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Innovations: A Journal of Politics Volume 8, 2008-2009

2008 Culture Clash: The Influence of Behavioural Norms on Military Performance in Asymmetric Conflicts

Fitzsimmons, Scott http://hdl.handle.net/1880/112888 journal article

© Innovations: A Journal of Politics 1998-2052 Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca Volume 8 – 2008-2009 CULTURE CLASH: THE INFLUENCE OF BEHAVIOURAL NORMS ON MILITARY PERFORMANCE IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS

Scott Fitzsimmons Department of Political Science University of Calgary

Abstract – This paper establishes the ways in which the military cultures of mercenary groups and their opponents influence their military performance in asymmetric conflicts. It develops and tests a constructivist military culture theory of military performance against the empirical record of two modern mercenary groups, one of which achieved victory over its opponent and one of which was defeated. The core logic of the theory is that a grossly outnumbered force must be highly flexible and adaptable if it is to perform the range of military tasks required to defeat materially superior opponents. Norms encouraging the pursuit of a wider range of tactical behaviour should increase military effectiveness, which, in turn, should increase a group’s prospects for military success. If the theory is correct, a military force’s performance should be conditioned by the degree to which the members of the force have been indoctrinated into norms that encourage them to be militarily effective. Specifically, the theory reasons that military forces that strongly emphasize norms encouraging creative thinking, decentralized authority, personal initiative, technical proficiency, and group loyalty, should exhibit greater militarily effectiveness than forces that deemphasize these norms. Moreover, it reasons that military forces exhibiting greater military effectiveness should experience greater battlefield military performance than less effective groups, all else equal. Taking this into account, the theory predicts that the materially weaker party in an asymmetric conflict, which the mercenaries were in both cases, should only be able to defeat its materially stronger opponent if the weaker party emphasizes behavioural norms that encourage it to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour – that is, be very militarily effective – and the stronger party does not emphasize these norms because this should allow the weaker party to exploit the weaknesses and counter the strengths of the stronger party and, through this, defeat it. On the other hand, the theory predicts that, in asymmetric conflicts where neither party emphasizes behavioural norms encouraging them to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour, neither party should be capable of exploiting the weaknesses and countering the strengths of the other and, as a result, the balance of material capabilities should allow the materially stronger party to prevail.

Introduction Since the end of the Second World War, mercenary groups have played significant roles in wars throughout the developing world. However, despite being consistently outnumbered by their opponents, these groups have a highly uneven record of military performance. Indeed, some modern mercenary groups have managed to defeat far larger state and insurgent militaries while similar sized groups of private soldiers have experienced crushing defeats at the hands of

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Volume 8 – 2008-2009 numerically superior adversaries. Taking this into account, how can we explain the military performance of modern mercenary groups in asymmetric conflicts?1 Scarce literature exists on the performance of mercenary groups and that which does exist consists largely of descriptive case studies offering an overview of specific groups or the private military industry. In brief, most of the leading works on mercenary forces are long on empirical data and narrative but short on theory and explanation.2 This paper seeks to redress this failing by evaluating my own normative theory of military performance against the empirical record of two of the best-known conflicts involving mercenaries: the Simba Rebellion, which lasted from January 1964 to November 1965, and the early stages of the Angolan Civil War in January- February 1976. The theory hypothesizes that a military force’s cultural norms influence its tactical behaviour (its military effectiveness), which, in turn, influences its battlefield military performance. However, given that warfare is an interactive activity, the theory reasons that the battlefield military performance of opposing military forces is primarily the result of the interplay of their relative military effectiveness. In other words, the theory argues that the interactive clash of combatants’ norm-influenced tactical behaviour is the primary determinant of victory or defeat on the battlefield. The core logic of the theory is that a grossly outnumbered force must be highly flexible and adaptable if it is to perform the range of military tasks required to defeat materially superior opponents. Norms encouraging the pursuit of a wider range of tactical behaviour, such as personal initiative, should, therefore, increase military effectiveness, which, in turn, should increase a group’s prospects for military success. If the theory is correct, a military force’s performance should be conditioned by the degree to which the members of the force have been indoctrinated into norms that encourage them to be militarily effective. Specifically, the theory reasons that military forces that strongly emphasize norms encouraging creative thinking, decentralized authority, personal initiative, technical proficiency, and group loyalty, should exhibit greater militarily effectiveness than forces that deemphasize these norms.3 Moreover, it reasons that military forces exhibiting greater military effectiveness should experience greater battlefield military performance than less effective groups, all else equal. Taking this into account, the theory predicts that the materially weaker party in an asymmetric conflict, which the mercenaries were in both cases, should only be able to defeat its

1 Military performance, the dependent variable in this paper, is specifically concerned with winning and losing battles. It is the outcome of battle; it is not what a military does in battle. Military performance is not a characteristic of an organization but rather the result of an organization’s activity. This concept does not equate with military effectiveness, another major variable in this paper referring to the range of military behaviours that a military force is capable of undertaking. Armed forces may be highly effective yet still be defeated. For example, the German Army was arguably the most effective fighting force during both the First and Second World Wars yet it ultimately lost numerous battles and both conflicts. Indeed, the German army is often cited as an example of extraordinary military effectiveness because it fought so well even when faced with more numerous and better armed foes. Therefore, while military effectiveness and military performance are related concepts, it is important to recognize that they are quite different; military effectiveness is only one possible determinant of military performance. Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power: German and US Army Performance, 1939-1945 (London, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1983); Allan Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," International Security 11, no. 1 (Summer 1986). 2 Indeed, only two major works of international relations theory directly examine mercenaries: Deborah D. Avant, The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Janice E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 3 The author wishes to acknowledge Kenneth Pollack’s scholarship on Arab military forces for helping to inspire the development of this theory. 100

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 materially stronger opponent if the weaker party emphasizes behavioural norms that encourage it to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour – that is, be very militarily effective – and the stronger party does not emphasize these norms because this should allow the weaker party to exploit the weaknesses and counter the strengths of the stronger party and, through this, defeat it. On the other hand, the theory predicts that, in asymmetric conflicts where neither party emphasizes behavioural norms encouraging them to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour, neither party should be capable of exploiting the weaknesses and countering the strengths of the other and, as a result, the balance of material capabilities should allow the materially stronger party to prevail. With respect to the two cases under study in this paper, the theory correctly predicted that 5 Commando should have defeated the materially superior Simbas in the Congo and that the materially superior Cuban-MPLA force in northern Angola should have defeated Callan’s Mercenaries. Ultimately, the results of this analysis suggest that the collection of behavioural norms, or military cultures, maintained by the combatants in these conflicts played a decisive role in deciding the outcomes of the wars and the major battles that took place within them. Taking this into account, the normative theory of military performance offers a convincing explanation of military performance in these asymmetric conflicts. This paper is composed of four main parts: it first provides a brief overview of the cases. Second, it outlines the military cultures maintained by the primary combatants in these cases. Third, it tests the normative theory of military performance against the evidence of these cases. Finally, it concludes with a summary of the findings of this analysis.

Historical Background on the Simba Rebellion and the Angola Civil War The Simba Rebellion began in the Congolese province of Kwilu in January, 1964, when Pierre Mulele, Gaston Soumialot, and Christophe Gbenye organized a group of rebel fighters, which later came to be known as the Simbas (Lions), to rise up against the national government in Leopoldville.4 These troops were later supported by a force of approximately 100 Cuban soldiers, led by Che Guevara, which entered the Congo on April 24, 1965.5 From the outset, the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) proved unable to stop or even significantly slow the rebels’ advance through Kwilu and other parts of the Congo, despite possessing overwhelming material superiority.6 Indeed, most Simba soldiers were initially armed with clubs and spears and very few had rifles.7 In contrast, the far larger ANC was well-armed with modern automatic rifles and armoured cars. Nevertheless, the Simbas advanced quickly and easily because they utilized a form of witchcraft called dawa, which included “magical” water that both they and the ANC believed afforded invincibility to the Simba troops.8 Most ANC soldiers naturally felt that trying to kill an invulnerable enemy was pointless, so they frequently abandoned their weapons and fled in terror when they learned of an impending Simba attack.9

4 Anthony Clayton, Frontiersmen: Warfare in Africa Since 1950 (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999), 79; Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, Pretoria (Alberton, SA: Galago, 2002), 62-63; Anthony Rogers, Someone Else’s War: Mercenaries from 1960 to the Present (London, UK: Harper Collins, 1998), 15. 5 Ernesto "Che" Guevara, The African Dream: The Diaries of the Revolutionary War in the Congo (New York, NY: Grove Press, 1999), 12. 6 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 62-63. 7 Clayton, Frontiersmen, 80. 8 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 63. 9 Mike Hoare, Congo Mercenary (London, UK: Robert Hale, 1982), 21; Peter Tickler, The Modern Mercenary: Dog of War, or Soldier of Honour? (London, UK: Thorston Publishing Group, 1987), 20-21. 101

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 In an effort to address the worsening crisis, the decisive and charismatic Moise Tshombe replaced Cyrille Adoula as Prime Minister of the Congo on June 30, 1964.10 He initially sought to find a diplomatic solution to the conflict by inviting the Simba leadership to join with him in a national “Government of Reconciliation.”11 These efforts were, however, rebuffed and, by August, the Simbas controlled approximately half the country, including Kwilu, Kivu, and Orientale provinces, the cities of Stanleyville, Albertville, and Coquilhatville, and dozens of towns and smaller settlements.12 In desperation, Tshombe contacted Michael “Mad Mike” Hoare to establish a battalion of ground troops to put down the rebellion.13 5 Commando, a force of fewer than 300 mercenaries, was soon assembled to engage and defeat a force of between five and seven thousand Simbas, who were equipped with greater quantities of equal or higher quality equipment than that fielded by the mercenaries.14 However, despite their material inferiority, 5 Commando seized territory from the Simbas throughout the conflict. Indeed, between August, 1964, and November, 1965, the mercenaries captured virtually every rebel-held settlement, from tiny villages to medium- sized towns, like Kindu and Aba, to cities like Stanleyville, inflicting several hundred Simba casualties in the process.15 The conflict ultimately ended when the mercenaries crushed the final remnants of Simba resistance in the Fizi-Baraka region in the fall of 1965. However, in spite of 5 Commando’s decisive victory over their materially superior opponents, or perhaps because of it, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu sacked the increasingly popular Tshombe in October of that year.16 Kasavubu’s own rule lasted only another month for he was ousted in a bloodless coup by ANC General Joseph Mobutu on November 25. Finally, Hoare ended his successful tenure as commander of 5 Commando on the following day as the conflict was effectively over and his services were no longer required.17 The Angolan Civil War began in July 1975 as an offshoot of the Angolan War of Independence from Portugal and saw three major combatants struggle for control over the newly independent colony’s political future: the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the US- and Chinese-backed National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), and the South African-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).18 While the first few months of the war went poorly for the MPLA, as it suffered numerous defeats at the hands of UNITA and the South African Defence Forces in southern Angola, it experienced much greater success against the FNLA in northern Angola. Indeed, by the end of 1975, the FNLA were on the verge of total defeat, which motivated the movement’s

10 Colin Baker, Wild Goose: The Life and Death of Hugh van Oppen (Cardiff, UK: Mpemba Books, 2002), 169; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 64; Anthony Mockler, The New Mercenaries: The History of Hired Soldiers from the Congo to the Seychelles (New York, NY: Paragon House Publications, 1987), 57; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 21. 11 Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 15. 12 Clayton, Frontiersmen, 80; Anthony Mockler, The Mercenaries (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1969), 172; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 15-16; Gerry S. Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 16. 13 Baker, Wild Goose, 170; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 16; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 21. 14 Guevara, The African Dream, 196; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 89. 15 Baker, Wild Goose, 187; George H. Dodenhoff, "The Congo: A Case Study of Mercenary Employment," Naval War College Review 21 (April 1969): 59; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 77-78, 103, 167-170; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 20-25. 16 Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 31. 17 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 77. 18 Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 67. 102

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 leader, Holden Roberto, to hire European mercenaries in a desperate attempt to hold on to what little territory the FNLA still controlled, including the settlements of Damba, Quibocolo, Sao Salvador, Maquela, and San Antonio do Zaire.19 This force of private soldiers was led by a former corporal in the British Parachute Regiment named Costas “Colonel Callan” Georgiou, who was assisted by a small cadre of senior commanders, including “Regimental Sergeant-Major” Sam “Sammy” Copeland, an ex-Sergeant from the British Parachute Regiment, “Captain” Mick Wainhouse, an ex-Para private, and “Captain” Charles “Shotgun Charley” Christodoulou, another ex-Para, who had attained the rank of corporal.20 The group, which came to be known as “Callan’s Mercenaries,” fought a brief but eventful campaign against a materially superior force of Cuban and MPLA troops between January 5 and February 6, 1976. Indeed, although Callan’s Mercenaries never fielded more than 60 fighters at any given time, they engaged a 1,600-strong Cuban-MPLA force, which was armed with a far greater quantity of equal or higher quality equipment than that fielded by the mercenaries, six times during the month-long campaign.21 Ultimately, although the mercenaries were successful in several engagements, they were defeated by their materially superior opponents, after which northern Angola fell under MPLA control.

The Combatants’ Military Cultures The military cultures maintained by the combatants in these conflicts placed varying degrees of emphasis on five norms of military effectiveness.

Creative Thinking Hoare had clear and unambiguous views about the value of creative thinking: it was absolutely essential for the success and survival of a small group of fighters. He argued plainly that he and his officers had to come “to grips with the real problems of soldiering in the Congo

19 Robin Hallett, "The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-76," African Affairs 77, no. 308: 378; W. Martin James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1992), 231; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 174; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 23-24; Al J. Venter, "Angola Flashbacks," Soldier of Fortune Spring 1976, 21. 20 Chris Dempster and Dave Tomkins, Fire Power (London, UK: Transworld Publishers Ltd., 1978), 134; Peter Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune: The Twentieth Century Mercenary (New York, NY: Gallery Books, 1986), 93-94; Peter McAleese, No Mean Soldier: The Story of the Ultimate Professional Soldier in the SAS and Other Forces (London, UK: Cassell, 2003), 82, 84, and 87; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 160-161, 163, 172, 182; Wilfred Burchett and Derek Roebuck, The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1977), 42; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 73; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 68. 21 Juan del Aguila, "The Changing Character of Cuba's Armed Forces," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Press, 1989), 33; Mitchell Bainwoll, "Cuba," in Fighting Armies: Non-Aligned, Third World, and Other Armies, ed. Richard A. Gabriel (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 229 and 231; Caribbean Report, "U.S. Admiral Pushes for Neutral Havana," Caribbean Report, March 29, 1985, 4-5; Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 171 and 363-364; Edward George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965- 1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 2005), 107; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 266 and 338; Ian Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies (Richmond, UK: Foreign Affairs Publishing Co. Ltd., 1977), 229; Helmoed-Romer Heitman, War in Angola: The Final South African Phase (Gibraltar: Ashanti Publishing Ltd., 1990), 202-305; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 83 and 111; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 165 and 183; Piet Nortje, 32 Battalion: The Inside Story of South Africa's Elite Fighting Unit (Cape Town, SA: Zebra Press, 2004), 9-10; Kenneth M. Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness" (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996), 662; Daniel Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Co. Inc., 1993), 297; Christopher Stevens, "The Soviet Union and Angola," African Affairs 75, no. 299 (April 1976): 144; John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1978), 216. 103

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 and shuffl(e) off preconceived notions” about how they, as a group and as individuals, should behave.22 Recalling discussions with his officers, he told them that, “there is no book on the Congo… we must write one ourselves.”23 Hoare drummed this norm into his force in a variety of ways. For example, in a “Lecture on Man Management,” he provided direct advice to his officers on the value of creative thinking: Imagine that you are riding along in a convoy and suddenly you run into an ambush. Bullets are flying everywhere and confusion and panic grip the column. This is the ‘moment of truth’ for you as a leader. Every man will look to you for leadership… My advice to you is simply this. Anticipate every situation which can arise in battle and think out your reaction to it, well in advance. The split second which you can gain can be decisive.24

In stark contrast to Hoare’s 5 Commando, the Simbas not only discouraged creative thinking, but also actively encouraged all members of the force to follow the strict rules of behaviour associated with dawa, a magical medicine that Simba witch doctors claimed would provide invincibility to any rebel under its protection.25 In effect, the witch doctors convinced their followers that the mercenaries’ bullets would transform into harmless water upon contact with a rebel’s skin or fly back and hit the shooter.26 As Hoare describes: In this drugged state the (Simbas)… firmly believed in their invincibility and their immunity from all harm. The immunity the dawa gave existed only in their half-crazed minds, but their centuries’ old beliefs in witchcraft were sufficient to convince them that they could go into battle against machine guns and all the weapons of modern warfare and emerge unscathed and victorious merely by screaming ‘Mai Mulele.’27

Moreover, before Simba troops went into battle, the witch doctors would rattle off a series of claims about dawa’s protective power as well as an ever-changing list of “dos” and “don’ts” that Simba warriors were compelled to follow in order for the dawa to work effectively.28 For example, “dos” included waving palm branches and chanting “mai, mai,” meaning “water, water,” and “Mai Mulele,” meaning “water of Mulele,” continuously during the battle.29 The list of “don’ts” was seemingly endless, but included looking anywhere other than

22 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 72. 23 Ibid; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 30. 24 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 308. 25 Tony Geraghty, Who Dares Wins: The Story of the SAS - 1950-1980 (London, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1980), 118; Piero Gleijeses, "‘Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!’: The United States, the Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-65," Diplomatic History 18, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 210; Wayne Thallon, Cut-Throat: The Vicious World of Rod McLean - Mercenary, Gun-Runner, and International Drug Baron (London, UK: Mainstream Publishing, 2005), 15. 26 Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 46; Gleijeses, "‘Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!’: The United States, the Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-65," 210-211; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 20; Benoit Verhaegen, "La Premiere Republique (1960-1965)," in Du Congo au Zaire, 1960-1980, ed. Jacques Vanderlinden (Brussels, Belgium Centre de Recherche et D'information Socio-politiques, 1984), 126. 27 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 21. 28 Guevara, The African Dream, 14. 29 Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 46; David Reed, Save the Hostages (New York, NY: Bantam, 1988), 10. 104

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 straight ahead, touching any item that did not belong to you, touching a woman in any way, eating food, lying down, feeling fear, feeling pain, or failing to return for another dawa application within four hours.30 More taboos were added after every disastrous encounter with the mercenaries to explain why, in any specific instance, the dawa failed.31 As Guevara describes: The answer to any transgression is very simple: a man dead = a man who took fright, stole or slept with a woman; a man wounded = a man who was afraid. Since fear accompanied wartime operations, fighters found it quite natural to attribute wounds to faintheartedness – that is, to lack of belief. And the dead do not speak; all three faults can be ascribed to them.32

Unlike Hoare, Callan did not emphasize creative thinking within his force.33 He perhaps felt this was unnecessary since he always employed precisely the same tactics against the Cuban- MPLA forces.34 Callan referred to these as “hunt-and-destroy” tactics; however, in practical terms they amounted to establishing an ambush position from which to spring a surprise full- frontal assault straight at the enemy, or just the latter if the mercenaries approached an enemy unit in vehicles.35 Therefore, rather than attempt to develop new tactics for each tactical scenario, Callan’s Mercenaries were encouraged to utilize one tactic in virtually any situation, regardless of its conditions. Although it is unclear why Callan deemphasized creative thinking to such an extent, one scholar of the group, Anthony Mockler, attributes it to Callan’s previous experience as a corporal in the British Parachute Regiment, which allegedly also deemphasized creative thinking: “Like the SAS, the Parachute Regiment prides itself on its training and its toughness. But the Paras are very much more of a rough, tough mob than the SAS. Intelligence is not a requirement, nor indeed much sought after, in the Parachute Regiment.”36 Regardless, while an ambush followed by a full-frontal assault is considered one of several tactics that British soldiers may employ, Callan seemingly developed an unnaturally strong preference for it over all possible alternatives.37 He personally lead the majority of the strike missions during the campaign; as a result, his subordinates were able to observe first hand that this tactic was the only one he wanted them to use.38 Turning now to the Soviet-inspired behavioural norms conveyed to Cuban personnel, the Soviet Red Army strongly emphasized creative thinking among its senior commanders, but deemphasized it among its junior officers and enlisted soldiers. Essentially, the Red Army believed that senior officers, commanding tens or hundreds of thousands of troops, had to be as creative as possible to adapt to major changes in the strategic balance along a large battle-front.39

30 Guevara, The African Dream, 14; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 21; Reed, Save the Hostages, 10 and 70. 31 Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 46. 32 Guevara, The African Dream, 14; Reed, Save the Hostages, 10. 33 Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 67; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 72; Venter, "Angola Flashbacks," 29. 34 McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 89. 35 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 77-78, 140, 176, 206, 209, 251, 320, 328, 353, 363, 364, 367, and 368; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 89; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87. 36 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 154. 37 Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 173. 38 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 189-190, and 196-197; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-90. 39 Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and War (Alexandria, VA: Jane's Publishing Inc., 1988), 86 and 217; Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 122. 105

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 To accomplish this, the Soviets believed that tactical-level commanders had to follow the orders of senior commanders to the letter because, if they failed to do so, senior commanders could not guarantee that all of their subordinates would be in the correct positions and accomplishing the correct tasks at the correct times.40 As a result, the Soviets deemphasized creative thinking among junior personnel. This is not to suggest that Cuban junior officers were encouraged to be automatons, completely bereft of all judgment; rather, Cuban junior officers were encouraged to believe that they had relatively limited discretion to think about how best to adapt to the tactical circumstances facing their unit.41 In other words, these officers had a very short “menu” from which to choose tactics to execute their orders: the subordinate formation and unit commanders followed set orders, implementing them by means of a number of established alternative drills. The commander, therefore, did not make a plan, but a ‘decision,’ that is, he decided from a choice of alternatives upon one ‘variant,’ amended it according to local circumstances, and implemented it.42

Ultimately, given the considerable deemphasize on creative thinking in the Soviet indoctrination program, which diffused throughout the Cuban armed forces, the Cuban troops deployed in Angola in 1976 also likely deemphasized creative thinking.

Decentralized Authority Hoare placed strong emphasis on decentralized authority within his force, which he felt was a critical influence on the behaviour of junior officers and enlisted men, both in combat and between engagements.43 He encouraged all of his officers to exercise command authority and provided them sufficient discretion to execute his general orders as best they saw fit.44 In other words, he believed that all major elements of the force should be made aware of his general intentions for a mission and then left to their own devices to carry it out independently.45 The way Hoare organized his command structure reflected his belief in decentralized authority. Indeed, he divided 5 Commando into eight, and later nine, subgroups, designated 51 through 59 Commando.46 Each of these was made up of between 30 and 40 men and commanded by two junior officers and three sergeants.47 The chain of command was clear and unambiguous, with highly general orders, such as, for example, “find and liquidate the Simba rebels in the Wambamuke area,” flowing from the officers to the sergeants to the men.48

40 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 122. 41 Ibid., 123. 42 Donnelly, Red Banner, 85. 43 Baker, Wild Goose, 173. 44 Stephen Clarke, The Congo Mercenary (Johannesburg, ZA: South African Institute of International Affairs, 1968), 73; Tony Geraghty, Inside the SAS (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1980), 103; Hans Germani, White Soldiers in Black Africa, trans. E. Lansberg (Capetown, ZA: Nasionale Beekhandel Beperk, 1967), 82; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 35. 45 Baker, Wild Goose, 185. 46 Brian Pottinger, Mercenary Commander (Alberton, ZA: Galago Publishing, 1986), 192. 47 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 62; J. Gérard-Libois and J. Van Lierde, Congo: 1964 (Brussels, Belgium: Centre de Recherche et d’Information Sociopolitiques, 1965), 365; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 63 and 66; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 19; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 35-36. 48 Baker, Wild Goose, 175; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 180. 106

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 However, the junior officers and sergeants in charge of the subcommandos were encouraged to decide how to implement Hoare’s general orders and develop and carry out their own tactical- level orders to suit the requirements of their circumstances, not to rely on Hoare to tell them precisely what to do: My advice to you is simply this… As soon as trouble strikes, shout out an order. It matters little what it is, so long as you let your men know you are in command. ‘Take cover!,’ for instance – obvious enough and something which they will do in any event, but the fact that you have reacted immediately to the situation, and given an order, is a relief to your men. Instinctively, every man will obey. Your next order is eagerly awaited. Go on and lead firmly…49

The Simbas serve as a good example of how norms that can encourage positive behaviour when emphasized and adhered to in moderation can be highly detrimental when taken to extremes. Indeed, while 5 Commando certainly emphasized decentralized authority, the Simbas overemphasized the norms to such an extent that the officers in charge of Simba subunits did not respect the authority of their superiors at all.50 As a result, although General Laurent-Désiré Kabila was the official commander-in-chief of the Simba forces in the Fizi-Baraka region, several units did not recognize his authority. Reflecting on this problem, Guevara wrote frequently about the “marked lack of organization” within the rebel force.51 For example, in a letter to Comrade Muteba, a member of the Simba general staff, Guevara highlighted a “proliferation of local chiefs (officers), each with his own authority and both tactical and strategic freedom of action.”52 He also concluded that authority was so decentralized that the Simbas were “incapable of coordinating the movement of units beyond a certain size,” because the commanders in charge of disparate units would not work together effectively.53 Callan’s Mercenaries deemphasized decentralized authority. The behaviour of Callan and his senior officers and NCOs, who had all served as junior enlisted troops in the British army, is telling of their limited knowledge of the proper roles of a military officer. Indeed, they routinely reenacted one of the only aspects of officer life they had observed as junior enlisted men, which was to order their subordinates to assemble on the parade ground and then dress them down for real or perceived infractions in appearance or attitude.54 In this role, Callan was a natural for he with gifted with a sharp eye and an even sharper tongue.55 On the other hand, he seemingly knew nothing of the organizational aspects of senior command, like creating a consistent command structure and delegating decision-making authority to lower-ranked personnel.56 Instead, he and his senior officers established an informal “pecking order,” “with a trail of broken sunglasses… trampled underfoot to prove who had lost out.”57 Although this may have succeeded in intimidating members of the force into following Callan’s questionable orders, it was no

49 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 308; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 62. 50 Al J. Venter, War Dog: Fighting Other People's Wars (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2006), 250. 51 Guevara, The African Dream, 25. 52 Ibid., 34. 53 Ibid. 54 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 148; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 87; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 172 and 188; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 73. 55 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 172; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 37. 56 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 155. 57 McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 88 and 91. 107

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 substitute for a real command structure to coordinate not only the mercenaries but also the hundreds of FNLA troops nominally under Callan’s command.58 Moreover, instead of establishing standardized subunits led by a permanent officer and NCO, who could have become familiar with the men under their command and learnt how to best employ them, Callan assembled ad hoc “killer groups” of any size and composition by pointing at whomever happened to be nearest to him when he decided to embark on a mission.59 As Thomas described, “no… sub-commandos were formed as integral units.”60 In addition, Callan generally did not encourage his subordinates to undertake missions on their own, without his direct presence.61 Finally, unlike the experience within 5 Commando, Callan’s junior personnel were not encouraged to make any tactical decisions regarding how to accomplish their objectives.62 Similarly, following the Soviet norm of highly centralized command authority, the Cuban-led forces arrayed against Callan’s Mercenaries in Angola deemphasized decentralized authority as well. As in Soviet military culture, Cuban military culture strongly encouraged respect for hierarchy and deference to higher authority.63 According to Pollack, “It was generally the case that the Soviets expected their senior officers to be aggressive, innovative, flexible, and decisive, and they expected their junior officers to be obedient.”64 Tactical commanders were discouraged from using their own judgment to formulate new orders and plans on the spot, without direct approval from their superiors.65 Rather, “the Soviets maintained that giving junior officers decision-making responsibility restricted the freedom of action of the senior officers because actions taken by a junior officer on his own initiative could prevent his commander from employing those forces for a different mission.”66 As Christopher Donnelly put it, “A Soviet battalion commander, operating as part of a larger force, has no more liberty in the performance of his mission than a British platoon commander.”67 Gouré’s analysis of Cuban-Soviet military relations concluded that the “FAR… has… largely adopted Soviet… command, organizational concepts… and so on.”68 Taking this into account, it is highly plausible that the Cuban forces in Angola deemphasized decentralized authority as well.69

58 Ibid., 95. 59 Callan stated at one point that he intended these groups to be standardized four-man units, though he never followed through with this plan. As a result, some accounts of the campaign, which took his statement at face value, erroneously indicate that Callan’s force was better-organized than it was in reality. Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 140, 172, and 200; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 81, 84, and 97; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 74; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 37; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 89. 60 Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 37. 61 As Thomas summarizes, “eventually, 141 British and 6 American mercenaries came under Callan’s control; but, without any organizational structure… the situation floundered quickly.” Ibid; Venter, "Angola Flashbacks," 29. 62 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 183. 63 Aguila, "The Changing Character of Cuba's Armed Forces," 39. 64 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 122. 65 Ibid. 66 Steven L. Canby, The Alliance and Europe. Part IV: Military Doctrine and Technology, Adelphi Paper 109 (London, UK: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1976), 85; Donnelly, Red Banner, 86 and 217; Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 122. 67 Donnelly, Red Banner, 211. 68 Leone Gouré, "Soviet-Cuban Military Relations," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Press, 1989), 188. 69 Rafael Fermoselle, The Evolution of the Cuban Military: 1492-1986 (Miami, FL: Ediciones Universal, 1987), 306. 108

Volume 8 – 2008-2009

Personal Initiative Hoare strongly emphasized personal initiative within his force. He argued plainly that, “Men with initiative, that much admired but little understood military attribute, would be needed more than ever.”70 Similarly, he encouraged the officers and sergeants in charge of each subcommando to “foster the commando spirit” amongst their men because, “in this campaign, we would need several self-reliant bodies.”71 Moreover, he directly conveyed the rationale behind this norm and the importance of its dissemination throughout 5 Commando. For example, in a lecture to his officers, he argued that: You must recognize strength in personality, even if it makes your life a little harder. So often have I found these ‘prickly pears’ to be the ones who are still in there fighting, when all others have fled – for the basic reason that they are obstinate and will not give in. These are priceless qualities in a soldier which must be encouraged, rather than weakened.72

In contrast to the members of 5 Commando, the Simba rebels did not encourage personal initiative at all. Indeed, after living with the rebels for several months, Guevara concluded that they generally lacked the will to fight a dangerous and competent opponent and merely wanted to while away the days in the relative safety of their camps without lifting a finger to improve their situation.73 For example, he wrote that: After a while, when we had begun living communally with this original army, we learnt some exclamations typical of the way they saw the world. If someone was given something to carry, he said: ‘Mimi hapana motocari’ – that is, ‘I’m not a truck.’ In some cases, when (the Simbas were serving) with Cubans, this would become ‘Mimi hapana Cuban’ – ‘I’m not a Cuban.’74

Colonel Callan’s Mercenaries similarly did not emphasize personal initiative. It should be noted, however, that Callan frequently showed initiative in his own actions, even to the point of recklessness.75 He developed a reputation for leading from the front and personally engaging as many enemy combatants and vehicles as possible in every firefight he was involved in.76 Nevertheless, although one might expect this to have encouraged other mercenaries to follow their commander’s example, Callan did not instill his belief in the virtues of personal initiative in the rest of his force.77 In fact, the actions of Callan and his senior officers off the battlefield aggressively stifled personal initiative among their subordinates. Perhaps their most prominent and influential behaviour was their tendency to summarily execute any mercenaries and allied FNLA troops under their command for virtually any mistake or questionable behaviour, real or

70 Mike Hoare, The Road to Kalamata: A Congo Mercenary’s Personal Memoir (London, UK: Leo Cooper, 1989), 19. 71 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 180. 72 Ibid., 305. 73 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 150. 74 Guevara, The African Dream, 26-27. 75 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 292. 76 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 183; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 76 and 177. 77 Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 92. 109

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 perceived.78 As Daniel Spikes put it, “by the time the first group of British mercenary reinforcements arrived in Sao Salvador around January 20, Callan’s rule by terror was absolute.”79 Callan allegedly verbalized his belief in severely punishing mistakes by tersely stating, “This is the only law here,” before repeatedly shooting an enlisted man who accidentally fired on a friendly vehicle he mistook for the vanguard of a Cuban convoy.80 Ultimately, Callan instilled a belief among his men that not taking initiative, and, thus, not risking mistakes or failures, was their safest and best course of action. Likewise, due to their indoctrination in Soviet military culture, the Cuban forces deployed in Angola in 1976 did not emphasize personal initiative at all.81 Pollack’s analysis of Soviet military culture concluded that, “for Soviet junior officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel… (the Soviet) approach meant a training system that was tremendously rigid and consciously sought to limit their independence and initiative.”82 Herbert Goldhamer similarly argued that, “The Soviets have a pronounced tendency to provide regulations for almost all aspects and contingencies of military life in order to constrain behavior within narrow, authorized limits.”83 Likewise, Donnelly argued that, “The opportunities for displaying initiative, even by divisional commanders, were severely restricted. Not below army level was any initiative usually expected, and even then only on occasion.”84 Erickson further confirmed that Soviet military culture discouraged most officers and men, particularly junior personnel, from taking initiative and exploiting fleeting opportunities on the battlefield.85 Taking this into account, it is likely that the Cuban troops arrayed against the mercenaries in 1976 deemphasized personal initiative as well.

Technical Proficiency Hoare placed strong emphasis on maintaining technical proficiency among his personnel. For instance, he argued that, “The infantryman’s need for proficiency in weaponry is self- evident. That proficiency should include the stripping and firing of all weapons used by his immediate enemy as these can become a vital source of armament to him.”86 Moreover, Hoare also actively sought out recruits with prior experience operating military weapons and other technical qualifications.87 As with the other norms he tried to instill in his men, he communicated his emphasis on technical proficiency directly in lectures and informal discussions with his subordinates. For example, he informed his officers that they must maintain “a thorough knowledge of (their) job. Anything you ask your men to do, you must be capable of doing yourself, from marching fifty miles in full equipment to stripping a machine gun. You must be technically superior in all facets of soldiering… You must demonstrate to your men that you know your stuff.”88 In addition, Hoare ran his men through numerous live fire drills where

78 Guy Arnold, Mercenaries: The Scourge of the Third World (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 37; Geraghty, Who Dares Wins, 131; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 190. 79 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 298. 80 Arnold, Mercenaries, 37; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 85. 81 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 130. 82 Ibid., 122. 83 Herbert Goldhamer, The Soviet Soldier (New York, NY: Crane Russak and Co. Inc, 1975), 9. 84 Donnelly, Red Banner, 85. 85 John Erickson, Lynn Hansen, and William Schneider, Soviet Ground Forces: An Operational Assessment (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 205. 86 Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, 14. 87 Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 50. 88 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 307-308. 110

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 they learned how to use suppressive fire to protect their comrades while they moved between trees, rocks, and other bits of cover to close with the enemy.89 In contrast to their opponents, the Simbas deemphasized technical proficiency, which further undermined their military effectiveness. Guevara noted in his diary that the Simbas placed considerable value on possessing weapons and equipment, but placed no value on learning to use them properly. As a result, Simba soldiers routinely hoarded several weapons for no purpose other than lording them over their counterparts.90 At the same time, when Guevara offered to train the Simbas to use their rifles, machine guns, mortars, and artillery in more efficient and effective ways, he recalls that the rebel leaders simply saw no value in this.91 Callan did not emphasize technical proficiency at all. Although he and some of the other mercenaries were quite adept at using hand-held weapons, this was because they possessed preexisting competencies. For example, most of the senior officers in the group were veterans of the British Paratrooper Regiment, a unit renowned for its emphasis on weapons training and fighting prowess.92 However, despite his own technical proficiency, at least with hand-operated weapons, Callan did not encourage his subordinates to become similarly proficient. Perhaps the clearest evidence of Callan’s deemphasis on technical proficiency was his decision to almost completely forgo weapons training for his men.93 Instead, he threw raw recruits into combat straight away, even though many had never handled a rifle before.94 Ultimately, the only semi- organized training conducted during the campaign was a single, one hour, ad hoc session, which attempted, unsuccessfully, to teach a few dozen mercenaries to use a 66 mm rocket launcher.95 This compares poorly to the weeks of training conducted by every member of Hoare’s 5 Commando. The Cuban forces deployed in northern Angola against the mercenaries also deemphasized technical proficiency among their troops.96 This may seem implausible to some observers, given that many full-time Cuban military officers received between three and six years of in the use of advanced weapons systems, including tanks, jet aircraft, artillery, and armoured personnel carriers, and also personal weapons, like rifles and anti-vehicular rocket- launchers.97 These professional troops were indoctrinated to accept the Soviet Red Army’s strong emphasis on technical proficiency in general and proficiency in combined-arms warfare in particular. As Pollack puts it, “Although the military effectiveness of the Soviet forces has varied over time, their stress on integrating their forces into combined arms teams has remained a constant.”98 William Schneider similarly argues that, “The Soviet Union has come closer to creating a combined arms outlook among its forces than any other country.”99 Therefore, full-

89 Baker, Wild Goose, 179-180; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 245; Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, 19. 90 Guevara, The African Dream, 62. 91 Ibid., 107. 92 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 154.; John Parker, The Paras: The Inside Story of Britain’s Toughest Regiment (London, UK: Metro Books, 2000); Peter Harclerode, Para!: Fifty Years of the Parachute Regiment (London, UK: Arms and Armour Press, 1992). 93 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 74, 216, 320-321, and 400; Stewart Tendler, "British mercenaries 'killed by mine'," The Times, February 5, 1976, 7; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 67. 94 Arnold, Mercenaries, 34. 95 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 320-321. 96 Bainwoll, "Cuba," 231-232; Leone Gouré, "Cuban Military Doctrine and Organization," in The Cuban Military Under Castro, ed. Jaime Suchlicki (Miami, FL: University of Miami Press, 1989), 69. 97 Fermoselle, The Evolution of the Cuban Military, 293 and 296. 98 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 127. 99 Erickson, Hansen, and Schneider, Soviet Ground Forces, 217. 111

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 time Cuban officers were taught by the Soviets to believe in the value of integrating armour, infantry, engineers, artillery, airpower, and other supporting elements into combined-arms teams.100 They then trained their full-time enlisted personnel in these same skills through “constant exercises and training” during peacetime.101 However, the northern front of the Angolan Civil War provides a good illustration of the potential differences in the military culture maintained by groups of full-time and reserve military personnel because the Cuban reservists did not share this emphasis on technical proficiency. Rather, these troops received considerably less technical training than the full-time officers who attended Soviet military academies. For instance, most reservists received only basic military training, including some target practice with small caliber rifles, and limited exposure to military vehicles.102 This practice not only illustrated to Cuban reservists that they were not expected to be technically proficient, it also produced several training deficiencies. Taking this into account, it is likely that the Cuban troops arrayed against the mercenaries in 1976 deemphasized technical proficiency as well.

Group Loyalty Finally, Hoare placed considerable emphasis on group loyalty, what he called the “spirit of camaraderie, the very soul of soldiering, which is vital to the success of small unit warfare.”103 In his “Lecture on Man Management,” which was directed at his officers, he explained that, “the good leader is one who cares for his men,” and that, “the bed-rock of man management is discipline. Nothing is more certain than that you will obtain the best results with your men if you insist on a high standard of discipline.”104 He went on to argue that, “you will soon find that your men, all men, prefer to be led firmly with discipline. It results in fairer treatment for one thing and every man knows what to expect and where he stands.”105 He also stressed the notion of group loyalty to his enlisted personnel. For instance, as part of his “Rules for Battle,” he encouraged his men to “Soldier in pairs; look after each other; be faithful to your mate. Be loyal to your leaders.”106 Hoare specifically recognized the importance of fostering group cohesion: “Soldiers must be made to feel that they are a vital part of their organization. They matter. If they are ignored and treated merely as numbers they will rapidly lose interest. To build on their natural enthusiasm a good leader has to capture their minds.”107 Acting on this belief, he organized the subgroups of his force by cultural and linguistic background.108 For example, 52 Commando was made up primarily of Germans; most of the members of 55 Commando were Italian; and 58

100 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 127. 101 Fermoselle, The Evolution of the Cuban Military, 299. 102 Adrian J. English, "The Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces," Jane's Defence Weekly, June 30, 1984, 1066; Fermoselle, The Evolution of the Cuban Military, 302; Gouré, "Soviet-Cuban Military Relations," 167; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 166; U.S. Department of State, The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 6. 103 Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, 16. 104 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 306. Likewise, Jerry Purren, commander of the small mercenary air force supporting 5 Commando commented that “Hoare’s basic intention was to build a unit of highly disciplined mercenaries… an attempt to return an air of dignity to mercenary soldiering.” Pottinger, Mercenary Commander, 193. 105 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 306. 106 Ibid., 309. 107 Hoare, The Road to Kalamata, 10. 108 Pottinger, Mercenary Commander, 192. 112

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 Commando was composed entirely of anti-Castro Cubans.109 This structure enhanced esprit de corps and facilitated intra-group communication. Guevara’s Cubans also sought, yet failed, to instill a strong sense of group loyalty among the Simbas. As Dreke explains, “Che went with the idea of being able to unite all the Africans.”110 In the short-term, the Cubans directed their efforts toward integrating themselves and a group of Rwandans into the Congolese forces. However, although it took months for the Cubans to finally appreciate that the Simbas would never fully accept outsiders into their ranks, Guevara eventually “recognized it wasn’t possible at that time to bring Africans from different countries together in unity in the Congo.”111 Guevara also emphasized the importance of discipline. For instance, Dreke recalls hearing his commander argue that, “Discipline has to be maintained. If we don’t, this will turn into a free-for-all.”112 Similarly, Guevara noted in his diary that, “I emphasized the need for rigid discipline.”113 Nevertheless, as with every other new behavioural norm he tried to instill in the Congo, the Simbas proved reluctant to change their beliefs and they maintained a near-total lack of group loyalty throughout the conflict.114 Callan and his senior officers went out of their way to destroy any sense of group loyalty among their subordinates.115 Indeed, they made no attempt to develop esprit de corps among the mercenaries or integrate FLNA troops into their tiny force, which greatly reduced the number of available personnel.116 Callan was remarkably direct about his threats to kill his subordinates for almost any reason. For example, after setting up an ambush position on January 24, he bluntly told his men that, if they attempted to retreat from the position, he would personally shoot them.117 Similarly, when addressing the force’s logistical problems, Copeland warned Banks, in front of several other mercenaries, that, “if the supplies you promised don’t turn up, I’m personally going to kill you.”118 Moreover, junior members of the force reported that their commanders also murdered members of the FNLA “just to arouse fear in the rest of the men.”119 These threats were carried out throughout the campaign during near-daily “toppings” performed by Copeland, Christodoulou, and often by Callan as well.120 For example, Callan executed 21 FNLA troops in front of several mercenaries on the day they arrived.121 Tickler concluded that, “Callan’s management of the mutiny, ruthlessly efficient through it was, did not cause the recent arrivals to feel any great confidence in his leadership…. Distrust of his unpredictable behaviour was considerable.”122

109 Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 36. 110 Victor Dreke, From the Escambray to the Congo: In the Whirlwind of the Cuban Revolution (New York, NY: Pathfinder Press, 2002), 140. 111 Ibid. 112 Quoted in Ibid., 144-145. 113 Guevara, The African Dream, 53. 114 Ibid., 34. 115 One mercenary who survived the campaign later wrote that what order that did exist within the group was established and maintained “with a trail of broken sunglasses… trampled underfoot to prove who had lost out in various petty little arguments.” McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 90. 116 Stewart Tendler, "Mercenaries puzzle Angola court: Britons ‘knew little of what the war was about’," The Times, June 14, 1976, 5. 117 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 177; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 89; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 74- 75 and 80. 118 Quoted in Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 187. 119 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 177 and 279; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 187. 120 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 216. 121 Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 95; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 114. 122 Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 75. 113

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 The established norm within the force was, therefore, that, “Callan had only one response for failure to carry out an order. Instant execution,” which left junior members of the force with the impression that, to the senior leaders of the group, their lives were worth less than “a spoonful of Angolan mud.”123 Indeed, mercenaries who arrived in the second batch of recruits on January 20 explicitly warned later arrivals about Callan’s standing threats. For example, Tomkins informed members of the third cohort of recruits, which arrived on January 31, to “Just do what you’re told and you’ll be okay. But don’t upset Callan or he’ll blow you away.”124 From this it is clear that the members of the force understood that their commander felt no particular loyalty to them and did not afford any special value to their lives. Finally, despite a clear understanding of the value of group loyalty within the professional corps of the Cuban armed forces, group loyalty was not strongly emphasized within the Cuban-led MPLA forces arrayed against Callan’s Mercenaries because, unlike within the ranks of professional Cuban soldiers, the norm was not adequately transmitted to the largely conscript forces sent to Angola. According to Rafael Fermoselle, a specialist in the history of the Cuban military, professional, full-time Cuban troops “are taught to support the internationalist duty of Cuba to help revolutionary organizations in other countries. In addition, they are taught discipline and obedience to the state.”125 Likewise, Mitchell Bainwoll concluded that the considerable emphasis on political indoctrination within the professional members of the Cuban armed forces “almost certainly result(s) in a high degree of discipline and cohesiveness. The pervasiveness of political indoctrination, if successful, should also logically affect high morale.”126 In contrast, this norm was not emphasized among the part-time Cuban reservists deployed to Angola, many of whom were fresh conscripts who had not been exposed to years of pro-military propaganda inside the armed forces. This norm also certainly did not extend to the Cubans’ Angolan allies, at least not in early 1976.127

How well did the Normative Theory of Military Performance Predict the Tactical Behaviour of the Combatants in these Conflicts? The normative theory of military performance appears to have done an admirable job at predicting how the five norms thought to enhance military effectiveness would influence the tactical behaviour of the military forces discussed in this paper. This section analyzes each of the theory’s predictions in turn.

Tactical Innovation The normative theory of military performance predicts that military forces that strongly emphasize norms promoting creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority should demonstrate significant tactical innovation. Tactical units within these forces should routinely seek tactical advantages over opponents by, for instance, using maneuver warfare, and not rely exclusively on simple frontal assaults when attacking or counterattacking.128 This

123 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 230 and 268. 124 Ibid., 296. 125 Fermoselle, The Evolution of the Cuban Military, 302. 126 Bainwoll, "Cuba," 235. 127 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 353. 128 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 66. The US Army’s Field Manual 100- 5: Operations defines maneuver warfare as “the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage,” to gain an advantage over the adversary requires that the commander be able to imagine a situation different from his present situation, one in which he has an advantage over his enemy derived from a 114

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 prediction was borne out in this case. For instance, one of 5 Commando’s tactical innovations was to utilize motorized dash assaults, which involved a sudden show of force by driving into a Simba-occupied town at high speed, with jeep-mounted machine guns and automatic rifles blazing, in order to catch the Simbas off guard and unprepared.129 On the face of it, these tactics may appear simplistic; however, they were, in fact, an innovative rejection of conventional European tactics, which called for troops to move more slowly in repeated “bounds” during which one vehicle or fire team advanced while another attempted to cover it with very accurate fire.130 Conversely, during the initial stages of an assault, members of 5 Commando tended to prioritize the volume of ammunition they fired over the accuracy of their fire, based on the assumption that the additional noise would shock the Simbas into abandoning their defensive positions and flee into the open where they could be easily cut down.131 For example, when Lieutenant Gary Wilson’s sub-group of 5 Commando stormed into the town of Bumba on September 17, 1964, driving at about 80 kilometers an hour, the hurricane of gunfire they produced was enough to dislodge hundreds of Simbas from defensive positions inside the town and cause them to flee into the jungle.132 Many rebels were killed during their retreat. Likewise, in early November, 1964, when the mercenaries retook the town of Kindu from the rebels, they made three passes through the town in their jeeps, firing all the way.133 This quickly shattered the Simbas’ resolve and they consequently abandoned their heaviest weapons, including mounted machine guns, and fled through the open streets toward the river, where they hoped to make their escape. Several dozen rebels were killed during their retreat. In addition to this, the speed and tenacity with which the mercenaries attacked drove the rebels from the town so quickly that they did not have time to carry out planned executions of European hostages.134 The mercenaries used variations of this tactic numerous times during their campaign, always successfully.135 Nevertheless, this somewhat chaotic behaviour represents merely the first stage of an assault, and was typically followed up by more precise maneuvers to corral and eliminate the remaining Simbas. Indeed, after the initial flurry of gunfire, the mercenaries tended to work in closely coordinated groups to complete the assault, with some subcommandos or individual squads within these units providing covering fire while others advanced toward the enemy.136 For example, during the Kindu assault, 57 Commando corralled the rebels onto a waiting ferry at

different spatial arrangement. William S. Lind, "Maneuver," in Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, ed. Franklin Margiotta (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997), 662. Contemporary maneuver warfare developed in part out of the German concept of Aufragstaktik (mission tactics), which emphasizes decentralized decision making authority and personal initiative: “orders tell the subordinate what is to be accomplished while leaving him maximum latitude in deciding how to accomplish it. In effect, he is given a goal, and it is left to him to attain it. This is done at all levels of command. As part of mission orders, the subordinate is expected to show a high level of initiative.” Lind, "Maneuver," 665. Maneuver warfare demands that the commander quickly develop an operation plan that will allow him to place his forces into the newly imagined, spatially-advantageous position that anticipates the likely reactions of his adversary. Consequently, these forces ought to opt for more complicated flanking and envelopment maneuvers in situations where such maneuvers could be advantageous. 129 Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 74.; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 85. 130 Mike Hoare, Mercenary (New York, NY: Bantam Books, 1967), 84; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 63; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 19; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 80; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 33. 131 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 85; Reed, Save the Hostages, 193 and 268; Thallon, Cut-Throat, 14. 132 Reed, Save the Hostages, 142. 133 Ibid., 197. 134 Ibid. 135 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 158. 136 Thallon, Cut-Throat, 37. 115

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 the Congo River and then repeatedly raked the overloaded craft from step to stern, killing approximately 250 Simbas and leaving very few survivors.137 Similarly, at the very end of the campaign, in October, 1965, the mercenaries utilized these tactics to drive Simbas out of their defensive positions in the town of Lubonja and herd them toward a sizable ANC force, where they were easily eliminated in a confined area.138 These tactics were not chosen because they were standard operating procedures held over from Hoare’s experience serving with the British Army. Indeed, as explained above, they were a rejection of common practice. Rather, these tactics were chosen because the officers in charge of 5 Commando reasoned that they would be most appropriate to the situations confronting them. Moreover, the officers routinely modified these tactics and sometimes substituted more traditional tactics, like a slower assault by infantry on foot, as they encountered new and different scenarios.139 For example, at times, the mercenaries launched highly coordinated multi- stage attacks against rebel units they felt were better-prepared to defend against an attack. One such assault was used to capture the town of Mayaliwa and involved dividing a 40-strong subgroup of 5 Commando into three units and utilizing them in a “two prong, five phase scissor assault with flank stoppers,” wherein two units of mercenaries operated as bull horns to sweep the Simbas out of the town, while maintaining pace with each other to prevent rebels from escaping out the flanks, and then used the third unit of mercenaries to close the semi-circle formed by the horns, thus surrounding the Simbas.140 These tactics are notable not for being particularly ingenious in an objective sense, if such a determination is possible; rather, they are notable because, again, they are the product of conscious decision that they would be the most effective way to quickly eliminate a relatively unskilled enemy. The normative theory of military performance also predicts that military forces emphasizing creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority should have little difficulty adapting to unforeseen developments on the battlefield. This prediction was also borne out in this case. Indeed, the mercenaries were generally able to respond to Simba ambushes along roadways, which tended to work as follows: Congolese or Rwandan rebels, sometimes supported by Cuban troops, would spring the ambush by firing wildly from the underbrush at the side of the road, with rifles and rocket launchers, in the general direction of the mercenaries, then charge forward from the underbrush in a straight line to finish off any survivors.141 On the face of it, this tactic should have proven generally effective, especially if all of the mercenaries were immediately killed. However, this rarely happened, and, if even a handful of mercenaries remained alive and in fighting form after the initial attack, they tended to reverse the situation by inflicting heavy casualties on the advancing rebels and forcing them to retreat.142 One particularly illustrative incident occurred on September 11, 1965, when a mixed Cuban-African force ambushed two trucks carrying approximately twenty mercenaries. Although they successfully destroyed the first truck, killing seven or eight mercenaries, the occupants of the second debussed and quickly drove the now-exposed ambushers back into the jungle with witheringly accurate rifle fire. As Guevara describes, “Thus, instead of completely wiping out the two lorries, we were ourselves pursued at a certain moment and had to start retreating. As

137 Reed, Save the Hostages, 197; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 34. 138 Baker, Wild Goose, 193. 139 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 85. 140 Baker, Wild Goose, 194-196. 141 Guevara, The African Dream, 86. 142 Ibid., 88; Thallon, Cut-Throat, 28-29. 116

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 always happens at such times, the rout was complete.”143 In general, the rebels’ simple and non- varying ambush tactics were not very successful. Even Guevara, who desperately sought anything positive to say about the Simbas, recorded only “small triumphs” against the mercenaries when they occasionally killed a handful of men. Turning now to the other military forces under study, the normative theory of military performance predicts that military forces that weakly emphasize norms promoting creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority should demonstrate little tactical innovation. Tactical units within these forces should generally use very simple tactics, if any, such as full-frontal assaults, straight at their opponents, when attacking and counterattacking.144 These predictions were not completely borne out in the Congo case because the Simbas exhibited little tactical innovation despite strongly emphasizing decentralized authority. It appears in this case that the rebels’ near-complete lack of creativity more than compensated for their emphasis on decentralized authority. Indeed, they were so uncreative that they never developed new tactics that empowered junior officers could have implemented. As predicted for a force that deemphasizing creative thinking and personal initiative in favour of their staunch belief in the protective power of dawa, the Simbas were incapable of any tactical innovation whatsoever. As Dreke put it, “they relied on (dawa) to fight, to move.”145 Presuming that they were impervious to bullets, the Simbas employed only the very simplest tactics – walking straight toward the enemy while making no attempt to use cover or otherwise avoid being fired upon.146 The results of this behaviour were disastrous for the rebels. For example, on September 15, 1964, Lieutenant Wilson led 15 members of 5 Commando in an attack against the port town of Lisala, which was guarded by approximately 400 Simbas.147 Believing themselves to be invincible, the rebels grouped together in a single mass of troops on a highly exposed hilltop and made no attempt to take cover while their witch doctors chanted and fanned them with palm branches.148 In addition to numerical and magical superiority, the Simbas also fielded superior weapons, including heavy machine guns and bazookas, while the mercenaries only had rifles. Although the mercenaries assessed the situation and were prepared to employ creative tactics to address the threat, the Simbas’ demonstrable lack of creativity made this unnecessary. Indeed, how could innovative tactics possibly improve their changes of hitting a huge cluster of targets that made no attempt to avoid being shot? Wilson later described the scene, in which 160 Simbas were killed in only a few minutes, as “a shooting gallery.”149 The mercenaries only suffered a single slight injury during the assault. This example is typical of how the mercenaries’ attacks on Simba-held settlements played out: what should have been an easy victory for the materially superior rebels, instead turned into a slaughter at the hands of a tiny force of private soldiers. It is worth noting that the only engagements during which the Simbas demonstrated any tactical creativity were those in which Cuban advisors exercised direct command and control over the rebels. During these engagements, which occurred during the final stage of the conflict in the Fizi-Baraka region in the fall of 1965, the Simbas employed comparatively creative field

143 Guevara, The African Dream, 88. 144 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 66. 145 Dreke, From the Escambray to the Congo, 137. 146 Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 46; Gleijeses, "‘Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!’: The United States, the Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-65," 210-211; Verhaegen, "La Premiere Republique (1960-1965)," 126. 147 Dodenhoff, "The Congo," 59. 148 Reed, Save the Hostages, 140. 149 Ibid. 117

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 tactics, including avoiding enemy fire and responding to whistles signaling when they should advance and retreat.150 This was a remarkable improvement over their standard, suicidal human wave-style attacks and static defences.151 Although the mercenaries utilized their superior proficiency with weapons to repel repeated Simba onslaughts, the combined Cuban-Simba force succeeded in halting their advance toward the town of Fizi for one week in October, 1965. The Simbas performed so much better in this incident that Hoare admitted that, “for a few days it was touch and go as to whether we would make it. At one stage it looked as though I would have to evacuate my toe-hold on Baraka, but it turned out well in the end.”152 However, as soon as the Cubans left the Congolese to their own devices, the old pattern of behaviour returned: A vast mob of rebels attacked… Baraka, screaming and yelling… and advancing down the road in a solid mass, doped full of their dawa. We held our fire until they could receive the full benefit of every shot. They broke and fled, astonished that the bullets did not turn to water.153

Taking full advantage of this return to normalcy, 5 Commando quickly advanced and captured Fizi on 10 October, 1965. This marked the end of major combat operations in the Congo.154 All that remained were a few small-scale mopping up operations that would take time but not alter the forgone conclusion that the Simbas would be crushed. This prediction was borne out in the case of the Angolan Civil War. Indeed, Callan’s Mercenaries utilized the same tactics during each of the six major engagements that took place between January 24 and February 3. These involved establishing an ambush position and then launching a full-frontal assault straight at the enemy.155 Once an assault was launched, the mercenaries never attempted to use cover, suppressive fire, or any other tactics more advanced that standing-and-shooting or running-and-shooting at any enemy target.156 Though simple, these tactics were remarkably successful in all but the final major engagement of the conflict, which took place in the evening on February 3, because most members of the Cuban-MPLA force in northern Angola made little attempt to defend themselves. The first battle on February 3 was typical of the conflict in general. Callan and a group of less than two dozen mercenaries established an ambush position at the edge of a clearing containing several hundred Cuban and MPLA troops and then launched a full-frontal assault, during which they charged straight forward while unloading clip after clip of ammunition in the general direction of the stunned defenders, who did not take cover or even attempt to move out of the way of the mercenaries’ fire.157 The contact lasted only a few moments before both sides disengaged and ran in opposite directions, leaving approximately 80 Cuban-MPLA troops dead and three Cuban tanks destroyed, while the mercenaries suffered no

150 Baker, Wild Goose, 190; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 52. 151 Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 30. 152 Quoted in Baker, Wild Goose, 191-192. 153 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 264. 154 Baker, Wild Goose, 192. 155 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 77, 176, 206, 251, 320, and 353; George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 108; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 89; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 171 and 198-199. 156 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 77, 176, 206, 251, 320, and 353; George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 108; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 89; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 171. 157 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 363-367; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-200; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 88-90. 118

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 casualties.158 Callan, “laughing and shouting,” was observed “mowing down” Cubans scrambling to escape from the burning vehicles.159 However, taken as a whole, the four battles fought on February 3, 1976, during which Callan’s forces ambushed the 1,600-strong Cuban-MPLA column four times in two hours, provide a good illustration of how detrimental being too wedded to a single, straightforward tactic can be.160 For example, after breaking off their initial attack and escaping to the relative safety of the jungle, the mercenaries established a second ambush position near another section of the column and attacked again, killing approximately 40 enemy troops and destroying another tank.161 They then took to the bush once again and set up yet another ambush position next to a temporarily empty stretch of road. This time, they surprised and cut down three Russia-built armoured cars and two trucks carrying about 80 troops. Callan, “with a total disregard for his own safety ran laughing into the road” and closed to point-bank range as he attempted to kill as many Cubans as possible.162 Not content to disengage for the night, Callan ordered his exhausted men to conduct a fourth ambush and full-frontal assault against still more Cuban-MPLA troops. However, after facing three nearly identical attacks that same day, and two more in the previous weeks, the Cuban-MPLA soldiers finally learned the “secret” of defending against Callan’s straightforward tactics, which required them to merely stand their ground for a few minutes and use their numerical and technological superiority to dispatch the mercenaries while they were in the open and exposed.163 This is precisely what they did, which allowed them to eliminate about half of Callan’s killer group very quickly and send the remaining mercenaries fleeing in disarray. Moreover, as the theory predicted, the Cuban-MPLA troops in northern Angola employed very simple tactics during the two engagements during which they launched defensive counter-attacks.164 For example, during the battle on February 2, the few Cuban troops that attempted to mount a defence against the mercenaries’ surprise ambush, marched and drove their tanks very slowly, straight toward their attackers, rather than attempt to utilize any cover, such as, in the case of the infantry, the jungle along the edge of the clearing. These poor tactics help explain why the defenders lost between 160 and 200 troops while the mercenaries suffered no deaths and only a few wounded.165 Similarly, when the Cuban-MPLA soldiers launched a counter-attack during the final battle on February 3, they merely stood in exposed static positions

158 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 363-367; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-200; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 88-90. 159 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-199. 160 The Cuban-MPLA troops were also armed with at least twelve tanks and several Land Rovers, armoured cars, truck-mounted rocket launchers, as well as an armoured bulldozer utilized to clear landmines. Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198; Stewart Tendler, "'Callan' and nine other Britons face Angola trial," The Times, April 2, 1976, 1. 161 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-199; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 90. 162 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-199. 163 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 366-367. 164 Colonel Jan Breytenback of the South African Defence Forces, who was fighting against Cuban-MPLA troops in southern Angola described his opponents as “unimpressive.” Jan Breytenbach, The Buffalo Soldiers: The Story of South Africa's 32 Battalion, 1975-1993 (Alberton, SA: Galago Publishing, 2002), 123; Fred Bridgeland, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa (New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 150. Other South African sources confirm that Cuban troops were not tactically skilled. Bainwoll, "Cuba,", 233. 165 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 305; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-88 and 173. 119

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 and relied on sheer numerical superiority and a superior volume of fire to cut down about half of the fleeing mercenaries, who had been disoriented and injured by an unexpected explosion. The theory also predicted that military forces that deemphasized creative thinking, personal initiative, and decentralized authority should have difficulty adapting to unforeseen developments on the battlefield.166 Save for the caveat regarding the relative influence of creative thinking and decentralized authority discussed above, this prediction was borne out as well in the Congo. Indeed, instead of encouraging Simbas soldiers to develop new tactics following repeated defeats at the hands of the mercenaries, rebel witch doctors encouraged them to behave in precisely the same way in future encounters. When pitted against equally superstitious and unskilled ANC troops, who shared the Simbas’ beliefs about dawa, the rebels’ simple, unchanging tactics proved very successful, with most ANC soldiers fleeing without even firing a shot.167 As one student of the conflict put it, “The mere announcement of their (the Simbas’) arrival terrorized the soldiers of the… (ANC), convinced as they were that their bullets would turn into water or fly back to strike them.”168 Likewise, in the words of an African journalist who witnessed ANC-Simba firefights, “This superstition has had a powerful effect on Congolese National Army troops. In many places they lay down their arms and run when the rebels advance.”169 This is precisely what happened when the Simbas attacked Stanleyville in August, 1964: a handful of witch doctors led a column of 60 motor vehicles, loaded with Simba fighters, into the city and, through their mere presence, convinced the 1000-strong ANC garrison to abandon their posts and throw their weapons into the Congo River.170 By refusing to fire, or at least declining to fire accurately, the ANC allowed the Simbas to simply walk straight into and occupy towns and cities at their leisure.171 As a result, the rebels quickly conquered much of the Congo and established a reputation as invincible, unstoppable soldiers. When these tactics failed against the mercenaries, however, the Simbas seemingly learned nothing from their numerous defeats. Instead, the rebels blamed their poor showing on ineffective dawa, which was, in turn, blamed on committing taboos, like feeling fear and being in the presence of women. When it became clear that women had not been in the vicinity most battles, the rebels then concluded that their medicine men had misapplied the dawa and they were replaced.172 Their ineffective tactics were not, however, and it is, therefore, not surprising that the rebels failed to recapture any territory or settlements back from the mercenaries during the conflict. This prediction was also borne out in the Angola case. Callan made no attempt to customize his tactics to the particulars of the enemy units he faced or the local geography. For example, when Callan set up the January 24 ambush, which he expected to engage Cuban tanks, he established it on flat and hard ground, which was ideal terrain for the tanks to maneuver and

166 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 66. 167 Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 20-21. 168 Quoted in Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 63. Hoare similarly confirmed that “The mere announcement that ‘les Muleleistes’ were on their way, or worse still, the sight of them standing drugged, hands outstretched, throwing their eyes (symbolically] in their direction, was sufficient to reduce entire garrisons to a state of instant panic and headlong flight, in which they frequently abandoned their arms and equipment to the advancing rebels.” Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 21. 169 Quoted in Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 63-64. 170 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 23. 171 Clayton, Frontiersmen, 80. 172 Guevara, The African Dream, 48-49. 120

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 fire back at the mercenaries, flee, or, as Dempster put it, “flatten the five mercs under their tracks.”173 This unfortunate decision almost certainly allowed the tanks to quickly turn and escape, without suffering any damage, when the mercenaries sprung the ambush and launched their assault. Similarly, the Cuban-MPLA troops tended to experience great difficulty adapting to unforeseen developments on the battlefield. Indeed, most of these troops tended to either flee in panic once they encountered an ambush, and those who attempted to mount a defence tended to fight while bunched tightly together, in exposed positions, rather than make any attempt to seek cover or avoid being hit by enemy fire.174 Presenting a large, exposed target most likely contributed to their considerable casualties during most battles. Thus, far from mounting effective defences, in most battles the tactical behaviour of the Cuban-MPLA troops allowed the mercenaries to act as if they were in a shooting gallery.

Decision-making Patterns The normative theory of military performance predicts that military forces that strongly emphasize norms promoting personal initiative and decentralized authority should maintain decentralized patterns of decision-making. Within these military forces, tendencies toward demonstrating personal initiative and decentralization of authority should mutually reinforce each other because junior officers should demonstrate personal initiative if they have been delegated sufficient authority to permit them to do so, and senior officers should delegate authority if their subordinates have demonstrated sufficient personal initiative to warrant it.175 Therefore, most tactical-level decisions in these forces should be addressed by tactical level commanders (junior officers and senior enlisted personnel), which should significantly increase the pace at which the tactical units of these forces are able to act and react to against their opponents.176 This prediction was certainly borne out in the case of 5 Commando. For instance, in practice, each of the subcommandos could, and frequently did, operate separately and independently from each other.177 For example, 53 Commando, commanded by Lieutenants Jack Maidan and George Schroeder, spent much of the fall of 1964 operating completely apart from Hoare and the rest of the subcommandos. During this period, Maidan’s sub-group captured the towns of Kabare and Uvira near the Congo-Rwandan border, then Lubero and Butembo as it moved north.178 The actions of 52 and 54 Commando during the fall of 1964 provide a particularly good illustration of the benefits to military performance produced by 5 Commando’s emphasis on personal initiative and decentralized authority. After the Simbas captured the town of Ingende in western Congo, Captain Sigfried Muller’s 52 Commando quickly rushed to nearby Coquilhatville, then retook Ingenda and continued 320 km east toward Boende.179 Muller’s force met heavy resistance on the outskirts of the town, suffering one dead and another severely wounded, and was forced to withdraw to the nearby village of Bikili. Several hundred Simbas attacked Bikili but were driven off by 52 Commando. The mercenaries suffered another death

173 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 206. 174 Ibid., 363-367; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-200; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 88-90. 175 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 67. 176 Ibid. 177 Baker, Wild Goose, 173-174; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 19; Thallon, Cut-Throat, 35. 178 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 65. 179 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 77; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 20. 121

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 during the engagement, while the Simbas lost approximately 100 soldiers.180 Nevertheless, the Simbas succeeded in encircling Bikili. In response, Hoare ordered Second Lieutenant Forsbrey’s 54 Commando, which had just driven the Simbas out of the town of Yakoma, located along the border between the Congo and the Central African Republic, to assist Muller.181 They quickly broke the Simbas siege. The subcommandos could also seamlessly recombine into any combination of new groupings to suit the requirements of the mission.182 For example, following 55, 56, and 57 Commandos’ successful recapture of Kamina in southern Congo and Kindu in the central part of the country in the early fall of 1964, they united with 51 Commando at Kindu for a north- westerly advance on the Simba strong-hold of Stanleyville, capturing Punia and Lubutu as they went.183 At the same time, 52 Commando retook the northern town of Aketi; 53 Commando captured Lubero, Butembo, and Mambasa in the north-east before advancing on Stanleyville; and 54 Commando advanced on Stanleyville from the south-west, capturing the towns Ikela and Opela along the way.184 Following the capture of Stanleyville, the united subcommandos split up again in November, 1964, and spent several months capturing more towns from the Simbas all over the Orientale Province, including, among others, Aketi, Buta, Poko, Paulis, which were captured by 52 Commando; Butembo, Olenga, Beni, Mambasa, and Bunia, which were captured by 53 Commando; and Wamba, which was captured by 54 Commando.185 In the process, they saved thousands of Congolese and foreign civilians from certain death at the hands of the rebels. These examples illustrate how effective 5 Commando, as a whole, could be since its autonomous constituent sub-units could achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. This, in turn, almost certainly allowed the small force to defeat the Simba insurgency much more quickly than it would have if it had remained clustered together under Hoare’s direct command and control. The theory also predicts that military forces that emphasize personal initiative and decentralized authority should rarely miss opportunities to harm their opponents or fail to respond quickly to sudden moves by their opponents because officers at all levels of command can make tactical-level decisions without the need for higher approval. The mercenaries’ behaviour bore out this prediction as well. Indeed, almost all of 5 Commando’s junior officers, who were tasked with leading their independent subcommandos into battle and ensuring that they accomplished their required tasks, took the tactical initiative as a matter of course.186 For example, upon learning on August 26, 1965 that a large group of rebels were attacking civilians in villages around the outskirts of the town of Ganga, killing at least 22 adults and four children, Captain Hugh van Oppen, the commander of 53 Commando at the time, decided to take action himself. This necessitated working through the night to repair some damaged vehicles before leading his subcommando to the area of operations and issuing them a set of tactics he sketched out as they mercenaries raced to engage the rebels:

180 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 77. 181 Ibid., 78. 182 Baker, Wild Goose, 182. 183 Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 22. 184 Ibid., 22-25. 185 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 167-170. 186 In very rare cases where junior officers did not take initiative, such as when the leader of 54 Commando stopped on the southern bank of the Lomami River instead of figuring out how to move his men across, Hoare voices his displeasure and removed the officer from his post. Ibid., 156. 122

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 Column in vehicles will strike south toward Nzala with police and guides leading as far as vehicles can go. Debus. Recce forward and proceed on foot in wide tactical formation by section, left, right, and centre to 2 km north of Nzala. Recce and assault. Vehicles left in laager under guard will come forward, embus and proceed to Ganga.187

Van Oppen’s quick reaction to the attacks around Ganga allowed his subcommando to catch the Simbas while they were still in the immediate area, box them in from the west, east, and north, and force them south toward the Ao River where they were eliminated.188 Had he delayed or declined to respond, the rebels would most likely have attempted more attacks against civilians and then fled the area to strike somewhere else. The actions of Lieutenant Bekker are also illustrative. When a small group of mercenaries, led by Hoare and Van Oppen, were ambushed by Simbas on the road to Kasimia in October, 1965, Bekker rallied the men under his command who then stormed out of their vehicles, which were under point-blank machine-gun fire, and turned the tables on the rebels with steady aim and steely resolve.189 This quickly proved too much for the Simbas, and they fled after taking heavy casualties. It is likely that had it not been for Bekker’s actions, Hoare and Van Oppen would have been killed, but the mercenaries ultimately suffered only four wounded out of a force of several dozen.190 Ron McLean, a junior enlisted member of 5 Commando, likewise recounts incidents wherein Simba ambushes were quickly reversed because junior leaders led their subordinates in flanking maneuvers and counter-attacked the rebels from unexpected directions.191 These actions were typical of the behaviour exhibited by members of 5 Commando. Conversely, the normative theory of military forces that weakly emphasize norms promoting personal initiative and decentralized authority should maintain centralized patterns of decision-making. Within these military forces, tendencies toward general passivity and over- centralization of authority should mutually reinforce each other because junior officers should not demonstrate personal initiative if they have not been delegated sufficient authority to permit them to do so, and senior officers should not delegate authority if their subordinates have not demonstrated sufficient personal initiative to warrant it.192 Therefore, most tactical-level decisions in these forces should be referred to senior commanders for resolution, which should significantly decrease the pace at which the tactical units of these forces are able to act and react against their opponents.193 This prediction was not completely borne out by in the case of the Simbas because, while the force placed strong emphasis on decentralized authority, it behaved in the manner predicted for a force that deemphasized this norm. As before, it seems that the influence of another norm, personal initiative in this case, which the Simbas deemphasized, overwhelmed the influence of the norm of decentralized authority. Speaking generally, Simba troops would only prepare to engage in combat if a high-ranking officer was present, in the flesh,

187 Quoted in Baker, Wild Goose, 176. 188 Ibid. 189 Quoted in Ibid., 196. 190 Ibid. 191 Thallon, Cut-Throat, 30. 192 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 67. 193 Ibid. 123

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 to force them to do so.194 This did occur on occasion, such as when General Kabila visited the main Simba base in the Fiz-Baraka region. While he was present, the normal refusals to work were replaced by the sound of shovels and hammers, as work on defensive trenches and a military hospital began.195 However, these were fleeting exceptions to the general state of inactivity and sloth that pervaded the rebel movement at all levels of command. Indeed, as soon as Kabila left the camp, all work ceased. Overall, Simba troops tended to remain idle most of the time.196 For example, Guevara described encountering a Simba ambush position on a major road that the mercenaries were known to use that was well into a lengthy period of passivity and inactivity because their commanding officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel, and his deputy, had abandoned their posts weeks before. A junior officer remained at the position, but none of the men recognized his authority. Guevara felt so strongly about what he saw that he launched into a tirade against the men, admonishing them that, “a revolutionary soldier is made in combat, and there are no signs of combat here.”197 Guevara also encouraged them to do their duty and seek out battle with the mercenaries. Despite his attempts, the men were unwilling to engage in combat without a direct order from their superiors, which did not come since their superiors were as disinterested in fighting as they were.198 This prediction was borne out in the Angola case. For instance, most of Callan’s Mercenaries were generally passive and inactive much of the time because all decisions were deferred up to the highest levels of the chain of command for resolution and no operations were attempted in the absence of direct authorization and participation by senior officers.199 This, in turn, greatly slowed the pace at which the force could operate because the mercenaries were not able to conduct several strike missions at the same time. Had they been able to do this, it would certainly have enhanced their capacity to wear down the main Cuban-MPLA column arrayed against them by allowing them to strike the column at multiple points simultaneously as it slowly advanced toward the mercenary-held settlements. Beyond this, Callan’s tendency to lead from the front, rather than delegate command authority to junior officers and NCOs, directly contributed to the force’s defeat because junior personnel were unwilling to exercise command in his absence.200 As a result, when he suffered a debilitating leg injury in a battle with the Cubans on February 3, his subordinates instantly fell into disarray and he, along with many other members of his killer group, were soon captured or killed.201 This signaled the collapse of the entire mercenary campaign for no junior personnel were willing or able to take over permanent command of the force.202 The main Cuban-MPLA force in northern Angola similarly did not exercise decentralized command. For example, the force generally traveled as one mile-long column for most of the conflict, which enabled senior commanders to exercise direct authority over all subordinate

194 Guevara, The African Dream, 41. 195 Ibid., 57. 196 Venter, War Dog, 250. 197 Guevara, The African Dream, 103. 198 Ibid., 103-104. 199 Other observers characterized their behaviour as highly unmotivated. McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 95; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 79. 200 Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 37. 201 Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 90. 202 Ibid., 92. 124

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 troops.203 There is no evidence that junior personal exercised any command authority in the field.204 As discussed above, the junior Cuban and MPLA personnel encountered by the mercenaries rarely made any decisions about what to do about their rapidly changing tactical circumstances. Indeed, most troops that did not flee immediately tended to freeze in place rather than attempt to organize an ad hoc defence. Cuban tank crews were observed to be somewhat more willing to make decisions for themselves, which they did during some battles on February 2 and 3, but these personnel still often fled in panic and made no attempt to organize a coordinated defence of their positions with other tank crews.205 Instead, they fought individually, which made them much easier to attack and destroy. Disproportionate deemphasis on personal initiative may also explain why, as the theory predicted, the Simbas frequently missed opportunities to harm their opponents and fail to respond quickly to sudden moves by their opponents. For instance, even when ordered to leave their base camps and seek out combat with the mercenaries, the rebels frequently refused to fight. For example, on June 29, 1965, during a joint Cuban-Rwandan attack on a well-defended mercenary-held power station/town on the banks of the of the Kimbi River, which the Simbas had refused to participate in at all, virtually all of the Rwandan troops opted at the last minute to avoid fighting and abandoned a much smaller group of Cubans to do the fighting for them.206 A Cuban after-action report, included by Guevara in his book, confirms that, shortly after the fighting began, “Only Cubans were left… there were no Rwandans. The Rwandans were ordered to occupy (combat) positions, (but) they went over the mountain to (their) camp. The Rwandans abandoned their weapons and ammunition, and did not pick up their dead.”207 Specifically, 44 Rwandans abandoned five Cubans to assault several dozen highly trained mercenaries, who were fighting from hardened defensive positions. As with virtually every engagement in the Congo after the arrival of the mercenaries, this one degenerated into a complete rout and the rebels suffered heavy casualties. The Simbas’ general unwillingness to fight on behalf of their own rebellion also made it difficult to find sufficient soldiers to conduct patrols or staff ambush positions, where the probability of encountering the mercenaries was relatively high.208 Indeed, Guevara recalled that it was “an uphill battle to keep the sentries at their posts.”209 He went on to describe how, as soon as additional troops would leave the camp to strengthen a forward ambush position, others would leave and so the total troop strength never increased, and weapons that would have been very useful during ambushes, like heavy machine guns, were left in the camp because troops were unwilling to carry them.210 Moreover, many ambush positions that were manned at some point were abandoned before ANC or mercenary convoys even came near them.211 Overall, few rebel ambush positions were adequately manned during the conflict.212

203 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 363-367; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-200; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 88-90. 204 Clayton, Frontiersmen, 141. 205 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-88 and 173. 206 Guevara, The African Dream, 44. 207 Ibid., 45. 208 Ibid., 51. 209 Ibid., 111. 210 Ibid. 211 Ibid., 164. 212 Ibid., 87. 125

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 This prediction was borne out in the Angola case. Undeniably, the mercenaries’ belief that they could be killed if they took initiative, but failed to accomplish a chosen task, paralyzed the vast majority of the force into inaction. As a result, although Callan organized killer groups and sought out combat with the Cubans and the MPLA, no junior members of his force did.213 Rather, virtually all the members of the force who were not chosen for a mission simply sat around while Callan was away from their base camps, which further undermined their capacity to engage multiple threats at the same time.214 Furthermore, unless junior personnel were specifically ordered to do something by Callan or one of his senior officers, even tasks that were critical to their survival would not get accomplished.215 For example, all of the defensive ambush sites along the approaches to the mercenaries’ base camps were usually inadequately manned.216 Moreover, the single, uneventful strike mission not personally commanded by Callan, which tasked Copeland and Dempster to man forward ambush positions along the Damba road on the night of January 31, was designed and ordered by him.217 Taking this into account, Thomas rightly argues that, “the attempt by British ‘Colonel’ Callan to exercise command in Angola was a chaotic disaster,” and that the mercenaries’ poor command and authority structure contributed to their defeat in Angola.218 As mentioned above, the Cuban-MPLA troops generally remained concentrated in one large force for most of the conflict. In fact the force’s commanders only sent out smaller groups twice during the campaign: one made up of at least two dozens personnel on January 24 and another made up of approximately 200 personnel on February 2.219 However, during these instances, the vast majority of the force remained concentrated in one large, slow moving group, several kilometers away from the mercenaries’ bases. Consequently, this force could usually only target a single mercenary-held settlement or engage in a single battle at any one time. Moreover, since most Cuban and MPLA troops that were deployed in the smaller subgroups fled contacts with the mercenaries almost immediately, the Cuban-MPLA force could only do serious harm to the mercenaries when Callan’s men opted to leave their bases and directly engage the entire concentrated Cuban-MPLA column.220 This likely caused the force to miss opportunities to harm their opponents, which they could have done if multiple smaller, faster subgroups had been willing and able to seek out battle with the mercenaries and hold their own during these engagements. This, in turn, almost certainly prolonged the conflict.

213 Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 81. 214 As Thomas summarizes, “eventually, 141 British and 6 American mercenaries came under Callan’s control; but, without any organizational structure… the situation floundered quickly.” Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 37; Venter, "Angola Flashbacks," 29. 215 Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97. 216 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 176, 199, 206, 211, and 429. 217 Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 303. Some accounts of the campaign, reflecting the observations of junior officers and enlisted personnel, suggest the Copeland took the initiative and devised the mission himself; however, Callan stated in his interrogations that he explicitly ordered Copeland “to go after the tanks with the remainder of the men” left in Maquela after Callan had departed to Sao Salvador with the rest o the main force. Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 189-190; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 80. 218 Thomas, 35, 89. 219 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 95 and 98; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 298; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-88 and 173. 220 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 365-366; George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 108; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 199; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86-87; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 305; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 89-90. 126

Volume 8 – 2008-2009

Use of Hand-operated Weapons The normative theory of military performance predicts that, to the extent that the members of military forces that strongly emphasize norms promoting technical proficiency are willing to familiarize themselves with the functioning of military technology, these forces should be adept at using hand-operated weaponry, such as rifles, bazookas, anti-aircraft guns, and dismounted artillery.221 Specifically, the marksmanship of the personnel in these forces should be quite good.222 This prediction was borne out in the Congo for, after undergoing Hoare’s rigorous training regime, raw recruits, with little or no prior military experience, felt confident in their ability to fire accurate, controlled bursts of fire and use a variety of weapons, from rifles to tear gas and white phosphorous grenades.223 Several accounts of mercenary assaults on Simba-held towns describe the rebels “either scattering in panic or being slaughtered by the more accurate and lethal firepower of the mercenaries.”224 For example, within the first few minutes of 5 Commando’s assault at Kindu, the marksmen of Captain John Peters’ 57 Commando systematically eliminated virtually every Simba fighter still in the town.225 The mercenaries also used conventional weapons in unconventional ways, which allowed them to strike at the Simbas in situations that a more conventional military force could not. For example, on a pitch-black and rainy night in late November, 1964, where visibility was nearly non-existent, a member of 5 Commando held a lighted match aloft to help another mercenary line up the fore and aft sights of an otherwise unaimable bazooka. This provided sufficient accuracy to hit a Simba ammunition truck with two out of the three shots fired.226 Given that it took over five minutes for all of the ammunition in the vehicle to stop exploding, it is likely that their actions prevented a major arms shipment from reaching the Simbas’ front lines.227 The mercenaries’ superior technical proficiency also allowed them to easily respond to the Simbas’ simplistic frontal assaults and kill enough rebels to make them break off almost instantly. This is precisely what happened when a Cuban-led force launched a frontal assault against a mercenary-controlled power station on the Kimbi River on June 29, 1965. The mercenaries simply held their fire until the attackers had ambled into the open, about a hundred meters away from their defensive positions, and then systematically picked them off, one-by- one, until they routed in a panic, abandoning a multitude of weapons and injured comrades.228 Guevara’s summary of reports from Cubans present at the battle confirms that the rebels were forced back and dispersed by “intense, well-coordinated fire” from the mercenaries.229 Likewise, at the Battle of Katenga on June 30, 1965, the mercenaries routed a Cuban-led frontal assault by

221 Timothy Lupfer, "Tactics," in Brassey’s Encyclopedia of Land Forces and Warfare, ed. Franklin Margiotta (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1997), 1022 and 1031; Millett, Murray, and Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," 62. 222 Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948-1991 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 564. 223 Thallon, Cut-Throat, 20. 224 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 74; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 245; Fred Wagoner, Dragon Rouge: The Rescue of Hostages in the Congo (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1980), 66. 225 Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 34. 226 Reed, Save the Hostages, 258. 227 Ibid., 259. 228 Guevara, The African Dream, 43-47. 229 Ibid., 47. 127

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 lobbing accurate 60 mm mortar bombs into the mass of men approaching their defensive positions.230 Conversely, the theory predicts that, to the extent that the members of military forces that weakly emphasize norms promoting technical proficiency are unwilling to familiarize themselves with the functioning of military technology, these forces should not utilize hand- operated weaponry very well. Specifically, the marksmanship of personnel in these forces should be quite poor.231 This prediction was borne out as well. Indeed, due to their general deemphasis on technical proficiency, the Simbas rarely conducted training to learn how to use their weapons. For example, in a letter to Comrade Muteba, Guevara argued plainly that, “There is a general lack of the minimum training necessary to handle firearms, a lack all the graver in the case of weapons requiring special combat preparations.”232 Despite his pleas to start a training program, Guevara never received authorization to do this. However, it seems likely that, even if he had received authorization, few rebel foot soldiers would have submitted to training because they too placed little value on technical proficiency. Contemporary observers on both sides of the conflict frequently remarked on the near- total lack of technical competency among the Simbas.233 For example, an American military attaché in Leopoldville told The New York Times in December, 1964, that, “We’re not worried too much about the rebels getting small arms and ammunition,” and went on to state that, “We’re not even worried about their getting heavier equipment, like mortars and bazookas, which they don’t know how to handle any better than the Congolese army.”234 The same reporter printed a conversation with Lieutenant Gary Wilson of 5 Commando in which he described the pitiful state of Simba technical proficiency: “The rebs have one thing in common with our own Congolese. They don’t take aim. They think that noise kills.”235 Other front-line observers, like 5 Commando’s Hugh van Oppen, similarly reported that, despite often fielding far superior equipment than the mercenaries, including artillery with much greater range than anything in the mercenaries’ inventory, the rebels inflected few casualties because they simply could not aim.236 Guevara likewise observed a group of Simbas who had “set up a recoilless 76 mm gun on a hillock – the craziest place they could have found, because it had no strategic importance and all the gun could do was sink a boat that might pass nearby. It had, of course, already let loose some volleys without hitting the target, because the artillerymen did not know how to handle it.”237 The Simbas were equally inept with small-arms, which they tended to fire far above the heads of the mercenaries. For instance, Guevara commented in his diary entry for April 24, 1965, that, “The main defect of the Congolese is that they do not know how to shoot, so ammunition is wasted.”238 As a result, the Simbas rarely hit their targets during ambushes and larger operations if the targets were beyond point-blank range.239 For example, at the Battle of Katenga on June 30, 1965, when the mercenaries routed a numerically-superior Cuban-led frontal assault by

230 Ibid., 48. 231 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 73. 232 Guevara, The African Dream, 34. 233 Piero Gleijeses, for example, who is somewhat sympathetic in his portrayal of the Simbas nevertheless admitted that they had “poor fighting skills.” Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 137. 234 Lloyd Garrison, "Another Vietnam Feared in the Congo," New York Times, December 13, 1964, E3. 235 Ibid., , E3. 236 Baker, Wild Goose, 189. 237 Guevara, The African Dream, 63-64. 238 Ibid., 25. 239 Ibid., xxxiv. 128

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 lobbing accurate 60 mm mortar bombs at their attackers, it is conceivable that the rebels could have recovered and continued the assault had they taken cover and targeted the mercenaries with accurate fire.240 However, according to Cuban observers present at this battle, the Africans closed their eyes when firing their weapons and, consequently, emptied their clips harmlessly into the air.241 During earlier operations, on November 4, 1964, Simbas guarding the road to Stanleyville repeatedly ambushed a mercenary subcommando but failed to score a single hit.242 Hoare also recalled an incident where Simba troops failed to hit mercenary troops that were a mere four feet away and not moving.243 Finally, the Simbas were also unable to use anti-armour and anti-aircraft weapons effectively. Indeed, although the Simbas fielded a greater number of bazookas than the mercenaries, their deemphasis on technical proficiency meant that they could not aim these weapons accurately. As a result, they missed several opportunities to destroy 5 Commando’s armoured cars on the confining roadways of the Congo, even though the vehicles could not maneuver out of the way of incoming fire.244 Likewise, Guevara noted in June, 1965, that, “it would have been impossible to use Simba machine gunners to defend the base from air attack: they do not know how to handle their weapons and did not want to learn (nor, with a few honourable exceptions, did they learn throughout our time in the Congo).”245 Taking this into account, it is unsurprising that the rebels only managed to destroy one of 5 Commando’s armoured cars with a gun during the conflict and failed to shoot down any of the mercenaries’ aircraft.246 This prediction was also borne out in the Angola case. As discussed above, Callan’s Mercenaries did not conduct any organized training to familiarize the volunteers with their weapons. Although the senior members of the force, like Callan, Copeland, and Christodoulou, possessed preexisting training and experience in the use of military rifles and anti-vehicular weapons, which rendered them quite proficient in their use, the vast majority of their subordinates lacked this background and were, consequently, far less proficient.247 Given the general ineptitude of the allied FNLA forces, this dearth of training prevented the mercenaries from maintaining decisive tactical superiority over their opponents.248 Callan’s general lack of emphasis on technical proficiency rendered most of the mercenaries incapable of independent operations, which meant that the vast majority of the fighting had to be performed by the senior leaders of the group and the few others who had either

240 Ibid., 48. 241 Ibid. 242 Reed, Save the Hostages, 196. 243 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 157. 244 Guevara, The African Dream, 196. 245 Ibid., 38. 246 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 307. 247 For example, many of the mercenaries had never handled a rifle before arriving in Angola. Arnold, Mercenaries, 34; Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 224. 248 Multiple accounts of the conflict confirm that the FNLA troops did not know how to use their weapons and other military equipment at all and rarely hit enemy troops or vehicles. For example, they frequently loaded rifles with the wrong caliber of bullets, which damaged and risked destroying the weapons. Peter McAleese provided perhaps the most blunt assessment: “These soldiers were useless. They had been trained by the Chineese at Kinkusu in Zaire and spent their time learning stupid communist slogans rather than training with their weapons, which they had hardly fired, even on the range.” Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 149; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 258, 267, and 269; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 93; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 25; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 74. 129

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 preexisting weapons training or who opted to learn how to use their equipment on their own time.249 For instance, the leading first hand account of the campaign, which was written by mercenaries Chris Dempster and Dave Tomkins, indicates that Callan and his senior officers were responsible for inflicting a hugely disproportionate number of casualties against enemy infantry, using their rifles, and against enemy vehicles, including multiple tanks, using 66 mm anti-tank rocket launchers.250 However, although these particular mercenaries proved proficient with hand-operated weapons, Callan’s deemphasis on technical proficiency precluded others from becoming similarly competent. As a result, most other mercenaries had very poor accuracy with the 66 mm rocket launchers, even against stationary vehicles, which allowed many of the Cubans’ most potent weapons to escape the mercenaries’ ambushes.251 For example, Dempster’s account of the brief battle on January 24 acknowledges that he fired several 66 mm rockets at very close range at a cluster of Cuban tanks, yet failed to score a single hit.252 The Cuban-MPLA force sent to destroy the mercenaries was similarly inept in the use of hand-operated weapons.253 Despite fielding far more rifles and machine guns in every encounter, and often fielding hand-operated heavy weapons, including BM-21s and heavy mortars, the members of this force rarely succeeded in hitting any of the mercenaries.254 Indeed, even sympathetic sources suggest that the “Cuban soldiers… do not seem to have been terribly good shots.”255 For example, member of this force fired several volleys of BM-21 and heavy mortar shells on January 24, presumably in an attempt to soften up the mercenaries’ forward position before launching an assault with infantry and tanks. However, as with each of their other attempts to use hand-operated heavy weapons during the campaign, they failed to inflict any casualties.256 Similarly, prior to the mercenaries’ final ambush on February 3, Cuban soldiers rarely managed to hit any of Callan’s men with rifle fire during their brief encounters, despite the fact that the mercenaries always charged straight ahead and never used cover.257 For example, during one particularly devastating attack, Callan successfully engaged and killed an entire truckload of Cuban soldiers at point blank range by charging at them down the middle of an open road.258 Therefore, had any of the Cuban or MPLA troops been able to aim their rifles, they probably would have inflicted heavy casualties in every battle. Nevertheless, in six major battles, these soldiers only caused the deaths of approximately 20 mercenaries while, at the same time, they suffered several hundred deaths on their side.259

249 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 74, 135, and 400; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 67. 250 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 62 and 77; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 108; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 66. 251 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 205; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 76. 252 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 171, 176-177, and 204-205; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 95; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 183; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 76; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 76. 253 Bainwoll, "Cuba," 234. 254 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 298. 255 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 657; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 267. 256 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 204; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 298. 257 The MPLA’s technical abilities have been completely, and justifiably, written off as well. Indeed, multiple accounts of the conflict confirm that the MPLA troops “handled their weapons extremely poorly,” and rarely hit enemy troops or vehicles. Breytenbach, The Buffalo Soldiers, 46; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 317; Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 660 and 749. 258 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 198-199. 259 McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 354. 130

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 Use of Ground Combat Vehicles The normative theory of military performance predicts that military forces that strongly emphasize norms promoting creative thinking, personal initiative, and technical proficiency should be adept at using their ground combat vehicles. These forces should capitalize on both the maneuverability and firepower of their ground combat vehicles.260 Moreover, vehicle crews in these forces should be able to fire the vehicles’ weapons fairly accurately. These predictions were borne out in the Congo case. As expected, the mercenaries sometimes employed their armoured vehicles as part of highly mobile long-range maneuver actions to attack settlements from unexpected approach angles using rapid dash assaults that took advantage of the cars’ speed rather than merely their armoured plating. For example, these assets were used to help take Kamini in October, 1964, Kindu in November, 1964, and Baraka in September, 1965.261 Specifically, at the battle of Kindu on November 5, 1964, 5 Commando used their armoured cars to shock the Simba defenders out of the defensive positions and into the streets where the mercenaries then utilized the vehicles’ machine guns to eliminate several hundred of the fleeing rebels.262 Similarly, the mercenaries used two of their Ferret armoured cars to provide a “spearhead of steel” in advance of several dozen mercenary infantry to help shock Simba defenders into routing during assaults at the Battle of Baraka in September, 1965. 263 This assault helped the mercenaries gain a foothold near Baraka, from which they rallied their force to launch the main attack against the town. Beyond this, as a result of Hoare’s concerted training regime, the mercenaries’ vehicle crews became quite accurate with the cars’ .30-calibre machine guns. Consequently, the mercenaries were often able to quickly kill the crews of Simba armoured cars before the latter could return fire. For example, on November 4, 1964, a Simba armoured car ambushed a subcommando along a confining stretch of road, but the mercenaries quickly killed the Simba crew, whose heads were exposed, with accurate fire from one of their own Ferret scout cars before the rebels could start firing with their more powerful .50-calibre machine guns.264 This was fortuitous because the Simbas’ weapons would almost certainly have penetrated the mercenaries’ armour, which was only rated to stop .30-calibre bullets.265 Conversely, the theory predicts that military forces that weakly emphasize norms promoting creative thinking, personal initiative, and technical proficiency should not utilize their ground combat vehicles very well. These forces should generally use their ground vehicles as static roadblocks rather than mobile fire support platforms.266 Moreover, vehicle crews in these forces should generally not be able to fire the vehicles’ weapons accurately.267 These predictions were borne out in the Congo case. The Simbas tended to drive their armoured cars to a narrow point in a road and stop them to try to block the mercenaries’ advance. Moreover, because the Simbas could not fire the cars’ machine guns accurately, they failed to cause significant

260 Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver-Warfare Theory and Airland Battle (New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1991), 33. 261 Baker, Wild Goose, 187. 262 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 92-93. 263 Baker, Wild Goose, 187; Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 261. 264 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 66-67; Reed, Save the Hostages, 196. 265 Reed, Save the Hostages, 191. 266 Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 49; Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 73. 267 Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver, 49 and 109. 131

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 casualties and permitted the mercenaries sufficient time to counter-attack and disable the Simbas’ vehicles with accurate bazooka fire.268 For example, the Simbas once used three armoured cars as a road block on a confined stretch of road between the towns of Kibombo and Kindu. Despite ambushing the mercenaries, the Simba vehicle crews fired so inaccurately that they failed to immobilize the mercenary convoy. Instead, Captain Ian Gordon, the commander of 56 Commando at the time, leapt from the protection of his own vehicle, bazooka in hand, and charged forward to destroy one of the armoured cars as quickly as possible.269 Gordon’s actions cut the volume of inaccurate but torrential fire being directed at the mercenaries by one third. Moreover, the speed by which he reacted to, engaged, and destroyed the first armoured car had the side effect of terrifying the occupants of the other two cars into crawling out of their vehicles and breaking for the jungle on foot. All were cut down under a hail of accurate fire from the mercenaries’ own armoured vehicles before they could reach cover.270 This prediction was largely borne out in the Angola case as well. During their campaign, Callan’s Mercenaries possessed two Land Rovers equipped with 106 mm M40 anti-tank recoilless rifles, which were utilized as tank destroyers.271 In addition, they also possessed a Panhard M3/VTT armoured personnel carrier, a Dodge armoured personnel carrier, a Ferret scout car, a Panhard AML-90 armoured car with six rounds of 90 mm anti-tank ammunition, three additional Land Rovers equipped with Browning .30 caliber machine guns, and one Land Rover equipped with a Soviet-made Goryunova machine gun.272 However, despite possessing a number of armoured vehicles, Callan’s forces did not utilize them in combat. Moreover, the mercenaries tended to utilize their Land Rovers for transportation rather than combat. In fact, the Land Rovers were only used in combat once, during the engagement on February 2.273 Beyond this, although Callan’s men scored several point-blank hits against Cuban tanks with the M40 anti-tank rifles mounted on the Land Rovers, they made no attempt to use the Land Rovers in flanking attacks or other maneuvers. Rather, they parked these vehicles at the edge of a clearing for the duration of the battle and bombarded the Cuban tanks from a stationary position. Finally, compared to the actions of the mercenaries’ infantry, which destroyed three tanks using 66 mm rockets and ultimately had to finish off the same tank the two Land Rovers attempted to destroy, the vehicle crews were not particularly successful.274 The Cuban soldiers that crewed the tanks and other armoured vehicles fielded against the mercenaries proved to be even less capable than their opponents. Indeed, although the Cubans possessed a far greater quantity and higher quality of armoured vehicles, including approximately 20 Soviet-made T-34, T-54, and T-55 tanks and at least six Soviet BRDM-2 armoured scout cars and BTR 60 anti-personnel carriers equipped with one or more turreted

268 Reed, Save the Hostages, 196. 269 Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 31-33. 270 Hoare, Congo Mercenary, 89. 271 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 132; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 107; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97 and 107. 272 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 139, 176, and 245; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 107; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 97; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 74-75; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 73. 273 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-88 and 173. 274 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-88 and 173. 132

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 machine guns, their crews simply did not use them very well.275 Scholars of the conflict have concluded both that, “Cuban tankers were mediocre marksmen,” and that, “Cuban… weapon crews do not seem to have been terribly good shots.”276 Another study of Cuban forces in Angola similarly concluded that, “although the Cubans possessed almost all of the weaponry of Soviet motor-rifle divisions, their tactical handling of armoured fighting vehicles was, until 1988, generally poor.”277 These assessments are supported by the evidence in this case. For example, despite the fact that scoring even an indirect hit in the general vicinity of the mercenaries’ Land Rovers would have either severely damaged or destroyed them, a group of four Cuban tanks only succeeded in destroying two Land Rovers during the February 2 battle, while losing all four tanks in the process, because the tankers rarely hit their stationary targets.278 Moreover, although the Cuban tank crews did attempt to keep their vehicles moving during the battle, they made no attempt to maneuver their vehicles to better-protected locations or more advantageous firing positions and drove their tanks so slowly that Callan had little trouble scoring multiple point-blank hits.

Unit Cohesion Finally, the normative theory of military performance predicts that military forces that strongly emphasize norms promoting group loyalty should maintain strong unit cohesion, manifested in consistently cooperative behaviour between group members.279 To put it differently, members of these forces should feel that the other members of the force both can and will help keep each other alive and accomplish their assigned tasks. Therefore, members of these forces should demonstrate discipline in the face of enemy fire and not simply abandon the force without authorization. These predictions were borne out as well in the Congo case as the mercenaries were generally very disciplined on the battlefield. As Al Venter describes, Hoare’s “force launched spearhead attacks against a number of Simba strongholds, and as his mercs took the offensive – using their technical superiority and discipline to good effect – the rebels couldn’t match it.”280 Moreover, no accounts of the mercenaries’ operations suggest that they ever lost cohesion or retreated in panic from a battle, despite facing much larger Simba forces. On the face of it, this may not seem like a noteworthy accomplishment; however, if a group of mercenaries had ever broken and been routed during an engagement, its members would likely have suffered tremendous losses because they would have ceased to utilize the other components of military effectiveness, such as creative thinking and technical proficiency, which, in turn, would have removed the primary mitigating factor allowing the mercenaries to survive asymmetric engagements. In other words, for the other components of military effectiveness to serve a positive purpose, the mercenaries had to be willing to utilize them against the Simbas, which

275 Aguila, "The Changing Character of Cuba's Armed Forces," 33; Bainwoll, "Cuba," 229 and 231; Caribbean Report, "U.S. Admiral Pushes for Neutral Havana," 4-5; Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 171 and 363-364; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 266 and 338; Heitman, War in Angola, 202-305; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 83 and 111; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 165 and 183; Nortje, 32 Battalion, 9-10; Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 662; Stevens, "The Soviet Union and Angola," 144; Stockwell, In Search of Enemies, 216. 276 Heitman, War in Angola, 653; Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 75-78, 231, 233, and 657. 277 Clayton, Frontiersmen, 141. 278 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-88 and 173. 279 Millett, Murray, and Watman, "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations," 66. 280 Baker, Wild Goose, 174; Venter, War Dog, 334-335. 133

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 they could not do if they were fleeing in a panic. If this had happened often, many of 5 Commando’s 300 members would have been quickly eliminated. The mercenaries also experienced few cases of desertion. Conversely, the theory predicts that military forces that weakly emphasize norms promoting group loyalty should maintain weak unit cohesion, manifested in consistently uncooperative behaviour between group members. Individualistic members of these forces should tend to feel little loyalty and obligation to their fellow members, which, in turn, should reduce their will to fight. Therefore, members of these forces should demonstrate little discipline in the face of enemy fire and desertion should occur relatively frequently. These predictions were borne out as well in the Congo case, with the most visible effect of the Simbas’ deemphasis on group loyalty being that rebel troops were undisciplined in the face of enemy fire. Instead, they tended to run from battle once the fighting began. For example, on June 30, 1965, a force of 160 Cubans and Africans attacked the mercenary-controlled town of Katenga. Despite vastly outnumbering the mercenaries defending the settlement, 60 Simbas fled in panic right before the battle began and several dozen more Simbas and Rwandans followed soon afterwards, abandoning the Cubans to their fate.281 The attack instantly turned into a complete rout during which at least 20 Simbas and four Cubans lost their lives.282 The mercenaries suffered no casualties. Compounding that day’s failure, the complete lack of discipline amongst the African troops demoralized and undermined the loyalty of the Cubans, who thereafter could not be certain whether their African “allies” would abandon them again. The following remarks, attributed to one of the Cuban advisors, nicely illustrate the social rift that developed between the rebels and the foreign allies: “The Simbas fled the minute they heard a shot; our brothers who died, died because of them… I wish I were back in Cuba, and a lot of the others who were in the battle feel the same way.”283 The rebels’ behaviour at Katenga reflected a pattern displayed throughout the conflict.284 Ultimately, the most detrimental effect of the Simbas’ complete deemphasis on group loyalty was that, during the final months of the conflict, many African rebels, along with some Cubans, simply opted to desert when the opportunity arose. Multiple accounts confirm this.285 For example, Guevara noted in October, 1965 that, “People were deserting all the time and taking their rifles with them.”286 A month later Dreke reported to his commander that the rebel movement was completely falling apart: “All the Rwandans have gone… the Congolese already know the news and are leaving.”287 The total disregard for their troops shown by Kabila and other senior Simba commanders contributed to mass desertions of Simba and Rwandan troops.288 Many more that chose to remain in the camps to the end of the conflict refused to fight unless the Congolese rebel commanders did the same, which they declined to do.289 Most rebels serving at static barriers along roads agreed to stay on only so long as they were not asked to perform any combat function.290

281 Guevara, The African Dream, 48. 282 Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 116. 283 Quoted in Ibid., 111. 284 Guevara, The African Dream, 88. 285 Dreke, From the Escambray to the Congo, 138; Guevara, The African Dream, 146. 286 Guevara, The African Dream, 146. 287 Quoted in Ibid., 206. 288 Ibid., 59. 289 Ibid. 290 Ibid., 134. 134

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 This prediction was also borne out in the Angola case. Although most of Callan’s Mercenaries generally maintained discipline and cohesion when they launched assaults against the Cuban-MPLA troops, they always took their opponents by surprise, their assaults were very brief, and they generally did not come under accurate defensive fire. Therefore, while the mercenaries stood firm during five of their six battles, their discipline was not really tested in these engagements. On the other hand, in the one instance when their discipline was tested, which occurred during the fourth battle on February 3, when they faced a concerted Cuban- MPLA counter-attack, the force quickly collapsed and fled in a disorganized panic.291 Moreover, as with the Simbas, many of Callan’s Mercenaries opted to desert when the opportunity arose.292 For instance, a diary found on the body of a dying mercenary noted, in an entry dated February 11, that, “the problem of retreating troops has become acute.”293 Moreover, 23 mercenaries, who had earned death threats from Callan by opting out of the fighting, attempted to desert en mass on January 31, while Callan and the other senior officers were out on patrol. However, they were intercepted and most were executed on Callan’s orders.294 Following the incident, which shattered whatever loyalty most of the surviving mercenaries had to Callan or each other, several other members of the group fled Angola by, for example, stowing away on a visiting aircraft or stealing Land Rovers, as soon as Callan left Maquela on his final strike mission on February 3.295 As Mockler put it, “it was off the battlefield that the calm authority of a Hoare, supported by others of his class and type, was needed to impose discipline, mutual loyalty and in moments of crisis a sense of restraint.”296 Consequently, although the campaign officially came to an end when the Cuban-MPLA force captured Callan and his few loyal followers on February, 6, 1976, it was a lost cause by that point for virtually the entire rest of the force had already deserted.297 Turning now to the Cuban-MPLA force, the most visible effect of its deemphasis on group loyalty was that both the Cuban and MPLA troops were undisciplined in the face of the mercenaries’ fire; rather, they almost always fled from battle once the fighting began.298 Indeed,

291 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 365-366; George, The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, 108; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 199; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86-87; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 305; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 89-90. 292 McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 107; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 94; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 114. 293 Quoted in Roebuck, The Whores of War, 94. 294 Associated Press, "13 British mercenaries reported executed by comrades in Angola," The Times, February 9, 1976, 1; Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 335; Geraghty, Who Dares Wins, 131; Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions, 334-336 and 339; McAleese, No Mean Soldier, 101; Roebuck, The Whores of War, 85 and 99; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 304; Tendler, "'Callan' and nine other Britons face Angola trial," 1; Stewart Tendler and Hugh Noyes, "New evidence of executions among British mercenaries," The Times, February 10, 1976, 1; Thomas, Mercenary Troops in Modern Africa, 114. 295 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 361-362; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197-198, and 200; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 88-89. 296 Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 172. 297 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 179, 186, and 361-362; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 200 and 204; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 90. 298 Pollack, "The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness", 656, 661, and 749.This proved to be a common trend in the simultaneous conflict in southern Angola as well. Recounting a typical engagement, an MPLA commander recalled that, once ordered to attack, his men “shot off all their ammunition at the beginning and later they couldn’t attack because there was nothing to attack with.” Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 199. He also concluded that, typically “MPLA forces retreated without fighting.” Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 200. 135

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 Spikes concluded that the MPLA “tended to bolt at the first suggestion of enemy activity.”299 For example, on January 24, five mercenaries equipped with rifles and a single rocket launcher ambushed a force of at least two dozen Cuban and MPLA troops equipped with three tanks. Despite vastly outnumbering the mercenaries, the Cuban-MPLA troops fled in panic, under only marginally accurate fire, as soon as the battle began, suffering 21 deaths.300 As Spikes described, “still unaccustomed to being fired at, the troops slammed the tanks’ turrets shut and swirled around, following the jeeps and foot soldiers in retreat.”301 The Cuban-MPLA soldiers repeated this behaviour in virtually every subsequent engagement, which almost certainly contributed to their high casualties. For example, although the Cuban tank crew, and a handful of Cuban infantry, stood their ground for a few minutes during a battle between 200 Cuban-MPLA troops and 48 mercenaries on February 2, most of their Cuban and MPLA comrades either froze, fell into a panic, or attempted to flee almost immediately, which allowed the mercenaries to easily cut down at least 160 of them.302 This general tendency to flee in the face of far smaller mercenary attack groups continued during three subsequent battles and only ceased during the final major battle of the conflict on February 3. This engagement, in particular, illustrates the critical importance of battlefield discipline in the conflict. Indeed, once the Cuban-MPLA troops stood their ground for the first time and fought back in the face of a surprise attack, they were able to inflict devastating casualties on the mercenaries and, through this, effectively won the conflict.

Broad Predictions of the Theory: 5 Commando should have Defeated the Simbas and the Cubans-MPLA should have Defeated Callan’s Mercenaries The normative theory of military performance reasons that the battlefield military performance of opposing military forces is primarily the result of the interplay of their relative military effectiveness. In other words, the interactive clash of tactical behaviour is the primary determinant of victory or defeat on the battlefield. Based on this, the theory predicted that the materially weaker party in an asymmetric conflict, which the mercenaries were in both cases, should only have been able to defeat its materially stronger opponent if the weaker party emphasized behavioural norms that encouraged it to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour – that is, be very militarily effective – and the stronger party did not emphasize these norms because this should have allowed the weaker party to exploit the weaknesses and counter the strengths of the stronger party and, through this, defeat it. On the other hand, the theory predicted that, in asymmetric conflicts where neither party emphasized behavioural norms that encouraged them to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour, neither party should have been capable of exploiting the weaknesses and countering the strengths of the other and, as a result, the balance of material capabilities should have allowed the materially stronger party to prevail. With respect to the two cases under study in this paper, the theory correctly predicted that 5 Commando should have defeated the materially superior Simbas in the Congo and that the materially superior Cuban-MPLA force in northern Angola should have defeated Callan’s Mercenaries. These broad predictions of the theory were supported by the evidence in these cases. In sum, 5 Commando emphasized the norms that the theory hypothesized would benefit military

299 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 199. 300 Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 95; Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 298. 301 Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, 298. 302 Dempster and Tomkins, Fire Power, 352-354; Macdonald, Soldiers of Fortune, 98; Mockler, The New Mercenaries, 197; Rogers, Someone Else’s War, 86; Tickler, The Modern Mercenary, 87-88 and 173. 136

Volume 8 – 2008-2009 effectiveness, and, as expected, their military effectiveness was generally very good. At the same time, the Simbas generally deemphasized the norms that the theory hypothesized would benefit military effectiveness, and, as expected, their military effectiveness was quite poor. As a result, the mercenaries were able to perform a much wider range of behaviour than the Simbas, which the rebels simply could not counter. In other words, the Simba Rebellion was a test of skill between two grossly mismatched opponents. It is, therefore, unsurprising that 5 Commando defeated the Simbas quite decisively. On the other hand, both Callan’s Mercenaries and the Cuban-MPLA force arrayed against them deemphasized the norms that the theory hypothesized would benefit military effectiveness, and, as expected, their military effectiveness was generally poor. As a result, the mercenaries were unable to perform a much wider range of behaviour than the Cuban-MPLA force and could not, therefore, exploit the weaknesses and counter the strengths of their stronger opponent. It is, consequently, unsurprising that the Cuban-MPLA force ultimately defeated the mercenaries.

Conclusion The results of this analysis suggest that ideational factors played an important role in shaping the military effectiveness and battlefield military performance of the combatants in these cases. Indeed, the vast majority of the predictions made by the normative theory of military performance were borne out during both the Simba Rebellion and the Angolan Civil War. Overall, the normative theory of military performance appears to provide a convincing explanation of military performance in these asymmetric conflicts. The implications of these results are profoundly important because they suggest that governments, international organizations, and anyone else considering using mercenaries to implement their foreign and defence policies should attempt to understand the military culture of the private security organizations vying for their business. In other words, the potential clients of private security organizations cannot afford to determine the suitability of an organization based solely on the size of its inventory of weapons and vehicles or on the length of its personnel roster. Rather, prudent clients must demand access to the inner-workings of these organizations, particularly the junior and senior personnel who would be charged with implementing the terms of any contract, to assess how these individuals think and how they are encouraged to behave. Only then can a client determine whether a private security organization emphasizes the five norms of military effectiveness discussed in this paper and, in turn, determine whether this organization will likely accomplish its required tasks, even in the face of materially superior opponents.

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