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1 Ottoman military either a catastrophic defeat on the battlefield or an invasion of their country. However, organization (1800–1918) even before their military defeats at the end GU¨ LTEKIN YILDIZ of the eighteenth century the Ottoman polit- ical elite did not hesitate to make military The long nineteenth century was an age of technology transfers from Europe or to reorganization for the Ottoman military. employ non-Muslim experts in arms Many European and American observers production. at the time glorified this process as a reform On the other hand, the motivations that signified the “westernization” of the behind the late Ottoman military reorgani- military. This attitude was reproduced in zation and state-building efforts were not the twentieth century by scholars of Middle triggered by foreign affairs alone. Recent Eastern and Ottoman history in the context studies on Ottoman economic history have of “modernization.” In a rather Orientalist shown that increasing privatization and approach, they constructed a linear, pro- monetization in the Ottoman land-based gressive story about the so called moderni- economy from the mid-seventeenth cen- zation of , which seemed designed tury on strengthened local elites as tax to justify the emergence of a secularist collectors and suppliers of military man- and westernist regime in post-Ottoman power on behalf of central government. As Turkey founded and monitored by a consequence of this the Ottoman politi- praetorian generals. According to this ver- cal system became rather decentralized sion, lateOttoman history from the middle and contractual. Local magnates and gov- of the eighteenth century to the first ernors in various parts of the empire, but quarter of the twentieth had represented especially in Egypt, the , Anatolia, a confrontation between the so-called and Iraq, proved to be an additional reformist/progressive statesmen in favor of force in Ottoman high politics, alongside westernization and their conservative/tradi- the palace, the bureaucracy of the Sublime tionalist opponents. It was argued that as a Porte, the religious bureaucracy, and the consequence of successive defeats against . For the central government non-Muslim/European forces the “progres- in , the hidden agenda behind sive party” in the Ottoman bureaucracy had the military reforms of the nineteenth finally discovered Europe and came to century was the restoration of its monop- believe that the state could be saved only oly of coercion – which was expected to if the Ottoman military was reorganized ensure its monopoly of political and fiscal in the fashion of its non-Muslim power. adversaries. In fact, the dynamics of late Ottoman military reform were not much different THE OTTOMAN SEARCH FOR than its contemporary rivals in continental “NEW ORDER” IN THE AGE Europe. Looking at the history of modern OF NAPOLEONIC WARS European warfare, one can easily conclude that the defeated often tend to imitate the The first modern attempt to form the victorious, in the hope of taking revenge. nucleus of a new regular and standing central Each of the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian instead of the existing organization of military reforms in the mid-eighteenth and Janissaries, which had constituted the main early nineteenth centuries had followed body of the Ottoman since the

The Encyclopedia of War, First Edition. Edited by Gordon Martel. © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2012 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2 fifteenth century, was made by Selim other ranks. Though this was not large, the III in 1792. Following defeat by an Austro- taxes levied to finance it caused remarkable Russian coalition, he asked his top bureau- disquiet among local magnates, peasants, crats for proposals regarding the reorganiza- and urbanites throughout the empire. The tion of the army. Almost all of them were of New Order was crushed only fifteen years the opinion that new “state soldiers” should after its creation in May 1807 by a popular be recruited and trained in accordance with uprising led by Janissaries during the contemporary European techniques of “drill Russo-Ottoman War of 1806–1808. A few and discipline.” Existing Janissaries, merce- months later, the Ottoman capital was the naries, and forced volunteers, they argued, stage of a second violent confrontation had not proven to be obedient and skilled between the troops of Alemdar Mustafa soldiers. on the one side and Janissaries on the The new regiments formed with the sul- other. Mustafa Pasha, an ambitious local tan’s approval were called the New Order governor from the Balkan town of Ruschuk (Nizam-i Cedid). To avoid the resistance of (located in today’s ), invaded Istan- opponents (including the Janissaries), they bul to support the dethroned Sultan were presented to the public as a branch Selim III. He was appointed of the existing army. However, with their and, although he was not able to prevent two barracks built outside of Istanbul city the execution of Sultan Selim III, Alemdar center, and their French-style uniforms, tried to revitalize the military reforms and drill, and training techniques, they clearly enlisted his own mercenaries as “state sol- indicated the intention of restructuring diers” to form the nucleus of a new central the military. imperial army. Thereafter he summoned With close relations to the new republican some of the leading magnates from different regime in France, the Ottoman government regions of the empire to come to a compro- did not hesitate to ask the French ambassa- mise concerning the future of the state. dor in Istanbul for an official military mis- Accepting a constitution-like document sion – consisting of officers, technicians, and called “The Treaty of Union” (Sened-i drill sergeants – to train the new recruits ˙Ittifak) in September 1808, these members and to improve the armaments industry. of a burgeoning local bourgeoisie hoped Soon after the arrival of the French mission, to legitimize their existing power and however, the Egyptian expedition of wealth in return for assisting the Ottoman in 1798 interrupted Franco- army when requested to do so. However, the Ottoman diplomatic and military relations. traditional Ottoman leadership in Istanbul Ironically, one of the regiments of the New did not tolerate these newcomers and orga- Order troops trained by French officers suc- nized a plot against them. Istanbul once cessfully resisted the invading Napoleonic again became the center of a civil war, with forces. Joining the anti-Napoleon coalition the rebels successfully postponing the “new of European states, the Ottoman govern- order” reforms for the next twenty years. ment replaced the French military mission with British and German officers and tech- nicians who succeeded in improving train- DESTRUCTION OF THE JANISSARIES: ing, arms manufacturing, and rebuilding of COUP D’E´TAT OR MILITARY REFORM? fortifications. The nucleus of the new army consisted of The Greek Rebellion in Wallachia and the approximately ten thousand officers and Morean Peninsula (1821–1826) was a 3 turning point in Ottoman history. After five However, only three weeks later, on June years of counterinsurgency operations, the 14, the last mutiny in Ottoman Ottoman central government was able history broke out. This movement was led to quiet the uprising, but not without the by middle- and low-grade officers who were military support of its semi-independent supported by civilian Janissaries such as governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali Pasha. porters, owners, and manual The rebellion demonstrated that the laborers. However, the palace and the Janissaries, coerced volunteers, and merce- were better prepared than naries were nothing more than an unco- their predecessors had been for a violent ordinated and disorganized association of clash in the center of the Ottoman capital. fighters compared to the recently established Cannons fired upon the Janissary barracks, regular army and navy of Muhammad Ali while other military forces, joined by stu- Pasha. The latter had inherited the unfin- dents of religious schools and Muslim inhab- ished project of the late Sultan Selim III itants of Istanbul, marched against the rebels. and he attempted to form a standing army The government forces put down the mutiny consisting mainly of conscripted native on the same day it began. Approximately two Egyptian Arab peasants trained by French thousand rebels were executed in Istanbul officers and led by Turkish, Albanian, and and many more were banished either to Circassian commanders. Sultan Mahmud II, frontier fortresses in the Balkans or to pursuing a policy of eliminating the local their home provinces. Two days later, holders of power in Anatolia and the Balkans on June 17, it was officially announced that to restore the sultan’s authority in these ter- the Janissary Corps was abolished through- ritories, did not keep his promise to grant out the empire. more land and tax revenue to Muhammad With the exception of some provinces Ali in return for his support against the (including Bosnia) where Janissaries were Greek rebels. Instead, the sultan initiated able to resist for several months because of a military reorganization project to enable their close commercial and social bonds him to confront his main domestic rival. with local officials and powerholders, the After the news from Morea that the rebels abolition of this four-centuries-old institu- had finally been defeated on April 23, 1826, tion was realized more easily than expected. discussions about forming a new military Although the estimated number of Janissar- force were restarted in Istanbul following ies at the time was seventy thousand, only eighteen years of silence. thirty thousand of them were combat sol- Only one month later, at the end of May diers; the rest were officials and civilians 1826, the newly established infan- who received the pay that originally had try companies appeared on the training gone to combat soldiers, but which had ground. Being afraid of their reaction against been traded by third parties over the years this organizational innovation, the govern- as some sort of state bonds. In fact, from the ment tried to convince the Janissaries to mid-seventeenth century on, the Janissaries accept it by using the argument that the had gradually lost their role as the main state faced an emergency caused by Greek combat force in the Ottoman army. Never- and Serbian rebels backed by British and theless, because of their continuing privi- Russian support. High religious officials leges concerning the carrying of arms and were ordered to give sermons that it was a immunity from taxation, the Janissaries religious obligation to oppose the enemy continued to act as an influential group in “with their own arms and techniques.” domestic political, social, and economic 4 affairs. In many towns of the empire they and unarmed who fled became involved in commercial activities of from the battlefield at the first opportunity. all kinds, sometimes establishing monopo- Although the new army was officially lies, sometimes playing the role of a trade imagined as an all-Muslim community, union for their prote´ge´s among the riffraff many Muslims tried to avoid both volun- of Istanbul. It was because of this that tary and mandatory . Under some nineteenth-century British agents in the leadership of their feudal and tribal the – such as Stratford chiefs, rural and tribal communities of Canning, Adolphus Slade, and David ethnic , , Kurds, Yezidees, Urquhart – described the Janissary Corps Arab Bedouins, Lazes, and Turcomans as the “representative of people” and won- fiercely resisted for dozens of dered whether the post-Janissary regime years, and proved willing to give service might be a more repressive one, giving the only as undisciplined mercenaries during sultan a loyal and apolitical military instru- campaigns. ment; their concerns were not misplaced, In the first ten years, from 1828 to 1836, given the history of the new Ottoman reg- the number of recruits was reported to have ular army as a domestic counterinsurgency reached 161,036 soldiers. Of every ten force from 1826 to 1918. draftees, however, five were lost because of epidemics, four disappeared as war losses (deserters, captives, deaths), and the DRILL IN UNIFORM: remaining one was dismissed. Those who THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE were able to retire after twelve years of NEW REGULAR ARMY obligatory service constituted a very small minority. In addition to the main body, a Following the abolition of the Janissaries second branch was created in 1837 as a pool as the main body of the Ottoman central of reserves who would be employed in the army, efforts were made in Istanbul to agricultural sector during peacetime, except recruit jobless and poor youngsters aged for short terms of training. The number of 15–25 for the new army: “The Victorious these reserve (redif) recruits was reported at Soldiers of Muhammad” (Asakir-i 85,000 in 1838. Mansure-i Muhammediyye). The new army For the Ottoman political elite, the key was planned to consist of eight regiments attributes of the new army were “discipline with a total of twelve thousand officers and and drill.” However, the army lacked the other ranks. Although the recruits were skilled officers to teach European drill and expected to join the ranks voluntarily on a maneuvers. Husrev Pasha, the second com- professional basis, low wages and the twelve- mander in chief and the real founding year obligatory service was not attractive to father of the new army, when grand admiral many young men. During the Russo- of the Ottoman army, had employed a Ottoman War of 1828–1829, which occurred French sergeant named Gaillard as the only two years after the founding of the new instructor of the model troops he formed Ottoman army, the urgent need for more following the destruction of the Janissaries. troops was met by coercing draftees. Local Husrev presented him to the sultan who, officials preyed upon them and some- after attending a military exercise led by times sent them in chains to army camps. Gaillard, appointed him as the instructor However, many of these “volunteers” were of his recently established infantry troops. sick, old, or unskilled, providing horseless Gaillard was succeeded by a Piedmontese 5 e´migre´ captain, Giovanni Timoteo Calasso, officers for the army and navy, the first Impe- who came to Istanbul following service rial Military School for Officers was inaugu- in various countries (including a short rated in 1836. The next year another school term among the Greek rebels). He became was opened for . At the same time, the founder of regular squadrons in Ottoman cadets were sent for the first time to the new army and replaced the centuries- military academies in Paris, London, Vienna, old Ottoman way of riding, saddle, and and Berlin – another practice borrowed from stirrup with those of Hungarian hussars. Muhammad Ali Pasha’s Egypt. The Ottoman In the late Istanbul seems to have officer and general staff education was based been an attractive place for adventurous mainly on the contemporary French military and e´migre´ European officers of middle school curriculum. The Prussian lieutenant and low grades who were willing to accept colonel W. L. Colmar Freiherr von der Golz, the low salaries and positions offered by who came to Istanbul in 1883 under the Ottoman government. However, by the German military reform mission and stayed 1830s, official military missions replaced till 1896, revised this rather theoretical mili- individual career-seekers. European powers tary training, attempting to make Ottoman such as Prussia, Britain, France, , staff officers more aware of the practice of and even vied with one another to military science. send their officers, engineers, and techni- cians to Istanbul. Such initiatives, however, were not limited to technical assistance: TOWARDS A NATION-IN-ARMS: European and Ottoman governments alike THE EVOLUTION OF OTTOMAN attempted to use military missions as a dip- CONSCRIPTION PRACTICE lomatic instrument for establishing politi- cal alliances. But sometimes Ottoman Following the catastrophic defeat against statesmen did not know how and where to the forces of Muhammad Ali Pasha and employ the European officers sent to them. the death of the authoritarian sultan Most of these European officers were used Mahmud II, the Ottoman central govern- as drill sergeants or instructors rather than ment announced the Imperial Edict of in higher command positions because they Gulhane at the end of 1839, which were non-Muslims. But there were other guaranteed universal respect for the life, reasons: the Ottoman commander in chief, honor, and property of all Ottoman subjects, Husrev Pasha, for instance, did not appoint as well as equality at court, and a just distri- any European to a command position bution of the burden of taxation and military because these were filled by his and the service. In this document military service sultan’s own retinues. Often illiterate, these was defined as the religious/patriotic duty appointees were not suitable to command of all Muslim males for the sake of the regular troops. Only a small number of “defense of the homeland.” foreign engineers and officers were effi- During the subsequent military reorgani- ciently employed in tasks such as the zation of 1843, through which the existing improvement of fortifications at the Darda- Ottoman regular forces were divided into nelles or frontier zones, and in the mecha- five garrisoned in different regions nization of Ottoman rifle and cannon of the empire, the term of obligatory military manufacturing. service was established as five years, with an Beside the two imperial engineering acad- additional reserve status of seven years. Con- emies, founded in the 1770s to educate scription was to be regulated by drawing lots 6 among the Muslim inhabitants of a certain other important jobs. However, with the age. But the absence of a population census third law of conscription enacted in 1886, in all provinces made conscription difficult, this replacement practice was abolished and and throughout the empire – and especially even those who were exempted by paying in the tribal frontier zones – the Muslim a fee were obliged to attend five months of population had resisted the census, basic military training. By the same law, the conscription, and seizure of their arms. term of active military service was increased In 1846 a conscription law was enacted to six years, which was decreased in 1909 to for the first time in Ottoman history. It three years and in 1913 to two. applied to those between the ages of 20 In 1909, shortly after the beginning of the and 25. For each district, a quota was to be second Constitutional Period, with its determined in regard to its actual popula- promises of equality for all citizens, many tion. Those who were not conscripted in of the exemptions were abolished. However, one year because of exemptions or the the majority of non-Muslim Ottoman citi- local quota being filled would be transferred zens were unwilling to accept this change, to the next year’s ballot, until they reached and many of them chose to leave the coun- the age of 26. Exceptions were to be made try to evade the draft. Some non-Muslim for high-ranking palace and state officials, draftees were reported to have fled from the inhabitants of the capital, students and pro- battlefield during the Balkan Wars in fessors of religious high schools, judges, 1912–1913, but the Ottoman army did preachers, the sole male in a family, and have Jewish and Christian privates among the only son of a widow. Furthermore, its ranks during . those who could not serve personally for When the regular army had been various reasons could be exempted upon established in the first half of the nineteenth payment of a fee or by arranging for some- century, high-ranking Ottoman bureaucrats one to take their place. Buying an exemp- had favored using Islam as a patriotic mobi- tion in this way became the norm for non- lization device rather than satisfying the Muslims. The new Ottoman conscription demands of non-Muslims for political system combined French and Prussian emancipation in a system of universal con- practices: choosing only a proportion of scription. Although officials explained their able-bodied men by lots was the main decision as arising from the possibility of recruitment principle used in France after negative reactions on the part of Muslim 1815; maintaining a reserve force was a privates against non-Muslim officers and Prussian innovation formulated during the from the practical difficulties involved in last years of the Napoleonic Wars. maintaining harmony between Muslim and In 1869 a second wave of military reorga- non-Muslim privates, the decision was a nization was planned by Huseyin Avni Pasha, conservative one. As a consequence of the the first formally educated minister of war. decision, the Ottoman state was unable to First of all, a Prussian-like general staff was obtain the fullest usage of its heterogeneous established under the ministry of war. Mili- population for military purposes – in con- tary service was designated as four years, trast to rivals such as the Austro-Hungarian with an additional sixteen years at various monarchy or czarist Russia. The patriotic levels of reserve status. The second conscrip- obligation to serve in the armed forces tion law of 1870 introduced some changes: became a burden imposed on the Muslim substitutes were permitted for those who population of Anatolia and Ottoman were occupied in a trade, commerce, or Rumelia. 7

During World War I the Ottoman con- and the Greek War of 1897, scription regime was transformed by the none of these conflicts ended in victory for Ottoman–German joint general staff into a the Ottoman Empire (although it should system of total mobilization. Active person- be noted that the Ottoman army proved nel rose from 295,000 in 1913 to around to be more effective in World War I than 800,000 in each of the four years of the war. had been expected by contemporary The total number of recruits has been esti- European political and military observers). mated at 2,873,000, including 2,608,000 On the other hand, the army was often army regulars, 80,000–100,000 tribal irregu- successful in its counter-guerilla and coun- lars, 250,000 gendarmerie, and 15,000 naval terinsurgency operations against tribal and men. At the time of the Mudros armistice on rural groups resisting policies of taxation October 30, 1918, the total number of men and conscription in , under arms was about 560,000. Organized in , South and East Anatolia, Syria, eleven armies, the total operational force of Iraq, Lebanon, and ; it put down the the Ottoman military in the war amounted much more politicized uprisings in Bosnia- to 36 infantry divisions, fourteen of which Herzegovina (1875), in Bulgaria (1876), in were units recreated after the defeat in the Crete (1897), and in Macedonia (1903). Balkan Wars (1912–1913). However, in These counterinsurgency expeditions, espe- regions populated by Arab and Kurdish cially those of the Third Army in Macedo- tribes, such as East Anatolia, Syria, Iraq, nia in the early 1900s, turned the army into Arabia, and Yemen, the resistance against a reactive and irregular combat force, which conscription continued. may have negatively influenced the capabil- ities of officers to maneuver larger units in regular warfare. EFFECTIVENESS OF OTTOMAN Groups of irregular hired ARMED FORCES: REGIONAL (Bashibozuks) of tribal origin have always MILITARY POWER OR DOMESTIC been a part of Ottoman counterinsurgency COUNTERINSURGENCY FORCE forces. Mercenary groups composed mainly of ethnic Albanian or Laz warriors, semi- In the nineteenth century, nationalized independent Kurdish light cavalry battal- regular armies played a twofold role ions formed by Ottoman statesmen in the throughout Europe: war-making abroad 1890s, and the Circassian irregular cavalry and state-making at home. The Ottoman units of the Ottoman Intelligence Agency case was no exception. From its establish- during World War I, were among these. ment in 1826 to the demise of the empire in However, these irregulars comprised a 1918, the regular army fought three times two-edged sword in the hands of Ottoman against Russia: in 1828–1829, in 1853–1855 authorities. Their use of violence in (in the Crimean War in alliance with France crushing domestic uprisings and their plun- and Britain), and in 1877–1878; twice dering of civilian populations not only against Muhammad Ali Pasha’s Egyptian alienated local groups from the Ottoman army in 1832–1833 and in 1839; against government, but also caused diplomatic Greece in 1897; against Italy in 1911–1912 friction between the Sublime Porte and (in Libya); against the Balkan League European powers who intervened on behalf (including , Greece, and Bulgaria) in of Christian minorities. 1912–1913; and finally against the Allies of The main deficiencies of late Ottoman the Entente in 1914–1918. Except for the military forces were the scarcity of 8 experienced and skilled officers, the absence (Kavalah Mehmet Ali Pasa) (ca. 1769–1849); of communication necessary to carry out Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878); Russo- complicated offensive maneuvers, the dis- Turkish Wars (pre-1878); Turco-Italian War organization of logistics and sanitation, the (1911–1912). absence of non-commissioned officers, the jealousy and competition between com- manders, the incoherence between edu- FURTHER READING cated and non-educated officers, and the poor quality of intelligence gathering and Aksan, V. H. (2007) Ottoman Wars 1700–1870. processing. London: Pearson Education. Nevertheless, from the time of the Badem, C. (2010) The Ottoman Crimean War Ottoman–Russian War of 1877–1878 (1853–1856). Leiden: Brill. onward, the Ottoman military was reported Bes¸ikc¸i, M. (2009) “Between Voluntarism and to be superior to its Russian rival in its use of Resistance: The Ottoman Mobilization of the most recent military technology, such as Manpower in the First World War.” PhD disser- tation. Istanbul: Bog˘azic¸i University. heavy Krupp cannons and breech-loading, Erickson, E. J. (2001) Ordered to Die: A History rapid-fire rifles of American and British ori- of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. gin. In the adoption of operational and tac- Westport: Praeger. tical innovations such as trench warfare and Erickson, E. J. (2003) Defeat in Detail: The triangular infantry divisions and corps, the Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–13. West- Ottoman general staff – advised by the Ger- port: Praeger. man military mission – was among the most Heinzelmann, T. (2004) Heiliger Kampf oder Landesverteidigung? Die Diskussion um die proficient of the combatant states. Einfu¨hrung der allgemeinen Milita¨rpflicht im As a consequence of the various wars and Osmanischen Reich 1826–1856. Frankfurt am domestic counterinsurgency operations in Main: Peter Lang. which they had participated, late Ottoman Klein, J. (2011) The Margins of Empire: Kurdish educated-officer cadres formed a self-image Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone. Stanford: of themselves as “saviors of the state and Stanford University Press. nation.” Politicized officers and cadets were Levy, A. (1968) “The Military Policy of Sultan directly involved in Ottoman palace politics Mahmud II, 1808–1839.” PhD dissertation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. ´ through the coups d’etat of May 1876, July Shaw, S. J. (1965) The Origins of Ottoman Military 1908, April 1909, and January 1913. The Reform: The Nizam-ı Cedid Army of Sultan military dictatorship of the Committee Selim III,” Journal of Modern History, 37 (3): for Union and Progress (1913–1918), the 291–306. Young Turk party, as well as the establish- Uyar, M. and Erickson, E. J. (2009) A Military ment of a military republic in post- History of the Ottomans from Osman to Atatu¨rk. Ottoman Turkey following the “War for Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO. Yes¸il, F. (2009) “Nizam-ı Cedid’den Yenic¸erilig˘in Independence” (1919–1922), can be deemed Kaldırılıs¸ına Osmanlı Kara Ordusunda Deg˘is¸im the by-products of late Ottoman military 1793–1826.” PhD dissertation. Ankara: history. Hacettepe University. Yıldız, G. (2009) Neferin Adı Yok: Zorunlu SEE ALSO: Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Askerlig˘e Gec¸is¸Su¨recinde Osmanlı Devleti’nde Crimean War (1853–1856); Greco-Turkish Siyaset, Ordu ve Toplum (1826–1839). Istanbul: War (1897); Janissaries; Muhammad Ali Kitabevi.