AMERICA’S CULTURE WARS AND THE CLASSROOM HIROSHIMA By Leo Maley III and Uday Mohan

The dominant American view of Hiroshima and Nagasaki owes much to what people felt when they first heard about the bombings fifty years ago. In 1945, many Americans believed the Japanese got what they deserved when we bombed those two cities. An August 1945 Gallup poll showed 85 percent of the public approving of the use of the atomic bombs on Japanese cities.1 A second poll, published in the December 1945 issue of Fortune, a leading business magazine, is even more revealing. It showed 53.5 percent of the American public believing we “should have used the two bombs on cities, just as we did.” An additional 22.7 percent believed that we “should have quickly used many more of them [atomic bombs] before Japan had a chance to surrender.”2

For Americans of the World War II gener- Nagasaki. Scholarship critical of the ation, the passage of fifty years has not widely-held belief that it was necessary to significantly altered attitudes concerning use atomic bombs on Japanese cities has America’s use of the atomic bomb. When steadily accumulated since the 1960s.5 asked to “remember Hiroshima,” many But because most textbooks fail to incor- still angrily respond by evoking Pearl porate or emphasize the latest atomic Harbor or the Bataan Death March.3 A bomb scholarship, and few college cours- substantial number of Americans have es focus on Hiroshima in any depth, the passed down family memories of death accumulating scholarship has had limited and survival in the Pacific war. Many of effect. For their part, the media ignore, these veterans and their families continue with limited though sometimes striking to believe that the atomic bomb saved exceptions, the impressive body of evi- their own lives or the lives of loved ones. dence and argument that runs counter to Half a century after the end of the war, the official justifications for the atomic many still “thank God” for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.6 bomb, and they are contemptuous of his- The National Air and Space torians who question the necessity of the Museum’s plans for a 1995 exhibit on the bombings.4 end of World War II and its nuclear after- In contrast, for some time it has been math was in many ways a watershed for possible for American academics to chal- American thinking about Hiroshima. This lenge the dominant justifications for the V. J. Day, Aug. 15, 1945, Paris was the first nationally prominent effort atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Photo: National Archives to make use of, however cautiously, some

32 EDUCATION ABOUT ASIA Volume 2, Number 2 Fall 1997 It was in this context—of tenaciously of the newer critical scholarship on the held myths about Hiroshima, but also of bomb decision. Museum curators had signs that the myths are unstable—that we intended to acknowledge the continuing had the opportunity in the fall of 1995 to intense debate about the decision among teach a 15-week undergraduate seminar historians, as well as the diversity of opin- titled “Hiroshima: History, Ethics, and ions among American military, scientific, Memory” under the auspices of the and political leaders concerning the University Honors Program at the bombings. University of Maryland, College Park. Unfortunately, the proposed exhibit Our primary goal was to have our and the meaning of Hiroshima became class of 18, only one of whom was a his- deeply embroiled in America’s accelerat- tory major, converse and write thoughtful- ing “culture wars.” Scholars who raised ly about what remains a highly contested critical questions about the atomic bomb- historical event. While we had our stu- ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were dents read some hibakusha (atomic bomb pejoratively labeled “revisionists,” or survivors) testimonies, including poetry even “cultists”; and Smithsonian curators by Kurihara Sadako, we maintained an were called “politically correct pinheads” almost exclusively American focus in our among other names.7 Conservative veter- course. We wanted to explore with our ans and their allies wished to banish any students the multifaceted ways that interpretation that might draw into ques- American media, historians, scientists, tion the legitimacy of momentous deci- THE 1990 POLL also ethicists, and others have responded to the sions made fifty years ago. As Peter moral and political challenge of Blute, at the time a Congressman from indicated that: Hiroshima. Like the title of Robert J. Massachusetts, stated, “I would hate to n one in four Americans Lifton and Greg Mitchell’s recent book, think that young people in this country we wanted our students to grapple with would go into our national museum and did not recall that an Hiroshima in America.12 view an exhibit and come out of that Our course considered what is now exhibit and say to themselves, ‘Weren’t atomic bomb had known about the decision to use the atom- 8 we wrong?’” been used against an ic bomb, as well as the historical, ethical, The somewhat greater openness of and commemorative voices that have vied the media to questions about the bomb enemy in wartime. to determine the meaning of Hiroshima decision during the summer of 1995 sug- over the past fifty years. We wanted our gests that the forced cancellation of the THE 1995 POLL also students to examine the relationship Smithsonian exhibit and the marginaliza- showed that: between government, war, and the writing tion of historians in the media during of history: How did President Truman 1994 do not reflect the final word on n 60 percent did not (and other top government officials) American understanding of Hiroshima. explain the use of the bomb? What does Some poll numbers bear this out. A know that Truman current scholarship tell us about the deci- Gallup poll conducted in July 1990 was the president sion-making that led to the bomb’s use? showed that Americans split about evenly We also wanted them to reflect on public when asked if they approve or disapprove who authorized the consent: What factors contributed to pub- of the use of the atomic bombs against lic “consent” to the bomb’s use? What Japan.9 According to a 1995 America’s atomic bombings. role did the media play in shaping public Talking/Gallup poll, 49 percent of the n 35 percent opinion? What responsibility do citizens American public say they would have have for decisions made “in their name”? tried means other than the bomb to force did not know that We planned to discuss the topic of com- Japan to surrender in World War II.10 It memoration: How have Americans com- is worth noting that the latter poll was Hiroshima was the memorated the use of the bomb? How has taken soon after the months-long barrage target of the first the tension between commemoration and of propaganda against the planned history played out in the media and in the Smithsonian exhibit.11 atomic bomb. conflict over the recently canceled

Photo: President Truman at Potsdam, July 26, 1945. Larousse Editions, Paris 33 Perhaps our students’ willingness to question American orthodoxies Smithsonian exhibit? How should we—as about Hiroshima cabinet (Henry Stimson and James Americans—remember Hiroshima? Byrnes), and General Leslie Groves (who We also considered issues of ethics reflects poll data directed the project that developed the and law: Are there ethical limits to the atomic bombs) with what scholars now conduct of war? What rights does an showing young know about the decision. The picture that enemy have in wartime? What did Americans to be less emerges is one of self-deception among American military leaders think of the American leaders and the willful mislead- atomic bombing of Hiroshima and supportive than older ing of the American public through sup- Nagasaki? How did the atomic scientists pression of information and the construc- view their role in the making and use of Americans of the tion of an official and misleading history the bomb? Is scientific research morally Hiroshima and of the decision to use the bomb. This offi- neutral, or do scientists have a particular cial history includes the infamous and social responsibility? Was the use of the Nagasaki bombings. endlessly repeated myth that the bomb atomic bomb a violation of international saved half a million or even a million law? These were the kind of tough, open- American lives. ended questions we wanted our students Our students also read a number of to grapple with for a semester.13 essays that take issue with Alperovitz’s The principal text for our course was interpretations. In one essay, for example, Gar Alperovitz’s 1995 book, The Barton Bernstein, a leading historian of Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the the bomb decision, argues that most Architecture of an American Myth.14 In American leaders did not question or addition, our students read John Hersey’s challenge the bomb’s use. For Truman, Hiroshima, nearly sixty essays and book the weapon, conceived under Franklin D. excerpts, several newspaper editorials, Roosevelt, appeared legitimate, and its and some poems. We also showed a brief use seemed necessary and desirable.16 documentary film and excerpts from tele- Another essay, emphasizing Japanese vision news programs. wartime fanaticism and questioning the The first half of Alperovitz’s book is seriousness of Japanese peace feelers, the most detailed and heavily documented defended President Truman’s decision to analysis to date of the decision to use the use atomic weapons.17 We also had as a atomic bomb.15 Alperovitz argues from guest speaker J. Samuel Walker, a histori- the documents that the atomic bombing of an who has surveyed recent scholarship Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not militari- on the atomic bomb decision.18 We ly necessary. Truman and his advisers thought it important that our students con- understood that a combination of Russian sider the interpretive nature of all history, entry into the Pacific war and an including Alperovitz’s book, and struggle American clarification of surrender terms with the ambiguity of historical evidence could in all likelihood have ended the war concerning the decision to use the atomic well before any planned American inva- bomb. sion of Japan. These options were put Most of our students were quite open aside, however, in favor of using the to questioning the dominant rationale for bomb, which was seen as a (postwar) the atomic bombings. Their responses trump card against the Russians. were less rigid than those generally found If the first half of Alperovitz’s book in the public at large, at least the public considers what we now know (and do not sentiment generally reported in the media. know) about the decision to use the atom- U. S. Navy press photo, November 27, 1945. Perhaps our students’ willingness to ques- Caption: “Officers of USS Appalachian view the ic bomb, the second half of the book damage at Hiroshima.” tion American orthodoxies about examines what the public was told (and Photographer unknown. Hiroshima reflects poll data showing not told) about the decision. Alperovitz young Americans to be less supportive contrasts public statements by President than older Americans of the Hiroshima Harry Truman, two key members of his and Nagasaki bombings.19 The greater

34 EDUCATION ABOUT ASIA Volume 2, Number 2 Fall 1997 The second theme concerned the state’s relation to civil society. Students saw the decision to use the atomic bomb openness of students to questioning the A third overarching theme concerned and the various ways top government offi- bombings might also be a function of the the ambiguity and uncertainty of histori- cials rationalized the decision as a lesson academic setting, which is somewhat cal interpretation. For some students a in how political elites attempt to stifle shielded from the heated rhetoric and semester of studying the atomic bomb public debate about questionable govern- media simplifications of the American decision raised more questions than it ment actions. One student commented public sphere. answered. One student stressed a major that we should shed our apathy and Initially, faced with Alperovitz’s difficulty involved in evaluating historical demand more accountability from govern- monumental scholarly work, students interpretations about the decision. ment officials. A second student added appeared to put aside whatever conven- Without personal familiarity with the that the media could play an important tional preconceptions they might have original historical documents, he won- role in both pressuring the government had about the bomb. Students at first will- dered, how can a reader evaluate the and in providing honest information about ingly refracted their understanding of conflicting interpretations put forth by Hiroshima. A third student expressed con- Hiroshima through Alperovitz’s frame- historians? In the face of uncertainty, he cern about undemocratic and overzealous work, but because Alperovitz stresses the said that he would give “orthodox” inter- government classification policies. ambiguity of some of the historical evi- pretations of the atomic bomb decision dence, and because we encouraged stu- the benefit of the doubt. Another student dents to seek as open and complex a pic- A number of our took a contrary position, arguing that ture of Hiroshima as possible, a number “revisionists,” such as Alperovitz, were of our students eventually voiced frustra- students responsible for disclosing a fuller and tion at the unresolvable nature of some more accurate history that made possible questions: What exactly was going eventually voiced serious debate about the decision. For a through the minds of Harry Truman and frustration at the third student, the course resulted in a shift his advisers regarding the use of the from accepting Hiroshima myths to bomb? How clearly and firmly were unresolvable nature accepting uncertainty about the bomb’s American officials laying out alternatives necessity. to the bomb’s use? What responsibility of some questions: Finally, a fourth theme concerned the did the Japanese leaders share in continu- What exactly was morality of the bombings. Interestingly, ing the war and bringing greater destruc- most of our students were reluctant to tion on Japan? These disturbing questions going through the make strong ethical claims. Statements remain unanswered. were often qualified with some version As these ambiguities surfaced and minds of Harry Truman of “It’s only my opinion, but . . .” Some remained unresolved, some students and his advisers students suggested that Hiroshima may be became less critical of the conventional justifiable, but nevertheless it should justifications for using the atomic bomb. regarding the use of never be repeated. Only one student, a As the semester progressed and we got self-declared pacifist, made consistent further away from Alperovitz’s book, the bomb? ethical arguments throughout the semes- questioning the bomb decision began to How clearly and firmly ter. In this last meeting, for example, he give way to uncertainty about what posi- offered the clearest ethical statement tion to hold on the use of the bomb. were American about Hiroshima: intentional targeting of During the final meeting of our class, civilians is immoral. Strikingly, little was we asked students to list the significant officials laying out said directly about the victims of the issues Hiroshima raised for them. Most alternatives to the A-bomb in our wrap-up discussion. This comments congealed around four broad may have been due to the largely issues that had come up repeatedly bomb’s use? American focus of our course, and possi- throughout the course. The first theme bly to the discomfort which many concerned Cold War rationales. A few stu- What responsibility Americans feel when presented with the dents less critical of the bomb based their did the Japanese testimony of hibakusha and other victims arguments on general Cold War grounds. of our government’s actions. Perhaps, to They felt that the bomb helped to contain leaders share in varying degrees, we all want to avoid Soviet ambitions in the Far East and else- confronting the human consequences of where and that this justified its use. continuing the war the atomic bombings. and bringing greater destruction on Japan? 35 NOTES 1. Only ten percent of the American public disap- proved of the bombing. See George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 1935–1971, Vol. I: 1935–1948. New York: Random House, and 35 percent did not know that Hiroshima was 1972, 521–22; and also, Public Opinion the target of the first atomic bomb. Quarterly 9 (Fall 1945): 385. 12. Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima urs is not the only recent course to 2. “The Fortune Survey,” Fortune, 32:6 (December in America: Fifty Years of Denial. New York: G. O 1945): 305. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995. examine the decision to use the atomic 3. See, for instance, Charles Glover, “Americans 13. For a useful, brief examination of the several bomb in detail. Classes that consider at Froze Day in Memory: Dec. 7 Became Point of facets involved in understanding and teaching the length the use of the atomic bomb in 1945 Reference for the Comings and Goings of Life,” atomic bombings, see Richard Minear, have recently been offered at a number of Atlanta Journal and Constitution, December 7, “Hiroshima, HIROSHIMA, ‘Hiroshima,’ 1991, A14; and James E. Romero, Jr., “No Hiroshima: The Event and Its Facets,” Education U.S. universities, including American Hiroshima, if Pearl Harbor Hadn’t Happened,” About Asia 1 (February 1996): 31–8. Minear University (Peter Kuznick), Stanford Santa Barbara News-Press, September 11, includes a very helpful bibliography of the recent University (Barton J. Bernstein), the 1994, G4. literature. 4. See, for instance, Paul Fussell, “Hiroshima: A 14. One of us (Maley), it should be noted, was a University of Massachusetts, Amherst Soldier’s View,” New Republic, August 22/29, researcher for this book. (Richard Minear), Tufts University (Martin 1981, 26–30. 15. For a judicious review of Alperovitz’s book, see Sherwin), and Birmingham-Southern 5. See, for example, J. Samuel Walker, “The Marilyn Young, review of Gar Alperovitz, “The College (Matthew Levey). Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Update,” Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): Architecture of an American Myth,” in American As important as we think it is, our 97–114. Historical Review 100 (December 1995): course, and others like it, are not adequate 6. See Tony Capaccio and Uday Mohan, “Missing 1515–16. vehicles to expose students to the the Target,” American Journalism Review, 16. Barton J. Bernstein, “The Atomic Bombings July/August 1995, 18–26; Uday Mohan and Reconsidered,” Foreign Affairs 74 (January/ complexity and ambiguity surrounding Sanho Tree, “Hiroshima, the American Media, February 1995): 135–52. the decision to use the atomic bomb. and the Construction of Conventional Wisdom,” 17. See, for instance, Robert James Maddox, “The Clearly, only a very small minority of uni- Journal of American-East Asian Relations 4 Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the (Summer 1995): 141–60, especially pp. 159–60; Atomic Bomb,” American Heritage, May/June versity students will ever take a class that and Uday Mohan and Leo Maley III, “Orthodoxy 1995, 71–7. considers Hiroshima in any depth. and Dissent: The American News Media and the 18. J. Samuel Walker, “The Decision to Use the Unfortunately, American high school and Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan, Atomic Bomb: A Historiographical Update,” 1945–1995,” in Cultural Difference, Media college history textbooks generally do a Diplomatic History 14 (Winter 1990): 97–114. A Memories: Anglo-American Images of Japan, ed. slightly different and updated version of this poor job when it comes to their treatment Phil Hammond. London and Washington: essay appears in Michael J. Hogan, ed., of the decision to use the atomic bomb.20 It Cassell, 1997. Hiroshima in History and Memory. Cambridge: is important, therefore, that those who use 7. Andre Ryerson, “The Cult of Hiroshima,” Cambridge University Press, 1996. Commentary 80 (October 1985): 36–40; Robert 19. See, for instance, Fred Bruning and Jee-Young textbooks in their survey courses on P. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult. Shin, “Truman’s Decision: Do LIers [Long American, Japanese, and world history East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, Islanders] Agree? Poll Results Vary Widely By incorporate into their course lectures the 1995; R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., “Hiroshima and the Age,” Sunday Newsday (Long Island, New Hectoring Herd,” Washington Times, September York), July 16, 1995, A4, A45; Kristin E. research findings and arguments found in 2, 1994, A18. Also, rather than being judged on Hussey, “Hiroshima, Nagasaki a Mystery to the recent historiographical debate on the its merits, history critical of the atomic bombings Americans,” Washington Times, March 3, 1995; bomb decision.21 In addition, two excellent is often accused of being a product of 1960s divi- and Barton J. Bernstein, “The Struggle Over sions over the Vietnam War. See, for instance, History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative,” in essay collections (not yet available when Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., “. . . Or Hiroshima Cult,” Judgment at the Smithsonian, ed. Philip Nobile. we taught our course) are likely to facilitate Washington Post, February 4, 1995, A17. New York: Marlowe and Company, 1995, 202. teaching about Hiroshima as a politically 8. Peter Blute, quoted in Saito Michio, “Skimming 20. J. Samuel Walker, “History, Collective Memory, over the Mushroom Clouds: The Saga of the 22 and the Decision to Use the Bomb,” in Michael and culturally contested event. Beyond Atomic-Bomb Exhibit,” Japan Echo (Summer Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory. these few suggestions, we believe that 1995): 68. Congressman Blute also declared that 21. In addition to the Alperovitz volume, we recom- teaching possibilities on this topic are near- “the decision to drop the atomic bomb was . . . a mend reading the essays collected in Michael J. morally unambiguous decision . . . ” Peter Blute, ly endless, and we look forward to hearing Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory, “Revisionist History Has Few Defenders,” especially those by J. Samuel Walker, Barton J. about others’ experiences in bringing Technology Review, August/September 1995, 52. Bernstein, and Herbert Bix. For a defense of the 9. Only 53 percent approved. Gallup Poll Monthly, Hiroshima into American classrooms. n atomic bomb decision see Robert J. Maddox, August 1990, 33. Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision 10. Kristin E. Hussey, “Hiroshima, Nagasaki a Fifty Years Later. Columbia, MO: University of Mystery to Americans,” Washington Times, Missouri Press, 1995. LEO MALEY III is a graduate student in history March 3, 1995. 22. See Edward Linenthal and Tom Engelhardt, eds., at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 11. Both polls also showed American loss of memory History Wars: The Enola Gay and Other Battles He lectures and writes about American about World War II. The 1990 poll, for example, for the American Past. New York: Metropol- responses to the use of the atomic bomb. indicated that one in four Americans did not itan/Henry Holt, 1996; and Laura Hein and Mark UDAY MOHAN is a graduate student in histo- recall that an atomic bomb had been used against Selden, eds., Living with the Bomb: American ry at American University in Washington, D.C. an enemy in wartime. The 1995 poll showed that and Japanese Cultural Conflicts in the Nuclear His work focuses on the ways the American 60 percent did not know that Truman was the Age. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997. media have dealt with the atomic bombings president who authorized the atomic bombings, of Japan for the last fifty years.

36 EDUCATION ABOUT ASIA Volume 2, Number 2 Fall 1997