of a master-slave cannot be consi­ example to understand the general frame of dered a sort of monadic intrinsic property the Deleuzian “Transcendental Deduction” of the two subjects or individuals: in fact, it of time, sketched above. In fact, the process qualifies the relata not in the same way (one of sensing and responding to a desire could is the master, the other is the slave), that is, be described in three stages. it characterizes them differently. Hence, it First. We are all enchanted in what we must be extrinsic to them, which is another are doing at the moment – that is, we are way of saying that before and apart from all contracted with our present, we are – as the master-slave relationship, there aren’t Deleuze puts it – contemplating: we are such things as a master and a slave. simply all the same with our present acti­ But this is not enough, and Hegel could vity, whatever it is; we don’t feel any need. even agree with this insight. Indeed, se­ Second. The enchantment breaks up condly, for Deleuze, what counts is that the and fatigue emerges, revealing that we relation of a master-slave makes them above were not generating needs, that we were all different with respect to each other, not that they can then be reciprocally opposite 6 For a more general presentation of relations or against each other. Besides for Deleuze, as a ground philosophical problem, see we have two movements of affirmation Marmodoro-Yates 2016, where also some important affinities with the Deleuzian per- (the ones of the “master” and the “slave”), spective appear. But in the end, why is Deleuze “Anti-Hegelian”? Religija ir kultūra 107 totally absorbed by the previous activity, or of the problem, or of the question, or of which solely now appears as such. The past the pure empty form of time and so on. On comes over, telling us not just what we were the Hegelian side, we have desire seen as doing, but above all that there was a the loss of the best star and the subsequent “hidden” request inhabiting us (“so was I painful need to recollect it, counting on hungry?”). If we could be enchanted, it was the power of the negative; on the Deleu­ because a kind of energy reserve was stored, zian side, we have desire seen as openness but now it is awakening itself and us. of the sky full of stars, and the subsequent Third. It’s the time of the future, the demand for the construction of the better real origin of all the matter. The energy circumstantiated constellation of stars, rely- reserve becomes problematic, it compels ing upon the dynamism of the affirmative. and animates us: the past undergoes forking Aufhebung contra agencement, or recollection paths. Now we can try to face this request, contra expression, to put it in a slogan. articulating its indetermination and deve­ Let me be clear: again, I’m not saying loping its determinability, in order to find that Hegel is wrong, while Deleuze is right, how they could be formulated, expressed or vice versa. One could say that even if de- and finally satisfied (“how can I satisfy siring is active and problematic questioning, the appetite? Should I?” etc.). Only then satisfying it requires de facto the negation, as we could fall again under the spell of the it happens when – in example – you have present, of another unpredictable present, to kill an animal, or to eat a killed animal, without knowing when, why and how that in order to silence your hunger; and here is, in a passive and unconscious way. And you are not taking in a generic, differential now, the eternal return can go on and on. and affirmative process of composition of For Hegel, instead, it seems as if this forces. Hence, I’m not saying that things process consists in returning to the (sup- cannot be seen as such, rather I’m exactly posed) condition of the beginning, that is, saying that things can be seen that way, to the absence (negation) of lack (negation), or – better – that you can see them in these where time is finally annulled, or – at least – different ways depending on the conceptual where the recollection of all the stages of framework you rely on. the negation has been completed, and the So, it is in this sense that I’m claiming origin – that is, a form – has been regained. that Hegel and Deleuze do nothing but It matters less to satisfy the desire and more build different conceptual architectures, to apprehend retrospectively it, its meaning and that it is exactly this fact (the faktum and its sense, so to speak; or – better – what of the difference) that – according to De- most counts is that in the end the subject leuze – Hegel is not able to focus; before has found a new form through his labor that they reciprocally negate in order to and pain – namely, that he has digested determine themselves, things just diffe­ and defecated, that has freed himself and rence themselves and have to develop that let free. internal difference that constitutes them. We can say that in Deleuze’s philosophy, But this is also why, paradoxically, Deleuze desire is nothing but the same of the virtual, ends up being radically against Hegel – as 108 Religija ir kultūra Giacomo Pezzano if he himself could not resist to that move- Hegel asks how a process starts and ends, ment of becoming where there could not while Deleuze asks what happens in the be a Deleuze-becoming of Hegel without middle of a process; but both of them are a Hegel-becoming of Deleuze. nonetheless asking if and how it is possible In the end, this ambiguity may indicate to think the process. Is this the reason why that, on the one side, Hegel and Deleuze do, Deleuze, the philosopher of the “indiffer- at all effects, pose different problems, but, ence” toward opposition, could not be indif- on the other side, they also share a field of ferent to Hegelian system? Maybe, but this coordinates within which these problems problem could be the start of another new are posed and developed. In other words, philosophical system, which is yet to come.7

References

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TAČIAU, GALIAUSIAI, KODĖL DELEUZE’AS YRA „ANTIHĖGELININKAS“? HEGELIO–DE- LEUZE’O SUSIDŪRIMO PRIEŽASTIS

Giacomo Pezzano

Santrauka Deleuze’as yra pasakęs, kad nekenčia hėgelizmo ir dialektikos. Šiame straipsnyje tvirtinama, jog Deleuze’as yra prieš Hegelį, nes turi ir siūlo kitokią filosofinę sistemą. Taigi straipsnio autorius tei- gia, kad, norėdami suprasti tokio „bjaurėjimosi“ priežastį, turime susitelkti į filosofinį klausimą, išjudinantį visą delioziškąją sistemą (§ 1). Autorius paaiškina, kad pamatinis Hegelio filosofijos klausimas – kaip yra įmanoma dalykų įveika, vystymasis?, o delioziškasis klausimas – kaip įmanomas naujumas, dalykų pasirodymas (§ 2). Galiausiai autorius aptaria, kaip geismas gali būti laikomas pagrindiniu pavyzdžiu, parodančiu abiejų autorių perspektyvų išsiskyrimą (§ 3). Pagrindiniai žodžiai: dialektika, prisiminimas, kūrybiškumas, transformacija, skirties filosofija, geismas.