Proceedings of GREAT Day

Volume 2017 Article 6

2018 The urE asian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making Maria Gershuni SUNY Geneseo

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ABSTRACT e idea of the Eurasian Economic Union, or the EEU, was rst brought up by Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazerbaev in 1994. By 2015, the Russian Federation, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed the Treaty for the Establishment of the EEU, making the idea a reality. e EEU currently occupies nearly 15% of the earth’s land, and is the 12th largest economy in the world. However, very little is known about this integration project. Criticized as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s pet project, and a hollow imitator of the European Union, the EEU now faces challenges of imbalance, inequity, and further integration. However, the economic bloc is poised to expand, with talks of incorporating Iran and Turkey into the Union. With the European Union weakened by this summer’s Brexit, the question remains whether the EEU will take the opportunity to expand into new spaces or whether integration projects all around the world are stalled in the anti-integration political environment. Looking at the history, politics, and possibilities for the EEU, this analysis will exam- ine the nuances of this largely unstudied organization and predict its future.

tion project starting in the countries that previously NTRODUCTION I made up the Soviet space, he called it “a future be- Very little is known in the West about the Eurasian ing born today” (2011). Embedded into the project Economic Union (EEU or Eurasian Union), a single was the hope that the EEU would become one of the market between Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyr- poles of a multipolar world, a partner and a balancer gyzstan, and the Russian Federation. However, many to the European Union (EU) and the United States in Central Asia and Eastern Europe consider it to be (Putin, 2011). ough the EEU and the EU are nor- the next stage in Eurasian development and coopera- mative competitors, the idea behind the EEU and tion. e lack of knowledge regarding the Eurasian the inspiration for its institutions came from the EU. Economic Union by American writers and scholars Like the EU, the EEU evolved from a free trade area comes in part from the rapid and recent creation and in which duties and taris between nations within evolution of the Union, and in part from the dearth the area were eliminated. It then became a customs of American geographical understanding. One of the union, setting a common external tari on imports more concerning issues regarding this paper was the from other nations. At the moment, both the EU lack of geographic knowledge of the EEU member and EEU are working on eliminating all non-tari states. is is particularly concerning since the re- barriers between nations within the union, such as gions of Central Asia and Eastern Europe lay directly burdensome regulations and quotas. In his speech in the interests of rising powers such as China and announcing the intention to create the EEU, Putin the Russian Federation. e Eurasian Economic Un- even praised the EU for their integration model, and ion is an example of the growing importance of the specically praised the Schengen Agreement: accords Eurasian region as it tries to assert itself in the inter- that allowed citizens of EU nations free movement be- national political order. tween the borders of participant states (Putin, 2011). In 2011, when Russian President Vladimir Putin He explicitly stated the desire to recreate Schengen announced his plans to create a large scale integra- to some extent within the participating countries of is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Published by KnightScholar,Maria Gershuni .2018 1 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 73-91. 74 The Proceedings of GREAT DayProceedings 2017 of GREAT Day, Vol. 2017 [2018], Art. 6

the Eurasian Union, to allow for better movement of the Eurasian Economic Union and understand the labor and capital between the nations. changes that need to be implemented for the pro- ject to work. e unique aspects of EEU normative However, in the summer of 2016, the integration framework allow it to be an attractive option for projects seemed to face an irreparable blow when, in countries wishing to engage in regional integration. an unprecedented move, the United Kingdom voted But in order for the project to be sustainable, further to leave the EU. is led many to question the vi- deepening of integration must be paced more care- ability of long term integration projects and their fully, and the member states’ leaders must be com- attractiveness to member states. Since the Eurasian mitted in projecting a unied, functional agenda for Economic Union was explicitly based on the model the future of the Eurasian Union. of the EU and often denes itself in relation to the EU, questions about the future of the EEU rose as well. Does Brexit spell bad news for the EEU, un- EVOLUTION OF THE EEU covering aws with regional integration as a whole? e idea for a concrete Eurasian Union was born Or was Brexit benecial to the development of the even before 1994, the year when the President of EEU, exposing the aws in a competitor’s model and Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazerbayev, suggested cre- making the still unaligned nations of Eastern Europe ating a trade bloc and alliance structure he called more hesitant to pursue European Union member- “ e Eurasian Union” (Yesdauletova, & Yesdauletov, ship, as some writers claim (Walker, 2016)? Further- 2012). e historical roots for creating the union more, since much of the rhetoric of the “Brexit” vote stretch back to the Russian Empire, which existed was centered around a fear of migrants and refugees from 1721 to 1917. Currently, all members of the taking advantage of the free movement clause of the EEU were once a part of the Empire or its protec- EU, will fear of backlash also prevent better imple- torates, meaning they were economically subjected mentation of free movement in the Eurasian Union? to the rulings of the central government in Moscow and in St. Petersburg. Some of the infrastructure that e long term viability of the Eurasian Union, core EEU industries depend on was created dur- however, is unrelated to events going on in Britain. ing the days of the Russian Empire, such as the rail ough modeled on the European Union, vari- lines stretching across Central Asia (Cheng-Hin Lim, ous normative dimensions of the EEU are entirely 2017). ese rail lines provided the linkages among dierent from the EU and, occasionally, go against which the economies of the peripheral areas of the the core foundation of the EU. Not only is the idea Russian Empire were connected to the center and of a referendum on membership foreign to the cen- along which the modern freight industry is being or- tralized, authoritarian leaning leadership of most ganized (Cheng-Him Lin, 2017). e rising of the EEU member states, but technical implementation USSR, from the still-smoldering ashes of the Russian of EEU policies has not been suciently executed Empire, provided for the formation of the “Socialist enough to produce a backlash. Long term viability of Republics” within the USSR. ese states, includ- the EEU depends on the ability of its institutions to ing Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan uphold their responsibilities under EEU treaties and were also subordinate to the central government in the commitment of the leaders to pursue successful Moscow within the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic integration, not only in name, but in function. (Shkaratam, 2015). e economies of the socialist re- e Eurasian Economic Union “stands a good publics were integrated under a Communist system, chance of becoming an inalienable part of the new but the partnerships were unequal and exploitative, global architecture that is being created” (53), but and therefore, unattractive to attempt and recreate needs to overcome signicant hurdles stemming in a voluntary economic union (Shkaratam, 2015). from its rapid integration and focus on solidifying Almost immediately after the collapse of the USSR, cultural boundaries of “Eurasianism,” versus creating attempts were made to facilitate cooperation among longstanding norms and institutions (Podberezkin & the now-independent states. e Commonwealth Podberezkina, 2014). Using the lessons learned from of Independent States (CIS) was created in 1991 EU integration, we examine the challenges faced with the participation of ten Former-Soviet repub- is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2017/iss1/6Maria Gershuni . 2 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 74-91. Gershuni: The Eurasian Union e Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017 75

lics (Yesdauletova, & Yesdauletov, 2012). e focus Union encompasses 180 million people, stretches of the organization was to provide a forum to dis- over 15% of the world’s land (International Crisis cuss social issues such as human rights, and possible Group, 2016). It spans 12 dierent time zones and military cooperation (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, is looking only to grow (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). However, implementation mechanisms of 2012). ough Ukraine and Georgia withdrew from the CIS were relatively weak and some CIS countries previous Eurasian cooperative agreements, in part wanted further cooperation. In 1994, CIS countries because of obligations imposed by their EU Asso- started negotiations on a free trade area, but negotia- ciation Agreements, and in part because of conicts tions were only completed in 2011, when the CIS with the Russian Federation, the EEU is considering Free Trade Area was established by eight of the CIS countries such as Uzbekistan, Iran, and Turkey to be member states (Radzievskaya, 2014). potential collaborators in the long run (Cheng-Hin Lin, 2017). However, individual members of the CIS were frus- trated at the lack of immediate progress and began to Two vital conclusions can be drawn from examining pursue further economic integration (Radzievskaya, the historical legacy and recent evolution of the Eura- 2014). Russia and Belarus signed the Agreement on sian Union. e rst is that there is an underlying Establishing a Customs Union in 1995, which out- foundation of inequality embedded in the relation- lined their intention to work on harmonizing ex- ship between the nations of the Union. Relations be- ternal taris. In 1996, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan tween Russia and the nations in the periphery of the signed onto the Customs Union agreement, followed Russian Empire and of the USSR were exploitative by Tajikistan in 1998. e Eurasian Economic Com- and unequal. erefore, critics both inside and out- munity was formed in 2000, with all ve signatories side the union were wary of any integration projects of the Customs Agreement (Belarus, Kazakhstan, in the post-Soviet space because of the possibility of a Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan) and three observ- resurgence of such relationships. er states (Armenia, Ukraine, and Moldova) in order to functionally set up the framework for a Customs Some, like former Secretary of State Hillary Clin- Union. e Eurasian Economic Community worked ton, claimed that the Eurasian Union was simply an on creating a streamlined procedure for currency ex- attempt by Russia to recreate the USSR “under the changes, creating a common market for key indus- guise of economic integration” (Glazyev, 2015, p. tries such as energy and transport, and worked on 93). However, Russia quickly rebuked those claims. increasing cross border entrepreneurship opportuni- Membership in the economic union was purely vol- ties. In 2010, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia nally untary, and based on mutual interests. Russian Presi- created the Eurasian Customs Union. dential aide for the formation of the Customs Un- ion between Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, Sergei As soon as the Customs Union was created, work be- Glazyev said that: gan on further integration (Yesdauletova & Yesdau- letov, 2012). In 2012, a Single Economic Space was “Unlike the EU or the US empires, created between the three Customs Union member which coerce other countries by force of states which aimed to remove all physical and techni- arms and the power of their reserve cur- cal barriers to movement of labor, goods, and capital. rencies, Eurasian integration is a volun- Both the treaty establishing the Customs Union and tary association of people who have lived the Single Economic Space were terminated by the side by side for centuries.” (2015, p. 93) Treaty of the Eurasian Economic Union which was He went on to further underscore the EEU’s focus signed in 2014, and came into force on 1 January on individual sovereignty and mutual economic 2015. Armenia and Kyrgyzstan signed in January prosperity as the cornerstone of the EEU’s creation. and August respectively and negotiations for Tajik- Putin specically denied imperialistic accusations in istan’s participation are underway as of 2017. Pro- his 2011 speech, saying that the EEU is not intended ponents of the project claim that the EEU is “viable” to be “fortress Eurasia” (Kazantsev, 2015, p. 215). In- and not “declarative” like previous agreements such stead, the EEU is intended to be a link between Eu- as the CIS (Radzievskaya, 2014, p. 7). Currently, the is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Published by KnightScholar,Maria Gershuni .2018 3 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 75-91. 76 The Proceedings of GREAT DayProceedings 2017 of GREAT Day, Vol. 2017 [2018], Art. 6

rope and the Asia-Pacic, unied by common values integration was pursued. is has had a tremendous and norms, and embracing of the liberal approach to impact on the creation of institutions and on output. integration. In order to internally ameliorate fears regarding THEORETICAL BACKGROUND USSR re-creation, Belarus and Kazakhstan worked In order to understand the process behind this rapid to make “equality” one of the principles of the EEU integration of the Eurasian Economic Union, we can (Sevim, 2013, p. 53). Specically, President Nazer- look to the theoretical backgrounds of integration bayev of Kazakhstan was cautious of allowing Russia projects. eories of international relations serve to too much inuence in the Union because Kazakh- explain the impetus behind the formation of regional stan is the only EEU member to share a long border organizations. e theories of international relations with Russia, and has a sizable Russian population in that will be examined in the context of the EEU are the north (Nurgaliyeva, 2016). When signing the neo-liberal institutionalism, the functionalist theory agreement to join the EEU, Nazerbayev assured his of integration, transactional theory of integration, people that this was not a return to the Soviet era and neo-realism. by asserting that Kazakhstan will act as a balancer to Russia in the EEU and will never be submissive to Proponents of the EEU claim that neo-liberal insti- Russia (Nurgaliyeva, 2016, p. 94). At least on paper, tutionalism serves as the foundation for the integra- there seems to be a genuine attempt to represent the tion project, much like it did for the European Union Union as a partnership of equals without any hint of project. Neo-liberal institutionalists claim that states Soviet-ism. overcome the anarchy inherent in the international system by creating governing institutions and ceding e second conclusion to be drawn from examining some sovereignty to these institutions (Keohane & the evolution of the EEU is that post-Soviet integra- Nye, 2012). ese institutions, in turn, create rules tion has been extremely rapid. For a project that often and norms which states have to obey (Keohane & compares itself to the EU, the timelines of evolution Nye, 2012). is theory contends that mutual pros- couldn’t be more divergent. e European Union perity, peace, and order will result from the creation began as the European Coal and Steel Community of these governing institutions (Keohane & Nye, with the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951 (Mc- 2012, p. 163). e anarchy and instability result- Cormick & Olsen, 2011). e European Union as it ing from the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed is known today was only established in 1993 by the for some nations in the post-Soviet space to seek out Maastricht Treaty and it wasn’t until the completion order and peace through multilateral governance, of the internal market in 1994, that the EU able to and the creation of regimes and norms (“Introducing facilitate and regulate free movement of labor, goods, the Eurasian Economic Union,” 2014). Neo-liberal and services inside its borders. Furthermore, one of institutionalism is fundamental to all regional inte- the core institutions of the European Union, the Eu- gration projects because it requires some seceding of ropean Council, was only established in 2000, while sovereignty for mutual peace and prosperity. Eco- the Eurasian Union equivalent was created immedi- nomic integration through multilateral institutions ately following the formation of the Customs Union. allows for greater mutual prosperity because of the “economies of scale” argument, the principle that e Eurasian Union integration pace is generally the production costs can be saved by increasing demand result of a top-down process by governments who for a good and its production (Rosencrance, 2012, p. sought closer economic ties (Yesdaultova & Yesdaule- 356). erefore, increasing unfettered market access tov, 2012). Because industries such as natural gas and within Eurasia would be advantageous to producers transport are partially or wholly owned by the state in and consumers, who would benet from lower cost Eurasia, the interests of these industries were heavily goods. e rst few years of the project already saw considered in the decision making process to inte- an increase in prosperity, with trade within the Un- grate. Furthermore, integration occurred so rapidly ion increasing by 30% (Rosencrance, 2012, p. 356). that results from the previous stages of integration erefore, some neo-liberal institutionalists might were impossible to measure before the next stage of

is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2017/iss1/6Maria Gershuni . 4 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 76-91. Gershuni: The Eurasian Union e Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017 77

say that the rules regime created by the economic in- project. Functional integration, and its doctrinal suc- tegration of Eurasia has worked. cessor neo-functionalism, say that integration is pur- sued in sectors where it is most protable (Mitrany, Within liberalism, there are theories regarding the 2014). Integration produces needs for other sectors dierent paths that states use to integrate. In post- to begin integrating that are related to the rst sec- World War II Europe, Robert Schuman and Jean tors, or for political policy and governance to be cre- Monnet believed in sectoral integration of the econo- ated in order to better accommodate the integrated mies of France and Germany (Monnet, 2014). ey sectors. is eect is called “spill-over” and theorists believed that integrating certain sectors of the econo- like David Mitrany and Ernst B. Haas claim that my, in the European case, coal and steel, would lead spill-over was one of the driving forces behind the to peaceful relations between nations. e European further integration of the European Union (Haas, continent had just come out of two world wars, and 2014, p. 145). the plan, which became known as the “Schuman Plan” was the foundation of the European Coal and In the Eurasian Union, one might be able to see Steel Community (Monnet, 2014, p. 21). e Com- functional integration in the oil and natural gas in- munity, composed of France, Germany, Belgium, the dustry, spilling over into other industries such as Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Italy, was supposed transportation, shipping, and communications. e to ensure stability and prosperity on the European links that were formed between government ocials continent by integrating some of their most vital in- and business leaders, during pipeline negotiations dustries (Monnet, 2014, p. 21). e Schuman and made it easier for connections to be forged in other Monnet logic, though not explicit, was foundation- industries that would be beneted by closer integra- ally a part of the formation of the Eurasian Union. tion. e shipping industry is a prime example of this. Before the formation of the Eurasian Union, e sectoral drive behind the Eurasian Union, how- 98% of all trade between the Asia-Pacic and Europe ever, was not coal and steel (Niemi, 2017). Rather it went through the Suez Canal in Egypt (Lysokon, was natural gas and oil, the most important sector of 2012, p. 7). However, the EEU’s focus on increasing Russia and the Central Asian economies. “Pipeline the speed and lowering the costs of freight trac will politics,” the political negotiations behind the acqui- make shipping across land twice as fast and half as sition and transport of oil and natural gas reserves expensive (Lysokon, 2012, p. 7). erefore, freight in Eurasia, drove much of the original negotiations trac is projected to rise by 490 million tons annu- behind economic integration since it was the sector ally by 2020, four times the growth than in the years providing most of the funding to carry out further between 2000 and 2010 (Lysokon, 2012, p. 7). projects. e nationally owned natural gas and oil companies, Gazprom in Russia and KazMunayGas is looks like sectoral spillover from original nego- in Kazakhstan, required both business and govern- tiations to integrate the oil and gas industry. How- mental cooperation in order to extract natural gas ever, it is very dicult to discern whether or not the and ship it to Europe. e Belarusian government is Eurasian Union came as a result of functional inte- also a vital cooperator in pipeline politics, since pipe- gration, because the industries that were benetted lines running through Belarus allow gas companies from integration were government owned (Yesdau- to export their products to Europe. e Soviet Un- letova & Yesdauletov, 2012). While functionalism is ion meant pipelines could be built and run with the supposed to be driven by demand from the industries mandatory cooperation of all Republics involved and and the “invisible hand” of the market determining with assured stability. e break-up of the Soviet Un- which sectors are most beneted from integration, ion was an event akin to the Second World War, put- integration in the Eurasian Union has been primar- ting stability in Eurasia at risk, and therefore, Pipe- ily government driven (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, line Politics would push for stability via economic 2012). ere has been benets in industries, but cooperation. those industries, such as rail trac and natural gas, are owned by the government and therefore would Sectoral integration leads to the question of whether naturally be privileged in government orchestrated it was functional integration that drove the Eurasian integration. Furthermore, functionalist integration is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Published by KnightScholar,Maria Gershuni .2018 5 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 77-91. 78 The Proceedings of GREAT DayProceedings 2017 of GREAT Day, Vol. 2017 [2018], Art. 6

takes time to naturally progress, and, as we will see, Slavic culture that stretches across a “vast unbroken the Eurasian Union has been integrating too quickly landmass bounded on its edges by the high mountain to let functionalism run its market-driven course. It ranges of the Himalayas, Caucasus and Alps, and the is clear that functionalism is not the primary driving large bodies of water like Arctic, Pacic, and Atlantic factor behind the creation of the Eurasian Union. Oceans, and the Black, Mediterranean, and Caspian Seas” (Sevim, 2013, p. 52). e transactionalist approach to regional integration explains the formation of the Eurasian Economic Eurasianists describe Eurasian culture as distinct from Union better. Transactionalism was a theory cham- both the cultures of Western Europe and East Asia, pioned by Karl W. Deutsch in an attempt to explain as well as a mix of both (International Crisis Group, the successful integration of the European communi- 2016, p. 6). It is traditionalist and conservative, valu- ty (Deutsch, 2014, p. 125). He claimed that integra- ing hard work and the family. It does not emphasize tion was a long-term process that took place after sus- the importance of each individual, but rather stresses tained contact with people from dierent states, in the importance of society as a whole. Some theorists key areas of political involvement. His theory “con- also claim that Orthodoxy and Christianity is vital cluded that successful integration required a sense of to Eurasianism, since Eurasian expansion stems back community — a “we feeling” based on a common from the Kievan “Holy Rus,” and therefore, piety is set of values” (Deutsch, 2014, p. 125). Deutsch also considered a marker of Eurasian identity (Shkaratam, stressed the importance of transactions that political 2015, p. 29). Some Eurasianists reject Peter the Great actors have prior to the integration project’s start. Po- as a national icon, because they believe he pivoted litical and business actors in Eurasia had prolonged too far toward Europe, sacricing the Russian soul contact with each other during the Soviet period. in the process (Shkaratam, 2015, p. 30). However, When the Soviet Union fell, their interactions con- Eurasianism also stresses the importance of econom- tinued and allowed for easy lines of communication ic and geographical ties with Europe, not rejecting between political boundaries, making integration ne- the European continent completely, but acting as an gotiations easier. equal partner while keeping European inuences on culture at a distance (Shkaratam, 2015, p. 30). Deutsch’s idea of a “we feeling” as a prerequisite to successful integration has been a vital factor to the Because Eurasianism is a theory without any set drive behind Eurasian integration. e historical and boundaries however, it has been dicult to dene, cultural community stretching across Eastern Europe resulting in diverging schools of thought. Vladimir and Central Asia has inspired the doctrine known as Putin, for example, is considered by some scholars “Eurasianism” (International Crisis Group, 2016). to be a “pragmatic Eurasianist,” because he has his- Eurasianism has its roots in the Russian diaspora torically approached a balanced policy between out- that occurred after the Bolshevik Revolution (Niemi, reach to the East and the West (Sevim, 2014, p. 47). 2017). Early Eurasianists, such as Nikolai Trubetzkoy On the other hand, far right Eurasianists such as and L.M. Gumilyov, believed there was a new Or- Alexander Dugin, founder of the Eurasia Party and thodoxical, Slavic center of civilization concentrated advisor to Vladimir Putin, approaches Eurasianism around Russia (Duncan, 2015, p. 102). Eurasian- from a geo-political perspective (International Crisis ism rejects the notion of Euro-centrism, and does Group, 2016, p. 5). Dugin and his ideological breth- not regard Greco-Roman development as the start of ren, believe that the “Great Game” between major all civilization (Radzievskaya, 2014). Russia and the powers dictates Eurasia must rise to challenge the Slavic lands are not on the periphery of Europe, the United States, which far right Eurasianists consider doctrine claims, but rather are in the center of their to be Eurasia’s chief civilizational rival. Far right Eur- own “third way” of civilizational development (In- asianists further believe that the borders of Central ternational Crisis Group, 2016, p. 7). Eurasianism Asia and Eastern Europe are articially drawn and also rejects the notion that there is a “high-culture,” do not reect the unied Eurasian civilization that which a culture consumed by the elites, and “low-cul- resides in these regions, regardless of ethnic back- ture” consumed by the masses (Radzievskaya, 2014, ground (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 5). p. 80). Eurasianists believe that there is an accessible is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2017/iss1/6Maria Gershuni . 6 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 78-91. Gershuni: The Eurasian Union e Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017 79

Furthermore, there have been inconsistencies with that it is a product of geo-political, realist thinking. using Eurasianism as the transactional basis for Nicolas J. Spykman, American realist thinker and Eurasian Union integration. First, transactions be- the “godfather of containment” policy during the tween people of dierent Eurasian nations have been Cold War, once famously said, “Who rules Eurasia, limited to the upper political and economic classes controls the destinies of the world (Sevim, 2013, p. (Radzievskaya, 2014). Working class people, espe- 45).” Russia has been accused of following this logic cially those engaged in agricultural industries which through neo-imperialist methods, by using econom- continue to make up a signicant portion of the Eur- ics rather than military might to tighten connects asian economy, have had very little contact with peo- between the member states of the Eurasian Union ples from other nations, especially in vast countries (Sevim, 2013, p. 45). Some have also accused Russia such as Kazakhstan and Russia (Radzievskaya, 2014). of following a neo-revisionist doctrine by undermin- Furthermore, only 8% of Russians polled in 2013 ing the liberal economic order from within in order view all ethnic groups within Russia, including Ka- to follow a realist agenda (Sakwa, 2015b, p. 163). zakhs, Uzbeks, Armenians, and Belarussians, equally (Sakwa, 2015a, p. 21). ere was a clear preference in Neorealism acknowledges the existence of multi- the poll for European-looking Russians, which seems lateral institutions such as the Eurasian Union, but to stand in clear objection to the founding principles believes that these organizations only reect current of Eurasianism. It seems that Eurasianism is a doc- power dynamics and do not have an inuence on pol- trine most easily embraced by the upper political and icy making. Applying this theory to the evolution of economic classes, who have had substantial interac- the Eurasian Union makes several key assumptions. tion with other Eurasian nations and stand to benet First, it rejects the notion of Eurasianism as a genu- from political and economic integration. ine driving force behind the integration or claims it is being applied “defensively,” as to avoid criticism e doctrine of Eurasianism, around which the of neo-imperialism (Podberezkin & Podberezkina, “we feeling” of transactional integration is centered 2014, p. 7). In fact, some critics dismiss the notion of around has been imposed top-down on the popula- Eurasianism in general claiming there are “no unify- tions of Eurasia by being peppered into the rhetoric of ing ideas in Eurasianism, but only geographical con- speeches and policies of national leaders. Eurasianism venience with a whi of transnational imperialism” has been at the center of Nazerbayev’s “multi-vector (Podberezkin & Podberezkina, 2014, p. 7). Neo- foreign policy” for Kazakhstan since he rst became realism also assumes that Russia, as the wealthiest President in 1991 (International Crisis Group, 2016, and most militarily advanced country in the Union, p. 5). Putin believes that it is the role of the Eurasian is the center of the integration project and the rest space to be the bridge between the East and West of the members as akin to “satellite states” (Standish, (Cheng-Hin, 2017). However, this sentiment is not 2015). is approach dismisses the large inuence commonly held among the people in their nations, of Kazakhstan in the creation and evolution of the whose memory of a united Eurasia is limited to the EEU. However, examining the institutions and poli- Soviet experience, and therefore Eurasianist has had tics within the EEU will reveal the power dynamics, to be reinforced by government policy. is is not to relative benets of cooperation, and may shed light say that it is impossible for carefully crafted policy on the theories used. initiatives and cultural programs imposed top-down to stir Eurasianist sentiment among the people of the NSTITUTIONS Eurasian Economic Union. However, since govern- I ment-initiated community building projects are not e head executive and bureaucratic arm of the the natural progression for the creation of Deutsch’s Eurasian Economic Union is the Eurasian Economic “we feeling,” the Eurasian Union would have to be an Commission (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. experiment in top-down imposed identity. 9). e Eurasian Commission was modeled on the European Commission, which governs the Euro- Finally, we can look to the theory of neorealism in pean Union. e Commission was originally started order to explain the drive behind integration in Eura- to govern the Single Economic Space in 2012, and sia. Many critics of the Eurasian Union Project claim was incorporated into the governing structure of the is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Published by KnightScholar,Maria Gershuni .2018 7 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 79-91. 80 The Proceedings of GREAT DayProceedings 2017 of GREAT Day, Vol. 2017 [2018], Art. 6

EEU with the 2014 Treaty on the EEU. e Com- sidelined by political leaders who want to make deals mission currently has approximately 2,000 sta rather than follow rules (International Crisis Group, working for it and is headquartered in Moscow, al- 2016, p. 9). erefore, an excessive amount of issues though the Moscow headquarters are not meant to get bumped up to the level of the Supreme Council be permanent. Currently, the Commission is tasked of the Eurasian Union because political leaders pri- with running the day to day operations with the Un- marily use that as a forum for negotiating acquisi- ion, allocating budgets, solving sectoral issues, and tions and concessions. upholding EEU treaties. e Supreme Eurasian Economic Council is the At the moment, there are approximately 2,000 sta- highest level organ of the Eurasian Union. It is based ers at the EEU headquarters, and it has two main o of the European Council, where European heads organs: the Council of the Eurasian Economic of government meet to discuss the direction and stra- Commission and the Board of the Eurasian Eco- tegic planning of the Union. e Supreme Eurasian nomic Commission (“Struktura,” 2017). e rst Economic Council also facilitates meetings between is the Council of the Eurasian Commission, which the heads of government of Armenia, Belarus, Ka- is composed of the Deputy-Prime Ministers from zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian Federation each members state, who share a rotating president (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015). e Su- between them. e Council has the primary func- preme Council is tasked with determining the fu- tion of approving decisions made by the Board, and ture prospects of the EEU, including further areas has the power to veto decisions made by the Board. of integration, possible new members, and current However, this rarely happens because decisions on projects (International Crisis Group, 2016). e the Council are reached by consensus. e Board of Council is also responsible for approving the budget the Eurasian Economic Commission is made up of and determining the contribution of member states 14 Ministers of the Board, three from each member (Eurasian Economic Commission, 2015). However, state and two from Kyrgyzstan. Working under the while in the EU, the European Council is one of the Board of Ministers are bureaucrats from 23 func- many important organs of the EU, and the Supreme tional departments, such as the Department of En- Eurasian Economic Council is considered the “main ergy and the Department Antimonopoly Regulation, body” of the EEU (Eurasian Economic Commission, which each Minister heads. Decisions within the 2015). As previously stated, the Supreme Eurasian Board of the Eurasian Commission are made based Economic Council is delegated tasks from the Com- on Qualied Majority Voting, where each minister mission and makes most of the key decisions inside has one vote. Decisions the board makes are binding the Eurasian Union (International Crisis Group, if they are agreed to by two-thirds of the Ministers. 2016, p. 9). Because the Supreme Council gets heavy While these two bodies make decisions regarding use inside the EEU, the decisions within the EEU are day-to-day operative policies of the EEU, anything made by compromises between the heads of states. big or controversial gets sent up to the Council of the is robs the EEU bureaucracy of the same agency Eurasian Union. and inuence their EU counterparts have. e Commission of the Eurasian Economic Union e EEU also has a court modeled on the Europe- has the power to truly be a supranational institution an Court of Justice (ECJ) (Eurasian Economic Un- (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). With its deci- ion, 2015). e Court of the Eurasian Union was sion making, it can move power away from federal originally founded in 2010 as part of the Eurasian governments and into the multilateral institutions. Economic Community, and like the Commission, However, it faces some challenges. First, the Com- was incorporated into the Eurasian Union in 2015. mission does not have any real sanction power (In- e Court is composed of two judges appointed by ternational Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10). It mostly en- the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council from each forces its decisions though peer pressure and political member state, who then serve nine-year terms on the leverage (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10). court. e Court has a similar mandate to the ECJ; Furthermore, it is dicult for the Commission to it’s charged with ensuring the uniform application of operate as a rules based organization because it often is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2017/iss1/6Maria Gershuni . 8 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 80-91. Gershuni: The Eurasian Union e Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017 81

EEU treaties among member states. All the court’s ere are proposals for the currency to be called the rulings are, in theory, supposed to be public. “altyn” after the currency that was used at the time Golden Horde, the Mongol Empire that controlled However, the Court has gotten no use since its foun- vast swaths of Eurasia (Sudakov, 2014). e imagery dation. As of 2016, the court has not been used once evoked on currency is symbolic of the culture that (International Crisis Group, 2016, p. 10). Consider- uses the currency. e European Union, for exam- ing the lack of news regarding court rulings, and the ple, has banknotes highlighting European architec- empty “summary” and “acts of the court” pages on ture from throughout the continent. e fact that the website of the Court of the Eurasian Union, it the proposed currency is named after the Mongol seems that the court has not been active in 2017 ei- Empire, as opposed to something reminiscent of the ther (Eurasian Economic Union, 2015). Private par- Kievan Rus for example, can be indicative of the de- ties are hesitant to use the Court of the Eurasian Un- nition of Eurasia lying closer to the heart of nomadic ion because they prefer to settle out of court and out culture, as opposed to a more Western orientation. of the public eye (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). e However, the name of the currency has not been set member states of the EEU have not used the court in stone. Some proposals had the currency called the to settle disputes among each other, preferring other “Yevraz,” after the Slavic pronunciation of “Eurasia” means to dispute settlements such as going through as “Yevrazia” ( e Moscow Times, 2015). Whatever the head of state meetings in the Supreme Economic name the Eurasian Union chooses will not only re- Council. ect economic unity, but will also further reect on It is also telling to see which EU institutions have the denition of Eurasianism. President Nazarbayev not been adopted into the framework of the EEU. believes that one day, the currency, regardless of what e EEU has no parliament, meaning it has no di- it’s called, will one day enter into the world as a re- rectly elected body. Russia has been at the forefront serve currency, further bolstering the power of the of calling for the creation of a EEU parliament as one Eurasian region (Sudakov, 2014). of the legislative institutions of the EEU (Maloof, By examining the institutions created, and not cre- 2012). Putin is reportedly pushing “full speed ahead” ated, by the Eurasian Union, one sees both neoliberal in preliminary negotiations for the creation of such and realist inuence. Missing, so far, is the transac- a body (Maloof, 2012). However, Russia is receiving tional inuence that would have united the region pushback from Kazakhstan and Belarus who believe under Eurasianism. Depending on how the mon- that the creation of a parliament is “premature” and etary union project progresses, Eurasianism could do not foresee the creation of a directly elected body manifest itself in both the use and the design of the in the foreseeable future. It should be noted that if common currency. ere have been some neoliberal the EEU parliament adopted the EU Parliament’s institutionalist progressions made in the formation proportional representation model, the Russian Fed- of the Eurasian Economic Commission, which seems eration would retain the most seats out of all EEU to have an infrastructure that is capable of dealing member states. It should further be noted, however, with sectoral issues. However, the accusations of real- that the EU Parliament is considered to be the most ist power politics manifest themselves in the activity supranational body of the EU, bypassing the federal of the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, which governments of the EU member states entirely with bypasses the Commission’s bureaucratic structures direct elections (McCormick & Olsen, 2011, p. 29). and allow for federal politics to manifest themselves ough Russia might be hoping to capitalize on their in the multilateral organization. However, the real- large population in order to control an EEU institu- ist assumption that the Eurasian Economic Union is tion, their push for supranational is noteworthy. simply run by the Russian Federation is undercut by e EEU also does not have a common currency, the failure of the Russian Federation to push through unlike the Eurozone within the EU which does. De- their agenda to create a Parliament. erefore, with spite the fallout from the Eurozone crisis, plans for signicant reform to overcome obvious shortcom- creating a new Eurasian common currency are pro- ings, the Eurasian European Union has the institu- jected to be completed by 2025 (Sudakov, 2014). tional capacity to be an eective organization. is,

is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Published by KnightScholar,Maria Gershuni .2018 9 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 81-91. 82 The Proceedings of GREAT DayProceedings 2017 of GREAT Day, Vol. 2017 [2018], Art. 6

however, would require deep commitment from its that could potentially receive Chinese investment leaders to further increase the EEU’s viability. funds, the partnership between the EEU and China has been amicable. However, as both entities seek to OREIGN ARTNERSHIPS expand their inuence, the positive relationship may F P not last. At the moment, the Eurasian Union is surrounded on both sides by global powers. On the west, the Eu- e relationship between the EU and the EEU has ropean Union and the Eurasian Union are engaged been far more tense. In Putin’s speech announcing in a “normative rivalry,” in which they compete for the intention to create the EEU, he claimed it would inuence in a rules based regime (Dragneva & Wolc- be a partner to the EU (Putin, 2011). Proponents zuk, 2015). On the east is the rising power of China, of the project claim that the EEU is complemen- which also has initiatives and ambitions in Eurasia tary, not rival to the EU (Dzarasov, 2015, p. 125). (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). Ideally, the Eur- However, in practice the EU and the EEU have been asian Union is looking to keep a balance of power clashing in the shared neighborhood of Eastern Eu- among the three, remaining within the cooperative rope (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 6). e Euro- nature of multilateral institutions. However, because pean Union is facing its own crisis with a ood of both the European Union, the Eurasian Union, and migrants, uneven economic development, and the China hope to expand their inuence, they often rise of far right parties (Dragneva-Lewers & Wol- nd themselves in competition with each other. czuk, 2015). However, Europe still is more attrac- tive with potential candidate countries than Russia China is a rising power that is starting to look to the (Seten, 2015). To combat this, the EEU has created a Eurasian region as a partner, and sometimes, rival for normative framework that is more appealing to East- expansionist inuence (Cheng-Hin, 2016). Today, ern Europeans than the EU’s framework in order to China is the EEU’s largest trading partner and has gain further partners and candidates (Seten, 2015). strong bilateral relations with individual members of the Union. Kazakhstan and China have just suc- One of the sources of tension between the EU and cessfully completed a massive rail project that now the EEU is the proliferation of EU Association connects the two countries. China has also given Be- Agreements (Sala, 2015, p. 165). Inside the EU these larus 5.5 billion USD in loans and conducts approxi- agreements are viewed as declarations of friendship, mately 4 billion USD in trade with Belarus annu- as well as armations that a state might eventually ally. Russia and China have collaborated on the New join the EU (Sala, 2015, p. 167). However, there Development Bank made up of the BRICS countries have been some states who have signed the Associa- of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. tion Agreements that have been consistently rejected Cooperation has been so strong that China and the in their applications for membership. Turkey has had EEU are now in talks to create a free trade zone in an Association Agreement with the EU since 1963 the near future. and is currently in its fth decade of waiting for EU membership approval (Onis, 2004). Dutch voters re- However, it is unlikely that China would ever be- cently held a non-binding referendum, rejecting the come incorporated into the EEU (Glazyev & Tka- opening of any negotiation chapters that would al- chuk, 2015, p. 81). Fundamentally, China is a com- low for the eventual membership of Ukraine, which petitor in the Central Asian space for inuence. signed the Association Agreement in 2014 (Drag- China is planning on creating the “Silk Road Eco- neva & Wolczuk, 2015). e EU requires countries nomic Belt,” a trade and cultural exchange initiative wishing to sign an Association Agreement to reform that is meant to develop infrastructure and bi-lateral their government and economic systems, engaging relations between nations along the path of the Silk in democratization and aligning itself closer with the Road and China. China has planned investment into rules of the EU, without allowing the associate mem- cities along Mongolia, Kazakhstan, and along the bers much say in the process (Dragneva & Wolczuk, Middle East, to the Caspian Sea. Because the initia- 2015). Furthermore, the EU requires that Associate tive is still new, and the EEU has not entered into any Members do not participate in any other regional formal talks of association with candidate countries trading blocs, preventing Eastern European countries is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2017/iss1/6Maria Gershuni . 10 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 82-91. Gershuni: The Eurasian Union e Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017 83

from becoming observer states in the EEU while also eective governance. First, it prevented policymakers seeing associate EU membership (Dragneva & Wol- from examining the benets and drawbacks of the czuk, 2015). previous form of integration before moving onto the next one (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012, p. 8). To combat this, the EEU has created a framework Second, it rushed the creation and evolution of the that would make it easier to states to join without Eurasian Commission, preventing the formation of a conducting much internal reform. e EEU does robust and egalitarian bureaucracy that would have not allow for Association Agreements, but does allowed for more supranational and equality among grant countries observer status in the bloc (Morgan, EEU members. 2017). It also does not explicitly prohibit its mem- bers from signing Association Agreements with the While the EU was allowed to functionally integrate EU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). In the EU, a set from the European Coal and Steel Community to of criteria labeled the “Copenhagen Criteria,” out- the European Economic Community, and eventually line democratic standards that countries have to meet to the European Union, the EEU did not have that before they can ascend to membership (McCormick benet. e transactional ties formed over natural gas & Olsen, 2011, p. 81). e Eurasian Union has no and oil partnerships could have been a solid founda- such criteria and only requires that a country be able tion for a hypothetical Eurasian Natural Gas and Oil to take on the full set of agreements that were already Community, however, it was not enough to form ties adopted by the Eurasian Union (Dragneva & Wolc- over many various industries. Within the EEU, there zuk, 2015, p. 9). Finally, the EEU is willing to oer are simply “too many economic sectors requiring too small countries a seat at the table of negotiation and many regulations” and not enough time to determine a more equal status than they would have received in the best course of regulation for them all (Yesdaule- the EU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). is ap- tova & Yesdauletov, 2012, p. 10). ere have been proach seems to have a degree of appeal. Moldova, a benets to some industries that were mostly owned country once thought to be rmly on the side of Eu- by the state, such as transport and heavy engineering rope, has now applied for and was granted observer rms, but overall growth has slowed down (Standish, state status in the EEU on April 18, 2017 (Morgan, 2015). Seeing stagnation this early in the develop- 2017). ough the country still claims that it will ment of an integration project could spell trouble for maintain the viability of their EU Association Agree- the future unless reforms are pursued. ment, it was noted that Ukraine was forced to give up observer status in the EEU in order to be granted e rapid speed of integration has also prevented the EU associate membership (Petro, 2013). It is now up creation of the robust institutions that are required the EU to decide how they will react to Moldova’s to x these problems. e Eurasian Commission has observer status. However, one fears that escalation the sta and structure capable to work on ameliorat- of this dispute to the level of the Ukrainian conict, ing issues that come with rapid integration. However, which revealed some of the weaknesses in the unity the overwhelming focus on state sovereignty within and the governing framework of the EEU. the EEU has weakened the Commission and given most of the power to the Supreme Eurasian Eco- nomic Council. ough the Commission is a rules- CRITICISMS AND CRISES based organization capable of decision making, deci- ough the EEU has made some strides toward pro- sion making is not at the core of the former Soviet gress, it is severely hampered by its lack of institu- space (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). Instead, tional capacity. is has severely weakened both the decisions are delegated to the highest level possible, ability of the EEU to implement some of its more which in this case, is to the heads of state (Dragneva ambitious policies, as well as respond to crises. As & Wolczuk, 2015, p. 9). is limits decision mak- stated before, integration was very rapid. ough ing to top-down deal making, at the highest level of this allowed for the countries within the Union so governance. solidify their denition of Eurasia, and enter into a normative rivalry with the EU, it didn’t allow for a Delegating all decisions to the highest possible au- natural evolution that would have allowed for more thority can further create mistrust and suspicion be- is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Published by KnightScholar,Maria Gershuni .2018 11 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 83-91. 84 The Proceedings of GREAT DayProceedings 2017 of GREAT Day, Vol. 2017 [2018], Art. 6

tween states (Yesbayeva, Delovarova, & Momynku- with an EU Association Agreement. e Ukrainian lov, 2013, p. 476). Some Kazakhs feel that they have shipbuilding, aircraft, and mechanical engineering lost out on key decision making processes within the industries, economists claimed, would all benet EEU and guard their sovereignty cautiously (Yes- signicantly within a decade of joining the Union bayeva, Delovarova, & Momynkulov, 2013, p. 477). (Seten, 2015). Furthermore, supporters of Ukraine’s Some argue that national interest should always take pivot to the EEU said that the EU wasn’t oering priority over integration because they fear a return Ukraine membership, and that Ukraine would have to the Soviet days (Yesbayeva, Delovarova, & Mo- signicantly more political power in the institutions mynkulov, 2013, p. 477). Worse, some fear that Rus- of the EEU (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2012, p. 13). sia will attempt to annex some of the Russian ethnic Critics of the EEU pivot claim that even under the majority areas in Northern Kazakhstan, just like Rus- pro-Russian Yanukovych, Ukraine never made clear sia annexed Crimea (“Introducing the Eurasian Eco- commitments to join the EEU and only wanted par- nomic Union,” 2014). ese fears force Kazakhstan’s tial membership at best (Dragneva-Lewers, Rilka, & leaders to stall on political integration and ensure that Wolczuk, 2015). the EEU stays purely economic, halting projects like the Eurasian Parliament (“Introducing the Eurasian However, the abrupt shift away from the European Economic Union,” 2014). Because the bureaucratic Union angered the Ukrainian population and the and institutional structure of the Eurasian Union move prompted the Euromaidan protests that oust- is weak, power politics and realist fears are allowed ed Yanukovych and caused Russia to annex Crimea to ourish. It is clear that on a Council where the (Fesenko, 2015). is resulted in Russia annexing heads of state are the only members, Putin, the most Crimea in order to protect their interests on the pen- powerful man in the world according to Forbes (“ e insula, which resulting in the EU levying heavy sanc- world’s most powerful people 2016,” 2016), would tions against Russia. Russia’s response in turn was to reign supreme. However, if the bureaucracy played create sanctions against the European Union. In the a more important role in decision making, then the fallout, “the Kremlin hasn’t streamlined its political Kazakhs (and Byelorussians and Armenians), who incentives with its economic partners,” leading to an are well-represented in the Councils and Boards of inability to coordinate successfully retaliatory sanc- the Commission, would no longer feel like they are tions (Seten, 2015). Russia had to reinstate border losing out on key decisions. and customs controls in 2014 on the Russian-Byelo- russian border because Russia was accusing Belarus ese institutional setbacks harm the way that the of allowing European goods to ow into Russia by EEU is able to respond to crises (Petro, 2013). No mislabeling them as Byelorussian (Niemi, 2016). Ka- discussion of the EEU is complete with analyzing the zakhstan has refused to end business and trade with setbacks it faced in the lead up and the aftermath of the European Union, despite Russian requests to do the Ukraine crisis. Ukraine’s ousted President Yanu- so (Furman & Libman, 2015). e EEU has been kovych was weighing the costs and benets of joining entirely unhelpful in resolving trade related disputes either the Eurasian Customs Union or signing an As- stemming from the Ukraine crisis, because it has not sociation Agreement with the European Union when had the institutional capacity to do so. Since most the crisis took place. Yanukovych abruptly pulled out of the controversial decisions were delegated to the the EU negotiations in favor of a deal closer to Russia heads of state, national interests took precedence and the Eurasian Union. over any issue, hampering any dispute settling func- tion the EEU could have had. Supporters of this plan oered similar incentives to the ones mentioned before. Ukraine, EEU propo- What is possibly more concerning is the fact that nents argued, “should be the cradle of Eastern Euro- the EEU institutions are incapable of overcoming pean civilizations, not on the outskirts of other Euro- sovereign conicts that prevent eective implemen- pean powers” (Fesenko, 2015, p. 126). Some Russian tation of existing policies. An example of institu- economists claimed that “the invisible hand of the tional decit is evidenced by the restrictions placed market” guides Ukraine toward Russia and Ukraine on the free movement objective of the EEU. Putin would be better o as a member of the EEU than openly praised the Schengen Area within the EU for is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2017/iss1/6Maria Gershuni . 12 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 84-91. Gershuni: The Eurasian Union e Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017 85

facilitating free movement of labor between coun- not having access to education, healthcare, and legal tries (Putin, 2011). He and the EEU leaders hoped employment services (“Russian ombudsman,” 2007). to create the area within the EEU. Free movement of labor within the EEU would benet Russia, since e EEU has not addressed these registration sys- it is the second largest importer of labor, after the tems in their negotiations over free movement. It is United States and has an aging population similar to within the national interests of Russia, Belarus, and that of Europe (Yesdauletova & Yesdauletov, 2012). Kyrgyzstan to keep their registry systems because it Furthermore, the labor exporting Central Asian re- collects revenue from registry permit fees and allows publics, as well as some countries in Eastern Europe, government intervention into movement within would be able to prot on remittances and ensure their own countries. Because of the focus on sover- safer, easier passage of their population to and from eignty within the EEU, national interests are allowed the Russian Federation (Yesdauletova & Yesdaule- to reign supreme over the interests of the trading tov, 2012). For these reasons, border controls were bloc. erefore, even a fundamental tenet like free eliminated in 2011 in order to facilitate better free movement of labor across borders, that might be mu- movement of labor between the countries of the Eur- tually benecial to all parties involved, is subject to asian Economic Community (Radzievskaya, 2014). restriction at the domestic level. “Free movement” became one of the core objectives of the Eurasian Economic Union, embedded into its PROSPECTS AND founding treaty (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2017). How- ever, the agreement on free movement has not been RECOMMENDATIONS applied practically, and therefore remains mostly de- At the moment the EEU has massive potential to clarative (Radzievskaya, 2014). On paper, any citizen be a successful trading bloc and integration project of any of the EEU member states can live and work (Niemi, 2016). ere are multiple positive prospects in any other EEU member state. However, those at- that currently exist within the EEU. For example, tempting to do so will be faced with domestic bu- the Eurasian Economic Commission has the sta reaucratic restrictions that make it very dicult to framework present within its numerous, specic de- move to a new county, much less a new country. partments to solve trade-related problems. e EEU treaty specically doesn’t allow for states to have res- Many of the problems regarding free movement ervations to EEU agreements, so states cannot “opt arise from strict and arcane registration systems that out” of measures that the EEU creates (Dragneva & began in the Russian Empire after the liberation of Wolczuk, 2015). is is a big step toward creating the serfs (Dragneva & Wolczuk, 2015). In order to a rules-based multilateral regime. Furthermore, the prevent mass migration of peasants to urban centers EEU is currently working with the WTO in order to and prevent the creation of slums, the Imperial Rus- remove protectionist measures and receive the same sian government created a registration system, called voting rights within the WTO as the EU has (Drag- the “propiska” system, that tied someone’s ability to neva & Wolczuk, 2012). is shows that progress is receive social services based on their permanent place possible within the framework of the EEU. of residence (Schenk, 2015). It was dicult and ex- pensive to change one’s registration, especially if one But in order for the EEU to continue move beyond wished to move from the countryside to the city. e its current stage and provide maximal prosperity for USSR kept this policy in order to control popula- all its members, it needs to move away from geopoli- tion ows and ensure the viability of collective farms tics and focus on governance (International Crisis (Schenk, 2015). After the fall of the USSR, Belarus, Group, 2016, p. 22). Geopolitics simply breeds re- Kyrgyzstan, and Russia chose to keep their registry alist fears about hostile takeovers and unequal part- systems in order to continue maintaining control nerships, which does not bode well for collabora- over population ow (Schenk, 2015). erefore, a tion. In order for the EEU to reach its potential, the Kazakh national who chooses to live and work in St. leaders of the Union must commit to neoliberalism Petersburg must go through a bureaucratically di- and strengthen the institutions in which they have cult, and expensive place of registry process, or risk invested. Of course, hints of power politics will al- ways be embedded into the project, but leaders must is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. Published by KnightScholar,Maria Gershuni .2018 13 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 85-91. 86 The Proceedings of GREAT DayProceedings 2017 of GREAT Day, Vol. 2017 [2018], Art. 6

recognize it is in everyone’s best interests if decision However, in regards to horizontal expansion, and making mechanisms were strengthened and issues of adding the new members, the EEU needs to actively inequality were resolved. continue seeking possible applicants. Because its nor- mative rivalry with the EU and the potential threat e European Economic Commission must be made of a rivalry with China, the Eurasian space must stronger and be reformed to give it the capacity and be a competitive one. In order to do this, the EEU political clout to tackle non-tari barriers and pro- must capitalize on what makes it a unique project tectionism within the Union (International Crisis and dierent from the EU and China’s potential Silk Group, 2016, p. 22). Issues should not be simply Road Initiative. e framework for the EEU already delegated up to the Supreme Council, but dealt with is in place, putting it in a normative advantage over along the channels that were created for its purpose. China’s stalled Silk Road project. Furthermore, the is will increase the eciency and prosperity of the EEU must exploit its focus on sovereignty and lack EEU because the Commission is staed with experts of democratic requirements. is can make it an at- in economics and trade specically, and would be tractive project to new or incomplete democracies able to craft eective policy. e Court of the Eura- whose leaders are not willing to commit resources sian Union must also be put to use for both private and political risk to “Europeanizing” their govern- parties and states wishing to settle disputes (Interna- ments. From a non-Western perspective, the idea of a tional Crisis Group, 2016, p. 22). Finally, the Union multilateral institutions that does not interfere with should orient itself to deal further with problems of domestic politics can be very attractive. e EEU has social welfare and standard of living across the Un- great potential with countries such as Iran, Azerbai- ion, along with xing the broken migration and free jan, and Uzbekistan. ese countries, which would movement architecture (International Crisis Group, never have even been considered as European Union 2016, p. 22). Improved social wellbeing as a result members present an opportunity for enlargement of the Union will mobilize the masses in support of and political allies in Asia. the EEU in an organic manner which the doctrine of Eurasianism has failed to do among the populace Turkey also presents a potential opportunity for (Sakwa, 2015b, p. 167). Improving migration and EEU expansion. Once thought to be rmly a can- free movement architecture and allowing it to go into didate for EU membership, Turkey has veered away practice will also benet the Union, as it will attract from the liberal democratic principles of the EU and smaller countries who wish to benet from the Rus- is charting its path closer to the partial democracies sian labor import market (Schenk, 2015). of the EEU (Kirisci, 2016). Turkey signed the As- sociation Agreement with the European Community Until structural reforms happen, it would be wise to in 1963, and has since applied for membership twice pace integration. Before the monetary union, which and been rejected (Redmond, 2007, pp. 305-317). would be in eect once a common currency is es- It seems that the Turkish public is becoming less en- tablished, is created, results from the common mar- chanted with the EU with favorability ratings of the ket should be measured. Before the results from the EU among Turks falling (Dagdeverenis, 2004). e common market could be measured, the common Turkish government is also turning away from Eu- market needs to function properly. e tenets of the rope. President Erdogan has used the summer 2016 common market should be fullled before the next coup attempt to crack down on political dissent step of deeper integration is pursued. erefore, un- and consolidate his power, despite various condem- til proper institutional reform is implemented which nations of his actions by EU governments (Kirisci, allows the original goals that drove integration to be 2016). Furthermore, the European Parliament has realized, the EEU should not pursue a monetary un- voted to suspend all further accession negotiations ion. ough the timeline of EEU integration does with Turkey, making Turkish membership in the EU not have to exactly follow the timeline of the EU, unlikely in the near future (Kanter, 2016). EEU leaders should keep in mind how long it took for the EU to create the institutions that it currently is is the ideal space for the EEU to move in and at- functions under. tempt to forge ties with Turkey. Turkey and Kazakh- stan already have longstanding relations, collaborat- is work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2017/iss1/6Maria Gershuni . 14 e Eurasian Union: Future of Integration or Failure in the Making. e Proceedings of GREAT Day (2017): 86-91. Gershuni: The Eurasian Union e Proceedings of GREAT Day 2017 87

ing on oil and natural gas pipelines (Nurgaliyeva, CONCLUSION AND FURTHER 2016). ese oil and gas collaborations could serve as the basis for further negotiations, as they had in the QUESTIONS rest of the EEU. In 2014, Turkey even began work- e world is being divided into areas governed by dif- ing on establishing a free trade area with the Eura- ferent sets of norms that will either collaborate or ri- sian Economic Community. However, negotiations val each other (Lukyamov, 2015). e ability to per- stalled when Turkey shot down a Russian ghter suade other nations to adopt a particular set of norms plane, heading to Syria, leading to tense relations is becoming the new test for the inuence a nation between the two countries in 2015 (Genc, 2016). has in the international system (Lukyamov, 2015). Today, however, relations between Turkey and Rus- e EEU will be a test of Russia’s ability to create sia have “normalized,” and might have strengthened an organization that is attractive to other nations, after the Russian Ambassador to Turkey was shot by led by a “third way,” Eurasian set of rules and norms an ISIS operative, bringing the two countries togeth- that stresses economic cooperation, while maintain- er in their aims of ghting Islamic terrorism (Genc, ing sovereignty and disregarding democratic devel- 2016). opment. Creating this attractive institution requires both a focus on building a Eurasian community and Some Turkish scholars have embraced the concept building the viable institutions that would be able to of Eurasianism and have started turning away from facilitate economic prosperity. Europe (Tanrisever, 2015). Turks are starting to look to the Turkic communities in Central Asia to histori- e focus on building and solidifying the borders of cally and culturally bind them to the rest of the Eura- a “Eurasian” community was a major driving force sian nations (Tanrisever, 2015). However, in order to in the creation of the EEU. However, the rapid pace fully embrace Turkey into the Eurasian community, of integration that resulted from this transactional Eurasianism must be redened. Some scholars view drive came at the expensive of viable and function- Christian Orthodoxy as essential to the Eurasian ing institutions. e lack of a single case presented to identity, a qualication that stands at odds with the the Court of the Eurasian Union shows that the rules Muslim population of Turkey (Radzievskaya, 2014). based regime that Putin, Nazerbayev, and Lukashen- If the Eurasian Union embraces a denition of Eura- ko were attempting to create needs work. Because of sianism free from religious constraints however, us- the lack of institutional framework, power politics ing the social welfare focus to gain popular support are allowed to ourish, reviving old Soviet-era fears among citizens rather than an appeal to religious about the dominance of Moscow. However, if a com- fervor, they have much to gain. Turkish membership mitment to liberal institutionalist reforms that prior- would be a victory in the “normative rivalry” between itize rules based decision making over striking politi- the EEU and the EU. Turkey would be the second cal deals are made, the EEU has a chance to ourish. largest economy in the bloc and act as a balancer to Russia’s power, ensuring that it would be dicult for e EEU has potential for growth, but needs solid one nation to dominate the bloc (Nurgaliyeva, 2016). institutions in order to compete with its normative Furthermore, Turkey’s strategic location would pro- rival the EU and the growing power of China. How- vide the EEU with access to the Mediterranean and ever, that would be very dicult if the EEU cannot a gateway to the rest of the Middle East. e current manage its own crises or even fully implement a core government in Turkey might also be incentivized by agenda, such as free movement. Reform requires the lack of democratic requirements to join the EEU, commitment from the leaders of the countries in- allowing the Turkish government to continue to pur- volved. But, if they realize the type of potential the sue its current path of power centralization. If the EEU can have in the international system, even the EEU pursues, and successfully convinces Turkey to leaders of these authoritarian-leaning countries can accept Europe’s rejection and join the Eurasian bloc, act in a collective best interest and improve the insti- it would be a great victory for the EEU. tutions of the EEU. For future study, the most pertinent question rising out of this analysis is why exactly the staers at the

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Eurasian Economic Commission delegate so much Dragneva-Lewers, R. & Wolczuk, K. (2015). responsibility up the level of the Supreme Economic Trade and geopolitics: Should the EU engage Council? Were they instructed to do so by their su- with the Eurasian Economic Union? European periors? Is economics considered “high politics” in Policy Centre. Retrieved from http://www.epc. post-Soviet regimes, and therefore only heads of state eu/documents/uploads/pub_5462_trade_and_ are allowed to make nal decisions on it? Or is there geopolitics.pdf simply self-censorship in the ranks of the Commis- sion, when they fear retribution if they act too de- Duncan, P. J. S. (2015). Ideology and interests in cisively on a core matter? Currently, no literature on Putin’s construction of Eurasia. In D. Lane & this exists and learning more about the inside mecha- V. Samokhvalov (Eds.), e Eurasian project and nisms of the Commission and the Council and the Europe: Regional discontinuities and geopolitics project would be a massive undertaking. However, (pp. 102–116). London, England: Palgrave understanding the internal decision making struc- Macmillan. tures of these organizations would allow for the crea- Dzarasov, R. (2015). Economic developments and tion of better modalities to ameliorate problems of institutional obstacles to the Eurasian project. In ineectiveness and inequality. D. Lane & V. Samokhvalov (Eds.), e Eurasian project and Europe: Regional discontinuities and REFERENCES geopolitics (pp. 153–168). London. England: Cheng-Hin Lim, A. (2017). China and the Palgrave Macmillan. Eurasian Economic Union: Prospects for the Eurasian Economic Commission. (2015). Eurasian Silk Road economic belt. IPP Review. Retrieved economic integration: Facts and gures. Retrieved from http://ippreview.com/index.php/Blog/ from http://www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/ single/id/18.html Documents/broshura26_ENGL_2014.pdf Court of the Eurasian Economic Union. Eurasian International Crisis Group. (2016). e Eurasian Economic Union. (2015). Retrieved from http:// Economic Union: Power, politics, and trade. courteurasian.org/en/ Retrieved from http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/ Dagdeverenis, D. (2004). EU public opinion and dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for- Turkey’s EU membership. Bridging Europe. 2. securities-studies/resources/docs/Crisis%20 Retrieved from http://www.bridgingeurope.net/ Group%20-the-eurasian-economic-union- uploads/8/1/7/1/8171506/working_paper_on_ power-politics-and-trade.pdf eu_public_opinion_on_turkey_dagdeverenis_ Fesenko, V. (2015). Ukraine: Between Europe and august.pdf Eurasia. In R. Sakwa & P. Dutkiewicz (Eds.), Deutsch, K. W. (2014). Political community and Eurasian integration: e view from within (pp. the North Atlantic area. In B. Nelsen & A. 126–149). London, Engand: Routledge. Stubb (Eds.), e European Union: Readings on Furman, E., & Libman, A. (2015). Europeanization the theory and practice of European integration and the Eurasian Economic Union. In R. Sakwa (pp. 125–144). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner & P. Dutkiewicz (Eds.), Eurasian integration: Publishers. e view from within (pp. 173–192). London, Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2012). Russia, England: Routledge. the Eurasian Customs Union, and the EU: Genc, K. (2016). e Russian ambassador’s killing Cooperation, stagnation or rivalry? Chatham will only strengthen Turkey-Russia relations. House Brieng Paper. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2125913 New Statesman. Retrieved from http://www. newstatesman.com/world/europe/2016/12/ russian-ambassadors-killing-will-only- strengthen-turkey-russia-relations

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