DOCSLIB.ORG

Taiwan's Security Policy Since the Cold War Era: a Review of External

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Taiwan's Security Policy Since the Cold War Era: a Review of External History of Global Arms Transfer, 9 (2020), pp. 3-25 Taiwan’s Security Policy since the Cold War Era: A Review of External Military Assistance and the Development of Indigenous Defence Industry By FU-KUO LIU* Throughout the Cold War era, the ROC’s national security was threatened by the PRC’s enmity. Even in the present day, the ROC’s national security strategy focuses overwhelmingly on addressing military threats from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Although the US has, over the years, granted hardware and software to Taiwan to strengthen its defence capabilities, Taiwan has remained far from independent in defence modernisation and national security. For Taiwan, a hard lesson learned from changes to US policy in Asia and other bilateral relations was that the US will only invest in countries that will bear fruit for it. Post-World War Two economic development in Taiwan has been closely linked to political attempts to develop a strong indigenous defence industry, with the aim of ensuring Taiwan would be able to avoid the potential risks associated with changes in US policy. The development of an indigenous defence industry thus became critical and would go on to gain prevailing support in domestic politics. Taiwan’s development of an indigenous defence industry started with three public institutions/organisations and gradually networked more than 200 indigenous SMEs. Over the decades, the country has built a very useful and promising defence industrial chain, reflecting more generally the benefits of economic development for Taiwan. I Introduction Ever since the end of the Second World War, due to the continuing civil war between the Communist Party of China and the Nationalist Government, the fates of China (the People’s Republic of China, the PRC) and Taiwan (Republic of China, the ROC) have been decided not by themselves but by the changing international environment; this was especially the case after the Nationalist Government was defeated in the civil war and consequently relocated to Taiwan in 1949. Defeat in the civil war posed a great threat to the survival of the ROC. Externally, the National government crumbled completely and lost control of the whole mainland to the communists. At this low point, the US government * Author Affiliation: Research Fellow, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. 3 FU-KUO LIU under President Truman decided not to resume support of the ROC’s leadership, Chiang Kai-sheik and his government, after the PRC was formally established. The reluctance of the US to support the Nationalists indicated a lack of faith in Chiang Kai-sheik’s leadership and his competence to rule the country. Importantly, Truman’s administration decided to focus its Cold War efforts of containing communism on Europe rather Nationalist China, and this policy would eventually result in the Chinese Communist victory in mainland China.1 Without any external support, the sustainability of the ROC was at tremendous risk. Internally, the Nationalist Government was perceived by the people as being corrupt, ill- fated, inefficient, pathetic and incapable. In no way could the Nationalists gain immediate support from the people of what was fast becoming a panicked and disordered society. At first, the chaotic government arrived in Taiwan in 1949 and the civil war continued. The ROC government did not have sufficient competence to govern, nor to defend itself; the leadership, governmental organisations and overall morale of the ROC were under threat. The political atmosphere was very uncertain and the government needed time to recover and reorganise after its comprehensive defeat. Under such circumstances, the ROC’s fragile defence capabilities were not sufficient to keep the island free from communist military attack. After the Second World War, the ROC had been too exhausted to implement any new nation-building processes alone, let alone regenerate its security policy. It therefore needed external assistance from the US. Then, in June 1950, with the support of the Soviet Union and the PRC, North Korea invaded South Korea. The Korean War disintegrated into a war between the US-led alliance and the Communist Camp. As a result, the Cold War was ignited. The cause of the Korean War was seen by the United States government as a Communist expansion effort attempting to break through the defence line of East Asia and therefore as a threat to US strategic interests; as a result, the First Island Chain (Japan, the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the Philippines and Borneo) and the Second Island Chain (Japan, Guam, Indonesia and Australia) were created to contain communism2, establishing what became known as the ‘hub-and-spoke’ security alliance system, linking bilateral and multilateral security arrangements in the Asia Pacific region. In doing so, the US tightened its military alliances with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines and others in the region. Based on the concept of island chain defence, Taiwan’s strategic importance was substantially recognised and enhanced. The aftermath of the Second World War showed that countries in the region were extremely unlikely to recover fully by themselves, as most of them had suffered or were suffering the setbacks of either civil wars or wars of independence. As a result of Cold War strategic thinking, the US incorporated these Asian allies into its wider strategic picture as a way of supporting its overall defence capabilities and strengthening the American sphere of interest. The US was, on the one hand, committed to protecting and ensuring the security of its allies in the region; on the other hand, it also sought to strengthen its global strategic position against communist expansionism. With these goals in mind, the US helped boost the defence capabilities of those allies to support the defence of the two Island Chains in the West Pacific. By doing so, the US has since then supplied a security umbrella to those regional allies, such as Japan, South Korea, Taiwan et-al. This paper intends to examine the transformation of Taiwan’s security policy under the support of the American security alliance system during the Cold War era. By examining 1 Hamby, A. L., ‘Harry S. Truman: Foreign Affairs’, UVA/ Miller Centre, 2019, https://millercenter.org/ president/truman/foreign-affairs. 2 Yoshihara, T., ‘China’s Vision of its Seascape: The First Island Chain and Chinese Seapower’, Asian Politics & Policy, 4:3 (2012), p. 297. 4 Taiwan’s Security Policy since the Cold War Era security policy, it will also focus on security partnerships between the US and Taiwan. Within such a US-led alliance, American security structures have shaped the fundamental structure of Taiwanese security and supported the emergence of an indigenous defence industry. Since the US has consistently assisted Taiwan in strengthening its defence capabilities in all areas, Taiwan’s defence industry has been generated by American policy during and after the Cold War. This paper will therefore also argue that the development of an indigenous defence industry in Taiwan has been generated by national security concerns about the changing nature of relations between great powers. II Civil War and the Revival of the ROC’s National Security in Taiwan After being defeated in the civil war in mainland China, the Nationalist Government was plunged into disorder and fled to Taiwan. At first, the government which re-established itself in Taiwan realised that, with little access to resources, it was highly vulnerable to military attack. It was therefore critical for the ROC to shift its political centre from Nanjing to Taipei, so as to transform the geopolitical foundation from mainland- to maritime-oriented thinking. Thereafter, the ROC’s national security policy gradually shifted to the security context of the maritime domain. Although the government settled hastily in Taiwan, the first stage of the ROC’s national strategy was overshadowed by military objectives: the early stages of national security policy development aimed to take advantage of Taiwan’s remaining resources to prepare to fight another war. The core focus of national strategy at that time was to recover the mainland, ensure Taiwanese security and develop Taiwan. It was that the country prioritised its strategy. The ROC Nationalist Government, when it first arrived in Taiwan, anticipated winning back the mainland within three to five years of fighting. It therefore did not have a long- term plan to settle in Taiwan, but instead anticipated launching a war back on the mainland. However, the ROC did not have clear support from the US, as the US government hesitated to grant support to the corrupt and incapable Nationalists. In 1949, the PRC was formally established as the communist regime on the mainland. Seen by the US as a new opportunity to be engaged with, the PRC’s position was critical in Asia. To begin with, the US government waited, hoping to formally engage with the PRC, and anticipated abandoning the ROC in due course. Militarily, the ROC was weakened further after it was defeated in the civil war and did not have any external support. Diplomatically, as the PRC gradually gained ground, the ROC was quickly losing the support of the international community. Domestically, the chaotic society in Taiwan resulted from a hasty settlement from mainland China and did not have a clear vision for the future. During this critical period, however, the military forces of the ROC defeated the Chinese Communist Army in the Battle of Guningtou, in October 1949, and the Battle of Dengbu Island, in November 1949. These victories, which successfully deterred the PLA’s ambition to march through quickly to Taiwan, helped drive up confidence and moral in Taiwan. The ROC government decided to restructure its strategic deployment by withdrawing its military from Hainan and Chousang Islands.3 The Nationalists from this point forward would focus more on Taiwan’s defence, making it much harder for PLA to invade.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Corvettes and Opvs Countering Manpads Air Forces Directory Corvettes and Opvs Countering Manpads Air Forces Directory Singapore
    VOLUME 26/ISSUE 1 FEBRUARY 2018 US$15 ASIA PAcific’s LARGEST CIRCULATED DEFENCE MAGAZINE SINGAPORE’S ARMED FORCES ASIA-PACIFIC MAIN BATTLE TANKS MALE /HALE UAVS CORVETTES AND OPVS COUNTERING MANPADS AIR FORCES DIRECTORY www.asianmilitaryreview.com B:216 mm T:213 mm S:197 mm AQS-24 B:291 mm S:270 mm T:286 mm THE VALUE OF ENSURING AN UNDERSEA ADVANTAGE KNOWS NO BORDERS. Mines don’t recognize borders, nor should the most advanced mine hunting solutions. Only Northrop Grumman’s advanced AQS-24 family of sensors deliver unparalleled performance with complete adaptability. From hardware versatility (deployable from helicopter or unmanned surface vessel) to increased speed in mission execution, the AQS-24 is the future of mine warfare. That’s why we’re a leader in advanced undersea technology. www.northropgrumman.com/minehunter ©2017 Northrop Grumman Corporation 02 | ASIAN MILITARY REVIEW | ©2017 Northrop Grumman Corporation Project Manager: Vanessa Pineda Document Name: NG-MSH-Z35767-B.indd Element: P4CB Current Date: 9-18-2017 11:09 AM Studio Client: Northrop Grumman Bleed: 216 mm w x 291 mm h Studio Artist: DAW Product: MSH Trim: 213 mm w x 286 mm h Proof #: 3-RELEASE Proofreader Creative Tracking: NG-MSH-Z35767 Safety: 197 mm w x 270 mm h Print Scale: None Page 1 of 1 Print Producer Billing Job: NG-MSH-Z35767 Gutter: None InDesign Version: CC 2015 Title: AQS-24 Intl Aus - Asian Military Review Color List: None Art Director Inks: Cyan, Magenta, Yellow, Black Creative Director Document Path: Mechanicals:Northrop_Grumman:NG-MSH:NG-MSH-Z35767:NG-MSH-Z35767-B.indd
    [Show full text]
  • 2013 National Defense Report
    National Defense Report Ministry of National Defense, ROC 2013 1 Minister’s Foreword 17 Introduction 21 Part 1 Strategic Environment 25 Part 2 General Plan of National Defense 73 Chapter 1 Security Situation 26 Chapter 3 National Defense Strategy 74 Section 1 Global Security Environment 27 Section 1 National Defense Policy 75 Section 2 Asia-Pacific Security Situation 34 Section 2 National Defense Strategies 78 Section 3 Military Strategy 85 Chapter 2 Security Challenges 44 Section 1 Current Status and Chapter 4 National Defense Administration 92 Developments of the PLA 45 Section 1 Military Strength Reformation 93 Section 2 Military Capabilities and 94 Threat of the PRC 57 Section 2 Military Service Reformation 98 Section 3 Security Challenges Section 3 Talent Cultivation of the ROC 67 Section 4 Armaments Mechanism 100 Section 5 Military Exchanges 106 Section 6 National Defense Legal System 108 Section 7 Morale and Ethical Education 113 Section 8 Crisis Response 116 Section 9 Care for Servicemen 119 Section 10 Gender Equality 121 2 Part 3 National Defense Capabilities 123 Part 4 All-out National Defense 197 Chapter 5 National Defense Force 124 Chapter 7 All-out Defense 198 Section 1 National Defense Organization 125 Section 1 National Defense Education 199 Section 2 Joint Operations Effectiveness 136 Section 2 Defense Mobilization 204 Section 3 Information and Electronic Warfare Capabilities 141 Chapter 8 Citizen Services 210 Section 4 Logistics Support 144 Section 1 Disaster Prevention and Relief 211 Section 5 Reserve Capability Buildup
    [Show full text]
  • Today's News 18 May 2021
    Today’s News 18 May 2021 (Tuesday) A. NAVY NEWS/COVID NEWS/PHOTOS Title Writer Newspaper Page NIL NIL NIL NIL B. NATIONAL HEADLINES Title Writer Newspaper Page 1 ‘Pandemic response to boost admin bets’ A Romero P Star 1 urged: add more work sectors to jab M Cinco PDI A1 2 Gov’t list C. NATIONAL SECURITY Title Writer Newspaper Page 3 Roque says some Duterte language on A Romero P Star 1 WPS ‘no accurate’ 4 Palace: Nothing to retract in Du30 sea row J Aning PDI A4 remarks 5 Duterte snubbing WPS critics on Enrile’s M Blancaflor D Tribune A1 advice 6 Show of force D Tribune A5 7 Duterte tells US to leave PH alone R Arcilla M Times A4 8 Enrile’s insights on West PH Sea dispute G Kabiling M Bulletin A2 helpful to gov’t- Roque 9 Strategy to enforce the Arbitral Ruling J Lina M Bulletin 5 10 Enrile to Du30: Befriend China J Pañares MST A1 D. INDO-PACIFIC Title Writer Newspaper Page NIL NIL NIL NIL E. AFP RELATED Title Writer Newspaper Page 11 New Army chief assumes post today M Punongbayan P Star 8 F. CPP-NPA-NDF-LCM Title Writer Newspaper Page 12 SC agrees to stop Esperon testimony M Ramos PDI A1 13 NPA committed 1,506 atrocities- AFP official D Reyes M Times A3 NPA committed 1,506 crimes, rights MST 14 A3 violations in past decades 15 28 bomba ng NPA natunton ng militar V Martin Ngayon 9 G. MNLF/MILF/BIFF/ASG Title Writer Newspaper Page A Romero P Star 4 16 ‘Congress OK needed to extend Bangsamoro transition’ 17 3 ASG bandits killed in 2 Basilan clashes L Jocson M Bulletin 8 18 3 ASG men dead in 2 Basilan clashes PNA Tempo 3 19 2 pang BIFF dedo sa sagupaan D Franche Ngayon 9 H.
    [Show full text]
  • Taiwan's Indigenous Defense Industry: Centralized Control of Abundant
    Taiwan’s Indigenous Defense Industry: Centralized Control of Abundant Suppliers David An, Matt Schrader, Ned Collins-Chase May 2018 About the Global Taiwan Institute GTI is a 501(c)(3) non-profit policy incubator dedicated to insightful, cutting-edge, and inclusive research on policy issues regarding Taiwan and the world. Our mission is to enhance the relationship between Taiwan and other countries, especially the United States, through policy research and programs that promote better public understanding about Taiwan and its people. www.globaltaiwan.org About the Authors David An is a senior research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute. David was a political-military affairs officer covering the East Asia region at the U.S. State Department from 2009 to 2014. Mr. An received a State Department Superior Honor Award for initiating this series of political-military visits from senior Taiwan officials, and also for taking the lead on congressional notification of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. He received his M.A. from UCSD Graduate School of Global Policy and Strategy and his B.A. from UC Berkeley. Matt Schrader is the Editor-in-Chief of the China Brief at the Jamestown Foundation, MA candidate at Georgetown University, and previously an intern at GTI. Mr. Schrader has over six years of professional work experience in China. He received his BA from the George Washington University. Ned Collins-Chase is an MA candidate at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and previously an intern at GTI. He has worked in China, been a Peace Corps volunteer in Mo- zambique, and was also an intern at the US State Department.
    [Show full text]
  • Threading the Needle Proposals for U.S
    “Few actions could have a more important impact on U.S.-China relations than returning to the spirit of the U.S.-China Joint Communique of August 17, 1982, signed by our countries’ leaders. This EastWest Institute policy study is a bold and pathbreaking effort to demystify the issue of arms sales to Taiwan, including the important conclusion that neither nation is adhering to its commitment, though both can offer reasons for their actions and views. That is the first step that should lead to honest dialogue and practical steps the United States and China could take to improve this essential relationship.” – George Shultz, former U.S. Secretary of State “This EastWest Institute report represents a significant and bold reframing of an important and long- standing issue. The authors advance the unconventional idea that it is possible to adhere to existing U.S. law and policy, respect China’s legitimate concerns, and stand up appropriately for Taiwan—all at the same time. I believe EWI has, in fact, ‘threaded the needle’ on an exceedingly challenging policy problem and identified a highly promising solution-set in the sensible center: a modest voluntary capping of annual U.S. arms deliveries to Taiwan relative to historical levels concurrent to a modest, but not inconsequential Chinese reduction of its force posture vis-à-vis Taiwan. This study merits serious high-level attention.” – General (ret.) James L. Jones, former U.S. National Security Advisor “I commend co-authors Piin-Fen Kok and David Firestein for taking on, with such skill and methodological rigor, a difficult issue at the core of U.S-China relations: U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Ballistic, Cruise Missile, and Missile Defense Systems: Trade and Significant Developments, June 1994-September 1994
    Missile Developments BALLISTIC, CRUISE MISSILE, AND MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS: TRADE AND SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS, JUNE 1994-SEPTEMBER 1994 RUSSIA WITH AFGHANISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN TAJIKISTAN AUSTRALIA 8/10/94 According to Russian military forces in Dushanbe, the 12th post of the Moscow INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS border troops headquarters in Tajikistan is INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS attacked by missiles fired from Afghan ter- 9/27/94 ritory. The Russians respond with suppres- 7/94 Rocket and mortar attacks leave 58 people sive fire on the missile launcher emplace- It is reported that Australia’s University of dead and 224 wounded in Kabul. Kabul ment; no casualties are reported. Queensland can produce a scramjet air- radio attributes this attack to factions op- Itar-Tass (Moscow), 8/11/94; in FBIS-SOV-94-155, breathing engine, which may offer payload posing President Burhanuddin Rabbani. 8/11/94, p. 36 (4564). and cost advantages over conventional SLVs. More than 100 rockets and mortar shells Chris Schacht, Australian (Sydney), 7/20/94, p. 6; are fired on residential areas of Kabul by 8/27/94 in FBIS-EAS-94-152, 8/8/94, pp. 89-90 (4405). anti-Rabbani militia under the control of During the early morning hours, Tajik Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Mujaheedin launch several missiles at the 7/94 northern warlord General Abdul Rashid Russian Frontier Guard observation posi- It is reported that the Australian government Dostam. tion and post on the Turk Heights in awarded Australia’s AWA Defence Industries Wall Street Journal, 9/28/94, p. 1 (4333). Tajikistan. The missiles are launched from (AWADI) a $17 million contract to produce the area of the Afghan-Tajik border and from the Active Missile Decoy (AMD) system, a Afghan territory, according to the second “hovering rocket-propelled anti-ship missile commander of Russian border guards in decoy system” providing for ship defense against sea-skimming missiles.
    [Show full text]
  • Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike
    (Image Source: Wired.co.uk) Able Archers Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike IAN EASTON September 2014 |Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy and Precision Strike | Draft for Comment Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy in an Age of Precision Strike September 2014 About the Project 2049 Institute The Project 2049 Institute seeks to guide decision makers toward a more secure Asia by the century’s Cover Image Source: Wired.co.uk mid-point. Located in Arlington, Virginia, the organization fills a gap in the public policy realm Above Image: Chung Shyang UAV at Taiwan’s 2007 National Day Parade through forward-looking, region-specific research on alternative security and policy solutions. Its Above Image Source: Wikimedia interdisciplin ary approach draws on rigorous analysis of socioeconomic, governance, military, environmental, technological and political trends, and input from key players in the region, with an eye toward educating the public and informing policy debate. ii |Able Archers: Taiwan Defense Strategy and Precision Strike | Draft for Comment About the Author Ian Easton is a research fellow at the Project 2049 Institute, where he studies defense and security issues in Asia. During the summer of 2013 , he was a visiting fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) in Tokyo. Previously, he worked as a China analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). He lived in Taipei from 2005 to 2010. During his time in Taiwan he worked as a translator for Island Technologies Inc. and the Foundation for Asia-Pacific Peace Studies. He also conducted research with the Asia Bureau Chief of Defense News.
    [Show full text]
  • RSIS COMMENTARIES RSIS Commentaries Are Intended to Provide Timely And, Where Appropriate, Policy Relevant Background and Analysis of Contemporary Developments
    RSIS COMMENTARIES RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the authors are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced electronically or in print with prior permission from RSIS. Due recognition must be given to the author or authors and RSIS. Please email: [email protected] or call (+65) 6790 6982 to speak to the Editor RSIS Commentaries, Yang Razali Kassim. __________________________________________________________________________________________________ No. 85/2011 dated 24 May 2011 Indonesia’s Anti-ship Missiles: New Development in Naval Capabilities By Koh Swee Lean Collin Synopsis The recent Indonesian Navy test-launch of the supersonic Yakhont anti-ship missile marked yet another naval capability breakthrough in Southeast Asia. The Yakhont missile could potentially intensify the ongoing regional naval arms competition. Commentary ON 20 APRIL 2011, the Indonesian Navy (Tentera Nasional Indonesia – Angkatan Laut or TNI-AL) frigate KRI Oswald Siahaan test-fired a Russian-made Yakhont supersonic anti-ship missile during a naval exercise in the Indian Ocean. According to TNI-AL, the missile took about six minutes to travel 250 kilometres to score a direct hit on the target. This test-launch marks yet another significant capability breakthrough amongst Southeast Asian navies. It comes against the backdrop of unresolved
    [Show full text]
  • THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES in the 21St CENTURY Edited By
    THE CHINESE ARMED FORCES IN THE 21st CENTURY Edited by Larry M. Wortzel December 1999 ***** The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at [email protected] ***** Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: http://carlisle-www.army. mil/usassi/welcome.htm ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at [email protected] or by calling (717) 245-3133. ISBN 1-58487-007-9 ii CONTENTS Introduction James R. Lilley..................... v 1. Geographic Ruminations Michael McDevitt ................... 1 2. The Chinese Military and the Peripheral States 1 in the 21st Century: A Security Tour d’Horizon Eric A.
    [Show full text]
  • Chinabrief Volume X  Issue 8  April 16, 2010
    ChinaBrief Volume X Issue 8 April 16, 2010 VOLUME X ISSUE 8 APRIL 16, 2010 IN THIS ISSUE: IN A FORTNIGHT By L.C. Russell Hsiao 1 SYRIA IN CHINA’S NEW SILK ROAD STRATEGY By Christina Y. Lin 3 KARZAI’S STATE VISIT HIGHLIGHTS BEIJING’S AFGHAN PRIORITIES By Richard Weitz 5 TAIWAN’S NAVY: ABLE TO DENY COMMAND OF THE SEA? By James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara 8 CHINESE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES: IMPLICATIONS FOR NAVAL MODERNIZATION By Andrew S. Erickson 11 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan China Brief is a bi-weekly jour- In a Fortnight nal of information and analysis covering Greater China in Eur- asia. IMPLICATIONS OF KYRGYZSTAN REVOLT ON CHINA’S XINJIANG POLICY By L.C. Russell Hsiao China Brief is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation, a s the political crisis in Kyrgyzstan reaches a turning point, after opposition forces private non-profit organization Aseized the capital Bishkek in a bloody clash and ousted the president and his based in Washington D.C. and allies, Chinese leaders from regions across China have reportedly descended upon is edited by L.C. Russell Hsiao. Xinjiang en masse in a rare spectacle that carried with it a heavy political undertone. The sight of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders at the top provincial party- The opinions expressed in secretary level arriving in droves in Xinjiang appears to highlight the importance that China Brief are solely those of the authors, and do not the Chinese leadership attaches to the future of this restive northwestern region in necessarily reflect the views of the People’s Republic that still hangs uncertainly against the backdrop of the violent The Jamestown Foundation.
    [Show full text]
  • A Question of Time: Enhancing Taiwan's Conventional Deterrence
    at George Mason University A QUESTION OF TIME Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture Michael A. Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka with Brian Davis, Matthew Fay, Erik Goepner, Joseph Petrucelli and Erica Seng-White at George Mason University A QUESTION OF TIME Enhancing Taiwan’s Conventional Deterrence Posture Michael A. Hunzeker and Alexander Lanoszka with Brian Davis, Matthew Fay, Erik Goepner, Joseph Petrucelli and Erica Seng-White NOVEMBER 2018 The authors would like to thank Professors Ellen Laipson, Ming Wan, John Gordon, and Aaron Friedberg for feedback on earlier versions of this report, as well as Mr. Kevin Wu for research assistance. The analysis and opinions expressed in this monograph are the authors’ alone. They do not represent the views or positions of George Mason University, the University of Waterloo, Department of Defense, the American Institute in Taiwan, or the Niskanen Center. Copyright ©2018 Center for Security Policy Studies, Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University Library of Congress Control Number: 2018961952 ISBN: 978-1-7329478-1-8 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without written permission from: The Center for Security Policy Studies Schar School of Policy and Government George Mason University 3351 Fairfax Avenue Arlington, Virginia 22201 www.csps.gmu.edu PHOTO CREDITS Cover: RHK111/ Zhang Lei (Flickr, Creative Commons) Page 14: Taiwan Ministry of National Defense Page 32: RHK111/Li Dongdong, Deng Zhiqiang and Liu Huan ( Flickr, Creative Commons) Page 48: RHK111/Wei Jinxin ( Flickr, Creative Commons) Page 62: Times Asi (Flickr, Creative Commons) Page 78: 總統府 (Flickr, Creative Commons) Page 104: tenz1225 (Flickr, Creative Commons) Page 116: Jenna Dobson, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for US
    Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy David A. Shlapak David T. Orletsky Barry A. Wilson Supported by the Smith Richardson Foundation National Security Research Division R The research described in this report was sponsored by the Smith Richardson Foundation. The research was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of RAND’s National Security Research Division. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Shlapak, David A. Dire strait? ; military aspects of the China–Taiwan confrontation and options for U.S. policy / David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, Barry Wilson. p. cm. “MR-1217-SRF.” Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-2897-9 1. Taiwan—Military policy. 2. China—Military policy. 3. United States— Military policy. I. Orletsky, David T., 1963– II. Wilson, Barry, 1959– III. Title. UA853.T28 S55 2000 355'.03355124'9—dc21 00-062657 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. © Copyright 2000 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2000 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] PREFACE Even a half century after the birth of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the Taiwan Strait remains the locus of one of the most dan- gerous military confrontations in the world.
    [Show full text]