Lying with Arguments All Arguers Sometimes Lie
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Lying with Arguments Roy Sorensen Washington University in St. Louis All arguers sometimes lie. Therefore, some arguments are lies. Confession: Although I believe the premise and the conclusion, I do not believe the premise entails the conclusion. I concede my use of `therefore’ expressed belief that the premise supports the conclusion. I lied. That completes my quick and dirty demonstration of my thesis. I next adduce slower, cleaner evidence. The Argument from Conditional Lies We can lie with conditionals. Conditionals are analogous to arguments. Therefore, we can lie with arguments. One sign of the deep similarity is our frequent uncertainty as to whether the speaker is propounding an argument or asserting a conditional: Since all communists are atheists and John Paul Sartre is an atheist, Sartre is a communist. Given that the speaker believes that the conjunction `All communists are atheists and John Paul Sartre is an atheist’ fails to raise the probability of `Sartre is an atheist’, then the speaker has lied. The fact that he believes both propositions does not exonerate him. Any argument from asserted premises can be converted into a conditional by treating its premises as a conjunctive antecedent. For instance, P, Q, therefore R converts to `If P and Q, then R’. As Peter Strawson quipped, “if” is the first cousin of “therefore”. One group of commentators goes beyond the claim that arguments are analogous to conditionals. They say conditionals are identical to arguments. 1 According to J. L. Mackie, the conditional `If you swim there, you will be swept out to sea’ is a condensed argument of the form: “Suppose that you swim there: then (in view of certain unspecified facts) you will be swept out to sea.” (1973, 69). Mackie concludes that these conditionals lack truth- values. He is joined by others who are impressed by Ernest Adams’ insight that the assertibility of conditionals is dictated by conditional probability rather than the probability of the conditional. These “no-truth value” theorists do not wish to conclude that it is impossible to lie with conditionals. Almost all postulators of truth-value gaps (for future contingents, false presupposition, and so on) would be inclined to agree that we can lie with statements that lack truth-values. Lying depends solely on one’s internal psychological state. Given the interchangeability of conditionals and arguments, we should be able to lie with arguments. Otherwise there would be a moral loophole. One could avoid lying by recasting the assertion as an inference. A Legal Asymmetry But the joke is on me! Legal ethics is based on this escape clause. On the one hand, lying under oath is forbidden. A lawyer cannot instruct her client to lie – even if the lawyer knows that the lie is her client’s best hope of acquittal. She cannot even call him to testify if she knows he plans to lie. Lawyers are disbarred for lying or getting others to lie. No other profession is as opposed to lying. On the other hand, no other profession openly trains new members to mislead innocent people about grave matters. Your attorney is permitted to coach you into propounding deceptive arguments -- as long as the premises and conclusions are not lies (because they are assertions). Since your 2 attorney is obliged to furnish a zealous defense, your attorney often has a professional obligation to make deceptive inferences. Here is the final punch line: Logicians back the lawyers! Experts on inference never characterize arguments as lies. At worse, they characterize inferences as misleading. Try it. Tell a logician that an argument is lie. He will admonish you with a semantic syllogism: All lies are falsehoods. No argument is false. Therefore, no argument is a lie. You might even be subjected to a speech act syllogism: All lies are assertions. No argument is asserted (arguments are instead propounded). Therefore, no argument is a lie. Despite this impressive convergence between the theory and practice of argument, I defend the possibility of lying with arguments. To some extent, I will be preaching to the choir. I think ordinary people, prior to legal or logical indoctrination, recognize that one can lie with arguments. Corpus searches bear me out. A Google search of “argument is a lie” will yield over a million hits. But do not try Google Scholar; you will get fewer than a hundred hits. Google Books is in between, yielding less than a thousand. Although a scholar will sometimes slip and call an argument false, the discipline imposed by the logicians is surprisingly effective. Consequently, attributions of `lie’ to argument are inversely correlated with logical indoctrination. The Modal Exaggeration Thesis Attempts to convict someone of lying with an inferential lie systematically but contingently fail. Logicians over-explain this contingent failure as an 3 attempt to do the impossible. Thus the study of logic discourages the psychological curiosity central to lie attribution. Logic instructors urge students to follow the chess player’s maxim “Play the board, not the man”. Under this approach, you choose the best move rather than try tricks that exploit the psychological weaknesses of your adversary. When playing the board, you may encourage your opponent to retract blunders so that the two of you can continue to drive the position to a logical conclusion. Those unschooled in logic detect some lying arguments and are more outraged by lying arguments than merely misleading arguments. However, logic illiteracy leads to many false charges. Consequently, logic training makes people drop out of the practice of attributing inferential lies. This abstention from attributing lies to inferences improves performance (like learning how to pilot a plane with only instruments). After the teachers themselves became drop-outs, the methodological consensus became a substantive consensus: `inferential lie’ is a category mistake. A Brief History of Lying Arguments Given that training in logic blinds us to the possibility of inferential lies, there should be more attribution of lying in the past – a period in which logical literacy was less prevalent. The history of controversy about lying arguments goes back to the Greek sophists. In 399 BC, Socrates was charged with impiety. The second charge was corrupting the youth. The third charge supported the other two accusations by specifying the means by which corruption was executed: Socrates made the weaker argument appear to be the stronger. Socrates protested that he was being confused with the Sophists. Aristophanes had 4 portrayed Socrates as a Sophist in The Clouds. Socrates laments Aristophanes’ defamation. Socrates agrees that passing off bad arguments as good arguments is counterfeiting. He appeals to his poverty as evidence that he is not so employed. In 155 BC the Athenians sent a delegation of three philosophers on an embassy to Rome. The Skeptic Carneades addressed a crowd of thousands. On the first day, he argued that you should be just for the sake of justice itself. The audience marveled at the power of his arguments. On the second day Carneades argued, with equal force, that you should be just only because justice is in your self-interest. Scandalized, Marcus Porcius Cato (the Censor) led a conservative backlash that expelled the philosophers. On my interpretation, Carneades lied on the first day and then “debriefed” the Romans on the second day. If you lie then you should confess to the lie promptly. This aborts bad consequences. However, Carneades’ rapid retraction did not change the fact that he lied. Some lies can be justified. Carneades taught the Romans a valuable lesson. Instead of dryly discoursing on the advantages of hypothetically arguing both sides of an issue, Carneades employed a memorable shock tactic. Politically ambitious Romans were soon sending their sons to Athens to learn debating techniques. Lies can be pedagogically useful. Some teachers propound fallacious arguments to provoke students into diagnosis. Tactful teachers understate rebuttals to avoid embarrassing a student. Instead of cementing the premises to the conclusion with a hard must, a gentle teacher will use a soft might, allowing wiggle room. Inferential lying is systematic in therapeutic philosophies. Consider Sextus Empiricus’ method of equipollence. As a believer in the therapeutic 5 value of suspended judgment, Doctor Sextus would argue the opposite side of any issue – but only to the degree needed to cancel out the force of the patient’s original argument. Sextus was playing for a draw, not a win. If necessary, Doctor Sextus would deliberately understate the force of his counter-argument. His goal was cure, not conversion. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus emulates Sextus Empiricus’ purgative – medicine that is expelled along with the toxin. After the book’s restrictive implications become manifest, Wittgenstein makes parting acknowledgement that his deductions are nonsense. Samuel Johnson’s Defense of Lawyers James Boswell feared becoming a lawyer. He did not want to go to hell with the other liars. His father, an eminent judge, had beat into him a need for truth and integrity: I do not recollect having had any other valuable principle impressed upon me by my father except a strict regard for truth, which he impressed upon my mind by a hearty beating at an early age when I lied, and then talking of the dishonour of lying. Paternal punishment combined with maternal Calvinism to create a teenager with a morbid fear of lying. (This honesty is widely credited with making Boswell an excellent biographer. When challenged by reviewers whether it was proper to reveal Samuel Johnson's follies and whims and private conversations, Boswell replied, "Authenticity is my chief boast".) The judge was vexed by the boy’s reluctance to follow him into the legal profession. The elder Boswell should have realized that respect for 6 truth entails respect for validity.