HOW W E BECAME POSTHUMAN

Virtual Bodies in

Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics

N. KATHERINE HAYLES

The University of Chicago Press

Chicago er London N. KATHERINE HAYLES is professor of English atthe University of California, Los Angeles. She holds degrees in both chemistry and English. She is the author of The Cosmic Web: Scientific Field Models and Literary Strategies in the Twentieth Century (1984) and Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (1990) and is the editor of Chaos and Order: Complex Dynamics in Literature and Science (1991), the last published by the University of Chicago Press.

The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 1999 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 1999 Printed in the United States of America 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00 3 4 5

ISBN (cloth): 0-226-32145-2 ISBN (paper): 0-226-32146-0

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hayles, N. Katherine. How we became posthuman : virtual bodies in cybernetics, literature, and informatics / N. Katherine Hayles. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN: 0-226-32145-2 (cloth: alk. paper). - ISBN: 0-226-32146-0 (pbk. : alk. paper) l. Artificial intelligence. 2. Cybernetics. 3. Computer science. 4. Virtual reality. 5. Virtual reality in literature. I. Title. Q335.H394 1999 003'.5---dc21 98-36459 CIP

SThe paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for the Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992. Contents

Acknowledgments / ix

Prologue / xi

1. Toward Embodied Virtuality / 1

2. Virtual Bodies and Flickering Signifiers / 25

3. Contesting for the Body ofInformation: The Macy Conferences on Cybernetics / 50

4. Liberal Subjectivity Imperiled: Norbert Wiener and Cybernetic Anxiety / 84

5. From Hyphen to Splice: Cybernetic Syntax in Limho / 113

6. The Second Wave of Cybernetics: From Reflexivity to Self-Organization / 131

7. Turning Reality Inside Out and Right Side Out: Boundary Work in the Mid-Sixties Novels of Philip K. Dick / 160

8. The MaterialityofInformatics / 192

9. Narratives of Artificial Life / 222

10. The Semiotics of Virtuality: Mapping the Posthuman / 247

11. Conclusion: What Does It Mean to Be Posthuman? / 283

Notes / 293

Index /325 Prologue

You are alone in the room, except for two computer terminals flickering in the dim light. You use the terminals to communicate with two entities in an­ other room, whom you cannot see. Relying solely on their responses to your questions, you must decide which is the man, which the woman. Or, in an­ other version of the famous "imitation game" proposed by Alan Turing in his classic 1950 paper "Computer Machinery and Intelligence," you use the responses to decide which is the human, which the machine. 1 One of the entities wants to help you guess correctly. His/herlits best strategy, Turing suggested, may be to answer your questions truthfully. The other entity wants to mislead you. He/she/it will try to reproduce through the words that appear on your terminal the characteristics of the other entity. Your job is to pose questions that can distinguish verbal performance from embodied reality. Ifyou cannot tell the intelligent machine from the intel­ ligent human, your failure proves, Turing argued, that machines can think. Here, at the inaugural moment of the computer age, the erasure of em­ bodiment is performed so that "intelligence" becomes a property of the formal manipulation of symbols rather than enaction in the human life­ world. The Turing test was to set the agenda for artificial intelligence for the next three decades. In the push to achieve machines that can think, re­ searchers performed again and again the erasure of embodiment at the heart of the Turing test. All that mattered was the formal generation and manipulation of informational patterns. Aiding this process was a defini­ tion of information, formalized by Claude Shannon and Norbert Wiener, that conceptualized information as an entity distinct from the substrates carrying it. From this formulation, it was a small step to think ofinformation as a kind of bodiless fluid that could flow between different substrates with­ out loss of meaning or form. Writing nearly four decades after Turing, Hans

xi xii I Prologue Moravec proposed that human identity is essentially an informational pat­ tern rather than an embodied enaction. The proposition can be demon­ strated, he suggested, by downloading human consciousness into a computer, and he imagined a scenario designed to show that this was in principle possible. The Moravec test, in may call it that, is the logical suc­ cessor to the Turing test. Whereas the Turing test was designed to show that machines can perform the thinking previously considered to be an exclu­ sive capacity of the human mind, the Moravec test was designed to show that machines can become the repository of human consciousness-that machines can, for all practical purposes, become human beings. You are the cyborg, and the cyborg is you. In the progression from Turing to Moravec, the part of the Turing test that historically has been foregrounded is the distinction between thinking human and thinking machine. Often forgotten is the first example Turing offered ofdistinguishing between a man and a woman. Ifyour failure to dis­ tinguish correctly between human and machine proves that machines can think, what does it prove if you fail to distinguish woman from man? Why does gender appear in this primal scene of humans meeting their evolu­ tionary successors, intelligent machines? What do gendered bodies have to do with the erasure of embodiment and the subsequent merging of ma­ chine and human intelligence in the figure of the cyborg? In his thoughtful and perceptive intellectual biography of Turing, Andrew Hodges suggests that Turing's predilection was always to deal with the world as if it were a formal puzzle.2 To a remarkable extent, Hodges says, Turing was blind to the distinction between saying and dOing. Turing fundamentally did not understand that "questions involving sex, society, politics or secrets would demonstrate how what it was possible for people to say might be limited not by puzzle-solving intelligence but by the restric­ tions on what might be done" (pp. 423-24). In a fine inSight, Hodges sug­ gests that "the discrete state machine, communicating by teleprinter alone, was like an ideal for [Turing's] own life, in which he would be left alone in a room of his own, to deal with the outside world solely by rational argument. It was the embodiment ofa perfect J. S. Mill liberal, concentrating upon the free will and free speech of the individual" (p. 425). Turing's later embroil­ ment with the police and court system over the question of his homosexu­ ality played out, in a different key, the assumptions embodied in the Turing test. His conviction and the court-ordered hormone treatments for his ho­ mosexuality tragically demonstrated the importance of doing over saying in the coercive order of a homophobiC society with the power to enforce its will upon the bodies of its citizens. Prologue I xiii The perceptiveness of Hodges's biography notwithstanding, he gives a strange interpretation of Turing's inclusion of gender in the imitation game. Gender, according to Hodges, "was in fact a red herring, and one of the few passages of the paper that was not expressed with perfect lucidity. The whole point of this game was that a successful imitation of a woman's responses by a man would not prove anything. Gender depended on facts which were not reducible to sequences of symbols" (p. 415). In the paper itself, however, nowhere does Turing suggest that gender is meant as a counterexample; instead, he makes the two cases rhetorically parallel, indi­ cating through symmetry, if nothing else, that the gender and the hu­ man/machine examples are meant to prove the same thing. Is this simply bad writing, as Hodges argues, an inability to express an intended opposi­ tion between the construction of gender and the construction of thought? Or, on the contrary, does the writing express a parallelism too explosive and subversive for Hodges to acknowledge? If so, now we have two mysteries instead of one. Why does Turing in­ clude gender, and why does Hodges want to read this inclusion as indicat­ ing that, so far as gender is concerned, verbal performance cannot be equated with embodied reality? One way to frame these mysteries is to see them as attempts to transgress and reinforce the boundaries of the subject, respectively. By including gender, Turing implied that renegotiating the boundary between human and machine would involve more than trans­ forming the question of"who can think" into "what can think." It would also necessarily bring into question other characteristics of the liberal sub­ ject, for it made the crucial move of distinguishing between the enacted body, present in the flesh on one side of the computer screen, and the rep­ resented body, produced through the verbal and semiotic markers consti­ tuting it in an electronic environment. This construction necessarily makes the subject into a cyborg, for the enacted and represented bodies are brought into conjunction through the technology that connects them. If you distinguish correctly which is the man and which the woman, you in ef­ fect reunite the enacted and the represented bodies into a Single gender identity. The very existence of the test, however, implies that you may also make the wrong choice. Thus the test functions to create the possibility of a disjunction between the enacted and the represented bodies, regardless which choice you make. What the Turing test "proves" is that the overlay between the enacted and the represented bodies is no longer a natural in­ evitability but a contingent production, mediated by a technology that has become so entwined with the production of identity that it can no longer meaningfully be separated from the human subject. To pose the question xiv / Prologue of "what can think" inevitably also changes, in a reverse feedback loop, the terms of "who can think." On this view, Hodges's reading of the gender test as nonsignifying with respect to identity can be seen as an attempt to safeguard the boundaries of the subject from precisely this kind of transformation, to insist that the ex­ istence of thinking machines will not necessarily affect what being human means. That Hodges's reading is a misreading indicates he is willing to prac­ tice violence upon the text to wrench meaning away from the direction to­ ward which the Turing test points, back to safer ground where embodiment secures the univocality of gender. I think he is wrong about embodiment's securing the univocality of gender and wrong about its securing human identity, but right about the importance of putting embodiment back into the picture. What embodiment secures is not the distinction between male and female or between humans who can think and machines which cannot. Rather, embodiment makes clear that thought is a much broader cognitive function depending for its specificities on the embodied form enacting it. This realization, with all its exfoliating implications, is so broad in its effects and so deep in its consequences that it is transforming the liberal subject, regarded as the model of the human since the Enlightenment, into the posthuman. Think of the Turing test as a magic trick. Like all good magic tricks, the test relies on getting you to accept at an early stage assumptions that will de­ termine how you interpret what you see later. The important intervention comes not when you try to determine which is the man, the woman, or the machine. Rather, the important intervention comes much earlier, when the test puts you into a cybernetic circuit that splices your will, desire, and per­ ception into a distributed cognitive system in which represented bodies are joined with enacted bodies through mutating and flexible machine inter­ faces. As you gaze at the flickering signifiers scrolling down the computer screens, no matter what identifications you assign to the embodied entities that you cannot see, you have already become posthuman...... C b ..0 .. p. f. e.r ... O.o.e

TOWARD EMBODIED VIRTUALITY

We needfirst to understand that the human form-including human desire and all its external representations-may be changing radically, and thus must be re-visioned. We need to understand that five hundred years ofhumanism may be coming to an end as humanism transforms itselfinto something that we must helplessly call post-humanism. Ihab Hassan, "Prometheus as Perfonner: Towards a Posthumanist Culture?"

This book began with a roboticist's dream that struck me as a nightmare. I was reading Hans Moravec's Mind Children: The Future ofRobot and Hu­ man Intelligence, enjoying the ingenious variety of his robots, when I hap­ pened upon the passage where he argues it will soon be possible to download human consciousness into a computer. l To illustrate, he invents a fantasy scenario in which a robot surgeon purees the human brain in a kind ofcranial liposuction, reading the information in each molecular layer as it is stripped away and transferring the information into a computer. At the end of the operation, the cranial cavity is empty, and the patient, now in­ habiting the metallic body of the computer, wakens to find his conscious­ ness exactly the same as it was before. How, I asked myself, was it possible for someone of Moravec's obvious intelligence to believe that mind could be separated from body? Even as­ suming such a separation was possible, how could anyone think that con­ sciousness in an entirely different medium would remain unchanged, as if it had no connection with embodiment? Shocked into awareness, I began noticing he was far from alone. As early as the 1950s, Norbert Wiener pro­ posed it was theoretically possible to telegraph a human being, a suggestion underlaid by the same assumptions informing Moravec's scenario.2 The producers of Star Trek operate from similar premises when they imagine that the body can be dematerialized into an informational pattern and re­ materialized, without change, at a remote location. Nor is the idea confined to what Beth Loffreda has called "pulp science."3 Much of the discourse on molecular biology treats information as the essential code the body ex­ presses, a practice that has certain affinities with Moravec's ideas.4 In fact, a defining characteristic ofthe present cultural moment is the beliefthat in­ formation can circulate unchanged among different material substrates. It 2 I Chapter One is not for nothing that "Beam me up, Scotty," has become a cultural icon for the global informational society. Following this thread, I was led into a maze ofdevelopments that turned into a six-year odyssey of researching archives in the history ofcybernetics, interviewing scientists in computational biology and artificial life, reading cultural and literary texts concerned with information technologies, visit­ ing laboratories engaged in research on virtual reality, and grappling with technical articles in cybernetics, information theory, autopoiesis, com­ puter simulation, and cognitive science. Slowly this unruly mass of material began taking shape as three interrelated stories. The first centers on how information lost its body, that is, how it came to be conceptualized as an en­ tity separate from the materialforms in which it is thought to be embedded. The second story concerns how the cyborg was created as a technological artifact and cultural icon in the years follOwing World War II. The third, deeply implicated with the first two, is the unfolding story of how a histori­ cally specific construction called the human is giving way to a different con­ struction called the posthuman. Interrelations between the three stories are extensive. Central to the construction of the cyborg are informational pathways connecting the or­ ganic body to its prosthetic extensions. This presumes a conception of in­ formation as a (disembodied) entity that can flow between carbon-based organic components and silicon-based electronic components to make protein and silicon operate as a Single system. When information loses its body, equating humans and computers is especially easy, for the materiality in which the thinking mind is instantiated appears incidental to its essential nature. Moreover, the idea of the feedback loop implies that the bound­ aries of the autonomous subject are up for grabs, since feedback loops can flow not only within the subject but also between the subject and the envi­ ronment. From Norbert Wiener on, the flow of information through feed­ back loops has been associated with the deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject, the version of the "human" with which I will be con­ cerned. Although the "posthuman" differs in its articulations, a common theme is the union of the human with the intelligent machine. What is the posthuman? Think of it as a point of view characterized by the follOwing assumptions. (I do not mean this list to be exclusive or defini­ tive. Rather, it names elements found at a variety of sites. It is meant to be suggestive rather than prescriptive.)5 First, the posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an in­ evitabilityoflife. Second, the posthuman view considers consciousness, re- Toward Embodied Virtuality I 3 garded as the seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an epiphenomenon, as an evo­ lutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow. Third, the posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or re­ placing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born. Fourth, and most important, by these and other means, the posthuman view configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily exis­ tence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological or­ ganism, robot teleology and human goals. To elucidate the Significant shift in underlying assumptions about sub­ jectivity signaled by the posthuman, we can recall one of the definitive texts characterizing the liberal humanist subject: C. B. Macpherson's analysis of possessive individualism. "Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capaci­ ties, owing nothing to society for them . ... The human essence is freedom from the wills ofothers, and freedom is a function of possession."6 The ital­ icized phrases mark convenient points of departure for measuring the dis­ tance between the human and the posthuman. "Owing nothing to society" comes from arguments Hobbes and Locke constructed about humans in a "state of nature" before market relations arose. Because ownership of one­ self is thought to predate market relations and owe nothing to them, it forms a foundation upon which those relations can be built, as when one sells one's labor for wages. As Macpherson points out, however, this imag­ ined "state of nature" is a retrospective creation ofa market society. The lib­ eral self is produced by market relations and does not in fact predate them. This paradox (as Macpherson calls it) is resolved in the posthuman by doing away with the "natural" self. The posthuman subject is an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction and reconstruction. Consider the six-million-dollar man, a paradigmatic citizen of the posthu­ man regime. As his name implies, the parts of the self are indeed owned, but they are owned precisely because they were purchased, not because ownership is a natural condition preexisting market relations. Similarly, the presumption that there is an agency, desire, or will belonging to the self and clearly distinguished from the "wills of others" is undercut in the posthu­ man, for the posthuman's collective heterogeneous quality implies a dis­ tributed cognition located in disparate parts that may be in only tenuous 4 / Chapter One communication with one another. We have only to recall Robocop's mem­ ory flashes that interfere with his programmed directives to understand how the distributed cognition of the posthuman complicates individual agency. If"human essence is freedom from the wills of others," the posthu­ man is "post" not because it is necessarily unfree but because there is no a priori way to identify a self-will that can be clearly distingUished from an other-will. Although these examples foreground the cybernetic aspect of the posthuman, it is important to recognize that the construction of the posthuman does not require the subject to be a literal cyborg. Whether or not interventions have been made on the body, new models of subjectivity emerging from such fields as cognitive science and artificial life imply that even a biologically unaltered Homo sapiens counts as posthuman. The de­ fining characteristics involve the construction of subjectivity, not the pres­ ence of nonbiological components. What to make of this shift from the human to the posthuman, which both evokes terror and excites pleasure? The liberal humanist subject has, of course, been cogently criticized from a number of perspectives. Feminist theorists have pointed out that it has historically been constructed as a white European male, presuming a universality that has worked to sup­ press and disenfranchise women's voices; postcolonial theorists have taken issue not only with the universality of the (white male) liberal subject but also with the very idea of a unified, consistent identity, fOCUSing instead on hybridity; and postmodern theorists such as Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have linked it with capitalism, arguing for the liberatory potential of a dispersed subjectivity distributed among diverse desiring machines they call "body without organs."7 Although the deconstruction of the lib­ eral humanist subject in cybernetiCS has some affinities with these perspec­ tives, it proceeded primarily along lines that sought to understand human being as a set of informational processes. Because information had lost its body, this construction implied that embodiment is not essential to human being. Embodiment has been systematically downplayed or erased in the cybernetic construction of the posthuman in ways that have not occurred in other critiques of the liberal humanist subject, espeCially in feminist and postcolonial theories. Indeed, one could argue that the erasure of embodiment is a feature common to both the liberal humanist subject and the cybernetic posthu­ man. Identified with the rational mind, the liberal subject possessed a body but was not usually represented as being a body. Only because the body is not identified with the self is it possible to claim for the liberal subject its notorious universality, a claim that depends on erasing markers of bodily Toward Embodied Virtuality / 5 difference, including sex, race, and ethnicity.8 Gillian Brown, in her influ­ ential study of the relation between humanism and anorexia, shows that the anoretic's struggle to "decrement" the body is possible precisely because the body is understood as an object for control and mastery rather than as an intrinsic part of the self. Quoting an anoretic's remark-"You make out ofyour body your very own kingdom where you are the tyrant, the absolute dictator" - Brown states, "Anorexia is thus a fight for self-control, a flight from the slavery food threatens; self-sustaining self-possession indepen­ dent of bodily desires is the anoretic's crucial goal."g In taking the self-pos­ session implied by liberal humanism to the extreme, the anoretic creates a physical image that, in its skeletal emaciation, serves as material testimony that the locus of the liberal humanist subject lies in the mind, not the body. Although in many ways the posthuman deconstructs the liberal humanist subject, it thus shares with its predecessor an emphaSiS on cognition rather than embodiment. William Gibson makes the point vividly in Neuro­ mancer when the narrator characterizes the posthuman body as "data made flesh."lOTo the extent that the posthuman constructs embodiment as the instantiation of thought/information, it continues the liberal tradition rather than disrupts it. In tracing these continuities and discontinuities between a "natural" self and a cybernetic posthuman, I am not trying to recuperate the liberal sub­ ject. Although I think that serious consideration needs to be given to how certain characteristics associated with the liberal subject, especially agency and choice, can be articulated within a posthuman context, I do not mourn the passing of a concept so deeply entwined with projects of domination and oppression. Rather, I view the present moment as a critical juncture when interventions might be made to keep disembodiment from being rewritten, once again, into prevailing concepts of subjectivity. I see the de­ construction of the liberal humanist subject as an opportunity to put back into the picture the flesh that continues to be erased in contemporary dis­ cussions about cybernetic subjects. Hence my focus on how information lost its body, for this story is central to creating what Arthur Kroker has called the "flesh-eating 90s."11 If my nightmare is a culture inhabited by posthumans who regard their bodies as fashion accessories rather than the ground of being, my dream is a version of the posthuman that embraces the possibilities of information technologies without being seduced by fan­ tasies of unlimited power and disembodied immortality, that recognizes and celebrates finitude as a condition of human being, and that under­ stands human life is embedded in a material world of great complexity, one on which we depend for our continued survival. 6 / Chapter One Perhaps it will now be clear that I mean my title, How We Became Posthuman, to connote multiple ironies, which do not prevent it from also being taken seriously. Taken straight, this title points to models of subjec­ tivity sufficiently different from the liberal subject that if one assigns the term "human" to this subject, it makes sense to call the successor "posthu­ man." Some of the historical processes leading to this transformation are documented here, and in this sense the book makes good on its title. Yet my argument will repeatedly demonstrate that these changes were never com­ plete transformations or sharp breaks; without exception, they reinscribed traditional ideas and assumptions even as they articulated something new. The changes announced by the title thus mean something more complex than "That was then, this is now." Rather, "human" and "posthuman" coex­ ist in shifting configurations that vary with historically specific contexts. Given these complexities, the past tense in the title-"became" -is in­ tended both to offer the reader the pleasurable shock of a double take and to reference ironically apocalyptic visions such as Moravec's prediction of a "postbiological" future for the human race. Amplifying the ambiguities of the past tense are the ambiguities of the plural. In one sense, "we" refers to the readers of this book-readers who, by becoming aware of these new models of subjectivity (if they are not al­ ready familiar with them), may begin thinking of their actions in ways that have more in common with the posthuman than the human. Speaking for myself, I now find myself saying things like, "Well, my sleep agent wants to rest, but my food agent says I should go to the store." Each person who thinks this way begins to envision herself or himself as a posthuman collec­ tivity, an "I" transformed into the "we" of autonomous agents operating to­ gether to make a self. The infectious power of this way of thinking gives "we" a performative dimension. People become posthuman because they think they are posthuman. In another sense "we," like "became," is meant ironically, positioning itself in opposition to the techno-ecstasies found in various magazines, such as Mondo 2000, which customarily speak of the transformation into the posthuman as if it were a universal human condi­ tion when in fact it affects only a small fraction of the world's population­ a pOint to which I will return. The larger trajectory of my narrative arcs from the initial moments when cybernetics was formulated as a discipline, through a period of reformula­ tion known as "second-order cybernetics," to contemporary debates swirling around an emerging discipline known as "artificial life." Although the progression is chronolOgical, this book is not meant to be a history of cy­ bernetics. Many figures not discussed here played important roles in that Toward Embodied Virtuality / 7 history, and I have not attempted to detail their contributions. Rather, my selection of theories and researchers has been dictated by a desire to show the complex interplays between embodied forms ofsubjectivity and argu­ ments for disembodiment throughout the cybernetic tradition. In broad outline, these interplays occurred in three distinct waves of development. The first, from 1945 to 1960, took homeostasis as a central concept; the sec­ ond, going roughly from 1960 to 1980, revolved around reflexivity; and the third, stretching from 1980 to the present, highlights virtuality. Let me turn now to a brief sketch of these three periods. During the foundational era of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, John von Neumann, Claude Shannon, Warren McCulloch, and dozens of other distinguished researchers met at annual conferences sponsored by the JOSiah Macy Foundation to formulate the central concepts that, in their high expectations, would coalesce into a theory of communication and control applying equally to animals, humans, and machines. Retrospectively called the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics, these meetings, held from 1943 to 1954, were instrumental in forging a new paradigm.12 To succeed, they needed a theory of information (Shannon's bailiwick), a model of neural functioning that showed how neurons worked as information-processing systems (McCulloch's lifework), computers that processed binary code and that could conceivably reproduce themselves, thus reinforcing the analogy with biolOgical systems (von Neumann's specialty), and a visionary who could articulate the larger implications of the cybernetic paradigm and make clear its cosmic significance (Wiener's contribution). The result of this breathtaking enterprise was nothing less than a new way oflooking at human beings. Henceforth, humans were to be seen primarily as information-pro­ cessing entities who are essentially similar to intelligent machines. The revolutionary implications of this paradigm notwithstanding, Wiener did not intend to dismantle the liberal humanist subject. He was less interested in seeing humans as machines than he was in fashioning hu­ man and machine alike in the image of an autonomous, self-directed indi­ vidual. In aligning cybernetiCS with liberal humanism, he was following a strain of thought that, since the Enlightenment, had argued that human be­ ings could be trusted with freedom because they and the social structures they devised operated as self-regulating mechanisms. 13 For Wiener, cy­ bernetics was a means to extend liberal humanism, not subvert it. The point was less to show that man was a machine than to demonstrate that a ma­ chine could function like a man. Yet the cybernetic perspective had a certain inexorable lOgiC that, espe­ cially when fed by wartime hysteria, also worked to undermine the very lib- 8 / Chapter One eral subjectivity that Wiener wanted to preserve. These tensions were kept under control during the Macy period partly through a strong emphasis on homeostasis. 14 Traditionally, homeostasis had been understood as the ability ofliving organisms to maintain steady states when they are buffeted by fickle environments. When the temperature soars, sweat pours out of the human body so that its internal temperature can remain relatively stable. During the Macy period, the idea of homeostasis was extended to machines. Like ani­ mals, machines can maintain homeostasis using feedback loops. Feedback loops had long been exploited to increase the stability of mechanical systems, reaching a high level of development during the mid-to-Iate nineteenth cen­ tury with the growing sophistication of steam engines and their accompany­ ing control devices, such as governors. It was not until the 1930s and 1940s, however, that the feedback loop was explicitly theorized as a flow ofinforma­ tion. Cybernetics was born when nineteenth-century control theory joined with the nascent theory of information. IS Coined from the Creek word for "steersman," cybernetics signaled that three powerful actors-information, control, and communication-were now operating jointly to bring about an unprecedented synthesis of the organic and the mechanical. Although the informational feedback loop was initially linked with homeostasis, it quickly led to the more threatening and subversive idea of reflexivity. A few years ago I co-taught, with a philosopher and a phYSiCist, a course on reflexivity. As we discussed reflexivity in the writings of Aristotle, Fichte, Kierkegaard, Codel, Turing, Borges, and Calvino, aided by the in­ sightful analyses of Roger Penrose and Douglas Hofstader, I was struck not only by the concept's extraordinarily rich history but also by its tendency to mutate, so that virtually any formulation is sure to leave out some relevant instances. Instructed by the experience, I offer the follOwing tentative def­ inition, which I hope will prove adequate for our purposes here. Reflexivity is the rrwvement whereby that which has been used to generate a system is made, through a changed perspective, to become part ofthe system it gen­ erates. When Kurt Codel invented a method of coding that allowed state­ ments of number theory also to function as statements about number theory, he entangled that which generates the system with the system. When M. C. Escher drew two hands drawing each other, he took that which is presumed to generate the picture-the sketching hand-and made it part of the picture it draws. When Jorge Luis Borges in "The Circular Ru­ ins" imagines a narrator who creates a student through his dreaming only to discover that he himself is being dreamed by another, the system gene rat - ing a reality is shown to be part of the reality it makes. As these examples il­ lustrate, reflexivity has subversive effects because it confuses and entangles Toward Embodied Virtuality / 9 the boundaries we impose on the world in order to make sense of that world. Reflexivity tends notoriously toward infinite regress. The dreamer creates the student, but the dreamer in tum is dreamed by another, who in his tum is dreamed by someone else, and so on to infinity. This definition of reflexivity has much in common with some of the most influential and provocative recent work in critical theory, cultural studies, and the social studies of science. Typically, these works make the reflexive move of showing that an attribute previously considered to have emerged from a set of preexisting conditions is in fact used to generate the condi­ tions. In Nancy Armstrong's Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political His­ tory of the Novel, for example, bourgeOiS femininity is shown to be constructed through the domestic fictions that represent it as already in place.16 In Michael Warner's The Letters ofthe RepubliC: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America, the founding document of the United States, the Constitution, is shown to produce the very people whose existence it presupposes.17 In Bruno Latour's Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, scientific experi­ ments are shown to produce the nature whose existence they predicate as their condition of possibility. 18 It is only a slight exaggeration to say that contemporary critical theory is produced by the reflexivity that it also pro­ duces (an observation that is, of course, also reflexive). Reflexivity entered cybernetics primarily through discussions about the observer. By and large, first-wave cybernetics followed traditional scientific protocols in considering observers to be outside the system they observe. Yet cybernetics also had implications that subverted this premise. The objectivist view sees information flOwing from the system to the ob­ servers, but feedback can also loop through the observers, drawing them in to become part of the system being observed. Although participants re­ marked on this aspect of the cybernetic paradigm throughout the Macy transcripts, they lacked a single word to describe it. To my knowledge, the word "reflexivity" does not appear in the transcripts. This meant they had no handle with which to grasp this slippery concept, no Signifier that would help to constitute as well as to describe the changed perspective that reflexivity entails. Discussions of the idea remained diffuse. Most participants did not go beyond remarking on the shifting boundaries between observer and sys­ tem that cybernetics puts into play. With some exceptions, deeper formula­ tions of the problem failed to coalesce during the Macy discussions. The most notable exception turned out to hurt more than it helped. Lawrence Kubie, a hard-line Freudian psychoanalyst, introduced a re­ flexive perspective when he argued that every utterance is doubly encoded, 10 / Chapter One acting both as a statement about the outside world and as a mirror reflecting the speaker's psyche. If reflexivity was already a subversive concept, this in­ terpretation made it doubly so, for it threatened to dissolve the premise of scientific objectivity shared by the physical scientists in the Macy group. Their reactions to Kubie's presentations show them shying away from re­ flexivity, preferring to shift the conversation onto more comfortable ground. Nevertheless, the idea hung in the air, and a few key thinkers-especially Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, and Heinz von Foerster-resolved to pursue it after the Macy Conferences ran out of steam. The second wave of cybernetics grew out of attempts to incorporate re­ flexivity into the cybernetic paradigm at a fundamental level. The key issue was how systems are constituted as such, and the key problem was how to redefine homeostatic systems so that the observer can be taken into account. The second wave was initiated by, among others, Heinz von Foerster, the Austrian emigre who became coeditor of the Macy tran­ scripts. This phase can be dated from 1960, when von Foerster wrote the first of the essays that were later collected in his influential book Observing Systems. 19 As von Foerster's punning title recognizes, the observer of sys­ tems can himself be constituted as a system to be observed. Von Foerster called the models he presented in these essays "second-order cybernetics" because they extended cybernetic principles to the cyberneticians them­ selves. The second wave reached its mature phase with the publication of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela's Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization ofthe Living. 20 Building on Maturana's work on reflexivity in sensory processing and Varela's on the dynamics of autonomous biologi­ cal systems, the two authors expanded the reflexive tum into a fully articu­ lated epistemology that sees the world as a set of informationally closed systems. Organisms respond to their environment in ways determined by their internal self-organization. Their one and only goal is continually to produce and reproduce the organization that defines them as systems. Hence, they not only are self-organizing but also are autopoietic, or self­ making. Through Maturana and Varela's work and that of other influential theorists such as German SOCiologist Niklas Luhmann,21 cybernetics by 1980 had spun off from the idea of reflexive feedback loops a theory of au­ topoiesis with sweeping epistemological implications. In a sense, autopoiesis turns the cybernetic paradigm inside out. Its cen­ tral premise-that systems are informationally closed-radically alters the idea of the informational feedback loop, for the loop no longer func­ tions to connect a system to its environment. In the autopoietic view, no information crosses the boundary separating the system from its environ- Toward Embodied Virtuality / /I ment. We do not see a world "out there" that exists apart from us. Rather, we see only what our systemic organization allows us to see. The environ­ ment merely triggers changes determined by the system's own structural properties. Thus the center of interest for autopoiesis shifts from the cy­ bernetics of the observed system to the cybernetics of the observer. Au­ topoiesis also changes the explanation of what circulates through the system to make it work as a system. The emphasis now is on the mutually constitutive interactions between the components of a system rather than on message, signal, or information. Indeed, one could say either that infor­ mation does not exist in this paradigm or that it has sunk so deeply into the system as to become indistinguishable from the organizational properties defining the system as such. The third wave swelled into existence when self-organization began to be understood not merely as the (re)production of internal organization but as the springboard to emergence. In the rapidly emerging field of arti­ ficiallife, computer programs are designed to allow "creatures" (that is, dis­ crete packets of computer codes) to evolve spontaneously in directions the programmer may not have anticipated. The intent is to evolve the capacity to evolve. Some researchers have argued that such self-evolving programs are not merely models oflife but are themselves alive. What assumptions make this claim plausible? Ifone sees the universe as composed essentially of information, it makes sense that these "creatures" are life forms because they have the form oflife, that is, an informational code. As a result, the the­ oretical bases used to categorize all life undergo a significant shift. As we shall see in chapters 9 and 10, when these theories are applied to human be­ ings, H onw sapiens are so transfigured in conception and purpose that they can appropriately be called posthuman. The emergence of the posthuman as an informational-material entity is paralleled and reinforced by a corresponding reinterpretation of the deep structures of the phYSical world. Some theorists, notably Edward Fredkin and Stephen Wolfram, claim that reality is a program run on a cosmic com­ puter.22 In this view, a universal informational code underlies the structure of matter, energy, spacetime-indeed, ofeverything that exists. The code is instantiated in cellular automata, elementary units that can occupy two states: on or off. Although the jury is still out on the cellular automata model, it may indeed prove to be a robust way to understand reality. Even now, a re­ search team headed by Fredkin is working on shOwing how quantum me­ chanics can be derived from an underlying cellular automata model. What happens to the embodied lifeworld of humans in this paradigm? In itself, the cellular automata model is not necessarily incompatible with 12 / Chapter One recognizing that humans are embodied beings, for embodiment can flow from cellular automata as easily as from atoms. No one suggests that be­ cause atoms are mostly empty space, we can shuck the electron shells and do away with occupying space altogether. Yet the cultural contexts and technological histories in which cellular automata theories are embedded encourage a comparable fantasy-that because we are essentially inform a­ tion, we can do away with the body. Central to this argument is a conceptu­ alization that sees information and materiality as distinct entities. This separation allows the construction of a hierarchy in which information is given the dominant position and materiality runs a distant second. As though we had learned nothing from Derrida about supplementarity, em­ bodiment continues to be discussed as if it were a supplement to be purged from the dominant term of information, an accident of evolution we are now in a position to correct. It is this materiality/information separation that I want to contest-not the cellular automata model, information theory, or a host of related theo­ ries in themselves. My strategy is to complicate the leap from embodied re­ ality to abstract information by pointing to moments when the assumptions involved in this move were contested by other researchers in the field and so became especially visible. The point of highlighting such moments is to make clear how much had to be erased to arrive at such abstractions as bod­ iless information. Abstraction is of course an essential component in all theOrizing, for no theory can account for the infinite multiplicity of our in­ teractions with the real. But when we make moves that erase the world's multiplicity, we risk losing Sight of the variegated leaves, fractal branchings, and particular bark textures that make up the forest. In the pages that fol­ low, I will identifY two moves in particular that played important roles in constructing the information/materiality hierarchy. Irreverently, I think of them as the Platonic backhand and forehand. The Platonic backhand works by inferring from the world's noisy multi­ plicity a Simplified abstraction. So far so good: this is what theOrizing should do. The problem comes when the move circles around to constitute the ab­ straction as the originary form from which the world's multiplicity derives. Then complexity appears as a "fuzzing up" ofan essential reality rather than as a manifestation ofthe world's holistic nature. Whereas the platonic backhand has a history dating back to the Greeks, the Platonic forehand is more recent. To reach fully developed form, it required the assistance ofpowerful comput­ ers. This move starts from simplified abstractions and, using simulation tech­ niques such as genetic algorithms, evolves a multiplicity sufficiently complex that it can be seen as a world ofits own. The two moves thus make their play in Toward Embodied Virtuality / 13 opposite directions. The backhand goes from noisy multiplicity to reductive simplicity, whereas the forehand swings from simplicity to mulilicity. They share a common ideology-privileging the abstract as the Real and down­ playing the importance of material instantiation. When they work together, they lay the groundwork for a new variation on an ancient game, in which dis­ embodied information becomes the ultimate Platonic Form. If we can cap­ ture the Form of ones and zeros in a nonbiological medium-say, on a computer disk-why do we need the body's superfluous flesh? Whether the enabling assumptions for this conception of information occur in information theory, cybernetics, or popular science books such as Mind Children, their appeal is clear. Information viewed as pattern and not tied to a particular instantiation is information free to travel across time and space. Hackers are not the only ones who believe that information wants to be free. The great dream and promise of information is that it can be free from the material constraints that govern the mortal world. Marvin Minsky precisely expressed this dream when, in a recent lecture, he suggested it will soon be possible to extract human memories from the brain and import them, intact and unchanged, to computer disks.23 The clear implication is that ifwe can become the information we have constructed, we can achieve effective immortality. In the face of such a powerful dream, it can be a shock to remember that for information to exist, it must always be instantiated in a medium, whether that medium is the page from the Bell Laboratories Journal on which Shannon's equations are printed, the computer-generated topolOgi­ cal maps used by the Human Genome Project, or the cathode ray tube on which virtual worlds are imaged. The point is not only that abstracting in­ formation from a material base is an imaginary act but also, and more fun­ damentally, that conceiving of information as a thing separate from the medium instantiating it is a prior imaginary act that constructs a holistic phenomenon as an information/matter duality.24 The chapters that follow will show what had to be elided, suppressed, and forgotten to make information lose its body. This book is a "rememory" in the sense of Toni Morrison's Beloved: putting back together parts that have lost touch with one another and reaching out toward a complexity too unruly to fit into disembodied ones and zeros.

Seriation, Skeuomorphs, and Conceptual Constellations The foregOing leads to a strategic definition of "virtuality." Virtuality is the cultural perception that material objects are interpenetrated by informa- 14 I Chapter One tion patterns. The definition plays off the duality at the heart of the condi­ tion of virtuality-materiality on the one hand, information on the other. Normally virtuality is associated with computer simulations that put the body into a feedback loop with a computer-generated image. For example, in virtual Ping-Pong, one swings a paddle wired into a computer, which cal­ culates from the paddle's momentum and position where the ball would go. Instead ofhitting a real ball, the player makes the appropriate motions with the paddle and watches the image of the ball on a computer monitor. Thus the game takes place partly in real life (RL) and partly in virtual reality (VR). Virtual reality technologies are fascinating because they make visually im­ mediate the perception that a world of information exists parallel to the "real" world, the former intersecting the latter at many points and in many ways. Hence the definition's strategic quality, strategic because it seeks to connect virtual technologies with the sense, pervasive in the late twentieth century, that all material objects are interpenetrated by flows of informa­ tion, from DNA code to the global reach of the World Wide Web. Seeing the world as an interplay between informational patterns and material objects is a histOrically specific construction that emerged in the wake of World War II. 25 By 1948, the distinction had coalesced suffiCiently for Wiener to articulate it as a criterion that any adequate theory of materi­ ality would be forced to meet. "Information is information, not matter or energy. No materialism which does not admit this can survive at the present day."26 Wiener knew as well as anyone else that to succeed, this conception of information required artifacts that could embody it and make it real. When I say virtuality is a cultural perception, I do not mean that it is merely a psychological phenomenon. It is instantiated in an array ofpowerful tech­ nologies. The perception ofvirtuality facilitates the development ofvirtual technolOgies, and the technologies reinforce the perception. The feedback loops that run between technologies and perceptions, ar­ tifacts and ideas, have important implications for how historical change oc­ curs. The development ofcybernetics followed neither a Kuhnian model of incommensurable paradigms nor a Foucauldian model of sharp epistemic breaks.27 In the history of cybernetics, ideas were rarely made up out of whole cloth. Rather, they were fabricated in a pattern of overlapping repli­ cation and innovation, a pattern that I call "seriation" (a term appropriated from archaeolOgical anthropology). A brief explanation may clarifY this concept. Within archaeolOgical anthropology, changes in artifacts are cus­ tomarily mapped through seriation charts. One constructs a seriation chart by parsing an artifact as a set of attributes that change over time. Suppose a researcher wants to construct a seriation chart for lamps. A key attribute is Toward Embodied Virtuality I 15 the element that gives off light. The first lamps, dating from thousands of years ago, used wicks for this element. Later, with the discovery of electric­ ity, wicks gave way to filaments. The figures that customarily emerge from this kind of analysis are shaped like a tiger's iris-narrow at the top when an attribute first begins to be introduced, with a bulge in the middle during the heyday of the attribute, and tapered off at the bottom as the shift to a new model is completed. On a seriation chart for lamps, a line drawn at 1890 would show the figure for wicks waxing large with the figure for filaments intersected at the narrow tip of the top end. Fiftyyears later, the wick figure would be tapering off, and the filament figure would be widening into its middle section. Considered as a set, the figures depicting changes in the at­ tributes of an artifact reveal patterns ofoverlapping innovation and replica­ tion. Some attributes change from one model to the next, but others remain the same. As figure 1 illustrates, the conceptual shifts that took place during the development ofcybernetics display a seriated pattern reminiscent of mate­ rial changes in artifacts. Conceptual fields evolve similarly to material cul­ ture, in part because concept and artifact engage each other in continuous feedback loops. An artifact materially expresses the concept it embodies, but the process of its construction is far from passive. A glitch has to be fixed, a material exhibits unexpected properties, an emergent behavior sur­ faces-any of these challenges can give rise to a new concept, which results in another generation of artifact, which leads to the development of still other concepts. The reasoning suggests that we should be able to trace the development of a conceptual field by using a seriation chart analogous to the seriation charts used for artifacts. In the course of the Macy Conferences, certain ideas came to be associ­ ated with each other. Through a cumulative process that continued across several years of discussions, these ideas were seen as mutually entailing each other until, like love and marriage, they were viewed by the partici­ pants as naturally going together. Such a constellation is the conceptual en­ tity corresponding to an artifact, possessing an internal coherence that defines it as an operational unit. Its formation marks the beginning of a pe­ riod; its disassembly and reconstruction Signal the transition to a different period. Indeed, periods are recognizable as such largely because constel­ lations possess this coherence. Rarely is a constellation discarded whole­ sale. Rather, some of the ideas composing it are discarded, others are modified, and new ones are introduced. Like the attributes composing an artifact, the ideas in a constellation change in a patchwork pattern of old and new. Constellations

Period Player Homeostasis Reflexivity Virtuality Artifacts Skeuomorphs

1945 Shannon feedback loop electronic rat mall-ill-the-middle MacKay information as homeostat Homeostasis McCnlloch signal/noise electric tortoise Pitts circular causality Kubie instrumental von Foerster language

1960 von Foerster frog's visual homeostasis Maturana cortex Self­ Varela Organization

1985 Varela simulation self~orgallizatioll Brooks mobile robot Virtuality Moravec

FIGURE 1 The three waves of cybernetics Toward Embodied Virtuality / 17 Here I want to introduce another term from archaeological anthropol­ ogy. A skeuonwryh is a design feature that is no longer functional in itself but that refers back to a feature that was functional at an earlier time. The dashboard of my Toyota Camry, for example, is covered by vinyl molded to simulate stitching. The simulated stitching alludes back to a fabric that was in fact stitched, although the vinyl "stitching" is formed by an injection mold. Skeuomorphs visibly testify to the social or psychological necessity for innovation to be tempered by replication. Like anachronisms, their pe­ jorative first cousins, skeuomorphs are not unusual. On the contrary, they are so deeply characteristic of the evolution of concepts and artifacts that it takes a great deal of conscious effort to avoid them. At SIGGRAPH, the annual computer trade show where dealers come to hawk their wares, hard and soft, there are almost as many skeuomorphs as morphs. The complex psychological functions a skeuomorph performs can be illustrated by an installation exhibited at SIGGRAPH '93. Called the "Catholic Turing Test," the simulation invited the viewer to make a confes­ sion by chOOSing selections from the video screen; it even had a bench on which the viewer could kneel. 28 On one level, the installation alluded to the triumph of science over religion, for the role of divinely authorized interro­ gation and absolution had been taken over by a machine algorithm. On an­ other level, the installation pointed to the intransigence of conditioned behavior, for the machine's form and function were determined by its reli­ gious predecessor. Like a Janus figure, the skeuomorph looks to past and future, Simultaneously reinforcing and undermining both. It calls into a playa psychodynamic that finds the new more acceptable when it recalls the old that it is in the process of displacing and finds the traditional more comfortable when it is presented in a context that reminds us we can escape from it into the new. In the history of cybernetics, skeuomorphs acted as threshold devices, smoothing the transition between one conceptual constellation and an­ other. Homeostasis, a foundational concept during the first wave, func­ tioned during the second wave as a skeuomotph. Although homeostasis remained an important concept in biology, by about 1960 it had ceased to be an initiating premise in cybernetics. Instead, it performed the work of a gesture or an allusion used to authenticate new elements in the emerging constellation of reflexivity. At the same time, it also exerted an inertial pull on the new elements, limiting how radically they could transform the con­ stellation. A similar phenomenon appears in the transition from the second to the third wave. Reflexivity, the key concept of the second wave, is displaced in 18 I Chapter One the third wave by emergence. Like homeostasis, reRexivity does not alto­ gether disappear but lingers on as an allusion that authenticates new ele­ ments. It performs a more complex role than mere nostalgia, however, for it also leaves its imprint on the new constellation of virtuality. The complex story formed by these seriated changes is told in chapters 3, 6, and 9, which discuss cybernetics, autopoiesis, and artificial life, respectively. I have already suggested that living in a condition ofvirtuality implies we participate in the cultural perception that information and materiality are conceptually distinct and that information is in some sense more essential, more important, and more fundamental than materiality. The preamble to "A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age," a document coauthored by Alvin TofHer at the behest of Newt Gingrich, concisely sums up the matter by proclaiming, "The central event of the 20th century is the overthrow of matter."29 To see how this view began to acquire momentum, let us brieRy Rash back to 1948 when Claude Shannon, a brilliant theorist working at Bell Laboratories, defined a mathematical quantity he called information and proved several important theorems concerning it.3o

Information Theory and Everyday Life Shannon's theory defines information as a probability function with no di­ mensions, no materiality, and no necessary connection with meaning. It is a pattern, not a presence. (Chapter 3 talks about the development of infor­ mation theory in more detail, and the relevant equations can be found there.) The theory makes a strong distinction between message and signal. Lacan to the contrary, a message does not always arrive at its destination. In information theoretic terms, no message is ever sent. What is sent is a sig­ nal. Only when the message is encoded in a Signal for transmission through a medium-for example, when ink is printed on paper or when electrical pulses are sent racing along telegraph wires-does it assume material form. The very definition of "information," then, encodes the distinction between materiality and information that was also becoming important in molecular biology during this period.31 Why did Shannon define information as a pattern? The transcripts ofthe Macy Conferences indicate that the choice was driven by the twin engines of reliable quantification and theoretical generality. As we shall see in chap­ ter 3, Shannon's formulation was not the only proposal on the table. Donald MacKay, a British researcher, argued for an alternative definition that linked information with change in a receiver's mindset and thus with meaning.32 To be workable, MacKay's definition required that psychologi- Toward Embodied Virtuality / 19 cal states be quantifiable and measurable-an accomplishment that only now appears distantly possible with such imaging technologies as positron­ emission tomography and that certainly was not in reach in the immediate post-World War II years. It is no mystery why Shannon's definition rather than MacKay's became the industry standard. Shannon's approach had other advantages that turned out to incur large (and mounting) costs when his premise interacted with certain predisposi­ tions already at work within the culture. Abstracting information from a material base meant that information could become free-floating, unaf­ fected by changes in context. The technical leverage this move gained was considerable, for by formalizing information into a mathematical function, Shannon was able to develop theorems, powerful in their generality, that hold true regardless of the medium in which the information is instanti­ ated. Not everyone agreed this move was a good idea, however, despite its theoretical power. As Carolyn Marvin notes, a decontextualized construc­ tion of information has important ideological implications, including an Anglo-American ethnocentrism that regards digital information as more important than more context-bound analog information.33 Even in Shannon's day, malcontents grumbled that divorcing information from context and thus from meaning had made the theory so narrowly formal­ ized that it was not useful as a general theory of communication. Shannon himself frequently cautioned that the theory was meant to apply only to certain technical situations, not to communication in generaP4 In other circumstances, the theory might have become a dead end, a victim of its own excessive formalization and decontextualization. But not in the post-World War II era. The time was ripe for theories that reified informa­ tion into a free-floating, decontextualized, quantifiable entity that could serve as the master key unlocking secrets of life and death. Technical artifacts help to make an information theoretic view a part of everyday life. From ATMs to the Internet, from the morphing programs used in Terminator II to the sophisticated visualization programs used to guide microsurgeries, information is increasingly perceived as interpene­ trating material forms. EspeCially for users who may not know the material processes involved, the impression is created that pattern is predominant over presence. From here it is a small step to perceiving information as more mobile, more important, more essential than material forms. When this impression becomes part of your cultural mindset, you have entered the condition ofvirtuality. U.S. culture at present is in a highly heterogeneous state regarding the condition of virtuality. Some high-tech preserves (elite research centers 20 / Chapter One such as Xerox Palo Alto Research Center and Bell Laboratories, most ma­ jor research universities, and hundreds ofcorporations) have so thoroughly incorporated virtual technologies into their infrastructures that informa­ tion is as much as part of the researchers' mindscapes as is electric lighting or synthetic plastics.35 The thirty million Americans who are plugged into the Internet increasingly engage in virtual experiences enacting a division between the material body that exits on one side of the screen and the com­ puter simulacra that seem to create a space inside the screen.36 Yet for mil­ lions more, virtuality is not even a cloud on the horizon of their everyday worlds. Within a global context, the experience of virtuality becomes more exotic by several orders of magnitude. It is a useful corrective to remember that 70 percent of the world's population has never made a telephone call. Nevertheless, I think it is a mistake to underestimate the importance of virtuality, for it wields an influence altogether disproportionate to the num­ ber of people immersed in it. It is no accident that the condition of virtual­ ity is most pervasive and advanced where the centers of power are most concentrated. Theorists at the Pentagon, for example, see it as the theater in which future wars will be fought. They argue that coming conflicts will be decided not so much by overwhelming force as by "neocortical warfare," waged through the techno-sciences of information. 37 If we want to contest what these technologies SignifY, we need histories that show the erasures that went into creating the condition of virtuality, as well as visions arguing for the importance of embodiment. Once we understand the complex in­ terplays that went into creating the condition ofvirtuality, we can demystifY our progress toward virtuality and see it as the result of historically specific negotiations rather than of the irresistible force of technological determin­ ism. At the same time, we can acquire resources with which to rethink the assumptions underlying virtuality, and we can recover a sense of the virtual that fully recognizes the importance of the embodied processes constitut­ ing the lifeworld of human beings.38 In the phrase "virtual bodies," I intend to allude to the historical separation between information and materiality and also to recall the embodied processes that resist this division.

Virtuality and Contemporary Literature I have already suggested that one way to think about the organization ofthis book is chronologically, since it follows the three waves of seriated changes in cybernetics. In this organization of the textual body, each of the three chronologically arranged divisions has an anchOring chapter discussing the scientific theories: on the Macy Conferences (chapter 3); on autopoiesis Toward Embodied Virtuality / 21 (chapter 6); and on artificial life (chapter 9), respectively. Each section also has a chapter showing specific applications of the theories: the work of Norbert Wiener (chapter 4); tape-recording technologies (chapter 8); and human-computer interactions (chapter 10). Also included in each of the three divisions are chapters on literary texts contemporaneous with the development of the scientific theories and cybernetic technolOgies (chap­ ters 5,7, and 10). I have selected literary texts that were clearly influenced by the development of cybernetics. Nevertheless, I want to resist the idea that influence flows from science into literature. The cross-currents are conSiderably more complex than a one-way model of influence would al­ low. In the Neuromancer trilogy, for example, William Gibson's vision of cyberspace had a considerable effect on the development of three-dimen­ sional virtual reality imaging software. 39 A second way to think about the organization of How We Became Posthuman is narratively. In this arrangement, the three divisions proceed not so much through chronolOgical progression as through the narrative strands about the (lost) body of information, the cyborg body, and the posthuman body. Here the literary texts playa central role, for they display the passageways that enabled stories coming out of narrowly focused scien­ tific theories to circulate more widely through the body politic. Many ofthe scientists understood very well that their negotiations involved premises broader than the formal scope of their theories strictly allowed. Because of the wedge that has been driven between science and values in U.S. culture, their statements on these wider implications necessarily occupied the posi­ tion of ad hoc pronouncements rather than "scientific" arguments. Shaped by different conventions, the literary texts range across a spectrum ofissues that the scientific texts only fitfully illuminate, including the ethical and cul­ tural implications of cybernetiC technologies:4o Literary texts are not, of course, merely passive conduits. They actively shape what the technolOgies mean and what the scientific theories signify in cultural contexts. They also embody assumptions similar to those that permeated the scientific theories at critical points. These assumptions in­ cluded the idea that stability is a desirable social goal, that human beings and human social organizations are self-organizing structures, and that form is more essential than matter. The scientific theories used these as­ sumptions as enabling presuppositions that helped to gUide inquiry and shape research agendas. As the chapters on the scientific developments will show, culture circulates through science no less than science circulates through culture. The heart that keeps this circulatory system flOwing is narrative-narratives about culture, narratives within culture, narratives 22 / Chapter One about science, narratives within science. In my account ofthe scientific de­ velopments, I have sought to emphasize the role that narrative plays in articulating the posthuman as a technical-cultural concept. For example, chapter 4, on Wiener's scientific work, is interlaced with analyses ofthe nar­ ratives he tells to resolve conflicts between cybernetics and liberal human­ ism, and chapter 9, on artificial life, is organized by looking at this area of research as a narrative field. What does this emphasis on narrative have to do with virtual bodies? FollOwing Jean- Franc:;ois Lyotard, many theorists of postmodernity accept that the postmodern condition implies an incredulity toward metanarra­ tive. 41 As we have seen, one way to construct virtuality is the way that Moravec and Minsky do-as a metanarrative about the transformation of the human into a disembodied posthuman. I think we should be skeptical about this metanarrative. To contest it, I want to use the resources of narra­ tive itself, particularly its resistance to various forms of abstraction and dis­ embodiment. With its chronolOgical thrust, polymorphous digreSSions, located actions, and personified agents, narrative is a more embodied form of discourse than is analytically driven systems theory. By turning the tech­ nolOgical determinism of bodiless information, the cyborg, and the post­ human into narratives about the negotiations that took place between particular people at particular times and places, I hope to replace a teleol­ ogy of disembodiment with historically contingent stories about contests between competing factions, contests whose outcomes were far from obvi­ ous. Many factors affected the outcomes, from the needs ofemerging tech­ nologies for reliable quantification to the personalities of the people involved. Though overdetermined, the disembodiment ofinformation was not inevitable, any more than it is inevitable we continue to accept the idea that we are essentially informational patterns. In this regard, the literary texts do more than explore the cultural impli­ cations of scientific theories and technolOgical artifacts. Embedding ideas and artifacts in the situated specificities of narrative, the literary texts give these ideas and artifacts a local habitation and a name through discursive formulations whose effects are specific to that textual body. In explOring these effects, I want to demonstrate, on multiple levels and in many ways, that abstract pattern can never fully capture the embodied actuality, unless it is as prolix and noisy as the body itself. Shifting the emphaSiS from tech­ nolOgical determinism to competing, contingent, embodied narratives about the scientific developments is one way to liberate the resources of narrative so that they work against the grain ofabstraction running through the teleology ofdisembodiment. Another way is to read literary texts along- Toward Embodied Virtuality I 23 side scientific theories. In articulating the connections that run through these two discursive realms, I want to entangle abstract form and material particularity such that the reader will find it increaSingly difficult to main­ tain the perception that they are separate and discrete entities. If, for cul­ tural and historical reasons, I cannot start from a holistic perspective, I hope to mix things up enough so that the emphasis falls not on the separa­ tion of matter and information but on their inextricably complex com­ poundings and entwinings. For this project, the literary texts with their fashionings of embodied particularities are crucial. The first literary text I discuss in detail is Bernard Wolfe's Limbo. 42 Writ­ ten in the 1950s, Limbo has become something of an underground classic. It imagines a postwar society in which an ideology, Immob, has developed; the ideology equates aggression with the ability to move. "Pacifism equals passivity," Immob slogans declare. True believers volunteer to banish their mobility (and presumably their aggreSSion) by having amputations, which have come to be regarded as signifiers of social power and influence. These amputees get bored with lying around, however, so a vigorous cyberneticS industry has grown up to replace their missing limbs. As this brief summary suggests, Limbo is deeply influenced by cybernetiCS. But the technical achievements of cybernetics are not at the center of the text. Rather, they serve as a springboard to explore a variety of social, political, and psycho­ logical issues, ranging from the perceived threat that women's active sexu­ ality poses for Immob men to global East-West tensions that explode into another world war at the end of the text. Although it is unusually didactic, Limbo does more than discuss cyberneticS; it engages a full range of rhetor­ ical and narrative devices that work both with and against its explicit pro­ nouncements. The narrator seems only partially able to control his verbally extravagant narrative. There are, I will argue, deep connections between the narrator's struggle to maintain control of the narrative and the threat to "natural" body boundaries posed by the cybernetiC paradigm. Limbo in­ terrogates a dynamiC that also appears in Norbert Wiener's work-the in­ tense anxiety that erupts when the perceived boundaries of the body are breached. In addition, it illustrates how the body of the text gets implicated in the processes used to represent bodies within the text. Several Philip K. Dick novels written from 1962 to 1966 (including We Can Build You, Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, Dr. Blood­ rooney, and Ubik) provide another set of texts through which the multiple implications of the posthuman can be explored.43 Chronologically and the­ matically, Dick's novels of simulation cross the scientific theory of au­ topoiesis. Like Maturana, Varela, and other scientific researchers in the 24 I Chapter One second wave ofcybernetics, Dick is intensely concerned with epistemolog­ ical questions and their relation to the cybernetic paradigm. The problem ofwhere to locate the observer-in or out of the system being observed?­ is conflated in his fiction with how to determine whether a creature is an­ droid or human. For Dick, the android is deeply bound up with the gender politics of his male protagonists' relations with female characters, who am­ biguously figure either as sympathetic, life-giving "dark-haired girls" or emotionally cold, life-threatening schizoid women. Already fascinated with epistemological questions that reveal how shaky our constructions of reality can be, Dick is drawn to cybernetic themes because he understands that cybernetics radically destabilizes the ontolOgical foundations of what counts as human. The gender politics he writes into his novels illustrate the potent connections between cybernetics and contemporary understand­ ings of race, gender, and sexuality. The chapter on contemporary speculative fictions constructs a semiotics of virtuality by shOwing how the central concepts ofinformation and materi­ ality can be mapped onto a multilayered semiotic square. The tutor texts for this analYSis, which include Snow Crash, Blood Music, Galatea 2.2, and Ter­ minal Games, indicate the range of what counts as the posthuman in the age of virtuality, from neural nets to hackers, biolOgically modified humans, and entities who live only in computer simulations.44 In follOwing the construc­ tion of the posthuman in these texts, I will argue that older ideas are rein­ scribed as well as contested. As was the case for the scientific models, change occurs in a seriated pattern ofoverlapping innovation and replication. I hope that this book will demonstrate, once again, how crucial it is to recognize interrelations between different kinds of cultural productions, specifically literature and science. The stories I tell here-how informa­ tion lost its body, how the cyborg was created as a cultural icon and techno­ lOgical artifact, and how humans became posthumans-and the waves of historical change I chart would not have the same resonance or breadth if they had been pursued only through literary texts or only through scientific discourses. The scientific texts often reveal, as literature cannot, the foun­ dational assumptions that gave theoretical scope and artifactual efficacy to a particular approach. The literary texts often reveal, as scientific work can­ not, the complex cultural, social, and representational issues tied up with conceptual shifts and technological innovations. From my point ofview, lit­ erature and science as an area of specialization is more than a subset of cul­ tural studies or a minor activity in a literature department. It is a way of understanding ourselves as embodied creatures living within and through embodied worlds and embodied words. ..ChapterELeven

CONCLUSION: WHAT DOES IT MEAN

TO BE POSTHUMAN?

What, finally, are we to make of the posthuman?l At the beginning of this book, I suggested that the prospect of becoming posthuman both evokes terror and excites pleasure. At the end of the book, perhaps I can summa­ rize the implications of the posthuman by interrogating the sources of this terror and pleasure. The terror is relatively easy to understand. "Post," with its dual connotation of superseding the human and coming after it, hints that the days of "the human" may be numbered. Some researchers (notably Hans Moravec but also my UCLA colleague Michael Dyer and many others) believe that this is true not only in a general intellectual sense that displaces one definition of "human" with another but also in a more dis­ turbingly literal sense that envisions humans displaced as the dominant form of life on the planet by intelligent machines. Humans can either go gently into that good night, joining the dinosaurs as a species that once ruled the earth but is now obsolete, or hang on for a while longer by be­ coming machines themselves. In either case, Moravec and like-minded thinkers believe, the age of the human is drawing to a close. The view echoes the deeply pessimistic sentiments of Warren McCulloch in his old age. As noted earlier, he remarked: "Man to my mind is about the nastiest, most destructive of all the animals. I don't see any reason, ifhe can evolve machines that can have more fun than he himself can, why they shouldn't take over, enslave us, quite happily. They might have a lot more fun. Invent better games than we ever did."2 Is it any wonder that faced with such dis­ mal scenarios, most people have understandably negative reactions? If this is what the posthuman means, why shouldn't it be resisted? Fortunately, these views do not exhaust the meanings of the posthuman. As I have repeatedly argued, human being is first of all embodied being, and the complexities of this embodiment mean that human awareness 284 I Chapter Eleven unfolds in ways very different from those of intelligence embodied in cy­ bernetic machines. Although Moravec's dream of downloading human consciousness into a computer would likely come in for some hard knocks in literature departments (which tend to be skeptical of any kind of tran­ scendence but especially of transcendence through technology), literary studies share with Moravec a major blind spot when it comes to the signifi­ cance of embodiment.3 This blind spot is most evident, perhaps, when lit­ erary and cultural critics confront the fields of evolutionary biology. From an evolutionary biologist's point of view, modem humans, for all their tech­ nological prowess, represent an eye blink in the history of life, a species far too recent to have significant evolutionary impact on human biological behaviors and structures. In my view, arguments like those that Jared Diamond advances in Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Soci­ eties and Why Sex Is Fun: The Evolution of Human Sexuality should be taken seriously.4 The body is the net result of thousands of years of sedi­ mented evolutionary history, and it is naive to think that this history does not affect human behaviors at every level of thought and action. Of course, the reflexivity that looms large in cybernetics also inhabits evolutionary biology. The models proposed by evolutionary biologists have encoded within them cultural attitudes and assumptions formed by the same history they propose to analyze; as with cybernetics, observer and system are reflexively bound up with one another. To take only one example, the computer module model advanced by Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby in The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psy­ chology and the Generation ofCulture to explain human evolutionary psy­ chology testifies at least as much to the importance of information technolOgies in shaping contemporary worldviews as it does to human brain function. 5 Nevertheless, these reflexive complexities do not negate the importance of the sedimented history incarnated within the body. In­ terpreted through metaphors resonant with cultural meanings, the body itself is a congealed metaphor, a phYSical structure whose constraints and possibilities have been formed by an evolutionary history that intelligent machines do not share. Humans may enter into symbiotic relationships with intelligent machines (already the case, for example, in computer-as­ sisted surgery); they may be displaced by intelligent machines (already in effect, for example, at Japanese and American assembly plants that use ro­ botic arms for labor); but there is a limit to how seamlessly humans can be articulated with intelligent machines, which remain distinctively different from humans in their embodiments. The terror, then, though it does not disappear in this view, tends away from the apocalyptic and toward a more Conclusion / 285 moderate view of seriated social, technological, political, and cultural changes. What about the pleasures? For some people, including me, the posthu­ man evokes the exhilarating prospect ofgetting out ofsome ofthe old boxes and opening up new ways of thinking about what being human means. In positing a shift from presence/absence to pattern/randomness, I have sought to show how these categories can be transformedfrom the inside to arrive at new kinds of cultural configurations, which may soon render such dualities obsolete if they have not already. This process of transformation is fueled by tensions between the assumptions encoded in pattern/random­ ness as opposed to presence/absence. In Jacques Derrida's performance of presence/absence, presence is allied with Logos, God, teleology-in general, with an originary plenitude that can act to ground signification and give order and meaning to the trajectory of history. 6 The work of Eric Havelock, among others, demonstrates how in Plato's Republic this view of originarypresence authorized a stable, coherent self that could witness and testifY to a stable, coherent reality. 7 Through these and other means, the metaphysics of presence front-loaded meaning into the system. Meaning was guaranteed because a stable origin existed. It is now a familiar story how deconstruction exposed the inability of systems to posit their own ori­ gins, thus ungrounding signification and rendering meaning indetermi­ nate. As the presence/absence hierarchy was destabilized and as absence was privileged over presence, lack displaced plenitude, and desire usurped certitude. Important as these moves have been in late-twentieth-century thought, they still took place within the compass of the presence/absence dialectic. One feels lack only if presence is posited or assumed; one is driven by desire only if the object of desire is conceptualized as something to be possessed. Just as the metaphysics of presence required an originarypleni­ tude to articulate a stable self, deconstruction required a metaphysics of presence to articulate the destabilization of that self. By contrast, pattern/randomness is underlaid by a very different set of assumptions. In this dialectic, meaning is not front-loaded into the system, and the origin does not act to ground signification. As we have seen for mul­ tiagent simulations, complexity evolves from highly recursive processes being applied to simple rules. Rather than proceeding along a trajectory to­ ward a known end, such systems evolve toward an open future marked by contingency and unpredictability. Meaning is not guaranteed by a coherent origin; rather, it is made possible (but not inevitable) by the blind force of evolution finding workable solutions within given parameters. Although pattern has traditionally been the privileged term (for example, among the 286 / ChapTer Eleven electrical engineers developing information theory), randomness has in­ creasingly been seen to playa fruitful role in the evolution of complex sys­ tems. For Chris Langton and Stuart Kauffman, chaos accelerates the evolution of biological and artificiallife;8 for Francisco Varela, randomness is the froth of noise from which coherent microstates evolve and to which living systems owe their capacity for fast, flexible response;9 for Henri Atlan, noise is the body's murmuring from which emerges complex com­ munication between different levels in a biological system. lO Although these models differ in their specifics, they agree in seeing randomness not simply as the lack of pattern but as the creative ground from which pattern can emerge. Indeed, it is not too much to say that in these and similar models, ran­ domness rather than pattern is invested with plenitude. Ifpattern is the re­ alization of a certain set of possibilities, randomness is the much, much larger set of everything else, from phenomena that cannot be rendered co­ herent by a given system's organization to those the system cannot perceive at all. In Gregory Bateson's cybernetiC epistemology, randomness is what exists outside the confines of the box in which a system is located; it is the larger and unknowable complexity for which the perceptual processes of an organism are a metaphor. 11 Significance is achieved by evolutionary processes that ensure the surviving systems are the ones whose organi­ zations instantiate metaphors for this complexity, unthinkable in itself. When Varela and his coauthors argue in Embodied Mind that there is no stable, coherent self but only autonomous agents running programs, they envision pattern as a limitation that drops away as human awareness ex­ pands beyond consciousness and encounters the emptiness that, in an­ other guise, could equally well be called the chaos from which all forms emerge.12 What do these developments mean for the posthuman? When the self is envisioned as grounded in presence, identified with originary guarantees and teleolOgical trajectories, associated with solid foundations and logical coherence, the posthuman is likely to be seen as antihuman because it en­ visions the conscious mind as a small subsystem running its program of self­ construction and self-assurance while remaining ignorant of the actual dynamics of complex systems. But the posthuman does not really mean the end ofhumanity. It Signals instead the end of a certain conception of the hu­ man, a conception that may have applied, at best, to that fraction of hu­ manitywho had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice. 13 What is lethal is not the posthuman as such but the grafting of the Conclusion / 287 posthuman onto a liberal humanist view of the self. When Moravec imag­ ines "you" choosing to download yourself into a computer, thereby obtain­ ing through technological mastery the ultimate privilege of immortality, he is not abandoning the autonomous liberal subject but is expanding its per­ ogatives into the realm of the posthuman. Yet the posthuman need not be recuperated back into liberal humanism, nor need it be construed as anti­ human. Located within the dialectic of patternirandomness and grounded in embodied actuality rather than disembodied information, the posthu­ man offers resources for rethinking the articulation of humans with intelli­ gent machines. To explore these resources, let us return to Bateson's idea that those or­ ganisms that survive will tend to be the ones whose internal structures are good metaphors for the complexities without. What kind of environments will be created by the expanding power and sophistication of intelligent machines? As Richard Lanham has pOinted out, in the information-rich en­ vironments created by ubiquitous computing, the limiting factor is not the speed of computers, or the rates of transmission through fiber-optic cables, or the amount of data that can be generated and stored. Rather, the scarce commodity is human attention. 14 It makes sense, then, that technological innovation will focus on compensating for this bottleneck. An obvious solu­ tion is to design intelligent machines to attend to the choices and tasks that do not have to be done by humans. For example, there are already intelli­ gent -agent programs to sort email, discarding unwanted messages and pri- 0ritizing the rest. The programs work along lines similar to neural nets. They tabulate the choices the human operators make, and they feed back this information in recursive loops to readjust the weights given to various kinds of email addresses. After an initial learning period, the sorting pro­ grams take over more and more of the email management, freeing humans to give their attention to other matters. If we extrapolate from these relatively simple programs to an environ­ ment that, as Charles Ostman likes to put it, supplies synthetic sentience on demand, human consciousness would ride on top of a highly articulated and complex computational ecology in which many decisions, invisible to human attention, would be made by intelligent machines.1.5 Over two decades ago, Joseph \Veizenhaum foresaw just such an ecology and pas­ sionately argued that judgment is a uniquely human function and must not be turned over to computers. Hi With the rapid development of neural nets and expert programs, it is no longer so clear that sophisticated judgments cannot be made by machines and, in some instances, made more accurately than by humans. But the issue, in vVeizenbaum's view, involves more 288 / Chapter Eleven than whether or not the programs work. Rather, the issue is an ethical im­ perative that humans keep control; to do otherwise is to abdicate their re­ sponsibilities as autonomous independent beings. What Weizenbaum's argument makes clear is the connection between the assumptions under­ girding the liberal humanist subject and the ethical position that humans, not machines, must be in control. Such an argument assumes a vision of the human in which conscious agency is the essence of human identity. Sacri­ fice this, and we humans are hopelessly compromised, contaminated with mechanic alienness in the very heart of our humanity.I7 Hence there is an urgency, even panic, in Weizenbaum's insistence that judgment is a uniquely human function. At stake for him is nothing less than what it means to be human. In the posthuman view, by contrast, conscious agency has never been "in control." In fact, the very illusion of control bespeaks a fundamental igno­ rance about the nature of the emergent processes through which con­ sciousness, the organism, and the environment are constituted. Mastery through the exercise of autonomous will is merely the story consciousness tells itself to explain results that actually come about through chaotic dy­ namics and emergent structures. If, as Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, Evelyn Fox Keller, Carolyn Merchant, and other feminist critics of science have argued, there is a relation among the desire for mastery, an objectivist account of science, and the imperialist project of subdUing nature, then the posthuman offers resources for the construction of another kind of ac­ count.I8 In this account, emergence replaces teleology; reflexive episte­ mology replaces objectivism; distributed cognition replaces autonomous will; embodiment replaces a body seen as a support system for the mind; and a dynamic partnership between humans and intelligent machines re­ places the liberal humanist subject's manifest destiny to dominate and con­ trol nature. Of course, this is not necessarily what the posthuman will mean-only what it can mean if certain strands among its complex seri­ ations are highlighted and combined to create a vision of the human that uses the posthuman as leverage to avoid reinscribing, and thus repeating, some of'the mistakes of the past. Just as the posthuman need not be antihuman, so it also need not be apocalyptic. Edwin Hutchins addresses the idea of distributed cognition through his nuanced study of the navigational systems of oceangoing ships.I9 His meticulous research shows that the cognitive system responsi­ ble for locating the ship in space and navigating it successfully resides not in humans alone but in the complex interactions within an environment that includes both human and nonhuman actors. His study allows him to give an Conclusion / 289 excellent response to John Searle's famous "Chinese room." By imagining a situation in which communication in Chinese can take place without the actors knowing what their actions mean, Searle challenged the idea that machines can think. 20 Suppose, Searle said, that he is stuck inside a room, he who knows not a word of Chinese. Texts written in Chinese are slid through a slot in the door. He has in the room with him baskets of Chinese characters and a rule book correlating the symbols written on the texts with other symbols in the basket. Using the rulebook, he assembles strings of characters and pushes them out the door. Although his Chinese interlocu­ tors take these strings to be clever responses to their inquiries, Searle has not the least idea of the meaning of the texts he has produced. Therefore, it would be a mistake to say that machines can think, he argues, for like him, they produce comprehensible results without comprehending anything themselves. In Hutchins's neat interpretation, Searle's argument is valu­ able precisely because it makes clear that it is not Searle but the entire room that knows Chinese.21 In this distributed cognitive system, the Chinese room knows more than do any of its components, including Searle. The sit­ uation of modem humans is akin to that of Searle in the Chinese room, for every day we participate in systems whose total cognitive capacity exceeds our individual knowledge, including such devices as cars with electronic ignition systems, microwaves with computer chips that preCisely adjust power levels, fax machines that warble to other fax machines, and electro­ nic watches that communicate with a timing radio wave to set themselves and correct their date. Modem humans are capable of more sophisticated cognition than cavemen not because modems are smarter, Hutchins con­ cludes, but because they have constructed smarter environments in which to work. Hutchins would no doubt disagree with Weizenbaum's view that judgment should be reserved for humans alone. Like cognition, decision­ making is distributed between human and nonhuman agents, from the steam-powered steering system that suddenly failed on a navy vessel Hutchins was studying to the charts and pocket calculators that the naviga­ tors were then forced to use to calculate their position. He convincingly shows that these adaptations to changed circumstances were evolutionary and embodied rather than abstract and conSCiously deSigned (pp. 347-51). The solution to the problem caused by this sudden failure of the steering mechanism was" clearly discovered by the organization [of the system as a whole] before it was discovered by any of the participants" (p. 361). Seen in this perspective, the prospect of humans working in partnership with intel­ ligent machines is not so much a usurpation of human right and responsi- 290 / Chapter Eleven bility as it is a further development in the construction ofdistributed cogni­ tion environments, a construction that has been ongoing for thousands of years. Also changed in this perspective is the relation of human subjectivity to its environment. No longer is human will seen as the source from which emanates the mastery necessary to dominate and control the environment. Rather, the distributed cognition of the emergent human subject corre­ lates with-in Bateson's phrase, becomes a metaphor for-the distributed cognitive system as a whole, in which "thinking" is done by both human and nonhuman actors. "Thinking consists of bringing these structures into co­ ordination so they can shape and be shaped by one another," Hutchins wrote (p. 316). To conceptualize the human in these terms is not to imperil human survival but is precisely to enhance it, for the more we understand the flexible, adaptive structures that coordinate our environments and the metaphors that we ourselves are, the better we can fashion images of our­ selves that accurately reflect the complex interplays that ultimately make the entire world one system. This view of the posthuman also offers resources for thinking in more so­ phisticated ways about virtual technologies. As long as the human subject is envisioned as an autonomous self with unambiguous boundaries, the hu­ man-computer interface can only be parsed as a division between the so­ lidity of real life on one side and the illusion of virtual reality on the other, thus obscuring the far-reaching changes initiated by the development of virtual technologies. Only if one thinks ofthe subject as an autonomous self independent of the environment is one likely to experience the panic per­ formed by Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics and Bernard Wolfe's Limbo. This view ofthe self authorizes the fear that if the boundaries are breached at all, there will be nothing to stop the self's complete dissolution. By contrast, when the human is seen as part of a distributed system, the full expression of human capability can be seen precisely to depend on the splice rather than being imperiled by it. Writing in another context, Hutchins arrives at an inSight profoundly applicable to virtual technolOgies: "What used to look like internalization [of thought and subjectivity] now appears as a gradual propagation of organized functional properties across a set of malleable media" (p. 312). This vision is a potent antidote to the view that parses vir­ tuality as a division between an inert body that is left behind and a dis­ embodied subjectivity that inhabits a virtual realm, the construction of virtuality performed by Case in William Gibson's Neuromancer when he delights in the "bodiless exultation of cyberspace" and fears, above all, dropping back into the "meat" of the body.22 By contrast, in the model that Hutchins presents and that the posthuman helps to authorize, human Conclusion I 291 functionality expands because the parameters of the cognitive system it in­ habits expand. In this model, it is not a question ofleaving the body behind but rather of extending embodied awareness in highly specific, local, and material ways that would be impossible without electronic prosthesis. As we have seen, cybernetics was born in a froth of noise when Norbert Wiener first thought of it as a way to maximize human potential in a world that is in essence chaotic and unpredictable. Like many other pioneers, Wiener helped to initiate a journey that would prove to have consequences more far-reaching and subversive than even his formidable powers of imagination could conceive. As Bateson, Varela, and others would later ar­ gue, the noise crashes within as well as without. The chaotic, unpredictable nature of complex dynamics implies that subjectivity is emergent rather than given, distributed rather than located solely in consciousness, emerg­ ing from and integrated into a chaotic world rather than occupying a posi­ tion of mastery and control removed from it. Bruno Latour has argued that we have never been modem; the seriated history of cybernetics-emerg­ ing from networks at once materially real, socially regulated, and discur­ Sively constructed-suggests, for similar reasons, that we have always been posthuman.23 The purpose of this book has been to chronicle the journeys that have made this realization pOSSible. Ifthe three stories told here-how information lost its body, how the cyborg was constructed in the postwar years as technological artifact and cultural icon, and how the human be­ came the posthuman-have at times seemed to present the posthuman as a transformation to be feared and abhorred rather than welcomed and em­ braced, that reaction has everything to do with how the posthuman is con­ structed and understood. The best possible time to contest for what the posthuman means is now, before the trains of thought it embodies have been laid down so firmly that it would take dynamite to change them.24 Al­ though some current versions of the posthuman point toward the anti­ human and the apocalyptic, we can craft others that will be conducive to the long-range survival of humans and of the other life-forms, biological and artificial, with whom we share the planet and ourselves. Not e s

Chapter One 1. Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge: Halvard University Press, 1988), pp. 109-10. 2. Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society, 2d ed. (Garden City, N .Y.: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 103-4. 3. Beth Loffreda, "Pulp Science: Race, Gender, and Prediction in Contemporary American Science" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1996). 4. Richard Doyle discusses the "impossible inversion" that makes information pri­ mary and materiality secondary in molecular biology in On Beyond Living: Rhetorical Transformations in the Life Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). See also Evelyn Fox Keller's analysis of the disembodiment of information in molecular biology in her Secrets of Life, Secrets of Death: Essays on Language, Gender, and Sci­ ence (New York: Routledge, 1992), especially chapters 5,8, and the epilogue. Lily E. Kay critically analyzes the emergence ofthe idea of a genetic"code" in "Cybernetics, In­ formation, Life: The Emergence of SCriptural Representations of Heredity," Configu­ rations 5 (winter 1997): 23-92. For a discussion of how this disembodied view of information began to circulate through the culture, see Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee, The DNA Mystique: The Gene as a Cultural Icon (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1995). 5. Michel Foucault famously suggested that "man" is a historical construction whose era is about to end in The Order ofThings: An Archaeology ofthe Human Sciences (N ew York: Vintage Books, 1973), a few years earlier than Ihab Hassan's prescient announce­ ment ofposthumanism cited in the epigraph to this chapter. Since then, the more radi­ cal idea of the posthuman (as distinct from posthumanism) has appeared at a number of places. Among the important texts defining the posthuman in cultural studies are Allucquere Roseanne Stone, The War ofDesire and Technology at the Close ofthe Me­ chanical Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995); Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, eds., Posthuman Bodies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Scott Bukat­ man, Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science Fiction (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993); and Anne Balsamo, Technologies ofthe Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996). A number of scien-

293 294 / Notes to Pages 3-10 tific works, detailed in chapters 3, 6, and 9, also figure importantly in delineating this list of characteristics. 6. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 3 (emphasis added). 7. Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1990), especially "A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century," pp. 149-82; Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994); Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, translated by Brian Massumi (London: Athlone Press, 1987). 8. Lauren BerIant, in The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), discusses the white male body of the ideal citizen, including its tendency toward disembodiment. 9. Gillian Brown, "Anorexia, Humanism, and Feminism," Yale Journal ofCriticism 5, no. 1 (1991): 196. 10. William Gibson, Neuromancer (New York: Ace Books, 1984), p. 16. 11. Arthur Kroker, Hacking the Future: Storiesforthe Flesh-Eating 90s (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996). 12. Five of the Macy Conference transactions were published: Heinz von Foerster, ed., Cybernetics: Circular Causal and Feedback Mechanisms in Biological and Social Systems, vols. 6-10 (New York: Josiah Macy Jr. Foundation, 1949-55). From the sev­ enth conference on, Margaret Mead and Hans Lukas Teuber are listed as "assistant ed­ itors." The best study of the Macy Conferences is Steve J. Heims, The Cybernetics Group (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991). In addition to discussing the conferences and doing extensive archival work, Heims also conducted interviews with many of the par­ ticipants who have since died. 13. See Otto Mayr, The Origins ofFeedback Control (Cambridge: MITPress, 1970), for a full history of the concept of the feedback loop. 14. Walter Cannon is usually credited with working out the implications of home­ ostasis for biological organisms in The Wisdom ofthe Body (New York: W. W. Norton, 1939). Claude Bernard originated the concept in the nineteenth century. 15. Mayr, The Origins ofFeedback Control. 16. Nancy Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History ofthe Novel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 17. Michael Warner, The Letters ofthe Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990). 18. Bruno Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987). Malcome Ashmore ex­ plores this feature of science studies in The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology ofSci­ entific Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 19. Heinz von Foerster, Observing Systems, 2d ed. (Salinas, Calif.: Intersystems Publications, 1984). 20. H umberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 42 (Dor­ drecht: D. Reidel, 1980). 21. NikIas Luhmann has modified and extended Maturana's epistemology in signif­ icant ways; see, for example, his Essays on Self-Reference (New York: Columbia Uni- Notes to Pages 11-18 / 295 versity Press, 1990) and "The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and a Reality That Remains Unknown," in Self-Organization: Portrait ofa Scientific Revolution, edited by Wolfgang Krohn, Guenter Kueppes, and Helga Nowotny (Dordrecht: Kluwer Aca­ demic Publishers, 1990),64-85. 22. Edward Fredkin, "Digital Mechanics: An Information Process Based on Re­ versible Universal Cellular Automata," Physica D 45 (1990): 245-70. See also the ac­ count ofFredkin's work in Robert Wright, Three Scientists and Their Gods: Looking for Meaning in an Age ofinfomwtion (New York: Times Books, 1988). Also central to this theory is the work of Stephen Wolfram; see his Theon} and Applications ofCellular Au­ tonwta (Singapore: World Scientific, 1986). 23. Marvin Minsky, "Why Computer Science Is the Most Important Thing That Has Happened to the Humanities in 5,000 Years" (public lecture, Nara, Japan, May 15, 1996). I am grateful to Nicholas Gessler for providing me with his transcript of the lec­ ture. 24. See Jennifer Daryl Slack and Fred Fejes, eds., The Ideology ofthe Information Age (Norwood, N.J.: Ablex Publishing Company, 1987), for essays explOring the impli­ cations of the contemporary construction of information. The tendency to ignore the material realities of communication technologies has been forcefully rebutted in two important works: Friedrich A. Kittler's Discourse Networks, 1800-1900, translated by Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), and Hans Ulrich Gum­ brecht and K. Ludwig Pfeiffer, eds., Materialities of Communication, translated by William Whobrey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994). 25. The relation of molecular biology has been explored in Keller, Secrets; the cen­ trality of World War II to the development of cybernetics is demonstrated by Peter Galison in "The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision," Critical Inquiry 21 (1994): 228-66. Relevant here also is Kay, "CybernetiCS, Informa­ tion, Life" and Andy Pickering, "Cyborg History and the World War II Regime," Per­ spectives on Science 3, no. 1 (199.5): 1-48. 26. Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics; or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1948), p. 132. 27. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970); Foucault, The Order of Things. Both Kuhn and Foucault substantially revised their theories in later years. The vision of historical change in Michel Foucault's The History of Sexuality, translated by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), is much closer to seriation than are his earlier works. 28. The simulation is the creation of Gregory P. Garvey of Concordia University. An account of it can be found in Thomas E. Linehan, ed., Visual Proceedings: The Art and InterdiSCiplinary Programs ofSiggraph 93 (New York: Association for Computing Ma­ chinery, 1993), p. 125. 29. "A Magna Carta for the Knowledge Age" can be found (along with skeptical commentaries, mine among them) at the FEED Web site,< http://www.emedia.net/ feed>. 30. Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Communi­ cation (Urb.ma: University of Illinois Press, 1949). 31. Doyle, On Beyond Living, makes the pOintthatthe construction ofinformation as primary, with materiality as supplemental, is a rhetorical rather than an experimental 296 I Notes to Pages 18-23 accomplishment. He argues that the discourse of molecular biology functions as "rhetorical software," for it operates as if it were running a program on the hardware of the laboratory apparatus to produce results that the research alone could not accom­ plish. See also Kay, "Cybernetics, Information, Life." 32. Donald M. MacKay, Information, Mechanism, and Meaning (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969). 33. Carolyn Marvin, "Information and History," in Slack and Fejes, The Ideology of the Information Age, pp. 49--62. 34. In response to a presentation by Alex Bavelas at the eighth Macy Conference, Shannon remarked that he did not see a "close connection" between the semantic ques­ tions that concerned Bavelas and his own emphasis on "finding the best encoding of symbols." Foerster, Mead, and Teuber, Cybernetics (Eighth Conference, 1951), 8:22. 35. Xerox PARC has been at the forefront of developing the idea of"ubiquitous com­ puting," with computers embedded unobtrusively throughout the home and workplace environments. See Mark Weiser, "The Computer for the 21st Century," Scientific American 265 (September 1991): 94-104. For an account of how computers are trans­ forming contemporary architecture and living patterns, see William J. Mitchell, City of Bits: Space, Place, ami the Infobahn (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). 36. Sherry Turkle discusses the fascination ofVR worlds in Life on the Screen: Iden­ tity in the Age ofthe Internet (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). Stone, The War of Desire and Technology, proposes that VR technologies undo the commonsense notion that one person inhabits one body. She suggests instead that we think of the subject "warranted by" the body rather than contained within it. 37. For an account of the extensive connections between cybernetics and the mili­ tary, see Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), and Les Levidow and Kevin Robins, eds., Cyborg Worlds: The Militan} Information Society (London: Free Associ­ ation Books, 1989). 38. Don Ihde develops the full resonances of "life world" from his grounding in phe­ nomenology in Technology and the Lifeworld: From Garden to Earth (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), showing how the contemporary world is marked by a double attraction toward technology and toward the "natural" world Simultaneously. 39. The notorious case is Autodesk's initiative to develop VR software that cited Neuromancer; see John Walker, "Through the Looking Glass: Beyond 'User' Inter­ faces," CADalyst (December 1989), 42, and Randall Walser, "On the Road to Cyberia: A Few Thoughts on Autodesk's Initiative," CADalyst (December 1989), 43. 40. An important work linking postmodern fiction with cybernetic technologies is David Porush, The Soft Machine: CybernetiC Fiction (New York: Methuen, 1985). Porush defines cybernetiC fiction as self-reflexive fictions that look to cybernetics both for their themes and for the literary machinery of their texts. 41. Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Min­ nesota Press, 1984); Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of the Postmodern: History, Theory, Fiction (New York: Routledge, 1994); and Brian McHale, ConstructingPostmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1992) andPostmodernFiction (New York: Methuen, 1981). 42. Bernard Wolfe, Limbo (New York: Random House, 1952). 43. Philip K. Dick: We Can Build You (London.: Grafton Books, 1986), first pub- Notes to Pages 24-28 / 297 lished in 1969; Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (New York: Doubleday, 1968); Dr. Bloodmoney; or, How We Got Along after the Bomb (New York: Carroll and Graf, 1988), first published in 1965; and Ubik (London: Grafton Books, 1973), first published in 1969. 44. Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash (New York: Bantam, 1992); Greg Bear, Blood Music (New York: Ace Books, 1985); Richard Powers, Galatea 2.2: A Novel (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1995); and Cole Perriman, Temlinal Games (New York: Bantam, 1994).

Chapter Two 1. The paradox is discussed in N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in ContemporanJ Literature and Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp.31-60. 2. Self-organizing systems are discussed in Gregoire Nicolis and Ilya Prigogine, Ex­ plOring Complexity: An Introduction (New York: Freeman and Company, 1989); Roger Lewin, Complexity: Life at the Edge of Chaos (New York: Macmillan, 1992); and M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992). 3. Friedrich A. Kittler, Discourse Networks, 1800-1900, translated by Michael Metteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), p. 193. 4. The fluidity ofwriting on the computer is eloquently explored by Michael Joyce in Of Two Mind~: Hypertext Pedagogy and Poetics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995). 5. Howard Rheingold surveys the new virtual technologies in Virtual Reality (New York: Summit Books, 1991). Also useful is Ken Pimentel and Kevin Teixeira, Virtual Re­ ality: Through the New Looking Glass (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993). Benjamin Woolley takes a skeptical approach toward claims for the new technology in Virtual Worlds: A Journey in Hyped Hyperreality (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1992). 6. Allucquere Roseanne Stone, The \Var ofDesire and Technology at the Close ofthe Mechanical Age (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). 7. Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age ofthe Internet (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). 8. In The Age ofthe Smart Machine: The Future ofiVork and Power (New York: Ba­ sic Books, 1988), Shoshana Zuboff explores, through three case studies, the changes in U.S. workplaces as industries become informatted. 9. Computer law is discussed in Katie Hafner and John Markoff, Cyberpunk: Out­ laws and Hackers on the Computer Frontier (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991); also informative is Bruce Sterling, The Hacker Crackdown: Law and Disorder on the Electronic Frontier (New York: Bantam, 1992). 10. Turkle documents computer network romances in Life on the Screen. Nicholson Baker's Vox: A Novel (New York: Random House, 1992) imaginatively explores the erotic potential for better living through telecommunications; and Rheingold looks at the future of erotic encounters in cyberspace in "Teledildonics and Beyond," Virtual Reality, pp. 345-77. 11. Among the studies that explore these connections are Jay Bolter, Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erl- 320 I Notes to Pages 242-50

At Home in the Universe: The Searchforthe Laws ofSelf-Organization and Complexity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 39. Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, The Adapted Mind: Evolu­ tionary Psychology and the Generation ofCulture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), especially the chapter by Tooby and Cosmides: "The Psychological Foundations of Culture," pp. 19-136. Tooby and Cosmides have also been instrumental in forming the Human Behavior and Evolution Society (HBES), which holds annual conferences centered on the ideas ofevolutionary psychology. In some ways the HBES is a successor to sociobiology, although with a more flexible framework ofinterpretation. 40. Steven Pinker makes this point in The Language Instinct (N ew York: W. Morrow, 1994). This model provides an interesting corrective to Maturana's largely passive model of"languaging" between "observers." 41. Steels, "The Artificial Life Roots." 42. Marvin Minsky, The Society ofMind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), es­ peciallypp.17-24. 43. Marvin Minsky, ''Why Computer Science Is the Most Important Thing That Has Happened to the Humanities in 5,000 Years" (public lecture, N ara, Japan, May 15, 1996). I am grateful to Nicholas Gessler for providing me with his transcript ofthe lecture. 44. Marvin Minsky, "How Computer Science Will Change Our Lives" (plenary lec­ ture, Fifth Conference on Artificial Life, Nara, Japan, May 17,1996). 45. Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Enwtion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1994), p. 226.

Chapter Ten 1. Ihab Hassan, "Prometheus as Performer: Towards a Posthumanist Culture?" in Performance in Postmodem Culture, edited by Michael Benamou and Charles Caramella (Madison, WI: Coda Press, 1977), p. 212. See also Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, "Introduction: Posthuman Bodies" in Posthuman Bodies, edited by Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995): "Posthuman bodies are the causes and effects of postmodern relations of pleasure, vir­ tuality and reality, sex and its consequences" (p. 3). 2. For a discussion of the semiotic square, see Ronald Schleifer, Robert Con Davis, and Nancy Mergler, Culture and Cognition: The Boundaries ofLiterary and Scientific Inquiry (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992). See also A. J. Greimas, Structural Se­ mantics: An Attempt at a Method, translated by Daniele MacDowell, Ronald Schleifer, and Alan Velie (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983). I do not claim for the semiotic square the ineVitability with which Greimas, its inventor, invested it. Rather, for my purposes it is useful as a stimulus to thought and as a way to tease out relation­ ships that might not otherwise be apparent. 3. Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman(NewYork: Semiotext(e), 1983). 4. Greg Bear, Blood Music (New York: Ace Books, 1985) (hereafter cited in the text as BM); Richard Powers, Galatea 2.2: A Novel (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1995) (hereafter cited in the text as G2); Cole Perriman, Terminal Games (New York: Bantam, 1994) (hereafter cited in the text as TG); Neal Stephenson, Snow Crash (New York: Bantam, 1992) (hereafter cited in the text as SC). Notes to Pages 254-81 / 321

5. Fredric Jameson cogently makes the connection between an information society and late capitalism in Postrrwdcmism; or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Dur­ ham: Duke University Press, 1991). 6. Darko Suvin, "On Gibson and Cyberpunk SF," Foundation 46 (1989): 4l. 7. Dani el Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1991), notes, "The voice the schizophrenic 'hears' is his own" (p. 250 n). 8. Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking ofthe World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). 9. Veronica Hollinger, "Cybernetic Deconstructions: Cyberpunk and Postmod­ ernism," Mosaic 23 (1990): 42. 10. Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagina­ tion, and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). 11. Judith Butler, Gender Trouhle: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990); J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1972). 12. Andrew Hodges, in his excellent biography Alan Turing: The Enigma (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), comments, "To Alan Turing, the multiplier was a rather tiresome technicality: the heart [of the Universal Turing Machine llay in the log­ ical control, which took the instructions from the memory, and put them into operation" (p.320). 13. For a discussion of the deep structure ofVR programming languages and their relation to utterances that can perform the viewpoint they instantiate, see Robert Markley, "Boundaries: Mathematics, Alienation, and the Metaphysics of Cyberspace," in Virtual Reality and Their Discontents, edited by Robert Markley (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp ..55-77. 14. David Porush, "Hacking the Brainstem: Postmodern Metaphysics and Stephenson's Snow Crash," Configurations 3 (1994): 537-7l. 15. Mary Catherine Bateson, Our Own Metaphor: A Personal Account ofa Confer­ ence on the Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human Adaptation (1972; \Vashington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991). 16. Richard Dawkins develops the concept of memes as the ideational ana­ logue to selfish genes in The Selfish Gene (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 17. In the introduction to Posthurrwn Bodies, Halberstam and Livingston note: "You're not human until you're posthuman. You were never human" (p. 8). 18. Veronica Hollinger, in "Feminist Science Fiction: Breaking Up the Subject," Ex­ trapolation 31 (1990): 229-39, makes a similar argument regarding the diversity of fem­ inist science fiction. Some texts want to recuperate some aspects of the subject, whereas others aim for a more subversive and far-reaching deconstruction. Those who have never experienced a strong and unified subjectivity, Hollinger observes, might want to have a chance to articulate such subjectivity before they deconstruct it. Anne Balsamo, in "Feminism for the Incurably Informed," South Atlantic Quarterly 92 (1993): 681-712, takes issue ,vith Hollinger's conclusion, arguing that what is needed is not so much diversity among texts and readings as articulations that can escape from the dual­ ism of anti/pro-humanism by offering a vision of "post-human existence where 'tech­ nology' and the 'human' are understood in contiguous rather than in oppositional terms" (p. 684). 322 / Notes to Pages 283-86 Chapter Eleven 1. I am grateful to Marjorie Luesebrink for conversations that stimulated me to think further about the ideas in this conclusion. 2. \Varren McCulloch, quoted in Mary Catherine Bateson, Our Own Metaphor: A Personal Account ofa Conference on the Effects ofConscious Purpose on Human Adap­ tation (1972; Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1991), p. 226. 3. Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988). 4. Jared Diamond, Guns, Gerrns, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: Norton, 1997), and Why Sex Is Fun: The Et;olution of Human Sexuality (New York: Basic Books, 1997). 5. Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby, eds., The Adapted Mind: Evolutionanj Psychology and the Generation of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 6. Jacques Derrida, 0fGramllwt%gy, translated by Gayatri C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 7. Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). 8. Chris G. Langton, "Computation at the Edge of Chaos: Phase Transition and Emergent Computation," Physica D 42 (1990): 12-37; Stuart A. Kaufhnan, The Ori­ gins cif0rder: Self-Organization and Selection in Ewiution (New York: Oxford U niver­ sity Press, 1993). 9. Francisco J. Varela, "Making It Concrete: Before, During, and After Break­ downs," in Revisioning Philosophy. edited by J arnE'S Ogihy (Albany: Statc University of New York Press, 1992),pp. 97-109. 10. Henri Atlan, "On a Formal Definition of Organization," Journal of Theoretical Biology 45 (1974): 295-304. Michel Serres has a provocative interpretation of how this noise can give rise to human language, in "The Origin of Language: Biology, Informa­ tion Theory and ThermodynamiCS," Hermes: Literature, Science, Philosophy, edited by Josue V Harari and David F. Bell (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 71-83. See N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 56, 204-6, for a dis­ cllssion of Atlan and Serres. 11. Gregory Bateson, qlloted in Bateson, prologue to Our Own Metaphor, pp.13-16. 12. Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch, The Embodied Mind: Cognitit;e Science and Human Experience (Cambridge: MIT PrE'ss, 1991). -13. In l'\eal Stephenson's Snow Crash C'.Jew York: Bantam, 1992), his young white heroine, "YT.," is kidnapped, dumped aboard the Raft, and aSSigned to mess detail. She then has an insight into how small the fraction of the world's population is who ever be­ lieved they had a liberal humanist self. Once she gets over the shock and settles into a routine, she starts looking around her, watching the other fish-cutting dames, and real­ izes that this is just what life must be like for about 99 percent of the people in the world. "You're in this place. There's other people all around you, but they don't understand you and you don't understand them, but people do a lot of meaningless babble anyway. In order to stay alive, you have to spend all day every day doing stupid meaningless work. And the only way to get out ofit is to quit, cut loose, take a Ryer, and go offinto the wicked Notes to Pages 287-91 / 323 world, where you will be swallowed up and never heard from again" (pp. 303-4). 14. Richard Lanham, The Electronic Word: Democracy, Technology, and the Arts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 15. Galen Brandt, "Synthetic Sentience: An Interview with Charles Ostman," Mondo 2000, no. 16 (winter 1996-97): 25-36. See also Charles Ostman, "Synthetic Sentience as Entertainment," Midnight Engineering 8, no. 2 (MarchiApril 1997): 68-77. 16. Joseph \Veizenbaum, Computer Pou;er and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1976). 17. Gilles Delueze and Felix Guattari of course celebrate this very alienness in their vision of the phylum and "body without organs" inAnti-Oediplls: Capitalism and Schiz­ ophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983). For an ecstatic interpre­ tation of the posthuman, see Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, eds., Posthwll{ln Bodies (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). 18. Donna J. Haraway, "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,"in Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Rein­ uention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 183-202; Evelyn Fox Keller, "Ba­ conian Science: The Arts of Mastery and Obedience," Reflections on Gender and Science (N ew Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), pp. 33-42; Sandra Harding, The Sci­ ence Question in Feminism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Carolyn Mer­ chant, The Death of Nature: 'Nomen, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolutio/l (San Francisco: Harper, 1982). 19. Edwin Hutchins, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995). 20. John R. Searle, "Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?" Scientific American 262, no. 1 (1990): 26-31; see also John R. Searle, Mind~, Brains, and Science (Cam­ bridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 32-41, f()f the "Chinese room" thought ex­ periment. Searle attempts to answer the analysis that it is the whole room that knows Chinese, saying there "is no way to get from Sy11tax to semantics" (p. 34). 21. Hutchins, Cognition, pp. 361-62. 22. \Villiam Gibson, Nellromancer(NewYork: Ace Books, 1984). The narrator, after relating how Case has been exiled from cyberspace, comments: "For Case, who'd lived in the bodiless exultation of cyberspace, it was the Fall .... The body was meat. Case fell into the prison of his own flesh" (p. 6). 23. Bruno Latour, We Haue Never Been I\Jodem, translated hy Catherine Porter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Latour's important argument is that quasi-ohjects operate within networks that are at once in material real, socially regu­ lated, and discursively constructed. Using different contexts, I have argued in this book for a very similar view regarding the history of cybernetics. 24. Dynamiting the system here alludes to Bill N'ichols's seminal article on cyber­ netics, "The VVork of Culture in the Age of Cybernetics," in Electronic Culture: Tech­ Iwlogy and Visual Representation, edited by Timothy Drnckrey (New York: Aperture, 1996), pp. 121-44.