Western Intelligence, Libyan Covert Actions, and Palestinian Terrorism (1973-74) Guttmann, Aviva
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University of Southern Denmark Turning oil into blood Western intelligence, Libyan covert actions, and Palestinian terrorism (1973-74) Guttmann, Aviva Published in: Journal of Strategic Studies DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1868995 Publication date: 2021 Document version: Final published version Document license: CC BY-NC-ND Citation for pulished version (APA): Guttmann, A. (2021). Turning oil into blood: Western intelligence, Libyan covert actions, and Palestinian terrorism (1973-74). Journal of Strategic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1868995 Go to publication entry in University of Southern Denmark's Research Portal Terms of use This work is brought to you by the University of Southern Denmark. Unless otherwise specified it has been shared according to the terms for self-archiving. 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Sep. 2021 Journal of Strategic Studies ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjss20 Turning oil into blood: Western intelligence, Libyan covert actions, and Palestinian terrorism (1973-74) Aviva Guttmann To cite this article: Aviva Guttmann (2021): Turning oil into blood: Western intelligence, Libyan covert actions, and Palestinian terrorism (1973-74), Journal of Strategic Studies, DOI: 10.1080/01402390.2020.1868995 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1868995 © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. Published online: 14 Jan 2021. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 457 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fjss20 JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1868995 ARTICLE Turning oil into blood: Western intelligence, Libyan covert actions, and Palestinian terrorism (1973-74) Aviva Guttmann Marie Sklodowska-Curie Senior Research Fellow Center for War Studies, Southern Denmark University, Odense, Denmark ABSTRACT How can multilateral liaison be used as a tool to counter state-sponsored terrorism? This article analyses cooperation among 18 Western European intel ligence agencies to counter Libyan-Palestinian terrorism in Europe in the early 1970s. Two arguments are presented. Concerning Western perceptions of Palestinian-Libyan operations, the article argues that the intelligence reports overestimated Libyan influence over Palestinian actions. Concerning intelli gence cooperation, the article argues that intelligence was shared to collec tively understand the threat posed by Libya but also to send implicit political messages. The article is based on unprecedented access to records from a multilateral liaison called the Club de Berne. KEYWORDS Intelligence; covert action; security cooperation; intelligence-sharing; Club de Berne; threat perception; state-supported terrorism; counterterrorism; Muamar al-Qaddafi; Europe, Middle East 17 December 1973 was a bloody day at Rome Fiumicino airport. After ten armed terrorists shot indiscriminately at people in the waiting hall, a Pan American plane was attacked and caught fire1. Exits were blocked, and 27 passengers were killed in the flames. The perpetrators hijacked another plane and escaped. After this attack, security agencies from 18 countries shared intelligence to find out more about who might have been behind this attack. Gradually, it crystallised that this was a Libyan-Palestinian terrorist attack. State-supported Palestinian terrorism or a form of Libyan covert operation seemed to have happened – a dangerous and worrying development in the eyes of the intelligence agencies. This article focuses on these intelligence exchanges and the agencies’ perceptions of this Libyan-Palestinian secret warfare. It specifically examines the early 1970s: a time between Muammar al-Qaddafi’s ascent to power and his increasingly bold leadership aspirations in the Arab world. A time of CONTACT Aviva Guttmann [email protected] Marie Sklodowska-Curie Senior Research Fellow, Center for War Studies, Southern Denmark University, Campusvej 55, 5230 Odense M, Denmark 1This article leaves the term ‘terrorism’ in its original context and uses the term in accordance with what the intelligence officers at the time meant by it. © 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way. 2 A. GUTTMANN intense divisions within the Palestinian movement. A time also when Western European and Euro-Israeli intelligence-sharing mechanisms emerged to counter Palestinian terrorism. In 1971, Western European intelligence agen cies established a secret communication system to share intelligence about Palestinian armed groups. Because Qaddafi was believed to have used radi calised Palestinian refugees for his operations, Western intelligence became increasingly concerned with Libyan involvement in the Palestinian armed struggle. The framework for this secret communication channel was a liaison called the Club de Berne. The Club de Berne was a multilateral liaison of intelligence agencies from nine Western European countries and nine extra-European partners (includ ing Mossad, Shin Bet, and the FBI).2 This liaison was created in 1969 and still today hosts an important informal counterterrorism intelligence-sharing fra mework among Western intelligence agencies.3 The goal of the Club de Berne was to ensure an effective exchange of information and knowledge about terrorism and espionage. In June 1971, a system to alert against Palestinian terrorist attacks was introduced, which became operational in October 1971. All nine Western European Club de Berne members and nine partner agencies participated in the encrypted telex system.4 To this day, the Club de Berne remains an extremely secretive liaison and very little is known about its operations.5 It is very rare for researchers to obtain access to the sources of a multilateral intelligence liaison, especially where one can see exactly what was shared by which agency. This article thus provides unique insights into Western security cooperation. The sources were accessed in the Swiss Federal Archives in Bern. Through a special request to consult the Club de Berne files I obtained full unredacted access to all cables that were sent under the Club de Berne alerting system from October 1971 onwards.6 The source material for this article includes the daily 2For an account about the creation of the Club de Berne and its cooperation mechanisms in the 1970s see my monograph, Aviva Guttmann, The Origins of International Counterterrorism. Switzerland at the Forefront of Crisis Negotiations, Multilateral Diplomacy, and Intelligence Cooperation (1969–1977) (Leiden: Brill 2018), part III is about the Club der Berne. 3For an account about the Club der Berne’s function today, see Oldrich Bures, ‘Informal counterterrorism arrangements in Europe: Beauty by variety or duplicity by abundance?’ Cooperation and Conflict 47/4 (2012), 495–518, 502; and John D. Occhipinti, ‘Still Moving Toward a European FBI? Re-Examining the Politics of EU Police Cooperation’, Intelligence and National Security 30/2 (2015), 234–58, 241. 4In alphabetical order, the countries that were part of the Club de Berne alerting system were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA, West Germany. The Club de Berne members used the code word Kilowatt for their encrypted messages. 5For a journalistic investigation about the Club de Berne today, and its development into a near- institutionalised multilateral liaison, see Jan Jirát and Lorenz Naegeli, ‘Der geheime Club der geheimen Dienste’, Wochenzeitung, 5 Marc. 2020 and the translation into English, ‘The Club de Berne: a black box of growing intelligence cooperation,’ in about intel, https://aboutintel.eu/the-club-de-berne/. 6The Club de Berne members had agreed to send all messages to the entire group. (Today’s equivalent would be to ‘copy in’ everyone in an email). Therefore it is possible to understand cooperation as a whole by consulting the cables that the Swiss received and sent in the Club de Berne. THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES 3 correspondence among the Club de Berne liaison before, during, and after two Libyan-Palestinian terrorist attacks in 1973. This correspondence includes threat assessments, warnings, and the results of police investigations after terrorist attacks, as well as intelligence about the members of terrorist groups, their operational methods, and their tactical innovations. In short, it com prised what an agency deemed relevant and necessary for another agency to know to enable it