America's Eastern Tier

“America’s Eastern Tier: Poland between NATO and United Europe,” Periphery, vol. 8/9 (2002-2003): 4- 12. America’s Eastern Tier: Poland between NATO and United Europe1 Following the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has remained the only superpower standing. Nonetheless, it faces several challenges including rogue, so-called “terrorist” states, a potentially menacing China, a broodingly resentful Russia, and a vexingly enigmatic European Union (EU). Although perfectly capable of defending its own territory, America’s foreign entanglements and commitments continuously require the US to cultivate reliable regional allies. This paper considers Poland as an American friend complementing Great Britain on the Eastern flank of Europe. Against the backdrop of Poland’s membership in NATO and the nation’s impending access to United Europe, we shall explore the tensions accompanying the integration process and show how they reflect on the future of Polish-American affairs. In particular, we shall deal with three major Polish political forces, the Euroenthusiasts, Europhobes, and Euroskeptics. First, however, we shall describe briefly the historical background. The Cold War and Its Aftermath A dozen years ago, the world was divided neatly into “East” and “West.” On the one hand, the Soviet Union, its satellites, and China constituted “the Eastern Bloc.” On the other, the United States, Western Europe, and, somewhat incongruously, Japan, formed “the Western alliance.” The Soviets and the Americans avoided direct confrontation. They fought wars by proxy, preferring to assist their clients indirectly and only exceptionally getting involved directly themselves (Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan). The overriding concern of the superpowers, their allies, and their clients was the Cold War. It waxed and waned continuously for almost half a century with NATO and the Warsaw Pact states facing each other off. Of course, during this conflict, neither the “West” nor the “East” were monolithic. For the Kremlin, the breach with China presented the most serious challenge. Rebellions among the Soviet Union’s European satellites were less dangerous. Yet, they were serious enough because they destabilized the area – from the Yugoslav schism in 1948 through the Hungarian Insurrection in 1956 and the Prague Spring in 1968. Even tiny Albania asserted itself against Moscow, albeit in a grotesque Stalinist way. And so did Rumania, which coupled its relative independence in foreign affairs with orthodox Marxist-Leninist repression at home. 1 This paper was prepared for the forum “United Europe, United States, united Poles?” held at the Miller Center of Public Policy, the University of Virginia, on September 7, 2001. I would like to dedicate my paper to Professor Edmund Wnuk Lipiński who asked me about an alternative to Euroenthusiasm. Arguably, no one was more vexing for the Kremlin than the Poles, who rebelled against the Communist proxy regime in Warsaw in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980. That year also witnessed the birth of “Solidarity”. The last Polish rebellion lasted in essence until 1989, when the Communists agreed to share power with left-wing dissidents. In the West, during the Cold War, the US relied chiefly on the British who loyally supported Washington. At the same time, America had to deal with the maverick French who, sour because of the loss of their influence in world affairs, pursued a flamboyant policy often detrimental to US interests. Meanwhile, since the late sixties, the Germans quietly plied their Ostpolitik of rapprochement with the Soviets. A joke current in the 1980s summarized the attitude of Western Europeans vis-à-vis the Soviet Union best: “the French talk tough like the British but ultimately they kow-tow like the Germans.” Thus tensions between at least two major Western European countries and the United States were real enough. Naturally, there were also misunderstandings among Western Europeans themselves. Much of the strife was caused by economic matters. Meanwhile, after 1945, the economy of the western part of the Old Continent became operational mostly thanks to an enormous infusion of American capital, know-how, and materiel. Nonetheless, during the Cold War, the West lacked a uniform economic organization encompassing the US and its allies. Although they cooperated much of the time, all too often particularist interests impeded the development of a common economic policy. This vexing impediment affected adversely not only the relations between the US and its allies but also between Western European nations themselves. Nonetheless, since the 1950s, Western Europeans very gradually created the European Economic Community (EEC), or the Common Market. Significantly, the political idea of the European Union (EU) was presented as an afterthought to economic integration. The process of economic and political integration accelerated rapidly only after the re-unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Because the EU is still in the making, we are unsure what shape it will eventually take. Admittedly, however, the potential for Europe to become an economic powerhouse is alluring. Prosperity achieved through cooperation should neutralize conflict on the Old Continent. That is the optimistic outlook. According to the pessimistic point of view, the EU is yet another futile exercise in hyperbureacratic, overregulated, and supercentralized utopia. We shall return to both sets of opinions shortly. Poland’s Transformations Before 1989 the Soviets had subordinated Poland to their military alliance, the Warsaw Pact. The Poles were also coerced to join an analogous economic organization run by the Kremlin, the so-called Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). The idea was to lead junior East European partners to the socialist paradise. In any event, Comecon presided over what can only be termed as the “Greater Soviet Co-Misery Sphere.” This economic contraption collapsed following the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As the old financial and commercial arrangement unraveled, the misery deepened and the newly liberated East Central European states, including Poland, began looking westward for a solution to their economic, social, and political problems. After 1989, Poland’s quest for security became an absolute priority. As a result, after much travail, the Poles joined NATO in 1999. Since then Polish armed forces have participated in numerous military exercises with their American and Western European counterparts. Further, Poland has proven a very reliable ally. It has supported diplomatically America’s endeavors in the Middle East (e.g. Poland represented US interests in Baghdad). It has also backed the US militarily in the Balkans (e.g. Polish troops serve as peacekeepers in Kosovo and Macedonia). According to the American commander of NATO forces in Kosovo, General William David, Polish soldiers “are wonderful guys. They are disciplined and magnificently trained.”2 Polish loyalty toward the United States is exemplary. Consequently, the French press dubbed Poland “America’s Trojan horse in Europe.”3 Nonetheless, the nation’s access to NATO had not been a forgone conclusion. Aside from legitimate concerns of the US and its Western European allies concerning a possibly hostile reaction by Russia, the Poles argued often passionately among themselves about joining the Western military alliance. In essence, the idea of Poland’s membership in NATO originated in the center-right circles in the early 1990s. It was only gradually espoused by most of the political elite. In contradistinction, the idea, first, of close cooperation and, then, integration with the European Union initially enjoyed an incredible degree of both elite and public support from 1989 on. Recently, however, according to some opinion polls, that support has eroded among the population at large. It still holds sway among the elite. For example, very recently Poland’s governing party, the center-right Solidarity Electoral Action (Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnośd – AWS) and all major opposition parties, including the post-Communist Union of the Democratic Left (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej – SLD), the populist Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe – PSL), the center-left Freedom Union (Unia Wolności – UW), and the centrist Citizens’ Alliance (Platforma Obywatelska – PO), signed a “Pact for *European+ Integration.” Thus, all significant players on Poland’s political scene committed themselves publicly once again to joining the European Union. (A disgruntled right-wing pundit ominously dead-panned that the signing of the document coincided with “the 62nd anniversary of the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of non-aggression between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union.”4) Three Polish Ways In Poland, as elsewhere in Europe, there are three main attitudes toward the unification of the Old Continent: Euroenthusiastic, Euroskeptic, and Europhobic. These attitudes express both the hopes and fears of their adherents and are reflected in the propaganda disseminated by the advocates and 2 Sebastian Karczewski, “Na obcej ziemi,” Nasz Dziennik, 28 August 2001. 3 See Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, “Poland and the Future of NATO,” The Sarmatian Review, Vol. XIX, No. 3 (September 1999): 655-659. 4 Katarzyna Cegielska, “Jednym fałszywym głosem,” Nasz Dziennik, 23 August 2001. opponents of the EU. Often self-contradictory and by no means monolithic, the support or its lack for European integration does not necessarily follow any ideological

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