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Peyton Young

  • Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice

    Uniqueness and Symmetry in Bargaining Theories of Justice

  • Slope Takers in Anonymous Markets

    Slope Takers in Anonymous Markets"

  • PDF Version

    PDF Version

  • Matthew O. Jackson

    Matthew O. Jackson

  • Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy

    Partisan Gerrymandering and the Construction of American Democracy

  • Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited Samuel Bowles And

    Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited Samuel Bowles And

  • Table of Contents (PDF)

    Table of Contents (PDF)

  • Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

    Conflict, Evolution, Hegemony, and the Power of the State

  • Could Have What Olsen Has Termed an

    Could Have What Olsen Has Termed an "Encompassing Interest" 67 in the Welfare of the Community and Act As Ifearg Emerged Under Perfect Cooperation

  • 1 the Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks H. Peyton Young 1

    1 the Diffusion of Innovations in Social Networks H. Peyton Young 1

  • Regret Testing: Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium Without Knowing You Have an Opponent

    Regret Testing: Learning to Play Nash Equilibrium Without Knowing You Have an Opponent

  • Financial Networks and Contagion †

    Financial Networks and Contagion †

  • Evolution and Intelligent Design

    Evolution and Intelligent Design

  • Fall 2020 Economics 712-007 Incomplete Information, Reputations, Matching

    Fall 2020 Economics 712-007 Incomplete Information, Reputations, Matching

  • Walrasian Economics in Retrospect Author(S): Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis Source: the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol

    Walrasian Economics in Retrospect Author(S): Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis Source: the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol

  • Evolution and Intelligent Design

    Evolution and Intelligent Design

  • Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning

    Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations: Contagion, Social Influence, and Social Learning

  • Restoring Trust in Finance: from Principal-Agent to Principled Agent

    Restoring Trust in Finance: from Principal-Agent to Principled Agent

Top View
  • Collusion, Randomization and Leadership in Groups$
  • 1 Learning by Trial and Error H. Peyton Young University of Oxford
  • A Model of Biased Intermediation∗
  • LARRY SAMUELSON June, 2019
  • Evolution and Intelligent Design
  • Inductive Inference: an Axiomatic Approach∗
  • A Theory of Case-Based Decisions Itzhak Gilboa and David Schmeidler Frontmatter More Information
  • Schedule of Talks Monday, July 13
  • Learning and Equilibrium
  • Introduction to Game Theory
  • Towards a Theory of Learning in Games
  • The Dynamics of Social Innovation
  • Logit Dynamics for Strategic Games Mixing Time and Metastability
  • Fair Allocation
  • 1 Social Norms Mary A. Burke and H. Peyton Young
  • Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network
  • Technical Writing: a Mathematical Approach, Nathan Shank 307
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