Schedule of Talks Monday, July 13 8:45- Breakfast 9:45 9:00- Yair Tauman (SUNY Stony Brook and Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya (IDC)) 9:45 The Decision to Attack a Nuclear Facility: The Role of Intelligence 9:45 Francis Bloch (Universite catholique de Louvain) - Dynamic assignment of durable objects 10:30 10:30 - Coffee Break 11:15 Session C: Market Session A: Solution Session B: Fairness Session D: Knowledge Games Concepts Chair: Artus Philipp and Expectations Chair: Eiichiro Chair: Charles Zheng Rosenbusch Chair: Ziv Hellman Kazumori Noah Stein Steven Brams (Massachusetts (New York University) Institute of The Undercut Procedure: 11:15 Technology) An Algorithm for the - Games on Envy-Free Division of 11:35 Manifolds Indivisible Items José Manuel Ahuva Mu'alem Massimo De Itai Arieli Zarzuelo (California Institute of Francesco (Hebrew University (Basque Country Technology) (University of Siena) of Jerusalem) University) 11:40 On Multi-Dimensional The Competitive Rationalizability in - The Bilateral Envy-Free Mechanisms Outcome in a Continuous Games 12:00 Consistent Prekernel Dynamic Entry and and the Core on Price Game with NTU Games and Capacity Exchange Indivisibility Economies Charles Zheng Artus Philipp Eiichiro Kazumori Ziv Hellman (Iowa State Rosenbusch (University of Tokyo) (Hebrew University) University) (Darmstadt University of Dynamic Limit Order How Common are Technology) 12:05 The Equivalence Book Markets Common Priors? - between the Core Satisfiable Fairness in 12:25 and the Equilibria of Cooperative Games with a Noncooperative Transferable Utility Game with Competing Contracts 12:25 - Lunch Break 14:00 14:00 Amparo Urbano (University of Valencia) - Pragmatic Languages and Universal Grammars: An Equilibrium Approach 14:45 Session A: Industrial Session B: Bounded Session C: Voting Session D: Learning Session E: Matching Organization Rationality Chair: Suntak Kim and Evolution Chair: Brijesh Preston Chair: Andriy Chair: Penelope Hernandez Chair: Javier Rivas Pinto Zapechelnyuk Chun-Hui Miao Ying-Ju Chen Yaron Azrieli Emerson Melo Emiliya Lazarova (University of South (University of California, (The Ohio State (California Institute (Queen's University Carolina) Berkeley) University) of Technology) Belfast) 14:50 - Sequential Contractual Traps Characterization of Congestion Pricing Coalitional 15:10 Innovation and the Multidimensional and Learning in Matchings Duration of Spatial Models of Traffic Networks Technology Elections with a Games Licensing Valence Dimension Evangelos Russell Golman Sourav Bhattacharya Marius-Ionut Ana Mauleon Rouskas (University of Michigan) (University of Ochea (Facultés (Athens University of Quantal Response Pittsburgh) (University of Universitaires Saint- 15:15 Economics and Equilibria with Preference Amsterdam) Louis) - Business) Heterogeneous Agents Monotonicity and Evolution in Von Neumann- 15:35 Efficient Delay in Information Repeated Prisoner's Morgenstern Decision Making Aggregation in Dilemma under Farsightedly Stable Elections Perturbed Best-Reply Sets in Two-Sided Dynamics Matching Andriy Penelope Suntak Kim Javier Rivas Brijesh Preston Zapechelnyuk Hernandez (University of (University of (University of Pinto (University of Bonn) Valencia) Pittsburgh) Leicester) (University of 15:40 Bounded Memory Southern - Bargaining Against a Divergence in Pre- Cooperation, Equilibrium California) 16:00 Status Quo: the Electoral Campaign Imitation and Algebra of Strikes Promises with Post- Correlated Strongly Stable Electoral Policy Matching Matchings with Bargaining Cyclic Preferences 16:00 - Coffee Break 16:30 16:30 Sergiu Hart (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) - Dynamics and Equilibrium 17:15 Tuesday, July 14 8:45 - Breakfast 9:00 9:00 Olivier Gossner (Paris School of Economics & London School of Economics) - A Reasoning Approach to Knowledge, introspection and unawareness 9:45 9:45 Herve Moulin (Rice University) - Pricing Traffic in a Spanning Network 10:30 10:30 - Coffee Break 11:15 Session C: Learning and Session A: Auctions Session B: Mechanism Session D: Repeated Evolution Chair: Gagan Pratap Design Games Chair: Fernando M. Ghosh Chair: Rodrigo Velez Chair: Marco Scarsini Louge Chia-Hui Chen Gwenael Piaser Nicolas (Alexandre) (Massachusetts (Université du Klein Institute of Luxembourg) (University of 11:15 Technology) Moral Hazard: Munich) - Name Your Own Deterministic Indirect Free-Riding And 11:35 Price at Mechanisms and Delegation In Priceline.com: Efficiency Research Teams Emel Filiz Ozbay Sergei Severinov Reinoud Joosten Antonio Miguel (University of (University of British (University of Twente) Osorio-Costa Maryland) Columbia and Essex Generalized (University Carlos III 11:40 Multi‐unit Auctions University) Projection Dynamics Madrid) - with Resale Multidimensional in Evolutionary Game Efficiency Gains in 12:00 Screening with One- Theory Repeated Games at Dimensional Random Moments in Allocation Space Time Gagan Pratap Rodrigo Velez Fernando M. Louge Marco Scarsini Ghosh (University of (University of (Libera Università (University of Iowa) Rochester) Wisconsin - Madison) Internazionale degli 12:05 Efficiency in a Class Are Incentives against Evolution with Private Studi Sociali) - of Multi-Unit Justice Information: Caution, Repeated Congestion 12:25 Auctions Contrarianism and Games with Local Herding Information 12:25 - Lunch Break 14:00 14:00 Wolfgang Pesendorfer (Princeton University) - Measurable Ambiguity 14:45 Session A: Mechanism Session B: Learning and Session C: Signaling Session D: Bargaining Session E: Contracts Design Evolution Chair: David Ong Chair: Tanguy Isaac Chair: Bo Chen Chair: Rida Laraki Chair: Hsiao-Chi Chen Daniele Condorelli Christopher Byrne Rabah Amir Toshiji Miyakawa Helena Aten (UCL and (Penn State University) (Université catholique (Osaka University of (Georgetown 14:50 Northwestern Size Dependence in an de Louvain) Economics) University) - University) Evolutionary Game Network Effects, On the Bilateral Competing Informed 15:10 Value, Willingness to Model of Self- Market Structure and Contracting Process in Principals and Pay and the Allocation Deception Industry Performance Economies with Representative of Scarce Resources Externalities Democracy Siddhartha Sahi Christina Wooyoung Lim Uri Weiss Kristina Buzard (Rutgers University) Achampong (University of (The Center for The (University of The Allocation of a (Penn State University) Pittsburgh) Study of Rationality, California, San The Hebrew Diego) 15:15 Prize The Effect of Belief on Communication in University) - Performance and of Bargaining over Contracting 15:35 Encounter History on Decision Rights The Robber Asks to Problems and the Beliefs in Hawk-Dove be Punished Technology of Trade: Competitions A Robustness Result with Application to Hold-Up Rida Laraki Hsiao-Chi Chen David Ong Tanguy Isaac Bo Chen (Centre national de la (National Taipei (University of (Université Catholique (Southern Methodist recherche scientifique, University) California) de Louvain) University) 15:40 Ecole Polytechnique) Imitation, Local Fishy Gifts: Bribing Information Optimal Time- - Majority Judgment Interaction, and with Shame and Revelation in Markets Contingent Contract 16:00 Strategic Analysis Coordination Guilt with Pairwise Design Meetings : Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis 16:00 - Coffee Break 16:30 16:30 Peyton Young (University of Oxford) - Gaming Performance Fees by Portfolio Managers: An Application of Game Theory to Finance 17:15 18:00 - Reception Dinner (Jasmine) 22:00 Wednesday, July 15 8:45 - Breakfast 9:00 9:00 Amy Greenwald (Brown University) - An Algorithm to Compute the Stochastically Stable Distribution of a Perturbed Markov Matrix 9:45 9:45 Barry O'Neill (University of California, Los Angeles) - Vagueness in Communication 10:30 10:30 - Coffee Break 11:15 Session B: Mechanism Session A: Solution Design Session C: Signaling Session D: Bargaining Session E: Networks Concepts Chair: Victor Chair: Younghwan In Chair: Ching-jen Sun Chair: Sunghoon Hong Chair: Elena Inarra Naroditskiy Paulo Barelli Matthew Elliott (University of (Stanford University) Rochester) Inefficiencies in Trade 11:15 On the Existence of Networks - Nash Equilibria in 11:35 Discontinuous and Qualitative Games Grandjean Gilles Ruben Juarez Wolf Gick Asha Sadanand Miguel A Duran (university of Louvain (University of Hawaii) (Harvard University) (University of Guelph) (University of Malaga) (UCL)) Monotonic Solutions Like-Biased Experts Outside Options and The Economics of 11:40 Strongly Rational Sets to the Experts And Noisy Signals Investment Favoritism - for Normal Form Aggregation 12:00 Games Problem Elena Inarra Victor Naroditskiy Younghwan Ching-jen Sun Sunghoon Hong (University of the (Brown University) In (National (Deakin University) (Vanderbilt University of Basque Country) Destroy to Save Interim Outcomes and University) Singapore) 12:05 Deriving Nash Bargaining Solutions Enhancing - Equilibria as the Signaling Private Transportation 12:25 Supercore for a Choices Security against Relational System Terrorist Attacks 12:25 - Lunch Break 14:00 14:00 Kfir Eliaz (Brown University) - Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects 14:45 Session A: Incomplete Session B: Bargaining Session C: Networks Session D: Cooperative Session E: Auctions Information Chair: Daniel Quint Chair: Vincent Games Chair: Cornelia F.A. Chair: Fristan Tomala Vannetelbosch Chair: Omer Edhan Van Wesenbeeck Scott Woodroofe Louis Boguchwal Maximilian Mihm Josune Albizuri Itai Sher Cunningham (University