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Peyton Young
Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice
Slope Takers in Anonymous Markets"
PDF Version
Matthew O. Jackson
Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy
Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited Samuel Bowles And
Table of Contents (PDF)
Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State
Could Have What Olsen Has Termed an "Encompassing Interest" 67 in the Welfare of the Community and Act As Ifearg Emerged Under Perfect Cooperation
1 the Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks H. Peyton Young 1
Regret Testing: Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium Without Knowing You Have an Opponent
Financial Networks and Contagion †
Evolution and Intelligent Design
Fall 2020 Economics 712-007 Incomplete Information, Reputations, Matching
Walrasian Economics in Retrospect Author(S): Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis Source: the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol
Evolution and Intelligent Design
Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning
Restoring Trust in Finance: from Principal-Agent to Principled Agent
Top View
Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups$
1 Learning by Trial and Error H. Peyton Young University of Oxford
A Model of Biased Intermediation∗
LARRY SAMUELSON June, 2019
Evolution and Intelligent Design
Inductive Inference: an Axiomatic Approach∗
A Theory of Case-Based Decisions Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler Frontmatter More Information
Schedule of Talks Monday, July 13
Learning and Equilibrium
Introduction to Game Theory
Towards a Theory of Learning in Games
The Dynamics of Social Innovation
Logit Dynamics for Strategic Games Mixing Time and Metastability
Fair Allocation
1 Social Norms Mary A. Burke and H. Peyton Young
Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network
Technical Writing: a Mathematical Approach, Nathan Shank 307
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DRAFT the Spread of Innovations by Social Learning H. Peyton Young
Evolutionary Game Theory: a Renaissance
Matthew O. Jackson
LPS/PHIL 244: LEARNING in GAMES Learning Is an Important Topic In
Reading List 1998
Neural Networks, Game Theory and Time Series Generation
Social Norms
The Speed of Innovation Diffusion in Social Networks
The Economics of Convention Author(S): H. Peyton Young Source: the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol
Learning in a Black Box∗
The Hedge Fund Game Dean P. Foster and H. Peyton Young
Social Norms and Economic Welfare H
American Economic Association
Working Paper .I.&
Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: a Case Study of Illinois Agriculture
July, 2007 H. PEYTON YOUNG Curriculum
Persuasion for the Long-Runspecial Thanks to Bill Zame for His Invaluable Help on Theorem 1 of This Paper. We Would Also Like To
Curriculum Vitae July 2021
Bowles-CV-April2016.Pdf
Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice John Thrasher Chapman University,
[email protected]
Market Design Special Topic: Social and Economic Networks Spring 2018