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Home , Aleksandr Dugin, Avigdor Eskin, Eurasianism, Ideocracy, Julius Evola, Mikhail Agursky

Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European ?

by Marlene Laruelle

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ABOUT THE CENTER The Center is the living of the United States of America to the nation’s twenty-eighth pres- ident, Woodrow Wilson. Congress established the Woodrow Wilson Center in 1968 as an international institute for advanced study, “symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relationship between the world of learning and the world of public affairs.” The Center opened in 1970 under its own board of trustees. In all its activities the Woodrow Wilson Center is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization, sup- ported financially by annual appropriations from Congress, and by the contributions of founda- tions, corporations, and individuals. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that pro- vide financial support to the Center. : A Russian Version of the European Radical Right? Marlene Laruelle

OCCASIONAL PAPER #294

Aleksadr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?

n studying contemporary Russian hour radio broadcast, Finis Mundi, which was —both as a doctrine and as a prohibited after he commented favorably on the Ipolitical movement—one constantly comes early 20th-century terrorist Boris Savinkov.2 across Aleksandr Dugin. One of the main rea- Dugin also regularly publishes articles in numer- sons that he is relevant to any such study is the ous dailies and appears on several television pro- quasi-monopoly he exercises over a certain part grams. In 1998, he took part in the creation of of the current Russian ideological spectrum. the “New University,” a small institution that This spectrum includes a plethora of right-wing provides Traditionalist and occultist teachings to groupuscules that produce an enormous number a select few, where he lectures alongside noted of books and an impressive quantity of low-cir- literary figures such as Yevgeny Golovin and culation newspapers, but are not readily distin- Iurii Mamleev. Since 2005, he has been appear- guishable from each other and display little the- ing on the new Orthodox TV channel Spas cre- oretical consistency or sophistication. Dugin is ated by Ivan Demidov, where he anchors a the only major theoretician among this Russian weekly broadcast on called radical right. He is simultaneously on the fringe Landmarks [Vekhi].3 He also regularly takes part and at the center of the Russian nationalist phe- in round table discussions on Russian television nomenon. He provides theoretical inspiration to and occupies a major place in the Russian many currents and disseminates precepts that can nationalist Web.4 be recycled at different levels. Above all he is Several intellectual tendencies manifest striving to cover every niche on the current ide- themselves in his thought: a political theory ological marketplace. He proceeds from the inspired by ,5 Orthodox religious assumption that Russian society and ’s philosophy,6 Aryanist and occultist theories,7 political establishment are in search of a new ide- and geopolitical and Eurasianist conceptions.8 ology: he therefore owes it to himself to exercise One might expect this ideological diversity to his influence over all the ideological options and reflect a lengthy evolution in Dugin’s intellec- their possible formulations. tual life. Quite to the contrary, however, all Beyond the doctrinal qualities that make him these topics did not emerge in succession but stand out among the spectrum of Russian have co-existed in Dugin’s writings since the , Dugin is noteworthy for his fren- beginning of the 1990s. While Eurasianism and zied and prolific output of publications begin- geopolitics are Dugin’s most classic and best- ning in the early 1990s. He has published over a known “business cards” for public opinion and dozen books, either original texts or thematical- the political authorities, his philosophical, reli- ly rearranged articles initially printed in various gious and political doctrines are much more journals or newspapers. He has also edited sev- complex and deserve careful consideration. The eral journals: Elementy (9 issues between 1992 diversity of his work is little known, and his and 1998), Milyi Angel (4 issues between 1991 ideas are therefore often characterized in a rash and 1999), Evraziiskoe vtorzhenie (published as an and incomplete way. therefore ought to irregular supplement to the weekly Zavtra, with look for his intellectual lineage and try to six special issues in 2000), and Evraziiskoe understand his striving to combine diverse ide- obozrenie (11 issues from 2001 to 2004).1 In ological sources. Dugin is one of the few 1997, he wrote and presented a weekly one- thinkers to consider that the doctrinal stock of

Marlene Laruelle is an Associate Scholar at the French Center for Russian, Caucasian, and East European Studies in . In 2005–2006 she was a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center.

This paper was translated by Mischa Gabowitsch.

ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 1

Russian nationalism has depreciated and must leader, . The two men shared a be revitalized with the help of Western input. desire to develop close ties with the counter-cul- Dugin is thus “anchoring” tural sphere, in particular with nationalistically- in more global theories and acting as a mediator minded rock and punk musicians, such as Yegor of Western thought. It is this aspect of Dugin Letov, Sergei Troitskii, Roman Neumoev or that will be the focus of this paper. Sergei Kurekhin.9 In 1995, Dugin even ran in the Duma elections under the banner of the NBP in DUGIN’S SOCIAL TRAJECTORY a suburban constituency near Saint-Petersburg, AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE but received less than 1 percent of the vote.10 It is particularly important to understand However, this electoral failure did not harm him, Aleksandr Dugin’s complex place within Neo- as he was simultaneously busy writing numerous Eurasianism, since, to a certain extent, his posi- philosophical and esoteric works to develop what tion is representative of certain more general he considered to be the Neo-Eurasianist “ortho- phenomena and thus helps trace the evolution of doxy.” Limonov would thereafter describe Dugin Russian nationalist ideas over the past twenty as “the ‘Cyril and Methodius’ of , since he years or so. Between 1985 and 1990, Dugin was brought Faith and knowledge about it to our clearly in favor of a “right-wing” Neo- country from the West.”11 Eurasianism, and close to conservative or even Dugin left the in monarchist circles. In 1988, he joined the ultra- 1998 following numerous disagreements with nationalist and anti-Semitic orgnization Pamiat’, Limonov, seeking instead to enter more influen- but did not feel intellectually at home there, tial structures. He hoped to become a “counsel since his ideas for a doctrinal renewal of the to the prince” and presented himself as a one- right were out of place in this fundamentally man think tank for the authorities. He succeed- conservative organization. He therefore left ed in establishing himself as an advisor to the Pamiat’ the following year, condemning its nos- Duma’s spokesman, the Communist Gennady talgic monarchism and vulgar anti-Semitism. In Seleznev, and, in 1999, he became chairman of 1990–1, he founded several institutions of his the geopolitical section of the Duma’s Advisory own: the Arctogaia Association, as well as a pub- Council on National Security, dominated by the lishing house of the same name, and the Center ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of for Meta-Strategic Studies. During this period, Russia, led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii. At the Dugin drew closer to Gennadii Ziuganov’s time, Dugin appeared to exert a certain influ- Communist Party, and became one of the most ence on Zhirinovskii, as well as on Aleksandr prolific contributors to the prominent patriotic Rutskoi of the Social Democratic Party and newspaper Den’ (later renamed Zavtra), which Gennady Ziuganov of the Communist Party12. was at that time at the height of its influence. His The latter, for example, borrowed from Dugin articles published in this newspaper contributed the idea that Russian nationalism does not con- to the dissemination of Eurasianist theories in flict with the expression of minority national Russian nationalist circles. At first he was sup- sentiments. Indeed, Ziuganov presented the ported by the nationalist thinker Aleksandr CPRF as the main defender of Tatar nationalism Prokhanov, who thought that only Eurasianism and Kalmyk . His book Russia after the could unify the patriots, who were still divided Year 2000: A Geopolitical Vision for a New State into “Whites” and “Reds,” but Prokhanov was directly inspired by Dugin’s ideas on the dis- quickly turned away and condemned tinctiveness of Russian geopolitical “science” Eurasianism for being too Turko-centric. and his idea that Russia’s renewal provides the From 1993–4, Dugin moved away from the only guarantee of world stability. Dugin also reg- Communist spectrum and became the ideologist ularly publishes on Russian official web sites, for the new National Bolshevik Party (NBP). such as www.strana.ru, where he expresses his Born of a convergence between the old Soviet ideas on the opposition between the re-emerg- counter-culture and patriotic groups, the NBP ing Eurasian empire and the Atlanticist model. successfully established its among the Dugin’s entry into parliamentary structures young. Dugin’s Arctogaia then served as a think was largely made possible by the publication (in tank for the political activities of the NBP’s 1997) of the first version of his most influential

2 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 work, The Foundations of Geopolitics: Russia’s pated in the Rossiia movement led by the Geopolitical Future.13 It is considered to be a Communist Gennady Seleznev and wrote its major study of geopolitics, and is often present- manifesto, before leaving due to disagreements ed as the founding work of the contemporary with its leadership. Putin’s election as president Russian school of geopolitics. By 2000, the in March 2000 caused an even stronger shift in work had already been re-issued four times, and Dugin’s political attitudes, as he began to move had become a major political pamphlet, enjoy- closer to country’s new strong man. ing a large readership in academic and political On 21 April 2001 he resolved to put his circles. Indeed, Dugin has always hoped to cards on the table and created a movement influence promising young intellectuals as well named Evraziia, of which he was elected presi- as important political and military circles. He dent. During its founding convention, has stated that his Center for Geopolitical Evraziia—often described as a brainchild of Expertise could quickly become an “analytical presidential counsel , who is instrument helping to develop the national close to Dugin—officially rallied to Putin and idea”14 for the executive and legislative powers. proposed to participate in the next elections as Since the beginning of the 1990s, he has part of a governmental coalition. The move- been especially keen on getting in touch with ment’s goal, according to Dugin’s declarations, acting military officers: coming from a military is to formulate the “national idea” that Russia family, he regularly asserts that only the army needs: “our goal is not to achieve power, nor to and the secret services have a real sense of patri- fight for power, but to fight for influence on it. otism. Thus, in 1992, the first issue of Elementy Those are different things.”18 On 30 May 2002, carried texts by three generals who were then Evraziia was transformed into a heads of department at the Academy of the that Dugin defines as “radically centrist,” an General Staff.15 In addition, The Foundations of ambiguous formulation that springs from his Geopolitics seems to have been written with the Traditionalist attitude. Dugin accepts the com- support of General Igor’ Rodionov, who was bination of “ and ” which minister of defense in 1996–7.16 Thanks to this he says is proposing, on the con- book, Dugin has been invited to teach at the dition that the liberal element remains sub- Academy of the General Staff as well as at the servient to state interests and to the imperatives Institute for Strategic Research in . He of national security. As he affirms, “our patriot- offered them a certain vision of international ism is not only emotional but also scientific, colored by an “isolationism that only based on geopolitics and its methods,”19 a classic serves to disguise a project of expansion and claim of Neo-Eurasianists. According to its own conquest.”17 Following this best-seller, Dugin data, the has 59 regional branches considerably expanded his presence in the main and more than 10,000 members. Its creation was Russian media; to some, he became a publicly welcomed by Aleksandr Voloshin, then respectable personality of public life. The suc- the head of the presidential administration, and cess of his geopolitics book, now used as a text- Aleksandr Kosopkin, chief of the administra- book by numerous institutions of higher educa- tion’s Internal Affairs Department. tion, as well as his lectures at the Academy of Dugin also enlisted the support of another the General Staff and at the so-called New influential figure close to the president, Mikhail University, satisfies his desire to reach the polit- Leont’ev, the presenter of Odnako (broadcast by ical and intellectual elites. Pervyi kanal, the first channel of Russian state Thus the years 1998–2000 saw the transfor- TV), who joined the party’s Central Committee. mation of Dugin’s political leanings into a spe- Strengthened by his success after these public dis- cific current that employs multiple strategies of plays of recognition, Dugin hoped to acquire entryism, targeting both youth counter-culture influence within a promising new electoral for- and parliamentary structures. Dugin moved mation, the Rodina bloc, and use it as a platform away from opposition parties such as the CPRF for a candidacy in the parliamentary elections in and the LDPR and closer to centrist groups, December 2003. This alliance, however, was tac- lending his support to the then prime minister, tically short-lived, and questionable in its ideo- Yevgeny Primakov. In 2000, he briefly partici- logical import. Thus, Dugin never concealed his

ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 3

disdain for the monarchist nostalgia and the Dugin’s own convictions: he has never hidden his politicized orthodoxy embodied by Rodina lead- disdain for the present Communist Party, does ers such as Dmitrii Rogozin and Natalia not appreciate the emotional attitude of the Narochnitskaia. Indeed, it seems that Sergei Orthodox in matters of international politics, Glaz’ev20 was the one who was responsible for the rejects all Tsarist nostalgia, has always denounced rapprochement with Dugin. Although Glaz’ev can- the racialism of Barkashov’s theories, and con- not be considered a Neo-Eurasianist, he did par- demns electoral . The second set of crit- ticipate in the founding convention of Evraziia in icisms seems more opportunistic: a close reading 2002. The two men share an interest in econom- of Dugin’s works clearly reveals his fascination ic policies leaning toward socialism, and Dugin with the National Socialist experience and his acknowledged his sympathy for Glaz’ev’s eco- ambiguous anti-Semitism. Today, Dugin is nomic ideas (which he calls “healthy”) even after attempting to play down these aspects of his the latter left Rodina in March 2004. thought in order to present himself as a “politi- Dugin and Glaz’ev met as early as February cally correct” thinker waiting to be recognized by 2003 in order to constitute a party they defined the Putin regime. as “left-patriotic.” In July, Evraziia declared itself In return, instances of Dugin borrowing ide- ready to support the creation of this electoral ologically from Rodina seem rather rare. His bloc. However, internal arguments over person- Traditionalist, National Bolshevik and esoteric alities ensued: the bloc needed to choose three ideas, which constitute an important part of his leaders who would be sure to become deputies thinking, are not appreciated by Rodina and have if it passed, and would benefit most from the not exercised any influence on the bloc’s con- campaign’s publicity. Dugin hoped to be chosen, ceptions. Indeed, Rodina is more conservative but was hampered by his political marginality than revolutionary, and cannot take up Dugin’s linked to his reputation as an extravagant theo- provocative suggestions, which often aim to retician whose ideas are too complex to inform break the social order. The strictly Neo- an electoral strategy.21 At the end of September, Eurasianist aspect of Dugin’s ideas—his best- the disappointed Dugin left the Rodina bloc, known “trademark” in Russian society today— explaining at a press-conference that Rodina’s is in tune with some of Rodina’s geopolitical nationalism was too radical for him—a statement conceptions, but this concurrence is actually that must draw a smile from those familiar with founded on the anti-Westernism that is common his work. This nationalist setting had not dis- to both, not on a shared vision of Russia as a turbed him until then. Nor did he move closer Eurasian power. For this reason, despite their to Rodina when certain overly virulent national- attempted alliance, Rodina may not be said to ists such as V. I. Davidenko, leader of the small have adopted elements of Neo-Eurasianist Spas party, were expelled from Rodina’s list of thought in the strict sense of the term. candidates under pressure from the Kremlin. Nevertheless, these difficult relations did not Dugin’s accusations against Rodina fall into stop Dugin from being delighted with the results two categories. He condemns the bloc for being of the December 2003 elections, which carried too close to the CPRF and its oligarchy, and crit- four nationalist parties (the presidential party icizes its “irresponsible populism.” He also takes , the CPRF, the LDPR, and to task those he calls “right-wing chauvinists”: Rodina) into the Duma. Dugin has connections Sergei Baburin and the Spas movement.22 By with every one of them, and some members of contrast, Dugin insists on the conciliatory and each of these parties openly acknowledge having multinational mission of his Evraziia party, which been inspired by his theories. “represents not only the interests of the , After this personal failure in Rodina, Dugin but also those of the small peoples and the tradi- reoriented his strategies away from the electoral tional confessions.”23 Dugin has also accused sphere, and toward the expert community. some Rodina members of and anti- Hence the transformation of his party into an Semitism, stressing that the party includes former “International Eurasian Movement” (IEM), for- members of Russian National Unity24 as well as malized on 20 November 2003. The new move- Andrei Savel’ev, who translated into ment includes members from some twenty Russian. The first set of criticisms is justified by countries, and its main support seems to come

4 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 from and . Whereas the orig- ation of an “anti-orange front.” Dugin is thus inal organization founded in 2001 comprised pursuing, with relative success, his objective of mainly figures from civil society,25 the Supreme building up a global cultural : he is Council of the new Eurasian Movement trying to gain a foothold in alter- includes representatives of the government and movements (which promote alternatives to parliament: Mikhail Margelov, head of the American-led globalization) and to participate in Committee for of the international ideological regroupings. This right, Federation Council (the Parliament’s Upper which Dugin modernizes and profoundly House), Albert Chernyshev, Russia’s ambassador renews in his theories, seems therefore to suc- to India, Viktor Kalyuzhny, vice-minister of for- ceed in its strategy of entering into left-wing eign affairs, Aleksey Zhafyarov, chief of the structures that are badly informed and looking Department of Political Parties and Social for any and all allies in their struggle against Organizations in the justice ministry, etc. The American domination. IEM even officially asked Vladimir Putin and Thus Dugin’s regular but always temporary Nursultan Nazarbaev to head the movement’s presence in the political field cannot, it seems, Supreme Council. Dugin congratulates himself be considered a new phase of his life that would on having moved beyond a mere political party build on an already completed body of doctrine. to an international organization. He now culti- Although Dugin currently seems to be concen- vates his image in neighboring countries, heavi- trating on his involvement in the Eurasianist ly publicizing his trips to Turkey, but also to movement and publications on the topic of Kazakhstan and . Dugin has become a Eurasianism, one should not forget that a similar zealous supporter of the Eurasian Economic combination had been in place from 1994 to Union and is pleased to think that he has influ- 1998, when his membership in the National- enced Aleksandr Lukashenko’s and Nursultan Bolshevik Party went hand in hand with publi- Nazarbaev’s decisions in favor of a tighter inte- cations on the concept of National . gration of their countries with Russia. His web Dugin thus seems to adjust his strategy in accor- site also presents the different Eurasianist groups dance with the available opportunities to influ- in Western countries. is particularly well ence public opinion. Moreover, he continues represented, with numerous translations of even today to disseminate the Traditionalist ideas Dugin’s texts, several Eurasianist-inspired web that have been his mainstay since the beginning, sites, and a journal, . Rivista di studi displaying a high degree of doctrinal consisten- geopolitici. France is represented by the “Paris- cy. What has evolved is his public status, marked Berlin-Moscow” association, while Britain has by his desire no longer to be considered an orig- long had a Eurasianist movement of its own. inal and marginal intellectual, but rather to be Austrian, Finnish, Serbian, and Bulgarian asso- recognized as a respectable political personality ciations, and of course organizations in other close to the ruling circles. post-Soviet republics, especially in and Kazakhstan, are presented as “fraternal parties”. A RUSSIAN VERSION OF ANTI-GLOBALISM: Having enthusiastically welcomed Vladimir DUGIN’S GEOPOLITICAL THEORIES Putin as a “Eurasian man,”26 Dugin now, since All the Neo-Eurasianist currents that emerged in early 2005, appears to be deeply disappointed by the 1990s share an imperial conception of the president. According to him, Putin hesitates Russia, but they are all based on different pre- to adopt a definitively Eurasianist stance, and his suppositions. Aleksandr Dugin occupies a partic- entourage is dominated by Atlanticist and over- ular position inside this group, and is sometimes ly liberal figures. In current affairs, Dugin is try- criticized virulently by the other Neo- ing to play on the wave of anti-Westernism that Eurasianists. Indeed, Dugin “distorts” the idea of swept part of the Russian political scene after the Eurasia by combining it with elements borrowed revolutions in in 2003, in Ukraine in from other intellectual traditions, such as theories 2004, and in in 2005. He thus set up of , the German geopoli- a Eurasianist Youth Union, led by Pavel tics of the 1920s and 1930s, René Guénon’s Zarifullin, which became highly visible in Traditionalism and the Western New Right. September 2005 with the heavily publicized cre- Nevertheless, Dugin has enjoyed the greatest

ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 5

public success of all Neo-Eurasianists, and most porary definition of Neo-Eurasianism. He does directly influences certain political circles looking not, however, appropriate the highly elaborate for a new geopolitics for post-Soviet Russia. theories of the founding fathers concerning the Dugin thus largely outweighs small intellectu- historical, geographical or religious legitimacy al groups that pursue their own Neo-Eurasianist of the . He is content with try- reflections without having any direct access to a ing to establish a geopolitics for post-Soviet larger public. He can be considered today as the Russia, helping the country to become aware of principal theoretician of Neo-Eurasianism, even its particular eschatological sensibility: “the cur- though he shared this role with Aleksandr rent transformations in Russia’s geopolitical Panarin in the 1990s. At first, the two men had space and all of Eurasia are difficult to under- been rather opposed to each other, and Panarin stand unless interpreted as a sign of the times, had refused to be assimilated into the same ideo- announcing the proximity of the climax.”30 logical current. He described Dugin’s geopolitics Dugin even criticizes the founding fathers for as pagan for viewing man as dependent on nature having been overly philosophical and poetic: and led by a blind and determinist destiny, and according to him, Eurasianism had the right conceiving the state as an isolated and selfish intuitions (for example, the idea of a “third con- organism, not providing any guarantee of global tinent” and the importance of the Mongol peri- stability, and relying only on strength. At the od in the formation of Russian identity), but time, Panarin considered this view to be the was unsuccessful in formalizing them theoreti- strict opposite of the “civilizational” awareness cally. “In Eurasianism we are confronted with a that Neo-Eurasianism should be. The two double indeterminacy: the indeterminacy char- thinkers did, however, end up sharing some acteristic of Russian thought itself, and an points of view, as a consequence of Panarin’s attempt to systematize this indetermination into intellectual evolution rather than to Dugin’s. a new indeterminate conception.”31 His attitude Thus, Panarin gradually came to corroborate toward the other Neo-Eurasianists is even more Dugin’s public supremacy in matters Neo- negative: apart from the historian and ethnolo- Eurasian, attending the foundation of the gist Lev Gumilev (1912–1992), many of whose Evraziia movement in 2001 and becoming a ethnicist conceptions he shares, Dugin considers member of the party’s Central Council in 2002.27 his ideological competitors worthless, and According to Dugin, Panarin had even agreed, affirms that their Neo-Eurasianist conceptions before his illness, to write a foreword to one of are “hardly consistent [and] represent only an Dugin’s latest books, .28 The adaptation to a changing political reality of the ’s sudden death, however, eliminated whole complex of ideas already quoted.”32 this ally-cum-competitor from the public stage. Dugin’s Eurasianism involves a great interest in Dugin’s attraction to the early Eurasianism geopolitics, the main discipline on which he bases developed by 1920s and 1930s Russian émigrés his theories. For him, geopolitics by definition is not a belated addition to his doctrines. At the serves the state in which it is elaborated. Thus, end of the 1980s, while he was still close to cer- Russian geopolitics could only be Eurasianist, tain monarchist groups, Dugin had already since it is responsible for restoring Russia’s great become the apostle of a Eurasianist conception power status. It is also intended exclusively for the of Russia, and had contributed to its spread elites: according to Dugin, geopolitics is opposed among the patriotic circles linked to Den’. to the democratic principle because the ability to Today, he continues to be a dominant influence know the meaning of things is unavoidably among those trying to rehabilitate the founding restricted to the leaders. It is to this end that Dugin fathers of Eurasianism: he has edited compila- refers to the big names of the discipline, such as tions of the principal texts of the movement’s the Germans Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904), Karl main theoreticians—Pyotr N. Savitsky, Nikolay Haushofer (1869–1946), and Friedrich Naumann S. Trubetskoi, Nikolay N. Alekseev etc.—at (1860–1919), the Swede Rudolf Kjellen Agraf, then through Arctogaia publications.29 In (1864–1922), and the Briton Sir Halford his introductions to these compilations, he sys- Mackinder (1861–1947). Indeed, there is little that tematically tries to link the inter-war Eurasianist is Russian in Dugin’s intellectual baggage. Apart teachings as closely as possible with his contem- from Konstantin Leontyev (1831–91),33 whom

6 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 Dugin sometimes mentions, he is far more ing the Second World War. Within the Muslim inspired by Western authors than by Russians. For world, Dugin chooses Islamic , admired for example, he speaks with admiration of the its moral rigorism. He presents Iran as one of German organicists, such as Ernst Jünger the few real forces of opposition against (1895–1998), (1880–1936), American globalization, and invites it to unify Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (1876–1925), or the entire Arab world, as well as and (1889–1967) and Afghanistan, under its leadership. Dugin charac- (1888–1985). He borrows from Schmitt his con- terizes this quadruple alliance Russia-Germany- ception of the nomos, the general form of organ- Japan-Iran which would react against the thalas- ization of the objective and subjective factors of a socracies (the United States, Britain in Europe, given territory, and the theory of Großraum, in , Turkey in the Muslim world) as “large spaces.” a “confederation of large spaces,”35 since each Dugin attaches great value to this German ally is itself an empire that dominates the corre- heritage, and wishes to be viewed as a continen- sponding civilizational area. Unlike the tal geopolitician on a par with Schmitt and Eurasianists of the 1920s, Dugin does not talk of Haushofer: Russia’s centrality and continentality, an irreducible and romantic opposition between to him, are comparable to those of Germany in East and West; in Dugin’s theories, both Asia the 1920s–30s. He thus develops his own bipolar and Europe are destined to come under interpretation of the world, opposing the Russian-Eurasian domination. ‘Heartland’, which tends toward authoritarian As the maritime and democratic enemy regimes, to the ‘World Island’, the incarnation of allegedly has a “fifth column” in Russia, Dugin the democratic and commercial system. He com- calls for a restoration of the Soviet Union and a bines the classic Eurasianist theories with this reorganization of the Russian Federation. He is bipolar division of the world into sea-based and the only Neo-Eurasianist to include in his polit- land-based societies, or thallassocracies and tel- ical project not only the Baltic States, but the lurocracies, and links them to various classic cou- whole former socialist bloc.36 His Eurasia must ples of concepts from “Russian thought” even expand beyond Soviet space, as he propos- (Western Christianity/Orthodoxy, West/East, es to incorporate Manchuria, Xingjian, Tibet, democracy/ideocracy, individualism/collec- and Mongolia, as well as the Orthodox world of tivism, societies marked by change/societies the Balkans: Eurasia would only reach its limits marked by continuity). The opposition between with “geopolitical expansion to the shores of and socialism is seen as just one partic- the ,”37 an idea that was taken up ular historical clash destined to continue in other and popularized by Zhirinovskii. Dugin also forms. “The Earth and the Sea disseminate their proposes a general repartition of the Federation, original opposition to the whole planet. Human and especially of Siberia, which he considers to is nothing but the expression of this have been on the verge of implosion for quite struggle and the path of its absolutization.”34 some time. He calls for the abolition of the Dugin then divides the world into four civi- “national republics,” to be replaced by purely lizational zones: the American zone, the Afro- administrative regions subservient to Moscow. European zone, the Asian-Pacific zone, and the In The Foundations of Geopolitics, he acknowl- Eurasian zone. Russia must strive to establish edges his hopes for the breakup of Yakutia, various geopolitical alliances organized as con- Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Buryatia, con- centric circles. In Europe, Russia must of course demned for their separatism and their capacity ally itself with Germany, to which Dugin pays to form Buddhist or Pan-Turkic anti-Russian particular attention. Presented as the heart of axes with the neighboring regions. He wishes to Europe, Germany should dominate all of unify them with industrialized regions that have Central Europe as well as Italy, in accordance a Russian majority, such as the Urals or the with the theories of ‘centrality’ developed by Pacific shore [Primorskii krai].38 the Nazi geopoliticians as well as 19th century As in the Eurasianism of the 1920s–30s, the Prussian . In Asia, Russia should ally non-Russian peoples, and particularly the Turko- itself with Japan, appreciated for its Pan-Asian Muslim minorities, are treated ambiguously. ideology and the Berlin--Tokyo axis dur- They are appreciated as key elements confirming

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the distinctiveness of Russia’s Eurasian identity, However, Dugin does not limit himself to but are also presented as potential competitors or bringing Eurasianism’s geopolitical view of even enemies if they decided no longer to go Russia up to date. He seeks to anchor it in a along with a Russian-dominated multinational global vision and to present it as a relevant mode Eurasia. The international events of the past few of analysis that would help understand the entire years, especially 9/11, as well as the second war in evolution of the post-Cold War world. Once and the ensuing terrorist acts that cov- again, Dugin is playing the “guide,” using the ered Russia with blood, forced Dugin to fine- innumerable Western texts he is familiar with to tune his conception of Islam, and to be more adapt classic ideas from the history of Russian cautious in his positive appreciation of a certain thought to contemporary debates. Thus, for sev- type of Islamic radicalism. Thus, at a symposium eral years now he has centered his argument called “Islamic Threat or Threat against Islam?” about the Eurasian nature of Russia entirely on organized by Evraziia on 28 June 2001, the party the topic of globalization. According to him, officials disavowed fundamentalism, presented as a globalization presents as obvious truth what is danger to traditional Islam, and asserted a wish to actually ideology: representative democracy as create a Eurasian Committee for Russian-Muslim the end of the history of human development, Strategic Partnership. According to Evraziia, tra- the primacy of the individual over any commu- ditional Islam, Sufism, Shi’ism, and Orthodox nity, the impossibility of escaping the logic of the Christianity are spontaneously Eurasian, whereas liberal economy, etc.39 He argues that only the Catholicism and Protestantism, but also U.S.- Eurasianist solution offers a viable alternative sponsored radical Islamism, represent . with a strong theoretical potential that could face Dugin thus tries to distinguish between Shi’ite up to the current globalization processes institut- fundamentalism, which he considers positive, ed by the United States. “Russia is the incarna- from Sunni fundamentalism, which he disparages. tion of the quest for an historical alternative to Dugin’s wish to dissociate a “good”tradition- Atlanticism. Therein lies her global mission.”40 al Islam from the other branches of the religion, Like all Neo-Eurasianists, Dugin is a support- which he all equates with , is shared er of Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civiliza- by numerous contemporarz Russian nationalist tions” argument, which is fashionable in Russia. movements, which aim to woo official Russian Huntington’s warmongering allows Dugin to Islam. This kind of talk permitted Dugin to affirm the necessity of maintaining the Russian recruit the leaders of the Central Spiritual imperial structure and to reject any prospect of a Directorate of Russian Muslims into his Evraziia global equilibrium. According to him, the movement. Dugin tries to preclude any compe- Russian nation needs to be prepared for tition with Turkic Eurasianism on the question “defending its national truth, not only against its of the country’s religious and national minori- enemies, but also against its allies.”41 Indeed, ties. He has managed brilliantly to present his Dugin’s geopolitical doctrine cannot function movement not only as a tool for upholding without creating enemies. He bases his ideology Russian power, but also as a pragmatic solution on conspiracy theories, presenting the new to Russia’s internal tensions. Thus, from its cre- world order as a “spider web” in which global- ation in 2001, Evraziia includes representatives ized actors hide in order to better accomplish of sensitive regions such as Yakutia-Sakha, the their mission. Dugin even dedicated a whole North Caucasus, and Tatarstan, and was pleased book (published in 1993 and republished in a to bring together all of Russia’s confessions: revised version in 2005) to what he calls con- many muftis from the Central Spiritual spirology. The ideas expressed in it are contra- Directorate of Muslims, including their leader, dictory. He harshly criticizes the presuppositions Talgat Tadzhuddin, but also Buddhists (Dordzhi- about Jewish, freemason, Marxist etc. conspira- Lama, the co-ordinator of the Union of Kalmyk cies held by numerous left- and right-wing Buddhists) and members of the Radical Zionist political groups, but he also shares some of their Movement, adhered to the party and stated their ideas.42 For example, he recounts a secret histo- desire to fight the rise of religious extremism ry of the Soviet Union in which a Eurasianist using the integration strategy implicit in the order opposes its Atlanticist counterpart. The Eurasian idea. putsch of August 1991 is described as the culmi-

8 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 nation of the war between these two mystical bond with faith. He left France for orders. According to Dugin, however, the alter- Cairo, where he joined an Egyptian order and natives to globalization remain limited: either tried to put his Traditionalist precepts into prac- left-wing worked out in the West, or tice in Sufism. During the 1930s, his ideas were a right-wing liberalism and the stagnation typi- developed in Italy, Germany and Romania, and cal of Asian countries. Dugin also notes that Traditionalism became one of the main catch- these two alternatives are opposed to each other words for -minded spiritualist groups. The even though they share a common enemy. He work of Guénon’s main disciple, therefore proposes that Russia elaborate a fertile (1896–1974), an Italian painter close to the combination, because “all anti-globalization Dadaists, should be mentioned here. One of his tendencies are ‘Eurasianist’ by definition.”43 books, Revolt against the Modern World (1934), Dugin does not play the autarchy card at any had a deep influence on German and Italian cost: he is convinced that the Eurasian model of Neo-pagan movements. Traditionalism gained a resistance to American domination is exportable new impetus in the 1960s, in particular in the to the rest of the planet. He presents it as the Muslim world and, to a lesser extent, in Russia. most appropriate way of resisting the so-called Traditionalists believe in the Tradition, that New World Order. One of the aims of his is, in the existence of a world that was steady in thinking is therefore, as he describes it, “to its religious, philosophical, and social principles transform Russian distinctiveness into a univer- and started disappearing with the advent of sal model of culture, into a vision of the world modernity in the sixteenth century. Modernity that is alternative to Atlanticist globalization but is considered to be harmful in that it destrois the also global in its own way.”44 pre-established hierarchical order that is natural Thus Russia is called upon to participate in to the world: the hierarchization of human world affairs while constructing a certain beings is believed to be of transcendent origin Eurasian cultural autarchy. Much more than, for and to have a mystical value. The Tradition is example, Pyotr Savitsky and Count Trubetskoi, better preserved in non-Western civilizations, Dugin seems to have completely internalized but through the colonial experience, the the contradiction between, on the one hand, an reassessment of the past begun in the West dur- exaltation of national distinctiveness and a pas- ing Renaissance spread to other cultural spaces. sionate rejection of any borrowing that would Guénon gives this view—which, in its political risk “warping” Russia and, on the other hand, a aspects, is a typical example of counterrevolu- desire for geopolitical and ideological expan- tionary thought (de Maistre, Bonald)—a reli- sionism and a new messianism. Far from being gious coloring that makes Traditionalism stand just a “successor” to the first Eurasianists, he is a out among conservative currents. For him, all theoretician who has multiple or even contra- religions and esoteric traditions—regardless of dictory facets: many other doctrines have influ- their concrete practice—reveal the existence of enced his intellectual evolution at least as much a now-extinct original sacred Tradition. Dubbed as, if not more than, Eurasianism. the “primordial Tradition,”it is seen as the secret essence of all religions. Guénon then urges the TRADITIONALISM AS THE FOUNDATION modern world to regain an awareness of this OF DUGIN’S THOUGHT unity in the face of the desacralization and sec- Traditionalism is a comparatively little studied ularization of the modern world. Through this strand of thought, although many 20th century appeal, he has influenced numerous Gnostic and thinkers have been more or less discreetly Masonic currents, as well as several Sufi orders. inspired by it.45 In the 1920s, René Guénon Some Traditionalist texts seem to have been (1886–1951) formalized the main concepts of known in the USSR since the 1960s thanks to Traditionalism in five books.46 He went through the poet Yevgeny Golovin and his discovery of a Catholic phase, followed by a spiritualist stage Louis Pauwel’s The Morning of the Magicians. (first in a theosophist lodge, then in the Martinist From the end of the 1970s, Dugin participated Order), during which he discovered the oriental in Golovin’s circle of occultist intellectuals, religions and became disappointed with the which included, among others, the Muslim West, which he thought incapable of restoring a thinker Geydar Dzhemal’ and the writer Yuri

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Mamleev (who would later leave the country for Dugin also lectured on Traditionalism at the the United States). The intellectual unity of this New University in 2002, and published his lec- circle was based on a simultaneous rejection of tures in The Philosophy of Traditionalism in the the Soviet experience, the West, and same year. He believes that the contemporary Slavophilism. These clandestine activities, as well period, being profoundly eschatological, allows as the possession of forbidden books, caused him to disseminate the Traditionalist message Dugin to be expelled from the Moscow Aviation much more broadly than before, and to reveal Institute where he had been studying. Introduced the radical and revolutionary character of to Traditionalism at a very young age, Dugin Guénon by teaching what Dugin calls Guénon’s translated the 1933 version of Evola’s Pagan “eschatological humanism.”48 “Tradition, accord- into Russian in 1981 and distributed ing to Guénon’s definition, is the totality of it in . Choosing among the various cur- divinely revealed, non-human Knowledge, rents of Traditionalism, Dugin did not content which determined the makeup of all sacred civi- himself with the search for an individual inner lizations—from the paradisiacal empires of the spiritual way—such as that, for example, of A. K. , which disappeared several millennia Coomaraswamy (1877–1947), which concen- ago, to Medieval civilization which, in its various trates on the aesthetic aspect of Traditionalism. forms (Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, Confucian, Dugin is closer to Evola, who developed a politi- etc.) reproduced the fundamental parameters of cized vision of Traditionalism, and does not hes- Sacred Order.”49 itate to affirm a sacrificial conception of politics: According to Dugin, the mission of soterio- “We need a new party. A party of death. A party logical Traditionalism has three stages: the first, of the total vertical. God’s party, the Russian ana- or individual stage, is to contribute to the devel- logue to the Hezbollah, that would act according opment of the Tradition as such, i.e. of esoteri- to wholly different rules and contemplate com- cism; the second, political and exoteric stage, is pletely different pictures. For the System, death is to reaffirm the superiority of the laws of the truly the end. For a normal person, it is only a church (or, for example, of the Shari’a); the beginning.”47 third, or social stage, is to assist in the restoration The influence of Traditionalism on Dugin of a hierarchy of medieval orders. Dugin is seems to be fundamental: it constitutes his main never, however, a simple ideological “reproduc- intellectual reference point and the basis of his er.” He hopes to “Russify” the doctrines that political attitudes as well as his Eurasianism. inspire him, and to adapt them to what he calls Dugin has made considerable efforts to dissemi- the traditional concepts of the . nate Traditionalist thought in Russia. He regu- Thus, he defines himself as a “post- larly translates extracts from the works of the Guénonist,”50 seeking to deepen Guénon’s basic great Traditionalist theoreticians, René Guénon ideas, which implies acknowledging certain and Julius Evola, but also from so-called “soft” points of disagreement with the founding father. Traditionalist authors such as and His main criticism of the Western ; so-called “hard” Traditionalists like Traditionalists, and in particular of Guénon, Titus Burckhardt; converts to Sufism, such as concerns their vision of Orthodoxy. In The Frithjof Schuon; and converts to Islamism, like of the Gospel (1996), Dugin asserts Claudio Mutti. The journals Elementy, and, that Guénon, who held that Christianity especially, Milyi angel, whose full subtitle is became exoteric after the great Councils, was “Metaphysics, angelology, cosmic cycles, escha- actually targeting the two Western confessions, tology, and tradition,”are dedicated to the diffu- but not Orthodoxy, which has retained its initi- sion of Traditionalist thought. They include arti- atic character and esoteric foundations to this cles on specifically Russian apocalyptic tradi- day.51 He also affirms that metaphysics and ontol- tions, aiming to facilitate the acceptance of ogy, which Traditionalism attempts to rehabili- Traditionalism in Russia by proving that ele- tate, have been particularly well preserved in ments of it were present in old popular concep- Orthodoxy, which has never rejected an escha- tions (the mystical currents of Orthodoxy, the tological approach: “We are the church of the about the submerged city of Kitezh, hesy- final times […], the history of the terrestrial chasm, and the teachings of Gregory of Palama). church is probably nearing its end.”52

10 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 Concerning the divisions between Neo- thought, born of the rejection of the seculariza- pagans and Christians that shook the Western tion of Orthodoxy, which he dates at around the Traditionalist movement, Dugin remains in an same time as that given by Guénon for the end of ambiguous position that is revelatory of his own Tradition in the West (after the end of the Thirty hesitations on this matter. He appreciates the Years’War in 1648). So “Eurasianism will only be rehabilitation of paganism as Tradition proposed entirely logical if it is based on a return to the by Evola. Like Evola, he believes that Christianity Old Belief, the true ancient and authentic has remained the most pagan monotheism Russian faith, the true Orthodoxy.”57 According (through the figure of the Trinity), and admires to Dugin, the schismatic church is simultaneous- the importance of entropy and eschatology in the ly conservative and revolutionary, espousing a pagan religions. He remains, however, deeply cult of the earth (like paganism), free of an insti- anchored in Christianity and, like Guénon, sees tutionalized conception of faith, and driven by a it (but only in its Eastern variety) as the reposito- fundamentally apocalyptic vision of the fate of ry of Tradition. Dugin affirms that “the develop- humanity. This view is ideologically convenient mental stages of the metaphysical constructions since it permits Dugin to avoid making a choice in orthodox Guénonian (and Evolian) between a national paganism and a universal Traditionalism [lead] to the ultimate affirmation faith. Thus, Orthodoxy, and in particular the Old of Orthodox Trinitarian metaphysics, in which Believers, can incorporate Neo-paganism’s all the most valuable vectors of insight found nationalist force, which anchors it in the Russian their complete and accomplished expression […] soil and separates it from the two other Christian Everyone who follows this metaphysical logic confessions. […] necessarily arrives at Orthodoxy.”53 Dugin fully agrees with the Traditionalist Dugin remains, however, attracted to Neo- criticism of spiritualism. Guénon already con- pagan conceptions, which exalt the body and sidered spiritualism to be a “counter-initiation,” harmony with nature, although he remains a reconstruction of pseudo-traditions actually embedded in Orthodoxy as the founding institu- born of modernity, which must be condemned tion of Russian distinctiveness. His position on for wanting to usurp the real Tradition. For this question is therefore revolutionary in its Dugin too, theosophism, cosmism and the break with Christianity, and fundamentally con- religions are a spiritualist version of servative in its respect for the religious institution post-industrial modernity and a veiled cult of and its hierarchy. Dugin links an esoteric account technology.58 He condemns their populism and of the world to Orthodoxy, which he sees as lack of coherent spiritual conceptions, whereas having preserved an initiatic character, a ritual- he sees Traditionalism as intended for a restrict- ism where each gesture has a symbolic meaning. ed elite, which is alone able to understand its He thus calls for the restoration of an Orthodox requirements.59 vision of the world, for a “clericalization Dugin views religion as being at the founda- [otserkovlenie] of everything.”54 This opposition, tion of societies as well as modes of analyzing however, which had divided the German societies. This implies a reinterpretation of mod- National Socialists and later the New Right, ern Western intellectual life, and especially of its may seem less relevant for Russia: Orthodoxy, scientific attitudes. Following the Traditionalist unlike Catholicism or Protestantism, is more precept that rationality is a mental construct, and easily instrumentalized as a specifically national progress a notion that bears no relation to reali- rather than universal faith. This is indeed how ty, Dugin argues that the positivist foundation of Dugin interprets it: he regularly participates in contemporary science must be questioned in its the various nationalist movements launched by very principle.60 Since the Renaissance, the sep- official Russian Orthodoxy.55 His adherence, aration between sacred and profane, like that since 1999, to the allows him to between art and science, has opened the way to uphold a strictly national faith without having to a distorted vision of the human ability to under- make the difficult choice of converting to stand the universe. Dugin therefore calls for a paganism and reject official Orthodoxy.56 rehabilitation of esoteric knowledge as part of Dugin tries to present the Russian schism of scientific research, and appreciates Romantic the 17th century as the archetype of Traditionalist Naturphilosophie because of its intention to recre-

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ate a holistic knowledge of the world. Likewise, West.64 Dugin thus formalizes two “rights,”a rev- he believes in the imminent end of positivist sci- olutionary and a conservative one (the third ide- ence, and in the rebirth of synthetic sciences that ology represents the “left”), and displays a dis- would be full of meaning and reveal man’s place tinct preference for the former of the visions of in the world. the world. Dugin formulates this idea by trying to theo- Dugin also proposes another Traditionalist rize so-called “sacred sciences.” According to terminology with which to define the political him, their sacredness expresses itself not in a spe- spectrum, which he sees as always being divided cific methodology, but rather in the functions into three groups. The right is “History as and goals attributed to the discipline. Like the Decadence, the necessity of instantaneous modern sciences, thus, these “sacred sciences” Restoration, the primacy of eschatology.” The have a specific object of research, but they do center is “History as Constancy, the necessity to not lose their ties with ontological and gnoseo- preserve the balance between the Spiritual and logical knowledge.61 One of the fields capable of the Material.” The left is “History as Progress, fusing objective data and philosophical back- the necessity to contribute to its advancement ground is geopolitics. Dugin systematically pres- and acceleration in every possible way.”65 In this ents it not as a simple scientific discipline, but as second account, seems to be classi- a Weltanschauung, a meta-science which encom- fied as being in the center, thereby reserving the passes all the other sciences, thereby endowing right exclusively for the revolutionary move- them with meaning. According to him, ment of which Dugin considers himself a repre- “geopolitics is a vision of the world. It is there- sentative. This reveals the ambiguous political fore better to compare it not to sciences, but to place he attributes to Traditionalism: “from the systems of sciences. It is on the same level as point of view of Integral Traditionalism, the , liberalism, etc., i.e. systems of inter- only adequate position for implementing the pretation of society and history.”62 principles of the Sacred Tradition to contempo- Dugin does not limit himself to a spiritual or rary political reality is, in a normal case, that of intellectual understanding of Traditionalism. He the which is often called ‘extreme right’ […]. asserts that it is in itself an “an ideology or meta- But social history advances in a sense which is ideology that is in many ways totalitarian and strictly opposed to this ideal, from theocracy to requires that those that adopt it accept its strin- secularism, from monarchism to egalitarianism, gent requirements.”63 Among these requirements, and from spiritual and empire-building disci- political commitment seems fundamental to pline to an apology of comfort and individual Dugin. According to him, Traditionalism is the well-being. […] This is why the ‘extreme right’ metaphysical root of numerous political ideolo- on the political level often proves to be too gies, in particular those known as the theories of “left” for the authentic Traditionalist […] Some the . He thus outlines three types of Traditionalists may pass from ‘extreme right’ doctrines that are simultaneously philosophical, positions to the ‘extreme left,’ revolutionary or religious and political, and between them govern even socialist or communist wing, while the entire history of the world. The first, which remaining fully consistent and logical in their he calls the polar-paradisiacal one, expressed itself actions.”66 This idea of the interchangeability of on the religious level as esotericism or left and right is reminiscent of certain ideas of , on the historical level as the the Western New Right. medieval civilization of the Ghibellines, then German National Socialism, and on the political THE RUSSIAN EXPONENT level as eschatological . The second OF THE NEW RIGHT? ideology, called the “creation-creator” one, is Dugin has often been compared to Alain de religiously exoteric, its historical incarnation is Benoist (b. 1943), the principal theoretician of Catholicism or classical Sunnism. On the politi- the French movement called “New Right.”This cal level it blends theocracy, clericalism and con- school of thought emerged in the second half of servatism. The third ideology, defined as “mysti- the 1970s, going back to the GRECE (Groupe cal materialism,”is a form of absolutist pantheism d’Études et de Recherche sur la Civilisation embodied in the militant atheism of the liberal Européenne) and the magazine Nouvelle École.67

12 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 The two men met during Dugin’s stay in Paris at Benoist is from the classic French nationalism of the end of the 1980s, and they remained close Charles Maurras or Maurice Barrès. collaborators for a few years. In 1992, for exam- Both Dugin and de Benoist have therefore ple, the patriotic newspaper Den’ published the regularly had to explain their stance, and have transcript of a round table discussion with been considered as “traitors” by other factions of Dugin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Sergei Baburin the radical right. Dugin, for example, provided a and .68 When Dugin launched lengthy explanation of his dismissal of ethno- his own journal the same year, he called it nationalism. According to him, the Russian Elementy and presented it as the Russian version nationalist milieu is divided into two groups: on of Éléments, the magazine of the European New the one hand are the Pan-Slavists and monar- Right. This publication made the split between chists, who have an ethnocentric and politically Dugin and the more classical nationalists of Den’ outdated vision of Russia; on the other hand are (future Zavtra) official, but did not prevent dis- the Eurasianists, Communists and pro-statists, agreements with de Benoist. Thus, in 1993, de who give priority to great state power over eth- Benoist strove to clear himself of associations nic feeling, and who are above all focused on the with Dugin after a virulent French and German future.71 Indeed, like de Benoist, Dugin attempts press campaign against the “red-and-brown to “dissociate the question of identity affirmation threat” in Russia. In an interview, he acknowl- from the question of nationalism”:72 he extols edged that he had become aware of a number of non-xenophobic nationalism, criticizes Pan- ideological divergences with Dugin, concerning Slavist sentimentalism such as it manifested itself politics—e.g. on the concept of Eurasia and in Russia during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, Russian imperialistic tendencies69—but also the- and rejects the popular anti-Caucasian phobia ory. Indeed, de Benoist makes only partial use of instrumentalized by politicians such as Ziuganov, Traditionalism, whereas Dugin draws on the or, even more strongly, Zhirinovskii. whole body of that doctrine. Conversely, de Dugin thus calls for a rational, dispassionate Benoist is strongly attracted to Heidegger’s phi- nationalism, one that would acknowledge its losophy, while Dugin does not find it congenial. borrowings from alternative projects such as Nevertheless, the careers of both men have religious fundamentalism, Third Worldism or many features in common. For example, it is left-wing environmentalism. Since the 1980s, impossible to classify either using pre-defined Dugin and de Benoist have been the main pro- ideological patterns, or to pin down their polit- ponents, in their respective countries, of a doc- ical sympathies precisely in the classical right- trinal revitalization of right-wing thought. Both left spectrum. Both reject populism and, in spite also presuppose that the conquest of political a few fruitless attempts, neither of them has power requires first gaining cultural power. For been able to find a political party capable of more than a decade, de Benoist’s aim has been reflecting their complex thought. Since the to disseminate his doctrines in French intellec- early 1990s, de Benoist has never hidden his tual circles, in particular through the journal contempt for Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Krisis, which offers a space for critical discussion Front,70 while Dugin condemns the famous fig- between the foremost right-wing and left-wing ures of Russian nationalism, such as Eduard thinkers. This preference for culture also Limonov, Gennady Ziuganov, or Vladimir explains Dugin’s choice of public strategy over Zhirinovskii, despite having more or less direct- the past few years. ly inspired them. Like the French thinker, he In spite of their break, Dugin continues to subjects the entire right-wing spectrum in his make regular references to de Benoist, and country to fierce criticism, denies the relevance shares his hope for a continental destiny for of the distinction between right and left, and Europe, built along overtly anti-Atlanticist lines. cannot accept the electoral populism of those He borrows many conceptions from the Jeune groups, in particular their most xenophobic Europe movement, as well as from the Belgian statements. In the diversity of his sources of Jean Thiriart (1922–92), who had striven for a inspiration and in his striving to to find an alter- Euro-Soviet empire to be brought about by a native way of thinking, Dugin seems as alienat- movement he called “national communitarian”. ed from traditional Russian nationalism as de What is common to all these trends is a striving

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for what they call organic democracy, which he calls “civilizational” differences. For instance, would place the state at the service of the Eurasia to him is a racial synthesis between national community. This kind of democracy Whites (the Indo-European ) and Yellows would express itself in political unanimity as well (the Finno-): according to the as in a return to a “natural hierarchy” of social Evolian principle of “spiritual racism,” each of castes, and in a (professional, regional or confes- these races is endowed with innate qualities rev- sional) that would leave no room elatory of certain philosophical principles79 for the individual outside the collectivity. Thus, which Dugin, borrowing from the Slavophile Dugin distinguishes himself from other figures A.S. Khomiakov80 (1804–60), calls the Finnish in the Russian nationalist movements precisely and the Frisian principles: the former, that of through his militant Europeanism, his exaltation the “Whites,” is associated with authoritarian- of the Western Middle Ages, and his admiration ism, hierarchy, order, exotericism; to the latter, for Germany. All these ideological features con- that of the “Yellows,”correspond equality, liber- trast strongly with the ethnocentrism of his ty, and esotericism. The hybrid nature of competitors and a Soviet tradition of equating Eurasia, which is simultaneously white and yel- Germany with “fascism”. This is why Dugin has low, gives it a global role to play: Russia will start often been criticized, in particular by the its Nordic renewal, and “wherever there is a sin- Communists, for whom the Russian “anti-fas- gle drop of Aryan (Slavic, Turkic, Caucasian, cist” tradition rules out the recognition of any European) blood, there is a chance for racial German, and more generally Western, cultural awakening, for the rebirth of the primordial influence on Russian nationalism. Aryan conscience.”81 Even more than de Benoist, Dugin has an Dugin’s texts abound in references to ambiguous position on the racial question. and Neo-paganism, a classic corollary GRECE has largely abandoned the theme of of the racial ideology and of the idea of the “biological realism,” which was very present in original superiority of the Whites. Here again, and other radical nationalist fac- his inspiration comes from the New Right, tions, and has preferred to insist on a cultural which since the 1950s has tried to transcend tra- and non-racial differentialism since the 1960s. ditional nationalism by refocusing on the De Benoist was the main driving force behind European idea, and from the doctrines of this evolution, and, since the end of the 1960s, Europe-Action. These proponents of the idea of he has condemned all racial ideas, which he an ethnic and cultural unity of European peoples presents as an application of the Judeo-Christian no longer wish to express their identity in an presuppositions he criticizes. Nevertheless, racial insular or chauvinist manner, remembering the arguments remain important in other Western obstacles that divided the European nationalists radical right-wing circles. On this point, Dugin during the Second World War. Thus Dugin does not go as far as de Benoist: he remains more accepts the theory of a “defense of the West,” if influenced by racialist currents as well as by this term is understood in its ancient racial and those Traditionalists who, like Evola and unlike Aryan sense, not in terms of contemporary Guénon, were also sensitive to racial topics. . In his works, he regularly refers Thus, Dugin condemns racialism in its Nazi ver- to Guido von List (1848–1919) and Jörg Lanz sion for having led to , but also for von Liebenfels (1874–1954), the famous having crystallized around a German-centered thinkers of Germanic Aryanism, and presents vision of the world instead of a European one. himself as one of the founders of Ariosophy, or Dugin supports Evola’s criticism of the racial the science of Aryan wisdom. and anti-Semitic determinism of Third Reich There are even more frequent references to Germany, but shares his vision of race as the Hermann Wirth (1885–1981), one of Dugin’s “soul” of peoples.78 favorite authors, and to his occultist theories on He systematically constructs an opposition the Arctic homeland of the original Aryan peo- between race and geopolitics, between national- ples. “Thousands of years ago, our land wel- ism and loyalty to the state, and systematically comed the descendants of the Arctic, the takes a stand in favor of the latter. Nevertheless, founders of the Hindu and Iranian civilizations. he regularly uses the term “race” to clarify what We (especially as Orthodox Christians) are the

14 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 most direct heirs of the Arctic, of its ancient tra- lization and continents, and of the origin of races, ditions.”82 Guénon would have affirmed that the religions and old mythologies.”88 All these ele- Hyperborean civilization was not in Scandinavia ments of occultist culture are not specific to the but more to the East, a theory that Dugin has New Right, they have their roots in the esoteric discussed at length, in particular in The Mysteries ideas of the founding fathers of Traditionalism, of Eurasia (1991). In this book, he presents and have been explored by mystical currents of Siberia and its enormous Nordic continental the 1920s and 1930s close to fascism. mass as the original cradle of the Aryans, as well as the magical center of the world, following FASCISM, CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION the idea that “the continents have a symbolic AND significance.”83 In The Hyperborean Theory (1993) The connections between Dugin’s ideas and fas- and The Philosophy of Traditionalism (2002), he cism have been a subject of much debate.89 also professes his belief in a runic writing, a kind However, the terms of the debate stand in need of Aryan Grail written in a universal proto-lan- of definition. Fascism is a historically circum- guage, supposedly discovered and published by scribed phenomenon that was politically and Hermann Wirth in 1933 under the name of intellectually liquidated with the end of the Chronicle of Ura-Linda.84 Second World War, though it left some traces Dugin’s occultist leanings are also apparent in with small Neo-Fascist groups which reap- his striving to create a metaphysics of the cardi- peared, above all in Europe and in Latin nal points, which he perceives as absolutes that America, in the second half of the 20th century. are sources of identity. The North and the East Fascism can also be chronologically and ideolog- are at the heart of his esoteric concerns: the ically divided into Fascist movements and Fascist North confirms Russia’s Nordic identity, a fun- regimes (in Italy and Germany). Only the first damental element of the discourse of racial interest us here. To classify a thought as “Fascist” identity inspired by . The East is the does not, then, mean to predict that it will take expression of Russia-Eurasia’s inner Oriental power and endanger human lives, nor to catego- nature. “The Drang nach Osten und Norden of rize it in a discriminatory manner that would Russia is the natural geopolitical process of deny it the right to be analyzed. This terminol- Russian history.”85 Russia’s global role then ogy merely points to an adherence to a specific appears distinctly, since only Russia combines intellectual tradition. Intellectual fascism shares the symbolic distinctions of being racially with the other currents of the “extreme right” a Northern, Eastern by its cultural and religious Romantic heroism (a cult of the leader, the choices, and economically Southern, an ally of army, and physical effort, and the a Third World resisting Westernization. In a of the young), but distinguishes itself from them blend of the Nazi and Eurasianist traditions, by its revolutionary and pro-socialist aspects, as Dugin sees Siberia as destined to play a major well as by its attraction to and esoteri- role in the new Russian identity. He thus elab- cism. Dugin’s ideas share many features of this orates a cosmogony of the world in order to original fascism, as he is expecting a cultural rev- make Siberia, the last “empire of paradise”86 olution aiming to create a “New Man”. It can- after Thule, the instrument of his geopolitical not, however, be equated with fascism if that is desire for a domination of the world, justified understood to designate the contemporary racist by Russia’s “cosmic destiny.”87 extreme right, a designation that is moreover Dugin advances various occultist lines of rea- historically and conceptually incorrect. soning in favor of this Hyperborean theory, draw- On economics, Dugin unapologetically ing on the mystique of the alphabets, sounds, stands “on the left,”even if this Western (or even numbers, and geometric symbols, references to “all-too-French”) terminology is not necessari- the Kabbala, , , Gnosticism, ly applicable to the Russian . the law of astrological correspondences, parallels For example, Dugin repeatedly asserts that he with Iranian and Indian culture, etc. Dugin has borrowed from certain socialist theories, in defines this set of theories as sacred geography, particular on economics, since he is in favor of that is to say, “the unknown science of the secrets giving the state a crucial role in production of world history, of the enigmas of ancient civi- structures. Economics was not at all addressed in

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his first works, but it seems to have taken on an Communists, or left-wing Nazis. During his dis- increasing importance since 2001. Dugin even sident years, Dugin seems to have opposed this hopes to establish the “theoretical sources of a strand of thought, which he did not identify as new socialism,”90 based largely on a paternalistic “Traditionalist,”93 but in the 1990s, he changed version of Keynesian economics. He has also his mind and attempted a synthesis between his appropriated some Marxian ideas: for him, the Guénonian philosophical conceptions and the opposition between labor and capital, political ideas of the National . Like and Atlanticism, and East and many , Dugin only took a positive view West, are parallel.91 These left-wing conceptions of the Soviet experience after two events: a trip played a role in Dugin’s rapprochement with the to the West in 1989, and the disappearance of the socialist-leaning economist Sergei Glaz’ev and regime in 1991. their brief alliance in 2003 within the Rodina Dugin then developed the distinction pro- bloc, which presented itself as a left-wing alter- posed by Mikhail Agursky, between “National native to the Communist Party. Bolshevism,” a messianic ideology that has a Dugin never plays the communist card. He national basis but a universal vocation, and has only negative things to say about Marxism- “national ,” the Soviet newspeak Leninism such as it existed in the USSR, and term that designated the separatism of the has, for several years, been a condescending crit- Russian Empire’s ethnic margins.94 Basing himself ic of the Communist Party. He appreciates on Karl Popper,95 Dugin defines National Ziuganov’s borrowings from his geopolitical the- Bolshevism as a “meta-ideology common to all ories, but condemns his electoral exploitation of the enemies of open society.”96 Indeed, what is Soviet nostalgia, and most of all regrets his ide- most important for him is that right-wing and ological inconsistency. According to Dugin, the left-wing totalitarian ideologies are united in their CPRF no longer has a claim to the heritage of refusal to accord a central role to the individual the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and and to place it above the collectivity, be it social cannot even present itself as a left-wing party, or national. The phenomenon of National since it advances a series of arguments that Bolshevism, then, is not a specific moment of Dugin classifies as right-wing, such as social history, but a philosophical conception of the conservatism, racism and anti-Semitism, monar- world which has lost none of its relevance, brack- chism, calls for tax cuts, etc. Dugin therefore eting together all non-conformist thinkers seek- believes that the Communist Party can be ing an alternative to liberalism and communism. defined as an unacknowledged Eurasianist Dugin’s view of National Bolshevism rests movement, whose function is to express social largely on mystical foundations, which once discontent, but not to take power.92 more reminds one of the original Fascists. He This combination of economic socialism and stresses the parallels between esotericism and conservatism regarding values is typical of cur- political commitment, be it Fascist, Nazi, or rents espousing the so-called “third way”. Dugin Bolshevik: National Bolshevism is thus to him acknowledges his fundamental attraction to rev- merely a politicized version of Traditionalism, olutionary ideas: he has never been a of the modernized expression of the messianic any return to the past, which explains his gradual hopes that have existed in Russia since the fall of break with so many other nationalist figures. He Constantinople in 1453. According to Dugin, it does not play the card of czarist or Soviet nostal- heralds “the Last Revolution, worked by an gia and sees himself as resolutely turned toward acephalous, headless bearer of cross, sickle and the future. For example, he is a militant propo- hammer, crowned by the eternal of the nent of the introduction of modern technologies sun.”97 According to Dugin, the most complete in Russia, cultivating a strong presence of his incarnation of the Third Way was German own on the Internet and calling for a “modern- National-Socialism, much more so than ization without Westernization.” He is thus fully Mussolini’s Italy or the inter-war Russian exiles. in accordance with the doctrines of so-called He then points out parallels between “Third National Bolshevism, whose theoreticians he Rome, the Third Reich, the Third Inter- admires, whether they were Russian exiles, national,”98 and attempts to prove their common members of the Soviet party apparatus, German eschatological basis. For Dugin, the original triad

16 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 of Father, Son and Holy Spirit reveal to the ini- Our ideal is to make good physical and moral tiated that the Third Reich, just like Third health, strength, valor, fidelity and pride honor- Rome, will be the kingdom of the Holy Spirit. able goals.”99 The journals Elementy and Milyi Thus, examining the fear that the term “fas- Angel, as well as the Internet sites linked to cism” still causes today, even though the phe- Dugin, are therefore filled with a strong military nomenon no longer exists as such, Dugin symbolism, and sometimes exhibit muscular, explains: “By fascism we obviously do not mean weapon-laden and khaki-clad bodies. The back a concrete political phenomenon, but our deep- cover of one of his latest books, The Philosophy seated secret fear that brings the nationalist, the of War (2004), is particularly explicit: “The value liberal, the communist and the democrat closer of peoples, cultures and societies is proved in together. This fear does not have a political or war and through it. The beautiful is what has as ideological nature, it expresses a more general, its foundation the accomplishment of self-affir- more deep-seated feeling […] [the fear of] a mation. War renews Man, and the price to pay magical fascism.”94 for this gigantic personal effort confirms his Dugin therefore advances a positive reading of adherence to the community. War has always fascism, and does not denounce Nazism, even been a collective business, having as its goal the though he condemns its racism. He is content conservation of the people and the State, the with regretting that Hitler attacked the USSR increase of their power, of their space, and of and made mistakes in his application of the theo- their life regions. Herein lies the social and ries of conservative revolution, which were bet- national sense of war.”100 ter preserved by left-wing Nazis who called for an alliance between Germany and the Soviet A VEILED ANTI-SEMITISM Union. He especially appreciates the Waffen-SS95 His exaltation of this warlike spirit, combined and, even more, the cultural organization with numerous references to Fascist ideas, . In his publications of the 1990s, par- prompts questions on the place of the “Jewish ticularly in periodicals and on his web sites, question” in Dugin’s thought. As with the other Dugin’s ideological arsenal borrows from anoth- Eurasianist thinkers, this question is particularly er typical component of the original fascism: the complex because they all combine philo-Semitic ideologization of sex. According to him, men and anti-Semitic arguments. Dugin proposes his and women respond to different philosophical own version of that conjunction in the form of a principles (active and passive), and men’s superi- paradoxical Judaeophobic philo-. ority is proven etymologically since, in numerous In The Conservative Revolution (1994), Dugin languages, a single term designates both male recognizes that the state of has realized a persons and human beings in general.96 Thus, the kind of Traditionalism: “the only state that has liberalization of sex, pornography, feminism, partly succeeded in putting into practice certain , and the fashion for Freudianism aspects of the conservative revolution is the state and psychoanalysis are part of the process of of Israel.”101 This prompted him to establish close forced Westernization of the world. This “era of links with some Israeli ultra-nationalist currents. gynecocracy”97 heralds the “castration” of men Thus, since 1998, Dugin has sought to develop and, along with it, the disappearance of tradi- contacts with that part of the Israeli right which tional society. Dugin calls for a revindication of upholds the belief that all Jews must live in Israel. eroticism in a phallo-centric and patriarchal way, This militant Zionism agrees with him because it and hopes to develop a “patriotic conscience” of is in accordance with the principle of ethno-plu- the sexual act because “empire represents the cul- ralism: all peoples should live in peace, but “at minating point of eroticism.”98 home.” The Evraziia movement is linked with Like the original Fascists, Dugin admires the two radical Zionist groups, Vladimir Romantic taste for death and combat, shares a Boukharsky’s MAOF Analytical Group and Be’ad contempt for contemporary society, which he Artzeinu, controlled by Rabbi Avram believes to be bourgeois and decadent, and Shmulevich. These two groups, situated to the aspires to form young, purified generations: right of the right-wing Israeli party Likhud, are “the Eurasian is a strong, healthy, and beautiful led by two former Soviet citizens of Jewish ori- person, who has passionarity and passion […] gin who emigrated to Israel and are now com-

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mitted to politicizing the Israeli Russians. Both of expound a more sophisticated and euphemized them participated in the founding convention of version of anti-Semitism, centered on more sub- Evraziia and occupy important positions in the tle religious and philosophical arguments. For party hierarchy.102 The web site of the example, he disagrees with René Guénon, who International Eurasianist Movement also men- considered the Kabbala to be an authentic eso- tions a link with , a former Soviet tericism: for Dugin, the sense of the universal— Jew who took refuge in Israel and is now fighting an indispensable element of any real the “liberal oligarchy” which he says is running Traditionalism—is absent from the Kabbala, the country.103 Some radical currents of Judaism which, like the Talmud, is founded on the (most often Zionist, but also Hasidic and mysti- Jewish ethnic consciousness.105 He also argues cal) are also represented in Evraziia by Rabbis still that Traditionalism views history as cyclical, living in Russia, for example Adol’f Shaevich. whereas Judaism, because of its , They are all united by the idea that Jewish tradi- regards it as linear.106 For Dugin, the idea of tion, like Orthodoxy and Islam, is a target of God’s incarnation as a man fundamentally unceasing attacks by secularization, a kind of reli- changed the metaphysical cosmogony of gious globalization: only the unification of the Christianity. Thus, “from the point of view of traditionalists of all religions will allow for the Orthodox esotericism, the counter-initiation is, development of strategies of resistance.104 without doubt, Judaism.”107 Dugin then consid- Dugin’s objective of an alliance with Israel ers the term “Judeo-Christianity” to be an derives from the idea of a distinction between incorrect formula, in particular for Orthodoxy, “good” and “bad” Judaism, which had already which he argues is even more distant from been developed by the first Eurasianists, in par- Judaism than Catholicism is.108 ticular in Iakov Bromberg’s texts on the Jewish This argument illustrates Dugin’s version of question. Dugin borrows from Bromberg the anti-Semitism. He attempts to efface the com- distinction between a Eurasian and an Atlanticist mon historical roots that link Judaism to the two Jewishness. For Bromberg, the goal was to other monotheistic religions, and accuses the involve the Jews of the Russian Empire in the Jewish world of having created a biological con- construction of Eurasia, and to invite them to ception of itself. This inversion, a classical feature cultivate their specificities without trying to of anti-Semitism, is found in many of his texts, assimilate to the Russians. However, he belittled where he rejects, but also partly admires, the the West European Jews whom he saw as bear- Jews’ alleged capacity for conceiving of them- ers of political and economic modernity, of cap- selves as a race. Thus, according to Dugin, Israel italism and communism, and as being excessive- is the archetypal example of a state founded on an ly assimilated to the Romano-Germanic world. ethnic or racial principle, born of the Holocaust, In Dugin’s texts, the distinction is different: the of course, but also having contributed to the cre- “good” Jews are the citizens of Israel, as well as ation of this drama to which the Jews fell victim. those who choose to leave for Israel, because this Dugin argues that Zionism and Nazism are an act signals their awareness of their irreducible ideological couple, in which it is difficult to know Jewish specificity. The “bad” Jews are those who which caused the other: their polarity is a sign of continue to live in the diaspora and try to be their intimate correlation.109 assimilated by the surrounding cultures, be it in Dugin also repeatedly asserts that the Jews the Atlanticist or the post-Soviet world. Thus, consider themselves to be a chosen people, unlike the original Eurasianists, Dugin does not which squarely opposes them to Russian attempt to attract the East European Jews, Messianism, another ideology of national excep- whom he presents as historical enemies of tionalism. Another consistent opposition Russian nationalism. between Judaism and Russianness concerns the Dugin thus demonstrates a complex philo- relation to territory. According to Dugin, life in Zionism combined with anti-Semitic state- the diaspora has desacralized in the Jewish mind ments, another combination typical of a part of the territories on which the Jews have lived for the Western New Right. While he regularly two millenia, and only the long inaccessible land criticizes the vulgar anti-Semitism espoused by of Israel has kept its sacred character. Their lack most currents of Russian nationalism, he does of emotion toward nature and their theological

18 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 rejection of redemption by the earth—embod- from the “left” to the “right” in the 1980s, ied by Jesus in Christianity—reveals their catches on particularly well in Russia, where it incompatibility with the Eurasian idea, for fits into a conception of national distinctiveness which territory is laden with meaning, as well as that was already highly ethnicized. This differ- with Russian identity, marked by the cult of the entialist neo-racism (in Taguieff’s formula) and nurturing soil. The famous Jewish nomadism the exaltation of the “right to be different” are found its most sophisticated expression in the neither a new idea nor a mere import from the maritime character of the thallassocracies.110 This West. Throughout the 19th century, the princi- is why only the traditionalist Jews returning to pal thinkers of “Russian national distinctive- live in Israel can be in agreement with the ness” had upheld a culturalist approach, and, Eurasianist idea, all others being (possibly unlike their Western colleagues, accorded only unconscious) bearers of an Atlanticist identity very little importance to racial determinism.113 marked by affective indifference toward soil. Slavophile and Pan-Slavist thought remained In his interpretation of Jewishness, Dugin under the influence of Hegel and Herder, and also employs the esoteric elements that he devel- perceived the factual dimension of reality as a ops in his theory of peoples. According to him, hidden fight between ideas. Thus, for over a the world is divided into two types of cultures: century, it has been “normal” for Russian intel- Finnish (Judaism and Sunnism) and Aryan lectuals sensitive to the national question to (Christianity, Aryan paganism, Shiism). The par- affirm, in Dugin’s phrase, that “every people allel is also sexual: Dugin argues that masochism advances in History according to its own trajec- is Jewish, while sadism is Aryan.111 The funda- tory, upholding its own understanding of the mental difference between them resides in their world. That is why what is good for some peo- vision of the universe: for the Jews, the cosmos ples cannot be applied to others.”114 is God’s place of exile, whereas in Christianity, it Dugin, however, deploys an ambiguous cul- is the place willed by God. Dugin’s anti- turalist and biological terminology with regard Semitism appears in full here: the identity of the to this question: he uses the term ethnos with a Jews, the ‘Finnish’ culture par excellence, is not positive meaning, seeing it as the primary point just different from that of the Aryans, it is unas- of collective reference (“the whole, the ethnos, similable to it. This irreducibility foreshadows, according to the Eurasianists, is higher than the according to him, the coming metaphysical war part, the individual”115), but at the same time between the Aryan and Semitic worlds: “The remains critical of ethno-nationalism. According world of ‘Judaica’ is a world hostile to us. But the to Dugin, the superiority of the collectivity over sense of Aryan justice and the gravity of our the individual must be expressed in the political geopolitical situation require us to comprehend field as a “political ethnism.” This differential its laws, its rules, its interests. The Indo- pluralism would be based on a corporatist system European elite is facing a titanic mission today: that would institutionalize intermediate echelons to understand those who are different from us, between the individual and the state. It would not only culturally, nationally, and politically, but reveal Russia’s true imperial nature. Unlike the also metaphysically. And in this case, to under- Russians, who are “the empire’s constitutive stand does not mean to forgive, but to van- nation” [imperoobrazuiushchaia natsiia], the non- quish.”112 This paradoxical combination of a clas- Russian peoples may benefit from cultural sic anti-Semitism and a politically committed autonomy, but not from sovereignty, contrary to philo-Zionism can partly be explained by what was proclaimed during perestroika.116 No Dugin’s differentialist theories. nationality should be recognized territorially, because “Russians exist as the only national ETHNO-DIFFERENTIALISM AND community within a supranational imperial THE IDEA OF RUSSIAN DISTINCTIVENESS complex.”117 Dugin argues that the negotiations As we have already noted, Dugin followed the between the federal center and the subjects of theoretical turn of the New Right, which the federation started by fostered moved from a biological view of the differences separatism in the Caucasus and in the Volga-Ural between peoples to a primarily cultural one. region. This ethno-centrism should, on the con- This fashion for ethno-pluralism, transferred trary, be condemned, since stands in the way of

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a national supra-unification of the Eurasian eth- as the main subject of international and civil nos. Dugin’s strength is in his capacity for playing law.”121 Individuals will be legally identified by with concepts: for example, he proposes to their ethnic, religious or cultural affiliation. A “meet these identification tendencies of the peo- similar theory had already been proposed a long ples and regions of the Federation half-way,” but time ago by Panarin, who put forward a “civi- in a controlled way that would subject them to lizational” rather than political pluralism which the center.118 he saw as typical of Eurasia. Whether he bases himself on Eurasianist or Dugin’s absolutization of the ethnic collectiv- New Right arguments, Dugin condemns ity implies a difficult attitude toward the idea of nationalism in its ethnic and “chauvinist” variety, cultural transfer. As Pierre-André Taguieff has which he considers dangerous and obsolete. The justly and repeatedly noted, the cult of difference idea of an ethnic of peoples cele- implies a phobia of intermingling: it celebrates brated by Western newspeak appears to him as heterogeneity, but fears the mixing of peoples disastrous as was the theory of racial purity, and traditions. Dugin considers the possibility of because both lead to ethnocide. On the contrary, miscegenation between populations, or the “the Eurasianist attitude toward the ethnos transfer of cultural or political elements from one remains conservative, based on the principle of “civilization” to another, as dangerous. Indeed, the absolute necessity of protecting each ethnic he claims he has a “tolerant attitude toward eth- group from the prospect of historical disappear- nic miscegenation on the level of the elites, but ance.”119 This terminology remains paradoxical: a cautious attitude on level of the masses.”122 Here not only does Dugin refrain from rejecting the he is once more in tune with the tradition of idea of race, he also seems confused in his Soviet ethnology, which, following the theories understanding of ethnicity, as he gives it an emi- of Yulian Bromlei and Lev Gumilev, had regular- nently culturalist and civilizationist meaning, ly called for the development of endogamous tra- while at the same time using the terminology of ditions in order to preserve the “genetic fund” the ethnos, which, following the Soviet tradition, [genofond] of each ethnic entity. Once again, remains very much tied to nature and even biol- Dugin succeeds with aplomb in fitting old con- ogy. This contradiction can be explained by ceptions based on Russian or Soviet stereotypes Dugin’s “post-modern” approach: he says he into global intellectual debates. He adapts the wishes to restore all the ideas, both religious and Russian case to a more global theory on the cur- ethnic, that have been thrown out by moderni- rent recomposition of collective identities under ty, which is why he addresses the ethnic question conditions of globalization, anchoring his ideas in both a positive and a negative way: positive in alter-globalization movements, many of when he uses it against the globalized liberalism which have turned differentialism into one of which he views as destructive of the differences their main dogmas. between peoples, and negative when he sees as preventing the affirmation CONTEXTUALIZING DUGIN’S PLACE of Eurasian unity. IN RUSSIAN PUBLIC LIFE Thus Dugin’s main activity, for several years, A survey of Dugin’s ideas naturally prompts has been to speak out for a new interpretation of questions about the extent to which he is repre- the idea of human rights. He is convinced that sentative, about his strategies, and about the net- they constitute, through their claim to universal- works through which his ideas are spread. In ity, a “new kind of totalitarianism”. He propos- many senses, especially regarding his career, he es to develop a theory of the “rights of peo- can be considered to represent the general evo- ples,”120 appropriating Third Worldist discourse lution of the Russian nationalist milieux over the as the right has been doing for some time. past two decades. In the first half of the 1990s, According to Dugin, this theory will first be put these currents, then presented as “red-and- into practice in Russia, because, due to its natu- brown,” were united in their opposition to the ral federalism, that country advocates ethno-cul- liberal reforms of the Yeltsin era. A change in tural autonomy in exchange for unitarianism in their attitude toward the establishment set in state affairs. “The concept of people [narod] must during the prime ministership of Primakov, and be recognized as the fundamental legal category, gained momentum when Putin came to power,

20 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 an event which recomposed and narrowed eration, revealing post-Soviet Russia’s lack of down the political spectrum. Numerous nation- foundations of identity. His occultist leanings, alist figures came to support the authorities his exacerbated religious sensibility, his rejection while preserving their political structures, of communist ideology but not of the Soviet resulting in a kind of vociferous but fictitious experience, as well as his ahistorical discourse opposition. This was the case with Ziuganov’s about Russian grandeur, are his attractive Communist Party, as well as with Zhirinovskii’s points. Not only do his geopolitical theories LDPR and the Rodina bloc. Dugin also followed restore to Russia the role of a global superpow- this path from radical opposition to public pro- er, he also modernizes a certain variety of polit- fessions of loyalty. This is why he likes to classi- ical fundamentalism, exalts a sense of hierarchy fy himself as being in the “radical center” of the and war, resurrects the mythical triangle public spectrum:123 radical in his political and between Germany, Russia and Japan, and argues philosophical doctrines, but centrist by virtue of that cultures are incommensurable and will his support for the current president. He thus unavoidably come into conflict with one anoth- embodies one of the main tendencies of the er. His anti-Western feelings are reinforced by European radical right, which virulently the revival of Pan-Asianism in South-East Asia: attempts to differentiate itself from the centrist all Neo-Eurasianists admire these countries for discourse of the powers-that-be on an ideolog- having successfully allied economic dynamism ical level, while developing a public strategy for to political , as well as for their gaining respectability. general rejection of Western domination and Paradoxically, Dugin is isolated within the the “return” to Islamic values in the Muslim nationalist currents. He is their only substantial states of Indonesia and Malaysia. thinker, and his theories inspire numerous pub- Attempts to classify such a doctrine and per- lic figures and movements. At the same time, sonality inevitably remain guesswork: Dugin is his theoretical position is too complex for any above all in search of himself, and his inner party to follow him entirely and turn him into quest, particular the religious one, probably its official thinker. He is also disturbing for the constitutes one of the matrixes of his political entire camp of Russian nationalism on several doctrines. Dugin’s strategies are therefore tai- points: he condemns populism, which is central lored to fit his personal evolution and the insti- to the strategies of of the main figures: tutional position he hopes to reach. These Ziuganov, Zhirinovskii, and Eduard Limonov. strategies are organized along several lines: The various nationalist currents do not recog- Dugin understands that the Eurasianist and nize him as their ideologist; thus, while he geopolitical part of his theories is best suited to makes numerous Aryanist statements and adopts be widely spread in contemporary Russian soci- an ambiguous anti-Semitism, he is seldom ety. In the same way, the idea of a unification of quoted by Aryanist leaders, as he does not refer the patriotic scene and the creation of a kind of to the main neo-pagan reference book, the “union of nationalists without borders,” which Book of Vles. He is also strongly criticized by the International Eurasianist Movement hopes anti-Semitic circles for condemning theories of to become, strike a chord with numerous a Jewish plot, rejecting , and appar- Russian political circles. Traditionalism, escha- ently denying the authenticity of the Protocols of tologism and esotericism are relegated to the the Elders of Zion. This elitist position, which he background of his public activities, and are refuses to compromise in exchange for electoral reserved for a more restricted circle of initiated success, is reminiscent of Alain de Benoist. followers, for example in the framework of the However, Dugin cannot be entirely equated New University. Dugin’s Eurasianism is proba- with the New Right: his stance is also informed bly more promising than his National by Traditionalism and fascism (in the sense out- Bolshevism or Traditionalism: the term lined above). Thus he does not go as far as de “Eurasia” is being adopted very extensively in Benoist on Third Worldism, and uses racist Russia among very varied social and political arguments in a more pronounced way. milieux, though in a way that strips it of its orig- Dugin’s intellectual eclecticism assures him a inal theoretical implications. Dugin thus seems certain degree of success among the young gen- to have succeeded, at least regarding this aspect

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of his thought, in his entryism into official NOTES structures. Indeed, as was observed very justly by 1. For further details on the distribution of his the weekly Obshchaia gazeta, “Dugin is no publications (print runs, re-editions), see: longer considered to be the preacher of an ide- , “Kulturhegemoniale ological sect, but rather as an officially recog- Strategien der russischen extremen Rechten: nized specialist on geopolitical questions.”124 Die Verbindung von faschistischer ideologie Dugin thus attempts to pursue a multiform und metapolitischer Taktik im strategy on the fringe of the classical electoral Neoeurasismus des Aleksandr Dugin,” Öster- political spectrum. He develops a geopolitical reichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, vol. discourse aimed at a large public, a concept of 33, no. 2/2004, pp. 437–454. Eurasia as the basis for a new ideology of 2. Viacheslav Likhachev, Natsizm v Rossii, Russian great power for the Putin establishment, Moscow: Panorama, 2002, p. 103. and Traditionalism and other philosophical and 3. The title of this show is not neutral. It refers religious doctrines restricted to small but influ- to a famous collection of articles from 1909 ential and consciously elitist intellectual circles. called Vekhi, considered a manifesto against Even if Dugin’s institutional presence, in Russia the ideology of the radical intelligentsia. The and abroad, is based on groupuscules, the influ- authors of Vekhi argued for the primacy of ence of his personality and his works must not the spiritual and appealed to the revolution- be underestimated. In spite of his rhetorical rad- ary intelligentsia to recognize the spiritual icalism, which few people are prepared to follow source of human life: to them, only concrete in all its philosophical and political conse- idealism, manifested in Russian in the form quences, Dugin has become one of the most of religious philosophy, allows to objectivate fashionable thinkers of the day. Using networks traditional and to fuse knowledge that are difficult to trace, he is disseminating the and faith. myth of Russian great power, accompanied by 4. All his publications are available on the web. imperialist, racialist, Aryanist and occultist His two web sites, Arctogaia (www.arcto.ru) beliefs that are expressed in a euphemistic way and Evraziia (www.evrazia.org) also include and whose scope remains unclear, but that can- links to a nationalist network that includes not remain without consequences. web sites such as Novoe soprotivlenie (New Dugin’s role as an ideological mediator will Resistance), as well as to web-based maga- probably be an important point to consider in zines such as Lenin. any long-term historical assessment: he is one of 5. The Ways of the Absolute (Puti absoliuta), writ- the few thinkers to engage in a profound renew- ten in 1989 and published in 1991, The al of Russian nationalist doctrines, which had Conservative Revolution (Konservativnaia revoli- been repetitive in their Slavophilism and their utsiia, 1994), Goals and Tasks of our Revolution czarist and/or Soviet nostalgia. His originality (Tseli i zadachi nashei revoliutsii, 1995), lies precisely in his attempt to create a revolu- Templars of the Proletariat (Tampliery proletaria- tionary nationalism refreshed by the achieve- ta, 1997), The Philosophy of Traditionalism ments of 20th century Western thought, fully (Filosofiia traditsionalizma) and The Evolution of accepting the political role these ideas played the Paradigmatic Foundations of Science between the two world wars. Therefore, in his (Evoliuciia paradigmal’nykh osnovanii nauki, opposition to American globalization, Dugin 2002), The Philosophy of Politics (Filosofiia poli- unintentionally contributes to the international- tiki) and The Philosophy of War (Filosofiia voiny, ization of identity discourse and to the uni- 2004). formization of those theories that attempt to 6. The Metaphysics of the Gospel: Orthodox resist globalization. He illustrates that, although Esotericism (Metafizika Blagoi Vesti (Pravoslavnyi aiming for universality, these doctrines are still ezoterizm), 1996) and The End of the World. largely elaborated in the West.This is a paradox- Eschatology and Tradition (Konets sveta: ical destiny for a Russian nationalist, whose self- Eskhatologiia i tradiciia, 1997). defined and conscious “mission” is to anchor a 7. The Mysteries of Eurasia (Misterii Evrazii) and profoundly Western intellectual heritage in The Hyperborean (Giperboreec, 1991), The Russia, and to use it to enrich his fellow citizens. Hyperborean Theory (1993).

22 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 8. Conspirology (Konspirologiia, 1992, republished 18. “Evraziistvo: ot filosofii k politike,” Dugin’s in 2005), The Foundations of Geopolitics (Osnovy paper at the founding congress of the geopolitiki, 1996, four re-editions), Our Way. Evraziia movement, 21 April 2001. Strategic Prospects for the Development of Russia 19. “My—partiia natsional’noi idei,” Dugin’s in the 21st Century (Nash put’. Strategicheskie paper at the conference preparing the perspektivy razvitiia Rossii v XXI veke, 1998), transformation of Evraziia from a move- The Russian Thing. Essays in National ment into a political party, 1 March 2002. Philosophy (Russkaia veshch’. Ocherki natsion- 20. An economist by training, Glaz’ev was al’noi filosofii, 2001), The Foundations of known since the collapse of the Soviet Eurasianism (Osnovy evraziistva), The Union as a partisan of economic reforms. Eurasianist Path (Evraziiskii put’) and The In 1991, he was named vice-minister (and, Eurasian Path as National Idea (Evraziiskii put’ in December 1992, minister) of foreign kak natsional’naia ideia, 2002). economic relations in Egor Gaidar’s gov- 9. Markus Mathyl, “The National-Bolshevik ernment. He resigned after the October Party and Arctogaia: Two Neo-fascist 1993 events, when he refused to support Groupuscules in the Post-Soviet Political Boris Yeltsin in his struggle against the Space,” Patterns of Prejudice, vol. 36, no. White House. Between 1993 and 1995, he 3/2003, pp. 62–76. was a Duma deputy, chairing the parlia- 10. Stephen Shenfield, Russian Fascism. ment’s committee on economic policies. Traditions, tendencies, movements, London: M. Between 1995 and 1999, he worked at the E. Sharpe, 2001, p. 194. Federation Council and moved closer to 11. Eduard Limonov, Moya politicheskaia Aleksandr Lebed’. During these years, biografiia, St. Petersburg: Amfora, 2002, Glaz’ev changed his mind on his liberal p. 64. economic principles and moved closer to 12. Andrei Tsygankov, “Hard-Line Eurasianism the Communists. Today he is an interven- and Russia’s contending geopolitical per- tionist and statist in economic matters, spectives,” East European Quaterly, no. 3, although he doesn’t advocate a return to 1998, pp. 315–334. the Soviet model. In 1999, he was elected 13. Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee deputy on the CPRF list. Within Rodina, Rossii, Moscow: Arktogeya, 1997. On this Glaz’ev embodied the left wing. In spite of book, see J.B. Dunlop, “Aleksandr Dugin’s his hasty departure from the electoral ‘Neo-Eurasian’ Textbook and Dmitrii block, he succeeded in standing as candi- Trenin’s Ambivalent Response,” Harvard date in the presidential elections of March Ukrainian Studies, vol. xxv, no. 1-2/2001, 2004 and garnered 4.1% of the votes. pp. 91–127. 21. Dunlop, op. cit., p. 104. 14. Aleksandr Dugin, “Evraziiskaia platforma,” 22. “Partiia Evraziia vykhodit iz bloka Zavtra, 21 January 2000. Glaz’eva,” Km.Ru, 19 September 2003, 15. Wayne Allensworth, The Russia Question: http://www.km.ru/news/view.asp?id=7D Nationalism, Modernization, and Post- D7770F40434412B24FDB116 DB19000. Communist Russia, Lanham, Md.: Rowman 23. http://glazev.evrazia.org/news/190903- & Littlefield, 1998, and “The Eurasian 1.html. Project: Russia-3, Dugin and Putin’s 24. Aleksandr Barkashov’s Russian National Kremlin,” paper presented at the National Unity (RNU) was one of the first groups Convention of the American Association to emerge after Pamiat’ split up. Barkashov, for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Salt who rejects the Orthodox and czarist nos- Lake City, 4-6 November 2005. talgia of Pamiat’ leaders, founded his own 16. For further details on Dugin’s connections movement as well as the party newspaper with military circles, see: Dunlop, op. cit., Russkii poriadok. The RNU borrowed a pp. 94, 102. significant part of its symbols from Nazism: 17. Françoise Thom, “Eurasisme et néo- the swastika, the , paramili- eurasisme,“ Commentaires, no. 66/1994, tary clothes, and parts of the NSDAP’s p. 304. program, including a mixed economy and

ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 23

eugenic theories. The RNU contends that 34. Misterii Evrazii, p. 19. the USSR implemented a program of racial 35. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 247. miscegenation between Slavs and non- 36. However, Dugin accepts the separatism of Aryan peoples in order to make the Slavs those areas that he considers non-Russian disappear. The RNU differed from numer- (he proposes to return the Kuril Islands to ous others post-Soviet nationalist groups in Japan and Kaliningrad to Germany) provid- its racialist definition of the Russian nation. ed they remain under the control of allies The movement imploded in 2000 and is of Eurasia and Continentalism. now split into numerous small groups. 37. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 341. 25. The main exception was Dmitrii Riurikov, 38. He also wishes to return Ukraine into the one of Boris Yeltsin’s counselors on inter- Russian sphere of influence and to divide it national politics. In 2001, he became a in accordance with what he calls the ethno- member of the central board of Evraziia cultural realities of the country. For further while he was Russia’s ambassador to details, see: Dunlop, op. cit., pp. 109–112. (he was later transferred to 39. “Evraziiskii otvet na vyzovy globalizacii,” Denmark). Osnovy evraziistva, p. 541–563. 26. In Russian it is impossible to distinguish 40. Nash put’, p. 47. between ‘Eurasian’ and ‘Eurasianist’ (evrazi- 41. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 261. iskii chelovek). 42. Konspirologiia, also online at www.arctoga- 27. Andreas Umland, “Toward an Uncivil ia.com/public/consp. Society? Contextualizing the Recent 43. Evraziia prevyshe vsego,p.4. Decline of Extremely Right-Wing Parties 44. Osnovy evraziistva, p. 762. in Russia,”Weatherhead Center for 45. The reference book on Traditionalism is: International Affairs Working Paper No. , Against the Modern World. 02-03, 2002. Traditionalism and the Secret Intellectual History 28. http://evrazia.org/modules.php?name of the Twentieth Century, Oxford/New York: =News&file=article&sid=1508. , 2004. 29. He also republished Iakov Bromberg’s Evrei i 46. Introduction générale à l’étude des doctrines hin- Evraziia and E. Khara-Davan’s Rus’ mon- doues in 1921, Le théosophisme, histoire d’une gol’skaia in 2002. pseudo-religion in 1921, L’erreur spirite in 30. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 97. 1923, Orient et Occident in 1924, La crise du 31. “Evraziisky triumf,” in: P. Savitsky, monde moderne in 1927. Kontinent Evraziia, Moscow: Agraf, 1997, 47. Tampliery proletariata, p. 128. p. 434. 48. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 11. 32. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 159. 49. Milyi Angel, no. 1/1991, online at 33. Leontyev stood for a far-reaching turn in www.angel.com.ru. Russian thought. He argued that Russians are 50. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 11. not really Slavs but above all a people mixed 51. Puti absoliuta, republished in Absoliutnaia with Turkic groups. In an ambiguous man- rodina (Moscow, 1999), p. 174. ner, he anticipated the “turn to the East” of 52. Metafizika blagoi vesti, republished in the later Eurasianists: he abandoned the lin- Absoliutnaia rodina, p. 510. guistic argument about Slavic identity and, 53. Puti absoliuta, p. 152–153. for example, acknowledged that he preferred 54. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 255. the Greeks to the other Slavs in the religious 55. See for example his papers given at the 6th realm. Leontyev was the first to understand World Russian People’s Council in Osnovy the potential of the “Turanian argument” to evraziistva, p. 704–715. help Russia assert her identity against Europe. 56. The Old Believers are a current of See: M. Laruelle, “Existe-t-il des précurseurs Orthodoxy born after the Schism [Raskol], au mouvement eurasiste? L’obsession russe that is the separation, in the 17th century, pour l’Asie à la fin du xixe siècle,” Revue des of a significant portion of the Orthodox études slaves, Paris: Institut d’études slaves, vol. population from the official Russian LXXV, no 3-4/2004, pp. 437–454. church. They refused Patriarch Nikon’s

24 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 reforms of the Orthodox ritual and liturgy. 78. Misterii Evrazii, republished in Absoliutnaia They were repeatedly persecuted in czarist rodina, p. 575. times and were at the origin of numerous 79. Metafizika blagoi vesti, p. 482. religious and social revolts against the cen- 80. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 190. tral authorities. Dugin sees himself as one 81. Misterii Evrazii, p. 78. of the so-called “united believers” who fol- 82. Misterii Evrazii, p. 26. low the Old Believers’ rituals while recog- 83. Misterii Evrazii,p.2. nizing the authority of the Patriarch. Other 84. For example in Erwägen Wissen Ethik, vol. 15, Old Believers, who have refused to no. 3/2004 between Roger Griffin, Andreas acknowledge the Patriarchate in exchange Umland, and A. James Gregor. for tolerance of their specific practice of 85. Osnovy evraziistva, p. 638–656. worship, are in a minority today. 86. Russkaia veshch, vol. 1, ch. 2: “The social 57. Russkaia veshch, vol .1, p. 569. idea,” pp. 251–500. 58. Milyi Angel, no. 3/1996. 87. Programma politicheskoi partii “Evraziia”. 59. Milyi Angel, no. 2/1996. Materialy uchreditel’nogo s”ezda. Moscow: 60. see his Evoliuciia paradigmal’nykh osnovanii Arktogeya, 2002, p. 112, and Osnovy evrazi- nauki, his candidate of sciences thesis istva, p. 579–588. defended in 2000 at Rostov-on-Don 88. Osnovy evraziistva, p. 585. University. 89. Mikhail Agursky, Ideologiia natsional-bol’sheviz- 61. Evoliuciia..., p. 66. ma, Paris: YMCA-Press, 1980. See also: 62. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 12. Erik van Ree, “The Concept of National 63. Puti absoliuta,p.5. Bolshevism: An Interpretative Essay,” Journal 64. Konservativnaia revoliutsiia, p. 85–97. of Political Ideologies, no. 3/2001, pp. 65. Konservativnaia revoliutsiia, p. 99. 289–307, and D. Shlapentokh, “Bolshevism, 66. Konservativnaia revoliutsiia, p. 4–5. Nationalism and : Soviet Ideology in 67. See Pierre-André Taguieff, Sur la Nouvelle Formation,” Cahiers du monde russe,no. droite. Jalons d’une analyse critique,p. 4/1996, pp. 429–466. 148–296. 90. Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, 68. In Den’ nos. 2, 22, 34 and 37/1992 and London, 1945. 3/1993. 91. Tampliery proletariata,p.8. 69. “I have a lot of reservations about a 92. Tampliery proletariata, p. 26. ‘Eurasian’ construction, which seems to me 93. Tampliery proletariata, p. 25. to be mainly phantasmagorical” (Taguieff, 94. Tampliery proletariata, p. 188. p. 311). 95. Konservativnaia revoliutsiia, p. 54. 70. Taguieff, p. 254–265. 96. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 353. 71. Konservativnaja revoliutsiia, p. 131–136. 97. Elementy no. 6/1995, p. 18. 72. Taguieff, p. 259. 98. Russkaia veshch, vol. 1, p. 217. 73. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 135–191. 99. Evraziia prevyshe vsego,p.5. 74. See for example the chapter “Races, 100. Filosofiia voyny, back cover. Runes, and Worships” in Misterii Evrazii, 101. Konservativnaia revoliutsiia, p. 27. p. 673–736 or Nash put’, p. 21. 102. Sedgwick, p. 237–240. 75. The Slavophile philosopher A. Khomyakov 103. http://avigdor-eskin.com/index.shtml. (1804–1860) divided the world into two 104. Osnovy evraziistva, p. 600. philosophical principles: Iranian and 105. Puti absoliuta, p. 175. Cushite. He borrowed this idea from 106. Milyi angel, no. 3/1996, www.angel.com.ru. Friedrich Schlegel’s philosophy of history. 107. Konets sveta, p. 348. For more information, see Laruelle M., 108. Metafizika blagoy vesti, p. 248. Mythe aryen et rêve impérial dans la Russie du 109. See the chapter “Vojna narodov” in XIXe siècle, Paris: CNRS-Éditions, 2005. Russkaia veshch. 76. Giperboreiskaia teoriia, p. 5. 110. “Apokalipsis stikhii,” Elementy, no. 8/1997, 77. Filosofiia traditsionalizma, p. 176. p. 56.

ALEKSANDR DUGIN: A RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE EUROPEAN RADICAL RIGHT? 25

111. “Ad-Marginem. Sacher-Masoch,” 116. Evraziiskii vzglyad, p. 62. Elementy, no. 6/1995, p. 64. 117. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 251. 112. Konservativnaia revoliutsiia, p. 248. 118. Osnovy geopolitiki, p. 593. 113. See, for example, M. Laruelle, “Regards 119. Nash put’, p.135. sur la réception du racialisme allemand 120. Evraziia prevyshe vsego, p. 22. chez les panslavistes et les eurasistes 121. Nash put’, p. 124. russes,” in: C. Trautmann-Waller (ed.), 122. Evraziia prevyshe vsego, p. 19. L’Allemagne des linguistes russes. Revue 123. Evraziia prevyshe vsego, p. 4. germanique internationale, Paris, CNRS- 124. A. Maksimov., O. Karabaagi, “Oni v Editions, no. 3, 2006, pp. 145–156. svoikh koridorakh,“ in: Obshchaia gazeta, 114. Nash put’, p. 3. 31 May 2001. 115. Programma politicheskoi partii “Evraziia,” p. 25.

26 KENNAN INSTITUTE OCCASIONAL PAPER #294

Aleksandr Dugin: A Russian Version of the European Radical Right?

by Marlene Laruelle

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars OCCASIONAL PAPER #294 KENNAN One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW INSTITUTE Washington, DC 20004-3027 Tel. (202) 691-4100 Fax (202) 691-4247 www.wilsoncenter.org/kennan