University of Denver Digital Commons @ DU Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 1-1-2010 Leadership Analysis: Decision Making in Syria Taylor Reed University of Denver Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd Part of the Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons Recommended Citation Reed, Taylor, "Leadership Analysis: Decision Making in Syria" (2010). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 541. https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/541 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact [email protected],[email protected]. Leadership Analysis Decision Making in Syria __________ A Thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver __________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts __________ by Taylor Reed June 2010 Advisor: Joseph Szyliowiecz i ©Copyright by Taylor Reed 2010 All Rights Reserved Author: Taylor Reed Title: Leadership Analysis: Decision Making in Syria Advisor: Joseph Szyliowicz Degree Date: June 2010 ABSTRACT This thesis is intended to identify the distinctive traits of Syrian leadership. Its purpose is to better serve policy makers as they confront the challenges Syria presents. The first section identifies major research on decision making and leadership analysis. The second section is an analysis of Syria’s leadership components. The third section uses several quantitative methods to identify the leadership traits of President Bashar Al- Assad. A psychological leadership profile of the figurehead creates added complexity to the structural analysis, but is relevant because it has the capability of allowing actual policy makers to deal with their Syrian counterpart. Bashar Al-Assad is found to be a complex dictator by both Middle Eastern and world standards, who is likely to respond to challenges slowly, and with an eye towards his domestic constituency. His regime will continue as long as he can find the right balance between reform and conservation. ii Table of Contents Introduction......................................................................................................................iv Chapter One......................................................................................................................1 Model I..................................................................................................................1 Model II................................................................................................................5 Model III...............................................................................................................8 Groups.................................................................................................................10 Groups Cont’d.....................................................................................................15 Bargaining...........................................................................................................22 Weber..................................................................................................................25 Psychology..........................................................................................................27 Past Designs...................................................................................................28 Risk Taking....................................................................................................31 Qualitative......................................................................................................36 Chapter 1 Conclusion..........................................................................................39 Chapter Two....................................................................................................................43 Ethnicity, Society, War........................................................................................45 Historical Perspective.........................................................................................52 “Qa’idna, Mithalna, Amalna”.................................................................................60 Syria’s Institutions..............................................................................................63 Lesser Players.....................................................................................................70 Situations.............................................................................................................73 Chapter 2 Conclusion..........................................................................................83 Chapter Three..................................................................................................................86 Quantitative.........................................................................................................86 Integrative Complexity..................................................................................87 Trait Analysis.................................................................................................89 Operational Coding........................................................................................92 Trait Analysis of Bashar......................................................................................94 Operational Coding of Bashar..........................................................................105 Chapter 3 Conclusion........................................................................................109 Conclusion.....................................................................................................................111 Bibliography..................................................................................................................119 iii Introduction Syria is a country with a great deal of current relevance. The country is considered an ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has aspirations of becoming a nuclear power. It also has close connections with both Hizbullah and Hamas, considered terrorist groups whose actions have an effect on the state of Israel, a key U.S. ally in the Middle East. Further, Syria is one of two countries to take in the majority of refugees from the Iraq war, many of whom are Sunni, and some of whom are Ba’athists from the former government of Saddam Hussein. The importance of understanding the country cannot be stressed enough. However, this paper will focus on a distinct way of analysis, using a methodology whose primary purpose is not simply academic. Rather, the purpose of this essay is to use the tools of academics to enable foreign policy practitioners to interact in a more comprehensive and positive way with those in the government of Syria, specifically their head of state, Bashar Al-Assad. As a result, this paper will attempt to “bridge the gap.” “Bridging the gap” is a metaphor associated with the influential book by the same title, by Alexander George (1993)...George wrote about the gap between the academic and policy communities, characterizing it as the divide between knowledge and action. He argues that academic knowledge is organized along theoretical and generic lines in order to explain international relations, while policymakers need knowledge about specific actors and problems in foreign policy in order to take action. These organizational differences create a gap that needs to be bridged between the supply of academic knowledge iv and the demand for policy-relevant knowledge.1 This summation of Alexander George by Jerrold M. Post and Stephen G. Walker identifies a 'gap' between the academy and policymakers. This concept is related to a trust issue, or confidence 'gap,' which practitioners have in academics. Academics tend to couch their ideas in dense theory. Conversely, academics lack confidence in practitioners who follow the outmoded concept of a realism incorporating 'simplistic' notions of power. The relevancy of this paper lies in its ability to give policy makers an insight into the actual human being(s) they must interact with, in addition to the structure. The gap analogy may be applied to theories of international relations. Many popular theories explain the structures of international relations, but have a weakness in that they generalize broadly about the individual differences in powerful leaders. For structuralists, individual agency is only important insofar as it determines how actors should behave along a single continuum. Post and Walker write: “Depending on the paradigm at hand, realists see leaders as rational calculators of the relationships between national goals and national power; liberals conceptualize them as conformists to rules embodied in international or domestic institutions; and constructivists characterize them as constrained by cultural norms generated within and between societies.”2 Decision- making theorists see agency as a strong factor in the implementation of policy in international relations. Without agency, diplomats and policy makers fly blind when dealing with actual individuals within a state. The importance of decision making in domestic politics is rarely questioned. 1 Post, citing George 1993. p. 400 2 Post. p. 401-402 v Individuals create policy through the intermediaries of powerful leaders or representatives