Schedule of Talks

Monday, July 13 8:45- Breakfast 9:45 9:00- Yair Tauman (SUNY Stony Brook and Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC)) 9:45 The Decision to Attack a Nuclear Facility: The Role of Intelligence 9:45 Francis Bloch (Universite catholique de Louvain) - Dynamic assignment of durable objects 10:30 10:30 - Coffee Break 11:15 Session C: Market Session A: Solution Session B: Fairness Session D: Knowledge Games Concepts Chair: Artus Philipp and Expectations Chair: Eiichiro Chair: Charles Zheng Rosenbusch Chair: Ziv Hellman Kazumori Noah Stein Steven Brams (Massachusetts (New York University) Institute of The Undercut Procedure: 11:15 Technology) An Algorithm for the - Games on Envy-Free Division of 11:35 Manifolds Indivisible Items

José Manuel Ahuva Mu'alem Massimo De Itai Arieli Zarzuelo (California Institute of Francesco (Hebrew University (Basque Country Technology) (University of Siena) of Jerusalem) University) 11:40 On Multi-Dimensional The Competitive in - The Bilateral Envy-Free Mechanisms in a Continuous Games 12:00 Consistent Prekernel Dynamic Entry and and the on Price Game with NTU Games and Capacity Exchange Indivisibility Economies Charles Zheng Artus Philipp Eiichiro Kazumori Ziv Hellman (Iowa State Rosenbusch (University of Tokyo) (Hebrew University) University) (Darmstadt University of Dynamic Limit Order How Common are Technology) 12:05 The Equivalence Book Markets Common Priors? - between the Core Satisfiable Fairness in 12:25 and the Equilibria of Cooperative Games with a Noncooperative Game with Competing Contracts 12:25 - Lunch Break 14:00 14:00 Amparo Urbano (University of Valencia) - Pragmatic Languages and Universal Grammars: An Equilibrium Approach 14:45 Session A: Industrial Session B: Bounded Session C: Voting Session D: Learning Session E: Matching Organization Rationality and Evolution Chair: Suntak Kim Chair: Brijesh Preston Chair: Andriy Chair: Penelope Hernandez Chair: Javier Rivas Pinto Zapechelnyuk Chun-Hui Miao Ying-Ju Chen Yaron Azrieli Emerson Melo Emiliya Lazarova (University of South (University of California, (The Ohio State (California Institute (Queen's University Carolina) Berkeley) University) of Technology) Belfast) 14:50 - Sequential Contractual Traps Characterization of Congestion Pricing Coalitional 15:10 Innovation and the Multidimensional and Learning in Matchings Duration of Spatial Models of Traffic Networks Technology Elections with a Games Licensing Valence Dimension Evangelos Russell Golman Sourav Bhattacharya Marius-Ionut Ana Mauleon Rouskas () (University of Ochea (Facultés (Athens University of Quantal Response Pittsburgh) (University of Universitaires Saint- 15:15 and Equilibria with Preference Amsterdam) Louis) - Business) Heterogeneous Agents Monotonicity and Evolution in Von Neumann- 15:35 Efficient Delay in Information Repeated Prisoner's Morgenstern Decision Making Aggregation in Dilemma under Farsightedly Stable Elections Perturbed Best-Reply Sets in Two-Sided Dynamics Matching Andriy Penelope Suntak Kim Javier Rivas Brijesh Preston Zapechelnyuk Hernandez (University of (University of (University of Pinto (University of Bonn) Valencia) Pittsburgh) Leicester) (University of 15:40 Bounded Memory Southern - Bargaining Against a Divergence in Pre- Cooperation, Equilibrium California) 16:00 Status Quo: the Electoral Campaign Imitation and Algebra of Strikes Promises with Post- Correlated Strongly Stable Electoral Policy Matching Matchings with Bargaining Cyclic Preferences

16:00 - Coffee Break 16:30 16:30 (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) - Dynamics and Equilibrium 17:15

Tuesday, July 14 8:45 - Breakfast 9:00 9:00 Olivier Gossner (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics) - A Reasoning Approach to Knowledge, introspection and unawareness 9:45 9:45 Herve Moulin (Rice University) - Pricing Traffic in a Spanning Network 10:30 10:30 - Coffee Break 11:15 Session C: Learning and Session A: Auctions Session B: Mechanism Session D: Repeated Evolution Chair: Gagan Pratap Design Games Chair: Fernando M. Ghosh Chair: Rodrigo Velez Chair: Marco Scarsini Louge Chia-Hui Chen Gwenael Piaser Nicolas (Alexandre) (Massachusetts (Université du Klein Institute of Luxembourg) (University of 11:15 Technology) Moral Hazard: Munich) - Name Your Own Deterministic Indirect Free-Riding And 11:35 Price at Mechanisms and Delegation In Priceline.com: Efficiency Research Teams

Emel Filiz Ozbay Sergei Severinov Reinoud Joosten Antonio Miguel (University of (University of British (University of Twente) Osorio-Costa Maryland) Columbia and Essex Generalized (University Carlos III 11:40 Multi‐unit Auctions University) Projection Dynamics Madrid) - with Resale Multidimensional in Evolutionary Game Efficiency Gains in 12:00 Screening with One- Theory Repeated Games at Dimensional Random Moments in Allocation Space Time

Gagan Pratap Rodrigo Velez Fernando M. Louge Marco Scarsini Ghosh (University of (University of (Libera Università (University of Iowa) Rochester) Wisconsin - Madison) Internazionale degli 12:05 Efficiency in a Class Are Incentives against Evolution with Private Studi Sociali) - of Multi-Unit Justice Information: Caution, Repeated Congestion 12:25 Auctions Contrarianism and Games with Local Herding Information 12:25 - Lunch Break 14:00 14:00 Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University) - Measurable Ambiguity 14:45 Session A: Mechanism Session B: Learning and Session C: Signaling Session D: Bargaining Session E: Contracts Design Evolution Chair: David Ong Chair: Tanguy Isaac Chair: Bo Chen Chair: Rida Laraki Chair: Hsiao-Chi Chen Daniele Condorelli Christopher Byrne Rabah Amir Toshiji Miyakawa Helena Aten (UCL and (Penn State University) (Université catholique (Osaka University of (Georgetown 14:50 Northwestern Size Dependence in an de Louvain) Economics) University) - University) Evolutionary Game Network Effects, On the Bilateral Competing Informed 15:10 Value, Willingness to Model of Self- Market Structure and Contracting Process in Principals and Pay and the Allocation Deception Industry Performance Economies with Representative of Scarce Resources Externalities Democracy Siddhartha Sahi Christina Wooyoung Lim Uri Weiss Kristina Buzard (Rutgers University) Achampong (University of (The Center for The (University of The Allocation of a (Penn State University) Pittsburgh) Study of Rationality, California, San The Hebrew Diego) 15:15 Prize The Effect of Belief on Communication in University) - Performance and of Bargaining over Contracting 15:35 Encounter History on Decision Rights The Robber Asks to Problems and the Beliefs in Hawk-Dove be Punished Technology of Trade: Competitions A Robustness Result with Application to Hold-Up Rida Laraki Hsiao-Chi Chen David Ong Tanguy Isaac Bo Chen (Centre national de la (National Taipei (University of (Université Catholique (Southern Methodist recherche scientifique, University) California) de Louvain) University) 15:40 Ecole Polytechnique) Imitation, Local Fishy Gifts: Bribing Information Optimal Time- - Majority Judgment Interaction, and with Shame and Revelation in Markets Contingent Contract 16:00 Strategic Analysis Coordination Guilt with Pairwise Design Meetings : Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis

16:00 - Coffee Break 16:30 16:30 Peyton Young () - Gaming Performance Fees by Portfolio Managers: An Application of to Finance 17:15 18:00 - Reception Dinner (Jasmine) 22:00

Wednesday, July 15 8:45 - Breakfast 9:00 9:00 Amy Greenwald (Brown University) - An Algorithm to Compute the Stochastically Stable Distribution of a Perturbed Markov Matrix 9:45 9:45 Barry O'Neill (University of California, Los Angeles) - Vagueness in Communication 10:30 10:30 - Coffee Break 11:15 Session B: Mechanism Session A: Solution Design Session C: Signaling Session D: Bargaining Session E: Networks Concepts Chair: Victor Chair: Younghwan In Chair: Ching-jen Sun Chair: Sunghoon Hong Chair: Elena Inarra Naroditskiy Paulo Barelli Matthew Elliott (University of (Stanford University) Rochester) Inefficiencies in Trade 11:15 On the Existence of Networks - Nash Equilibria in 11:35 Discontinuous and Qualitative Games

Grandjean Gilles Ruben Juarez Wolf Gick Asha Sadanand Miguel A Duran (university of Louvain (University of Hawaii) () (University of Guelph) (University of Malaga) (UCL)) Monotonic Solutions Like-Biased Experts Outside Options and The Economics of 11:40 Strongly Rational Sets to the Experts And Noisy Signals Investment Favoritism - for Normal Form Aggregation 12:00 Games Problem

Elena Inarra Victor Naroditskiy Younghwan Ching-jen Sun Sunghoon Hong (University of the (Brown University) In (National (Deakin University) (Vanderbilt Basque Country) Destroy to Save University of Interim Outcomes and University) Singapore) 12:05 Deriving Nash Bargaining Solutions Enhancing - Equilibria as the Signaling Private Transportation 12:25 Supercore for a Choices Security against Relational System Terrorist Attacks 12:25 - Lunch Break 14:00 14:00 Kfir Eliaz (Brown University) - Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects 14:45 Session A: Incomplete Session B: Bargaining Session C: Networks Session D: Cooperative Session E: Auctions Information Chair: Daniel Quint Chair: Vincent Games Chair: Cornelia F.A. Chair: Fristan Tomala Vannetelbosch Chair: Omer Edhan Van Wesenbeeck Scott Woodroofe Louis Boguchwal Maximilian Mihm Josune Albizuri Itai Sher Cunningham (University of St (Cornell University) (Basque Country (University of (Delft University of Andrews) What Goes Around University) Minnesota) Technology) 14:50 A System for Comes Around: A Values and Coalition Optimal Shill Bidding - Strategic Modeling theory of strategic Configurations in the VCG 15:10 Transmission of Change, indirect reciprocity in Mechanism Information and the Demonstrated with networks Framing of the Ultimatum Environmental Game Regulation Yehuda Levy Wioletta Dziuda Roland Pongou Yong Sui (Hebrew University) (Northwestern (Brown University) (Shanghai Jiao Tong Stochastic Games University) A Dynamic Theory of University) 15:15 with Information Dynamic Policy- Fidelity Networks with All-pay Auctions with - Lag Making with an Application to the Private Values and 15:35 Endogenous Default Spread of Resale HIV/AIDS

Tristan Tomala Daniel Quint Vincent Omer Edhan Cornelia F.A. Van (HEC Paris) (University of Vannetelbosch (The Hebrew Wesenbeeck Existence of Belief- Wisconsin) (CORE) University) (VU University 15:40 free Equilibria in Bargaining with Connections among Continuous Values of Amsterdam) - Repeated Games with Endogenous Farsighted Agents Exact Market Games The Primal Auction: a 16:00 Incomplete Information New Design for Information and Multi-commodity Known-own Payoffs Double Auctions

16:00 - Coffee Break 16:30 16:30 Jeffrey Ely (Northwestern University) - Sunk-cost Bias: A Memory Kludge 17:15

Thursday, July 16 8:45 - Breakfast 9:00 9:00 Jacob Goeree (California Institute of Technology) - Threshold versus Exposure in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions 9:45 9:45 Francoise Forges (Dauphine Paris) - Core-stable bidding rings 10:30 10:30 - Coffee Break 11:15 Session A: Repeated Session B: Networks Session C: Cooperative Session D: Experimental Session E: Games Chair: Dinko Dimitrov Games Economics Miscellaneous Chair: Takako Fujiwara- Chair: Nichalin Chair: Ping Zhang Chair: Xiaofei Huang Greve Suakkaphong Mahmoud Farrokhi Georgy Artemov Xiaojian Zhao Kashani (University of (University of (Institute of Melbourne) Mannheim) 11:15 Mathematical Finitely Repeated Strategic Mis-selling - Economics, Bielefeld Bilateral Trade and Pre-Contractual 11:35 University) Cognition Coalition Formation in the

Salomon Antoine Kris De Jaegher Jason Marden Alexander Matros Attila Ambrus (LAGA Université (Utrecht University, (California Institute of (University of (Harvard University) Paris 13) Utrecht School of Technology) Pittsburgh) Hierarchical cheap Economics) 11:40 Large Bandit Games Distributed Welfare Raising Revenue With talk - All Purpose Minimal Games Raffles: Evidence from 12:00 Sufficient Networks a Laboratory in the Threshold Experiment Game

Takako Fujiwara- Dinko Dimitrov Nichalin Ping Zhang Greve (University of Suakkaphong (University of (Keio University) Munich) (University of Nottingham) 12:05 Cooperation in How to Connect Arizona) in Share - Repeated Prisoner's under Incomplete Competition and Auctions: Mechanism 12:25 Dilemma with Outside Information Cooperation in Design and Options Decentralized Communication Distribution among Bidders 12:25 - Lunch Break 14:00 14:00 Michihiro Kandori (University of Tokyo) - Revision Games 14:45 Session A:Applications Session B:Learning Session C:Incomplete Session D: Social and Session E:Auctions Chair: Ahmet Sahin and Evolution Information Political Chair: Zhen Xu Chair: Burkhard C. Chair: Akira Yokotani Chair: Yukio Koriyama Schipper Andrey Garnaev Emin Dokumaci Min Kim Brent Hickman Ram Orzach (Saint Petersburg State (University of (University of (University of Iowa) (Oakland University) University) Wisconsin-Madison) Southern California) 14:50 Effort, Achievement Revenue - Jamming in Wireless Schelling Redux: An Information Gaps, and Affirmative Comparison in 15:10 Networks with Evolutionary Asymmetry and Action: A New Look Common-Value Cooperative Jammers Dynamic Model of Incentives for Active at College Admissions Auctions: Two Residential Management Examples Segregation Shi-Miin Liu Marek Kaminski Eduardo Perez Matias Iaryczower Brennan Platt (National Taipei (University of (Stanford University) (California Institute of (Brigham Young University) California, Irvine) Technology) University) 15:15 Competing with - Commitment or No- Generalized Equivocal Choosing Records: Pay-to-Bid Auctions 15:35 Commitment to Information: The Flip-Flops and Monitoring in Importance of Weak Cronies Emission Tax Candidates Systems? Ahmet Sahin Burkhard C Akira Yokotani Yukio Koriyama Zhen Xu (Kahramanmaras Sutcu Schipper (University of (Ecole Polytechnique) (Stony Brook Imam University) (University of Rochester) Freedom to Not Join: University) California, Davis) 15:40 An Application of The Sequential Belief A Voluntary The Contrary - Game Theory to Unbeatable Representation of Participation Game of Effects of Listing 16:00 Producers in Imitation Harsanyi Type Spaces a Discrete Public Fee Competition with with Redundancy Good Production and Market Price Risks: The Case of Turkey

16:00 - Coffee Break 16:30 16:30 Round Table with participation of /Sergiu Hart// - /John Nash (moderator) and Peyton Young 17:40 Provost Kaler will give a brief greeting before the round table begins

Friday, July 17 8:45 - Breakfast 9:00 9:00 Shmuel Zamir (Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem) - 9:45 Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case 9:45 (Harvard University) - Repeated Unknown Games 10:30 10:30- Coffee Break 11:15 Session A: Social and Session B: Contests Session C: Solution Session D: Stochastic Session E: Political Chair: Subhasish Modak Concepts Games Experimental Economics Chair: Guillermo Flores Chowdhury Chair: SangMok Lee Chair: Eran Shmaya Chair: Karl Schlag David Laurens Bijl Magnus Hoffmann Konrad Nagarajan (Delft University of (University of Grabiszewski Krishnamurthy Technology) Magdeburg) (Instituto (Chennai A Model of Do I Want It All? A Tecnológico Mathematical 11:15 Consensus in the Simple Model of Autónomo de Institute, India) - European Satiation in Contests México) Orderfield Property of 11:35 Commission Procedural Type Stochastic Games via Spaces Dependency Graphs

Micael Ehn Dylan Minor Kamalakar Rida Laraki Dorothea Herreiner (Mälardalen (University of Karlapalem (Centre national de la (Loyola Marymount University) California, Berkeley) (International recherche scientifique, University) Why Social When Second Best is Institute of Ecole Polytechnique) Do Intentions Matter 11:40 Stratification is to be Best: on the Information Explicit Formulas for for Empowerment? - Expected Optimality of Technology, Repeated Games with Procedural Justice in 12:00 Offering a Larger Hyderabad, India) Absorbing States Simple Bargaining Second Prize Games with Games Minimalistic Agents

Guillermo Flores Subhasish Modak SangMok Lee Eran Shmaya Karl Schlag (Pontificia Chowdhury (California Institute (Kellogg School of (Universitat Pompeu Universidad Católica (Purdue University) of Technology) Management) Fabra) del Perú) The All-pay Auction The Testable The of Can Sanctions Induce 12:05 Corruption with Non-monotonic Implications of Zero- Infinite Games with Pessimism? An - Efficiency: Payoff sum Games Eventual Perfect Experiment 12:25 Corruptible Monitoring Bureaucratic Systems and Implementation of Governmental Solutions 12:25 - Lunch Break 14:00 14:00 Ehud Kalai (Northwestern University) - A cooperative/competitive solution to a class of strategic games 14:45 Session B: Repeated Session C: Session A: Social Choice Games Miscellaneous Chair: Jung You Chair: John Smith Chair: Duygu Yengin Geoffroy De Clippel Yakov Babichenko Adam (Tauman) (Brown University) (Hebrew University of Kalai Egalitarianism and Jerusalem, Center for (Microsoft Research) 14:50 Egalitarian the Study of Bargaining in - Equivalence under Rationality.) Strategic Games with 15:10 Asymmetric Completely Private Information Information Uncoupled Dynamics and Jung You Nobue Suzuki Laurent Mathevet (Rice University) (Komazawa (University of Texas 15:15 Envy-free and University) at Austin) - Incentive Compatible Voluntarily Separable Designing Stable 15:35 division of a Repeated Prisoner's Mechanisms in commodity Dilemma with Shared Economic Belief Environments John Smith Duygu Yengin (Rutgers-Camden) (University of Adelaide) 15:40 Not So : A - Model of Advice with Appointment Games 16:00 Communication in Fixed-Route Costs Traveling Salesman Problems and The

16:00 - Coffee Break 16:30 16:30 Bernhard Von Stengel (London School of Economics) - Pathways to Equilibria, Pretty Pictures and Diagrams (PPAD) 17:15