Supplement to

July 22, 2014 u vol. 111 u suppl. 3 u 10781–10896

Cover image: Pictured is a tapestry from Quito, Ecuador, depicting four women in a market- place. People engaged in cooperative or competitive interactions, such as in a marketplace, are the subject of game theory studies, which provide an important approach to evolutionary thinking in economics and other social sciences. See the introduction to the In the Light of Evolution VIII: Darwinian Thinking in the Social Sciences Sackler Colloquium by Skyrms et al. on pages 10781–10784. Image courtesy of John C. Avise.

Supplement to the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, which includes articles from the Arthur M. Sackler Colloquium of the National Academy of Sciences In the Light of Evolution VIII: Darwinian Thinking in the Social Sciences. The complete program and audio files of most presentations are available on the NAS website at www.nasonline.org/ILE-Darwinian-Thinking.

10826 Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium Contents Drew Fudenberg and David K. Levine 10830 Complexity in models of cultural niche construction with INTRODUCTION selection and homophily Nicole Creanza and Marcus W. Feldman 10838 10781 In the light of evolution VIII: Darwinian thinking in the Public goods in relation to competition, cooperation, social sciences and spite Brian Skyrms, John C. Avise, and Francisco J. Ayala Simon A. Levin 10846 Evolutionary shaping of demographic schedules Kenneth W. Wachter, David Steinsaltz, and Steven N. Evans COLLOQUIUM PAPERS 10854 Policy folklists and evolutionary theory Barry O’Neill 10785 Bargaining and fairness 10860 On the evolution of hoarding, risk-taking, and wealth Kenneth Binmore distribution in nonhuman and human populations 10789 Spatial interactions and cooperation can change the Theodore C. Bergstrom speed of evolution of complex phenotypes 10868 Natalia L. Komarova Properties of artificial networks evolved to contend with natural spectra 10796 Friendship and natural selection Yaniv Morgenstern, Mohammad Rostami, and Dale Purves Nicholas A. Christakis and James H. Fowler 10873 Some dynamics of signaling games 10802 Labor union members play an OLG repeated game Simon Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Pierre Tarrès, Michihiro Kandori and Shinya Obayashi and Elliott Wagner 10810 The replicator equation and other game dynamics 10881 Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks Ross Cressman and Yi Tao Gabriel E. Kreindler and H. Peyton Young 10818 Maximization, learning, and economic behavior 10889 Culture-dependent strategies in coordination games Ido Erev and Alvin E. Roth Matthew O. Jackson and Yiqing Xing

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