DOCSLIB.ORG

Operation Husky: a Critical Analysis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Operation Husky: a Critical Analysis NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, R.I. OPERATION HUSKY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS By Stephen R. Cote Lieutenant Colonel, USMC A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy Signature ____________________ 18 May 2001 ____________________________ Professor Theodore Gatchel Commander Erik Dahl, USN Report Documentation Page Report Date Report Type Dates Covered (from... to) 18052001 N/A - Title and Subtitle Contract Number Operation Husky-A Critical Analysis Grant Number Program Element Number Author(s) Project Number Cote, Stephen R. Task Number Work Unit Number Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Performing Organization Report Number Naval War College 686 Cushing Road Newport, RI 02841-1207 Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) Address(es) Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Supplementary Notes Abstract Subject Terms Report Classification Classification of this page unclassified unclassified Classification of Abstract Limitation of Abstract unclassified UU Number of Pages 24 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 2. Security Classification Authority: 3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule: 4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. 5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 6. Office Symbol: 7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE C 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207 8. Title (Include Security Classification): OPERATION HUSKY–A CRITICAL ANALYSIS (UNCLASSIFIED) 9. Personal Authors: LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN R. COTE, USMC 10.Type of Report: FINAL 11. Date of Report: 18 May 2001 12.Page Count: 23 12A Paper Advisor (if any): N/A 13.Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy. 14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Sicily, Mediterranean Theater, Husky, World War II, Amphibious Operations, Barclay, Mincemeat, Eisenhower, Alexander, Patton. 15.Abstract: The Allied invasion of Sicily was the largest amphibious operation conducted in World War II with over seven assault divisions landing across Italian beaches. The planning and conduct of HUSKY was fraught with indecision, fragmented planning, poor coordination, and a lack of unity of effort. Husky proves to be an interesting case study of the operational level of war and provides several relevant lessons for today’s commanders and joint staff officers. This paper analyses the Allied planning effort form the operational level of war only. Specifically, this paper analyses the planning and conduct of HUSKY against the following seven operational functions: operational intelligence, operational command and control, operational movement and maneuver, operational command and control warfare, operational fires, operational protection, and operational logistics. 16.Distribution /Availability Unclassified Same As Rpt DTIC Users of Abstract: X 17.Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 18.Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 19.Telephone: 841-6461 20.Office Symbol: C Security Classification of This Page Unclassified Abstract of OPERATION HUSKY – A CRITICAL ANALYSIS The Allied invasion of Sicily was the largest amphibious operation conducted in World War II with over seven assault divisions landing across Italian beaches. The planning and conduct of HUSKY was fraught with indecision, fragmented planning, poor coordination, and a lack of unity of effort. Husky proves to be an interesting case study of the operational level of war and provides several relevant lessons for today’s commanders and joint staff officers. This paper analyzes the Allied planning effort from the operational level of war only. Specifically, this paper analyzes the planning and conduct of HUSKY in regard to following seven operational functions: operational intelligence, operational command and control, operational movement and maneuver, operational command and control warfare, operational fires, operational protection, and operational logistics. 1 The Allied invasion of Sicily was the largest amphibious operation conducted in World War II, with over seven assault divisions landing across Italian beaches. From 10 July to 17 August 1943, Allied forces fought a determined opponent that effectively traded space for time and successfully evacuated a large force to the mainland of Italy. Operation HUSKY culminated in an Allied victory and proved to be the catalyst for the decision to invade the Italian mainland. However, the planning and conduct of HUSKY was fraught with indecision, fragmented planning, poor coordination, and a lack of unity of effort. HUSKY proves to be an interesting case study of the operational level of war and provides several relevant lessons for today’s commanders and joint staff officers. This paper analyzes the Allied planning and conduct of HUSKY from the operational level of war only. The analysis of grand strategy in the Mediterranean theater and the Allied decision to invade Sicily is beyond the scope of this paper. Likewise, this paper does not address the tactical conduct of units involved in this major operation or the Axis operational functions. Specifically, the planning and conduct of HUSKY is evaluated regarding the following seven operational functions: operational command and control, operational movement and maneuver, operational intelligence, operational command and control warfare, operational fires, operational protection, and operational logistics. The study of the command and control structure of HUSKY reveals many weaknesses and flaws that seriously jeopardized the outcome of the operation. Decisive leadership was lacking, unity of effort was difficult to achieve, and functional commanders were given too much freedom to act independently. Command and control is the first area to be discussed. 1 COMMAND AND CONTROL The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCOS) placed General Eisenhower in a difficult situation during the planning phase of Operation HUSKY. As Allied Commander in Chief (C-in-C) for HUSKY, he commanded a complex, combined organization in which his three subordinate commanders were British. General Sir Harold Alexander was designated as the Ground Force Commander and also served as the Deputy C-in-C for HUSKY. Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder was named C-in-C of Allied Air Forces and Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham was awarded command of all naval forces for the operation. General Eisenhower disliked the strong British influence within the command structure and its potentially negative impact upon HUSKY. The British practiced a system of cooperation or “leadership by committee” vice the American system of decisive leadership. General Eisenhower believed that this command structure would introduce the British system into the Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ) and possibly reduce his authority. 1 While the command structure was not optimal, it did not usurp Eisenhower’s authority. In some ways, the system actually ended up benefiting Eisenhower, as it gave him the freedom to concentrate on theater strategic issues, while leaving the detailed planning of HUSKY to his subordinate commanders. In this way, Eisenhower had the flexibility to pick and choose which issues he should become personally involved in. The HUSKY command structure was formed around the functional area concept, with each commander coequal in status and reporting to the C-in-C, their common superior. They also reported informally to their own national command authority. Since Eisenhower had to create harmony and teamwork within the organization, he had to be very careful not to be too assertive in his dealings with the British commanders. A more effective command structure 2 would have been the appointment of an overall operational commander, who was subordinate to Eisenhower, but commanded the entire HUSKY force. A single operational commander would have been able to unite the three commands without the additional burden of theater strategic duties. As the Deputy C-in-C, Alexander attempted to fill this role, however, he was overburdened with his duties as the ground force commander and his personality did not lend itself to the decisive leadership needed to effectively command the force. Unity of effort became a critical issue during the planning of HUSKY. The issue of air forces being responsive to naval and ground commanders was never adequately resolved. Air commanders retained complete control over all aspects of the air campaign. As one naval task group commander noted: “They took the point of view that all airplanes should be under air command regardless of their function.”2 Marshall Tedder’s air staff concentrated on defeating the Axis Air Force by accomplishing three tasks: destroy or neutralize enemy air forces within range of the invasion area, protect naval operations, and defend northwest Africa and captured areas of Sicily from attack.3 Close air support was not a primary mission of the air forces, and they never intended
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring in Context
    Field-Marshal Albert Kesselring in Context Andrew Sangster Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy University of East Anglia History School August 2014 Word Count: 99,919 © This copy of the thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that use of any information derived there from must be in accordance with current UK Copyright Law. In addition, any quotation or abstract must include full attribution. Abstract This thesis explores the life and context of Kesselring the last living German Field Marshal. It examines his background, military experience during the Great War, his involvement in the Freikorps, in order to understand what moulded his attitudes. Kesselring's role in the clandestine re-organisation of the German war machine is studied; his role in the development of the Blitzkrieg; the growth of the Luftwaffe is looked at along with his command of Air Fleets from Poland to Barbarossa. His appointment to Southern Command is explored indicating his limited authority. His command in North Africa and Italy is examined to ascertain whether he deserved the accolade of being one of the finest defence generals of the war; the thesis suggests that the Allies found this an expedient description of him which in turn masked their own inadequacies. During the final months on the Western Front, the thesis asks why he fought so ruthlessly to the bitter end. His imprisonment and trial are examined from the legal and historical/political point of view, and the contentions which arose regarding his early release.
    [Show full text]
  • Second World War Deception Lessons Learned for Today’S Joint Planner
    Air University Joseph J. Redden, Lt Gen, Commander Air Command and Staff College John W. Rosa, Col, Commandant James M. Norris, Col, Dean Stuart Kenney, Maj, Series Editor Richard Muller, PhD, Essay Advisor Air University Press Robert Lane, Director John Jordan, Content Editor Peggy Smith, Copy Editor Prepress Production: Mary Ferguson Cover Design: Daniel Armstrong Please send inquiries or comments to: Editor The Wright Flyer Papers Air Command and Staff College (ACSC/DER) 225 Chennault Circle Bldg 1402 Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6426 Tel: (334) 953-2308 Fax: (334) 953-2292 Internet: [email protected] AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY Second World War Deception Lessons Learned for Today’s Joint Planner Donald J. Bacon Major, USAF Air Command and Staff College Wright Flyer Paper No. 5 MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA December 1998 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. ii Foreword It is my great pleasure to present another of the Wright Flyer Papers series. In this series, Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) recognizes and publishes the “best of the best” student research projects from the prior academic year. The ACSC re - search program encourages our students to move beyond the school’s core curriculum in their own professional development and in “advancing aerospace power.” The series title reflects our desire to perpetuate the pioneering spirit embodied in earlier generations of airmen.
    [Show full text]
  • Deception: Theory and Practice
    View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2012-06 Deception: Theory and Practice Monroe, James D. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/7388 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE by James D. Monroe June 2012 Thesis Advisor: Hy Rothstein Second Reader: Kalev Sepp Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2012 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Deception: Theory and Practice 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) James D. Monroe 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10.
    [Show full text]
  • Art of Deception: Selling a Story to the German Army
    NATIONAL EISENHOWER MEMORIAL EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS LESSON Art of Deception: Selling a Story to the German Army Duration One 45-minute period Grades 7–12 Cross-curriculum Application U.S. History, World History, Geography, English, Media Arts NATIONAL EISENHOWER MEMORIAL LESSON: ART OF DECEPTION | 1 EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS Historical Background As Supreme Allied Commander Dwight D. Eisenhower later remarked, “Plans are worthless, but planning is everything.” Operation Overlord, also known as D-Day, was a massive undertaking involving unprecedented planning and meeting challenges in execution. The operation consisted of 2,700 ships manned by 195,000 sailors. The fleet carried 156,000 troops, 12,000 vehicles, 2,000 tanks, and nearly 10,000 tons of stores across the English Channel. In addition, thousands of military aircraft supported the amphibious invasion. The success of the Normandy invasion also depended on the element of surprise. All the plan- ning and effort that went into the operation could have been undone if German military leaders knew the location and timing of the landing ahead of time. German military leaders worked hard to determine what General Eisenhower and the Allies planned to do. In order to keep this important information secret, Eisenhower and his advisors initiated Operation Bodyguard (part of a larger deception plan called Operation Fortitude) to confuse the German forces about the exact location of the landing. Objective Students will examine primary sources related to some of the Allied plans to deceive the German Army as to the time and location of the invasion of northern Europe. What techniques of decep- tion were used? What role does deception play in military strategy? What can these deceptions tell us about how the German military viewed the Allies? Students will take on the role of documentary filmmaker and develop a plan for a short video promotion for a film on Allied military deceptions during World War II.
    [Show full text]
  • The Invasion of Sicily and the Anglo-American Alliance in the Second World War
    CRADLE OF TRIUMPH: THE INVASION OF SICILY AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR A Master’s Thesis by TAYLAN PAKSOY Department of History İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University Ankara August 2017 From Beirut to Gibraltar; To the Mediterranean, where the Fate of the World will be decided. CRADLE OF TRIUMPH: THE INVASION OF SICILY AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR Graduate School of Economic and Social Sciences of İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University by TAYLAN PAKSOY In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY İHSAN DOĞRAMACI BİLKENT UNIVERSITY August 2017 ABSTRACT CRADLE OF TRIUMPH: THE INVASION OF SICILY AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR Paksoy, Taylan M.A., Department of History Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Kenneth Weisbrode August 2017 This study analyzes the vital importance of the Invasion of Sicily (July 9/10-August 17, 1943), codenamed Operation Husky for the Anglo-American Alliance in the Second World War. As the largest amphibious operation in the Second World War, Operation Husky stands as a significant military action which enhanced the strategic, operational and the tactical capacities of the American and British forces. Surpassing the previous victories, this experience enabled the Anglo-American Alliance to attain further victories later in Europe. However, its role has been underrated in the military historiography of the Second World War. Therefore, this thesis aims to assert its importance through a three- level, strategic, operational and tactical analysis. Key Words: Anglo-American Alliance, Mediterranean Theatre of Operations in the Second World War, Operation Husky, Sicily, Three-Level Analysis of War iii ÖZET ZAFERİN BEŞİĞİ: İKİNCİ DÜNYA SAVAŞI’NDA SİCİLYA İSTİLASI VE ANGLO- AMERİKAN İTTİFAKI Paksoy, Taylan Yüksek Lisans, Tarih Bölümü Tez Danışmanı: Yrd.
    [Show full text]
  • Confidence Men the Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 By
    Confidence Men The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 by Brett Edward Lintott A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Department of History, in the University of Toronto © Copyright by Brett Edward Lintott, 2015 Abstract Confidence Men The Mediterranean Double-Cross System, 1941-45 Brett Edward Lintott Doctor of Philosophy Department of History University of Toronto, 2015 This dissertation provides an analysis of the Mediterranean double-cross system of the Second World War, which was composed of a number of double agents who were turned by the Allies and operated against their ostensible German spymasters. Utilizing many freshly released archival materials, this study assesses how the double-cross system was constructed, why it was an effective instrument, and how it contributed to Allied success in two areas: security and counter-intelligence, and military deception. The focus is thus on both organization and operations. The chapters cover three chronological periods. In the first — 1941-42 — the initial operational usage of a double agent is assessed, along with the development of early organizational structures to manage and operate individual cases as components of a team of spies. The second section, covering 1943, assesses three issues: major organizational innovations made early that year; the subsequent use of the double agent system to deceive the Germans regarding the planned invasion of Sicily in July; and the ongoing effort to utilize double agents to ensure a stable security and counter-intelligence environment in the Mediterranean theatre. The third and final section analyzes events in 1944, with a focus on double-cross deception in Italy and France, and on the emergence of more systematic security and counter-intelligence double-cross operations in Italy and the Middle East.
    [Show full text]
  • Strategic Military Deception
    1 RESEARCH PAPER No. 171 AUGUST – SEPTEMBER 2016 STRATEGIC MILITARY DECEPTION Prerequisites of Success in Technological Environment Oikonomakis Panagiotis (Strategic Security Analyst and RIEAS Research Associate) ISSN: 2241-6358 Note: RIEAS obtained the permission from the Author, Oikonomakis Panagiotis, to publish his Master Thesis (MA) which was submitted (2015) to the Department of International and European Studies in the University of Piraeus, Greece. RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STUDIES (RIEAS) # 1, Kalavryton Street, Alimos, Athens, 17456, Greece RIEAS URL:http://www.rieas.gr 2 RIEAS MISSION STATEMENT Objective The objective of the Research Institute for European and American Studies (RIEAS) is to promote the understanding of international affairs. Special attention is devoted to transatlantic relations, intelligence studies and terrorism, European integration, international security, Balkan and Mediterranean studies, Russian foreign policy as well as policy making on national and international markets. Activities The Research Institute for European and American Studies seeks to achieve this ob- jective through research, by publishing its research papers on international politics and intelligence studies, organizing seminars, as well as providing analyses via its web site. The Institute maintains a library and documentation center. RIEAS is an institute with an international focus. Young analysts, journalists, military personnel as well as academicians are frequently invited to give lectures and to take part in semi- nars. RIEAS maintains regular contact with other major research institutes through- out Europe and the United States and, together with similar institutes in Western Europe, Middle East, Russia and Southeast Asia. Status The Research Institute for European and American Studies is a non-profit research institute established under Greek law.
    [Show full text]
  • From Axis Surprises to Allied Victories from AFIO's the INTELLIGENCER
    Association of Former Intelligence Officers From AFIO's The Intelligencer 7700 Leesburg Pike, Suite 324 Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Falls Church, Virginia 22043 Web: www.afio.com, E-mail: [email protected] Volume 22 • Number 3 • $15 single copy price Winter 2016-17 ©2017, AFIO The Bleak Years: 1939 – Mid-1942 GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE The Axis powers repeatedly surprised Poland, Britain, France, and others, who were often blinded by preconceptions and biases, in both a strategic and tactical sense. When war broke out on September 1, 1939, the Polish leadership, ignoring their own intelligence, lacked an appreciation of German mili- tary capabilities: their cavalry horses were no match From Axis Surprises to Allied for German Panzers. British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain misread Hitler’s intentions, unwilling to Victories accept the evidence at hand. This was the consequence of the low priority given to British intelligence in the The Impact of Intelligence in World War II period between wars.3 Near the end of the “Phony War” (September 3, 1939 – May 10, 1940) in the West, the Germans engi- By Peter C. Oleson neered strategic, tactical, and technological surprises. The first came in Scandinavia in early April 1940. s governments declassify old files and schol- ars examine the details of World War II, it is Norway Aapparent that intelligence had an important The April 9 German invasion of Norway (and impact on many battles and the length and cost of this Denmark) was a strategic surprise for the Norwegians catastrophic conflict. As Nigel West noted, “[c]hanges and British.
    [Show full text]
  • “A Rush and a Push and the Land Is Ours”: Explaining the August 1941 Invasion of Iran
    University of Calgary PRISM: University of Calgary's Digital Repository Graduate Studies The Vault: Electronic Theses and Dissertations 2013-01-24 “A Rush and a Push and the Land is Ours”: Explaining the August 1941 Invasion of Iran Hann, Keith Hann, K. (2013). “A Rush and a Push and the Land is Ours”: Explaining the August 1941 Invasion of Iran (Unpublished master's thesis). University of Calgary, Calgary, AB. doi:10.11575/PRISM/25000 http://hdl.handle.net/11023/458 master thesis University of Calgary graduate students retain copyright ownership and moral rights for their thesis. You may use this material in any way that is permitted by the Copyright Act or through licensing that has been assigned to the document. For uses that are not allowable under copyright legislation or licensing, you are required to seek permission. Downloaded from PRISM: https://prism.ucalgary.ca UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY “A Rush and a Push and the Land is Ours”: Explaining the August 1941 Invasion of Iran by Keith Hann A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTERS OF STRATEGIC STUDIES CENTRE FOR MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES CALGARY, ALBERTA JANUARY, 2013 © Keith Hann 2013 Abstract The origins of British participation in the August 1941 invasion of neutral Iran are poorly understood. Rarely examined on its own, the invasion is instead typically simplified in a historiography dominated by other subjects or brushed over altogether, with the most common explanation of its origins—a need to establish a supply corridor to better provide the Soviet Union with war material—being incorrect.
    [Show full text]
  • PRACTISE »DECEIVE Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners PRACTISE to DECEIVE
    PRACTISE »DECEIVE Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners PRACTISE to DECEIVE Written by the undisputed dean of U.S. denial and deception experts, Practise to Deceive is the most in-depth look at deception as a military strategy Barton Whaley knew the history of denial and deception across time, disciplines, and culture. For Whaley, deception was a mind game requiring imagination, deep critical thought, a profound understanding of one’s self as well as the enemy (a variation of Sun Tzu), and patience and fortitude. This book presents eighty-eight vividly descriptive case studies to serve as a handbook for intelligence and military professionals. In Whaley’s analysis, variations in guilefulness between opposing individuals or groups can be crucial in deciding who achieves vic­ tory in combat. BARTON WHALEY (1928-2013) received his bachelor of arts degree in Chinese studies from the University of California, Berkeley, before serving with the intelligence section of U.S. Army Psychological Warfare headquartered in Tokyo during the Korean War. Following the war he attended London University School of Oriental and African Studies before receiving his PhD at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He was affiliated with the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and worked for the director of National Security’s Foreign Denial and Deception Committee of the Director of National Intelligence. ISBN-13: ITÄ-l-biaSl-ISE-l For more information on this and other great books, visit www.nip.org. eBook edition also available. 9 781612 519821 PRACTISE TO DECEIVE: Learning Curves of Military Deception Planners BARTON WHALEY Introduction by A.
    [Show full text]
  • Operation Mincemeat
    Operation Mincemeat Meet Major William Martin of the British Royal Air Force On April 30, 1943, the body of Glyndwr Michael, disguised as Major William Martin of the Royal Marines, was dropped into the sea off Huelva on the Spanish coast. In his briefcase were letters, meticulously faked by British intelligence officers to give the impression that the Allies intended to attack Greece, and not Sicily. Within hours the body was spotted by a young fisherman and brought to shore. The briefcase was taken into Spanish custody and Michael was buried under his assumed name in Huelva cemetery. Would the Spanish pass the documents to the Germans? And if they did, would the Germans take the bait? A British submarine planted Martin's body off the coast of Spain, making it appear that he had died in a plane crash. Although the Spanish were a neutral party in the war, they were sympathetic to the Nazis and shared their discover with them. The Spanish could not simply hand over the body to the Germans, however, without fear of provoking the British. To that end, they carefully examined the body and opened the briefcase. They opened the sealed envelopes very carefully and managed to get the "top secret" documents out long enough to photograph them before replacing them. They then passed the photographs on to Berlin and the body, including the suitcase, to the British. Major Martin was buried with full military honors and the documents were carefully studied by German intelligence. The Germans realized the probability of an attempt at deception, but the British had done such a good job at creating an identity for Major Martin that they were convinced by the evidence they saw.
    [Show full text]
  • Allied Deceptions in WWII Shelby Mason Junior Division Individual
    Allied Deceptions in WWII Shelby Mason Junior Division Individual Exhibit Project: 497 Process paper: 500 My original topic was going to be about female spies and how they communicated to each other in World War II. When I was reading a book about spies, I came across information which interested me about a ghost army. I found out that the Allies were deceiving the Nazis with a fake army. I decided to change my topic to Allied Deceptions in World War II because the idea of the Allies tricking or deceiving the Axis powers attracted me. I liked the different ways that they communicated false information to make the Axis powers believe something that was not true even if it involved a dead body or fake dummies. I started my research by searching the public library catalog to find books on the ghost army and on WWII deceptions. I also searched for websites, videos, and pictures with information on military deceptions. At first, it was hard to find books at my level, but the information I found gave me the names of Allied deception campaigns. I used these names to search for more articles, documentaries, and online videos. I told my grandma about my project and she found a book she had on WWII covert operations. While getting information, I wrote down what I thought was interesting and this information led me to other areas to research. I also found a number of books and websites with interesting information on deception used by the U.S. military before and after WWII.
    [Show full text]